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[Page: E1477]

• Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing bipartisan legislation to express congressional sentiment that the proliferation of missile technology to Iran from any source in Russia be stopped.

• There is substantial evidence in support of allegations that Russian entities have provided assistance to Iran's missile program. According to February 1997 reports by the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Times, Russia has transferred SS-4 guidance components to Iran. In May, the Washington Times further reported that two Russian companies, the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute and Inor, had contracted with Iran to supply missile parts and technology, including a wind tunnel for missile design, missile design software, and laser equipment. In a recent unclassified report, the CIA said that Russia has been a primary source of missile-related goods to Iran.

• The transfer of this technology is serious. Missiles modeled on the Russian SS-4 would have a reach of 2000 km--enough to threaten United States installations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Israel, and our NATO ally Turkey. Ironically such capabilities also threaten the territory of Russia itself.

• Let's not forget the lessons of the Persian Gulf war, when Iran targeted Israel with SCUD missiles: rogue countries that have these capabilities will not be deterred. Next time they may choose to add chemical or biological warheads.

• I have expressed these concerns regarding Russian assistance to Iran to Vice President Gore, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. They assured me that the Administration would address this issue and subsequently, it did raise it with the highest levels of the Russian Government.

• In several meetings, I have also expressed my strong concern to Russian Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov. The Ambassador told me that the Russian Government shares our concern about the threat of proliferation. He said it is investigating seriously these allegations to determine responsibility. Yet, we have not seen any tangible efforts so far that Russia has tried to punish those entities responsible for exporting missile technology to Iran.

• Mr. Speaker, this resolution expresses the sense of Congress that the Russian Government take all appropriate steps to cease the cooperation between Russian entities and Iran. The Russian Government has the legislative and regulatory tools at its disposal to stop unauthorized transactions of missile technology. We are asking that they use them.

• If we do not see clear evidence that Russia has taken practical steps to stop missile assistance to Iran, the resolution calls on the United States to enact the sanctions provided for in Presidential Executive Order 12938 on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This means freezing the assets and seizing the property of those entities responsible for proliferation.

• The resolution also calls for tougher standards for providing United States aid to Russia.

• Lastly, the resolution urges our European allies to join us in taking action against those Russian organizations and individuals responsible for exports that violate international agreements.

• Mr. Speaker, we are aware of the special constraints on the Russian Federation as it seeks to improve its export control system--not the least of which are the economic conditions of that country. But stopping missile technology proliferation to Iran is in everyone's interest. It is time for Russia to act.

• I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan concurring resolution

END