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NUCLEAR LEAKAGE FROM THE POST-SOVIET STATES

BY

Dr. William C. Potter

Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Oral Presentation
Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

March 13, 1996

Thank you very much Senator Nunn and members of the committee for the opportunity to report to you findings from my study on "Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States." Rather than attempt to summarize the study, I will confine my oral remarks to three issues that I believe merit special attention. They are:

1. What are the confirmed cases of proliferation significant diversions and exports of nuclear material from the post-Soviet states?
2. What patterns of behavior may be discerned across these cases? and
3. What are the most serious nuclear threats that have not received adequate attention to date?

Proliferation Significant Diversions and Exports

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, one can identify at least four confirmed cases in which more than minuscule quantities of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium have been exported from the ex-USSR, and another three cases in which HEU or plutonium were diverted from Russian nuclear facilities, but were seized prior to export. An additional four cases of diversion and/or export are of proliferation concern, but do not as clearly meet the standard of unambiguous evidence with respect to either independent sources to corroborate the diversion, or the size or enrichment level of the material.

Many of the important characteristics of these 11 cases are summarized in Appendix One of my written report. Because of time constraints, I will now only highlight those aspects of the cases relevant to the issue of establishing patterns of behavior with respect to the suppliers, smugglers, and the end-users.

Luch Scientific Production Association, Podolsk (1992)

The first confirmed case involving the diversion of fissile material from nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union occurred at the Luch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk, a town approximately 40 kilometers southwest of Moscow. Between late May and early September 1992, Leonid Smirnov, a chemical engineer and long-time employee of the plant, stole approximately 1½ kg. of weapons-grade uranium. He accumulated this quantity by some 20-25 different diversions, taking the material in the form of UO2 powder from the facility in glass jars and storing it on his apartment balcony.

Smirnov had no accomplices and appears to have been motivated by an article he read in a Russian newspaper about the fortune to be made by selling HEU. He was apprehended at the Podolsk Railroad Terminal on October 9, 1992, along with most of the HEU concealed in three lead cylinders. He had planned to travel to Moscow for the purpose of selling the nuclear material. Although Smirnov initially confessed to having a specific customer from the Caucasus in mind, the official investigation concluded that there was no concrete buyer who had been contacted.

Andreeva Guba, Russia: (1993)

One of the earliest confirmed thefts of HEU occurred in late July 1993 at a storage facility of the Northern Fleet naval base at Andreeva Guba, 40 kilometers from the Norwegian border. Two naval servicemen were arrested in the case and accused of stealing 1.8 kilograms of HEU from two fuel assemblies. The material, which was recovered, was enriched to approximately 36 percent uranium-235 (U-235) and used as fuel for third-generation naval reactors. The men said they were operating under instructions from two naval officers -- both of whom denied involvement in the theft. At the trial of the four suspects, which concluded in November 1995, the two naval servicemen were sentenced to prison terms of five years and four years. The two naval officers were found not guilty due to lack of evidence. Additional suspects associated with a Murmansk - St. Petersburg criminal ring are still under investigation.

Sevmorput Shipyard, near Murmansk (1993)

On November 27, 1993 Captain Alexei Tikhomirov and Oleg Baranov slipped through an unprotected gate and into the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk -- one of the Russian navy's main storage facilities for nuclear fuel. Captain Tikhomirov, a retired naval officer whose brother Dmitry still worked at the shipyard, climbed through one of many holes in the fence surrounding "Fuel Storage Area 3-30," sawed through a padlock on the back door, and pried open the door with a metal fire pole he found next to the building. Once inside, he located the containers of fresh submarine fuel, broke off parts of three assemblies from a VM-4-AM reactor core, stuffed the material containing 4.5 kg of uranium (enriched to approximately 20 percent U-235) into a bag, and retraced his steps.

The theft was soon discovered because the perpetrators carelessly left the back of the storage building open. The culprits, however, were only apprehended and the material recovered from Baranov's garage six months later when Dmitry Tikhomirov told a fellow officer about the theft and asked for help in selling the stolen merchandise. The parties to the crime, it appears, had not figured out a way to dispose of the material despite having carefully planned the operation for months prior to its execution.

In early 1994, the three defendants -- all past or present naval officers -- were tried for the theft of naval fuel. Two received prison sentences of three and one-half years; the third was freed. According to the military prosecutor who investigated the case, at the time of the theft, potatoes were guarded better than naval fuel, despite the fact that most of the fuel was highly enriched and some of it was weapons-grade.

Tengen Germany, (May 1994)

The first known case in which more than minuscule quantities of HEU or plutonium were illegally exported occurred in May 1994. It involved the inadvertent discovery by German police in Tengen, Bavaria of a vial containing 5.6 grams of nearly pure Pu-239. The super-grade material was found in the garage of Adolf Jaekle who was under investigation for counterfeiting.

Although the origin of the material has not been determined definitively, there are indications that it was produced for non-weapons purposes at the Soviet nuclear weapons laboratory Arzamas-16 (renamed Kremlev). Samples similar to the amount seized in Tengen may have been distributed by Arzamas-16 to dozens of nuclear research laboratories in the former Soviet Union, as well as in Eastern Europe.

Many important questions about the Tengen case remain unresolved, especially regarding the plutonium supply route and the intended end-user, if any. The case, however, is significant if for no other reason than the fact that it was not a sting operation.

Landshut, Germany (June 1994)

In June 1994 Bavarian authorities seized 800 milligrams of HEU enriched to 87.7 percent U-235. This material was recovered in Landshut, Bavaria. Subsequently, a German real estate dealer was arrested as the central figure in a group accused of illegal commerce in and possession of nuclear material. Also arrested as part of a sting operation were five men from Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Based upon spectrometric analyses of the HEU and its enrichment level, the material is believed to have been produced for use as naval reactor or research reactor fuel.

Lufthansa/Munich (August 1994)

The last of the significant German smuggling cases occurred in Munich on August 10, 1994, when Bavarian authorities seized a suitcase that had been unloaded from a Lufthansa flight from Moscow. Inside the suitcase was a metal container holding 560 grams of mixed oxides of uranium and plutonium. This seizure, the result of a sting operation, was by far the largest quantity of weapons-usable material (363 grams of Pu-239) recovered in the West. A Columbian national and two Spaniards were arrested at the airport in connection with the smuggling operation.

Last month it was reported that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service confirmed to German officials that the material in question had been diverted from a research facility at Obninsk. Although the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) disputes the report, the Russian communiqué to Germany appears to be authentic.

Without going into the details of the case, it should be noted that the Munich seizure was significant in demonstrating that sizable quantities of weapons-usable material could be procured. The demand in this instance, however, appears to have been artificially created by German intelligence and security service officials.

Prague, Czechoslovakia (December 1994)

On December 14, 1994 Prague police, reportedly responding to an anonymous phone tip, seized 2.72 kilograms of HEU from the back seat of a car parked on a busy street in the Czech capital. The HEU, enriched to 87.7 percent U-235, was in the form of uranium dioxide (UO2) powder.

Police arrested the car's owner, Jaroslav Vagner, from the Czech Republic, and his two companions in the car from Belarus and Ukraine. All three had backgrounds in the nuclear industry.

The seized material -- the largest quantity of weapons-usable nuclear contraband found outside of Russia to date -- appears to be identical to the 800 milligrams of HEU recovered in Landshut, Germany in June 1994. The case also resembles the Landshut seizure in that it too appears to have been the result of a German sting operation.

Additional Cases of Proliferation Concern

These seven seizures of nuclear material are singled out as proliferation significant because, unlike other reported cases of nuclear diversion, they involved more than minuscule quantities of either HEU or plutonium and also indisputably occurred. There are at least four more cases that are of probable proliferation concern, but which do not as clearly meet our standard of unambiguous evidence. These cases include: (1) the seizure of a large cache of beryllium, including a much smaller quantity of a beryllium and HEU alloy, in the basement of a bank in Vilnius, Lithuania in May 1993; (2) the reported recovery in St. Petersburg in June 1994 of 3.05 kilograms of weapons-usable HEU allegedly stolen from a nuclear facility (most likely Electrostal) near Moscow in March of that year; (3) the seizure of six kilograms of enriched uranium (probably 20 percent U-235) in March 1995 in Kiev, Ukraine; and (4) the diversion in January 1995 of one plutonium pellet or button from the Machine Building Plant at Electrostal, near Moscow.

Potentially the most serious diversion in terms of the reported quantity and enrichment level of material involved is the St. Petersburg case. Initial Russian press accounts, however, have not been followed by the release of more detailed information by other media sources or from a criminal investigation or trial, if any took place. Nevertheless, a number of (but not all) US government agencies believe that the theft occurred.

The Vilnius case, discussed in more detail in my full report, is intriguing mainly because of the possible complicity of government authorities. At issue in the March 1995 Kiev seizure is the level of enrichment of the six kilograms of uranium. Although the US Department of Energy is inclined to categorize the fuel as low-enriched uranium for power reactors, I have been told by Ukrainian nuclear scientists that an analysis of the material by the Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research indicated an enrichment level of 20 percent, consistent with much naval reactor fuel. Although little has been released about the diversion of plutonium material from Electrostal, suspects have been apprehended, and a trial is likely to be held later this year. The case is intriguing because the material appears not to have been recovered and because plutonium previously had not been known to be present at the Electrostal facility.

Patterns of Behavior

An analysis of the confirmed cases of theft and/or diversions of HEU and plutonium reveals a number of interesting, if not statistically significant, patterns of behavior. It is apparent, for example, that although the number of proliferation-significant instances of nuclear material theft remains small, the quantity of material offered for sale has increased.

Most of the material recovered to date has been enriched uranium, in the form of uranium dioxide powder. The preponderance of seizures involving definite or possible fresh fuel for propulsion reactors also is striking. None of the seizures to date provide any evidence of having a nuclear weapons' origin.

It is difficult, based upon the available information, to make generalizations about the suppliers of proliferation-significant nuclear material. Nevertheless, from what is known, most appear to have been "insiders," working at nuclear research institutes or naval bases, or having previously worked at such facilities. Most of the perpetrators do not appear to have had customers in hand (other than perhaps German intelligence authorities) at the time of the diversions. Rather, evidence suggests that the thieves who were apprehended generally were ill-informed novices in the business of nuclear trafficking who were disaffected with their economic lot, looking to make a quick profit.

Most analysts believe that an "end-user market" exists for weapons-usable nuclear material. The most likely end-users -- those who desire the material for actual use, as opposed to resale for a profit -- are perceived to be states with nuclear weapons ambitions. Terrorist groups and even transnational criminal organizations also have been identified as potential customers for weapons-grade material, if only for extortionist purposes. A review of those cases in which HEU and plutonium actually have been diverted, however, does not reveal reliable evidence that end-users were involved.

This being said, one must introduce two significant caveats. First, one legitimately may ask, "How confident should we be that proliferation significant exports of Soviet/NIS-origin nuclear material have simply escaped detection?" It is known, for example, that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran became particularly interested in Kazakhstan's nuclear-related assets, including those present at the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk -- the facility that held the 600 kg. of bomb-grade HEU airlifted to the United States in "Project Sapphire." Given the underdeveloped state of export controls in the former Soviet Union outside of Russia and the virtual absence of any barriers to movement of sensitive goods and material between Russia and the other NIS states, it is entirely possible, although not proven, that proliferation significant nuclear material and technology already may have exited Russia via one of a number of southern routes (e.g., through the Caucasus or Central Asia).

The second caveat, which reinforces the first, is that while there is no hard evidence that nuclear proliferants have illegally procured HEU or plutonium from the ex-USSR, there is indisputable evidence that would-be proliferants have been able to acquire key missile system components of Russian origin. The UN Special Commission on Iraq, for example, has documents which indicate that strategic gyroscopes from dismantled Russian SLBMs have been shipped to Iraq. All that remains in doubt is the number and kind of such transactions and whether or not they were state-sanctioned. Similar concerns exist regarding Ukrainian-Iraqi missile contacts and contracts, and Iranian (and possibly Iraqi) missile acquisition initiatives in Kazakhstan. Also disturbing is the readiness of Ukrainian governmental officials to overrule their own competent export control authorities in selling off state reserves of nuclear-related dual use material such as zirconium. These activities caution against attaching too much importance to the apparent lull in reported seizures of proliferation significant nuclear material in Europe.

New and Old Nuclear Threats

Time does not permit even a summary of all the serious nuclear threats emanating from the former Soviet Union, many of which are discussed admirably in the recent Harvard study on Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy. In my closing remarks, therefore, let me simply emphasize several significant nuclear threats that either have not yet received adequate attention or are proving resistant to US and Russian policy initiatives. These threats pertain to: (1) inadequate safeguarding of fuel for propulsion reactors; (2) large stocks of unsafeguarded highly-enriched uranium in Kazakhstan; and (3) enormous quantities of poorly safeguarded spent fuel.

Naval Fuel

Approximately two years ago I prepared testimony for Congress about the danger posed by the lack of attention in Russia to safeguarding fresh fuel for propulsion reactors. This fuel, which may be enriched up to 90 percent U-235, is used by both Russian naval vessels and civilian ice-breakers.

During the past year the issue has gained salience in US-Russian deliberations over physical protection, material control, and accountancy. The widespread publicity given the theft of fresh fuel assemblies from the Sevmorput Shipyard near Murmansk and Russian awareness of a similar diversion at Andreeva Guba provided a useful impetus. Progress in upgrading safeguards at storage sites for propulsion reactor fuel, however, has been hampered by confused lines of authority regarding material control at these facilities, the reluctance of Ministry of Defense and Minatom officials to cooperate with the Russian nuclear regulatory body Gosatomnadzor, and the failure of Russia to allocate adequate resources for the purpose of improving physical protection. US Navy resistance to Russian proposals for reciprocity and transparency in safeguarding naval fuel also has hampered the provision of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds to Russia for this purpose. Although there are indications that this obstacle may soon be overcome, it cannot occur too quickly given deteriorating work conditions at many naval facilities, failure to pay servicemen on time, and the lax physical protection and shoddy material control and accountancy practices that continue to plague naval fuel storage sites.

The Next Sapphire?

In November 1994 it was widely believed that with the successful conclusion of Project Sapphire, the United States had removed the last substantial quantity of HEU from Kazakhstan. That now is known not to be the case. Rather, in late 1995 Kazakhstan notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that 205 kilograms of HEU remained at its Semipalatinsk nuclear research site. What is surprising and worrisome is that because Russia claims that it owns the material, it refuses to allow Kazakhstan to accept IAEA safeguards on the HEU, although Kazakhstan is required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to have all of its nuclear facilities under safeguards. Russia also refuses to specify when it will remove the material.

This unusual development confronts the United States with several difficult choices. On the one hand, failure to remove or safeguard the HEU would set a dangerous precedent in which weapons-usable material would reside under ambiguous custody on the territory of a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. In addition to being imprudent, such a situation would appear to be at odds with both Kazakhstan's and Russia's NPT commitments. On the other hand, it may well be that the United States has more confidence in the ability of Kazakhstan to protect HEU at Semipalatinsk than it does in Russia's ability to protect the material if it were returned to the Luch Scientific Production Association, which originally had control over the material. Luch, one may recall, is where the first significant diversion of HEU took place in 1992. The unanticipated discovery of another cache of hundreds of kilograms of weapons-usable material also is a useful reminder that we probably can expect to find further large, undeclared quantities of HEU in the non-Russian successor states.

Spent Fuel

The last nuclear threat I would like to note may be the least obvious. Indeed, until very recently it has received practically no attention, perhaps because of the proper emphasis that has been given to first enhancing security for nuclear weapons and fresh (i.e., unirradiated) HEU and plutonium. It would be a mistake, however, to neglect the potential proliferation and terrorist risks posed by the enormous quantities of virtually unsafeguarded spent nuclear fuel, especially that which was never highly irradiated or has been sitting long enough to see its radiation barrier decline greatly.

It needs to be emphasized that this spent fuel containing so-called "reactor grade plutonium" can be used to fabricate nuclear weapons. Moreover, spent fuel from certain kinds of reactors may be especially attractive to would-be proliferants with access to reprocessing technology because of the unusually large proportion of HEU or plutonium present. Spent naval fuel, for example, typically will have a large HEU content, while that in fast breeder reactors may contain significant quantities of low irradiated plutonium.

The fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea poses a special risk. It has been in operation since 1973 and has produced a very large quantity of low-irradiated plutonium, much of which remains on the plant site. Although Kazakhstani nuclear authorities recognize the need to upgrade safeguards at the facility and are cooperating with the US government on this matter, a growing Iranian presence in the city highlights the need for more rapid action. Iran, it should be noted, has sought to establish a consulate in Aktau since 1993 and Iranian vessels routinely call on the formerly closed nuclear city. An even greater threat, from the perspective of Kazakhstani authorities, is posed by Chechen terrorists. Although this particular danger may be exaggerated, the potential damage that could be caused by terrorist attacks on or sabotage of civilian nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage sites is enormous and should become part of the calculus by which physical protection threat assessments are made. Such threats, however, currently are not reflected in the designs of most civilian nuclear power sites in the post-Soviet states.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude my remarks by emphasizing that most nuclear security problems are inextricably linked to the region's troubled economic, political and social conditions. As such, they are unlikely to be completely resolved without substantial progress toward stabilizing the economy and renewing public trust in government institutions and law. This is not likely to occur soon, and the United States will thus continue to face at least some threat of nuclear leakage from the former Soviet Union for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, this danger is likely to grow before it recedes, and it is imperative for the United States to commit resources commensurate with the threat.