FY 1998 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY, 03/18/1997, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19971024
- Chairperson:
- J. Myers
- Committee:
- House Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- T970318B
- Hearing Date:
- 19970318
- DOE Lead Office:
- NN
SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1998 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
- Witness Name:
- K.Baker
-
Hearing Text:
-
Statement of Kenneth E. Baker
Acting Director
Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
U.S. Department of Energy
FY 1998 Appropriations Hearings
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. It is
my pleasure to address you today as the Acting Director of the Office
of Nonproliferation and National Security at the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE).
PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES FACING THE UNITED STATES
The worldwide proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
and their missile delivery systems has emerged as one of the most
serious dangers confronting the United States. In November 1994 and
every year since, President Clinton has stated that, "The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States." The President also declared
the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and of
the means of delivering such weapons a national emergency through
Executive Order 12938.
As one of the United States Government's highest priorities, we
must proactively address this problem that has broad consequences for
international security and stability. At least 20 countries some of
them hostile to the United States already have or may be developing
WMD through the acquisition of dual-use technology, indigenous
development and production, and/or support from rogue supplier states.
Additionally, safety and security of existing nuclear weapons and
materials are of increasing concern as economic and social pressures
mount in countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus.
With the breakdown of the protection systems that secured nuclear
materials in the former Soviet Union, states and subnational groups
that do not have their own nuclear material production facilities or
civilian nuclear programs may obtain nuclear materials through theft
and smuggling. This illicit path to proliferation has become an area
of great concern and attention for the national security community.
Additionally, we must be concerned with the growing threat from
terrorism and the potential use of nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons. As we have seen over the past year, terrorist groups are
showing a greater capability to use large-scale weapons to achieve
their goal chemical weapons were used by terrorists in Japan for
example. The United States must have programs in place to combat and
prevent these kinds of weapons from being acquired or used.
ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The Department of Energy and the Office of Nonproliferation and
National Security continue to demonstrate to the world community the
Administration's commitment to nonproliferation and reducing the
threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Our responsibility to
reduce the danger to U.S. national security from such weapons involves
preventing the spread of WMD materials, technology, and expertise;
detecting the proliferation of WMD worldwide; reversing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities; and responding to
emergencies. We particularly draw upon 50 years of science and
technology expertise resident throughout the DOE National Laboratory
complex to help us achieve these goals. Today, I would like to
highlight some of our key programs as well as new initiatives.
The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program
in the former Soviet Union (FSU) seeks to provide enhanced protection
and security for weapons-usable nuclear materials in FSU facilities,
cooperatively strengthen indigenous MPC&A systems, and develop more
effective standardized regulatory programs. This MPC&A program is
part of our overall Arms Control and Nonproliferation effort that also
seeks to limit the use of fissile materials worldwide, establish
transparent and irreversible nuclear arms reductions, strengthen the
nonproliferation regime, and control nuclear related exports.
The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, formerly
known as the Industrial Partnering Program, draws scientists,
engineers, and technicians from the FSU nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons programs into commercial ventures. Through this
program, we are able to reduce the potential for "brain drain" to
proliferant states or organizations and provide long term employment
for these scientists in non-weapons work. Additionally, the program
facilitates broad access of U.S. laboratory personnel to FSU chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons facilities encouraging openness and
transparency. Cooperative projects involving the ten largest DOE
National Laboratories, a coalition of 75 U.S. corporations, and over
70 weapons institutes of the nuclear inheritor states of the former
Soviet Union have engaged more than 2700 former weapons personnel in
the FSU.
Our Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
program is dedicated to conducting applied research, development,
testing, and evaluation of science and technology for strengthening
the United States response to the threats to national security and to
world peace. The program focusses its activities on the development,
design, and production of operational sensor systems needed for
proliferation detection, treaty monitoring, nuclear warhead
dismantlement initiatives, and support to intelligence activities.
The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program complements
our significant effort in nuclear weapons nonproliferation. By
leveraging the Department's more than $1 billion investment in
chemical and biological sciences, our program seeks to complement
efforts of the Department of Defense, the Public Health Service, and
other U.S. Government agencies. The program supports long term
research and development and near term technology prototyping to
address mission needs in counterterrorism, military operations, and
policy and treaty support.
In concert with our international activities, we are responsible
for wide-ranging activities to accomplish nonproliferation and
national security goals in the United States. These activities
include: (1) directing a rigorous nuclear safeguards and security
program for the entire Department of Energy complex, thereby ensuring
the demonstrated security of our own nuclear materials, technology,
and expertise; (2) declassifying millions of Departmental documents
while protecting critical information that has the potential to
facilitate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (3)
maintaining a security investigations program for both Federal and
contractor employees of the Department; and (4) managing and
strengthening the Department's emergency management and response
capability and providing assistance to other government agencies as
well as state, tribal, and local governments.
The Office of Nonproliferation and National Security also
supports the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection to address growing concerns about domestic terrorist
activities and both physical security and cyber threats to eight
infrastructures that are increasingly dependent on technology and
information (Telecommunication, Electrical Power Systems, Gas and Oil,
Banking and Finance, Transportation, Water Supply Systems, Emergency
Services, and Continuity of Government).
Finally, through our Counterintelligence Enhancement Initiative,
we are redoubling efforts to protect sensitive national security
technologies, expertise, and information from foreign intelligence
services. We have increased our counterintelligence presence in the
field, expanded awareness and training, and are aggressively pursuing
counterintelligence leads and anomalies.
OUR SUCCESSES AND PLANNED ACTIVITIES
Over the past year, the Office of Nonproliferation and National
Security has achieved major successes in nonproliferation. I would
like to highlight five particular areas of which I am personally very
proud of our achievements.
In 1996, the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program
secured hundreds of tons of weapons-usable materials at over 35
facilities in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union.
Cooperation is now underway at over 40 locations in Russia, and
expanded cooperation in 1997 will include all weapons-usable nuclear
material at all known facilities in the FSU, accelerated work with the
Russian Navy, the addition of four new Ministry of Atomic Energy
(MINATOM) facilities, and accelerated transportation security
enhancements. Fiscal Year 1998 efforts will include: increased
equipment procurements; funding additional work at Krasnoyarsk-45;
accelerating ongoing work throughout the MINATOM defense complex;
extending naval fuel work to cover the icebreaker fleet, naval support
ships, and the transportation of naval nuclear fuel; and fully
implementing efforts to improve MPC&A for nuclear materials during
transportation.
Second, the Office played a key role in achieving the indefinite
and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
the negotiation and signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). Our technology development program focuses on supporting
operations to monitor and verify a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
has completed its second year. DOE technologies will significantly
increase the nation's capability to identify potential nuclear
explosions with high confidence and with minimal false alarms. The
primary objectives of the CTBT monitoring system are to deter nuclear
explosions in all environments (underground, underwater, or in the
atmosphere) and, if such an explosion does occur, to detect, locate,
and identify its source. The system is designed to provide credible
evidence to national authorities, to aid in resolving ambiguities, and
to serve as the basis for appropriate action. Seismic, radionuclide,
hydroacoustic, infrasound, on-site inspection, and data processing
technologies are all being exploited. During the summer of 1997, we
plan to launch the FORTE small satellite on an Air Force Space Test
Program provided Pegasus XL launch vehicle. FORTE will demonstrate
the next generation techniques for detecting and characterizing
electromagnetic pulses from nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.
This new technology will provide the U. S. with improved capability to
monitor compliance with nuclear test ban treaties.
Third, our new Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program,
initiated in Fiscal Year 1997, has been developing technologies to
detect, characterize, and facilitate decontamination of chemical and
biological threat agents. In 1998, we will expanding our emergency
management capabilities to provide critical information necessary for
an effective response to chemical and biological incidents.
Specifically we will be improving the Atmospheric Release Advisory
Capability to address chemical and biological plumes in addition to
the current radiological capability. We will also be enhancing the
Communicated Threat Assessment Program to provide assessments of
chemical and biological threats in addition to nuclear threats.
Fourth, our program to counter nuclear smuggling is part of a
partnership with other federal agencies to counter the theft of and
trafficking in special nuclear materials. Our program overlays
(1) barriers to illegal diversion of fissile and radiological
materials at their source through the MPC&A program, (2) detection and
interdiction of materials during transit and at international borders,
and (3) response to threatened or actual use of these materials. Over
the past year, we have developed technologies such as the Radiation
Pager that will assist U.S. Customs Service and law enforcement
personnel detect the presence of nuclear materials during transit. We
are working with foreign customs agencies to increase the potential
points of detection worldwide. We have also demonstrated the
capabilities of the National Laboratories to determine the source of
smuggled nuclear materials through forensic techniques. The Office
also is working with the Department of State to implement forensics
worldwide. In Fiscal Year 1998, the Office plans to provide
customized versions of equipment now used at DOE facilities to improve
security at U.S. borders. We also expect to develop highly portable
and inexpensive radiation detection technology for city and state law
enforcement and other emergency personnel.
Finally, our intelligence program continues to focus the decades
of laboratory experience in nuclear weapons design and production on
the emerging national security challenges of today. This program
provides vital intelligence support to Administration and Departmental
priorities, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Reduced
Enrichment Research and Test Reactor program, and our MPC&A
activities. We put cost-effective, user-friendly technologies in the
hands of intelligence, military, and law enforcement operators. Our
nonproliferation objectives are best served by timely and well-focused
intelligence assessments.
The efforts of the Office of Nonproliferation and National
Security in concert with DOE's National Laboratories are achieving
direct, tangible results that significantly improve our national
security.
FY98 BUDGET REVIEW
The table below summarizes the Fiscal Year 1998 budget request
for the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security from the
Energy and Water Development Appropriation as compared with the fiscal
year 1996 adjusted appropriation (in thousands).
Appropriation/Activity FY 96 FY97FY98
appropriated appropriated
Nonproliferation and Verification
Research and Development $ 241,495 $ 211,919 $
210,000
Arms Control and Nonproliferation 174,981 216,244
234,600
Intelligence 42,256
34,185 33,600
Nuclear Safeguards and Security 86,397
47,208 47,200
Security Investigations 20,000
20,000 20,000
Emergency Management 23,321
16,794 27,700
Program Direction 88,122
94,900
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST$ 588,450 $ 634,472 $ 668,000
The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
budget request for Fiscal Year 1998 is a net decrease of $1.9 million.
Funding is increased for the chemical and biological nonproliferation
program and the nuclear smuggling/terrorism initiative. The increases
are offset by reductions to remote spectrographic technologies for
proliferation detection and materials detection research and
development programs.
The Arms Control and Nonproliferation budget requests reflects a
continued increase in nonproliferation activities with the FSU as
cooperation increases for Materials Protection, Control, and
Accounting activities. The MPC&A program is expediting the
installation of systems, procedures, controls, facilities, and
equipment to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons-usable fissile
materials. The request also increases funding for the nuclear
smuggling/terrorism initiative. The increases are offset by
reductions to other Arms Control programs.
The Intelligence budget request reflects a minor net decrease
from Fiscal Year 1997, although we are increasing funding for the
nuclear smuggling/terrorism and counterintelligence initiatives.
The Nuclear Safeguards and Security budget request is overall
unchanged from Fiscal Year 1997. Funding has been provided for the
nuclear smuggling/terrorism initiative through offsets in other
Nuclear Safeguards and Security programs.
The Emergency Management budget request increases funding for the
chemical and biological nonproliferation initiative and for the
nuclear smuggling/terrorism initiative. Additionally, funding is
provided for the transfer of the Department's Communication Center
from the Office of Human Resources and Administration and provides for
the transfer of Threat Assessment funding from the Intelligence
budget.
The Program Direction request supports core staffing requirements
for the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security and restores
funding for support service contracts which were reduced as a result
of the Fiscal Year 1997 appropriation. This funding will be used to
meet requirements for the Declassification Initiative, Safeguards and
Security, Arms Control, Research and Development, and other
nonproliferation activities.
CONCLUSION
Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a crucial
national interest and a critical global security issue. The Office of
Nonproliferation and National Security is uniquely capable to serve
this national interest. Our policy expertise coupled with our science
and technology base enables us to provide innovative solutions to
national and international nonproliferation problems. The work we do
benefits the nation's security across a broad spectrum: protecting
nuclear material in the United States and worldwide; rolling back
existing nuclear weapons development programs internationally;
ensuring the verifiability of nuclear treaties; and responding to
emergencies. We are proud to be leaders working aggressively within
the U.S. Government and in the international arena to make the world a
safer place. Thank you.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
