H. Rpt. 104-563. NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997. REPORT

104th Congress Report HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 104-563 _______________________________________________________________________ NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 ---------- R E P O R T OF THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 3230 together with ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND DISSENTING VIEWS [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> May 7, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 104th Congress Report HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2nd Session 104-563 _______________________________________________________________________ NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 __________ R E P O R T OF THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 3230 together with ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND DISSENTING VIEWS [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] May 7, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY One Hundred Fourth Congress FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman RONALD V. DELLUMS, California BOB STUMP, Arizona G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi DUNCAN HUNTER, California PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio IKE SKELTON, Missouri HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas ROBERT K. DORNAN, California OWEN PICKETT, Virginia JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado LANE EVANS, Illinois JIM SAXTON, New Jersey JOHN TANNER, Tennessee RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM, GLEN BROWDER, Alabama California GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi STEVE BUYER, Indiana NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii PETER G. TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts CHET EDWARDS, Texas TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida FRANK TEJEDA, Texas JOHN M. McHUGH, New York MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts JAMES TALENT, Missouri ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam TERRY EVERETT, Alabama JANE HARMAN, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California PETE GEREN, Texas RON LEWIS, Kentucky PETE PETERSON, Florida J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana MIKE WARD, Kentucky SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North Carolina JAMES B. LONGLEY, Jr., Maine TODD TIAHRT, Kansas RICHARD ``DOC'' HASTINGS, Washington Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Explanation of the Committee Amendment........................... 1 Purpose.......................................................... 1 Relationship of Authorization to Appropriations.................. 2 Summary of Authorization in the Bill............................. 2 Summary Table of Authorizations.................................. 2 Rationale for the Committee Bill................................. 10 Hearings......................................................... 17 Continued Shortfalls........................................... 11 Quality of Life................................................ 12 Modernization.................................................. 13 Ballistic Missile Defense...................................... 15 Innovation..................................................... 15 Conclusion..................................................... 17 Division A--Department of Defense Authorization.................. 19 Title I--Procurement............................................. 19 Overview....................................................... 19 Aircraft Procurement, Army................................... 21 Overview................................................... 21 Items of Special Interest.................................. 24 Missile Procurement, Army.................................... 25 Overview................................................... 25 Items of Special Interest.................................. 28 Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army.................... 29 Overview................................................... 29 Items of Special Interest.................................. 32 Ammunition Procurement, Army................................. 33 Overview................................................... 33 Item of Special Interest................................... 36 Other Procurement, Army...................................... 36 Overview................................................... 36 Items of Special Interest.................................. 43 Aircraft Procurement, Navy................................... 43 Overview................................................... 43 Items of Special Interest.................................. 47 Weapons Procurement, Navy.................................... 48 Overview................................................... 48 Item of Special Interest................................... 52 Ammunition Procurement, Navy/Marine Corps.................... 52 Overview................................................... 52 Item of Special Interest................................... 55 Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy............................ 55 Overview................................................... 55 Items of Special Interest.................................. 57 Other Procurement, Navy...................................... 60 Overview................................................... 60 Items of Special Interest.................................. 69 Procurement, Marine Corps.................................... 72 Overview................................................... 72 Items of Special Interest.................................. 77 Aircraft Procurement, Air Force.............................. 77 Overview................................................... 77 Items of Special Interest.................................. 82 Ammunition Procurement, Air Force............................ 85 Overview................................................... 85 Missle Procurement, Air Force................................ 88 Overview................................................... 88 Items of Special Interest.................................. 92 Other Procurement, Air Force................................. 93 Overview................................................... 93 Items of Special Interest.................................. 99 Procurement, Defense-Wide.................................... 99 Overview................................................... 99 Items of Special Interest.................................. 105 National Guard and Reserve Equipment......................... 105 Overview................................................... 105 Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense........... 109 Overview................................................... 109 Items of Special Interest.................................. 111 Legislative Provisions......................................... 111 Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 111 Section 101-108--Authorization of Appropriations........... 111 Subtitle B--Army Programs.................................... 111 Section 111--Repeal of Limitation on Procurement of Certain Aircraft................................................. 111 Section 112--Multiyear Procurement Authority for Army Programs................................................. 112 Subtitle C--Navy Programs.................................... 112 Section 121--Nuclear Attack Submarine Programs............. 112 Section 122--Cost Limitations for Seawolf Submarine Program 112 Section 123--Pulse Doppler Radar Modification.............. 112 Section 124--Reduction in Number of Vessels Excluded From Limit on Purchase of Vessels Built in Foreign Shipyards.. 112 Section 125--T-39N Trainer Aircraft for the Navy........... 112 Subtitle D--Air Force Programs............................... 112 Section 141--Repeal of Limitation on Procurement of F-15E Aircraft................................................. 112 Section 142--C-17 Aircraft Procurement..................... 113 Title II--Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E).... 114 Overview....................................................... 114 Defense-Wide Programs........................................ 116 Special Considerations..................................... 116 Army RDT&E................................................... 131 Overview................................................... 131 Items of Special Interest.................................. 140 Navy RDT&E................................................... 148 Overview................................................... 148 Items of Special Interest.................................. 157 Air Force RDT&E.............................................. 177 Overview................................................... 177 Items of Special Interest.................................. 187 Defense Agencies RDT&E....................................... 194 Overview................................................... 194 Items of Special Interest.................................. 202 Legislative Provisions......................................... 217 Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 217 Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations............... 217 Section 202--Amount for Basic and Applied Research......... 217 Section 203--Dual Use Technology Programs.................. 217 Subtitle B--Program Requirements, Restrictions, and Limitations................................................ 217 Section 211--Space Launch Modernization.................... 217 Section 212--Live-Fire Survivability Testing of V-22 Aircraft................................................. 217 Section 213--Live-Fire Survivability Testing of F-22 Aircraft................................................. 218 Section 214--Demilitarization of Conventional Munitions, Explosives, and Rockets.................................. 218 Section 215--Research Activities of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Relating to Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense Technology.................... 219 Section 216--Limitation on Funding for F-16 Tactical Manned Reconnaissance Aircraft.................................. 219 Section 217--Unmanned Aerial Vehicles...................... 220 Section 218--Hydra-70 Rocket Product Improvement Program... 220 Section 219--Space-Based Infrared System Program........... 220 Section 220--Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) Program.................................................. 220 Section 221--Authorization of Joint United States-Israel Nautilus Laser/Theater High Energy Laser Program......... 220 Section 222--Nonlethal Weapons Research and Development Program.................................................. 220 Subtitle C--Ballistic Missile Defense Programs............... 220 Section 231--Funding for Ballistic Missile Defense for Fiscal Year 1997......................................... 220 Section 232--Certification of Capability of United States to Defend Against Single Ballistic Missile............... 221 Section 233--Policy on Compliance With the ABM Treaty...... 221 Section 234--Requirement That Multilateralization of the ABM Treaty be Done Only Through Treaty-Making Power...... 222 Section 235--Report on Ballistic Missile Defense and Proliferation............................................ 222 Section 236--Revision to Annual Report on the Ballistic Missile Defense Program.................................. 223 Section 237--ABM Treaty Defined............................ 223 Section 238--Capability of National Missile Defense System. 223 Subtitle D--Other Matters.................................... 223 Section 241--Uniform Procedures and Criteria for Maintenance and Repair at Air Force Installations........ 223 Section 242--Requirements Relating to Small Business Innovative Research Program.............................. 224 Section 243--Extension of Deadline for Delivery of Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOG-M) System............... 224 Section 244--Amendment to the University Research Initiative Support Program............................... 224 Section 245--Amendments to Defense Experimental Programs to Stimulate Competitive Research........................... 224 Section 246--Elimination of Report on the Use of Competitive Procedures for the Award of Certain Contracts to Colleges and Universities............................. 224 Section 247--National Oceanographic Partnership Program.... 225 Title III--Operation and Maintenance............................. 226 Overview....................................................... 226 Items of Special Interest...................................... 258 Intelligence Programs........................................ 258 Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)............................... 258 Over the Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) Radar System.......... 258 Pacer Coin................................................. 259 Senior Scout............................................... 259 Morale, Welfare and Recreation Issues........................ 259 Appropriated Fund Support for Morale, Welfare and Recreation Programs...................................... 259 Defense Commissary Agency/Performance Based Organization... 261 Distribution of Distilled Spirits.......................... 261 Other Issues................................................. 262 Abrams Integrated Management XXI........................... 262 Ammunition Management Program.............................. 262 Army After Next............................................ 262 Base Closure Transition.................................... 263 Base Operations Support Costs.............................. 263 Concept Development Center................................. 263 Contractor Operated Civil Engineering Supply Stores........ 264 Department of Defense Milk Plants.......................... 265 Depot-Level Maintenance and Repair......................... 265 Electron Scrubber Technology............................... 266 General Purpose Tents...................................... 267 Integrated Computer Framework.............................. 267 Manganese Dust Exposure Levels............................. 267 Military Traffic Management Command's Reengineering Personnel Property Initiative Pilot Program.............. 268 Mobility Infrastructure Enhancement........................ 269 Operational Support Aircraft............................... 269 Real Property Maintenance.................................. 270 Reserve Readiness.......................................... 270 Standard Missile Maintenance............................... 271 Total Asset Visibility Program............................. 271 Unobligated Balances....................................... 271 Legislative Provisions......................................... 272 Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 272 Section 301--Operation and Maintenance Funding............. 272 Section 302--Working Capital Funds......................... 272 Section 303--Armed Forces Retirement Home.................. 272 Section 304--Transfer From National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund......................................... 272 Subtitle B--Depot-Level Activities........................... 272 Section 311--Extension of Authority For Aviation Depots and Naval Shipyards to Engage in Defense-Related Production and Services............................................. 272 Section 312--Exclusion of Large Maintenance and Repair Projects From Percentage Limitation on Contracting For Depot-Level Maintenance.................................. 272 Subtitle C--Environmental Provisions......................... 273 Section 321--Repeal of Report on Contractor Reimbursement Costs.................................................... 273 Section 322--Payments of Stipulated Penalties Assessed Under CERCLA............................................. 273 Section 323--Conservation and Readiness Program............ 273 Section 324--Navy Compliance With Shipboard Solid Waste Control Requirements..................................... 274 Section 325--Authority to Develop and Implement Land Use Plans for Defense Environmental Restoration Program...... 274 Section 326--Pilot Program to Test Alternative Technologies for Limiting Air Emissions During Shipyard Blasting and Coating Operations....................................... 275 Section 327--Navy Program to Monitor Ecological Effects of Organotin................................................ 275 Subtitle D--Civilian Employees and Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities.......................................... 276 Section 331--Repeal of Prohibition on Payment of Lodging Expenses When Adequate Government Quarters Are Available. 276 Section 332--Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay Modification............................................. 276 Section 333--Wage-Board Compensatory Time Off.............. 276 Section 334--Simplification of Rules Relating to the Observance of Certain Holidays........................... 277 Section 335--Phased Retirement............................. 277 Section 336--Modification of Authority for Civilian Employees of Department of Defense to Participate Voluntarily in Reduction In Force........................ 277 Subtitle E--Commissaries and Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities.......................................... 278 Section 341--Contracts With Other Agencies and Instrumentalities for Goods and Services................. 278 Section 342--Noncompetitive Procurement of Brand-Name Commercial Items For Resale in Commissary Stores......... 278 Section 343--Prohibition of Sale or Rental of Sexually Explicit Material........................................ 278 Subtitle F--Performance of Functions by Private-Sector Sources.................................................... 278 Section 351--Extension of Requirement For Competitive Procurement of Printing and Duplication Services......... 278 Section 352--Requirement Regarding Use of Private Shipyards For Complex Naval Ship Repair Contracts.................. 279 Subtitle G--Other Matters.................................... 279 Section 360--Termination of Defense Business Operations Fund and Preparation of Plan Regarding Improved Operation of Working-Capital Funds................................. 279 Section 361--Increase in Capital Asset Threshold Under Defense Business Operations Fund......................... 280 Section 362--Transfer of Excess Personal Property to Support Law Enforcement Activities....................... 280 Section 363--Storage of Motor Vehicles in Lieu of Transportation........................................... 280 Section 364--Control of Transportation Systems in Time of War...................................................... 281 Section 365--Security Protection at Department of Defense Facilities in National Capitol Region.................... 281 Section 366--Modifications to Armed Forces Retirement Home Act of 1991.............................................. 281 Section 367--Assistance to Local Educational Agencies that Benefit Dependents of Members of the Armed Forces and Department of Defense Civilian Employees................. 282 Section 368--Retention of Civilian Employee Positions at Military Training Bases Transferred to National Guard.... 282 Section 369--Expansion of Authority to Donate Unusable Food 282 Military Personnel Overview...................................... 283 Title IV--Military Personnel Authorizations...................... 285 Items of Special Interest...................................... 285 Air National Guard Fighter Aircraft........................ 285 Army Military Personnel Account Shortfall for Fiscal Year 1997..................................................... 285 Army Reserve Full Time Manning Increase.................... 285 Navy Maritime Patrol Aircraft.............................. 285 Reserve Component Individual Training Funds................ 286 Legislative Provisions......................................... 286 Subtitle A--Active Forces.................................... 286 Section 401--End Strengths For Active Forces............... 286 Section 402--Permanent End Strength Levels to Support Two Major Regional Contingencies............................. 286 Section 403--Authorized Strengths For Commissioned Officers on Active Duty in Grades of Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel and Navy Grades of Lieutenant Commander, Commander, and Captain................................... 287 Subtitle B--Reserve Forces................................... 288 Section 411--End Strengths for Selected Reserve............ 288 Section 412--End Strengths for Reserves on Active Duty in Support of the Reserves.................................. 288 Section 413--End Strengths for Military Technicians........ 289 Subtitle C--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 289 Section 421--Authorization of Appropriations For Military Personnel................................................ 289 Title V--Military Personnel Policy............................... 290 Items of Special Interest...................................... 290 Collection of Comparison Data on Gender-Neutral Training... 290 Guidance to Commanders on Unexplained Absences of Personnel 290 Increased Funding for Off-Duty Education................... 291 Increased Funding for Recruiting........................... 291 Minority Representation in Special Operations Forces....... 291 New Parent Support Program................................. 292 Personnel Tempo............................................ 292 Reduction in Permanent Change of Station Moves............. 293 Report on Sentence Enhancements for Hate Crimes............ 294 Retention Standards for Permanent Medical Nondeployables... 294 Survey of Attitudes Towards Expansion of Roles of Women in Combat and Combat Related Military Skills................ 295 Legislative Provisions......................................... 295 Subtitle A--Personnel Management............................. 295 Section 501--Authorization For Senior Enlisted Members to Reenlist for an Indefinite Period of Time................ 295 Section 502--Authority to Extend Entry on Active Duty Under Delayed Entry Program.................................... 296 Section 503--Permanent Authority for Navy Spot Promotions for Certain Lieutenants.................................. 296 Section 504--Reports on Response to Recommendations Concerning Improvements to Department of Defense Joint Manpower Process......................................... 296 Section 505--Frequency of Reports to Congress on Joint Officer Management Policies.............................. 296 Section 506--Repeal of Requirement that Commissioned Officers be Initially Appointed in a Reserve Grade....... 297 Section 507--Continuation on Active Status For Certain Reserve Officers of the Air Force........................ 297 Subtitle B--Reserve Component Matters........................ 297 Section 511--Individual Ready Reserve Activation Authority. 297 Section 512--Training for Reserves on Active Duty in Support of the Reserves.................................. 298 Section 513--Clarification to Definition of Active Status.. 298 Section 514--Appointment Above O-2 in the Naval Reserve.... 298 Section 515--Report on Number of Advisers in Active Component Support of Reserves Pilot Program.............. 298 Section 516--Sense of Congress and Report Regarding Reemployment Rights for Mobilized Reservists Employed in Foreign Countries........................................ 298 Subtitle C--Jurisdiction and Powers of Courts-Martial for the National Guard When Not in Federal Service................. 299 Section 531--Composition, Jurisdiction and Procedures of Courts-Martial........................................... 299 Section 532--General Courts-Martial........................ 299 Section 533--Special Courts-Martial........................ 299 Section 534--Summary Courts-Martial........................ 299 Section 535--Repeal of Authority For Confinement in Lieu of Fine..................................................... 300 Section 536--Approval of Sentence of Bad Conduct Discharge or Confinement........................................... 300 Section 537--Authority of Military Judges.................. 300 Section 538--Statutory Reorganization...................... 300 Section 539--Effective Date................................ 300 Section 540--Conforming Amendments to Uniform Code of Military Justice......................................... 301 Subtitle D--Education and Training Programs.................. 301 Section 551--Extension of Maximum Age for Appointment as a Cadet or Midshipman in the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Service Academies................. 301 Section 552--Oversight and Management of Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps Program......................... 301 Section 553--ROTC Scholarship Student Participation in Simultaneous Membership Program.......................... 301 Section 554--Expansion of ROTC Advanced Training Program to Include Graduate Students................................ 301 Section 555--Reserve Credit for Members of Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship and Financial Assistance Program.................................................. 302 Section 556--Expansion of Eligibility for Education Benefits to Include Certain Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) Participants................................ 302 Section 557--Comptroller General Report on Cost and Policy Implications of Permitting Up to Five Percent of Service Academy Graduates to be Assigned Directly to Reserve Duty Upon Graduation.......................................... 302 Subtitle E--Other Matters.................................... 302 Section 561--Hate Crimes in the Military................... 302 Section 562--Authority of a Reserve Judge Advocate to Act as a Notary Public....................................... 302 Section 563--Authority to Provide Legal Assistance to Public Health Service Officers........................... 303 Section 564--Excepted Appointment of Certain Judicial Non- Attorney Staff in the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces......................................... 303 Section 565--Replacement of Certain American Theater Campaign Ribbons......................................... 303 Section 566--Restoration of Regulations Prohibiting Service of Homosexuals in the Armed Forces....................... 303 Section 567--Reenactment and Modification of Mandatory Separation From Service For Members Diagnosed With HIV-1 Virus.................................................... 304 Title VI--Compensation and Other Personnel Benefits.............. 306 Items of Special Interest.................................... 306 Foreign Language Proficiency Pay........................... 306 Privately Owned Vehicle Mileage Allowances During Permanent Change of Station Moves.................................. 306 Special Duty Assignment Pay for Army Special Operating Forces................................................... 307 Legislative Provisions......................................... 307 Subtitle A--Pay and Allowances............................... 307 Section 601--Military Pay Raise for Fiscal Year 1997....... 307 Section 602--Availability of Basic Allowance for Quarters for Certain Members Without Dependents Who Serve on Sea Duty..................................................... 307 Section 603--Establishment of Minimum Monthly Amount of Variable Housing Allowance for High Housing Cost Areas... 308 Subtitle B--Bonuses and Special and Incentive Pays........... 308 Section 611--Extension of Certain Bonuses for Reserve Forces................................................... 308 Section 612--Extension of Certain Bonuses and Special Pay for Nurse Officer Candidates, Registered Nurses, and Nurse Anesthetists....................................... 308 Section 613--Extension of Authority Relating to Payment of Other Bonuses and Special Pays........................... 308 Section 614--Special Incentives to Recruit and Retain Dental Officers.......................................... 308 Subtitle C--Travel and Transportation Allowances............. 309 Section 621--Temporary Lodging Expenses of Member in Connection With First Permanent Change of Station........ 309 Section 622--Allowance in Connection With Shipping Motor Vehicle at Government Expense............................ 309 Section 623--Dislocation Allowance at a Rate Equal to Two and One-Half Months Basic Allowance for Quarters......... 309 Section 624--Allowance for Travel Performed in Connection With Leave Between Consecutive Overseas Tours............ 310 Subtitle D--Retired Pay, Survivor Benefits, and Related Matters.................................................... 310 Section 631--Increase in Annual Limit on Days of Inactive Duty Training Creditable Towards Reserve Retirement...... 310 Section 632--Authority for Retirement in Grade in Which a Member Has Been Selected for Promotion When a Physical Disability Intervenes.................................... 310 Section 633--Eligibility for Reserve Disability Retirement for Reserves Injured While Away From Home Overnight for Inactive-Duty Training................................... 310 Section 634--Retirement of Reserve Enlisted Members Who Qualify for Active Duty Retirement After Administrative Reductions in Enlisted Grade............................. 311 Section 635--Clarification of Initial Computation of Retiree COLA's After Retirement.......................... 311 Section 636--Technical Correction to Prior Authority for Payment of Back Pay to Certain Persons................... 311 Section 637--Amendments to the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act.................................. 311 Section 638--Administration of Benefits for So-Called Minimum Income Widows.................................... 311 Section 639--Nonsubstantive Restatement of Survivor Benefit Plan Statute............................................. 312 Subtitle E--Other Matters.................................... 312 Section 651--Technical Correction Clarifying Ability of Certain Members to Elect Not to Occupy Government Quarters................................................. 312 Section 652--Technical Correction Clarifying Limitation on Furnishing Clothing or Allowances for Enlisted National Guard Technicians........................................ 312 Title VII Health Care Provisions................................. 313 Overview....................................................... 313 Items of Special Interest...................................... 313 Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) Network--Information Technology............................................... 313 Chiropractic Health Care Demonstration Program............. 314 Comptroller General Study on the Department of Defense Family Member Dental Plan................................ 314 Congressional Budget Office Scoring of Medicare Subvention Demonstration Program.................................... 315 Global Infectious Disease Surveillance Program............. 315 Pacific Medical Network.................................... 316 Provider Workstation....................................... 316 TRICARE Alternative Financing.............................. 316 TRICARE Prime Portability.................................. 316 Legislative Provisions......................................... 317 Subtitle A--Health Care Services............................. 317 Section 701--Medical and Dental Care for Reserve Component Members in a Duty Status................................. 317 Subtitle B--TRICARE Program.................................. 317 Section 711--Definition of TRICARE Program................. 317 Section 712--CHAMPUS Payment Limits for TRICARE Prime Enrollees................................................ 318 Section 713--Improved Information Exchange Between Military Treatment Facilities and TRICARE Program Contractors..... 318 Subtitle C--Uniformed Services Treatment Facilities.......... 318 Section 721--Definitions................................... 318 Section 722--Inclusion of Designated Providers in Uniformed Services Health Care Delivery System..................... 318 Section 723--Provision of Uniform Benefit by Designated Providers................................................ 318 Section 724--Enrollment of Covered Beneficiaries........... 319 Section 725--Application of CHAMPUS Payment Rules.......... 319 Section 726--Payment for Services.......................... 319 Section 727--Repeal of Superseded Authorities.............. 319 Subtitle D--Other Changes to Existing Laws Regarding Health Care Management............................................ 319 Section 731--Authority to Waive CHAMPUS Exclusion Regarding Nonmedically Necessary Treatment in Connection With Certain Clinical Trials.................................. 319 Section 732--Authority to Waive or Reduce CHAMPUS Deductible Amounts for Reservists Called to Active Duty in Support of Contingency Operations..................... 320 Section 733--Exception to Maximum Allowable Payments to Individual Health-Care Providers Under CHAMPUS........... 320 Section 734--Codification of Annual Authority to Credit CHAMPUS Refunds to Current Year Appropriation............ 320 Section 735--Exception to Requirements Regarding Obtaining Nonavailability-of-Health-Care Statements................ 320 Section 736--Expansion of Collection Authorities From Third-Party Payers....................................... 321 Subtitle E--Other Matters.................................... 321 Section 741--Alternatives to Active Duty Service Obligation Under Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship and Financial Assistance Program and Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences........................ 321 Section 742--Exception to Strength Limitations For Public Health Service Officers Assigned to the Department of Defense.................................................. 322 Section 743--Continued Operation of Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences........................ 322 Section 744--Sense of Congress Regarding Tax Treatment of Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship and Financial Assistance Program....................................... 322 Section 745--Report Regarding Specialized Treatment Facility Program......................................... 323 Title VIII--Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and Related Matters................................................ 324 Items of Special Interest...................................... 324 Implementation of Acquisition Reform Legislation........... 324 Truth in Negotiations Act Audit Rights..................... 324 Tungsten Anti-Tank Penetrators............................. 325 Legislative Provisions......................................... 325 Subtitle A--Acquisition Management........................... 325 Section 801--Authority to Waive or Modify Certain Requirements for Defense Acquisition Pilot Programs...... 325 Section 802--Exclusion From Certain Post-Education Duty Assignments for Members of Acquisition Corps............. 325 Section 803--Extension of Authority to Carry Out Certain Prototype Projects....................................... 325 Section 804--Increase in Threshold Amounts for Major Systems.................................................. 326 Section 805--Revisions in Information Required to be Included in Selected Acquisition Reports................. 326 Section 806--Increase in Simplified Acquisition Threshold for Humanitarian or Peacekeeping Operations.............. 326 Section 807--Expansion of Audit Reciprocity Among Federal Agencies to Include Post-Award Audits.................... 326 Section 808--Extension of Pilot Mentor-Protege Program..... 327 Subtitle B--Other Matters.................................... 327 Section 821--Amendment to Definition of National Security System Under Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1995.................................................. 327 Section 822--Prohibition on Release of Contractor Proposals Under Freedom of Information Act......................... 327 Section 823--Repeal of Annual Report by Advocate for Competition.............................................. 327 Section 824--Repeal of Biannual Report on Procurement Regulatory Activity...................................... 327 Section 825--Repeal of Multiyear Limitation on Contracts for Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair.................. 327 Section 826--Streamlined Notice Requirements to Contractors and Employees Regarding Termination or Substantial Reduction in Contracts Under Major Defense Programs...... 328 Section 827--Repeal of Notice Requirements for Substantially or Seriously Affected Parties in Downsizing Efforts.................................................. 328 Section 828--Testing of Defense Acquisition Programs....... 328 Section 829--Dependency of National Technology and Industrial Base on Supplies Available Only From Foreign Counties................................................. 328 Section 830--Treatment of Department of Defense Cable Television Franchise Agreements.......................... 328 Section 831--Extension of Domestic Source Limitation for Valves and Machine Tools................................. 329 Title IX--Department of Defense Organization and Management...... 330 Items of Special Interest...................................... 330 Unified Command Plan....................................... 330 Legislative Provisions......................................... 330 Section 901--Additional Required Reduction in Defense Acquisition Workforce.................................... 330 Section 902--Reduction of Personnel Assigned to Office of the Secretary of Defense................................. 330 Section 903--Report on Military Department Headquarters Staff.................................................... 331 Section 904--Extension of Effective Date for Charter for Joint Requirements Oversight Council..................... 331 Section 905--Removal of Secretary of the Army From Membership on the Foreign Trade Zone Board............... 331 Section 906--Membership of the Ammunition Storage Board.... 331 Section 907--Department of Defense Disbursing Official Check Cashing and Exchange Transactions.................. 332 Title X--General Provisions...................................... 333 Counter-Drug Activities...................................... 333 Overview................................................... 333 Items of Special Interest.................................. 333 National Guard Counter-Drug Program...................... 333 C-26 Aircraft Photo Reconnaissance Upgrades.............. 334 Gulf States Counter-Drug Initiative...................... 334 Southwest Border Fence Project........................... 334 Other Matters................................................ 334 Defense Information Systems Network (DISN)................. 334 Military Affiliate Radio System............................ 335 National Defense University Chinese Translations........... 335 Supercomputer Exports and Proliferation.................... 336 White House Communications Agency.......................... 336 Legislative Provisions......................................... 336 Subtitle A--Financial Matters................................ 336 Section 1001--Transfer Authority........................... 336 Section 1002--Incorporation of Classified Annex............ 337 Section 1003--Authority for Obligation of Certain Unauthorized Fiscal Year 1996 Defense Appropriations..... 337 Section 1004--Authorization of Prior Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1996...................... 337 Section 1005--Format for Budget Request for Navy/Marine Corps and Air Force Ammunition Accounts.................. 337 Section 1006--Format for Budget Requests for Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program.......................... 337 Subtitle B--Reports and Studies.............................. 338 Section 1021--Annual Report on Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Enhanced Southern Watch.................... 338 Section 1022--Report on Protection of National Information Infrastructure........................................... 338 Section 1023--Report on Witness Interview Procedures for Department of Defense Criminal Investigations............ 339 Subtitle C--Other Matters.................................... 339 Section 1031--Information Systems Security Program......... 339 Section 1032--Aviation and Vessel War Risk Insurance....... 340 Section 1033--Aircraft Accident Investigation Boards....... 341 Section 1034--Authority for Use of Appropriated Funds for Recruiting Functions..................................... 342 Section 1035--Authority for Award of Medal of Honor to Certain African American Solders Who Served During World War II................................................... 342 Section 1036--Compensation for Persons Awarded Prisoner of War Medal Who Did Not Previously Receive Compensation as a Prisoner of War........................................ 342 Section 1037--George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Security Studies............................... 342 Section 1038--Participation of Members, Dependents, and Other Persons in Crime Prevention Efforts at Installations............................................ 343 Section 1039--Technical and Clerical Amendments............ 343 Section 1040--Prohibition on Carrying Out SR-71 Strategic Reconnaissance Program During Fiscal Year 1997........... 343 Title XI--Cooperative Threat Reduction........................... 344 Overview....................................................... 344 Items of Special Interest...................................... 344 Lack of Updated, Multi-Year Program Plan................... 344 Chemical Weapons Destruction............................... 345 Fissle Material Storage Facility........................... 346 Program Overhead........................................... 347 Concerns Regarding Presidential Certification.............. 347 Legislative Provisions......................................... 348 Section 1101--Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs................................................. 348 Section 1102--Fiscal Year 1997 Funding Allocations......... 348 Section 1103--Prohibition on Use of Funds for Specified Purposes................................................. 348 Section 1104--Limitation on Funds.......................... 348 Section 1105--Availability of Funds........................ 348 Title XII--Reserve Forces Revitalization......................... 349 Legislative Provisions......................................... 349 Subtitle A--Reserve Component Structure...................... 349 Section 1211--Reserve Component Commands................... 349 Section 1212--Reserve Component Chiefs..................... 349 Section 1213--Review of Active Duty and Reserve General and Flag Officer Authorizations.............................. 349 Section 1214--Guard and Reserve Technicians................ 349 Section 1215--Technical Amendment Reflecting Prior Revision to National Guard Bureau Charter......................... 350 Subtitle B--Reserve Component Accessibility.................. 350 Section 1231--Report to Congress on Measures Taken to Improve National Guard and Reserve Ability to Respond to Emergencies.............................................. 350 Sections 1232 Through 1234--Reporting Requirements......... 350 Subtitle C--Reserve Forces Sustainment....................... 350 Sections 1251 Through 1256--Improvements to Reserve Component Quality of Life and Benefits................... 350 Title XIII--Matters Relating To Other Nations.................... 351 Items of Special Interest...................................... 351 Arms Control Implementation................................ 351 Chemical Weapons Convention................................ 351 Comprehensive Test Ban..................................... 352 Department of Defense Activities With China................ 353 Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia......................... 353 Russian Missile Detargeting................................ 355 Russian Threat Perceptions................................. 356 Legislative Provisions......................................... 357 Subtitle A--Miscellaneous Matters............................ 357 Section 1301--One-Year Extension of Counterproliferation Authorities.............................................. 357 Section 1302--Limitation on Retirement or Dismantlement of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles...................... 357 Section 1303--Certification Required Before Observance of Moratorium on Use by Armed Forces of Antipersonnel Landmines................................................ 357 Section 1304--Department of Defense Demining Program....... 359 Section 1305--Report on Military Capabilities of People's Republic of China........................................ 360 Section 1306--United States-People's Republic of China Joint Defense Conversion Commission...................... 361 Section 1307--Authority to Accept Services From Foreign Governments and International Organizations for Defense Purposes................................................. 361 Section 1308--Review by Director of Central Intelligence of National Intelligence Estimate 95-19..................... 361 Subtitle B--Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States....................................... 363 Section 1321--Establishment of Commission.................. 363 Section 1322--Duties of Commission......................... 364 Section 1323--Report....................................... 364 Section 1324--Powers....................................... 364 Section 1325--Commission Procedures........................ 364 Section 1326--Personnel Matters............................ 365 Section 1327--Miscellaneous Administrative Provisions...... 365 Section 1328--Funding...................................... 365 Section 1329--Termination of the Commission................ 365 Title XIV--Sikes Act Improvements Amendments..................... 366 Legislative Provisions......................................... 366 Section 1402--Definition of Sikes Act for Purposes of Amendments............................................... 366 Section 1403--Codification of Short Title of Act........... 366 Section 1404--Integrated Natural Resource Management Plans. 366 Section 1405--Review for Preparation of Integrated Natural Resource Management Plans................................ 366 Section 1406--Annual Reviews and Reports................... 366 Section 1407--Transfer of Wildlife Conservation Fees From Closed Military Installations............................ 366 Section 1408--Federal Enforcement of Integrated Natural Resource Management Plans and Enforcement of Other Laws.. 367 Section 1409--Natural Resource Management Services......... 367 Section 1410--Definitions.................................. 367 Section 1411--Cooperative Agreements....................... 367 Section 1412--Repeal of Superseded Provision............... 367 Section 1413--Clerical Amendments.......................... 367 Section 1414--Authorizations of Appropriations............. 367 Divison B--Military Construction Authorizations.................. 369 Purpose........................................................ 369 The State of Military Infrastructure......................... 369 Authorization For Military Construction........................ 387 Title XXI--Army.................................................. 396 Summary........................................................ 396 Items of Special Interest...................................... 396 Improvements of Military Family Housing.................... 396 Repair and Maintenance, Army............................... 396 Legislative Provisions......................................... 397 Section 2101--Authorized Army and Land Acquisition Projects 397 Section 2102--Family Housing............................... 397 Section 2103--Improvements to Military Family Housing Units 397 Section 2104--Authorization of Appropriations, Army........ 397 Section 2105--Correction in Authorized Uses of Funds, Fort Irwin, California........................................ 397 Title XXII--Navy................................................. 398 Summary........................................................ 398 Items Of Special Interest...................................... 398 Improvements of Military Family Housing.................... 398 Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi.................... 398 Ordnance Storage Needs of Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona.................................................. 398 Planning and Design........................................ 399 Power Plant Upgrade, Public Works Center, Guam............. 399 Legislative Provisions......................................... 399 Section 2201--Authorized Navy Construction and Land Acquisition Projects..................................... 399 Section 2202--Family Housing............................... 399 Section 2203--Improvements to Military Family Housing Units 399 Section 2204--Authorization of Appropriations, Navy........ 399 Secion 2205--Beach Replenishment, Naval Air Station, North Island, California....................................... 400 Section 2206--Lease to Facilitate Construction of Reserve Center, Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi......... 400 Title XXIII--Air Force........................................... 401 Summary........................................................ 401 Items of Special Interest...................................... 401 Defense Access Road, Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado....... 401 Improvements of Military Family Housing.................... 401 Planning and Design........................................ 401 Legislative Provisions......................................... 402 Section 2301--Authorized Air Force Construction and Land Acquisition Projects..................................... 402 Section 2302--Family Housing............................... 402 Section 2303--Improvements to Military Family Housing Units 402 Section 2304--Authorization of Appropriations, Air Force... 402 Title XXIV--Defense Agencies..................................... 403 Summary........................................................ 403 Legislative Provisions......................................... 403 Section 2401--Authorized Defense Agencies Construction and Land Acquisition Projects................................ 403 Section 2402--Military Housing Planning and Design......... 403 Section 2403--Improvements to Military Family Housing Units 403 Section 2404--Military Housing Improvement Program......... 403 Section 2405--Energy Conservation Projects................. 403 Section 2406--Authorization of Appropriations, Defense Agencies................................................. 403 Title XXV--North Atlantic Treaty Organization Infrastructure..... 405 Summary........................................................ 405 Legislative Provisions......................................... 405 Section 2501--Authorized NATO Construction and Land Acquisition Projects..................................... 405 Section 2502--Authorization of Appropriations, NATO........ 405 Title XXVI--Guard and Reserve Forces Facilities.................. 406 Summary........................................................ 406 Items of Special Interest...................................... 406 Alternative Funding for Certain Guard and Reserve Facilities............................................... 406 Armory Infrastructure Requirements......................... 406 Battle Projection Center, Fort Dix, New Jersey............. 407 Military Construction to Support the Beddown of Avenger Air Defense System Units, Various Locations, Mississippi..... 407 Planning and Design........................................ 407 Planning and Design, Fiscal Year 1996...................... 407 Unspecified Minor Construction............................. 407 Legislative Provisions......................................... 408 Section 2601--Authorized Guard and Reserve Construction and Land Acquisition Projects................................ 408 Title XXVII--Expiration and Extension of Authorizations.......... 409 Legislative Provisions......................................... 409 Section 2701--Expiration of Authorizations and Amounts Required to be Specified by Law.......................... 409 Section 2702--Extensions of Authorizations of Certain Fiscal Year 1994 Projects................................ 409 Section 2703--Extension of Authorizations of Certain Fiscal Year 1993 Projects....................................... 409 Section 2704--Extension of Authorizations of Certain Fiscal Year 1992 Projects....................................... 409 Section 2705--Effective Date............................... 409 Title XXVIII--General Provisions................................. 410 Items of Special Interest...................................... 410 Assessment of Certain Overhead Costs of Military Construction............................................. 410 Efficient Utilization of Existing Facilities............... 410 Infrastructure Requirements for Depot-Level Maintenance.... 410 Modular Utility Cores in Military Housing and Other Facilities............................................... 411 Legislative Provisions......................................... 411 Subtitle A--Military Construction and Military Family Housing 411 Section 2801--North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program....................................... 411 Section 2802--Authority to Demolish Excess Facilities...... 411 Section 2803--Improvements to Family Housing Units......... 411 Subtitle B--Defense Base Closure and Realignment............. 412 Section 2811--Restoration of Authority for Certain Intragovernmental Transfers Under 1988 Base Closure Law.. 412 Section 2812--Contracting for Certain Services at Facilities Remaining on Closed Installations............. 412 Section 2813--Authority to Compensate Owners of Manufactured Housing..................................... 412 Section 2814--Additional Purpose for Which Adjustment and Diversification Assistance is Authorized................. 412 Section 2815--Payment of Stipulated Penalties Assessed Under CERCLA in Connection With Loring Air Force Base, Maine.................................................... 412 Subtitle C--Land Conveyances Generally....................... 412 Part I--Army Conveyances................................... 412 Section 2821--Transfer and Exchange of Jurisdiction, Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia.................... 412 Section 2822--Land Conveyance, Army Reserve Center, Rushville, Indiana....................................... 413 Section 2823--Land Conveyance, Army Reserve Center, Anderson, South Carolina................................. 413 Part II--Navy Conveyances.................................. 413 Section 2831--Release of Condition on Reconveyance of Transferred Land, Guam................................... 413 Section 2832--Land Exchange, St. Helena Annex, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Virginia................................. 413 Section 2833--Land Conveyance, Calverton Pine Barrens, Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant, Calverton, New York..................................................... 413 Part III--Air Force Conveyances............................ 414 Section 2841--Conveyance of Primate Research Complex, Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico...................... 414 Section 2842--Land Conveyance, Radar Bomb Scoring Site, Belle Forche, South Dakota............................... 414 Part IV--Other Conveyances................................. 414 Section 2851--Land Conveyance, Tatum Salt Dome Test Site, Mississippi.............................................. 414 Section 2852--Land Conveyance, William Langer Jewel Bearing Plant, Rolla, North Dakota............................... 414 Subtitle D--Other Matters.................................... 415 Section 2861--Easements for Rights-Of-Way.................. 415 Section 2862--Authority to Enter Into Cooperative Agreements for the Management of Cultural Resources on Military Installations................................... 415 Section 2863--Demonstration Project for Installation and Operation of Electric Power Distribution System at Youngstown Air Reserve Station, Ohio..................... 415 Section 2864--Designation of Michael O'Callaghan Military Hospital................................................. 415 Title XXIX--Military Land Withdrawals............................ 416 Subtitle A--Fort Carson-Pinon Canyon Military Lands Withdrawal................................................. 416 Section 2902--Withdrawal and Reservation of Lands at Fort Carson Military Reservation.............................. 416 Section 2903--Withdrawal and Reservation of Lands at Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site..................................... 416 Section 2904--Maps and Legal Descriptions.................. 416 Section 2905--Management of Withdrawn Lands................ 416 Section 2906--Management of Withdrawn and Acquired Mineral Resources................................................ 416 Section 2907--Hunting, Fishing, and Trapping............... 416 Section 2908--Termination of Withdrawal and Reservation.... 417 Section 2909--Determination of Presence of Contamination and Effect of Contamination.............................. 417 Section 2910--Delegation................................... 417 Section 2911--Hold Harmless................................ 417 Section 2912--Amendment to Military Lands Withdrawal Act of 1986..................................................... 417 Section 2913--Authorization of Appropriations.............. 417 Subtitle B--El Centro Naval Air Facility Ranges Withdrawal... 417 Section 2921--Short Title and Definitions.................. 417 Section 2922--Withdrawal and Reservation of Lands for El Centro................................................... 418 Section 2923--Maps and Legal Descriptions.................. 418 Section 2924--Management of Withdrawn Lands................ 418 Section 2925--Duration of Withdrawal and Reservation....... 418 Section 2926--Continuation of Ongoing Decontamination Activities............................................... 418 Section 2927--Requirements for Extension................... 418 Section 2928--Early Relinquishment of Withdrawal........... 418 Section 2929--Delegation of Authority...................... 418 Section 2930--Hunting, Fishing, and Trapping............... 418 Section 2931--Hold Harmless................................ 419 Division C--Department of Energy National Security Authorizations and Other Authorizations....................................... 421 Title XXXI--Department of Energy National Security Programs...... 421 Purpose........................................................ 421 Overview....................................................... 421 Items of Special Interest...................................... 436 Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management..... 436 Fissle Materials Protection, Control and Accountability.... 438 Independent Review......................................... 438 Inertial Confinement Fusion................................ 438 Intelligence............................................... 439 International Nuclear Safety............................... 439 International Security..................................... 440 Laboratory Review of Missile Defense....................... 440 Naval Reactors............................................. 440 Nuclear Emergency Search Team.............................. 440 Nuclear Smuggling.......................................... 441 Technology Transfer........................................ 441 Tritium.................................................... 441 Warhead Master Plan........................................ 442 Legislative Provisions......................................... 442 Subtitle A--National Security Program Authorizations......... 442 Section 3101--Weapons Activities........................... 442 Section 3102--Environmental Restoration and Waste Management............................................... 442 Section 3103--Defense Fixed Asset Acquisition.............. 442 Section 3104--Other Defense Activities..................... 443 Section 3105--Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal............... 443 Subtitle B--Recurring General Provisions..................... 443 Section 3121--Reprogramming................................ 443 Section 3122--Limits on General Plant Projects............. 443 Section 3123--Limits on Construction Projects.............. 443 Section 3124--Fund Transfer Authority...................... 443 Section 3125--Authority for Conceptual and Construction Design................................................... 444 Section 3126--Authority for Emergency Planning, Design, and Construction Activities.................................. 444 Section 3127--Funds Available for All National Security Programs of the Department of Energy..................... 444 Section 3128--Availability of Funds........................ 444 Subtitle C--Program Authorizations, Restrictions, and Limitations................................................ 444 Section 3131--Stockpile Stewardship Program................ 444 Section 3132--Manufacturing Infrastructure for Nuclear Weapons Stockpile........................................ 445 Section 3133--Production of High Explosives................ 446 Section 3134--Limitation on Use of Funds by Laboratories for Laboratory-Directed Research and Development......... 446 Section 3135--Prohibition on Funding Nuclear Weapons Activities With People's Republic of China............... 446 Section 3136--International Cooperative Stockpile Stewardship Programs..................................... 446 Section 3137--Temporary Authority Relating to Transfers of Defense Environmental Management Funds................... 447 Section 3138--Management Structure for Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities and Nuclear Weapons Laboratories... 447 Subtitle D--Other Matters.................................... 447 Section 3141--Report on Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum............................................... 447 Section 3142--Report on Plutonium Pit Production and Remanufacturing.......................................... 447 Section 3143--Amendments Relating to Baseline Environmental Management Reports....................................... 448 Section 3144--Requirement to Develop Future Use Plans for Environmental Management Program......................... 448 Subtitle E--Defense Nuclear Environmental Cleanup and Management................................................. 449 Section 3151--Purpose...................................... 449 Section 3152--Covered Defense Nuclear Facilities........... 449 Section 3153--Site Manager................................. 449 Section 3154--Department of Energy Orders.................. 449 Section 3155--Deployment of Technology for Remediation of Defense Nuclear Waste.................................... 449 Section 3156--Performance-Based Contracting................ 449 Section 3157--Designation of Defense Nuclear Facilities as National Environmental Cleanup Demonstration Areas....... 450 Title XXXII--Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Authorization.................................................. 451 Legislative Provisions......................................... 451 Section 3201--Authorization................................ 451 Title XXXIII--National Defense Stockpile......................... 452 Legislative Provisions......................................... 452 Section 3302--Authorized Uses of Stockpile Funds........... 452 Section 3311--Biennial Report on Stockpile Requirements.... 452 Section 3312--Notification Requirements.................... 452 Title XXXIV--Naval Petroleum Reserves............................ 453 Legislative Provisions......................................... 453 Section 3401--Authorization of Appropriations.............. 453 Section 3402--Requirement on Sale of Certain Petroleum During Fiscal Year 1997.................................. 453 Title XXXV--Panama Canal Commission.............................. 454 Legislative Provisions......................................... 454 Subtitle A--Authorization of Appropriations.................. 454 Subtitle B--Panama Canal Act Amendments of 1996.............. 454 Section 3521--Short Title; References...................... 454 Section 3522--Definitions and Recommendations for Legislation.............................................. 454 Section 3523--Administrator................................ 454 Section 3524--Deputy Administrator and Chief Engineer...... 454 Section 3525--Office of Ombudsman.......................... 455 Section 3526--Appointment and Compensation; Duties......... 455 Section 3527--Applicability of Certain Benefits............ 455 Section 3528--Travel and Transportation Expenses........... 455 Section 3529--Clarification of Definition of Agency........ 455 Section 3530--Panama Canal Employment System; Merit and Other Employment Requirements............................ 455 Section 3531--Employment Standards......................... 455 Section 3532--Repeal of Obsolete Provision Regarding Interim Application of Canal Zone Merit System........... 456 Section 3533--Repeal of Provision Relating to Recruitment and Retention Remuneration............................... 456 Section 3534--Benefits Based on Basic Pay.................. 456 Section 3535--Vesting of General Administrative Authority of Commission............................................ 456 Section 3536--Applicability of Certain Laws................ 456 Section 3537--Repeal of Provision Relating to Transferred or Reemployed Employees.................................. 456 Section 3538--Administration of Special Disability Benefits 456 Section 3539--Panama Canal Revolving Fund.................. 456 Section 3540--Printing..................................... 457 Section 3541--Accounting Policies.......................... 457 Section 3542--Interagency Services; Reimbursements......... 457 Section 3543--Postal Service............................... 457 Section 3544--Investigations of Accidents or Injury Giving Rise to Claim............................................ 457 Section 3545--Operations Regulations....................... 457 Section 3546--Miscellaneous Repeals........................ 457 Section 3547--Exemption.................................... 458 Section 3548--Miscellaneous Conforming Amendments to Title 5, United States Code.................................... 458 Section 3549--Repeal of Panama Canal Code.................. 458 Section 3550--Miscellaneous Clerical and Conforming Amendments............................................... 458 Departmental Data................................................ 459 Department of Defense Authorization Request.................... 459 Military Construction Authorization Request.................... 459 Committee Position............................................... 460 Communications From Other Committees............................. 460 Fiscal Data...................................................... 466 Congressional Budget Office Estimate........................... 466 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate...................... 466 Authorization of Appropriations.............................. 469 Committee Cost Estimate........................................ 474 Inflation-Impact Statement..................................... 474 Oversight Findings............................................... 474 Statement of Federal Mandates.................................... 475 Roll Call Votes.................................................. 475 Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 482 Additional, Supplemental, and Dissenting Views................... 705 Additional views of James V. Hansen, Glen Browder, Tillie K. Fowler, Solomon P. Ortiz, Randy ``Duke'' Cunningham, Walter B. Jones, Jr., Saxby Chambliss, J.C. Watts, Jr., John N. Hostettler, Neil Abercrombie, Robert K. Dornan, Lane Evans, and James B. Longley, Jr..................................... 705 Additional and dissenting views of Ronald V. Dellums........... 709 Additional views of John Spratt................................ 717 Additional views of Chet Edwards............................... 718 Additional views of Jane Harman, Rosa L. DeLauro, Ronald V. Dellums, Patricia Schroeder, Lane Evans, Neil Abercrombie, Martin T. Meehan, and Patrick J. Kennedy..................... 721 Suplemental views of Patricia Schroeder........................ 724 104th Congress Report HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 104-563 _______________________________________________________________________ NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 _______ May 7, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed _______________________________________________________________________ Mr. Spence, from the Committee on National Security, submitted the following R E P O R T together with ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND DISSENTING VIEWS [To accompany H.R. 3230] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on National Security, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 3230) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1997, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass. RELATIONSHIP OF AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS The bill does not generally provide budget authority. The bill authorizes appropriations. Subsequent appropriation acts provide budget authority. The bill addresses the following categories in the Department of Defense budget: procurement; research, development, test and evaluation; operation and maintenance; working capital funds, military personnel; and military construction and family housing. The bill also addresses Department of Energy National Security Programs. SUMMARY OF AUTHORIZATION IN THE BILL The President requested budget authority of $254.3 billion for the national defense budget function for fiscal year 1997. Of this amount, the President requested $242.5 billion for the Department of Defense (including $9.1 billion for military construction and family housing) and $11.1 billion for Department of Energy national security programs and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. The committee recommends an overall level of $266.7 billion in budget authority. This amount is an increase of approximately $12.4 billion from the amount requested for the national defense budget function by the President, and represents an increase of approximately $2.0 billion from the amount authorized for appropriation by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106). Overall, the committee's recommendation is largely consistent with the amounts the committee expects to be established in the budget resolution for fiscal year 1997. RATIONALE FOR THE COMMITTEE BILL HR 3230, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, reflects the committee's continued effort to revitalize America's defenses in oqder to meet the security requirements of the post-Cold War world. Now in its seventh year, the post-Cold War world is still largely defined by what it is not, as the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire created shock waves that continue to ripple through the international geopolitical system. Yet over the past year, the sharper contours of revived and new great-power competitions have begun to emerge from the rubble of the old bipolar, Cold War order. While these new struggles will certainly involve new challenges to U.S. security interests, the form of the competition will not be fundamentally new. Neither history, nor world politics, nor military competition ended with the Cold War. The primary mission of the American military establishment in this turbulent international environment is to protect the United States and its vital national security interests. These fundamental interests have not changed with the end of the Cold War. While the Soviet Union no longer exists, the United States retains enduring interests in defending the American homeland and in maintaining as stable and peaceful a political order as possible in Europe, in Asia, and in the vital energy-producing regions of the world. Yet we face a growing roster of failed and failing states, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and tribal and ethnic conflicts fed by the emergence of a new ``warrior class,'' for whom war too often becomes an end in itself. The events of the past year clearly demonstrate that new challenges to U.S. security interests are emerging on many fronts. China has demonstrated a disturbing willingness to use military force as a tool of coercive diplomacy, threatening stability, prosperity and the growth of democracy in East Asia. In turn, China's actions have caused America's allies and adversaries alike to question the nature and endurance of American's commitment to the region. If the Chinese challenge is that of a newly emerging great power, the challenge from Russia is that of a disintegrating military superpower. Russia careens from extreme nationalism to unreconstructed communism as it struggles to hold itself together. As it does, it wages a bloody and bitter war in Chechnya, brandishes nuclear threats in an attempt to thwart NATO expansion, reintegrates its former empire in Belarus and Central Asia and sells advanced weaponry of all kinds-- including nuclear technologies--to anyone willing to pay in hard currency. Russia cannot protect its stockpile of nuclear materials and Moscow continues to maintain its strategic nuclear forces at Cold War levels of readiness as it invests scarce resources in strategic modernization. Disturbingly, Russia has even adopted a new military doctrine that relies more heavily on nuclear weapons than did Soviet doctrine. Perhaps most importantly, the threat of missile attack against the American homeland is becoming alarmingly real. The rest of the world recognizes the overwhelming advantage the United States enjoys in conventional forces, and the strategic freedom that results from that advantage. One of the lessons of Operations Desert Storm--that U.S. forces can project power virtually anywhere on earth--was not lost on our friends and enemies around the world. Thus, during the recent Taiwan crisis, a senior Chinese official threatened a nuclear attack on Los Angeles as a way of deterring American ``interference'' in East Asia. The inability to defend our citizens against attack by even a single ballistic or cruise missile armed with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction is increasingly recognized as one of our nation's greatest vulnerabilities. Standing in stark contrast to this troubling strategic landscape is the Administration's underfunding of our armed forces. The gap between the U.S. national military strategy and the resources committed by the Administration to executing that strategy, estimated by many analysts to be greater than $100 billion, continues to widen. MODERNIZATION The pillar of a sound American defense policy most in need of revitalization is the modernization of equipment, particularly weapons procurement. Despite the committee's concern, the Administration has done nothing to remedy the problem. In fact, the procurement request for fiscal year 1997 was $5 billion lower than last year's Administration projection for fiscal year 1997. Moreover, the Administration has proposed spending amounts totaling more than fifty percent of the funds added for modernization by Congress last year to pay for the growing costs of the Bosnia operation, increased counter- narcotics efforts, the transfer of F-16 aircraft to Jordan, and other foreign policy initiatives. As a result, the recapitalization of U.S. military forces continues to be sacrificed and postponed. The drop in procurement funding has been dramatic since 1990, especially during the past four years. By the Administration's own reckoning, there has been a real decline of 60 percent in procurement spending from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1997. This year's requested level of procurement funding of $38.9 billion is the lowest since before the Korean War and reflects a substantial cut from the $42.3 billion in procurement authorized by Congress just last year. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE The most glaring shortfall in the Administration's modernization program results from its antipathy to effective ballistic missile defenses. In light of the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them over great distances, the lack of urgency in the Administration's missile defense program is startling. Congressional attempts to instill purpose, direction and focus in the Administration's moribund missile defense efforts were stymied last year by the President's veto of HR 1530, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. For the strategic reasons highlighted at the outset of this introductory section, the committee strongly believes that deployment of a national missile defense should be of the highest priority. Protection of the American homeland must be the first object of any national defense policy, as well as the cornerstone of any broader security strategy. The Administration's failure to aggressively pursue a national missile defense program that will field a viable, cost- effective missile defense system to discourage the development of ballistic missile threats or to defeat them is a grave concern. Consequently, the committee has added substantial funding to the Administration's underfunded request for ballistic missile defense programs, including national missile defense. The committee is equally disturbed by the Administration's retreat from even its own efforts to develop and deploy more robust theater missile defenses. Americans will not forget how a crude, conventionally-armed Scud missile resulted in the greatest single loss of American lives during the Gulf War. Yet the Administration has chosen to scale back efforts and reduce funding necessary to develop and deploy the most robust theater missile defense system possible. The result will be to leave American forces exposed to threats that are a clear and present danger today. Consequently, in response to the Administration's inexplicable spending reductions in several key theater missile defense programs, the committee has provided additional funding for the Army's THAAD system and the Navy's ``Wide Area'' theater defense concept. HEARINGS Committee consideration of the Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1997 results from hearings that began on February 28, 1996 and that were completed on April 17, 1996. The full committee conducted 11 sessions, including markup meetings. In addition, a total of 34 sessions were conducted by five different subcommittees and two panels of the committee on various titles of the bill. DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION TITLE I--PROCUREMENT Aircraft Procurement, Army Airborne reconnaissance low (ARL) The budget request contained $24.7 million to procure the final ARL-M aircraft and mission equipment. The committee understands the Army reprogrammed fiscal year 1996 funds which were authorized and appropriated for converting ARL-I and ARL-C aircraft to the multi-disciplined ARL-M configuration. These funds were applied to incorporate a moving target indicator (MTI) radar into the ARL. Although the reprogramming action was within the scope of the Department's authority, the committee is concerned with the Army's failure to inform the Congress of what it considers a major reorienting of the funds. The committee does, however, support the validated requirement for MTI on ARL, and is aware that funds have not been budgeted to complete the MTI purchase. Therefore, the committee recommends an additional $5.2 million for completing the MTI upgrade. The committee directs the Army to provide the necessary funding to complete the ARL- I/-C conversion to ARL-M from within available resources.- Aircraft Procurement, Navy EA-6B modifications - The budget request contained $100.6 million for EA-6B modifications. Fleet aviation continues to require a robust electronic warfare capability. The decision to retire the Air Force's EF- 111s and rely on the EA-6B for the Department's tactical jamming mission makes it imperative that the EA-6B fleet be structurally sound and modernized to meet current requirements. The EA-6B's aluminum wing center sections have been found to be subject to embrittlement, which has led to stress cracks and resulted in the removal of a number of aircraft from active service. As a result of a Congressional initiative to address this problem, replacement wing center sections are currently being produced. However the Navy has a requirement for twenty more of these sections, since Congress added funds in fiscal year 1996 to upgrade an additional 20 EA-6Bs to support the Air Force's stand-off jamming needs. Consequently, the committee recommends an additional $55.0 million to purchase ten of the twenty new wing center sections in order to avoid a production break in the manufacture of this component. The current jamming transmitters on the EA-6B have not changed substantially since originally designed in the 1960s. There have been several generations of improved surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles since then, and many of these new systems operate at higher radio frequency signals than these jammers. Also, the great majority of current anti-ship missiles employ seekers in the band 9/10 frequency range. Since the EA- 6B is a key component of the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability against these threats, equipping these aircraft with Band 9/10 electronic countermeasure transmitters will provide a potent and effective defensive screen against such missiles. Consequently, the committee recommends an additional $40.0 million to procure 60 shipsets of these transmitters. Surface tomahawk support equipment- The budget request contained $75.6 million for surface Tomahawk support equipment. The Tomahawk afloat planning system (APS) successfully underwent extensive operational test and evaluation in 1994, and production system installations have been completed on the USS Carl Vinson and the USS George Washington. The APS significantly reduces Tomahawk strike planning response times. The APS also provides the centerpiece of the Joint Service Imagery Processing System-Navy which provides deployed planners real-time capability to receive, process, analyze and exploit tactical sensor imagery. The committee notes that the Congress has previously encouraged the Department to continue support and funding for the APS and to consider extending the APS's targeting and mission planning capabilities to other tactical command echelons. The committee is pleased with the APS program's development and production efforts, which have been on schedule, within cost, and have met or exceeded all specifications. Therefore, the committee recommends an additional $10.0 million to support continued fielding of the APS. Aircraft Procurement, Air Force E-8C Joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS) The budget request contained $417.8 million to procure two E-8C JSTARS aircraft and $111.1 million advance procurement for two aircraft in fiscal year 1998. The committee notes the successful deployment of JSTARS to Bosnia and the strong endorsements provided by theater commanders in support of accelerating the procurement of these aircraft. Consequently, the committee recommends $642.8 million, an increase of $225.0 million, to procure an additional JSTARS aircraft. Pacer Coin The budget request contained $2.6 million for the C-130 PACER COIN special mission aircraft. The committee notes that the Department has been directed to determine if the PACER COIN aircraft could be configured to perform both intelligence and airdrop missions. Preliminary indications available to the committee indicate that modifications which would result in a multi-mission aircraft are not only possible but cost-effective as well. However, the budget request did not include any funds for such modifications. Accordingly, the committee denies the request for PACER COIN-unique mission support equipment. RC-135 The budget request contained $66.2 million for support of the RC-135 fleet. The committee notes the increased emphasis placed on this intelligence collection asset and supports continuing the effort initiated by Congress last year to enhance existing RC- 135s and augment the fleet with additional aircraft. The committee understands that the theater commanders-in-chief have a high priority requirement for two additional RC-135s and that this requirement has been validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. To address this requirement, the committee recommends an increase of $39.3 million to accelerate the procurement of an additional aircraft. To continue the ongoing reengining effort, the committee also recommends an increase of $145.0 million to reengine six aircraft. Missile Procurement, Air Force Peacekeeper The budget request contained $8.3 million for procurement of missile replacement equipment, $72.8 million for procurement of Minuteman III modifications, and $44.6 million for procurement of spares and repair parts. The statement of managers accompanying the conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) directed the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report to the congressional defense committees that outlines the Air Force's plans for retaining up to 50 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in an operational status beyond 2003, including the timing and funding required to implement this plan. Although the committee has not received the required report, the committee continues to firmly believe that steps must be taken now to sustain the Peacekeeper ICBM force in light of the fact that Russia has yet to ratify the START II treaty. Therefore, the committee recommends $32.0 million for Peacekeeper sustainment activities. This includes an additional $3.4 million for missile replacement equipment, $5.3 million for Minuteman modifications, and $300,000 for replacement spares and repairs. In addition, of the amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to Title III for Air Force operations and maintenance, $23.0 million is to be used for sustaining Peacekeeper operations. Precision guided munitions (PGMs) The budget request contained $23.0 million to procure 937 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), $131.1 million to procure 400 Sensor Fuzed Weapons (SFW), and $18.4 million to procure 161 GBU-28 hard target penetrator bombs. No funds were requested for procurement of the AGM-130 powered laser guided bomb, the AGM-86B conventional air-launched cruise missile (CALCM), or the AGM-142 HAVE NAP medium range tactical missile, even though these weapons represent the only current stand-off PGMs in the Air Force inventory. The committee noted its concern about the lack of PGMs during its fiscal year 1996 budget deliberations and continues to have reservations with the Air Force's strategy for procuring this much-needed capability. Therefore, the committee recommends $95.0 million for procurement of 250 AGM-130 laser- guided bombs, $15.0 million to modify 100 air-launched cruise missiles to the CALCM configuration, and $39.0 million to procure 50 HAVE NAP missiles. The committee also recommends an increase of $12.0 for procurement of 100 additional GBU-28 hard target penetrator bombs and $21.6 million for procurement of 100 additional SFWs. Further, in order to accelerate deliveries of JDAM and provide the earliest possible operational capability to the bomber force, the committee also recommends an increase of $50.0 million for procurement of up to 3,000 additional JDAM kits. The committee notes that there is a requirement for more than 87,000 of these munitions and the Secretary of Defense has praised the JDAM program as one of the Department's most successful examples of acquisition streamlining. Consequently, the committee strongly urges the Department to consider multiyear procurement of this PGM. Other Procurement, Air Force Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) The budget request contained $57.8 million for procurement of two Predator UAV systems. The committee is pleased with the performance of the Predator in support of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and understands that the Department has determined that the Predator's demonstrated military utility merits its fielding to meet identified requirements. The committee notes that theater commanders-in-chief (CINCs) have requirements for 17 Predator systems, but that the requested funding does not support production rates to meet these requirements. Therefore, the committee recommends $107.8 million, an increase of $50.0 million, to procure up to four additional Predator systems. Consistent with the legislative provision recommended elsewhere in this report (sec. 217), the committee recommends that these funds be transferred from Procurement, Defense-Wide, to Other Procurement, Air Force. The committee also understands that the Air Force has identified a requirement to obtain a limited number of Predator systems to establish a training base for its Predator operators. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a cost analysis to determine whether leasing such systems (in addition to those procured) constitutes a cost- effective strategy for meeting this immediate training requirement. A report containing the details of this analysis and the Secretary's recommendations should be provided to the congressional defense committees not later than 60 days after enactment of this Act. Further, if leasing Predator systems proves to be a cost-effective solution to this requirement and is recommended by the Secretary, the committee urges the Secretary to immediately pursue such a lease arrangement. Procurement, Defense-Wide Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) The budget request contained $10.6 million for procurement of attrition spares and support kits for the Pioneer UAV system. The committee understands that the Department has decided to terminate procurement of the Hunter UAV system and use the existing equipment for testing and maintaining a residual capability. This decision results in the Pioneer being the only UAV currently capable of meeting Navy and Marine Corps short- range requirements. The committee further understands that several initiatives necessary to ensure continued effectiveness of the Pioneer are ongoing but have been underfunded in anticipation of future fielding of the Tactical UAV, a new, advanced concepts technology demonstration program. Consequently, the committee recommends $40.6 million, an increase of $30.0 million, to fund these initiatives and maintain the Pioneer system at acceptable readiness levels. TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION Defense-Wide Programs Ballistic missile defense The budget request included $2,798.8 million in various program elements (PEs) for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), procurement, and military construction activities of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The committee-recommended changes to the request are summarized below: [In millions of dollars] Corps SAM/MEADS (PE63869C).................................... ($56.2) Navy Upper Tier (PE 63868C)................................... 246.0 National Missile Defense (PE 63871C).......................... 350.0 THAAD (PE 63861C)............................................. 140.0 Support Technology-AIT (PE 63173C)............................ 40.0 Cooperative Projects with Russia (PE 62XXXC).................. 20.0 Management (General Reduction)................................ (15.0) A more detailed explanation is provided below. Advanced interceptor technology The budget request included $7.4 million in PE 63173C for Advanced Interceptor Technology (AIT). The committee recommends an additional $40.0 million in this PE for AIT. These additional funds would support a more aggressive schedule for development and testing of advanced kinetic kill vehicle technologies with potential applicability to various future TMD systems, such as THAAD and Boost Phase Interceptor. Arrow The committee continues to strongly support the U.S.- Israeli Arrow program. The committee recommends full funding of the Arrow and other U.S.-Israeli cooperative missile defense projects contained in the budget request. The committee notes, however, that $27.0 million in fiscal year 1996 and prior year funding for the U.S. portion of the Arrow Deployability Project remains unobligated as a result of the lack of a Presidential certification that a memorandum of agreement exists with Israel for the project, that the project provides benefits to the United States, that the Arrow missile has completed a successful intercept, and that the Government of Israel is adhering to export controls pursuant to the Missile Technology Control Regime. Cooperative projects with Russia The committee strongly endorses an expanded program of cooperative BMD-related projects with Russia as a means of building trust and confidence as both sides pursue development and deployment of TMD and NMD systems. U.S.-Russian cooperative BMD activities include various programmatic endeavors as well as a series of joint TMD simulation exercises, the first of which is to be held in June at the Joint National Test Facility, Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Russian-American Observational Satellite (RAMOS) program is one such high- payoff, cooperative technology development program, a point recognized by senior Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has written to the First Deputy Minister of Defense in the Russian Ministry of Defense to apprise him of U.S. government approval and support of the program and to encourage timely final approval from the Russian government. Other U.S.-Russian cooperative BMD activities include the Active Geophysical Rocket Experiment (AGRE) project, and small-scale projects such as electric thrusters for spacecraft, photo-voltaic arrays, and energetic materials. To promote and highlight expanded U.S.-Russian BMD cooperation, the committee recommends establishment of a new program element (PE) for cooperation with Russia. The committee recommends consolidating all existing cooperation projects within this new PE, and recommends $20.0 million be made available within this PE. CorpsSAM/MEADS The budget request included $56.2 million for the Corps surface-to-air missile/Medium Extended Air Defense System (CorpsSAM/MEADS). The committee has in the past supported a cooperative multinational program, but notes that: a memorandum of understanding establishing the program has yet to be signed; there is a high degree of uncertainty as to which U.S. European allies will join in the project; and other programmatic changes have significantly delayed formal initiation of the program. As a result, the committee can no longer determine the total cost of the program, the U.S. cost-share percentage, or the program schedule, including key technical milestones. Furthermore, the committee notes that senior DOD officials have thus far chosen not to press support for the program during congressional consideration of the fiscal year 1997 budget request. Therefore, the committee recommends no funds for the program. The committee also notes that the Department has yet to submit a report on options associated with the use of existing systems technologies and program management mechanisms to satisfy validated CorpsSAM/MEADS requirements, as was requested in the statement of managers accompanying the conference report on S. 1124 (H. Rept. 104-450). Therefore, only $5.0 million of the $20.0 million authorized in fiscal year 1996 has been obligated for CorpsSAM/MEADS. The committee urges the expeditious completion and submission of this report. Joint national test facility The budget request included $5.8 million for Joint National Test Facility (JNTF) modernization split among program elements 63871C, 63872C, and 63173C. The committee recognizes the importance of the BMDO-sponsored JNTF as an essential joint missile defense modeling, simulation, and test center of excellence. The JNTF's focus is the joint inter-service, interoperability, and integration aspects of missile defense system acquisition. As the only missile defense modeling and simulation facility which is staffed by all the services and BMDO, the JNTF provides inter-service computational capabilities and wide area network communication networks with service-sponsored facilities such as the Army's Advanced Research Center, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, and the Air Force Theater Air Command and Control Facility. To adequately satisfy the complex missile defense integration requirements leading to successful joint tests, analysis, wargaming, CINC exercises, and acquisition support, the committee recommends $15.0 million be made available for modernization, computational and wide area network capabilities in support of the Ballistic Missile Defense Network (BMDN) within the program elements listed above. This modernization program will also support the JNTF's contribution to emerging international efforts with friends and allies for interoperability and in development of joint missile defense systems. Management The budget request did not contain a separate program element for management. The committee believes that greater management efficiencies can be achieved, and therefore recommends a general reduction of $15.0 million for management. National Missile Defense The budget request included $508.4 million in PE 63871C for National Missile Defense (NMD). The committee recommends an additional $350.0 million for NMD in an effort to accelerate hardware development, including a new common booster, accelerate and increase the number of exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) flight tests, enhance systems engineering and integration, and accelerate planning and siting activities required for the deployment of an effective NMD system. The committee commends the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) for his recent decision to establish an NMD joint-service program office (JPO), and directs the Director, BMDO to ensure full participation by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the JPO. In addition, the committee directs the Director, BMDO to ensure that the EKV and associated booster designs are compatible with the widest possible range of NMD system architectures and basing modes. The committee directs that the Director, BMDO inform the committee of his plans in this regard not later than September 15, 1996.- The committee notes that the prototype ground-based radar (GBR-P) is an important NMD system element, and that GBR-P is scheduled to begin testing at U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA) in 1998. This schedule must be maintained, or accelerated, in order to realize cost savings associated with leveraging the THAAD radar program and test schedule. Of the amounts authorized in PE 63871C, the committee recommends $68.0 million for GBR-P in order to ensure that the radar is available for integrated system testing in fiscal year 1998. The committee recognizes the importance of the Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) for collecting and analyzing background data of use to future midcourse sensors such as the Space Missile and Tracking System. The committee is concerned, however, that BMDO has failed to budget funds to continue operations through the end of the expected lifetime of the satellite. Therefore, the committee strongly urges the Director, BMDO to provide adequate funds in the fiscal year 1998 budget submission and over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) for MSX satellite operations. The committee understands the importance of an effective battle management/command, control, and communications (BM/C3) architecture to overall NMD system performance and reliability. In this regard, the committee is aware of proposals to leverage existing theater missile defense (TMD) BM/C3 capabilities, including such capabilities being developed under the THAAD program, to support an NMD system. The committee therefore urges the Director, BMDO to study these proposals and inform the committee not later than October 15, 1996, of his views in this regard. - Finally, taking into account the various architectural options for providing a highly-effective defense of the United States against limited missile attacks, the committee directs the commander-in-chief, U.S. Space Command (CINCSPACE) to ensure that the NMD concept-of-operations is flexible enough to accommodate and support a wide range of NMD system architectures and basing modes. CINCSPACE shall inform the committee of his plans in this regard not later than September 15, 1996. NATO cooperation The committee is aware of recent progress made within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance regarding the threat posed to members of the Alliance by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and response options, including the development and deployment of effective missile defenses. The committee strongly endorses this effort and directs the Secretary of Defense to keep the Congressional defense committees apprised of future activities and progress in this area. Navy upper tier The budget request included $58.2 million for Navy Upper Tier (PE 63868C). The committee recommends an additional $246.0 million this high-priority project. The additional funds shall be used to accelerate the development, testing, and deployment of the Navy's theater-wide TMD system. The committee is dismayed by the Department's refusal to include Navy Upper Tier as a ``core'' TMD program--as required by section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106)--and the Department's proposal to reduce funding for this project in fiscal year 1997 by over $140.0 million as compared to the amount authorized by Congress in fiscal year 1996. Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide adequate resources in the fiscal year 1998 budget request to accelerate the schedule for Navy Upper Tier in accordance with previous congressional direction. New director, BMDO The committee was initially concerned by reports that, upon the retirement of the current Director, BMDO, the Department was planning to downgrade this position to a two-star billet. The committee is pleased to note that members of the committee expressed concern and strongly urged that the position remain a three-star billet. The Department has now agreed with the committee's recommendation. The committee looks forward to establishing a frank and open dialogue with the next BMDO Director, and expects that this individual will continue and expand upon the current, positive working relationship between the committee and the Director. Targets The committee directs the Director, BMDO to submit a report to the Congressional defense committees by December 1, 1996, describing BMDO target missile requirements, by number and types, and which target missiles are U.S.-built and which have been or will be acquired through the Foreign Military Acquisition (FMA) program. The report shall also discuss the issues associated with increasing reliance on missiles acquired through the FMA program for meeting BMDO target missile requirements. THAAD The budget request included $269.0 million in PE 63861C for THAAD demonstration/validation (dem/val), and $212.7 million in PE 64861C for THAAD engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). The committee continues to support the development, production, and fielding of THAAD as a matter of highest priority, and recommends an additional $140.0 million in PE 63861C for the THAAD program. The committee endorses the acquisition, beginning in fiscal year 1997, of a second THAAD radar, in order to reduce risk and support operational ground-testing. Of the $140.0 million in additional funds authorized for THAAD, $65.0 million shall be used for long-lead funding for a second THAAD radar. The committee strongly objects to the Department's plan for THAAD that emerged from the BMD Program Review. That plan, which involves delaying the initiation of low-rate initial production (LRIP) and hence achievement of a first unit equipped (FUE) date of 2006, violates the letter and the spirit of section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106). The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to include the necessary resources in the fiscal year 1998-2003 program objective memorandum (POM) to significantly accelerate the THAAD schedule.- Theater missile defense of U.S. territories The committee strongly supports fielding highly effective TMD systems that are capable of protecting U.S. territories from ballistic missile attack, and directs the Secretary of Defense to review the TMD requirements for U.S. territories. The Secretary shall submit a report on the results of this review to the Congressional defense committees not later than November 15, 1996. Chemical-biological defense program The budget request included a total of $505.0 million for the chemical-biological defense program of the Department of Defense, including $296.8 million in research, development, test, and evaluation and $208.2 million in procurement. The continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of chemical and biological weapons technology and delivery capabilities, and the threat posed to U.S. military forces by the potential use of chemical or biological weapons on the battlefield have resulted in repeated expressions of concern by the Congress about the chemical and biological defense readiness of U.S. forces. In response to the guidance provided in title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160), the Department has executed a number of management, research, development and acquisition, and training initiatives which over time and with proper emphasis and funding support should result in significant improvements in the chemical and biological defense readiness of U.S. armed forces. The committee is pleased that the Department has essentially implemented the requirements of the public law. Great strides have been made in establishing a consolidated chemical- biological defense program; however, much remains to be done. At the request of the Readiness Subcommittee, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has assessed the chemical and biological defense preparedness of early-deploying U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground forces. In testimony before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee in March, 1996, the GAO acknowledged the progress made by the Department of Defense, but stated that the Department had not done enough to overcome the chemical and biological defense shortcomings U.S. forces experienced in the Gulf War. The GAO concluded that ``U.S. forces still lack the ability to defend adequately against chemical and/or biological agents and a degrading war- fighting capability could still result from persistent equipment, training, and medical shortcomings.'' Many of the problems cited were similar to those cited in the ``Department of Defense Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense Annual Report to Congress for fiscal year 1995.'' In the GAO's view, the principal reason for these shortcomings is that chemical and biological preparedness has a relatively low priority on a DOD-wide basis relative to traditional operational missions, as evidenced by the limited funding, staffing, and mission priority that chemical and biological defense activities receive. The committee understands that a warfighting analysis is now underway within the Joint Staff with input from the military services and the combatant CINCs that will provide an assessment of chemical and biological defense mission priorities in view of the evolving threat and that will recommend funding levels for consideration in the development of the fiscal year 1998 budget request and the future years defense plan. The committee strongly believes that some action must be taken in the fiscal year 1997 defense budget to address shortcomings in the current chemical and biological defense program. The committee believes that unless the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense as a whole, down to individual unit commanders, all increase their emphasis on improving the armed forces' chemical and biological defense preparedness, many of the issues identified in the Department's annual report and by the GAO are likely to remain unresolved. Accordingly, the committee recommends a continuation of increased emphasis on chemical-biological defense training in units, joint training of commanders and chemical-biological defense specialists, and training of medical units and personnel which could be involved in the treatment of chemical- biological warfare casualties. The committee recommends an additional $16.2 million for shortfalls in operations and maintenance identified by the GAO as follows, and directs the Secretary of Defense to report to the Congressional defense committees on the plans for expenditure of these funds prior to their obligation: Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA)--$13.2 million for chemical-biological equipment maintenance support. Operations and Maintenance, Air Force (OMAF)--$3.0 million for sustainment and replacement of Air Force chemical protective equipment. To address shortfalls in chemical-biological defense research, development, testing, and evaluation, the committee recommends increased authorizations to the budget request as indicated below: PE 62384BP-..................... Chemical/ $3.9 million biological defense. Medical biological 1.7 million defense. PE 63884BP...................... Medical biological 2.2 million defense. PE 64384BP-..................... Contamination 2.0 million avoidance. Collective 6.6 million Protection-. Individual 200,000 Protection. Medical biological 9.0 million defense. PE 65384BP...................... Management support 15.0 million Dugway Proving 3.7 million Ground. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to address shortfalls in chemical-biological defense procurement, identified by the GAO and to report actions taken to resolve these shortfalls as a specific area of interest in the next annual report to Congress on the NBC defense program. Chemical-biological defense--counter-terror and crisis response The Congress has repeatedly expressed its concern about domestic readiness to respond to a terrorist attack, particularly one that might involve the use of chemical or biological agents. Title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160) expressed the sense of Congress that ``. . . the President should strengthen Federal interagency planning by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other Federal, State, and local agencies for development of a capability for early detection and warning of and response to (1) potential terrorist use of chemical or biological agents or weapons; and (2) emergencies or natural disasters involving industrial chemicals or the widespread outbreak of disease.'' A Military Research and Development Subcommittee hearing on March 12, 1996, reviewed the preparedness of the United States to respond to the use of chemical or biological agents in domestic terrorism, or to a natural disaster involving industrial chemicals or the widespread outbreak of disease. The hearing also addressed the preparedness of local jurisdictions to respond to natural disaster and to terrorism in general, and the federal response that could be provided in such situations. Despite the magnificent response by federal, state, and local emergency response agencies to the terrorist bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, local law enforcement and emergency response capabilities would, in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster involving chemical or biological agents, be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the casualties that would result. The subcommittee heard testimony that local agencies ``are simply not prepared to deal with a chemical or biological terrorist incident. We have neither the training nor the resources to allow us to mitigate this sort of incident.'' Even in the most prepared local jurisdictions, chemical/biological incident training is limited to a very few highly specialized response teams, as is the availability of protective equipment and chemical agent antidotes. The capabilities of local medical teams and hospitals to treat chemical agent casualties are likewise severely limited. The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to assess the advisability of establishing a program for enhancing the capability of the Department of Defense to assist domestic law enforcement agencies response to terrorism or natural disasters involving chemical or biological agents. The Secretary of Defense should report to the Congressional defense committees by September 30, 1996, the Secretary's assessment and recommendations for such a program, including a specific discussion on the appropriate role of the Department of Defense in this area. To preserve the option of initiating such a program in fiscal year 1997, the committee recommends an increased authorization of $12.0 million in PE 65760D, and requests the Secretary to report to the Congressional defense committees on the plans for expenditure of these funds prior to their obligation. Cruise missile defense The committee recommends additional funding in fiscal year 1997 for various cruise missile defense activities. The committee's recommendation builds upon the actions taken in section 274 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) wherein the Congress launched the cruise missile defense initiative. Specifically, to enhance the ability of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to detect the launch of cruise missiles, the committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million in PE 63226E and $5.0 million in PE 27417F. The committee also recommends an additional $5.0 million in PE 63226E and $5.0 million in program element 64770F, in order to upgrade the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and an additional $20.0 million in PE 23801A for continued development of improved cruise missile defense capabilities of the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) missile. Finally, the committee notes with concern that the Department has yet to provide the report required by section 274(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106), and strongly urges the Department to complete and submit this report promptly. Intelligence data support systems The budget request included the following amounts for intelligence data support systems: All Source Analysis System-..... PE 63745A......... $2.0 million Joint Maritime Combat PE 64231N......... 11.3 million Information System--. Intelligence Analysis System.... PE 26313N-........ 1.2 million Combat Information System....... PE 27431F-........ 7.7 million These individual military service efforts provide the specific combat users with similar, but uniquely tailored intelligence systems, and are logical acquisitions. However, the committee also believes there is a need to capitalize on specific system strengths and increase service cooperation to improve the collective capabilities of these individual systems. Such synergies of effort could lead to better interoperability, improved data fusion, reduced operator work loads and possibly reduced development costs. Therefore, the committee directs the Army to lead a joint service intelligence system group to explore and initiate efforts to improve such interoperability and determine the applicability of, and where possible, implement existing capabilities. Specifically, the committee recommends the following increases for the Army's All Source Analysis System; the Navy's Joint Maritime Combat Information System; the Marine Corps' Intelligence Analysis System; the Air Force's Combat Information System; and the Special Operations Command's Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System to examine and integrate correlation/fusion algorithms such as the Integrated Battlespace Server and the Generic Monitoring System capabilities developed under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Warbreaker program: [In millions of dollars] PE 63745A......................................................... $2.0 PE 64231N......................................................... 1.0 PE 26313M......................................................... 1.0 PE 27431F......................................................... 1.0 PE 1160405BB...................................................... 1.0 Army RDT&E Items of Special Interest 122mm rocket/mortar threat The committee has been apprised that the Army has a number of opportunities to counter 122mm rocket and mortar threats for which it now has no countermeasure. Several systems in development could possibly be refined to meet this threat if further development work were conducted. Among those competing systems are the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL), the Nautilus laser and the Depressed Altitude Guided Gun Round (DAGGR) program. The committee believes that the potential performance of these and other countermeasure system options should be explored through a detailed systems analysis and a recommendation made to the Secretary of the Army prior to any actual evaluation. The committee recommends an additional $1.0 million in PE 65103A to be available for this study by the Army's Rand Arroyo Center. Navy RDT&E Items of Special Interest Arsenal ship The budget request included $25.0 million in PE 64310N for the Department of the Navy to initiate a ``new start'' development for the Arsenal Ship. The budget request for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) also included $16.4 million in PE 63226E for development of technologies for application to future surface warfare and fast sealift ships, including the Arsenal Ship. Arsenal Ship development is a joint DARPA-Navy program to develop a ``proof-of-principle'' prototype for operational demonstration and exercise with the fleet. In concept forward deployed Arsenal Ships would combine the massive firepower and virtually unsinkable characteristic of the battleship with the relatively low cost and very small crew of modern commercial tankers and cargo ships. The Arsenal Ship would contain 500 vertical launch system cells, accommodating weapons for strike, anti-air warfare, and naval surface fire support. The capability of the prototype would be limited to a small number of vertical launch system (VLS) cells. At-sea test and trials of the prototype would begin in fiscal year 2000. A successful operational demonstration would be followed by refitting of the prototype and installation of the remaining VLS cells and by construction and deployment of up to five additional Arsenal Ships to the fleet beginning as early as fiscal year 2001. The estimated cost of the program for development of the prototype Arsenal Ship is $500.0 million. The committee commends the Navy's leadership and development community and participating activities of the Department of Defense for the innovative way in which the concept for the Arsenal Ship has been developed. Maximum use of available weapons systems, newly demonstrated command and control capabilities, automation, best commercial practices, advanced design and simulation tools, and the best features of acquisition reform could lead to the development of a significant operational capability for support of the regional joint combatant commanders-in-chief. The committee has a number of concerns about the concept, however, which lead it to recommend that the budget request for $25.0 million to begin development of the Arsenal Ship be included in PE 63563N, Ship Concept Advanced Design, rather than PE 64310N. The committee does not believe the Arsenal Ship concept is ready for engineering and manufacturing development. Although committee reviews of the fiscal year 1997 budget request for the program indicate overall agreement of the combat capability being sought for the Arsenal Ship, there appears to be a lack of general agreement on how to get there. Estimates that have been made of the cost of the Arsenal Ship (in excess of $1.0 billion per ship, including weapons load) indicate that the Arsenal Ship will be a major defense acquisition program. The committee believes that there are a number of issues that must be answered before a decision is made to proceed into engineering and manufacturing development, including analysis of the operational requirement, tradeoffs against existing operational capabilities, force structure, realism of the development schedule, system cost, affordability, and others. The committee strongly supports the concept of the advanced concept technology demonstration and the desirability of early user involvement in the development and evaluation of emerging technologies. The committee also supports the need to break out of bureaucratic practices, and make maximum use of best commercial practices, streamlined acquisition procedures, and modern design and analytical tools to develop new defense acquisition paradigms. This, however, does not relieve the DOD and the DON of the need to answer the issues outlined above. Their challenge is to establish new paradigms for operational, technical, and fiscal analysis which will provide the answers to the continuing questions of ``what is the operational requirement and what is the most cost-effective way of fulfilling that operational requirement?'' The committee expects the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy to review these and other core acquisition management issues identified in DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD Regulation 5000.2 during the conduct of the Arsenal Ship program. The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit the initial results of this review with the fiscal year 1998 budget request. Battle group passive horizon extension system--surface terminal The budget request included $1.9 million in PE 64721N for continued research and development of the Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System--Surface Terminal (BGPHES-ST) capabilities. The committee is convinced of the utility of the BGPHES-ST and is gratified that the Navy has elected to procure ground station capabilities already developed by the Air Force to keep costs down. However, the committee is concerned that the Navy has not yet provided a capability to fully exploit the ability of airborne systems to collect the class of threats known as ``PROFORMA.'' Therefore, the committee recommends an additional $1.0 million be provided for the Navy to procure existing USAF processing capabilities and algorithms. Specifically, this funding will be used to integrate EPR-157 or EPR-208 functional capabilities in existing BGPHES-ST hardware. Cooperative engagement capability The budget request included $164.5 million in PE 63755N to continue development of the cooperative engagement capability (CEC), focusing on the development of shipboard and airborne cooperative engagement systems (CES), initial operational test and evaluation of shipboard CES, and development of organic integrated logistic support for the CES. The committee recognizes the CEC as a top priority program for the Navy and for the Department of Defense. The committee notes the superb results of the Mountain Top experiment and demonstration of the ability of CEC to provide a common tactical engagement picture to ground, sea, and air systems. The committee urges the continued acceleration and expansion of joint service integration efforts, including application to the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft; Patriot and Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile systems; Marine Corps TPS-59 radar and HAWK missile system; and among other efforts planned by the Navy. The committee recommends an increase of $27.0 million for the CEC program. Fixed distributed system The budget request included $35.2 million in PE 64784N for continued development of the Distributed Surveillance System. The committee recommends an increase of $35.0 million to the budget request for a Fixed Distributed System commercial-off- the-shelf/non-development initiative fiber optics upgrade. Free electron laser The budget for fiscal year 1996 included $8.5 million in PE 62111N to continue design, fabrication, and activation of a one kilowatt average power free electron laser operating in the infrared spectrum for evaluation for ship defense. The committee recommends $9.0 million for fiscal year 1997 to continue this effort. Integrated surveillance system improvements The budget request included $14.0 million in PE 24311N for research and development support of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS,) including $3.3 million for research and development support of the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) and $10.7 million for the (IUSS) detection/ classification system. The committee recommends an increase of $22.1 million to the budget request to continue development and integration of SURTASS twin line arrays, reduction in the size of transmit arrays, fiber optic array development; expanding the frequency processing capability, and sea test of these developments, for the low frequency array program and development of more reliable low frequency active transmitters; and for adoption of SURTASS software algorithms for submarine sonar systems. Link 16 integration The budget request included $6.7 million in PE 64231N to continue development of the Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat (NTCS-A). The committee recommends an increase of $1.5 million for development of an integrated two-way Link 16 processing capability in the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) software. Integration of two-way Link 16 with all- source intelligence fusion will provide a common tactical picture between weapon systems and command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems and will permit the exchange of tactical data with the C3I systems of the other military services and U.S. NATO allies. The budget also included $37.3 million in PE 25604N for development of improvements in tactical data links in operational Navy systems. The committee recommends an increase of $11.6 million in PE 25604N for further development of Link 16 and related tactical data link programs for surface ship applications; $13.6 million in Other Procurement, Navy; and $2.2 million in Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OMN 0205604N 4B7N) to accelerate the installation of Link 16 tactical data links in AEGIS surface combatants. Elsewhere in this report the committee has recommended similar measures to accelerate the development and fielding of Link 16 capability in tactical and bomber aircraft. Naval joint surveillance and targeting attack radar system The budget request included no funding for providing U.S. Naval forces the ability to receive, process, or utilize the Joint Surveillance and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) moving target indicator (MTI) synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system. The JSTARS MTI will soon reach initial operating capability. However, neither the Air Force nor Navy is adequately prepared to make efficient use of the JSTARS product. As a result, neither will be able to effectively utilize the advanced, standoff weapons that will soon be fielded to attack large numbers of mobile targets. In the Air Force, the key technical limitation is the requirement to use low-capacity and unreliable voice communications to provide target and threat information to attack aircraft. The Air Force is equipping JSTARS platforms with Link 16 and appropriate message sets, but until this year showed little interest in procuring data links sets for its ground attack aircraft. The Navy, in contrast, is already committed to procuring Link 16 capabilities for all of its tactical aircraft, but has shown no appreciation of the enormous improvements that JSTARS could make to Navy interdiction capabilities. Furthermore, the Navy is seeking approval for so-called ``arsenal'' ships based in large part on their presumed ability to help halt massed attacks with missiles such as the Tomahawk. However, the Navy has almost no ability to acquire moving targets at long range, pass the data to Tomahawk mission planning cells, and update the missiles in flight as target dispositions change. While the Tomahawk program office has proposed a program to correct these deficiencies (including JSTARS, Link 16, and smart submunitions), the corporate Navy has yet to define an end-to-end architecture. The committee recommends an additional $10.0 million in a new PE 64770N to develop these capabilities aboard ship, and to ensure that Navy attack aircraft can receive and display JSTARS Link 16 data for use in standoff weapons targeting. The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the Congress on the status of this initiative by April 15, 1997, which includes an estimate of the total funding required to equip appropriate Navy ships, aircraft, and missiles with a JSTARS targeting capability. Naval surface fire support program The budget request included $42.2 million in PE 63795N for the naval surface fire support (NSFS) program. The committee is pleased that the Navy has addressed the overall funding shortfall in the NSFS program that was evident in previous budget requests, and has provided an increased level of funding for the program through the period of the future years defense plan. The committee notes the near-term focus of the program on upgrading the capability of existing Mark 45 5-inch gun systems and on the development and demonstration of an extended range guided projectile (ERGM) which would incorporate advanced, low cost global positioning system/inertial navigation system (GPS/ INS) guidance. The committee is aware that some advanced gun concepts are under consideration by the Navy's development community, but notes little programmatic emphasis on the development and demonstration of advanced gun propulsion and system technologies that could be applied to next-generation gun systems. To partially address this shortfall, the committee recommends an increase of $2.8 million in PE 62111N. The committee believes that increased emphasis must be placed on this area in future budget requests. The committee believes that the advanced GPS/INS guidance and control technology is absolutely key to the NSFS program. The success of this program, especially in terms of affordability, can be significantly enhanced by micro-electro- mechanical systems (MEMS) technology used in the guidance unit. MEMS technology has the potential of significantly reducing the cost of the GPS/INS guidance unit for ERGM and for other Department of Defense programs. The committee recommends an increased authorization of $5.0 million in PE 63795N to build on the Navy's guidance risk reduction program; accelerate development and qualification of MEMS-based GPS/INS guidance and control; and ensure the availability of that technology for the ERGM production program and for other guided munitions, rocket, and missile programs. Precision targeting and location The committee is aware of the potential vulnerability of the global positioning system (GPS) signals to collateral interference and intentional jamming. The committee recommends an additional $3.5 million in PE 64270N for the demonstration of a flyable prototype of a currently available technology capable of rapid, precision location of sources of GPS interference to assess the technical feasibility and utility of such a targeting system on operational aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. Tactical electronic reconnaissance processing and evaluation system The budget request included $2.5 million in PE 26313M for upgrades to, and communications integration testing within the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance processing and evaluation system (TERPES) system. The committee is aware that TERPES is currently fielded to Aviano Air Base in Italy and the Adriatic in support of multi- service operations in Bosnia. The committee is also aware of the unfunded and immediate need to improve TERPES interoperability with the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and Tactical Air Mission Planning System (TAMPS). Therefore, the committee recommends an additional $855,000 to provide required communications software and interoperability upgrades. Air Force RDT&E Items of Special Interest Digital data link The budget request includes $11.1 million in PE 64754F for a digital data link system known as ``Link 16'' that provides high capacity, jam resistant communications and navigation information among aircraft that greatly improve situational awareness of the tactical environment, mission effectiveness, and significantly reduces the likelihood of combat fratricide. The committee recommends an additional $55.7 million in fiscal year 1997 to accelerate fielding of this capability in F-15E, B-1, F-16, and RC-135 aircraft as recommended by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In addition, the committee is concerned that the Air Force has not given adequate consideration to the significantly increased capability potentially provided to the F-16 for beyond visual range weapons employment through the integration of the APX-113, already developed in the F-16 mid-life upgrade program. The committee therefore directs that the Secretary of the Air Force provide a report to the committee by not later than October 1, 1996, detailing the requirement, options and plan, to include schedule and cost, for providing advanced identification friend or foe or similar capabilities for its tactical aircraft. Global positioning system sensor The budget request included $13.6 million in program element 35913F for nuclear proliferation and detection sensors aboard the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite system. The committee recommends an additional $13.9 million to be used for electromagnetic pulse (EMP) sensor and ground system development. This added capability will assist in detecting foreign nuclear tests and, therefore, in monitoring a comprehensive test ban treaty. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to include sufficient resources in the fiscal year 1998 budget submission to continue this important project. Measurement and signal intelligence The committee recommends an additional $3.0 million in PE 31315F for developing an integrated measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) software maintenance and training facility. Milstar automated communication management system The budget request included $700.3 million for the Milstar satellite communications system. The committee recommends an additional $20.0 million in PE 64479F for the automated communication management system (ACMS), which will perform essential network planning and management of Milstar communications resources for a wide range of users. The Army's tactical terminal field operators and planners, in particular, will benefit from a capability to directly task the satellite constellation, move antennae, and change network configurations. ACMS will enable all users to fully utilize the flexibility and responsiveness of the Milstar system. Missile conversion The National Space Transportation Policy requires Secretary of Defense approval for the use of excess ballistic missiles for the launch of U.S. Government research and development payloads into orbit. The converted excess ballistic missiles would provide relatively low cost flight opportunities for research and scientific payloads as well as training and readiness opportunities for military personnel. The committee views with concern the significant delay that has occurred in the Secretary of Defense's approval of a pilot program requested by the Secretary of the Air Force that would convert five excess ballistic missiles for such purposes. This delay has imposed an unnecessary planning burden on potential users. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to immediately approve, as a pilot case, the use of five excess Minuteman missiles to launch small government research and development satellites and encourages the Secretary to delegate future approval authority for all similar uses to the Commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center. National polar-orbiting operational environmental satellite system The budget request included $34.0 million in PE 63434F for the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). As a result of significant delays in the schedule for this converged national weather satellite program, the committee recommends $19.0 million for NPOESS, a reduction of $15.0 million. Reusable launch vehicles The committee is committed to supporting the potential of ``triple-use'' reusable launch vehicle technologies that demonstrate the potential of high payoff benefits to military, civil, and commercial space launch capability and associated sectors of the U.S. industrial base. The committee supports the NASA-DOD-industry team effort for a reusable launch vehicle program by recommending an additional $50.0 million in PE 63401F for fiscal year 1997. Space and missile rocket propulsion technology The budget request included $46.0 million for rocket propulsion technology, including the Integrated High Payoff Rocket Technology (IHPRT) initiative. The committee commends the Department for its leadership in establishing a government- industry cost shared program for rocket and missile technologies similar of the successful Integrated High Payoff Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET) program. However, if the IHPRT initiative is to be successful, all government agencies as well as private contractors that expect to benefit from government programs must be willing to be active participants in the program. The committee notes that the Army is the only military service not actively participating in the program and cautions that in the future the committee will not accept military services conducting totally independent rocket technology development efforts. The committee also notes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's interest in integrating elements of its rocket technology program with IHPRT and supports this initiative. The committee recommends an additional $19.0 million for launch vehicle and tactical missile rocket technology programs to be authorized as follows: $7.0 million for PE 62601F, project 1011; $5.0 million for PE 63302F, projects 4373, 6339, and 6340; $2.0 million in PE 63302F for disposal of highly toxic obsolete pentaborane rocket fuel; $3.0 million for PE 62111N and $2.0 million for PE 63217N, project R0447. The additional authorization shall only be used for direct support costs of these technology projects. Space architect The budget request included $15.0 million in PE 63855F for the space architect's office. The committee is disappointed that the Secretary of Defense would create yet another office to do studies on space architecture without consolidating the responsibility for military and intelligence space requirements in one office. The committee finds the justification material inadequate to justify the request and recommends a reduction of $4.0 million to include any ``pass-through'' funding intended for the Office of the Secretary of Defense for which there was no request. Further, the committee is following with interest the DOD Space Architect's on-going reviews of the appropriate military satellite communications (milsatcom) architecture and the architecture for space control. The committee expects to be kept apprised of progress during the conduct of these important reviews. The committee also strongly urges the Architect to consult closely with the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Space Command during these reviews. Space-based infrared system program The budget request included $113.2 million for the low component of the space-based infrared system (SBIRS) program and $6.9 million for Cobra Brass in PE 63441F, and $173.3 million in PE 64441F for the high component. The committee recommends $247.2 million, an increase of $134.0 million, for SBIRS low (the Space and Missile Tracking System), $180.3 million, an increase of $7.0 million, for the high component, and the requested amount for Cobra Brass. The committee reaffirms support for the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS) program baseline established in section 216 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106). However, the committee is dismayed by the Department's continued withholding of $51.0 million of the total amount authorized and appropriated by Congress in fiscal year 1996 for SMTS. These funds are needed to support and implement the Department's own strategy of increasing competition within the program. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to release these funds immediately. The statement of managers accompanying the conference report on S. 1124 (H. Rept. 104-450) endorsed giving the Block I SMTS a missile defense focus. The committee is interested in learning more about how the Department has interpreted this guidance. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the Congressional defense committees on the functional allocation of requirements among the highly-elliptical orbit (HEO), geosynchronous (GEO), and low earth orbit (LEO) components of SBIRS. The report shall describe the planned design configuration of the SMTS Block I satellite constellation, and the HEO and GEO components, including the extent to which each component will be capable of performing portions of the missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions, and the assumed lifetime of these satellites. The report shall be submitted not later than October 30, 1996. Finally, the committee understands that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is reviewing the appropriate level of system survivability and nuclear hardness for the elements of the SBIRS program. The committee believes that adequate nuclear hardness should be a design feature of the SBIRS program, given the critical importance of assured tactical warning/attack assessment for national decision making. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to inform the committee promptly of the Department's plan for providing a sufficient amount of nuclear hardness for the SBIRS program. The Secretary is strongly urged to consult closely with the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Space Command and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command before rendering a decision on this matter. Defense Agencies RDT&E Items of Special Interest Common imagery ground/surface system The budget request included $47.0 million in PE 35154D for continued migration of the numerous ground stations to the Common Imagery Ground/Surface System (CIGSS) compliant standards. The committee strongly supports both the technical solutions and the management approach for migrating the various imagery ground stations to the CIGSS configuration and standards as outlined in the published handbook. The committee is aware that insufficient funds are available in fiscal year 1997 to modify core components to ensure the CIGSS common, interoperable baseline is achieved by fiscal year 1998. The committee therefore recommends an additional $11.0 million for this purpose. The committee directs the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) to provide a report to the Congressional defense and intelligence committees on specifically how this funding would be used, and on how and when the CIGSS baseline will be realized. The committee further directs the DARO to ensure full funding for this program is provided in future requests. Command intelligence architecture program The budget request included $2.0 million in PE 35898L for the Command Intelligence Architecture Program (CIAP) program to provide the unified commands with an intelligence planning process that documents and links requirements, intelligence operations and future intelligence capabilities. The committee is pleased with the success of this effort and, more so, by the fact that the Command and Control, Communications and Computers Integration (C4I) Support Activity (CISA) has expanded CIAP to include C4I, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) programs. The committee endorses this broader CIAP focus designed to maximize joint service operations and intelligence support. In view of the expanded role of the CIAP, the committee recommends an increase of $2.0 million to ensure the CIAP effort is fully expanded to all DOD services and agencies. Defense mapping agency The budget request included $100.0 million in PE 35139B for continued research and development of Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) production systems and capabilities. The committee is aware of a recent Defense Science Board (DSB) recommendation that DMA re-engineer its production processes to focus on creating and maintaining digital geospatial databases vice its current primary production of paper maps. One of the DSB's most critical findings was that DMA should focus its development funding on a course that continues to provide for the near-term paper products, but that provides an evolutionary path that moves the DMA to becoming a center for maintaining digital products. While the committee understands that DMA cannot discontinue map production in the near-term, it does believe DMA must pursue a course for the digital future. The fiscal year 1997 budget submission appears to continue research and development focus on improved production of government developed products, therefore the committee recommends a $10.0 million reduction in new mapping, charting and geodesy products. Of this reduction, none is to be applied to the alternate source development effort. The committee stresses its belief that DMA, as the DSB recommended, should evolve to a digital geospatial product server vice a paper product developer. Defense nuclear agency Section 217 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) also provided $4.0 million to initiate a counterterrorist explosives research program. The objective of this program was to make available to U.S. law enforcement authorities DNA technology and expertise in the prediction and analysis of explosive effects. The fiscal year 1997 budget request did not include funds to continue the program. The committee believes that the extensive data base and expertise on nuclear and conventional weapons effects acquired by the agency over the last fifty years constitute a unique foundation for predicting explosive and blast effects and for assisting forensic investigations of terrorist incidents. Accordingly, the committee recommends an increased authorization of $4.0 million in PE 62715H to continue the DNA program. The committee further directs the Secretary to submit, no later than February 28, 1997, a report to the Congressional defense committees which provides recommendations for continuation of the program and appropriate levels of funding for the period covered by fiscal year 1998 budget request and the future years defense plan. Finally, the committee remains unconvinced of any technical or ``defense conversion'' benefits that would accrue to the United States from the Topaz International Program (project AX). Therefore, the committee denies the $7.0 million request for this project. Electro-optic camera framing technology The committee believes there is demonstrated potential for electro-optical (EO) framing technology with on-chip forward motion compensation (FMC) for providing precision point target imaging and location. The committee strongly supports the continuation of this technology and the earliest application of these sensors on manned and unmanned tactical reconnaissance platforms. The committee recommends an additional $15.0 million in PE 35154D for continuation of the EO framing technologies with on- chip FMC. Specifically, $3.0 million is provided for the operational insertion and testing of the medium altitude wide area coverage ``step frame'' sensor, $2.2 million is provided to develop enhanced data compression algorithms that provide higher compression ratios and provide equal or better video/ image fidelity and at equal or higher throughput rates than currently fielded technologies to support the ultra high resolution EO framing reconnaissance sensors, $5.8 million is to fund an initial study and device development of a high quantum efficiency large area EO framing infrared charge coupled device with on-chip FMC, and $4.0 million is for multi- spectral EO framing technologies with on-chip FMC. Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) System (JASS) The budget request included $51.8 million for the continuation of the Joint Airborne SIGINT System (JASS). The committee is concerned about the current and long-term capability of airborne SIGINT reconnaissance assets. These platforms provide not only direct tactical support, but also provide valuable products used by the national intelligence community. These systems require continuous sensor and system improvements to maintain pace with the constantly evolving threats against which they are tasked. Past SIGINT upgrades have been inadequately coordinated between the military services and defense agencies. The costs of independent upgrades, even when similar capabilities were being developed, were borne individually by each service and platform. The intent of the statements of managers accompanying the conference report on H.R. 2401 (H. Rept. 103-357) and S. 1124 (H. Rept. 104-450) was that the architecture of existing SIGINT platforms be evolved to a common architecture and that the Department of Defense develop a testbed aircraft which could be used to evaluate commercial and evolving SIGINT architectures, standards and interface protocols such that all airborne SIGINT systems could benefit from the sensor upgrades developed by any service or agency. The statements of managers also endorsed ``maximum commonality'' of equipment to minimize duplication and enhance interoperability. There was no congressional intent for the Department to choose, or exclude, any architecture, including those already fielded, for application on the existing operational platforms. The Department's current development approach for JASS has been controversial, appears to be extremely costly and has not been well supported by the military services primarily due to cost concerns. Concern also exists that the current approach does not satisfy near-term operational needs, and the technical approach does not appear to fully capitalize on commercial standards and developments. The committee believes the current JASS acquisition strategy could benefit from the early establishment of commercial standards, thereby allowing rapid evolution of capability through the use of commercial components to satisfy changing requirements. Additionally, the committee understands that even under the current schedule, JASS will not provide new functional capabilities until after the turn of the century. The committee believes this does not constitute an effective upgrade program for the resources being spent, nor does it believe there is sufficient use of commercial, off-the-shelf technologies. Finally, the committee understands that JASS is better defined as a sensor function or subsystem that could be applicable to the various SIGINT systems as all the functional subsystems including the sensors, the antennas, the radio frequency distribution systems, the recorders, and the operator consoles. JASS does not include these other functions, and therefore should be appropriately defined as such, particularly in terms of budget requests and total system costs submitted to the Congress. The committee fully supports the tenets of a Joint Airborne SIGINT Architecture (JASA) and believes there is a need to develop a formal set of standards and interface protocols that allow the platform program offices to build open architecture systems. The committee also believes that, as capabilities are developed or procured off-the-shelf that meet the established platform requirements, these functions must comply with established architectural and technical guidelines. This would allow these capabilities or functions to be portable from one platform to the next without separate development efforts and associated costs. Finally, the committee also believes there must be a central authority to enforce such commonalities. There is a need for a centralized architecture standards vision and joint development of new capabilities, with decentralized procurement and system integration. Fiscal constraints and threat phasing suggest an evolutionary upgrade approach to systems, based on specific and enforced interface standards. The approach should build on the strengths of each of the fielded systems and should be focused on the individual mission requirements. The committee is committed to ensuring the services and agencies share these sensor developments and believes this approach will increase industry competition by focusing on commercial products, decrease risk, and most importantly, effectively ensure near and mid-term requirements satisfaction and decrease costs. Finally, due to the amounts of money already expended on the JASS high band prototype (HBP) and its predecessor, the committee does not believe terminating this prototype effort prior to test would be appropriate. Therefore, the committee authorizes up to $25.1 million of the request to continue and conclude JASS HBP functional development and testing. The committee does not authorize the obligation and expenditure of any funding for a follow-on JASS high band effort until the HBP has completed flight test, and has effectively proven its utility. The Department of Defense is authorized to obligate and expend fiscal year 1997 appropriated funds for airborne SIGINT functional or subsystem developments provided they are coordinated through, and for use by, multiple services and agencies. However, the committee directs the Secretary not to obligate or expend any fiscal year 1997 funds for such airborne SIGINT system research and development upgrades until the Secretary provides the defense and intelligence authorization committees a report which: (1) clearly identifies the airborne SIGINT system standards and protocols which the platform offices will use to build their architectures and functional capabilities; (2) provides a plan for ensuring the operational and intelligence requirements communities have the final authority for expending intelligence funds; (3) provides a plan for maximizing use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies; (4) provides a plan for ensuring the services collaborate on sensor improvements; (5) provides an upgrade plan which satisfies both the near-term and long-term operational requirements in a coordinated architectural approach; (6) provides a plan for the National Security Agency (NSA), under its Executive Order 12333 tasking, to review and approve platform sensor developments to ensure technical standards compliance; (7) provides a ``level of effort'' funding necessary to ensure continuous upgrades to the existing platforms; and (8) provides a detailed description of those functional capabilities, resulting from the HBP efforts which could be effectively used by the various platform offices. An interim copy of this report should be provided to the Congressional defense committees before June 10, 1996 and a final report will be provided not later than April 1, 1997. Joint command, control, communications, and computers/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance The committee recommends an increase of $15.0 million in PE 33149K for development of improved capabilities for concept development, analysis, and evaluation of advanced technologies and concepts for joint command, control, communications, and computers/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Of this amount $10.0 million is recommended for the establishment of a C4ISR Battle Laboratory and $5.0 million for the development of advanced C4ISR modeling and simulation. These programs are designed to investigate improvements in collection and distribution of targeting and intelligence data among commanders and weapons systems of all the military services, with the goal of permitting joint commanders to conduct operations as swiftly and effectively as possible. Joint surveillance targeting attack radar system The committee is committed to properly classifying those systems which are logically classified as tactical, joint or national intelligence systems. The Joint Surveillance Targeting Attack Radar System (JSTARS) platform and associated ground stations are currently contained in the Tactical Intelligence and Related Applications (TIARA) aggregation. While the committee realizes there are direct intelligence applications of the JSTARS associated Ground Support Modules (GSM) and the follow on Common Ground Stations (CGS), the committee believes the JSTARS aircraft is a direct battle management and targeting applications weapon system, and not an intelligence system. While it is true the JSTARS moving target indicator (MTI) radar system provides critical data to the operational and intelligence communities, the committee believes the primary mission is direct weapon system targeting and should, therefore, not be contained within the TIARA aggregation. Conversely, since the associated ground stations are direct multi-source intelligence support applications with a definitive need to remain part of the entire intelligence support architecture, the committee believes these must continue to be funded within TIARA aggregation. Multifunction self aligned gate technology A total of $18.0 million dollars has been authorized and appropriated in prior years to develop active array ``smart skins'' for unmanned aerial vehicles that permit high density packaging of multi-function communications and radar antennae. The committee recommends an additional $8.0 million in PE 35154D to demonstrate multifunction self aligned gate technology on unmanned aerial vehicles and to complete this program. Passive millimeter wave camera The committee recognizes the early development by the Army of the passive millimeter wave camera and recommends an additional $12.0 million in PE 63226E for integration on an aircraft with specific application to airborne wide-area surveillance. Quiet Knight advanced technology demonstration The budget request did not include any funding for continuation of the Quiet Knight advanced avionics technology demonstration program. In its consideration of the fiscal year 1996 budget request for Special Operations Tactical Systems Development, the committee expressed strong support in the committee report on H.R. 1530 (H. Rept 104-131) for a Phase I (component development and demonstration) of an advanced concept technology demonstration of Quiet Knight low probability of intercept/low probability of detection (LPI/D) avionics for both fixed and rotary wing aircraft and continuation to a Phase II full scale demonstration and flight test of the Quiet Knight capability. In the statement of managers accompanying the conference report on S. 1124 (H. Rept. 104-450), the conferees supported completion of the Quiet Knight technology demonstration, and encouraged the Department of Defense to validate the requirements for advanced LPI/D avionics for special operations aircraft. The committee understands that initial studies on requirements for low-level penetration aids have been completed which recommend reducing aircraft electronic emissions and that further LPI/D studies will be completed by December 1996. Flight demonstrations will follow in the Summer of 1997. The committee understands that sufficient funds are available from prior years to support the completion of the advanced technology demonstration and that no additional funds are required for the program through fiscal year 1997. The committee understands that the program will compete for funding in the fiscal year 1998 budget request. Rapid acquisition of manufactured parts The Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP) program is being transferred from the Department of the Navy to the Defense Logistics Agency. As a consequence, the Department failed to request funding for fiscal year 1997. Accordingly, the committee recommends an additional $12.0 million in PE 63736D for fiscal year 1997 to provide transition funding to support the program until fiscal year 1998. Rigid hull inflatable boat The budget request included $5.0 million for procurement of special warfare equipment, including $4.1 million for procurement of the Naval Special Warfare 10 meter Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB). The committee recommends an increase of $2.75 million in PE 1160404BB to complete development and operational testing of competing prototype RHIBs, a downselect decision to a single contractor, and other activities relative to a Milestone III decision in fiscal year 1997. To offset the increase, the committee recommends a corresponding reduction in the procurement account for special warfare equipment. Special operations M4A1 carbine modifications The budget request included $2.0 million in PE 1160404BB for Special Operations Weapons and Support Systems Advanced Development, including $1.7 million for development of the integrated night/day/observation/fire control device (INOD) for the M4A1 carbine. The committee recommends an increase of $1.9 million to the budget request to accelerate the development of the INODS and provide integrated day/night target acquisition and fire control out to a range of 500 meters for the special operations version of the M4 carbine. U-2 aircraft The budget request included $28.3 million in PE 35154D for sensor upgrades to the U-2 aircraft. The committee is deeply concerned about the technical health of the various sensors carried on the U-2. The special sensors, for example, have not been upgraded since 1991 and are currently in several different configurations. Also, the multi- sensor role of the aircraft is limited because the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS) and Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance Systems (SYERS) sensors cannot operate simultaneously. Finally, because of older technologies and implementations, geolocation accuracy for precision strike targeting is insufficient for required operations. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $57.0 million for critical U-2 sensor upgrades. Of this amount, $10.0 million is specifically for improving and downsizing the SYERS sensor such that SYERS and ASARS can be flown simultaneously. These funds should also be used to improve geolocational accuracies. The committee directs that up to $7.0 million be used for the ASARS Improvement Program (AIP) to ensure this upgrade can be fielded by fiscal year 1998. The remainder of the funding is to be applied to SENIOR RUBY, SENIOR SPEAR, and SENIOR GLASS commonality upgrades. Specifically, the committee directs that the Air Force upgrade the SPEAR/RUBY sensors to the GLASS configuration, and upgrade the SENIOR GLASS systems to an open architecture configuration consistent with an architectural approach approved by the Defense Cryptologic Program manager. Further, the committee directs the Department to determine, and program for, the necessary future years level-of-effort funding to continue evolutionary U-2 sensor upgrades. Unmanned aerial vehicles The committee has been and continues to be concerned about the Department's UAV program because of the lack of validated requirements and the frequency with which ``requirements'' change; lack of substantive analysis or the failure to provide the analysis, if it exists, to the Congress; affordability of the UAV program within the context of the Department's overall reconnaissance program; the ineptness and lack of preparation of the Department in preparing for the transition of the Predator UAV from an advanced concepts technology demonstration (ACTD) to a procurement program; and the claims made by the Department regarding ``joint'' programs versus the reality of very different requirements for those programs. Major changes were made to the Department's priority for UAV programs in 1995. Following what became the final change in the Fall of 1995 as a result of a Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) meeting, the committee twice requested and was refused the analysis from which the JROC recommendations were based. The committee understands that what at one point was the first priority for the UAV program, the Hunter UAV, was canceled by the Department. The Maneuver Variant UAV and Hunter UAV requirements were merged to become the JTUAV, and notwithstanding the claim of jointness, the Army and Marine Corps requirements for this system are significantly different. In an attempt to incorporate the Navy requirement, the range has been increased four-fold. The acquisition strategy calls for a down-select from nine to one contractor with no apparent concern over maintaining competitiveness in the program. The committee has to question that, if the Department's contention is correct that the payload and not the vehicle is what is important, if there is to be a JTUAV, why would it not be prudent to select two contractors to proceed to procurement? A heavy fuel engine for the tactical UAV's has been a continuing requirement for several years, yet the Department appears several years away from achieving this requirement. Close to $1.0 billion was expended on the Hunter UAV before it was canceled. The budget for the JTUAV is $900.0 million. Yet, there is uncertainty with regard to the requirement and its affordability. The Predator UAV ACTD has been relatively successful, but has become a symbol of bureaucratic ineptness as a procurement program. Fiscal year 1995 funding for procurement of additional vehicles has yet to be put on contract and the Department indicates it will be August 1996, before contract negotiations can be concluded. Further, the Department has requested funding for ``marinization'' of Predator. Other than ensuring that Predator UAV data is made available to ships in an area of operation, the committee opposes any modification of Predator for the purpose of operating the vehicle from ships. The committee also notes that the UAV program has been limited solely to reconnaissance payloads and questions whether adequate consideration has been given to operational applications such as laser target designators for UAV's for use with stand-off delivery of precision guided munitions. Such use would provide significant advantages to the operational users in high threat environments. Because of these numerous concerns with regard to the Department's UAV program, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 217) that would prohibit the obligation of funds for the Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle until the Secretary of Defense meets several certification requirements to the Congress, prohibit the obligation of funds for marinization of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, require an advanced concept technology demonstration of a laser technology designator with a Pioneer, Predator, or Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle with air-to-surface precision guided munitions, transfer the management and resources for the Predator UAV to the Department of the Air Force, and for fiscal year 1998, transfer the responsibility for UAV procurement to the military departments. Dark Star unmanned aerial vehicle The budget request included $17.4 million in PE 35154D for the ``Dark Star'' unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Notwithstanding the recent loss of the first Dark Star vehicle, the committee continues to support the objectives of the Dark Star program. The committee remains convinced that the Dark Star UAV holds significant promise for providing unique UAV support to the operational users. The committee is aware that the current linear scanning array sensor does not provide the integrated multi-disciplined imagery capabilities nor geolocation accuracies that an integrated electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) framing camera could provide. The committee therefore recommends an additional $3.5 million for integrating existing EO framing with on-chip forward motion compensation technology into the aircraft and associated ground processing equipment. Further, the committee is aware of the synthetic aperture radar (SAR) coverage problem due to the use of a non-developmental antenna. The committee understands the required design is completed, but no funds to implement the correction are available. Because the committee believes there is a need to ensure full ground coverage within the radar's field of view, it recommends an additional $10.0 million be provided to develop and install the necessary radar antenna. Finally, in the statement of managers accompanying the conference report on S. 1124 (H. Rept. 104-450), the conferees directed the Department to assess user needs against a more capable Dark Star air vehicle. The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) responded specifically to this directed action by stating that major improvements could be realized. However, the DARO has shown no further interest in pursuing such improvements. As representatives from several committees were told, the DARO wanted to fly and test this aircraft before they would consider any improvements. Yet, this same philosophy does not seem to pertain to the Global Hawk UAV, as the DARO is pursuing many upgrades to this vehicle's capabilities--long before its first scheduled flight in December 1996. The committee authorizes an additional $4.0 million for developing a concept of operations and design of an improved Dark Star UAV. This funding is to be specifically used to pursue the designs necessary to develop a Dark Star aircraft with a unit fly away cost of $20.0 million. The intent of this additional authorization is to provide the option for a more capable aircraft to potential users that satisfies the survivable long dwell reconnaissance need in a high threat environment. Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle The committee directs that no funds authorized for appropriation for the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) be used to develop, procure, integrate or install a signals intelligence UAV until the vehicle has completed Phase III of the advanced concepts technology demonstration (ACTD) and a system procurement decision has been made. Accordingly, all funds for such sensor development and procurement should be applied to the upgrade of U-2 sensors. All U-2 upgrades are to be fully designed and built for compatibility with the Global Hawk vehicle. Further, the committee is aware of existing state-of-the- art imagery technologies which provide both electro-optic (EO) and infrared imagery within the same camera. The committee is concerned by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office's (DARO) decision to allow the Global Hawk contractor to develop a new EO-only camera for the UAV rather than using off-the- shelf technologies. The committee directs the DARO to provide a report to the Congressional defense and intelligence committees that details the analysis that went into this decision, and furthermore, provides the rationale establishing why existing camera(s) could not be more cost effectively procured. This report should be transmitted to the Congress no later than July 1, 1996. Joint tactical unmanned aerial vehicle The budget request included $51.4 million for the Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (JTUAV). As previously noted, the program has evolved from the close range UAV and maneuver UAV to the current program. It is one of at least six UAV's under development or operational use. The Department has issued requests for proposals and intends to make an award in May 1996, for the joint tactical unmanned aerial vehicle--a program for which there has been no authorization or appropriation. The committee recommends $33.4 million for this project, a reduction of $18.0 million, because of the availability of prior year funds. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS Subtitle B--Program Requirements, Restrictions, and Limitations Section 211--Space Launch Modernization This section would authorize $50.0 million for a competitive reusable space launch vehicle (RLV) program and permit obligation of the authorized funds only to the extent that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's current operating plan allocates at least an equal amount for the RLV program. Section 215--Research Activities of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Relating to Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense Technology This section would amend the provisions of section 1701 of the National Defense Authorization Action for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160) and clarify the role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Department of Defense chemical and biological warfare defense technology research and development program. The intent of the amendment is to capitalize on the traditional function and flexibility of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in research, development, and exploitation of advanced technologies for the most difficult defense problems, while insuring that the DARPA program is coordinated and integrated with the overall defense chemical and biological warfare defense research and development program. Section 216--Limitation on Funding for F-16 Tactical Manned Reconnaissance Aircraft This section would limit total obligations for research, development, test, and evaluation; procurement; and modifications for the F-16 Tactical Manned Reconnaissance aircraft to $50.0 million, plus the amounts required for incorporating the Common Data Link into the system. Section 217--Unmanned Aerial Vehicles This section would prohibit the authorization of appropriations for the Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, prohibit the authorization of appropriations for marinization of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, and require an advanced concept technology demonstration of a laser technology designator with a Pioneer, Predator, or Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle with air-to surface precision guided munitions. Section 219--Space-Based Infrared System Program This section would authorize funds for the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program, prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds until the Secretary of Defense issues a certification to Congress, and direct the Secretary to consider the appropriate management responsibilities for the Space and Missile Tracking System program. Section 221--Authorization for Joint United States-Israeli Nautilus Laser/Theater High Energy Laser Program This section would state that the Congress strongly supports the Joint U.S.-Israeli Nautilus Laser/Theater High Energy Laser programs and encourages the Secretary of Defense to request authorization to develop these programs as agreed to April 28, 1996, in the statement of intent signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Prime Minister of the State of Israel. Section 222--Nonlethal Weapons Research and Development Program This section would authorize $3.0 million of the funds requested in PE 63640M to be used only for nonlethal weapons research and development. Subtitle C--Ballistic Missile Defense Programs Section 231--Funding for Ballistic Missile Defense for Fiscal Year 1997 This section would authorize funding for ballistic missile defense research and development activities in fiscal year 1997. Section 232--Certification of Capability of United States to Defend Against Single Ballistic Missile This section would require the President to submit to the Congress a certification stating whether the United States has the military capability to intercept and destroy a single ballistic missile launched at the territory of the United States. Section 233--Policy on Compliance With the ABM Treaty The current dispute between the Congress and the President over theater missile defense (TMD) ``demarcation'' hinges largely on the issue of whether U.S. obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a whole and under article VI(a) of the Treaty in particular are sufficiently clear such that the Secretary of Defense, who is charged by the President with the responsibility, can certify in good faith that the TMD systems currently under development by the United States can be tested and deployed in compliance with those obligations. In Article VI(a), each party undertakes not to give non-ABM systems ABM capabilities and not to test non-ABM systems in an ABM mode. The Secretary of Defense in the previous Administration took the position that the obligations of the parties under article VI(a) of the Treaty were sufficiently well understood that a standard of compliance could be developed unilaterally so as to enable the development and deployment of TMD systems then under development by the United States, including the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and Navy Upper Tier. Furthermore, this approach would have allowed full exploitation of data derived from space-based sensors, such as the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS), for TMD purposes. The current Administration has rejected adopting on a unilateral basis the compliance standard recommended by the Secretary of Defense from the previous Administration. Instead, it chose to revise the standard and then seek Russian agreement to that revised standard in order to permit the development and deployment of U.S. TMD systems such as THAAD and Navy Upper Tier. By choosing to seek Russian concurrence in what should have been a unilateral decision, the Administration has effectively granted Russia a veto over the technical capabilities of U.S. TMD systems. Further, pending the outcome of the negotiations, the Administration has artificially constrained the design and performance of THAAD and Navy Upper Tier, in effect ``dumbing down'' these systems in order to comply with alleged, perceived obligations under article VI(a) that do not exist. Therefore, the committee once again endorses the approach to a compliance standard recommended by the Secretary of Defense in the previous Administration, and which was adopted by the 103rd Congress in section 234(a)(7) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103- 160) and reaffirmed by the 104th Congress in section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337). The committee recommends a provision (sec. 233) that would codify this standard for assessing compliance of systems with the ABM Treaty, state certain prohibitions, and define an ABM-qualifying flight test. The committee notes that this standard is entirely consistent with U.S. obligations under the Treaty. Finally, the committee finds that continuation of negotiations with the Russians on this subject is both unnecessary and potentially deleterious to U.S. national security interests. Section 234--Requirement That Multilateralization of the ABM Treaty Be Done Only Through Treaty-Making Power The committee remains deeply concerned by the Administration's proposal to multilateralize the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by adding a dozen or more signatories from the states of the former Soviet Union. To date, the Administration has failed to provide a compelling case for why multilateralization is necessary or in the security interests of the United States. Among the republics of the former Soviet Union, only the Russian Federation has fielded an ABM system or possesses the technological capacity to develop and deploy such a system. The remaining former Soviet republics have no equities in the Treaty. In addition, multilateralizing the Treaty would increase the probability that a single former Soviet republic could block any amendment, modification, or clarification to the Treaty, including agreements that the United States and Russia might find in their interest to adopt. The Administration's proposal to multilateralize the ABM Treaty would grant to Russia and other former Soviet republics a right of veto over any Treaty modifications needed to permit deployment of a highly-effective NMD system. For these reasons, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 234) that would state that any addition of a new signatory party to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (in addition to the United States and the Russian Federation) constitutes an amendment to the treaty that can only be agreed to by the United States through the treaty-making power of the United States. This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for any fiscal year for the purpose of implementing or making binding upon the United States the participation of any additional nation as a party to the ABM Treaty unless that nation is made a party to the treaty by an amendment to the Treaty that is made in the same manner as the manner by which a treaty is made. Finally, the committee notes that this section is fully consistent with section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337). Section 235--Report on Ballistic Missile Defense and Proliferation This section would direct the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress by December 31, 1996, on ballistic missile defense and proliferation. In requiring the report, the committee directs the Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to address the various relationships between theater ballistic missile defense, national ballistic missile defense, and U.S. counterproliferation objectives. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the missiles that can be used to deliver them, constitutes a serious and growing threat to the security of the United States and U.S. allies. To date, traditional arms control and nonproliferation measures to prevent proliferation have met with limited success. The committee believes that insufficient attention is being given by the Administration to the role that ballistic missile defense can play in preventing proliferation. The ability to counter ballistic missiles once launched devalues the political and military utility of these weapons as instruments of terror or military significance. This was recognized by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, who noted that ``effective missile defenses can reduce incentives for proliferators to develop, acquire, or use ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.'' In the committee's view, it is reasonable to assume that nations with scarce resources may think twice about investing in expensive military means that can be easily countered. In addition to its role as a preventive, ballistic missile defense can also protect against the effects of proliferation should efforts to prevent it fail. However, the Administration's Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, announced in December 1993, failed to consider the role that a national missile defense can play in achieving the counterproliferation mission. In addition, the Administration's recent report on ``Proliferation: Threat and Response'' notes that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missile that can deliver them ``presents a grave and urgent risk to the United States and our citizens * * *.'' However, the report makes no mention of national missile defense. Section 236--Revision to Annual Report on the Ballistic Missile Defense Program Section 224(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189) established a reporting requirement for the Strategic Defense Initiative program. With the changed focus of the program, several of the reporting requirements are no longer valid. This provision would update the requirement for the annual ballistic missile defense report to Congress. Section 237--ABM Treaty Defined This section would define the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for the purposes of this subtitle. Section 238--Capability of National Missile Defense System This section would direct the Secretary of Defense to ensure that any national missile defense system deployed by the United States is capable of defeating the threat posed by the Taepo Dong II missile of North Korea. TITLE III--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST Intelligence Programs Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) The budget request included $698.9 million for continued operations of the DMA. Of this amount approximately $30 million was designated for funding a future National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) Space Shuttle (STS) to conduct earth imaging operations for mapping purposes. The committee supports this STS mission effort, but is not aware of a firm availability of a shuttle flight to carry the mapping payload. Therefore, the committee fences $30 million of DMA operations and maintenance funding until DMA has a firm commitment and date for the STS mapping mission from NASA. Additionally, the Defense Science Board (DSB) recently provided some study recommendations for improving DMA business practices and operations. Specifically, the DSB recommended DMA production processes be reengineered to move away from making maps and toward maintaining multi-source digital geospatial information data bases--this includes incorporating commercial products. While the committee recognizes that DMA cannot terminate its paper map products in the short-term, it does recognize the fact that the DSB stressed that DMA needs to move in this direction. Therefore, the committee directs DMA to provide the Congressional defense and intelligence committees with a detailed evaluation of the DSB report, and a plan for implementing those DSB recommendations it considers appropriate. An interim report of this plan should be provided to the Congressional defense and intelligence committees prior to the fiscal year 1997 defense authorization conference, with a final report provided no later than April 1, 1997. Finally, the committee notes the budget request for DMA did not include funding for the lease of the DMA Reston Center which had, prior to fiscal year 1997, been included in the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). The statement of managers accompanying the conference report on S. 1124 (H. Rept 104-450), directed that costs for this facility should not be maintained in the NRP, and directed that these funds be moved from the NRP into the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) DMA accounts. Therefore, the committee recommends this program be increased by $27.1 million from funds transferred from the NRP. Over The Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) Radar System The budget request included $5.693 million for continued ``warm storage'' maintenance of the two OTH-B radars. These radars are being maintained as part of NORAD's ``reconstitution assets.'' The committee understands that it will require at least 24 months to bring these first generation OTH-B radars out of caretaker status and into an operational status--if such a decision were made. The committee also understands that major upgrades, costing millions of dollars, will be necessary to bring out-dated technology up to modern standards. When considered with the totality of terrestrial and space based warning systems, the committee is not convinced the projected threat, or the technical capabilities of these older systems, warrants continued caretaker maintenance. The committee does, however, understand the potentially high costs to the U.S. Government of closing these systems down and returning the lands to the individual states. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study that determines the viability of retaining or terminating these radars. This study should include fully identified costs for all recommendations. The Secretary is to provide an interim report on the results of this study before the fiscal year 1997 defense authorization conference, with a completed report no later than April 1, 1997. Pacer Coin The budget request included $8 million for operations of the PACER COIN special missions C-130. In the statement of managers accompanying the conference report on S. 1124 (H. Rept 104-450), the conferees directed the Department of Defense to determine if PACER COIN could be configured to perform multiple missions including the PACER COIN, SENIOR SCOUT and airdrop missions. This direction was based on the condition that a PACER COIN-only mission would not be supported by the House. Preliminary indications are that such modifications are not only possible, but cost effective and would provide a viable and unique multi-role aircraft. However, the President's request included no funds for such modifications, and this committee has received no indication from the National Guard Bureau that this was an effort they wished to pursue. Therefore, the committee denies the PACER COIN funding request. Senior Scout The budget request included $1.3 million for operations of the SENIOR SCOUT intelligence support system. The committee recognizes the capability provided by the SENIOR SCOUT system, and also recognizes that this system could be effectively used to backfill systems such as the RC-135 and EP-3 that are being pressed into crisis and contingency areas. The committee therefore recommends an additional $600,000 be provided for the National Guard CINC's ``initiative fund'' to pay for C-130 transport flying hours to carry the SENIOR SCOUT package. Standard Missile Maintenance The committee is concerned that the Navy has not requested sufficient funds for Standard missile intermediate level maintenance to meet peacetime operational requirements. Additionally, the committee understands that the Navy is considering abandoning its current practice of maintaining a facility on each coast and consolidating all Standard missile maintenance activities at a single site . In order to ensure that the Navy has a sufficient number of Standard missiles available for deploying ships in peacetime and that adequate capacity is maintained on both coasts to support surge requirements in time of war or mobilization, the committee directs that $8.5 million of the additional funds provided for weapons maintenance shall only be available for Standard missile intermediate level maintenance processing to be performed at both facilities. TITLE IV--MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS Navy Maritime Patrol Aircraft The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to increase the number of Navy P3C maritime patrol aircraft squadrons by two (1 active, 1 reserve) above the 12 active and 8 reserve squadrons requested in the President's budget. As a consequence, the committee directs the following increases: Navy active personnel accounts (End Strength: 418 personnel, and $7 million); Naval Reserve personnel accounts (End Strength: 97 Training and Administration of the Reserves (TAR) personnel, 266 part-time personnel, and $3 million). TITLE V--MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY Minority Representation in Special Operations Forces The committee is aware that there may be a significant under-representation of minorities in certain areas of the special operations forces of the Department of Defense. The committee desires to understand better the reasons for and implications of any under-representation. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to assess the racial representation, both officer and enlisted, in the special operations forces of each of the military departments. In addition, if the Secretary determines that a significant racial imbalance exists, the committee directs the Secretary to report the reasons for the imbalance to the Congress, together with a plan to correct the imbalance. TITLE VII--HEALTH CARE PROVISIONS Global Infectious Disease Surveillance Program The committee recognizes the need to minimize the negative effect that infectious diseases have on the combat readiness of the military force. Therefore, the committee encourages the Department of the Army to develop a global infectious disease surveillance and response program. This type of program could minimize the impact of disease on operational readiness by rapid communication of systematically gathered information and prompt intervention through a coordinated response program. TITLE X Counter-Drug Activities Overview The budget request contained $782.0 million for Department of Defense counter-drug activities. This represents a net decrease of $32.3 million from the fiscal year 1996 appropriated level of $814.3 million. To ensure that the Department of Defense effort in this important national priority is not diminished, the committee recommends an increase of $40.0 million for fiscal year 1997 counter-drug activities for a total authorization of $822.0 million allocated as follows: [In thousands of dollars] FY97 Drug Interdiction & Counter-Drug Request................. $782,019 Source Nation Support..................................... 153,961 Dismantling Cartels....................................... 57,055 Detection and Monitoring.................................. 232,129 Law Enforcement Agency Support............................ 254,979 Demand Reduction.......................................... 83,895 Recommended Increases: Laser Strike (Project #9497).............................. 10,000 Riverine Operations (Project #9201)....................... 4,900 Southwest border support (Project #9499).................. 2,500 Signal intelligence equipment (Project #1313)............. 3,000 SOUTHCOM support (Project #9497).......................... 1,500 Enhanced JTF-6 DLEA support (Project #2435)............... 5,000 Gulf States Counterdrug Initiative (Project #7406)........ 4,800 Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force (Project #7408)........... 1,000 Spare TARS (Project #4110)................................ 3,800 C-26 reconnaissance upgrade (Project #7403)............... 3,500 Recommendation................................................ 822,019 Items of Special Interest National guard counter-drug program The committee continues to strongly endorse the contributions of the National Guard to the defense counter drug program. The unique role and status of the National Guard in the war on drugs makes the men and women of the National Guard an invaluable asset to the overall effort. National Guard counter drug activities take place in every state and virtually every community of the United States. Accordingly, with the exception of the increases noted above, the committee recommends the requested authorization for the fiscal year 1997 National Guard counter drug program and fully expects the Department to execute the program at this level of authorization. The committee strongly believes that the National Guard component of the defense counter drug program should be properly resourced to ensure the continued successful contribution of the National Guard to this national priority. C-26 aircraft photo reconnaissance upgrades The committee is aware of a shortfall in funding for the National Guard C-26 aircraft photo reconnaissance and infrared surveillance upgrade program. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $3.5 million to restore the number of aircraft involved in the C-26 photo reconnaissance upgrade program to its previous level. Gulf states counterdrug initiative The committee continues to support the Gulf States Counterdrug Initiative (GSCI) and is pleased to note that the budget request contains $3.2 million for this initiative. However, the committee is concerned that this funding level does not adequately cover the required costs for the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy, integrating the state of Georgia into the program and other priority initiatives. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $4.8 million over the requested amount. The committee notes that none of these funds should be utilized for construction or other infrastructure related costs. The committee strongly believes that funds provided for this program should remain focused on training and improving command, control, communications and computer (C4) capabilities. Southwest border fence project The committee continues to have a strong interest in facilitating support for the border fence project along the San Diego-Tijuana border area in Southern California. The committee is aware of the efforts of JTF-6 and the California National Guard in sustaining an adequate level of support to enhance this important barrier. The committee notes the growing support in Congress and within the Administration for upgrading the existing fence to a more capable design and endorses the decision to fund this effort from within the immigration control budget. However, to ensure that the existing program to extend the length of fence coverage is not unnecessarily interrupted, the committee recommends that, of the amounts authorized for Law Enforcement Agency Support, $5.0 million be made available for continued support of this national project. Further, the committee believes that improvements to the San Diego fence should receive priority consideration as Congress entertains Administration proposals to utilize up to $250 million in fiscal year 1996 Department of Defense funds for the national counternarcotics effort. Other Matters Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) The committee continues to strongly support the Department's efforts to upgrade its information technology infrastructure by rapidly transitioning to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN). While the committee had hoped that the Department would have had the full DISN program in place and operational by now, the committee expects implementation of the DISN program to move forward expeditiously to ensure widespread availability of state-of- the-art telecommunications for military users. Accordingly, the committee expects that the fifteen month extension of the current Defense Commercial Telecommunications Network (DCTN) end no later than the planned date of May, 1997. To facilitate the rapid migration of the Department's vast collection of telecommunication systems into DISN, the committee directs the military services to finalize plans to extend DISN operational concepts within their base infrastructure and within operationally deployed forces. The committee notes that DISN implementation must reflect the end- to-end nature of the program and elimination and migration of legacy systems in order to for the program to attain its full potential. Further, the committee believes that the aggressive integration of land, space, and deployable assets is essential to this strategy and should receive priority consideration during future budgeting and implementation decisions. Supercomputer Exports and Proliferation The committee continues to be troubled by the Administration's relaxation of export controls on sensitive items with military application and reiterates the directive contained in the statement of managers accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) directing the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the Administration's relaxation of export restrictions on supercomputers. The conferees expressed concern regarding the potential impact of the Administration's decision on United States nonproliferation efforts and the ability of the United States to maintain its military technological edge. Specifically, the Secretary was directed to submit a report that ``describes the impact of the export decision on the ability of nations to acquire and use high-performance computing capabilities to develop advanced conventional weaponry, weapons of mass destruction, and delivery vehicles.'' This report has not been submitted and is now overdue. The committee calls on the Secretary to submit the required report as soon as possible. White House Communications Agency The committee is aware of ongoing work by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, the Department of Defense Inspector General and the General Accounting Office to review the operations of the White House Communications Agency (WHCA). The committee is concerned that although funded exclusively through DOD appropriations of over $100 million a year, WHCA has functioned outside DOD operational control and with little or no Defense Department oversight. Operating under the direction of the White House, WHCA's budget requests have gone largely unreviewed, its annual performance plan has failed to meet DOD requirements, its acquisition planning has fallen short of the Federal Acquisition Regulation standards resulting in wasteful purchases, and the agency's staffing needs have not been adequately supported or justified. In addition, the agency's functions and activities appear to have expanded greatly beyond its initial mission of providing communications support to the President in his role as commander-in-chief. While the need for reform is clear, the committee is encouraged by the recent indications by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, the Director of the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Commander of WHCA of a willingness to undertake corrective actions. Together with the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, the committee will pursue a further review of the agency's operations in the coming year to ensure that necessary reforms are adopted. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS Subtitle A--Financial Matters Section 1002--Incorporation of Classified Annex This section would incorporate the classified annex prepared by the Committee on National Security into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. Section 1006--Format for Budget Requests for Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP) budget currently consolidates all research and development projects within one program element and all procurement programs within four generic procurement line item numbers in the Air Force and Defense-wide procurement accounts. Therefore, to overcome this lack of budget justification presentation detail and provide the Congressional defense committees sufficient information to conduct appropriate oversight, the committee recommends a legislative provision (sec. 1006) that directs the Secretary of Defense to identify all DARP research and development projects and procurement programs by unique program element numbers and procurement line items, respectively, in all future budget requests beginning with fiscal year 1998. Subtitle B--Reports and Studies Section 1022--Report on Protection of National Information Infrastructure Section 1053 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) established a requirement for a report from the President on national policy concerning protection of the national information infrastructure (NII) from strategic attack, and on the future role of the National Communications System (NCS) in implementing a strategy to protect the NII. To date, Congress has not received the required report and overall it is clear that the Administration's response to this statutory requirement has been lackluster at best. One encouraging development is the recent creation of a White House task force to establish policies for indications and warning, protection, assessment, and reconstitution with respect to a strategic attack on key sectors of the U.S. infrastructure through the nation's networked information systems. Therefore, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 1022) that would define what Congress expects from the President out of this task force process. The committee stresses that this effort cannot be regarded narrowly as a problem of counter- terrorism, law enforcement, emergency preparedness, intelligence, or national defense. Rather, it is a problem in all of those domains, requiring central direction and coordination. The committee also believes that the mandated NCS assessment has concluded correctly that the focus for analysis and corrective action should be on the telecommunications, transportation, finance, power, and energy sectors of the U.S. national infrastructure. Subtitle C--Other Matters Section 1031--Information Systems Security Program Judging by the results of the large and steadily growing volume of studies originating within the Department of Defense and its various scientific advisory boards, and by the recommendations and testimony of DOD's functional managers for information systems and information security, the Department is devoting woefully insufficient resources to protecting the Department's information systems. The problem is a familiar one. Despite widespread recognition of a problem, there are no volunteers to provide funds to correct it. The senior DOD leadership is reluctant to impose a solution to a non-traditional threat, particularly when functional managers and information systems developers present plans that would require funding from outside their own budgets, and therefore entail difficult tradeoffs. In other words, the military services, and the managers of the logistics, medical, personnel, transportation, finance, and other functions within DOD have thus far chosen to maximize capabilities rather than sacrifice capabilities slightly in order to ensure minimum critical requirements are met in wartime conditions. As a result, over the last two years, the DOD leadership has added only modest resources for information security. The level of funding was not based on a rigorous analysis of requirements, nor were funds limited because advocates failed to make a strong case for additional resources. Rather, the allocation appears to have been determined by the amount of funds that could be easily extracted from the overall budget for command, control, and communications after the normal budget review process. The potential consequences are that DOD may not be able to generate, deploy, and sustain military forces during a major regional conflict in the event of information warfare attacks on critical support functions controlled by networked computers. According to various studies within DOD, including several recent Defense Science Board reviews, such a threat could be mounted by virtually any nation or even sophisticated non-governmental organizations, with inexpensive, commercially available equipment. Past and present Directors of the National Security Agency have expressed grave concerns about this emerging threat and likened it to ``an electronic Pearl Harbor.'' The committee strongly believes that additional investments in information security are required given the growing dependence on networked computer systems. Therefore, in order to assure that DOD will sustain additional investments in future budget submissions, the committee recommends a provision (sec. 1031) that would require the Secretary of Defense to allocate an additional half-percent of the total appropriations for the defense information infrastructure (DII) to security each year through the remainder of the Future Years Defense Plan, for a total allocation of approximately 4.0 percent in fiscal year 2001. These funds are in addition to the funds available to the National Security Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for information security technology. This provision would also require a report from the Secretary annually through 2001 that describes specific, measurable goals and objectives, the progress made over the previous year in reaching them, and plans for the coming fiscal year. The committee would of course prefer that the Secretary of Defense develop a detailed information systems security investment plan and submit annual funding requests to the Congress. In the absence of executive branch leadership, however, the committee has no choice but to impose a specified funding allocation. Section 1040--Prohibition on Carrying Out SR-71 Strategic Reconnaissance Program During Fiscal Year 1997 This section would prohibit the Secretary of Defense from obligating any funds during fiscal year 1997 to operate the SR- 71 strategic reconnaissance program. The committee is concerned that this program, while continuing to provide a unique capability, has outlived its affordability. Further, the committee notes that the Department of Defense has long sought to cease the operation of this aircraft and has been precluded from doing so by Congressional direction. The committee intends for this provision to serve as emphatic direction to the Department to cease the operation of this unaffordable intelligence collection program. The committee notes the recent letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense informing the committee of the decision to terminate fiscal year 1996 SR-71 operations. The committee supports the Department's decision. While the Deputy Secretary's letter implied that this action was taken based on conflicting Congressional direction, the committee believes that it is fully consistent with the Department's position, as reflected by the lack of funding for this program in the President's fiscal year 1997 budget request. TITLE XI--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION OVERVIEW The budget request contained $327.9 million for cooperative threat reduction (CTR) activities, including $177.5 million for destruction and dismantlement, $119.5 million for fissile materials and nuclear weapons safety and storage, and $30.9 million for other program support. The committee reiterates its support for the accelerated dismantlement and destruction of strategic offensive weapons in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The committee recommends a total of $302.9 million for CTR activities in fiscal year 1997, a reduction of $25.0 million from the requested amount. The committee recommends the requested amount for strategic offensive arms elimination activities in Russia, strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine, fissile material storage containers in Russia, weapons storage and security in Russia, and defense and military-to- military contacts. The committee recommends the following reductions to the requested amounts: chemical weapons destruction ($4.0 million); fissile material storage facility ($20.0 million); and other program support ($1.0 million). The discussion below provides additional rationale for these reductions as well as other matters of interest and concern to the committee. ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST Lack of Updated, Multi-Year Program Plan Section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337) directed the Secretary to submit, together with the President's budget submission, an annual report on the Department's plans and funding required for the CTR program. This section also directed the Comptroller General to issue a report on the Secretary's report. The purpose of this reporting requirement for a multi-year program plan was to provide the Congress with greater visibility into the Department's long-term programmatic strategy and the resources required to implement that strategy. Unfortunately, the Department has failed to submit this report. Therefore, it is difficult for the committee to assess overall program costs and commitments, schedules, and milestones, and whether or how the funds requested for fiscal year 1997 fit into those plans. The committee once again directs that the Secretary promptly submit the requested multi-year plan. The committee also directs that future CTR multi-year plans should identify and explain significant cost, schedule, or scope changes from the preceding year's plan, and identify known uncertainties affecting project cost estimates and schedules. Finally, in order to better assess the impact of the CTR program on reducing the threat, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, on an annual basis beginning with the multi-year plan submitted with the President's fiscal year 1998 budget request, to include an assessment of the program's political and practical impact. This assessment shall include a listing of the number of missiles and launchers destroyed, the number of warheads safely stored, the quantities of chemical weapons destroyed, and the degree to which these actions resulted in an acceleration as compared to the schedule such activities would have otherwise occurred in the absence of U.S. assistance, as well as other appropriate measures of effectiveness that will allow the Congress to assess specific progress in the program. Chemical Weapons Destruction The budget request included $2.2 million to initiate dismantlement of a chemical weapons production facility at Volgograd, Russia. The committee is concerned about establishing a precedent for a new U.S. commitment and program to assume responsibility for destroying Russian chemical weapons production facilities, especially given that Russia has both the resources and the technical capability to destroy such facilities. The committee believes that Russia should take immediate steps to destroy such facilities as a gesture of goodwill. Therefore, the committee denies the request to initiate this project. The budget request also included $3.3 million for the chemical weapons destruction support office in Moscow. The committee is not convinced of the need for such significant annual funding for what is essentially a clearinghouse for information on the chemical weapons destruction project. Therefore, the committee recommends $1.5 million for this activity, a reduction of $1.8 million from the request, and directs the Department to scale back the planned costs and operations of the support office to the minimum essential level. The Department has assured the committee that no fiscal year 1997 funds will be used to initiate actual construction activities associated with a pilot chemical weapons destruction plant. The funding recommended by the committee is based on this assurance, and therefore the committee expects that the fiscal year 1997 funds recommended herein will be used solely for planning and design activities. The committee also has a number of concerns regarding this project. First, although Russia recently completed and provided to the United States a comprehensive chemical weapons destruction implementation plan, questions regarding cost estimates, timelines, and overall credibility of that plan remain to be resolved. Second, the Department's plan for this project has been modified several times over the past year. Thus, the committee is unable to ascertain whether an appropriate U.S.-Russian cost-sharing arrangement has been finalized and, if so, what the U.S. responsibilities and obligations are for this project. Likewise, the committee is unable to determine whether the latest programmatic and technical milestones are in fact achievable. Third, the committee is aware of, but unable to assess any progress for, the Administration's effort to convince other nations to contribute funding for Russian chemical weapons destruction. Fourth, Russia has yet to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, has made no specific commitment to the United States to carry out the terms and conditions of the U.S.-Russia bilateral chemical weapons destruction agreement, signed in 1990, and may still be developing offensive chemical weapons. In the absence of these details, and given the magnitude of the potential U.S. cost-share for this project (estimates range from several hundred million dollars to approximately $1.0 billion), the committee cannot endorse proceeding with the actual construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility. Fissile Material Storage Facility The budget request included $66.0 million for fissile material storage activities in Russia. The committee understands the Department plans to notify the committee of its intention to take $20.0 million in excess, prior-year funds for the fissile material storage facility and reallocate those funds for another CTR project. The committee directs that the $20.0 million in available, prior-year funds for the fissile material storage facility be applied toward fiscal year 1997 fissile material storage activities. As a result, the fiscal year 1997 budget request can be reduced by this same amount without impacting program content. Therefore, the committee recommends $46.0 million, a reduction of $20.0 million, for this project in fiscal year 1997. The committee is aware that the U.S. government has insisted in negotiations with Russia that this new facility meet or exceed Western standards for safe and secure warhead and weapon component storage, and that Russia store all or the vast majority of its excess weapons-grade fissile material and warhead components there. Correspondingly, the U.S. government has sought to negotiate detailed and binding agreements with the Russian government on the quantity and type of components and fissile material that will be stored in the facility, and on the irreversibility of the dismantlements. However, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) has been unwilling to provide firm commitments on these points. In addition, the U.S. government has insisted on inspection provisions that would allow the United States to confirm that it is being used for its intended purpose, and to verify that the weapons components or fissile material placed there is not later used for weapons construction. Minatom has refused to agree to this demand as well. Other concerns with this project have been raised as well. For example, a recent Harvard University study noted that ``The storage facility will not begin operations until 1998 at the earliest, which raises questions about the wisdom of spending the largest single amount of money devoted to fissile material security from a very limited budget on a project that does nothing to meet the immediate needs for secure storage.'' Based on these concerns, the committee directs that none of the fiscal year 1997 funds made available for fissile material storage may be obligated or expended until 15 days after the Secretary provides the congressional defense committees with a status report on the issues and concerns raised in the preceding paragraph. Finally, as with the chemical weapons destruction facility, the Department's plan for assisting in the design and construction of a fissile material storage facility in Russia has undergone significant changes recently, thereby making the description of this project contained in the 1995 multi-year plan no longer valid, according to DOD officials. Therefore, it is impossible for the committee to determine what obligations the United States now plans to assume for this project, the total project cost and planned completion date, and whether or how fiscal year 1997 funds fit into the overall plan. The committee notes again this situation could be rectified by prompt submission of the multi-year program plan. Program Overhead The budget request included $20.9 million for other assessments/administrative costs. The committee recommends $19.9 million, a reduction of $1.0 million, for these activities. The reduction is made without prejudice, but expects the Department to identify efficiencies in program management and support services and contracts. Concerns Regarding Presidential Certification Section 211 of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-228) requires that, as a condition of eligibility for U.S. assistance under the CTR program, the President must submit an annual certification that a proposed recipient country is ``committed to'' certain minimal actions and standards. For example, the President must certify that the proposed recipient country is committed to: making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons; forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass destruction; forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear weapons in new nuclear weapons; facilitating U.S. verification of weapons destruction; and complying with all relevant arms control agreements. The most recent certification was issued March 13, 1996, by the Secretary of State on the President's behalf. The committee strongly believes that the Russian Federation should promptly fulfill its obligations to honor all legal and political commitments to fully implement relevant arms control accords, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), and agreements regarding chemical and biological weapons. The committee is frustrated that the Congress has yet to receive the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's report to Congress on adherence to and compliance with arms control agreements, which is required to be submitted not later than January 31 of each year under which separate judgments are to be made regarding Russian compliance with relevant arms control accords. The committee believes that any certification judging Russia's commitment to complying with all relevant arms control agreements should be based on Russian actions, not rhetoric. The committee strongly believes it is not sufficient to refer to statements of Russian President Yeltsin and senior-level Russian policy officials as the sole evidence of Russia's compliance with arms control accords. In this regard, the committee notes that there is continuing evidence that the commitments made by President Yeltsin have not been implemented by the Russian Ministry of Defense. To this end, the committee expresses deep concern that the preponderance of the March 13, 1996 report referenced above raises numerous concerns and issues regarding Russian activities that are inconsistent with its obligations under various relevant arms control accords, and in one case outright noncompliance. Yet, in the face of such overwhelming evidence of Russian misbehavior and intransigence, Russia is still judged to be committed to complying with its arms control obligations. In this regard, the committee expects the Administration, as it deliberates on the 1997 certification for Russia, to ensure that such certification outlines a list of concrete steps and actions taken by Russia to fulfill its obligations under relevant arms control accords. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS Section 1101--Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs This section would specify CTR programs.- Section 1102--Fiscal Year 1997 Funding Allocations This section would allocate fiscal year 1997 funding for various CTR purposes and activities. Section 1103--Prohibition on Use of Funds For Specified Purposes This section would prohibit the use of CTR funds for specified purposes. Section 1104--Limitation on Funds This section would prohibit obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 1997 CTR funds until 15 days after various reports are submitted to Congress. Section 1105--Availability of Funds This section would make fiscal year 1997 CTR funds available for obligation for three fiscal years. TITLE XIII--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST Arms Control Implementation The Administration's fiscal year 1997 budget requests $282.3 million for arms control implementation programs. The committee notes that a number of arms control agreements have not yet been ratified or entered into force. For example, the Chemical Weapons Convention has been signed by both Russia and the United States, but neither country has ratified it and it lacks ratification by the requisite number of countries to enter into force. The START II Treaty has been ratified by the United States, but not by Russia. And the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is currently under negotiation. Delays in the entry into force of these treaties will likely allow some reduction in the amount of funding authorized for these arms control implementation programs. Accordingly, the committee will continue to monitor developments in these arms control areas with a view toward possible further adjustments to the Administration's budget request. Chemical Weapons Convention The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) prohibits the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. Last year, the Congress expressed its sense that the United States and Russia, both signatories to the agreement, should ratify it promptly. However, the treaty has not yet entered into force to date for lack of the requisite number of ratifications. The committee supports the ratification and full implementation by all parties of the convention, as negotiated. However, the committee remains concerned that Russia continues to engage in chemical weapons activities inconsistent with the accord. In addition, Iran, a signatory to the convention, has been characterized by one U.S. official as having ``the most active chemical weapons program'' in the Third World. And a number of states that possess active chemical weapons programs, such as Libya, are not signatories to the accord. For example, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence have confirmed that Libya is engaged in the construction of an underground chemical weapons facility carved into a mountain near Tarhunah. This extensive project demonstrates the Libyan commitment to the acquisition of a significant chemical weapons capability and raises questions about the ability of arms control agreements like the Chemical Weapons Convention to substantively impair the ability of rogue regimes to acquire these types of weapons of terror. The committee believes the continued proliferation of chemical weapons capabilities raises serious issues with respect to the CWC, and directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the Congressional defense committees no later than December 31, 1996, in both classified and unclassified form, that addresses the impact of the CWC on both the ability of U.S. forces deployed abroad to execute their missions and on the chemical weapons programs of other countries. The report should include: (1) an identification of the types of weapons or chemical agents that can and cannot be used by U.S. forces and under what circumstances; (2) an assessment of the impact of the CWC on the chemical weapons ----programs of other signatory states; (3) an assessment of whether the obligations contained within the CWC can be met by other signatory states within the time frames established by the Convention; (4) an identification of states that are not signatories and an assessment of the impact of the CWC on the chemical weapons programs of those states; (5) a description of efforts being undertaken to enlarge the number of ---signatories; and (6) a description and analysis of efforts by Libya to construct an underground chemical weapons facility at Tarhunah. Department of Defense Activities With China The committee recognizes that U.S.-China civilian-military and direct military-military contact are key components of the U.S. strategy of ``comprehensive engagement'' toward China. The committee also recognizes that as China continues to develop its armed forces, it could potentially evolve into a more direct threat to the national security of the United States and American interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the committee finds it necessary to pursue a fuller understanding of all Department of Defense interaction with the Chinese government and military organizations. Particularly, the committee seeks a full accounting and detailed presentation of: (1) Department of Defense interaction with the People's Republic of China, including meetings, training, military technology-sharing or other related events which took place during the period spanning fiscal years 1994-1996, and those proposed for fiscal years 1997 and 1998; (2) the rationale for any information or technology sharing which took place during or as a result of any of the previously identified forms of interaction; (3) costs incurred or other support provided by the Department of Defense for the aforementioned cooperative initiatives and related programs during the fiscal years 1994-1996, and costs and funding mechanisms anticipated for future or related activities; Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a classified and unclassified report to the congressional defense committees not later than February 1, 1997. Russian Missile Detargeting During his State of the Union Address on January 23, 1996, President Clinton stated, ``For the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, there are no Russian missiles pointed at America's children.'' President Clinton similarly claimed in 1994 that the so-called ``detargeting agreement'' of January 14, 1994 has effectively halted the targeting of Russian nuclear missiles against the United States. The detargeting agreement, officially the Moscow Declaration, was a statement signed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin that provides: ``. . . for the detargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under their respective commands so that by not later than May 30, 1994, those missiles will not be targeted.'' Both Russian and American experts overwhelmingly hold that the detargeting provisions of the Moscow Declaration are non- binding, unverifiable, and militarily inconsequential. For example, Russian General Viktor Yesin, Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) Main Staff, in an April 1995 interview on the detargeting agreement noted, ``The missiles' target coordinates can be unloaded and reloaded. Missile specialists believe that the SMF's actual combat readiness following Boris Yeltsin's generous gesture of friendship to the Americans has not diminished.'' Anton Surikov, a senior advisor to the Russian Ministry of Defense, acknowledged in a March 1995 interview, ``When it was decided to detarget missiles, the decision was mostly of a political, propaganda character,'' because, ``Technically it is not difficult to retarget a missile very quickly.'' Therefore, the committee is concerned that Administration statements may be significantly overstating the strategic and military significance of the 1994 detargeting agreement. To ensure that an appropriate record is established on this critical national security question, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to Congress by January 1, 1997 on the verifiability and military significance of the detargeting provisions of the Moscow Declaration of January 14, 1994. The report should specifically address the following questions: Can the United States independently verify that Russian nuclear missiles are not targeted on the United States? Assuming that Russian missiles are detargeted, is it likely that coordinates for targets in the United States are still stored locally and can be used to reprogram Russian missiles on short notice? How long does retargeting of Russian missiles take? The report is to be prepared in classified and unclassified versions. Russian Threat Perceptions The committee is aware of allegations that during the 1980s, military and political leaders of the former Soviet Union believed that a surprise nuclear attack by the United States was imminent and undertook special intelligence and defense measures to detect and preempt such an attack. In addition, allegations exist that Russian military forces went on nuclear alerts in 1991 and 1995, and that behavior and programs associated with the so-called ``war scare'' may persist in Russia today. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, to provide, not later than January 1, 1997, a report on these matters to the Congressional defense and intelligence committees. The report should describe any evidence since 1983 of such threat perceptions; nuclear alerts; Russian preparations to detect, preempt, or defend against a surprise nuclear attack; and the extent to which these attitudes and activities continue today. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS Subtitle A--Miscellaneous Matters Section 1301--One-Year Extension of Counterproliferation Authorities This section would extend through fiscal year 1997 the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (title XV of Public Law 102-484; 22 U.S.C. 5859a), which expires at the end of fiscal year 1996. This authority is necessary for the Department of Defense to continue its support of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). The committee supports the extension of this authority given ongoing concerns over Iraq's continued possession of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems. Section 1302--Limitation on Retirement or Dismantlement of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles This section would prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1997 for retiring or dismantling any B-52H bombers, Trident ballistic missile submarines, Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), or Peacekeeper ICBMs. The committee considers this a prudent step in light of the fact that Russia has thus far failed to ratify the START II treaty and the established shortcomings in the U.S. bomber force structure. The committee intends that this prohibition not apply to long-range pre- planning, design and evaluation efforts to allow the military departments to be ready to execute various retirement and dismantlement options in an efficient manner. To implement the provision, $56.4 million is required to retain 28 B-52H aircraft in the active inventory during fiscal year 1997. The committee recommends an additional $11.5 million in Air Force procurement funds for this purpose. Furthermore, the committee directs that of the amount authorized to be appropriated pursuant to Title III for Air Force operations and maintenance, $42.9 million shall be available for this purpose, and that of the amount authorized to be appropriated pursuant to Title IV for Air Force military personnel, $2.0 million shall be available for this purpose. Section 1305--Report on Military Capabilities of People's Republic of China The military exercises and missile firings conducted by the People's Republic of China this past spring in and around the Taiwan Straits represented the culmination of several years' of modernization and innovation in selected units of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The exercises formed a benchmark of Chinese military development, demonstrating new capabilities for projecting military power and for joint force operations. In the committee's judgment, the American response to these Chinese actions, though belated, also sent a clear signal of both U.S. political interests and military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result of these developments, the committee concurs with initial Department of Defense and independent analysis concluding that that the PLA has reached a crossroads, having gained a better understanding of the required military capabilities for the kind of power projection forces needed to support its geopolitical aims in the region. The committee further believes that the Chinese now better understand the strategic requirement to deter or to raise the costs of American military intervention if they intend to retain the option of coercive diplomacy or the actual use of military force to achieve their national goals. In particular, the committee is concerned that the PLA now will devote more intensive efforts to developing those kinds of capabilities that will work to deny the ability to U.S. forces to operate with little risk in the region. Thus, the Chinese may move to develop different kinds of systems than their past modernization efforts, with a view toward increasing deterrence of U.S. power projection forces in the Asia-Pacific region. These concerns prompt the committee to direct the Secretary of Defense to report, in classified and unclassified form, on the potential and likelihood for the People's Liberation Army to pursue such a modernization strategy. The committee also directs the Secretary of Defense to take a ``net assessment'' approach to the preparation of this report, so that the varying strategic concerns of the United States and China and the differing operational tasks of Chinese and American forces may be properly taken into account. The report shall be submitted no later than February 1, 1997. Section 1306--United States-People's Republic of China Joint Defense Conversion Commission This section would prohibit obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 1997 funds for activities associated with the U.S.- PRC Joint Defense Conversion Commission until 15 days after the date on which the first semiannual report required by section 1343 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) is received by Congress. Section 1308--Review by Director of Central Intelligence of National Intelligence Estimate 95-19 This section would direct the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to convene a panel of independent, non- government experts to review the underlying assumptions and conclusions of the November, 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on ``Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years,'' NIE 95-19, and to report the panel's findings to Congress, along with the DCI's comments. In light of serious questions that have been raised about the NIE's terms of reference and conclusions, which downplay the prospect of a long-range missile threat to the contiguous 48 states within the next 15 years, the committee believes that an objective and independent assessment of the NIE is both necessary and desirable. The committee notes that the public release by the Administration of the NIE's key findings, which were summarized in a December 1, 1995 CIA letter to the Senate, occurred in the midst of the debate over the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Pubilc Law 104-106). The NIE was cited during that debate to bolster the Administration's position that deployment of a national missile defense system was unnecessary because there was no threat in the foreseeable future. The conclusions reached in the NIE and the timing of its insertion into the missile defense debate have given rise to charges that intelligence may have been ``politicized.'' The committee believes it is essential that U.S. policy makers be confident that they are receiving objective analysis from the intelligence community. Any allegation of politicization brings into question the integrity of the intelligence community's work. The committee notes that independent scholars and former intelligence community officials, including former DCI R. James Woolsey, have questioned the terms of reference and methodology of the NIE. Ambassador Woolsey, President Clinton's first Director of Central Intelligence, testified before the committee on March 14, 1996 that the intelligence community's focus on missile threats to the continental United States (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) ``can lead to a badly distorted and minimized perception of the serious threats we face from ballistic missiles now and in the very near future . . .'' He further commented that drawing broad conclusions from an assessment ``of such limited scope'' would be ``a serious error.'' The former DCI observed that ``even with the best intelligence in the world it is impossible to forecast fifteen years in advance. . . .'' Criticisms of the NIE center on its core assumptions: (1) that nations will be limited to their indigenous industrial and technological base when developing ICBMs; (2) that countries with the capability to develop ICBMs will not do so in the time frame in question; (3) that ballistic missile threats to Alaska and Hawaii are somehow less consequential than a missile threat to the contiguous 48 states; (4) that nations will not seek to acquire ICBMs that do not provide a militarily significant warfighting potential; and (5) that the risk of unauthorized or accidental missile launch by Russia or China is no greater now than during the Cold War. In the committee's view, an independent review of the NIE must address these assumptions. In response to criticisms of the NIE, the committee supports an independent assessment of its assumptions, terms of reference, methodology, and conclusions. As part of such an effort, the committee directs the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure, at a minimum, that the panel conducting the assessment: (1) Reviews the classified and unclassified reports and other inputs that formed the basis for the NIE; (2) Analyzes the terms of reference and methodology used by the intelligence community in the preparation of the NIE and assesses their comprehensiveness; (3) Evaluates the conclusions reached in the NIE and reports on areas of agreement and disagreement with the panel's findings; (4) Identifies and assesses the reasons for the inclusion of any questionable assumptions and logic that may exist in the NIE; (5) Compares the methodology and conclusions of the NIE to that of earlier NIEs that address similar topics; and (6) Reports on any recommended changes in the current NIE process that would result in improvements to future NIEs. In a related matter, the committee believes a more comprehensive assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the United States is warranted. To this end, the committee recommends establishment in Section 1321 of a separate ``Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.'' Subtitle B--Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Section 1321--Establishment of Commission The committee believes that the threat posed to the United States from ballistic missiles is real and growing. However, the committee recognizes that much controversy surrounds this issue and the intelligence community's assessment, as reflected in the November, 1995 National Intelligence Estimate on ``Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years.'' In an effort to receive expert competitive analysis on the ballistic missile threat, this subtitle would establish a commission to be known as the ``Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.'' The committee believes that, in keeping with past precedent, this commission should ideally have been established as a cooperative and self-initiated endeavor within the executive branch. The intelligence community has in the past supported independent and competitive analysis of its conclusions by outside experts. In particular, the committee recalls the establishment in the 1970s of a ``Team B,'' which was granted full access to classified and unclassified information in order to review and critique the intelligence community's judgment and to provide an alternative analysis regarding the strategic goals and objectives of the Soviet Union. The ``Team B'' exercise was broadly judged to be a successful experiment in competitive analysis. Unfortunately, the Administration has been reluctant to establish its own ``Team B'' on the issue of the ballistic missile threat. Since the Administration has not expressed an interest in undertaking a true ``Team B'' effort on this issue, the committee believes it is necessary to pursue legislating such a review. In establishing a six-month commission to undertake this review, it is the committee's intent that the consultative nature of the appointment process for the commission parallel the process used by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and as established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510). The committee also supports and encourages a similar effort by the intelligence community and directs the Director of Central Intelligence to task the intelligence community to assess the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States, and to report back to Congress the results of that assessment. Accordingly, the committee recommens a provision (sec. 1321) that would establish a commission to be known as the ``Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.'' The commission's members will be private citizens with knowledge and expertise in the political and military aspects of proliferation of ballistic missiles and the ballistic missile threat to the United States, and will have access to the resources and information of the intelligence community necessary to carry out their responsibilities. The commission would consist of nine members appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence. Consistent with the consultative nature of the appointment process used by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (Public Law 101-510), three members would be chosen in consultation with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, three members would be chosen in consultation with the Majority Leader of the Senate, and three members would be chosen in consultation with the minority leaders of the House and Senate. This section also describes the procedure for designating a commission chairman and for filling vacancies, and describes the initial organizational requirements of the commission. It specifies that all members of the commission shall hold appropriate security clearances. The committee notes, however, that it is not the intent of this subsection to disqualify from membership former government officials whose clearances have lapsed but which could be reinstituted in a short period of time. The committee expects that in such circumstances, the government shall move to reinstitute the necessary clearances as expeditiously as possible. Section 1322--Duties of Commission This section describes the duties of the commission, which shall assess the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States. It also expresses the committee's view that the commission should receive the full and timely cooperation of any U.S. government official responsible for providing the commission with information necessary to the fulfillment of its responsibilities. Section 1323--Report This section would direct the commission to submit to the Congress a report on its findings and conclusions not later than six months after the date of its first meeting. Consistent with intelligence community practice, provision shall be made for the incorporation of dissenting footnotes in the commission's report. Section 1324--Powers This section would establish the commission's authority to hold hearings, take testimony, and receive evidence. It would also authorize the commission to secure any information from the intelligence community and other federal agencies as the committee deems necessary to carry out its responsibilities. Section 1325--Commission Procedures This section would establish the procedures by which the commission shall conduct its business. It describes the number of members required for a quorum and would authorize the commission to establish panels for the purpose of carrying out the Commission's duties. Section 1326--Personnel Matters This section notes that the members of the commission shall serve in that capacity without pay. It would authorize reimbursement of expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, for travel in the performance of services for the commission. It also would allow the chairman to appoint a staff director, subject to the approval of the commission, and such additional personnel as may be necessary for the commission to perform its duties. This section also would make provision for the pay of the staff director and other personnel. It would allow federal government employees to be detailed to the commission on a non-reimbursable basis and would grant the chairman authority to procure temporary and intermittent services. Section 1327--Miscellaneous Administrative Provisions This section would allow the commission to use the United States mails and to obtain printing and binding services in accordance with the procedures used by other federal agencies. It also would direct the Director of Central Intelligence to furnish the commission with administrative and support services, as requested, on a reimbursable basis. Section 1328--Funding This section would require the Secretary of Defense to provide such sums as may be necessary for the activities of the commission in fiscal year 1997. These funds should be made available from the national foreign intelligence program. Section 1329--Termination of the Commission This section would terminate the commission 60 days after the date of the submission of its report. DIVISION B--MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATIONS TITLE XXIII--AIR FORCE Defense Access Road, Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado The committee is aware of serious safety issues caused, and operational constraints imposed, by the publicly accessible road network through Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado. The committee notes recent studies have demonstrated that State Highway 94 is no longer capable of supporting the volume of traffic associated with the installation and that a deteriorating safety situation has caused numerous accidents, including fatalities. In addition, the proximity of the current road to the existing and planned antenna farms at the installation constitutes an untenable risk to national security. The committee understands that the Military Traffic Management Command has recently certified the requirement for a defense access road project at Falcon Air Force Base. The committee urges the Secretary of the Air Force to make every effort to include the defense access road project at Falcon Air Force Base in the fiscal year 1998 budget request. TITLE XXVI--GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES FACILITIES Planning and Design, Fiscal Year 1996 The committee recalls the direction provided to the Secretary of the Army in the statement of managers report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) concerning planning and design activities for an intelligence training center at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The committee reiterates its support for that requirement and urges the Secretary of the Army to initiate planning and design activities for that purpose as expeditiously as possible. DIVISION C--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS TITLE XXXI--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS Independent Review The committee recommends that, of the amounts authorized in section 3104, $500,000 shall be available to conduct an independent review of the potential to detect meteorites, asteroids, and comets of sufficiently great sizes to inflict large-scale damage on Earth, and possible means of averting such strikes. The committee urges that the review be performed by an independent group previously involved in reviewing complex scientific matters, such as the stockpile stewardship and inertial confinement fusion programs. In conducting this review, the views of the nuclear weapons laboratories and U.S. Space Command shall be solicited. The results of this review shall be transmitted to the congressional defense committees not later than January 15, 1997. Intelligence The budget request included $29.2 million for intelligence- related activities. A 1988 General Accounting Office (GAO) report noted that foreign visitors were coming to the nuclear weapons laboratories on unclassified visits but these visits were not well controlled. In fact, GAO reported that efforts to screen visitors were inadequate, subjects related to nuclear weapons were discussed, and little monitoring of these visits was occurring. GAO concluded that as a result, these visits may have transferred nuclear weapons-related information to foreign countries. Given greater involvement by the laboratories in international activities, the committee is concerned that the nuclear weapons laboratories may be an even more inviting target for foreign countries seeking to obtain nuclear weapons- related information. Senior DOE officials readily concede this point, and have informed the committee of their concerns about the adequacy of the Department's budget request in this regard. The committee directs the Comptroller General to follow up the prior GAO report and determine how well DOE is controlling foreign visits to the weapons laboratories and whether these visits raise any security or nuclear proliferation concerns. The report shall be submitted not later than October 15, 1996. In the interim, the committee directs the Secretary to reduce significantly the number of such visits and limit such visits to those individuals that hold appropriate security clearances or that have significant business interests at the laboratory. As to such business visitors, appropriate security measures shall be taken Based on these concerns, the committee recommends an additional $6.0 million for intelligence, of which $5.0 million shall be made available to support the expansion of counterintelligence activities at the nuclear weapons laboratories and at other high-risk facilities. The program shall be administered by the Office of Energy Intelligence under the guidance and oversight of the Department's senior intelligence officer. The Secretary is directed to review the Department's counterintelligence programs with the objective of strengthening these activities and to include additional resources for this important mission in the fiscal year 1998 budget submission. The committee recommends that the remaining $1.0 million shall be used for expanded analysis of the Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons programs. Furthermore, the committee strongly urges the Secretary to consider submitting a reprogramming request to provide additional funds for counterintelligence activities in fiscal year 1996. The Secretary shall promptly inform the committee of the Secretary's plans in this regard. International Nuclear Safety The budget request included $72.2 million for nuclear energy activities, including $66.2 million for Soviet-designed nuclear reactor safety activities in the former Soviet Union and $6.0 million for core-conversion efforts at plutonium production reactors in Russia. These activities were carried out by the Agency for International Development using foreign assistance funds in fiscal year 1996. The committee believes these activities should continue to be funded out of the foreign assistance budget, and therefore the committee recommends no funds be authorized for this purpose in fiscal year 1997. International Security The budget request included $19.6 million within the arms control account for international security activities, including $14.6 million for the Industrial Partnering Program (IPP) and $5.0 million for controlling North Korea's nuclear program. The committee recommends $7.9 million for international security, a reduction of $11.7 million from the requested amount. The reduction shall be applied against the Industrial Partnering Program. The committee remains unconvinced of the merits of this program and other programs whose goal is to promote ``long-term stability'' of Russia's nuclear weapons laboratories. The committee recommends $7.9 million for the North Korean project. However, the committee is concerned about the increased cost estimates for the project, as well as the continued uncertainties regarding total project cost and timetable for its completion. Finally, the committee urges that, prior to obligating or expending these funds, the President contact the South Korean Government to seek an appropriate cost-sharing arrangement for the remaining work associated with this project. The committee further expects to be informed promptly of the results of any such demarche. Laboratory Review of Missile Defense Recognizing that the nuclear weapons laboratories have played an important role in the development of promising ballistic missile defense (BMD) concepts, the committee directs the directors of each of the nuclear weapons laboratories to review the expertise in BMD resident at their respective laboratory and to report to the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs on how that expertise could be harnessed to strengthen the U.S. BMD program. In turn, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to the House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee a report detailing options for providing greater laboratory involvement in BMD. The report shall be due not later than November 15, 1996. Nuclear Emergency Search Team The committee understands that the Department is considering expanding the mission of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) to include activities outside the territory of the United States. In the absence of additional information regarding the cost and other implications of such an expansion of the NEST mission, the committee cannot endorse such a proposal. To better understand such implications, the committee directs the Secretary of Energy to submit a report to the House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee not later than 30 days after the enactment of this Act on the Department's future plans for the NEST, including plans for expanding NEST's missions, the anticipated costs and policy implications of such an expansion, required technology modernization programs, and NEST's relationship to various Department of Defense organizations and activities with capabilities in this area. The Secretary is further directed to coordinate with the Secretary of Defense in preparing the report. Nuclear Smuggling The committee endorses an innovative, joint Department of Energy-National Defense University program on nuclear smuggling, including smuggling pathway analysis. The committee recommends that, of the amounts made available within section 3104, $1.5 million shall be available for this study. Subtitle B--Recurring General Provisions Section 3135--Prohibition on Funding Nuclear Weapons Activities With People's Republic of China This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds for any activity associated with the conduct of cooperative programs relating to nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology, including stockpile stewardship and safety, with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and require a report on past and planned discussions or activities between the United States and the PRC regarding nuclear weapons. The committee is unconvinced of the merits of any such cooperative discussions or activities between the U.S. and the PRC. The committee is extremely concerned about any discussions that may have resulted in or could lead to the release of restricted data or other classified or sensitive information to the PRC given the PRC's ongoing strategic modernization program, including its efforts to acquire or develop multiple- independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), its recent nuclear threats against Los Angeles, and its willingness to sell or transfer nuclear and missile technology to anti-Western regimes. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 1990 AND 1991 TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION * * * * * * * Part C--Strategic Defense Initiative * * * * * * * SEC. 224. REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON SDI PROGRAMS (a) * * * (b) Content of Report.--Each such report shall include the following: (1) * * * * * * * * * * [(3) A clear definition of the objectives of each planned deployment phase of the Strategic Defense Initiative or defense against strategic ballistic missiles. [(4) An explanation of the relationship between each such phase and each program and project associated with the proposed architecture for that phase.] [(5)] (3) The status of consultations with other member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Japan, and other appropriate allies concerning research being conducted in the Strategic Defense Initiative program. [(6)] (4) A statement of the compliance of the planned SDI development and testing programs with existing arms control agreements, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. [(7)] (5) A review of possible countermeasures [of the Soviet Union] to specific SDI programs, an estimate of the time and cost required [for the Soviet Union] to develop each such countermeasure, and an evaluation of the adequacy of the SDI programs described in the report to respond to such countermeasures. [(8)] (6) Details regarding funding of programs and projects for the Strategic Defense Initiative (including the amounts authorized, appropriated, and made available for obligation after undistributed reductions or other offsetting reductions were carried out), as follows: (A) * * * * * * * * * * [(9)] (7) Details on what Strategic Defense Initiative technologies can be developed or deployed within the next 5 to 10 years to defend against significant military threats and help accomplish critical military missions. The missions to be considered include the following: (A) Defending elements of the Armed Forces abroad and United States allies against tactical ballistic missiles, particularly new and highly accurate shorter-range ballistic missiles [of the Soviet Union] armed with conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads. (B) Defending against an accidental launch of strategic ballistic missiles against the United States. [(C) Defending against a limited but militarily effective attack by the Soviet Union aimed at disrupting the National Command Authority or other valuable military assets. [(D) Providing sufficient warning and tracking information to defend or effectively evade possible attacks by the Soviet Union against military satellites, including those in high orbits. [(E) Providing early warning and attack assessment information and the necessary survivable command, control, and communications to facilitate the use of United States military forces in defense against possible conventional or strategic attacks by the Soviet Union. [(F) Providing protection of the United States population from a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.] [(G)] (C) Any other significant near-term military mission that the application of SDI technologies might help to accomplish. [(10) For each of the near-term military missions listed in paragraph (9), the report shall include the following: [(A) A list of specific program elements of the Strategic Defense Initiative that are pertinent to such mission. [(B) The Secretary's estimate of the initial operating capability dates for the architectures or systems to accomplish such missions. [(C) The Secretary's estimate of the level of funding necessary for each program to reach those initial operating capability dates. [(D) The Secretary's estimate of the survivability and cost effectiveness at the margin of such architectures or systems against current and projected threats from the Soviet Union.] * * * * * * * TITLE XII--MILITARY DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES * * * * * * * [SEC. 1208. TRANSFER OF EXCESS PERSONAL PROPERTY [(a) Transfer Authorized.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense may transfer to Federal and State agencies personal property of the Department of Defense, including small arms and ammunition, that the Secretary determines is-- [(A) suitable for use by such agencies in counter- drug activities; and [(B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense. [(2) Personal property transferred under this section may be transferred without cost to the recipient agency. [(3) The Secretary shall carry out this section in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Drug Control Policy. [(b) Conditions for Transfer.--The Secretary may transfer personal property under this section only if-- [(1) the property is drawn from existing stocks of the Department of Defense; and [(2) the transfer is made without the expenditure of any funds available to the Department of Defense for the procurement of defense equipment. [(c) Application.--The authority of the Secretary to transfer personal property under this section shall expire on September 30, 1997.] * * * * * * * NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994 TITLE XVII--CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEFENSE SEC. 1701. CONDUCT OF THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM. (a) * * * * * * * * * * (c) Coordination of the Program.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall designate the Army as executive agent for the Department of Defense to coordinate and integrate research, development, test, and evaluation, and acquisition, requirements of the military departments for chemical and biological warfare defense programs of the Department of Defense. (2) The Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency may conduct a program of basic and applied research and advanced technology development on chemical and biological warfare defense technologies and systems. In conducting such program, the Director shall seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities under the program with chemical and biological warfare defense activities of the military departments and defense agencies and shall coordinate the activities under the program with those of the military departments and defense agencies. (d) Funding.--(1) The budget for the Department of Defense for each fiscal year after fiscal year 1994 shall reflect a coordinated and integrated chemical and biological defense program for the [military departments] Department of Defense. (2) Funding requests for the program (other than for activities under the program conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under subsection (c)(2)) shall be set forth in the budget of the Department of Defense for each fiscal year as a separate account, with a single program element for each of the categories of research, development, test, and evaluation, acquisition, and military construction. Amounts for military construction projects may be set forth in the annual military construction budget. Funds for military construction for the program in the military construction budget shall be set forth separately from other funds for military construction projects. Funding requests for the program may not be included in the budget accounts of the military departments. (3) The program conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under subsection (c)(2) shall be set forth as a separate program element in the budget of that agency. [(3)] (4) All funding requirements for the chemical and biological defense program shall be reviewed by the Secretary of the Army as executive agent pursuant to subsection (c). * * * * * * * CHAPTER 6--COMBATANT COMMANDS * * * * * * * Sec. 162. Combatant commands: assigned forces; chain of command (a) Assignment of Forces.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands or to the United States element of the [North American Air Defense Command] North American Aerospace Defense Command to perform missions assigned to those commands. Such assignments shall be made as directed by the Secretary of Defense, including direction as to the command to which forces are to be assigned. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that such assignments are consistent with the force structure prescribed by the President for each combatant command. (2) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, forces to be assigned by the Secretaries of the military departments to the combatant commands or to the United States element of the [North American Air Defense Command] North American Aerospace Defense Command under paragraph (1) do not include forces assigned to carry out functions of the Secretary of a military department listed in sections 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b) of this title or forces assigned to multinational peacekeeping organizations. (3) A force assigned to a combatant command or to the United States element of the [North American Air Defense Command] North American Aerospace Defense Command under this section may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only-- (A) by authority of the Secretary of Defense; and (B) under procedures prescribed by the Secretary and approved by the President. * * * * * * * CHAPTER 153--EXCHANGE OF MATERIAL AND DISPOSAL OF OBSOLETE, SURPLUS, OR UNCLAIMED PROPERTY Sec. 2571. Interchange of property and services. * * * * * * * 2576a. Excess personal property: sale or donation for law enforcement activities. * * * * * * * Sec. 2576a. Excess personal property: sale or donation for law enforcement activities (a) Transfer Authorized.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense may transfer to Federal and State agencies personal property of the Department of Defense, including small arms and ammunition, that the Secretary determines is-- (A) suitable for use by the agencies in law enforcement activities, including counter-drug activities; and (B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense. (2) The Secretary shall carry out this section in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Drug Control Policy. (b) Conditions for Transfer.--The Secretary may transfer personal property under this section only if-- (1) the property is drawn from existing stocks of the Department of Defense; and (2) the transfer is made without the expenditure of any funds available to the Department of Defense for the procurement of defense equipment. (c) Consideration.--Personal property may be transferred under this section without cost to the recipient agency. (d) Preference for Certain Transfers.--In considering applications for the transfer of personal property under this section, the Secretary shall give a preference to those applications indicating that the transferred property will be used in the counter-drug activities of the recipient agency. * * * * * * * TITLE X--DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES * * * * * * * SEC. 1005. TRANSFER OF EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES Pursuant to [section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (10 U.S.C. 372 note) and section 372] sections 372 and 2576a of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense shall review the availability of equipment resulting from the withdrawal of United States forces from Europe and Asia for the purpose of identifying excess equipment that may be suitable for drug enforcement activities for transfer to appropriate Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement authorities. * * * * * * * ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS OF RONALD V. DELLUMS I offer dissenting views because I am deeply troubled by several aspects of the authorization bill and its report, most especially by its overall focus and direction. I remain convinced that the authorization top line is significantly higher than required for the military aspects of our national security strategy. It may be true that the committee marked to a top line that it anticipates in the coming fiscal year 1997 budget resolution. Despite this, I believe it had the opportunity to make prudent reductions in the overall program authorization, thereby providing guidance to the Committee on the Budget as to how better to meet deficit reduction goals. Moreover, I remain convinced that the significant plus-up over the President's request has caused a lack of focus and a lack of discipline in our procurement and research and development accounts, a point to which I will return later. Despite the collegial and effective working relationship between the committee's majority leadership and the minority, there has at times been a troubling partisan appearance to some of the committee's business and is reflected in the committee report as well. Most troubling has been an unwillingness to hear from administration witnesses on important policy issues before the committee. It is certainly true that outside experts provide important insight into the policy choices and strategic circumstances we confront, but we owe ourselves the responsibility to hear also from government experts and responsible officials. What is especially troubling is that we have failed to request the traditional intelligence threat briefing which has provided a cogent perspective on the strategic requirements that we face. Given our rapidly changing world, this annual review is even more important now than it was during the period of the Cold War. A small but important additional example of this problem is the committee's determination to plumb the conclusions reached by the Intelligence Community in a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the ballistic missile threat to the United States. Whether or not there is a legitimate concern about the development of the NIE and whatever questions one has regarding the validity of its conclusions, it is unconscionable that we have failed to have the Intelligence Community before the committee to testify on the NIE's contents and its methodology. I have requested such a committee hearing on several occasions, and am disappointed that this has not occurred. While I am willing to support the provisions contained in the committee report asking the Director of Central Intelligence to review both the matter of the NIE and to develop an updated and expanded assessment, and while I accept the majority's interest in having an alternative analysis rendered, it concerns me that we have gotten to this point without a full committee deliberation on the substance and development of the IN. While the fiscal year 1997 authorization bill reported by the committee does not itself contain highly contentious provisions on the command and control of U.S. armed forces participating in peacekeeping operations, the issue arises in a free-standing piece of legislation marked-up the same day by the committee and reported as H.R. 3308 just three months after the Congress sustained the President's veto of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 on this issue, among other reasons. The same point can be made for the committee's decision to report out H.R. 3144, a national missile defense program guideline clearly calculated to breach the ABM Treaty and return the United States to pursuit of a ``star wars'' missile defense program. A less extreme formulation for national missile defense program activity was met with a Presidential veto on last year's defense authorization bill. As with the command and control issue, it strikes this gentleman that there is little legislative reason to have decided to push forward an even more extreme ballistic missile defense program, given that it is surely destined to meet a Presidential veto as well. Our committee must achieve its policy goals through legislation, and obviously that activity must be bound by the constraints of our Constitution's separation of powers between the Branches. Pursuing legislation knowing that it will be vetoed, when nothing has occurred to change the imaginable outcome seems a political rather than a legislative course. But the national ballistic missile defense issue is also embedded in the committee recommendation and report on H.R. 3230 in important ways. And there is much more commonality between the administration and the Congress on this issue than the political rhetoric would suggest. Many of the differences between the two approaches are rooted in a perception of the timing of the appearance of a threat to which we would need such a response. This is essentially a function of risk management, and how to determine what type of ``insurance policy'' we wish to purchase against such a future contingency. What is less focused on but should be very central to the debate, is the cost and character of the alternative ``insurance policies'' that are available to the Nation. And this is where the parties diverge. The administration's current national ballistic missile defense plan can provide for an affordable defense against limited ballistic missile threats before those threats will emerge. It does so in a way that anticipates likely changes in the threat from today's estimates. It also does so in a way that avoids becoming trapped in a technological cul-de-sac by a premature deployment of a potentially misdirected system. The committee recommendation and its report would unfocus U.S. efforts by pursuing space-based interceptors without regard to ABM Treaty requirements, START treaty considerations and the threat reduction and strategic stability goals that the treaties promise. This course of action commits us as well to an incredibly expensive and ultimately unaffordable path. Both the department's 3+3 program and the Spratt substitute to H.R. 3144, provide for a more capable missile defense system when deployed, and one that is affordable within current budget projections. It blends arms control and counterproliferation activities with deterrence and missile intercept capabilities. It thus pursues the most effective approach to missile defense, preventing missiles from being deployed at all, while providing a prudent ``insurance policy'' against limited but as of yet non-existent threats. The overreliance by the committee recommendation on a ``hardware'' solution to intercept incoming missiles in the final minutes of their flight time, risks constructing a very expensive 21st Century Maginot Line. Such a defense strategy may well prove as ineffective to the 21st Century threats we might face, as the original Maginot Line was in defending France during World War II. Returning now to refocus on the issue of the size of the top line and its impact on our procurement choices, I am reminded of echoes from last year's debate on the fiscal year 1996 authorization bill. During that debate, we heard a hue and cry that there existed a readiness crisis in the services. Foregone training and maintenance, as well as ``optempo'' stress were all allegedly impacting adversely on the U.S. armed force's ability to perform its principal missions. This hue and cry was raised despite assurances by the top military leadership that the force was receiving historically high levels of operational funding and was as ready a force as we had ever had. Facts have borne out their more sober assessment and, indeed, one can say that the relatively modest increased investment that the fiscal year 1996 defense authorization conference in the end committed to the readiness accounts confirmed the view that a ``crisis'' did not really exist. The small increase in the readiness account proposed in the fiscal year 1997 authorization bill lends additional credence to this assessment. This year's hue and cry is that there is a ``modernization'' crisis, with much displaying of data to support the view that low levels of procurement spending must equate with an insufficient modernization strategy. What is so remarkably similar about this debate with last year's debate on readiness are three things: First, the services generally agree that they could all ``use'' more money for procurement this year, but that they could meet their requirements with what had been budgeted as long as long-term trends supported their needs. This sounds very much like ``we're missing some training'' but ``we're as ready as we've ever been.'' Second, the leadership of the Department of Defense has offered a cogent and calm viewpoint that the drawdown of the force structure from its Cold War levels allowed them one more year's grace before they needed to begin to replace equipment that had been procured in large numbers during the 1980s for a much larger force. In other words, they had a plan, it was being managed, and they could perform their mission. And they could more appropriately use defense resources in other accounts and reserve for the future year's defense plan a significant increase in procurement dollars. Third, while the committee invited the service chiefs to submit their ``wish list'' for additional procurement items, it has not followed the Secretary of Defense's plea to limit procurement additions to those items needed by the services. By my calculation approximately half of the procurement plus-up does not meet that qualification. Not satisfied with this explanation the committee recommendation would spend an additional $7.5 billion on procurement, and as I noted above much of that on requirements not established by the service chiefs. I believe that this unsolicited largess is imprudent and will have significant adverse impact on our ability to meet real future requirements. It will provoke budget and program disruptions in the near term and it will preempt important opportunities into the future. In many cases it would appear that these adds were made with little consideration to the ability to sustain the program in the next year. The disruptive business and human implications of creating program instabilities by ``spiking'' procurement for one or two years could haunt the military industrial base for years to come. This is a costly and ineffective way to approach long-term modernization requirements. In addition, it would also appear that program risks, indeed even assessing the department's ability to even execute a program, may not have been given adequate consideration in determining authorization levels. Equally important and worse, the committee recommendation throws much of this money into systems that were designed ``to fight the last war.'' This is a common failing that is so easily avoidable. In addition, the procurement ``theme'' to solve the ``crisis'' appears to be only to buy more, and often not more of what the service chiefs requested. This binge in procurement both purchases needlessly redundant weapons capabilities and does so in excessive amounts. With regard to the former, we will end making purchases of too many different systems, rather than making choices and sticking with the best choice. With regard to the latter, we are spending our investment capital to buy unneeded equipment for today that will prevent us from purchasing the right equipment when it becomes available tomorrow. Rather than buying more hardware now, we should invest in the technologies of the future, both the direct military technologies, including innovative non-lethal weapons technology more appropriate to operations other than war, and into those dual-use technologies that will give our economy a leg up as we move into the next century. Our failure to plan and invest wisely for the future because of hyperbolic claims about a modernization ``crisis'' will harm our national security in both the short and long term. Much more could be said about this particular problem. Let me summarize my views in this area by saying that this extravagant level of spending is neither needed for our current military requirements nor prudent for meeting the needs of the future. In addition, it contributes to a defense authorization top line that needlessly consumes resources from the two other elements of our national security triad: our economy and our foreign policy program that can dampen the circumstances that give rise to war. And, unlike money put into the operations and maintenance accounts, it is not easily or efficaciously diverted to other priorities when hindsight establishes that the perceived requirement in fact does not exist. The permanent extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty concluded last year was achieved in part because of the U.S. reaffirmation of its adherence to the Treaty's Article VI requirement to reduce our arsenal towards elimination. Despite the fact that this is, and remains, the policy of our government, we are not proceeding outside of our bilateral discussions with Russia under the START process to pursue further reductions. I am concerned that such a failure will lead to lost opportunities that seemed so promising only a year and a half ago, when President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin jointly declared that each nation would consider pursuing such unilateral initiatives. Ronald V. Dellums. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OFFERED BY HON. JOHN SPRATT Although I support most of this bill, I object to Sections 232, 233, and 234. These sections are superfluous and risk a veto of this bill. Section 232 requires the President, within 15 days after enactment, to certify whether this country could intercept a ballistic missile launched against U.S. territory. In hearings held by this committee, Secretary Perry and other senior Administration officials have discussed this matter and answered the question for the record. The certification does not add in any substantive manner to the committee's understanding of the ballistic missile threat to this country or the status of this country's defense against such an attack. Rather, given the timing of the certification, it appears to be an attempt to make ballistic missile defense a presidential election campaign issue. Section 233 reiterates a demarcation standard between theater and strategic missile defense systems in the ABM Treaty. This demarcation standard was established last year as a matter of law with bipartisan support. Deviation from this standard requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of both the House and Senate. Section 233 goes one step further and prohibits administration officials from even discussing potential ABM restrictions on theater missile defense systems. This prohibition is inconsistent with Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty and will surely be perceived as an intrusion on the prerogatives of the executive branch. Having settled the demarcation standard only a few months ago, raising the issue again with the funding prohibition leads me to the conclusion that this section is designed not to correct any unresolved demarcation issues but simply to challenge the Administration. Section 234 prohibits any new signatory parties to the ABM Treaty without approval of two-thirds of the Senate. The Administration should seriously consider the consequences of multilateralizing the ABM Treaty. But on the other hand, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine have demonstrated a high degree of cooperation in arms control and counter-proliferation discussions; this section is unnecessarily hostile toward nations which have made good faith efforts to earn our trust. In addition, this section will likely be viewed as an unwarranted intrusion upon executive branch powers and could draw a veto from the President. These provisions risk a repeat of last year's veto, but this year we will not likely have the time for a second conference. I urge my colleagues to drop these sections at a point in the legislative process prior to submittal to the President. Otherwise, we will not only be acting against the best interests of this committee, but we will not be serving the best interests of the men and women in uniform--for whom our efforts should be focused. John Spratt. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN CHET EDWARDS I was pleased to support final passage of the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorization Act. This measure, while not fully containing the defense objectives I believe our nation should pursue, does contain many provisions needed to preserve a strong defense. I am particularly pleased with the efforts to improve our procurement modernization efforts through an increase in funding for these accounts. I also applaud our committee's efforts to enhance our personnel's Quality-of-Life, which the Administration has made a top priority. I appreciate the efforts of our chairman for his continued efforts to maintain fairness and decorum throughout the hearing process. While the fiscal year 1997 hearing schedule was compressed, we did have a careful review of some critical areas which comprise our national security--especially in the area of national missile defense. As I stated last year, we need to fully review our future procurement strategy in a series of hearings to ensure the proper funding level for programs is designed. I remain concerned that we may be trying to do too much in the way of starting new programs, and having a tremendous funding problem in the out years. I am hopeful these hearings can take place soon, so that we can properly plan and budget to meet these critical defense needs. While the final defense budget figure is far from certain, I am pleased with the higher level of defense spending contained in this measure. During the post-cold war era, we have to define and meet new defense threats and obligations. To meet these objectives, we must craft a defense budget which takes into account these new criteria. With a shrinking force level and an increased number of foreign deployments, we need to be mindful of the adverse impact this has on our key defense component, our personnel. I remain concerned in the area of missile defense, especially with the decision to pursue separate legislation from our defense authorization bill. I believe this decision will create future political gridlock in the area of missile defense, much like we saw in the fiscal year 1996 Authorization bill. I am hopeful this decision can be reversed in short order so that we can craft a workable compromise in the area of national missile defense, rather than pursue an effort designed to score political points in an election year. The decision to rush headlong into deploying a national missile defense system, rather then continued development of a workable system is troubling. I am reminded of the lengthy budget negotiations for FY 96, which were recently resolved some six months into the fiscal year. The ability to compromise and find common ground was unfortunately lost during that struggle and not realized for many months. In the area of national missile defense, there has been significant progress in the area of reaching a general consensus in pursuing development of a system for eventual deployment. The leadership of our committee is pursuing a plan to develop within two years and to deploy a system within two years. The Administration has put forth a workable plan of developing a system within three years and then make a decision to deploy such a system within three years. I support this plan because it will give us adequate time to develop a technologically feasible system that will take into account our best available technology. We need to ensure our funding efforts are adequately channeled into development of a system which will meet present and future defense needs, and builds on the consensus a strong majority supports. Chet Edwards. SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF PATRICIA SCHROEDER During my career in the House, I have worked on twenty-four Defense Authorization bills. This year, the National Security Committee has strayed farther from its central mission than ever before. I have never seen so much attention paid to divisive social issues with so little discussion of our defense priorities. I have never seen so much money added to the Administration's request with so little Congressional oversight and scrutiny. While the rest of Congress focuses on balancing the budget and reducing the deficit, the committee has ignored these objectives. We made the Pentagon our sacred cow, never to be questioned or scrutinized. The public deserves better oversight from Congress. We should ensure wise and effective government spending. Moreover, the committee ignored glaring problems in Pentagon accounting systems, inventory overstock, and contractor overpayment. They threw $13 billion in unrequested funds to an organization that in the past could not account for $14.7 billion of its FY94 budget. The committee has abandoned its full funding principle that would have increased congressional oversight by putting the entire funding for a program in one fiscal year. We departed from this sound principle last year by partially funding National Missile Defense (NMD) and the B-2. This year, we did so again with long lead-funding for another aircraft carrier and NMD. These programs have potential budgetary commitments of more than $30 billion dollars. Pat Schroeder. <greek-d>

NEWSLETTER

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)