Introduction
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor and great pleasure to appear before your subcommittee to
testify on the nuclear situation in Russia. Certain developments in Russia pose increasing
nuclear danger to the United States, and I appreciate the opportunity to draw Congressional
and public attention to them.
Two trends are especially prejudicial to our security. First, Russian security policy
continues to shift toward an exclusive emphasis on nuclear weapons. Russian planners rely
more than ever on these weapons, on their widespread dispersal, and on their first use in a
crisis. Second, Russian control over its nuclear arsenal is tottering on the brink of collapse,
raising the specter of the accidental, illicit and inadvertent use, or the theft, of Russian nuclear
weapons and fissile materials. This is a deadly combination fraught with risk. Growing
reliance on intentional quick use in a crisis and growing susceptibility to unintentional use
means that the nuclear situation is more unstable and perilous today than it was during the
Cold War. And it cannot be endured indefinitely. Russia's nuclear circuits are too
overloaded to count on them not blowing sometime in the future. It is not at all unreasonable
to anticipate a catastrophic failure of Russian nuclear command and control.
This less than rosy assessment challenges the prevailing wisdom within the U.S.
government, but the assessment rests on a considerable body of evidence. Let me elaborate
on a part of the thesis.
We all know that Russia grew more dependent on nuclear weapons following the
disintegration of its regular conventional army. That puts Russia's nuclear doctrine and
strategy in the spotlight, where two disturbing strands are evident.
First-use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons
One of these strands is the growing expectation among Russian planners that they
could be forced to initiate the use of tactical or theater nuclear forces during a regional crisis
involving NATO or China. This doctrinal shift abandoning their no-first-use pledge of 1982
became evident in Russia's draft military doctrine in May 1992, a shift confirmed by Russia's
new doctrine officially promulgated in November 1993. Defense Minister Rodionov has long
been a proponent of such change, and by all accounts the forthcoming revision of Russian
military doctrine will codify the change. Recent statements from senior Russian security
officials including the Security Council Secretary, Ivan Rybkin, and President Yeltsin's
Defense Advisor, Yuri Baturin, leave little doubt on this score. In short the tables have
turned on Russia. It plans for compensate for conventional inferiority with nuclear weapons.
This growing reliance on nuclear weapons might cause Russia to reverse course on
tactical weapons consolidation, redeploying them on ships at sea, particularly on the Baltic
and Black Sea Fleets, on tactical aircraft, and on a new short-range tactical missile now being
tested. Many of these tactical forces could wind up deployed along Russian borders, in
Kaliningrad, and in Byelorus. Such dispersal not only might lower the threshold for their
intentional use during a crisis, but it also would compromise operational safety. Of all the
types of weapons, tactical nuclear weapons unfortunately have the poorest safeguards. Those
built before the early 1980s lack the safety locks known as permissive action links. Further
dispersal of Russia's 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons beyond the many dozens of depots
already in use would represent a serious setback for operational safety as well as safeguards
against theft.
Launch on Warning/First-Use of Strategic Nuclear Forces
The second disturbing strand in Russian strategy concerns the strategic nuclear forces,
whose main option today is launch on warning -- that is, launching strategic missiles after an
enemy missile attack is detected, but before the incoming enemy missiles arrive. Assessments
by the Russian General Staff conclude that if their strategic forces are not launched on
warning, then only a small fraction, and possibly none at all, would be able to retaliate after
absorbing a systematic attack. This estimate partially reflects the steep decline in the combat
readiness of Russia's least vulnerable forces -- submarines at sea and mobile ICBMs in the
field. But it also reflects Russian fear of D-5 missiles on U.S. Trident submarines, whose
high accuracy and short flight times reinforce Russian reliance on quick launch, at the same
time that they threaten to deny Russia that option.
Russia's heavy reliance on this option means that its early warning and nuclear release
procedures require a response time of 15 minutes in total; they allow only three or four
minutes for detecting an attack, and another 3 or 4 minutes for top level decision making.
The Russian command system is thoroughly geared to operate within these constraints of time,
and we have observed it practicing the option during numerous exercises.
Its obvious this is not a safe operational practice. It's inherently dangerous, and it's
compounded by the deterioration of Russia's command-control system and missile attack early warning network, which are falling on hard times like the rest of the military infrastructure. To illustrate, recall the serious false alarm in January 1995, triggered by the firing of a Norwegian scientific rocket, which for the first time in Russian history triggered a strategic alert of their LOW forces, an emergency nuclear decision conference involving their President and other national command authorities, and the activation of their famous nuclear suitcases.
The Russian General Staff can exercise its nuclear quick draw in either of two ways.
One is by sending unlock and launch authorization codes directly to individual weapons
commanders, who then perform the launch procedures. (The General Staff and the KGB
evidently shared joint custody of these codes at the General Staff war rooms until after the
1991 coup attempt. Today, the General Staff alone possesses these codes under normal
peacetime conditions; plans exist to extensively distribute the codes and pre-delegated launch
authority down the chain of military command during a nuclear crisis.) Or, the General Staff
can personally push the launch button from war rooms in the Moscow vicinity. This is a
remote, robotic-like launch of land-based strategic missiles that would totally bypass the
subordinate commanders and missile launch crews down the chain of command. In any case,
nearly 2,000 strategic warheads on launch-ready alert, mostly on silo-based missiles but
partially on alert submarines on the surface at piers, could be fired on warning.
Russian planners recognize the difficulty of launching on true warning as well as the
danger of launching on false warning. The pressure on the command system under such tight
time constraints is certainly acute. To relieve some of this pressure, Russia has several
options.
First, it could shift toward a policy of preemptive strike, a first-strike strategy for the
strategic forces that would complement the ongoing gravitation of military doctrine toward the
first use of tactical nuclear forces. This preemptive option holds out significant appeal to
some strategic planners (probably a distinct minority).
Another response would be to fine-tune launch on warning by further streamlining the
authorization process. Let us hope Russia does not go so far as to adopt the kinds of
extraordinary measures considered during the early 1980s to cope with the perceived threat of decapitation posed by Pershing II missiles. For example, the Soviets developed and tested a command link meant to give the top political leadership push-button launch control over a
portion of their ICBM force, bypassing even the General Staff, in order to shave off a few
minutes of launch reaction time. Such short-cuts are obviously dangerous in the extreme.
A response designed to mitigate the danger of launching on false warning has already
been adopted. Russia devised a back-up method of launch known as Perimeter, which they
colloquially call the "dead hand." If top leaders do not get a clear picture of an apparent
missile attack, or if for any reason they fail to give timely authorization to retaliate, the
General Staff can activate this system to ensure quasi-automatic retaliation in the event of
their decapitation.
Status of Russian Strategic Missile Detargeting
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have created the widespread impression that U.S. and
Russian strategic missiles no longer pose an immediate nuclear threat to each country's
population because of an agreement signed in early 1994 to stop aiming those missiles at one
another after May 1994. In reality, the steps they took to implement their pledge were
entirely cosmetic and symbolic. Neither removed the wartime aim points from their missiles
portfolios of preprogrammed targets. Neither lengthened the amount of time needed to
initiate a deliberate missile strike. And the risk and consequences of an accidental or
unauthorized launch were not significantly affected by their pledge.
So what actually has been done to honor the agreement? In the case of Russia, no one
knows for sure because no provision was made for verification. But let me clarify some of
the crucial details based on my research findings.
To fulfill their obligations, the Russian military set their intercontinental missiles on
what they call a "zero flight plan." This setting sounds good, but it is nothing more than a
symbolic gesture because the missiles' memory banks still retain their wartime aimpoints.
(Each missile stores several targets in memory.) If Russia decides to launch strategic rockets,
a single order sent from Moscow to the rockets over an automated computer network is all
that it would take to reprogram all of them for their wartime targets. The time required for
this retargeting is a scant ten seconds.
To be more specific, the Russian General Staff, from their wartime command posts in
Moscow, Chekhov, Penza and elsewhere, can use a computer network called Signal-A to
override the Clinton-Yeltsin de-targeting agreement and re-aim all their silo-based missiles at
the United States in 10 seconds.
And what if a strategic missile is launched accidentally or illicitly? At the moment of
launch, it automatically would switch from its "zero flight plan" back to its primary wartime
target, which might be Chicago, a Minuteman silo in Montana, London, Paris, or Beijing,
among other possible destinations. In short, Russia did nothing to diminish its missile threat
to the United States. On the available evidence, it is wrong to suggest otherwise. (Let me
note parenthetically that U.S. missiles can be re-aimed at Russia just as quickly, and that a
U.S. missile launched by mistake will not fly to its Cold War target but instead will land in
the ocean. In the event of an illicit U.S. launch, the missiles could easily be re-targeted for
their wartime destinations.)
Conclusion
The moral of the story is that our nuclear security remains entwined with Russia's
nuclear doctrine, strategy, operational practices and safeguards. We need to make
fundamental changes in U.S. policy to get real traction on the danger of weakening nuclear
control in Russia, a danger that in my opinion vastly exceeds the danger that Russia would
ever launch a deliberate attack. To reduce Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons, their
extensive dispersal, and "hair-trigger" posture, we must cooperate to develop mutual
confidence and strengthen mutual security. Various means of passive and active protection
from this danger, particularly national ballistic missile defense, also need to be thoroughly
examined and evaluated.
Note:
In accordance with House Rule XI, Clause 2 (g), Bruce G. Blair received $0 in federal grants
and contracts during the past three fiscal years. He does not represent, but is affiliated with,
the Brookings Institution. His views are personal, not official Brookings' views. The
Brookings Institution received approximately $400,000 (2% of its annual budget) in federal
grants and contracts during each of the past three fiscal years. None of these funds were in
support of the Foreign Policy Program of the Brookings Institution to which Bruce Blair is
assigned.
CURRICULUM VITAE
BRUCE G. BLAIR
CURRENT POSITION Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings
Institution, since 1987.
Expertise: U.S. nuclear security policy; U.S. and foreign
nuclear forces, command control, and safeguards; Russian
security and foreign policy; arms control; nuclear proliferation;
ballistic missile defense.
PREVIOUS POSITIONS Visiting Lecturer, Public and International Affairs, The
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 1989.
Visiting Professor, Political Science, Yale University, 1988.
Consultant, Cornell University and the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, 1985-86.
Project Director, National Military Command System
Architecture, Department of Defense, 1985.
Project Director, Office of Technology Assessment, United
States Congress, 1982-1985.
Research Fellow/Assistant/Associate, Foreign Policy Studies
Program, Brookings Institution, 1977-1982.
EDUCATION Ph.D., Operations Research, Yale University, 1984.
Course work in operations research; statistics and decision
sciences; game theory; policy analysis; economics; and national
security. Qualified for Ph.D. candidacy in: (1) microeconomics
and game theory (2) multivariate statistics and econometrics
and (3) policy analysis.
M.Phil., Operations Research, Yale University, 1977.
M.B.A. Program (42 semester hours), University of Montana,
1972-74.
B.S., Communications, University of Illinois, 1970.
HONORS
AND AWARDS 1986, W. J. Baird Award.
1986, Edgar S. Furniss Award.
Brookings Institution Research Fellowship, 1977.
Yale University Beach Fellowship, 1979.
Yale University Graduate Fellowship, 1975-77.
Yale Foreign Language Institute Fellowship (Russian).
MILITARY Minuteman Launch Control Officer, Malmstrom Air Force
Base,
EXPERIENCE Montana, 1972-74.
Aide to Wing Commander, 55th Strategic Reconnaissance
Wing, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, 1971-72.
PUBLICATIONS
Books Deep Cuts in Nuclear Forces. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, forthcoming.
Ballistic Missile Defense in the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, forthcoming.
Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces. Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1995.
The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War. Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1993.
Crisis Stability and Nuclear War. London: Oxford University
Press, 1988. Co-editor with Kurt Gottfried.
Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986. (1986
Edgar S. Furniss Award)
Progress in Arms Control? Selected Readings from Scientific
American. San Francisco: Freeman, 1979. Co-editor with Bruce
Russett.
Articles and
Chapters in Books
(Since 1990) "Where Would All the Missiles Go?" Washington Post,
October 15, 1996.
"Who's Got the Button?" Washington Post, September 29,
1996.
"Russian Control of Nuclear Weapons," in George Quester,
ed., The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of
Eurasia. London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995.
"Four Trillion and Counting," The Nuclear Weapons Cost
Study Project Committee, Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., in Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, November/December, 1995.
"Russian Realities and the Illusion of Arms Control," Christian
Science Monitor, September 19, 1995.
"And the Moral Price of Nuclear Peace," Washington Post,
August 10, 1995.
"Lengthening the Fuse," Brookings Review, Summer 1995
(Reprinted in Congressional Record, August 1, 1995).
"IAEA: Mission Impossible?" Brookings Review, Summer 1994.
"Dismantle Armageddon," (with Henry W. Kendall), New York
Times, May 21, 1994.
"Nuclear Inadvertence: Theory and Evidence," Security Studies,
Spring 1994.
"Russia's Doomsday Machine," New York Times, October 8,
1993.
"Ukraine's Nuclear Backlash," Brookings Review, Summer 1993.
"Lighten Up on Ukraine," New York Times, June 1, 1993.
"Break-up of the U.S.S.R.: Whither Nuclear Control?",
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall 1992.
"Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards through Arms Control," in
The Future of Arms Control: New Opportunities, report for the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Congressional
Research Service, Committee Print, 102 Cong. 2 sess. GPO,
April 1992.
"Accidental Nuclear War," (with Henry W. Kendall), Scientific
American, December 1990.
"The Effects of Warning On Strategic Stability," (with John D.
Steinbruner), Brookings Occasional Paper, June 1990.
TESTIMONY to CONGRESS and U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
"Nuclear Danger and the Former Soviet Union," Loose Nukes,
Nuclear Smuggling, and the Fissile-Material Problem in Russia
and the NIS", Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on European Affairs, 104th Congress, 1st
Session, August 22-23, 1995. Washington, DC; GPO, 1995.
"U.S. Policy on Ukrainian Security: The Nuclear Dimension."
Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, European
Affairs Subcommittee, June 24, 1993.
"Russian-Ukrainian Relations: The Nuclear Dimension." U.S.
Department of State Conference, July 2, 1993.
"The Risk of Accidental/Unauthorized Soviet Nuclear Attack
and the Need for Limited Defense." Hearings, National
Security Subcommittee, House Government Operations
Committee, October 1, 1991.
"U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Control: A Comparison." Testimony
to the Advisory Committee for Nuclear Fail-Safe and Risk
Reduction, October 18, 1991.
"Soviet Nuclear Weapons Control During the August 1991
Coup Attempt," Command and Control of Soviet Nuclear
Weapons: Dangers and Opportunities Arising From the August
Revolution, Hearings, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
European Affairs Subcommittee, 102nd Congress, 1st Session,
September 24, 1991. Washington, DC: GPO, 1992.
"Soviet Nuclear Command-Control." Hearings, House
Committee on Armed Services, July 31, 1991.
"Strategic Warning." Hearings, House Committee on Armed
Services, March 15, 1988.
Our Nation's Nuclear Warning System: Will It Work If We Need
It?, Hearings, House Committee on Government Operations,
99th Congress, 1st Session, September 26, 1985. Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1986.
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