• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

[Page: H10950]

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

(Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 is intended to close loopholes in our counterproliferation laws in order to address a matter of critical concern to our national security, the risk that Iran may soon obtain from firms in Russia and elsewhere the capability of producing its own medium and long-range ballistic missiles.

This legislation enjoys extremely strong support on both sides of the aisle. At last count, over 263 Members had asked to be listed as cosponsors, including both the Speaker, Mr. Gingrich, and the Democratic leader, Mr. Gephardt. A companion measure in the Senate has 84 cosponsors, led by the Senate majority leader, Mr. Lott, and by Mr. Lieberman of Connecticut.

The urgency for this legislation is apparent from press reports. For more than a year, our Government has been in constant dialog with the Russian leadership regarding Russian assistance to the Iranian ballistic missile program. The meetings have been going on, more talks are scheduled, more summits are held, yet the Iranian military continues to make rapid progress in developing long-range missiles with critically needed assistance from Russian firms. Unless something happens soon, according to press reports, Iran is likely to achieve the ability to produce its own ballistic missiles within less than 1 year.

It is now time for the Congress to say that enough is enough. We need to back up our rhetoric on nonproliferation with meaningful action. With this legislation, we will be giving Russian firms compelling reasons not to trade with Iran. The sanctions which this legislation threatens to impose will force those firms to choose between their short-term profits from dealing with Iran and potentially far more lucrative long-term economic relations with our own Nation.

To make certain that the President takes a careful look at this legislation, the amendment before us also adds to our Iranian sanctions measure the text of Senate 610, the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997, which passed the Senate unanimously earlier this year. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention itself, which was controversial in the Senate, the implementing legislation is strongly supported all across the political spectrum, from the administration to Senators such as John Kyl and Jesse Helms who have led the fight against the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Mr. Speaker, in the 1980's the world stood by as Saddam Hussein built up the Iraqi arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. This bill will help make certain that Iran does not follow the example of its neighbors in Iraq and become the next threat to international stability. Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to join in support of this measure.

• Mr. Speaker, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 is intended to close loopholes in our counter-proliferation laws in order to address a matter of critical concern to our national security--the risk that Iran may soon obtain from firms in Russia and elsewhere the capability to produce its own medium and long-range ballistic missiles.

• This legislation enjoys extremely strong support on both sides of the aisle. At last count, 263 Members had asked to be listed as cosponsors, including both the Speaker, Mr. Gingrich, and the Democratic Leader, Mr. Gephardt. A companion measure in the Senate currently has 84 cosponsors, led by the Senate Majority Leader, Mr. Lott, and by Mr. Lieberman of Connecticut.

• Once implemented, this bill will help to stop the scourge of missile proliferation that directly threatens our troops and our allies throughout Europe and Asia. It will help the Administration in its efforts to stop Russian institutes and research facilities from assisting Iran's medium and long range missile program, and will defuse the growing Iranian missile threat in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.

• The urgency for this legislation is apparent from recent press accounts regarding the status of Iran's ballistic missile program. For more than a year, our government has been in a constant dialog with the Russian leadership on the issue of Russian assistance to the Iranian ballistic missile program.

• On April 14 of this year in a letter to Senator McConnell, the President assured the Congress that the Administration will `continue to engage the Russians at the highest levels on this sensitive subject to prevent any transfer or cooperation inconsistent with Russian government policy and contrary to its assurances to us.'

• However, several months--and many meetings--later, on September 11, State Department Spokesman Jim Foley noted that `We're very concerned by reports indicating that Russian entitles may have provided * * * missile assistance to Iran. * * * While we appreciate * * * assurances [from the Russian government], we remain disturbed by the discrepancy between these assurances and reports of Russian firms cooperating with Iran.'

• The meetings go on, more talks are scheduled, more summits are held, yet the Iranian military continues to make rapid progress in developing long range missiles with critically-needed assistance from Russian firms. Unless something happens soon, according to press reports, Iran is likely to achieve the ability to produce its own ballistic missiles within less than a year.

• It is now time for the Congress to say that enough is enough. We need to back up our rhetoric on nonproliferation with meaningful action. With the adoption of this bill, we will close the loopholes in our existing sanctions laws, and help the Administration convince the Russian government to act decisively to crack down on their cash-strapped institutes and firms.

• Equally important, with this legislation we will give those Russian institutes and firms compelling reasons not to trade with Iran. The sanctions this legislation threatens to impose will force those firms to choose between short-term profits from dealing with Iran and potentially far more lucrative long-term economic relations with our own Nation. Under this legislation, firms that sell missile technology to Iran will be denied all arms export licenses, all dual use export licenses, and all U.S. foreign assistance for at least two years.

• Now it is well-known that the Administration does not support this legislation. As is almost always the case, they would rather deal with proliferation to Iran through quiet diplomacy rather than through meaningful sanctions legislation.

• To make certain that the President takes a careful look at this legislation, the amendment before us adds to our Iranian sanctions measure the text of S. 610, the `Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997', which passed the Senate unanimously earlier this year. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention itself, which was very controversial in the Senate, the implementing legislation is strongly supported all across the political spectrum, from the Administration to Senators such as Jon Kyl and Jesse Helms, who led the fight against the Chemical Weapons Convention.

• There is one technical point with regard to the text of S. 610--now title II of H.R. 2709--that Chairman Hyde of our Judiciary Committee has asked me make.

• Section 603 of S. 610--which appears as section 273 of H.R. 2709--replaces the exceptions to the automatic stay in paragraphs (4) and (5) of 11 U.S.C. 362(b) with both a broader exemption for governmental units and explicit language embracing organizations exercising authority under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Although Members of this body were not involved in crafting this provision, we view it as important for the legislative history to emphasize that the new paragraph (4) relates only to enforcement of police and regulatory power--a term which cannot appropriately be given an expansive construction for purposes of interpreting the new Bankruptcy Code language. The automatic stay, for example, will continue to apply to the post-petition collection of pre-petition taxes because such collection efforts are not exercises of police and regulatory power within the meaning of new paragraph (4) of Bankruptcy Code section 362(b). The language of section 603 of S. 610--now section 273 of H.R. 2709--also explicitly excludes the enforcement of a money judgment--an exclusion designed to ensure that an exemption from the automatic stay cannot successfully be asserted for such an enforcement effort.

• Because enactment of S. 610 is an Administration priority, and because it is something that we in the House will ultimately pass in any event, we have linked it to H.R. 2709 in hopes that the two measures can be enacted together.

• Mr. Speaker, in the 1980s, the world stood by as Saddam Hussein built up his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and the recent events in that country indicate that we have yet to identify and uncover a number of these weapons. We cannot afford to pay any less attention to Iran as it shows every indication that it is fully prepared to use its petrodollars to purchase weapons systems that will threaten its neighbors and endanger our forces throughout the Persian Gulf region.

• Your support for this bill will help to ensure that Iran does not follow the example of its neighbor and become the next threat to international stability.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

[Page: H10951]

END