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104th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 104-246
_______________________________________________________________________
CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE START II
TREATY
__________
R E P O R T
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
March 27 (legislative day, March 26), 1996.--Ordered to be printed
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania,
Chairman
J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice
Chairman
JOHN GLENN, Ohio RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BOB GRAHAM, Florida MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JON KYL, Arizona
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia CONNIE MACK, Florida
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
BOB DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota,
Ex Officio
------
Charles Battaglia, Staff Director
Christopher C. Straub, Minority
Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
104th Congress Report
SENATE
2d Session 104-246
_______________________________________________________________________
CAPABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE START II
TREATY
_______
March 27 (legislative day, March 26), 1996.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Specter, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
background
The START II Treaty, which was signed in Moscow on January
3, 1993, builds upon the reductions that are being implemented
pursuant to the Treaty between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Moscow on July
31, 1991 (the START I Treaty). The START I Treaty requires a
reduction of thirty to forty percent in the overall number of
long-range nuclear warheads deployed by both Parties, with a
fifty percent reduction in the most threatening systems. The
START II Treaty will further substantially reduce those
numbers. The START II Treaty's central limits require the
Parties to reduce their strategic offensive arms so that
specified limits are reached by the year 2003, with the
possibility of those limits being reached by the end of the
year 2000 if both Parties agree on a program of U.S. assistance
within a year after entry into force.
There are five Parties to the START I Treaty: the United
States and, as START I Treaty successors to the Soviet Union,
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, and
Ukraine, as well as the Russian Federation. In contrast, the
START II Treaty is bilateral: The United States and the Russian
Federation are its only Parties since, in association with the
Lisbon Protocol, the other three Parties to the START I Treaty
have pledged and are proceeding to eliminate strategic
offensive arms located on their territories. Nevertheless, the
START II Treaty draws upon the START I Treaty for definitions,
counting, rules, prohibitions, and verification provisions and
only modified those as necessary to meet unique requirements of
the START II Treaty. The START II Treaty is therefore built
upon the START I Treaty and could not enter into force without
the prior entry into force of the START I Treaty.
scope of the committee's effort
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee has formal
responsibility for reviewing all treaties before they are acted
upon by the full U.S. Senate, in light of the full spectrum of
policy concerns. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence has prepared this report, as well as a classified
report of over 100 pages, to support the ratification process
by providing the Senate its assessment of the arms control
monitoring and counterintelligence issues raised by this
Treaty.
This report is the culmination of the Committee's work over
the last thirteen years monitoring the progress of the START
negotiations. The Committee has routinely reviewed START
progress and addressed START monitoring capabilities in its
annual Intelligence Authorization Acts. Committee members and
staff have met numerous times with U.S. negotiators, in both
Washington and Geneva. The Committee has expressed its views on
verification issues to the negotiators and to other senior
level officials both formally and informally.
In preparation for the Senate vote on advice and consent to
ratification of the START II Treaty, Committee staff held
numerous staff briefings; reviewed hundreds of documents,
including National Intelligence Estimates of U.S. capabilities
to monitor compliance with START provisions and written
statements from the Director and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence; and asked numerous formal questions for the
record. Committee staff also travelled to our intelligence
operations to gain a more detailed, first-hand knowledge of how
the Intelligence Community collects, and how its analysts use,
information bearing upon other countries' compliance with arms
control agreements signed by the United States.
On May 12, 1993, the Committee held a closed hearing on the
START II Treaty, its implementation and its counterintelligence
and security implications. Testimony was taken at this hearing
from the Honorable Linton Brooks, U.S. Negotiator for Strategic
Offensive Arms; Major General Gary Curtin, USAF, Deputy
Director for International Negotiations, J-5, the Joint Staff;
and Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic Programs.
On March 1, 1995, the Committee held a closed hearing on
U.S. monitoring capabilities and the risks and implications of
violations by the other party to the Treaty. At this hearing,
the Committee took testimony from Mr. Douglas MacEachin, Deputy
Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency;
Ambassador Linton Brooks, Chief U.S. START Negotiator; and Dr.
Amy Sands, Assistant Director, Bureau of Intelligence,
Verification and Information Support, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
The Committee has also received numerous responses to
questions for the record that were submitted to the Executive
branch after these hearings, and the results of these inquiries
have been integrated into this report.
Throughout the Committee's efforts, experts in the U.S.
Intelligence Community have provided generously of their time
and insight. They also produced a detailed and honest analysis
of the strengths and limitations of U.S. monitoring
capabilities, in 1993, and an update of this and a related
analysis in 1995. The Committee has been especially pleased to
find in these analyses a straightforward discussion of the
differences between agencies on some major issues. The Report
of the Committee draws heavily on the 1993 analysis and could
not have been prepared without the Intelligence Community's
assistance.
textual, legal and regional issues
The President's submission to the Senate
The Treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Arms (the START II Treaty) consists of the main
Treaty text and three documents which are integral parts
thereof:
The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of
Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of
Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and
Conversion Protocol);
The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspection of Heavy
Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of American and the Russian Federation on
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and
The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead
Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the
Treaty Between the United States of American and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on
Attribution).
Also submitted to the Senate for its information were
documents that are associated with, but not integral parts of,
the START II Treaty. These included three exchanges of letters
between the two sides, addressing SS-18 missiles on the
territory of Kazakstan, heavy bomber armaments, and heavy ICBM
silo conversion. Although not submitted for the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, these documents are
relevant to the consideration of the START II Treaty by the
Senate.
The Treaty text
As noted earlier, there is an integral relationship between
the START I Treaty and the START II Treaty with respect to the
formalities of the entry into force of the two Treaties, and
this is true also with respect to every aspect of
implementation of the START II Treaty. Indeed, paragraph 1 of
Article V states that, except as otherwise specifically
provided for, ``the provisions of the START I Treaty, including
the verification provisions, shall be used for implementation
of this Treaty.'' Thus, whenever a question arises, reference
must be made to the START I Treaty. It is on this basis that
the terms used throughout the START II Treaty have their
meaning. This means that terms such as ``reduction and
limitation'' and ``strategic offensive arms'' are to be
understood in precisely the same manner as in the START I
Treaty.
Article 1, paragraph 1, obligates the United States and
Russia each to reduce its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and
SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, along with ICBM and SLBM
warheads and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that by seven
years after entry into force of the START Treaty neither party
has more than a total of 4250 warheads attributable to deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers, as counted
pursuant to Articles III and IV of the Treaty. Paragraph 2 of
Article 1 sets forth sublimits within the overall 4250 limit
that each party must observe: (a) 2160 for deployed SLBMs; (b)
1200 for those types of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is
attributed; and (c) 650 for deployed heavy ICBMs.
Paragraph 3 of Article 1 provides that once a party has
fulfilled its obligations pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall
continue the reductions process so that by January 1, 2003, it
does not have more than a total of 3500 warheads attributable
to its deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy
bombers. Paragraph 4 of Article 1 establishes the sublimits
applicable to the aggregate of 3500 (or less if a party decides
on a lower aggregate number for itself), as follows: (a) 1750
for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs; (b) zero for
warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more
than one warhead is attributed; and (c) zero for warheads
attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.
The effect of these reductions is that by January 1, 2003,
the aggregate number for deployed warheads must not exceed 3500
(no more than 1750 of which can be attributed to deployed
SLBMs) and neither party may have a deployed launcher of an
ICBM to which more than one warhead is attributed, a deployed
launcher of heavy ICBMs, or any heavy ICBMs or heavy-ICBM
launch canisters. Such language is redundant, as the only
deployed heavy ICBM (the SS-18) is in fact a deployed ICBM of a
type to which more than one warhead is attributed and, under
the terms of both the START and the START II Treaties, the
number of warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs may not be reduced
through downloading. In light of the separate reference to
heavy ICBMs that is maintained throughout the START Treaty and
in the START II Treaty for other purposes, however, the
separate treatment in subparagraph 4(c) of Article 1 is
designed to leave no doubt that the complete elimination of
heavy ICBMs is necessary.
Under the rules for elimination, launchers may be either
destroyed or converted and, in most cases, the missiles need
not be destroyed. All heavy ICBM silo launchers must be
destroyed (except for ninety that may be converted under
stringent procedures) and all heavy ICBMs and their launch
canisters must also be destroyed. There is no specific legal
obligation in START II to reduce at a given rate; thus, Russia
is not obligated to eliminate or convert a minimum of thirty-
five SS-18 silo launchers a year, although the START I
commitment (in letters of July 30, 1991, signed by the U.S. and
Soviet representatives) to eliminate twenty-two per year
remains. Eliminating or converting substantially fewer that
thirty-five per year over a sustained period, however, could
cause concern with regard to compliance with the commitment, as
the Executive branch has noted.
Article II states the exception to the above requirement
for launchers which are allowed under the START I Treaty at
space launch facilities. ICBM launchers that have been
converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be
capable of launching an ICBM of a former type. (This does not
include those silos for ICBMs which have been reduced in the
number of warheads they can launch, which will remain capable
of launching such missiles with more than the attributed number
of warheads.) No more than ninety silo launchers of heavy ICBMs
may be converted in this way; the remainder must be physically
destroyed. Only SS-25-type ICBMs can be installed in the
converted heavy launchers. Each party has the right to inspect
the destruction of heavy ICBMs and their launcher canisters, as
well as the conversion of silo launchers for heavy ICBMs. Both
parties agree not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient
whatsoever. Neither party will produce, acquire, flight-test,
or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed.
Article II sets forth the rules for reducing the warhead
attribution of (i.e., for downloading) existing types of ICBMs
and SLBMs other than heavy ICBMs. Like the START I Treaty,
START II bans downloading of heavy ICBMs and of new types of
ICBMs and SLBMs. The parties can exceed the START I limit on
total warhead downloading of 1250 and the 500-warhead limit on
downloading ICBMs and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III
ICBM and the Russian SS-19 SLBM. This article allows the United
States to maintain its sea-based leg of the Triad while meeting
the limit of 1,750-SLBM warheads, and it allows the Russians to
download 105 SS-19 ICBMs from six warheads to one, thus
allowing them to retain the missiles after the January 1, 2003,
deadline for the removal of MIRVed ICBMs. Reentry vehicle
platform destruction is not required in this case, allowing the
Russians to meet the lower limits in a more economical manner
than that which will still be required for downloading to meet
START I obligations (but perhaps making uploading--the
restoration of downloaded warheads--a more feasible breakout
scenario). The uploading of downloaded ICBMs or SLBMs is
banned.
Article IV establishes the constraints on heavy bombers.
This specifies that the number of nuclear warheads attributed
to a deployed heavy bomber shall be equal to the number of
nuclear weapons with which any bomber of that type or variant
is actually equipped. This is a significant departure from the
START I Treaty, under which 150 U.S. and 180 Soviet ALCM-
equipped heavy bombers were discounted up to fifty percent and
only one warhead was attributed to heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear weapons other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. For START
II purposes, the United States successfully argued that each
bomber should be counted as having the largest number of
nuclear weapons for which any bomber of that type or variant
would be actually deployed. Both sides agreed that the number
of warheads attributed to a heavy bomber of a given type or
variant of a type would be the number listed in the Memorandum
on Attribution.
The Memorandum requires a one-time exhibition of one heavy
bomber of each type and variant for the purpose of
demonstrating the number of nuclear weapons for which such
bombers are actually equipped. These exhibitions are to be
conducted no later than 180 days after entry into force. Each
Party can increase or decrease the number of warheads for which
a heavy bomber is actually equipped, but this requires another
exhibition of the same sort as just described.
Each party may reorient to a conventional role those heavy
bombers that have never been accountable under the START I
Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
The right to reorient bombers to a conventional role is in
addition to the right under START I to convert, using specified
procedures, no more than seventy-six heavy bombers to heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Heavy bombers which
are reoriented to a conventional role are to be segregated as
to basing and may not be used in nuclear missions or nuclear
exercises, nor can their crews train or exercise for nuclear
missions. Each party has the right to return heavy bombers to a
nuclear role once, with ninety-days' notice. Reoriented bombers
must be based at least one hundred kilometers away from storage
areas for heavy-bomber nuclear armaments, and are subject to
inspection. If only some bombers of a given type are
reoriented, then those bombers must be distinguished from the
nuclear types in a manner observable by National Technical
Means.
The Committee has found no aspects of the START II text
that are likely to cause compliance issues because of the
manner in which they are worded. Indeed, START II, by banning
flight-tests and deployment of MIRVed ICBMs after 2003, may
lessen the likelihood of compliance issues regarding the number
of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM is equipped or tested;
it should generally be easier to determine the presence or
absence of MIRVs than to determine (or agree upon) whether a
numerical limit has been exceeded.
One aspect of START II may increase the likelihood of
compliance concerns related to START I. By banning MIRVed ICBMs
after 2003, START II is likely to lead Russia to produce and
deploy more SS-25-type mobile ICBMs. Increased reliance upon
that system could cause Russia to approach the limit of 250
non-deployed mobile ICBMs in Article IV, paragraph 1(a), of
START I. Given U.S. uncertainties regarding total production
numbers for Russian ICBMs, analysts may well, at some point, be
unable to assure U.S. policy makers that Russia does not have
enough undeclared mobile ICBMs to exceed this START I limit.
Possession of undeclared missiles would be a START violation in
any case, but concern that any such missiles would also violate
a START I numerical limit might make the issue more salient.
One aspect of START I, which is also relevant to START II,
has already required diplomatic discussions and a new Joint
Statement (issued by START I's Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission on September 28, 1995). This is the question of when
a space launch vehicle (or SLV) shall also be considered an
ICBM or SLBM. The Committee's 1992 report on START I monitoring
capabilities (S. Rpt. 102-431) indicated a compliance issue
could result from the fact that START did not specify how SLV
stages must differ from the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs in
order not to be subject to the Treaty's limits.\1\ The SLV
issue is discussed in some detail later in the present report.
\1\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Capability of the
United States to Monitor Compliance with the START Treaty, S. Rpt. 102-
431 (September 29, 1992), p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
START II and the States of the former Soviet Union
The Executive branch believes the likelihood is small that
rising political tensions between the states of the former
Soviet Union would adversely affect the drawdowns under the
START treaties in the near term. Russia has agreements with
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan that are supposed to result in
the elimination or the withdrawal of the strategic nuclear
forces that were on their territory when the USSR dissolved.
Kazakstan
At START I entry into force (EIF), the Russians declared
two ICBM bases in Kazakstan with a total of 104 SS-18 heavy
ICBM silos and sixty-nine deployed SS-18 ICBMs; fifty-three at
Derzhavinsk, with thirty-one deployed ICBMs; and fifty-two
silos at Zhangiz Tobe, with thirty-eight deployed ICBMs. Since
EIF, the fifty-two silos at Zhangiz Tobe have been eliminated;
the United States has conducted a closeout inspection of this
base.
Roughly half of the original fifty-two declared silos at
the Derzhavinsk base have been eliminated. In the September 5,
1995, START I Notification of Annual Schedule for Conversion
and Elimination applicable to the Republic of Kazakstan during
Treaty Year Two, Russia indicated that the last twenty-four SS-
18 ICBM silos would be eliminated by July 2, 1996.
At EIF, the Russians also declared two non-deployed SS-18
ICBMs at the Leninsk Test Range, as well as ten SS-18 test
silos. The two missiles were eliminated earlier this year and
roughly half of the SS-18 test silos have been eliminated.
Ukraine
Pursuant to the terms of the January 1994 Russia-U.S.-
Ukraine agreement, Moscow is to provide Ukraine with nuclear
fuel rods for the latter's power reactors as a form of
compensation for the return of the warheads. Earlier this year,
a suspension of warhead withdrawals was announced, due to
compensation issues. Although the nuclear weapons remaining in
Ukraine are scheduled to be returned to Russia by May/June
1996, further compensation difficulties could cause additional
delays. The compensation issue may have been somewhat defused
by the recent Russian-Ukrainian agreement under which Russia
will purchase from Ukraine some thirty-two SS-19s, nineteen Tu-
160 blackjack and twenty-five Tu-95 strategic bombers, and
nearly 300 cruise missiles.
Ukraine manufactured two of Russia's most modern MIRVed
ICBMs, the SS-18 and the SS-24. At least to the extent that
tensions persist between Ukraine and Russia, the feasibility of
cheating scenarios involving covert production of those systems
may be significantly diminished. The United States had the
right under START I, to conduct perimeter and portal continuous
monitoring (PPCM) at the SS-24 final assembly facility at
Pavlohrad to count the number of ICBMs, if any, that exited
that portal. Since SS-24 production ended, however, the U.S.
right to conduct PPCM at Pavlohrad ceased as of May 31, 1995;
PPCM can only be conducted there again if SS-24 production
should resume.
Belarus
To date all but eighteen of the single-warhead SS-25 ICBMs
and their warheads originally deployed in Belarus have been
returned to Russia. Two regiments remain, one at Lida and the
other at Mozyr.
The withdrawals appeared to be proceeding on schedule until
July 1995, when Belarusian President Lukashenko reportedly
suspended nuclear weapons shipments to Russia, claiming that
Belarus should be fairly compensated for economic and financial
hardships stemming from the departure of Russian troops and
environmental damage at former Russian missile sites.
Belarusian officials have stated that all SS-25s will be
withdrawn by the end of 1996, the date specified in their
bilateral agreement ratified by the Belarusian Supreme Soviet
in November 1993. However, in the Committee's view, President
Lukashenko's recent tendencies to act in a more authoritarian
and arbitrary manner suggest that the original withdrawal
schedule is not guaranteed.
The Intelligence Community has a general understanding of
the various bilateral and multilateral agreements involving
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan for the return of
nuclear weapons in the newly independent states. The
Intelligence Community indicates that any suspension or
cessation in the withdrawals can be detected with high
confidence.
START I does not ban production in the non-Russian states
of items banned by START II. Ukraine was the producer of major
START II-banned items (i.e., the SS-18 and SS-24). If START II
should not be ratified, Russia might turn to Ukraine to replace
those SS-18s and SS-24s that Russia decided to maintain under
START I when they reached the end of their service life. In any
event, Ukraine may attempt to maintain cooperation with Russia
on future missile programs and to develop space launch
vehicles; but Russia has not announced any plans to purchase
such items.
Missile proliferation, however, continues to be of concern.
There has been proliferation activity in both Russia and
elsewhere, as exemplified by the reported seizure of Russian
``advanced guidance equipment, such as accelerometers and
gyroscopes,'' in transit to Iraq.\2\ Some of this activity may
well occur without official government knowledge, as designers
or producers make their own deals. The Russian Government
professes support of the goals of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), and it would constitute a START Treaty
violation to sell strategic systems.
\2\ ``U.N. Is Said to Find Russian Markings on Iraq-Bound
Equipment,'' The Washington Post, December 15, 1995, p. A30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intelligence support
The Intelligence Community, represented by the Special
Assistant to the DCI for Arms Control, was deeply involved in
the senior-level interagency process that led to the
development of U.S. positions during the START II negotiations.
The Community presented critical analysis of the implications
of the breakup of the Soviet Union for that country's nuclear
infrastructure, which provided insights into Russian
negotiating behavior. Moreover, the Intelligence Community
helped design specific provisions that were included in the
Treaty to complement U.S. monitoring capabilities and to
interact synergistically with national intelligence means to
enhance those monitoring capabilities.
u.s. monitoring capabilities
As is the case with START I monitoring, the United States
will rely upon a combination of capabilities--including
imagery, signals intelligence, human intelligence, open-source
information and the verification provisions of the START I and
START II Treaties--to monitor compliance with the provisions of
START II. Those verification provisions include on-site
inspections, exhibitions of equipment for either on-site or
satellite-based observation, perimeter and portal continuous
monitoring (PPCM), notifications, unencrypted telemetry, and
exchanges of data, including telemetry. Despite the strapped
resources and systems and personnel reductions thus far in the
post-Cold War era,\3\ the Intelligence Community assesses a
high probability of detecting questionable activity that might
be contrary to the Treaty.
\3\ The Director of Central Intelligence summarized these
difficulties in a public statement on January 10, 1995; see Worldwide
Intelligence Review, Hearing before the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the United States Senate, S. Hrg. 104-15, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee agrees with the Intelligence Community that
U.S. National Technical Means are generally sufficient to
monitor compliance with both START Treaties. Congress has
endeavored to maintain and enhance those capabilities in the
intelligence budget for Fiscal Year 1996, as well as in past
years. The Committee has concern, however, that U.S.
capabilities could be insufficient if competition for scarce
collection and analytic resources were intense and if Russian
practices were to change in ways designed to impede U.S.
monitoring. As noted below, the Committee recommends that the
President be required to certify the sufficiency of U.S.
monitoring capabilities regarding those START II provisions
relating to ICBM and SLBM capabilities and to report to
Congress on how such sufficiency will be assured. The Committee
also urges the Executive branch to pursue a firm policy
regarding Russian actions that may violate the terms of START I
or START II, including the verification provisions of those
Treaties.
Monitoring Russian missile tests
The Intelligence Community's monitoring confidences reflect
a vastly changed world from that of a decade ago. The end of
the Cold War has brought a substantial refocusing of U.S.
intelligence from the old Soviet Union to a much wider variety
of threats to the national security. Indicative of this change
is the fact that in the Fiscal Year 1996 budget process, the
Department of Defense opposed funding the COBRA DANE radar in
Shemya, Alaska. In order to protect that important arms control
monitoring system, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) stepped in and took responsibility for its funding. The
Congress instead restored full funding for the COBRA DANE
platform in the FY 1996 Intelligence Authorization Act, an
action that both Defense Appropriations Subcommittees have
sustained.
Some other systems that monitor Russian missile tests face
uncertain funding futures or are increasingly diverted to other
intelligence priorities, or even to non-intelligence functions.
Although intelligence officials remain confident of overall
U.S. monitoring capabilities, they have acknowledged that these
actions affect those capabilities.
The Committee finds it unacceptable that coverage by
National Technical Means of Russian strategic missiles--still
the systems with by far the greatest capability to effect the
nuclear destruction of U.S. territory--should be available only
at the expense of other important intelligence priorities. The
Committee recommends that the resolution of advice and consent
to ratification of the START II Treaty be conditioned on a
requirement that the President certify and, within ninety days
of depositing instruments of ratification, submit to the
Congress a plan for ensuring, continued adequate monitoring of
Russian ICBM and SLBM capabilities.
Treaty provisions to enhance monitoring
All START I provisions designed to enhance verification,
including those that guarantee access to telemetry data from
ballistic missile test flights, will continue to apply under
START II. In addition, START II provides for supplementary on-
site inspections that will enhance the Intelligence Community's
ability to monitor the Treaty's unique provisions. The value of
these Treaty provisions for U.S. monitoring varies, depending
on the task. In some cases, the United States can obtain the
same information from other sources. In other cases, the
information gained--particularly from on-site inspections--will
be unique and will help to reduce many of the Intelligence
Community's uncertainties over time.
In addition to the START I Treaty's thirteen types of
inspections, START II's new on-site inspection provisions will
be as follows:
The United States will have the right to observe the
elimination of all declared SS-18 missile airframes
that are not launched, as well as all launch canisters
from declared SS-18s.
The United States will have the right to confirm by
direct measurement that five meters of concrete have
been poured into converted SS-18 silos, as well as to
observe the entire process of concrete pouring, and to
measure the inner diameter of the restrictive ring
installed in the upper portion of each silo.
The United States will have the right to conduct four
additional RV inspections per year at converted SS-18
silos to confirm the single-RV load of the new SS-25-
type missile, observe the upper portion of its canister
for identification purposes, and confirm the continued
presence of the restrictive ring.
During special heavy bomber exhibitions and all
short-notice inspections of heavy bombers after the
START I baseline period (which has already ended), the
United States will have the right to inspect the
interiors of weapons bays and external weapons
attachment points.
Dealing with the ``Parallel Accounts'' issue
The START I and START II Treaties account for some systems
differently. In addition, START II requires the monitoring of
several elements that are not monitored under START I. The
major systems that could potentially be affected by these
differences in accounting are heavy bombers and SS-18 and SS-19
ICBMs.
Under START I, the number of warheads attributed to each
bomber type was a negotiated figure and was not the number of
warheads which that type of heavy bomber was actually capable
of carrying. START II provides that the number of warheads
attributed to heavy bombers be the number of warheads declared
to be carried by each bomber type. The chart below illustrates
the differences in the warhead attribution for each of the
Russian heavy bomber types:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
START I START II
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BLACKJACK....................................... 8 12
BEAR H16........................................ 8 16
BEAR H6......................................... 8 6
BEAR G.......................................... 1 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The START II Treaty right to ``reorient'' up to one hundred
heavy bombers to being conventional heavy bombers creates
another difference between the two Treaties' accounting rules.
START I does not make any provisions for conventional bombers.
Therefore, a group of bombers under START I could be counted as
having eight warheads per bomber, while under START II they
were considered ``reoriented'' conventional heavy bombers with
zero warheads. While the United States may ``reorient'' some of
its heavy bombers, Russia has indicated no intent to do so.
The difference in attributing warheads for the SS-19 ICBM
arises because of the different counting rules for downloaded
missiles in the two Treaties. Under START I, ICBMs may not be
counted as having been downloaded by more than four warheads.
In START II, by contrast, Russia is permitted to download the
six-warhead SS-19 ICBM to a single warhead. While START II
permits up to 105 ICBMs to be downloaded in this manner and to
count as single-warhead ICBMs, they would still count in START
I as having either two or four warheads (depending on whether
or not the Russians installed a new RV platform required in
START I if a missile is to be credited as being downloaded by
more than two warheads).
The Executive branch reports that it has taken steps to
preclude confusion between START I and START II accounting.
Thus, when START II enters into force, U.S. inspection teams
will be provided both START I and START II data to support
their inspections. A single inspection will do double duty for
both treaties, so a thorough knowledge of both treaties by team
members (especially team chiefs) will be essential. The
Department of Defense On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is
planning specific training sessions for its inspectors and
escorts highlighting the accounting difference between START I
and START II. In addition, OSIA will revise its current START I
inspection reports and coordinate with the other Parties to
ensure that START I and START II accounting are properly
accomplished and documented in the formal inspection reports on
both sides.
start ii monitoring tasks
The tasks and monitoring confidences associated with
monitoring Russian compliance with START II will be similar to
those for START I. The primary task under START II is to
monitor reductions of Russian strategic offensive arms beyond
those mandated by START I, in particular the elimination of all
MIRVed ICBMs. Additional tasks include:
Monitoring the ban on the production, flight-testing,
acquisition, and deployment of MIRVed ICBMs after
January 1, 2003 (or perhaps earlier);
Ascertaining that the conversion of up to 90 SS-18
silos, the elimination of all other SS-18 silos, and
the elimination of SS-18 missiles and canisters are
carried out according to the specified procedures;
Monitoring downloaded SS-19s to confirm that each
carries only a single warhead;
Monitoring new types of ICBMs to ascertain that they
do not have a MIRV capability;
Monitoring the number of nuclear weapons with which
Russian heavy bombers are actually equipped; and
Monitoring any heavy bombers reoriented for
conventional roles to ensure that they do not carry
nuclear weapons and that they or their crews are not
used in training for nuclear missions.
START II provides for additional on-site inspections that
will help the Intelligence Community accomplish some of these
monitoring tasks. START I provisions calling for notifications
of all movement of Treaty-limited items will also assist the
united States in monitoring eliminations, conversions, and new
deployments.
principal strengths in start ii monitoring
The Intelligence Community judges that it can monitor with
virtual certainty the elimination or conversion of declared
items and the number of deployed silo-based ICBMs, SLBMs and
heavy bombers that remain in the force. Treaty provisions
designed to enhance verification play important roles in
augmenting U.S. National Technical Means in this regard. The
ten annual RV inspections permitted under START I will help
assure, over time, that those silos are not being used for
MIRVed missiles, and the four extra RV inspections at converted
SS-18 silos that are provided for in START II will add
assurance regarding heavy ICBMs.
One particularly important aspect of START II verification
would be the on-site inspection of SS-18 heavy ICBM silo
conversions, to guard against a break-out scenario involving
speedy reconversion of SS-18 silos. In accordance with Section
II paragraph 6, of the Protocol on Procedures Governing
Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing
Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, U.S. inspectors
could either physically witness the pouring of the five meters
of concrete in the bottom of the silo or measure silo depth
before and after the concrete was poured. In order to guard
against improper implementation of the conversion procedures,
the Committee urges the Executive branch to exercise its START
II Treaty ``right to observe the entire process of pouring
concrete into each [SS-18] silo . . . that is to be converted,
and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring.''
The Intelligence Community generally expects to be able to
monitor the ban on flight-testing of MIRVed ICBMs after 2003,
assuming it receives the good telemetry data mandated by START
I. The Committee notes the importance of the START I provisions
regarding the transmission and provision of missile flight test
telemetry and interpretive data, and urges the Executive branch
to adopt the firmest practicable policy regarding Russian
compliance with those provisions.
most serious start ii monitoring uncertainties
Monitoring missile production and storage and,
consequently, the number of non-deployed missiles is inherently
difficult. At facilities where the United States conducts
continuous perimeter and portal monitoring, the Intelligence
Community's uncertainties are low. Uncertainties are higher,
however, in estimates of missile production at facilities not
subject to continuous monitoring or on-site inspection. As the
Director of Central Intelligence stated in the START I context,
``it is possible that some undeclared missiles have been stored
at unidentified facilities.'' \4\
\4\ The START Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, S. Hrg. 102-607, Pt. 2 (June 23, 25,
26 and 30, 1992), p. 160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As in 1992, when the Committee reported on U.S.
capabilities to monitor compliance with the START I Treaty, a
cheating scenario involving covert production and deployment of
mobile ICBMs--and especially of MIRVed ICBMs--and their
launchers would be particularly worrisome.\5\ The Committee
continues to believe that the possible existence of covert,
non-deployed mobile missiles must remain an important U.S.
intelligence target.
\5\ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Capability of the
United States . . ., p.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uncertainties in the estimates of numbers of non-deployed
missiles will make it difficult for the Intelligence Community
to determine whether all SS-18 airframes have been declared and
eliminated as required by START II. On the other hand, SS-18
missiles and canisters are not mobile, are the largest
ballistic missile system in the Russian force, and require
substantial equipment for handling and transport. Storing and
maintaining a covert force of any significant size would be a
major undertaking and would increase the risk of detection. As
SS-18 silos are destroyed or converted, moreover, the military
utility of any undeclared missiles should steadily diminish.
The Intelligence Community is quite confident of its ability to
monitor the essentially irreversible conversion of SS-18 silos.
Because heavy bomber weapon loadings can easily be changed,
the Intelligence Community will find it difficult to determine
whether Russian heavy bombers are equipped with more than the
number of nuclear weapons they are declared to carry. As noted
earlier, however, at least START II attributes more nuclear
weapons to these bombers than does START I. When the Committee
considered this matter in the START I context, the Executive
branch emphasized that ``heavy bombers are inherently
stabilizing, and . . . they play a more important role in the
U.S. strategic force structure than in the Russian. . . .''
General Curtin noted at the time that cheating scenarios ``that
involve heavy bombers and ALCMs . . . generally pose little
risk of militarily significant violations. Heavy bombers and
ALCMs are slow flyers which offer little potential for a
surprise attack.'' \6\
\6\ Ibid., p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
monitoring the number of rvs on a missile
As the Committee noted in its 1992 report, U.S.
intelligence alone cannot reliably monitor the number of re-
entry vehicles actually on a deployed missile. But on-site
inspections of randomly-selected missiles can lead to a
statistical confidence, over time, that the Russians have not
deployed illegal missiles at declared locations.\7\ START II
would not change the feasibility of cheating scenarios that
might involve the ``uploading'' of downloaded missiles,
although its provisions permitting more downloading than under
START I, its ban on MIRVed ICBMs after 2003 and its lower
limits on total nuclear warheads could increase the perceived
benefit of a successful cheating scenario.
\7\ Ibid. While the likelihood of finding a given illegal missile
might be small, one can conclude from elementary sampling theory that
the probability of detecting at least one such missile would be
substantial if illegal missiles were deployed in a large number of
silos subject to inspection. The Intelligence Community is confident
that with the fourteen RV inspections permitted annually under START I
and START II, consistent findings of compliance would produce, within a
few years, a very high level of confidence that no significant number
of illegal missiles was deployed at declared sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Downloading always carries the risk, moreover, that Russia
would engage in a breakout option. That is, while it might not
be practicable for the Russians to covertly upload their
downloaded missiles, they could more-or-less-overtly upload the
missiles in the event of a serious crisis.
The Join Staff representative at the Committee's May 12,
1993, hearing testified that, in the Joint Staff's view, no
potential cheating scenario posed a sufficient threat that
would be judge militarily significant by the United States.
Specifically addressing the risk of a Russian breakout through
missile uploading, he added that the U.S. side's ability to
restore its own forces to higher levels would be more than
equal to the challenge.
the issue of space launch vehicles (slvs) based on icbms
Both START I and START II permit the elimination of ICBMs
and SLBMs ``by using such missiles for delivering objects into
the upper atmosphere or space,'' i.e., by use as a space launch
vehicle (or SLV), although that term is not used in the
treaties. Russia has tested and advertised at least two SLVs
based upon ICBMs: the ``Rokot'' SLV, based on the SS-19; and
the ``Start'' SLV, based on the SS-25. (The ``Start'' SLV uses
the Russian-language word for ``start,'' which is unrelated to
the Treaty acronym.) No telemetry or START Treaty-required
notifications were provided for the tests of these vehicles,
and Russia asserted in 1994 and early 1995 that so long as the
whole SLV was clearly different from an ICBM or SLBM, it was
not (or should not be) covered by the START Treaty. The United
States objected to those statements and actions at the time.
In March of 1995, a ``Start'' SLV exited the Votkinsk
Machine Building Plant in two sections, which triggered a START
Treaty provision (the Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement) that
could force reclassification of the SS-25 ICBM as a missile
that is transported in stages. U.S. insistence upon
implementation of that START Treaty provision had the potential
to make Russian compliance with the Treaty impossible, because
U.S. inspectors would have gained the right to inspect the
insides of each SS-25 missile canister--in the field, as well
as at the Votkinsk exit portal--to ensure that it did not
contain two SS-25 first stages.
Faced with both this embarrassing dilemma and high-level
U.S. concern (which included discussions between Vice President
Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin), Russia at length
agreed to the U.S. interpretation of the START Treaty and, on
September 28, 1995, initialed Joint Statement Number 21 on
Space Launch Vehicles that Incorporate First Stages or ICBMs or
SLBMs. The first paragraph of the Joint Statement states that
all the Parties to START I: . . . confirm that the first stage
of an ICBM or SLBM . . . that is incorporated into a space
launch vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty, and
that, for the purposes of the Treaty, such a space launch
vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty relating to
ICBMs or SLBMs as an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
This provision has several implications, which are spelled
out in later paragraphs of the Joint Statement. First, it makes
clear that merely adding new features to an old first stage
does not remove that first stage from START (or, by
implication, from START II if that treaty should enter into
force). Secondly, the whole SLV that incorporates a Treaty-
limited first stage--and not just the first stage of that SLV--
is covered by START. Hence, pursuant to the Thirty-first Agreed
Statement to START I, telemetry from launches of such an SLV
must include telemetry from the later stages until ``such
objects either are in orbit or have achieved escape velocity.''
Finally, an SLV using the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a
given type will count as an ICBM or SLBM of that type, rather
than as a new type of ICBM or SLBM.
The second paragraph of the Joint Statement makes clear
that the Parties can agree, on a case-by-case basis, not to
require that an ICBM stored in a canister be reclassified as
one stored in stages, just because an SLV based on it is stored
in stages. The third paragraph specifies that the SS-25 will
not be reclassified as a result of the ``Start'' SLV,
``provided that the sections of the launch canister of the
`Start' space launch vehicle are maintained, stored, and
transported together, solely in this configuration, until the
`Start' space launch vehicle is prepared at a space launch
facility or test range for launch.''
The eighth paragraph of the Joint Statement confirms that a
space launch facility may be located outside the territory of a
Party to START. It also confirms, however, that the Party
``shall retain ownership and control of such ICBMs or SLBMs,
including such space launch vehicles, as well as their
launchers and support equipment.'' Thus, a space launch vehicle
that uses the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM may not be
exported, but it may be launched from a declared foreign site.
An SLV that only uses one or more upper stages from an ICBM or
SLBM, however, would not be subject to such START I or START II
limitations.
russian start ii compliance incentives
Russian critics of START II argue that the Treaty benefits
the United States because it does little to restrict heavy
bombers and SLBMs, which are considered U.S. strengths, while
it bans MIRVed ICBMs. They also argue that Russia cannot afford
the new single-RV ICBMs that START II compliance will require
it to field. The Executive branch has assured the Committee,
however, that, on balance, there is little incentive for Russia
to cheat on either START I or START II.
The disincentives for Russia to cheat are substantial. Many
cheating scenarios, such as the reconversion of converted SS-18
silos, would risk U.S. detection. The most feasible cheating
scenarios would yield only small gains; thus, covertly
reMIRVing all the 105 single-RV SS-19s allowed under START II
would increase the number of Russian RVs by only about fifteen
percent. And such scenarios as the covert production of large
numbers of ICBMs and their launchers would require a
considerable investment of scarce resources.
Despite these disincentives, however, the Committee urges
the Intelligence Community to base its collection and analysis
priorities upon a more cautious appreciation of the record of
Soviet and Russian compliance with arms control agreements.
Thus, it is hard to see how a purely rational analysis would
have led the Soviet Union to build a large phased array radar
near Krasnoyarsk. In the future, outmoded Russian doctrine
could persist because of individual or collective inertia in
adjusting to a changed world; or bureaucratic rivalries could
lead a portion of the Russian military to resist central
decisions to comply with START provisions.
u.s. readiness to implement start ii verification
The Department of Defense On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)
would be ready to implement START II as soon as it was ratified
and entered into force. START I baseline operations began on
March 1, 1995, so that treaty's 120-day intensive period will
not overlap with START II operations. From a logistical
standpoint, START II inspections and eliminations would closely
resemble those conducted under INF and START I. Team
composition would be as in INF and START I, with the same
mixture of weapons specialists, linguist(s), and team
leadership. And START II does not make any additional U.S.
facilities subject to inspection (although an additional
portion of Whiteman AFB, the area where the B-2 is deployed,
will become subject to inspection under START II).
OSIA notes that an accelerated schedule of inspections may
be required if the schedule for Phase II reductions under START
II should be accelerated. Such an acceleration could
necessitate formation of additional teams to ensure OSIA
capability to perform inspection and escort functions under
both regimes simultaneously while continuing to perform INF
Treaty inspections until 2001. This is to be done out of
currently planned START/INF resources.
The FY 1996-1997 President's Budget submission for OSIA
contains $8.9 million for START II implementation during FY
1994-1997. OSIA estimates an additional cost of $23.7 million
for it to meet its Treaty-related requirements during the
period FY 1998-2003. The major part of the budget consists of
travel, airlift, and logistical support costs for U.S.
inspections of Russian eliminations of SS-18s and S-24s, SS-18
silo conversions, and re-entry vehicle on-site inspections,
with very small amounts dedicated to U.S. escort of Russian
inspectors, equipment, training, and other minor costs. There
is no continuous monitoring regime under START II, and
therefore no continuous monitoring cost.
OSIA's figures are somewhat higher than earlier estimates
by DoD; they take into account the likely need for two
inspections of each SS-18 heavy ICBM silo conversion. As much
as two-thirds of total verification costs would be for on-site
inspection of the SS-18 silo conversions. As noted earlier, the
Committee considers those inspections to be especially
important and urges the Executive branch to exercise its full
rights to observe the pouring of the concrete plugs.
Budget estimates assume that the United States will
exercise all of its START II on-site inspection rights,
including those for the elimination of all SS-18 missiles and
their launch canisters, the conversion of ninety SS-18 silos
and the four additional reentry vehicle on-site inspections
allowed annually at converted SS-18 silos, and heavy bomber
inspection and protection. The estimates do not include
expenses related to National Technical Means, but the great
majority of such expenses would have to be borne anyway in
order to satisfy policy makers' needs for information on
Russian strategic systems.
counterintelligence and security concerns
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (ASDC3I) is responsible for
providing security policy guidance to the DoD components. The
Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) will
provide the same support for START II as that provided for
START I. The program assists new sites to determine their
vulnerabilities and develop appropriate treaty compliant and
cost efficient security countermeasures. As an integral part of
the OSIA site preparation program, DTIRP arms control security
specialists have provided support to START II facilities such
as Whiteman Air Force Base and systems such as the B-2 Bomber,
participated in START I Special Right of Access exercises, and
provided continued support during mock inspections.
Two sets of provisions in the START II Treaty, both related
to bomber inspections, highlight the issue of safeguarding
sensitive information. In general, the most important aspect of
the bomber issue is that under START II, Russia will be able to
inspect the U.S. B-2 stealth bomber. The U.S. Air Force is
developing an inspection implementation plan that will ensure
protection of sensitive information during inspections or
exhibitions, but will also ensure that U.S. treaty obligations
are met, and the Executive branch has assured the Committee
that these inspections can readily be managed to avoid the
compromise of classified information.
For purposes of complying with START II, all deployed heavy
bombers would be counted as carrying the actual number of
nuclear weapons for which the bomber is equipped. A modified
verification regime requires each Party to exhibit one heavy
bomber of each type to demonstrate the number of nuclear
weapons for which the bomber is actually equipped. The
inspecting Party is entitled to ``visually inspect'' those
portions of the exterior of the bomber that are equipped for
weapons, as well as the weapons bay of the bombers, ``but not
to inspect other portions of the exterior or the interior.''
The Party whose bomber is being inspected has the right to
shroud the portions of the bomber not being inspected.
START II also provides that up to 100 heavy bombers (except
cruise missile carriers) can be reoriented to non-nuclear roles
instead of being destroyed in order to meet the Treaty's bomber
weapons ceiling. The Treaty further provides that such bombers
can later be ``returned'' to a nuclear role. Bombers that have
been reoriented to conventional roles must have differences
observable by national technical means of verification and
visible during inspection in order to distinguish them from
nuclear-armed bombers with nuclear roles. During inspections,
the inspecting Party is entitle to ``visually inspect'' those
portions of the exterior of the bomber that have the
``observable differences,'' but not to inspect other portions
of the exterior or the interior. Again, shrouding is permitted
as to the portions of the bombers not subject to inspection.
Whenever Russian on-site inspectors visit the United States
or American inspectors visit Russia, there is a risk that
Russian personnel will take the opportunity to pursue espionage
objectives. The FBI is responsible for protecting against this
threat at home, and OSIA is the lead agency for responding to
the threat overseas. The Committee believes that the
counterintelligence challenges inherent in START II will be no
greater than those of past treaties, and that U.S. agencies are
capable of handling these challenges.
<greek-d>
<greek-d>
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