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THREAT REDUCTION AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY

March 5

Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Franklin C. Miller

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense's current and proposed policy programs in threat reduction and counterproliferation. These essential, and complementary, efforts are designed to reduce the threat to the United States and the world posed by weapons of mass destruction, whether from the former Soviet Union or potential proliferators, and to counter the effects of proliferation where it has occurred.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION

The United States faces growing threats to its security and other national interests due to the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. In many of the world's regions where the United States is likely to deploy forces -- including Northeast Asia, and the Middle East -- potential adversaries are pursuing the development or acquisition of NBC weapons. The Gulf War experience showed the implications of NBC proliferation for defense planning: DoD must take seriously the potential NBC dimension of future conflicts. Our forces must be properly trained and equipped for all potential missions including those in which opponents might threaten or use NBC weapons. In December 1993, pursuant to a Presidential Directive, then Secretary of Defense Aspin launched the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, which represents our response to these challenges. This initiative took real form under former Secretary Perry and continues today in a very robust form under Secretary Cohen.

The principal goal of U.S. counterproliferation policy is to ensure our forces are able to operate effectively and decisively even if an enemy employs WMD. By doing this we can help discourage proliferation in the first place. Secondarily, our policy supports U.S. non-proliferation efforts which seek to prevent the further spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Department's activities contribute in many ways to achieving these goals. Military preparations for operations in an NBC environment make clear that threats or use of NBC weapons will not deter the United States from using military power where necessary in defense of our national interests. Simply put, an enemy might use weapons of mass destruction against our forces, but this will not prevent us from winning the fight and, in addition, it will draw devastating retaliation. Effective defense capabilities to counter NBC weapons systems also devalue the potential political and military benefits of those weapons to a would-be proliferant. In addition, many of the capabilities developed for the battlefield to deal with NBC proliferation -- especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance means -- can be brought to bear in support of international regimes, export controls and other international monitoring efforts to prevent the spread of NBC weapons and related technologies.

INTEGRATING THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION MISSION WITHIN DOD

While preventing NBC proliferation from occurring in the first place remains a paramount goal of U.S. policy, we recognize that a country determined to obtain NBC weapons and their means of delivery, a country which is willing to violate global nonproliferation norms in doing so, can in all likelihood succeed despite the strongest prevention efforts. Because experience has demonstrated that countries armed with NBC weapons can and will use these weapons, U.S. armed forces must be prepared to counter fully the military threats posed by NBC proliferation. For these reasons, senior Department officials continue to play an active role in guiding implementation of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, and the Department has made substantial progress toward fully integrating the counterproliferation mission into its military planning, acquisition, intelligence and international cooperation activities.

These efforts have built upon the formal policy guidance issued by then Secretary of Defense Perry in May 1994, follow-on guidance contained in internal planning and programming documents, and a DoD Directive on Counterproliferation issued in July 1996 that delineates specific responsibilities, formalizes relationships among DoD organizations and establishes common terms of reference. These documents reflect the Department's role in the entire spectrum of U.S. government activities related to NBC proliferation -- from supporting diplomatic efforts to prevent or contain proliferation to protecting the United States and its friends and allies, and their military forces, from NBC attacks.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) COUNCIL

To ensure that these broad policy objectives are met and that the implementation of the Counterproliferation Initiative is integrated and focused, Secretary Perry established in April 1996 the DoD Counterproliferation Council (CPC). The CPC is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and it is composed of senior civilian and military officials. Its role is to monitor departmental progress in developing the strategy, doctrine and force planning necessary to execute effectively counterproliferation objectives. It also monitors DoD-wide efforts to train, exercise and equip U.S. forces for the counterproliferation missions. The CP Council met several times during 1996, focusing on the potential impact of NBC proliferation on the Department's strategy for fighting two overlapping Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs), as well as on joint and service CP doctrine, and on exercising and training for integrated operations in an NBC environment. In this connection, the Council identified the importance of understanding the likely NBC employment concepts and plans of proliferants, and it took steps to ensure that focused intelligence assessments in these areas inform the development of regional military plans, as well as doctrine and exercising policies.

MILITARY PLANNING FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION MISSIONS

One of the most important activities to integrate fully counterproliferation into the functions of the Department has been the implementation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) May 1995 Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study. The study concluded that each commander in chief (CINC) should be responsible for executing U.S. counterproliferation policy within his respective area of responsibility, and that implementation would be executed directly through each CINC's standard deliberate force planning process. Based on this study, the Secretary of Defense approved a Counterproliferation Charter, prepared by the CJCS, that supplements top-level policy guidance and provides a military focus for implementing the counterproliferation initiative. The CJCS subsequently provided guidance to the CINCs for developing their own concept plans for the counterproliferation mission, further defining national level counterproliferation policy in terms of operational objectives and tasks that will assist the CINCs in developing their own area-specific plans.

DOCTRINE, TRAINING AND EXERCISING FOR THE COUNTERPROLIFERATION MISSION

An equally important part of the job of implementing our policy, and fulfilling our requirements under P.L. 103-160, is to adapt joint doctrine, planning, training and exercises in light of the operational implications of the threat or use of NBC weapons. The Department's April 1996 report to Congress on Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense stressed that joint NBC defense doctrine needs to continue to evolve and include joint tactics, techniques and procedures. The U.S. Army Chemical School's joint doctrine cell is assisting in the development of updated joint doctrine with the guidance of the Joint Staff. In addition, the regional commands, as part of their task to develop concept plans for operations in an NBC environment, are assessing more fully how regional proliferation risks may affect doctrine, operational concepts and methods. A more thorough understanding of how routine military tasks may be affected by the presence of NBC weapons and associated delivery vehicles will, in turn, help DoD better define hardware requirements and the proper emphasis to be placed on various capabilities, including theater missile defenses, passive defenses, counterforce, and command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I).

The Department also continues to make extensive use of wargames and related activities to build a common understanding about warfighting issues associated with NBC proliferation. Senior civilian, Joint Staff and Service officials participated in a series of seminars involving scenarios where a proliferant had used NBC weapons against U.S. forces in a regional setting. Participants' discussion about the potential political and operational impacts resulting from such uses reinforced the importance of maintaining a mix of capabilities in the face of proliferation risks and thinking about how NBC proliferation may affect the way the United States fights. In this connection, the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University is continuing its assessment of potential employment doctrine of NBC-armed adversaries and how U.S. operational concepts and military operations could be adapted to improve the U.S. ability to prevail in an NBC environment.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION

The U.S. Intelligence Community, with a leading role played by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), continues to improve its ability to provide DoD leaders the detailed information necessary to support efforts to discourage NBC acquisition, to deter the threat or use of NBC weapons by a proliferant, and to protect against potential NBC attacks on the United States, U.S. forces, and U.S. friends or allies. A high priority is being placed on assessing the intentions, programs, operational practices and supporting infrastructure of countries of concern (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and North Korea) as well as countries which are also of concern as suppliers. Greater attention also is being given to operational intelligence (such as the location and characterization of NBC facilities, target vulnerability, early warning tracking data) and its timely dissemination, both of which are critical for planning defenses and responses to NBC threats.

ACQUISITION EFFORTS TO SUPPORT COUNTERPROLIFERATION

In order for our forces to be able to carry out their missions in support of our counterproliferation policy, they must be equipped with modern, effective weapons, sensors and defenses. We in the policy community work closely with our colleagues in OSD Acquisition, the Joint Staff, and the Service staffs to ensure that the R&D and procurement pipelines are working to supply our forces with what they need.

A key element in providing an important overview of our acquisition efforts is the interdepartmental Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC). The CPRC is composed of representatives the Secretary of Defense (Chairman), the Secretary of Energy (Vice-Chair), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. Congress chartered the CPRC to review counterproliferation-related research, development and acquisition programs of the represented Departments and to recommend programmatic and management initiatives to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter NBC proliferation threats. The CPRC's most recent findings and recommendations are detailed in its annual report to Congress, the 1997 version of which will be issued later this year.

The CPRC reviewed and modified the 15 counterproliferation Areas for Capability Enhancements (ACEs) for its upcoming 1997 report based on CINC staff's operational planning workshops, the DoD "Front End Assessment," and increased concerns about terrorist NBC threats. This year the CPRC Standing Committee decided that each CPRC representative organization would prioritize ACEs in accordance with departmental mission needs. They will be modified periodically to reflect changes in the international security environment. The ACEs characterize those areas where progress is needed to both enhance the warfighting capabilities of the CINCs, and the overall ability to promote national strategies to counter the growing proliferation threat. The counterproliferation ACEs, in DoD's priority order, are:

-- Detection, identification and characterization of biological weapons (BW) agents.

-- Detection, characterization and defeat of WMD facilities with minimal collateral effects.

-- Detection, characterization and defeat of underground facilities with minimal collateral effects.

-- Theater ballistic missile active defense.

-- Support for Special Operations Forces and defense against paramilitary, covert delivery and terrorist WMD threats.

-- Provide consequence management.

-- Cruise missile defense.

-- Collection, analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence to counter proliferation.

-- Robust passive defense to enable sustained operations on the NBC battlefield.

-- BW vaccine RDT&E and production to ensure stockpile availability.

-- Target planning for WMD targets.

-- Prompt mobile target detection and defeat.

-- Detection, tracking and protection of WMD and WMD-related materials and components.

-- Support export control activities of the U.S. government.

-- Support inspection and monitoring activities of arms control agreements and regimes.

These ACEs also provide a foundation for building the Department's Counterproliferation Support Program and Chemical and Biological

Defense Program, and will serve as a basis for assessing future programmatic progress in meeting counterproliferation mission needs.

The strategic planning process for DoD's Science and Technology (S&T) program also was enhanced this year with the issuance of the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan in May 1996. Biological and chemical warfare agent detection and counterproliferation are two of the 12 Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives identified in the plan. Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives will receive funding priority in future DoD budgets.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION (CP) SUPPORT PROGRAM AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

The core of DoD's acquisition efforts in support of our counterproliferation policy is contained in two broad programs: the Counterproliferation Support Program and the Chemical and Biological Defense Program.

The CP Support Program focuses on redressing the most critical shortfalls in deployed capabilities by leveraging and accelerating on-going and high payoff research and development efforts within the Services and the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program oversees and coordinates all DoD NBC passive defense efforts. The CP Support Program budget is $97.3 million in FY 97 and we are requesting $104.7 million in FY 98. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program budget is $523 million in FY 97 and we are requesting $531 million in FY 98. In addition to these efforts, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) programs involving theater missile defense also form an integral element of the counterproliferation effort.

Recognizing the increasing maturity of the DoD Counterproliferation Initiative and the progress made over the last several years in substantially improving U.S. counterproliferation capabilities, the Deputy Secretary directed in January 1996 that the Department take stock of its efforts to date and review all DoD counterproliferation-related programs to assess programmatic alternatives and priorities, policy impacts and management alternatives. The goal of this so-called "Front End Assessment" was to define a restructured and optimized acquisition program that will meet the CINCs' counterproliferation needs. The analytic assessment concluded that funding for a number of high payoff efforts should be accelerated and increased, including those aimed at detection of biological weapons and NBC warning. In addition, SOCOM's counterproliferation mission was defined and funded as part of the Front End Assessment. As a result, funding for counterproliferation programs during FY 1998-03 will increase substantially. The sections below describe recent progress to accelerate research, development and deployment of improved counterproliferation capabilities in five functional areas. They also describe key changes resulting from the Department's internal review of all DoD counterproliferation-related programs.

PREVENTION

The CP Support Program Office, in partnership with the U.S. Navy, successfully deployed the Navy's Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) prototype system to improve capabilities to identify and track ships at sea suspected of transporting NBC and NBC-related materials. Deployment began in 1995; a total of 28 units will be deployed by the end of FY 1997. The program will transition from an R&D supported program to Navy management in FY 1998. The CP Support Program is also supporting the joint DoD/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) effort involving the trafficking of NBC weapons and related materials and to apply DoD and FBI technologies, operational capabilities and training programs to train law enforcement officials in the Baltics, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. A joint report to Congress defining efforts that are planned under this program was submitted in 1996.

PASSIVE DEFENSE

The DoD NBC Defense Program fulfills joint passive defense requirements to permit U.S. forces to survive, fight and win in an NBC-contaminated environment. The CP Support Program enhances the NBC Defense Program by providing leveraging funds to accelerate fielding or development of critical programs, including detection systems to provide early warning of biological agent attacks. Over the past year, the Services have worked together to improve the joint orientation of NBC defense requirements, and the community is now better prepared to address shortcomings which still exist in the U.S. NBC defense posture. The established research, development and acquisition program will resolve many shortcomings by executing current procurement plans and adapting available technologies.

Based on experiences in Operation DESERT STORM, DoD identified the following shortfalls and issues related to NBC defenses:

-- Biological defenses needed more emphasis in DoD programs.

-- Inadequacies existed in CW/BW detectors, vaccines, protection and

decontamination capabilities.

-- To ensure effective contamination avoidance on future battlefields, additional reconnaissance systems and standoff detection were required; and

-- Continued modernization of individual and collective protection, medical support, detection, identification, warning and decontamination systems were necessary to ensure force survivability and mission accomplishment under chemical and biological warfare battlefield conditions.

Since the end of the Gulf War, significant and measurable progress has been made in addressing each of these issues. The accomplishments and plans are detailed in the DoD NBC Warfare Defense Annual Report to Congress. Specific examples of new and improved systems that have been fielded include new protective masks, advanced chemical and biological protective garments, standoff chemical detectors and first-ever capabilities for point biological agent detection and standoff aerosol/particulate detection. Additionally, there has been significant progress in such research and development initiatives as the development of miniature, pocket-sized chemical agent detectors, advanced point and stand-off biological detection and identification systems, and digitally automated warning and reporting networks.

An integrated "system-of-systems" approach that incorporates detection systems, force protection, medical programs and decontamination will provide the most effective means to ensure that U.S. forces will be ready to fight at the time and place of their choosing.

ACTIVE DEFENSE

Theater missile defense (TMD) is an essential element of DoD's approach to countering risks posed by NBC weapons delivered by cruise and ballistic missiles. Active defenses play an important role in protecting U.S., allied and coalition forces, civilians supporting military operations, and noncombatants. By intercepting and destroying NBC-armed missiles and aircraft, active defenses substantially enhance the ability of friendly forces to conduct successful military operations. The U.S. theater missile defense program is managed and funded by BMDO, the Services and DARPA. The program calls for near-term improvements to existing systems, development of a new core set of TMD capabilities, and exploration of advanced technology and other risk reduction activities to complement the core programs. These include efforts aimed at gaining a better understanding of the atmospheric dispersion of chemical and biological agents, along with methods for neutralizing them upon intercept. To improve the effectiveness of active defense, the Department has also established the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) to enhance coordination between the requirements and acquisition communities.

COUNTERFORCE

The CP Support Program supports projects to enhance U.S. military capabilities to identify, characterize and neutralize NBC weapons, related facilities and supporting infrastructure elements while minimizing and predicting the consequences of resulting collateral effects. The Counterproliferation Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) -- the core of the NBC counterforce effort -- allow the operational community to evaluate and influence the development of NBC counterforce capabilities, while expediting emerging capabilities into concepts of operations. Key accomplishments include:

-- Completion of static detonation and live weapon drops on a simulated BW storage facility to demonstrate the capabilities of NBC target planning tools and collateral effects prediction. This provides the CINCs a capability to target BW storage facilities while minimizing collateral damage.

-- Fielding of tools to U.S. European Command for use in Bosnia as part of Operation Joint Endeavor. We provided 30 prototypes of the Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN), a computer-based system to assess and report on NBC hazards to U.S. troops.

-- Accurate atmospheric transport prediction of hazard plumes and successful completion of field demonstration of integrated hazard prediction tools in support of collateral effects assessment.

-- Initiation of system design and penetration studies and initial sled testing of an advanced earth penetrating weapon. The tests indicate that we can achieve a significant increase in penetration capability, allowing the CINCs to place more buried NBC facilities at risk.

-- Demonstration of the ability of unattended ground sensors to locate and identify key components within a simulated NBC facility.

COVERT/TERRORIST NBC THREATS

As the committee is well aware, Subtitle A of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 mandates an increased role for the Department of Defense in assisting domestic authorities to combat WMD terrorism. I have included a synopsis of DoD activities pursuant to this as Appendix A to my testimony. Of particular note in this

discussion of acquisition activities, however, the fact that the CP Support Program is coordinating its technology prototype development activities with the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), which develops joint interagency counterterrorism requirements, and with the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and joint Service explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) units to ensure relevance and responsiveness in meeting user needs. An effort is also underway to address critical shortfalls in adapting biological and chemical warfare defense technologies to meet the unique requirements of the special operations environment. Recently completed programs include a vented suppressive shield to contain biological and chemical weapons effects and a joint U.S.-Canadian EOD suit for biological and chemical threats. Projects under way include development of NBC perimeter monitoring sensors, a Quick Mask for protection against biological and chemical agents, a non-intrusive chemical agent detection system, and a special chemical and biological agent sample extraction and rapid identification system.

OTHER OSD POLICY EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION

We in the Policy community also perform important roles in advancing our counterproliferation efforts by working with allies, raising public and allied awareness of the dangers posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and supporting administration arms controls efforts directed at the threat.

-- Cooperating with International Partners in Addressing Shared Risks

The Department is continuing to work with America's long-standing allies in Europe and elsewhere to develop common approaches on counterproliferation. Notably, the Department played the leading role in moving counterproliferation to the top of NATO's agenda. Indeed, largely at the urging of DoD, the development of a NATO response to proliferation risks was endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government at their Summit in 1994.

Accordingly, the NATO Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), chaired jointly by the United States and rotating chair held by a European ally (currently Italy), was established in 1994 to determine the range of alliance and national capabilities needed in light of proliferation risks and to recommend improvements for NATO's defense posture to counter emerging threats from NBC weapons and their delivery means. NATO's counterproliferation initiative is an integral part of the Alliance's adaptation to the post-Cold War strategic environment, in which the proliferation of NBC weapons can pose a direct threat to Alliance security. As part of NATO's strategic reorientation toward greater security responsibilities beyond Europe, the DGP has recommended ways of improving the protection of allied forces deployed in new roles and missions, including operations beyond NATO's periphery where the military dangers posed by NBC proliferation are greatest. The DGP has recommended steps to ensure NATO develops needed defenses against the threat or use of biological weapons threats, which are of particular concern. In June 1996, the DGP presented its recommendations to NATO defense and foreign ministers. It stressed the importance of developing a core, integrative set of capabilities that will provide a basis for continuing capability enhancements and force improvements as proliferation risks evolve.

This core set of capabilities includes:

-- Strategic and operational intelligence, including early warning data.

-- Automated and deployable command, control and communications.

-- Continuous, wide-area ground surveillance.

-- Standoff and point BW/CW detection, identification and warning.

-- Extended air defenses, including theater ballistic missile (TBM) defense for deployed forces.

-- NBC individual protective equipment for ground forces.

NATO already has, or is on the way to developing, the requisite capabilities in many of these areas. The findings of the DGP are intended to give impetus and added rationale for fielding such capabilities, as well as to demonstrate how supplementing this nucleus of capabilities with other means -- including layered defenses against TBM attack, special munitions for NBC agent defeat and hardened NBC targets, computer modeling and simulation, and medical countermeasures -- would strengthen the alliance's overall ability to discourage NBC proliferation, deter the threat of use of NBC weapons, and protect against NBC attacks.

In June 1996 -- for the first time in 12 years -- NATO's defense ministers launched an accelerated out-of-cycle force planning process for counterproliferation, through which allies are making resource commitments to develop and field needed capabilities. This extraordinary effort demonstrates how counterproliferation has become a top priority for NATO in the post-Cold War era.

NATO's counterproliferation initiative also has provided the context for discussions with Partnership for Peace countries, including Russia and Ukraine, on security challenges of mutual concern. Through these consultations, NATO is working to ensure interoperability and coalition effectiveness in future operations that include partner countries.

DoD also has bilateral or collective defense arrangements with many nations and conducts combined operations with their militaries. Many countries have participated in -- and will likely do so in the future -- international coalition operations in which the presence of NBC weapons has been a factor. For these reasons, DoD has held discussions with a number of long-time friends and allies to forge common approaches for improving military capabilities in the face of NBC risks. The Technical Cooperation Program (TCP) with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom pursues defense research collaboration to facilitate cooperation in research and development in several technology areas, including chemical defense. In addition, the Tri-Partite Memorandum of Understanding with Canada and the United Kingdom seeks to enhance cooperation in the research, development, test and evaluation of chemical and biological defense programs.

These international activities demonstrate that the United States is not alone in its concerns for the defense dimension of proliferation. The Department remains committed to building international partnerships with allies and friends whose security and national interests are threatened by NBC proliferation.

-- Public Education

In April 1996, DoD published an unclassified document, "Proliferation: Threat and Response (PTR)," providing detailed information to the public for the first time about the threats to U.S. security and regional interests posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery systems. PTR also described the steps being taken by the Department to respond to the NBC proliferation problem. It laid the foundation for informed public policy debate about the political and military efforts needed to counter growing proliferation risks. Public interest in the document was overwhelming, including at U.S. universities and overseas. A second printing was ordered, and the report is being used as a text in many of DoD's professional military education courses.

-- The Chemical Weapons Convention

No discussion of proliferation would be complete without addressing the arms control dimension of our efforts to contain and roll-back proliferation. A foremost element in this regard is the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC.

The CWC is both an arms control and a non-proliferation treaty. The Convention, which will come into force with or without the U.S. on April 29, will ban the development, production, use, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons.

From DOD's perspective, it is very much in our national security interest for three key reasons.

First, it will make our troops safer by reducing the probability that they will face chemical weapons on the battlefield.

Second, it will be a useful tool -- though by no means the solution -- in our fight against terrorism:

-- by restricting international trade in chemicals that can be used to make poison gas;

-- by strengthening the ability of domestic authorities to establish domestic legislation to investigate and prosecute illegal activities; and

-- by establishing a global verification and information network that can provide the early warning that is essential for combating terrorism.

Finally, it will make other nations do what an earlier Congress and President's Reagan and Bush decided that we would do -- namely, destroy chemical weapons stockpiles and forego future use of chemical weapons.

We do not need chemical weapons to fight future wars. Potential aggressors know that we would respond to a chemical weapons attack with overwhelming and devastating force. And, they know that we have a vast array of highly effective, superior forces to back up our words.

Whether or not we ratify the Convention, it will enter into force on April 29, 1997. Similarly, whether or not we ratify the Convention, DoD will -- pursuant to statute -- continue eliminating the U.S. unitary chemical weapons stockpile; given the Committee's interest, I have attached as Appendix B to my testimony a synopsis of the U.S. chemical demilitarization effort. By ratifying the Convention before April 29 we will ensure our place on the governing body for its implementation. We also will ensure that there are Americans on hand during inspections to help make certain that other nations live up to their promises to eliminate their chemical weapons.

The administration recognizes that the Chemical Weapons Convention is not a perfect treaty. Our knowledge about potential proliferants is not and never will be perfect, but the CWC requires declarations and inspections that should make our knowledge better than it is today.

Finding inconsistencies will require that we act -- that we use diplomacy, sanctions and, in extremis, our military power to eliminate threats to our forces and our security. The Convention will make it easier to marshal international support for such steps, since it establishes an international, legal norm against chemical weapons and calls for restrictions and sanctions against those who violate its terms.

Some rogue nations may remain outside of the Convention, but they will be penalized economically and politically for doing so. Over time, many of these states are likely to join the CWC, as was the case with the Nonproliferation Treaty.

There will be costs associated with joining the treaty. Our share for the international administration of the treaty will be about $25 million a year -- a very small sum in a Federal budget of about $1.7 trillion. DOD will incur additional costs for preparing its facilities for inspections and escorting the international inspectors at military facilities. About 140 commercial companies will have significant reporting requirements and some of these will be subject to routine inspections. Another 2,000 or so companies will have to fill out a short report.

On balance, these costs are modest compared to the national security benefits. As General Shalikashvili succinctly stated, "From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our national interest."

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

I would now like to turn to a detailed discussion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.

The political and economic conditions which followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 raised a number of concerns regarding the ability of four former Soviet states to meet treaty commitments on time and maintain effective control over nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials remaining on their territory.

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITIES

In reaction to the new challenges posed by the post-Cold War world, and through the visionary leadership of Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, Congress mandated the establishment of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in FY92 with three objectives:

-- Assist the recipient states in destroying nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction;

-- Assist those states to transport, store, disable and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and

-- Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.

In FY93, authorization was broadened to include:

-- Preventing diversion of weapons-related scientific expertise;

-- Facilitating demilitarization of defense industries and conversion of military capabilities and technologies;

-- Establishing science and technology centers; and

-- Expanding military-to-military and defense contacts between the U.S. and the recipient states.

In FY97, the Congress adopted the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment which broadened funding for the CTR program to include, within its existing authorities, projects to: convert the cores of Russian plutonium-producing reactors; dismantle chemical and biological weapons production facilities; and expand defense and military contacts to include NIS other than Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan. Those projects will be pursued in the FY97 CTR program, and further funding has been requested in FY98.

RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

Since FY92, all of the NIS has been eligible for CTR assistance, provided the Secretary of State certifies, on an annual basis, that the proposed recipient is committed to:

(1) making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying weapons of mass destruction, if such recipient has an obligation under a treaty or other agreement to destroy or dismantle any such weapons;

(2) forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction;

(3) forgoing any use in new nuclear weapons of fissionable or other components of destroyed nuclear weapons;

(4) facilitating U.S. verification of any weapons destruction carried out under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992, Section 212 of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, or Section 503(a) or 504(a) of the Freedom Support Act;

(5) complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and

(6) observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of minorities.

In 1992 through 1996, the Secretary of State certified to the Congress that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan met those criteria. The 1997 certifications will be submitted shortly.

CTR PROGRAMS

Through the CTR program, the U.S. has provided assistance in the form of equipment, services and technical advice to Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine. The bulk of this assistance is implemented by

the U.S. Department of Defense, as a program not of altruistic charity, but based on hard-nosed considerations of national and international security. Through CTR assistance, we attack the threat at its root -- by helping to dismantle and consolidate former Soviet weapons, and we thus ensure that the requirements of the hard-won treaties negotiated in recent years are met.

CTR is on the front lines of ensuring adequate controls on WMD capabilities. The CTR program is working in all four countries to reduce the threat of theft and/or diversion of these WMD and associated materials through support for safe and secure removal of nuclear warheads to Russia, destruction of WMD and related infrastructure, safe storage of warheads destined for destruction and of the fissile material removed from them. In all, we can divide the programs funded by CTR into three general categories:

-- WMD destruction and dismantlement;

-- Weapons protection, control and accounting, fissile material storage and other chain of custody; and

-- Demilitarization.

The CTR program is not motivated by altruism. These activities are undertaken to reduce real threats to US security: the threat of excess offensive weaponry, the threat of unsecured nuclear weapons and materials, and the threat of militaristic societies and economies. In addition to the security benefits of the CTR program, the economic benefits are worth noting. The majority of CTR funds are expended through contracts with American firms. These contracts create jobs here at home and open doors for U.S. companies to gain experience and contacts in recipient countries.

The CTR program has notified over $1.5 billion to Congress for use in Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine. The FY97 notification, currently being staffed, will bring that total to $1.8 billion. Almost $1.2 billion has been obligated for this program, and our spending rates have increased steadily since the program's inception in FY92. Early in the program, there was criticism of CTR for its slow obligation rates. Indeed, it took time for the U.S. and Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Kazakstani governments to define the assistance, sign the necessary agreements, and begin the work. It is a complicated process, but we have learned a great deal from our experience. We better understand the challenges of doing business in countries undergoing a transition from communism to capitalism. The projects funded by CTR are, for the most part, now moving smoothly. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are now free of nuclear warheads -- something which could not, and would not have occurred without the CTR program. This is the ultimate yardstick, the ultimate bottomline, for how much we have learned, and how well we are doing.

Progress does not equal victory, however -- not yet. CTR has much work left to do. Today, I will endeavor to describe some of what we have accomplished and some of what we propose for the future. I am sure that you will agree with me that this work remains just as important today as it was when first conceived, six years ago. We must continue to build on this foundation, for what we are building is safety and security for our children and our grandchildren.

DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLEMENT

Our Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) and Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) programs in Russia, Belarus, and Kazakstan, and Ukraine, and Nuclear and WMD Infrastructure Elimination programs in Kazakstan and Ukraine provide the recipient states with equipment, training, services, logistic support and other assistance for expediting the elimination of strategic offensive arms pursuant to the START treaties and facilities or infrastructure previously supporting WMD.

-- Ukraine:

Destruction and Dismantlement includes, among other things, assistance to eliminate all SS-19 silo launchers and launch control silos in Ukraine. With CTR assistance, a liquid rocket fuel storage facility critical to defueling SS-19 missiles in Ukraine is storing over 3,500 metric tons of fuel and a missile neutralization facility in Ukraine is eliminating six SS-19 missiles per month. On-base propellant transfer facilities and nuclear storage structures will also be decontaminated and dismantled. We hope for a decision soon on Ukraine's plans for SS-24 missiles. The Lisbon Protocol requires the silos to be eliminated by December 2001, which means that silo elimination (and therefore missile removal) should begin in 1998.

-- Kazakstan:

Through CTR, DoD is assisting Kazakstan in the safe elimination and clean up of all SS-18 silo launchers and launch control sites, training silos, and silo test launchers. The Russians have completed the initial phases of silo destruction, and CTR projects to complete the eliminations are underway. CTR is supporting bomber dismantlement and the elimination of infrastructure associated with nuclear weapons

test tunnels at Degelen Mountain, as well as on base propellant transfer facilities and nuclear storage structures. Last year we began a U.S. government project to be spearheaded by CTR to eliminate biological weapons production infrastructure at a former Soviet biological weapons facility, Stepnogorsk, in Kazakstan.

-- Belarus:

In Belarus, assistance already obligated will be used, in part, to facilitate elimination of fixed structures associated with the SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and to dispose of approximately 10,000 metric tons of liquid fuel and oxidizer.

-- Russia:

In Russia, SOAE assistance includes SSBN, bomber and silo launcher dismantlement. CTR has provided additional liquid freight intermodal containers to assist with fuel and oxidizer storage following defueling of liquid propellant missiles. We have begun efforts to increase the dismantlement rates at Russia's SS-18 missile elimination facility, and will soon let a contract for the solid propellant ICBM/SLBM elimination project.

The U.S. government is also helping and encouraging Russia to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and to eliminate their stockpiles. We intend to provide assistance in the form of equipment, services and training for the creation of a CW destruction facility to destroy artillery munitions with organophosphorous agent. A joint U.S.-Russian technical evaluation closely examined the Russian two-stage chemical agent destruction process, and validated its effectiveness. Laboratory facilities are being upgraded to allow development of analytical methods for monitoring during destruction operations. Three mobile labs were delivered last fall, and in December we let a contract with Parsons Engineering for the design and, ultimately, construction of a destruction facility at Shchuchye.

I spoke, a few moments ago, about bottom lines. In that regard, I submit for the committee's consideration the following facts.

In 1991, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus together had 3,300 strategic and roughly 2,600 tactical nuclear warheads on their soil. They would have been respectively -- by far -- the third, fourth and seventh largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, in what is probably the greatest nonproliferation achievement the world has seen, these three states are completely free of nuclear warheads. In addition, START I eliminations are well ahead of schedule. 431 ICBM launchers, 59 SS-18 ICBMs, 276 SLBM launchers (21 boats), and 53 heavy bombers have been eliminated in Russia and 104 ICBM launchers have been eliminated in Kazakstan. In Ukraine, 62 ICBM silos, 6 launch control centers, and 20 missiles have been dismantled.

Did CTR assistance do this alone? No. It is the cooperation, the pragmatic partnerships between ourselves and these countries that have enabled this steady movement to final success. But it would not have happened without CTR.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY

Chain of Custody programs provide assistance to enhance security of nuclear weapons and weapons material during storage and transport to dismantlement and storage sites -- at every "link" along the custody "chain". While complete assembled nuclear weapons are less prone to theft or diversion than stocks of fissile material or components, they are vulnerable nonetheless and the consequences of their falling into the wrong hands could be catastrophic. To support the safety and security of assembled weapons under MoD control, the DoD has developed a cooperative program with the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian MoD. The CTR assistance provided under the DoD-MoD Weapons Protection, Control and Accounting (WPC&A) project focuses on maintaining a high level of security during shipment and storage of Russian nuclear weapons in connection with their dismantlement. This program has been marked by excellent DoD-MoD cooperation and swift implementation.

Specifically, CTR has provided Russia with armored blankets to enhance weapons security during transport. We have helped upgrade cargo and guard railcars for the same purpose. Emergency Response Training/Equipment has been provided to all four recipient states to enhance their capability to respond to accidents involving nuclear weapons in transit for dismantlement activities. Working with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) we will help automate their nuclear stockpile inventory and provide computer models to assess storage site vulnerability as well as information about possible guard force training. We have been working with the Russian MoD to apply a systematic approach which will provide a coordinated security system at MoD sites.

A high priority and high profile project is the fissile material storage facility at Mayak, near the formerly-closed city of Chelyabinsk. This facility will protect fissile material resulting from dismantled weapons, providing a safe and secure location for it. The United States is willing to provide up to half the cost of the

facility. Lack of adequate and appropriate storage space could cause two problems: first, this material would be stored in facilities more vulnerable to theft; and second, the Russians have stated that lack of storage space for the fissile material would create a warhead dismantlement bottleneck.

While this program suffered from initial delays, we have recently seen progress. We believe the U.S.-set milestones for this program, announced last year, have been effective in generating forward movement. We are now pleased to report that cooperation on design has accelerated, construction is proceeding uninterrupted, an on-site Design and Construction Contractor is in place, along with the Army Corps of Engineers. Both sides have agreed that a state-of-the-art Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) system will be designed and installed to ensure that material in the facility is protected and accounted for. DoD will begin negotiations with Minatom on specific transparency requirements this spring.

A new CTR project is underway which will reduce the amount of fissile material produced in Russia. Conversion of the fuel cores of three plutonium-producing reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk will permit their continued operation to produce needed heat and electricity for the region but prevent them from producing weapons-grade plutonium as a by-product. DoD is building on the experience and expertise of DoE personnel in carrying out this project. Design and engineering work on this project has begun, and the conversion of the cores is planned to be completed in 2000.

Thus, CTR is helping to address the "loose nukes" issue in several ways. It worked to ensure that the removal of all nuclear warheads from Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine to Russia happened completely safely, without accident. It is also encouraging the reduction in total nuclear warhead and fissile material stockpiles, and the safety and security of the residual.

DEMILITARIZATION

Demilitarization programs include projects that aim to enable facilities, organizations and individuals which had been involved in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) related fields to pursue peaceful endeavors. Under this category, we include the defense conversion programs which provide assistance to convert former military enterprises in all four recipient states to the production of civilian goods. Consistent with Congressional direction, CTR no longer provides assistance to FSU defense conversion. Instead, DoD now supports defense conversion through other mechanisms, leveraging capabilities of the entire U.S. government and, more importantly, the private sector.

Finally, CTR helps support Defense and Military Contacts with the Ministries of Defense of the recipient states. By building on each previous years' contacts, a network of professional exchanges is established that gives recipient state defense and military establishments a stake in continued good relations with the United States. Goals are to: encourage nonproliferation; enhance stability by regular exchanges on defense strategy, and greater transparency in budgets and programs; encourage and assist the restructuring and downsizing of former Soviet defense establishments; address as far as possible the concerns of the militaries and encourage their support for democratic reforms; help militaries to better understand democratic societies, especially civil-military relationships; develop long-term institutional interfaces for substantive professional dialogue on defense and military topics; and encourage participation in bilateral program such as high-level exchanges, unit exchanges, ship visits, bilateral exercises in such areas as search and rescue, disaster relief and exchanges of delegations on a wide range of defense and military issues. We will be establishing contact programs with most of the newly certified states. Additionally, the Defense Military Contacts programs increases our understanding of defense establishments in the former Soviet Union.

FY98 PROGRAM

As you can see, we have both accomplished a great deal and have a great deal left to do. Since we began these efforts in FY92, we have seen some programs completed, such as the provision of armored blankets to Russia, others have had funding responsibility delegated to other agencies, such as MPC&A. In still other cases, while the work continues, prior years funding permit completion of the specific project. The CTR program is currently planned to make its last request for new funds in FY01. It was established to see certain goals accomplished, to enable us to see a safer world. Some of our needs have changed since the program was established, but its founding purpose continues. Russia not only retains a nuclear arsenal, but it continues to hold chemical weapons, and still possesses vast quantities of fissile material. Ukraine, from whose territory the last nuclear warheads were removed last June, still has more than one hundred ICBMs, dozens of launchers, and warhead storage bunkers. Kazakstan, which no longer has nuclear warheads on its soil and has returned all SS-18 missiles to Russia, still hosts some supporting infrastructure, as well as a former biological weapons facility and Soviet-era WMD test facilities at Baikonur, Degelen Mountain, Semipalatinsk and Sary-Shagan. Belarus returned the remaining SS-25 mobile missiles and associated warheads to Russia, but still has on its territory launch pads and supporting infrastructure. These remnants of the Soviet threat retain the potential to harm the U.S. and our allies around the world, whether by unauthorized use or by illicit transfer to other parties. CTR programs have the capability to eliminate these threats.

We have, over the years, much improved our planning, learning from difficulties experienced earlier. We have developed plans for each of our projects. These plans are challenging, but feasible. Given adequate funding, we should meet our goals. Our plans for the FY98 budget are in line with this approach. With this plan, we will continue projects that are ongoing, completing some of them in FY98. We will begin new projects that were not ready earlier. Let me briefly lay out to you how we propose to allocate the $382 million budget request for FY98. This plan may be revised over the coming months as we seek to maximize the effectiveness of the CTR program.

For Dismantlement activities, $210 million is requested in FY98 funds. This includes funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) in Russia, to help continue the projects now ongoing, such as SS-18 missile and SS-24 rail mobile launcher elimination, as well as continued bomber and SLBM elimination. Our Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination and Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination projects in Ukraine will require substantial funding in FY98, including continued support for demobilization infrastructure elimination, and silo launcher elimination, as well as SS-24 projects. it also includes additional funding for Chemical Weapons Destruction in Russia.

Complementing our dismantlement activities, a need will remain to ensure controls and safeguards over weapons and weapons materials. Our planning calls for $141.7 million in FY98 for Chain of Custody projects. Funding will support the Fissile Material Storage facility, acquisition of Fissile Material Containers, and Weapons Storage Security. We are moving into the second stage of that program -- support for creating an integrated warhead control system -- which will involve a more methodical analysis of MoD's security posture to support MoD's longer range needs (new computer inventory system), additional warhead shipments and the development of an integrated systems approach to upgrade physical security at MoD's nuclear weapons storage sites. Procurement will begin on the core conversion project.

Finally, our planning calls for an additional $30.5 million for Other Program Support, which will include continued funding for the defense and military contacts program, as well as covering our Congressionally-mandated audits and examinations and providing for various administrative and support costs.

CONCLUSION

Our threat reduction and counterproliferation programs have registered great success over the past few years. The key aim of ensuring that the break-up of the Soviet Union would not result in the creation of several nuclear-weapon state has been fully achieved. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been extended indefinitely, the Chemical Weapons Convention will shortly enter into force, and the START I Treaty continues to be implemented ahead of schedule. (While not the subject of this hearing, I understand that the committee has expressed an interest in the DoD budge for implementing various arms control agreements; I have, accordingly, attached a summary of those costs as Appendix C.) Since the beginning of the decade, six countries: Ukraine, Kazakstan, Belarus, North Korea, South Africa and Iraq, that might have been nuclear powers, have been turned away from that path.

But much more is still to be done. We must continue to encourage the dismantlement of excess nuclear warheads in Russia and the reduction of its weapons-grade material, and to help ensure the safety and security of the warheads and fissile material that remain. We must continue to help the states of the Former Soviet Union fully implement their START I reductions, and look forward to doing the same with START II, once that Treaty enters into force. While the CTR program assists the recipient states, it is fundamental to U.S. national security, ensuring the reduction in weapons of mass destruction that would otherwise be arrayed against us or pose a serious proliferation threat.

In the area of counterproliferation, we understand that we will not be successful in preventing proliferation all of the time and in all

places. When proliferation occurs and U.S. interests and commitments are involved, we must be in a position where we can prevail on the battlefield, even against opponents who possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. That is the goal of the Department of Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, and from a programmatic standpoint, of the Counterproliferation Support Program and the Chemical and Biological Defense Program.

It is our responsibility to ensure that the United States is prepared to fight and win under any circumstances, including when and if we are again facing an adversary which possesses nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. With your help and leadership, I am convinced that we will be ready to deal with all future contingencies. Thank You.

APPENDIX A

RESPONSE TO WMD -- DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS

Subtitle A, "Domestic Preparedness," of the "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996" (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici) directs the President to (1) enhance the capability of the Federal government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological or radiological weapons, and (2) provide enhanced support to improve the capabilities of state and local emergency response agencies to respond to such incidents at both the national and local level.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, chairs the Senior Interagency Coordination Group to facilitate the interagency coordination of policy issues and program activities for consequence management initiatives. This group also includes representatives from the Departments of Defense, Justice, Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency and General Services Administration.

In response to the congressional legislation, the Department has allocated funds and begun implementing its FY 1997 program as follows:

-- $10 million for equipment for the Marine Corps' Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, or CBIRF, to respond to the consequences of a release of chemical and biological agents. The CBIRF is building the capability to identify the specific chemical or biological agent, assess downwind hazards, conduct advanced lifesaving support and decontaminate patients. The CBIRF will employ state-of-the-art equipment to detect chemical/biological agents, treat casualties, and provide communications and an enhanced transportation capability.

-- $6.6 million to assist the Secretary of Health and Human Services establish Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams for medical services resulting from the use of weapons of mass destruction.

-- $6.2 million for research and development to counter weapons of mass destruction. Of the $6.2 million, $3.2 million is for an ACTD, called 911-BIO. This ACTD will evaluate new technologies proposed for use by DoD consequence management units to respond effectively to terrorist use of biological weapons.

-- $9.1 million to assist the U.S. Customs Service in the acquisition of equipment to detect and interdict the movement of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or materials across U.S. borders.

-- $36 million to support domestic emergency response preparedness initiatives that include: developing first-responder training programs; providing training to 26 metropolitan areas; implementing a WMD hotline; improving DoD chemical/biological rapid response; conducting exercises to evaluate and improve current Defense WMD coordination capabilities; and developing and conducting exercises and preparedness tests in coordination with federal, state and local agencies to improve interagency response to WMD incidents. In FY 1998, the Department is increasing its request for domestic prepardedness initiatives to $49.5 million to continue to: provide emergency response preparedness through first responder training and assistance to metropolitan area agencies; improve DoD rapid chemical/biological response; and, conduct preparedness tests in coordination with federal, state and local agencies.

In addition to efforts to assist federal, state and local first responders, the Department has established, in cooperation with the Department of Energy and the Director of Central Intelligence, a committee to address interagency and interdepartmental issues related to technologies and systems for countering proliferation of WMD, including terrorist activity. The committee brings senior level attention to the various programs in our departments to help ensure effective application of resources among DoD, DoE and the Intelligence Community. This process also promotes close cooperation among the participating agencies on technology projects. Within the DoD, we have increased funding to enhance our special operations capability to address terrorist use of WMD. The funds will be used for training and acquiring equipment to address this mission.

APPENDIX B

CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION PROGRAM

The U.S. chemical demilitarization program continues to make progress. The FY 97 budget for chemical demilitarization is $871.8 million and we have requested $741.2 million in FY 98. The current estimated lifecycle cost of the program is $12.6 billion. All M55 rockets, MK-94 bombs, MC-1 bombs on Johnston Island have been destroyed. Sixty-two percent of the stockpile at Johnston Island has been destroyed and we are now eliminating the GB 155 mm projectiles. Operations began at Tooele in August 1996. To date, we have safely destroyed over 11,000 rockets, 173 GB ton containers, and 382,000 pounds of chemical agent. At Anniston, we recently awarded a contract with a "limited notice to proceed" provision to Westinghouse Electric Company and we are awaiting permits which we anticipate receiving in the third quarter of 1997. At Umatilla, we awarded a $567 million contract to Raytheon Demilitarization on February 10 and we have been issued a permit. In January 1997, we decided to conduct a National Environmental Policy Act analysis and to continue R&D supporting alternative technologies (neutralization vice baseline incineration) at bulk storage sites at Aberdeen and Newport.

APPENDIX C

DOD ARMS CONTROL BUDGET

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology is responsible for ensuring that the Military Services and Defense Agencies plan, program and budget to implement all arms control treaties and agreements. The proposed FY 98 DoD arms control budget is $316 million, which is a $34 million increase over FY 97 due largely to implementation planning costs for the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These funds are reflected in the FY 98 budget requests of the Military Services, the On-Site Inspection Agency, and the Defense Special Weapons Agency. Let me briefly outline the funding associated with some of the major treaties and agreements.

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) entered into force in June 1988, and all treaty limited items have been eliminated. Perimeter/portal continuous monitoring of facilities where INF missiles were once produced and/or assembled is ongoing at Magna, Utah and at Votkinsk, Russia. The DoD budget for INF of almost $24 million covers U.S. costs at these two facilities as well as for conducting 10 on-site inspections (OSIs) on the territory of the former Soviet Union and for escort activities related to 10 F5U OSIs on U.S. and Allied territory. Under a policy arrangement reached in 1994 and notified to the Congress, the United States reimbursed Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine a total of approximately $26,000 for the period December 1995 to May 1996 to cover a portion of U.S. inspection costs in these countries, which did not exercise their right to inspect U.S. INF facilities during that period. The Department is preparing to notify Congress of an additional $18,000 in reimbursements for June through November 1996.

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) entered into force in November 1992, and the United States has already completed all of its treaty-required reductions. We expect to conduct 30 inspections and receive 10 inspections per year and have budgeted approximately $22 million to support our CFE-related obligations.

The START I Treaty entered into force in December 1994, and the parties are well ahead of schedule in carrying out their respective reductions. The United States, for example, has already eliminated over 800 missile launchers and heavy bombers, about 70 percent of its eliminations planned under START I. The former Soviet states have made comparable progress, eliminating over 900 launchers and bombers, helped by U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance, which has facilitated the elimination of these treaty limited items. During the past treaty year, December 1995 to December 1996, the United States conducted 33 on-site inspections in the FSU, while the Russian Federation conducted 27 such inspections at U.S. facilities. Under the same 1994 policy arrangement mentioned previously, the United States reimbursed Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine a total of roughly $11,000 for the period January to June 1996 to cover a portion of U.S. inspection costs in these countries, which did not exercise their right to inspect U.S. START facilities during that period. The Department is preparing to notify Congress of an additional $45,000 in reimbursements for the remainder of 1996. The DoD budget supporting START I implementation is approximately $62 million, which includes funds for ongoing Minuteman silo and Poseidon SSBN elimination under this treaty.

The United States ratified the Open Skies Treaty in December 1993, but the treaty's entry into force is pending ratification by three additional treaty parties. We expect this to occur later this year. We are preparing to perform the treaty-required certification of the first operational OC-135 aircraft once the treaty enters into force. A second WC-135 aircraft has been modified and is also operational. Both aircraft will enable the United States to exercise its rights under the treaty. The Open Skies budget is approximately $18 million. For budgeting purposes, DoD has planned, after full treaty implementation, to conduct 22 annual observations and to be subject to 22 such observations. In addition to observations, we will also conduct training missions throughout the life of the treaty, including U.S.-only dress rehearsals and foreign joint training missions, as required.

Although the U.S. Senate gave its consent to ratification of the START II Treaty in January 1996, the Russian parliament is still considering this treaty. We are working with the Russian government to encourage ratification and remain hopeful that START II will enter into force. In the meantime, DoD is complying with the Congressional mandate in the FY 97 authorization act not to retire or dismantle specified strategic weapon systems before entry into force. However, the Department needs to be prepared for this event and has therefore budgeted about $25 million for START II implementation in FY 98, the majority of which is to procure long-lead items associated with downloading re-entry vehicles for the Navy and to fund additional On-site Inspection Agency activities.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was concluded and opened for signature in January 1993, with the United States as one of the original signatories. It will enter into force in April of this year. A Preparatory Commission, comprising signatory states, has been established to carry out preparations for CWC implementation. Related to the CWC is the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, which was signed in June 1990. The United States and Russia concluded (ad ref) update and implementation protocols for this agreement in March 1993. DoD has budgeted slightly over $62 million for CWC and BDA planning and implementation.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted and opened for signature in September 1996. There are currently about 142 nations that have signed the Treaty, including all five declared nuclear weapon states. All treaty signatories are now participating in a commission to prepare for entry into force and implementation of the Treaty. In particular, they are working out the details to establish an international CTBT Organization which will oversee implementation of the Treaty and of an international monitoring system -- a part of the treaties verification regime. DoD is also preparing for implementation and has budgeted approximately $59 million for this purpose. The CTBT will enter into force when 44 nations, named in the Treaty, deposit their instruments of ratification, but no earlier than September 24, 1998. Three of those 44 states -- India, Pakistan and North Korea -- have not yet signed the Treaty.

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