WORLDWIDE DEMAND FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS, 03/22/1996, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19960419
- Chairperson:
- W. Roth
- Committee:
- Senate Governmental Affairs
- Docfile Number:
- T96AI085
- Hearing Date:
- 19960322
- DOE Lead Office:
- NN
SUB
- Committee:
- Permanent Investigations
- Hearing Subject:
- WORLDWIDE DEMAND FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS
- Witness Name:
- C. Curtis
-
Hearing Text:
-
STATEMENT
OF
CHARLES B. CURTIS
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
MARCH 22, 1996
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity
to testify before you today. The recent hearings of the Committee have
underscored the threat posed by the illicit spread of materials,
technology and expertise needed to produce weapons of mass destruction
to rogue states or terrorist groups. Reducing the danger posed by
proliferation is a vital national security mission for the United
States. Today, I will focus on the Department of Energy s programs to
assist Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to secure
their nuclear materials and expertise. I will also address our
programs to detect and respond to the threat generated by nuclear
smuggling.
THE PROBLEM AND THE THREAT
The breakup of the Soviet Union has posed difficult, new proliferation
challenges. To date, no new weapons states have resulted. The Newly
Independent States (NIS) of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus have
abjured nuclear weapons, embraced the Nuclear Nonproliferation-Treaty,
and agreed to Russia becoming the sole weapons successor state. That
triumph for international security in limiting proliferation among
states of the former Soviet Union, however, is stalked by a fear of
proliferation stemming from within them.
As Senator Nunn stated last week, "today, there is no greater threat to
our nation's, or our world's, national security, than the illicit
spread of weapons of mass destruction," and "the challenge facing the
Russians, and the rest of the world, is to ensure that the former
Soviet Union does not become a vast supermarket for the most deadly
instruments and technology known to man." That circumstance could
greatly complicate U.S. strategic nuclear planning. It could aid rogue
states and undercut nonproliferation prospects. And it could
dramatically embolden subnational groups using violence and terrorism
to pursue their aims.
The Committee's Staff investigation, and previous witnesses before the
Committee, including CIA Director John Deutch, have established the
urgency of the threat.
I will focus on two key aspects of the immediate problem:
o First, nuclear materials safeguards in Russia and the NIS are
being exposed to vulnerabilities they were not designed to withstand.
The transformation of the Soviet Union has lessened the surety of
controls over nuclear weapons useable materials in the successor
states. The breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in a weakening of
controls over enormous quantities of nuclear materials built up over
decades of the Cold War. The problems that the NIS now face in
accounting for and securing these materials are rooted in the Soviet
past. With the disintegration of many Soviet-era structures and
institutions, this material was becoming vulnerable to theft or
diversion. Working cooperatively with all relevant NIS states, we are
now reversing that dangerous trend through our programs to enhance
materials, protection, control and accounting (MPC&A).
o Second, difficult economic conditions and declining living
standards are threatening the nonproliferation incentives of those with
expertise or access to nuclear materials or technology. Many
scientists and engineers at NIS institutes that possess nuclear
material and weapons know-how are facing hardships that can only be
compared to the deprivation of the Great Depression. Through programs
such as the New Independent States Industrial Partnering Program (IPP)
and the International Science and Technology Centers, we are working to
provide productive, peaceful employment for these individuals.
On both fronts, the vulnerability of the NIS states is our
vulnerability as well. The appearance of genuine attempts to illicitly
market special nuclear materials since 1992 provide indirect
confirmation of these vulnerabilities. In addition, in 1995 we saw the
first example of a subnational group, the Chechens, planting an
industrial radiological source in a public Moscow Park.
To put the threat in perspective, I would say in an absolute sense the
threat remains very real and concerning; that said, in important
respects, we are relatively better off today than we were a year or two
to these concerns. But that is no basis for complacency, only greater
effort.
UNITED STATES POLICY
The Clinton Administration has made nonproliferation and the fight
against terrorism two of its highest national security priorities. The
Department of Energy has critical roles in carrying out these policy
missions.
Since the beginning of this Administration, a number of Presidential
directives have been issued dealing with the nonproliferation programs
of the United States. In September 1993, the United States Policy on
Nonproliferation and Export Controls laid out the broad policies of the
administration to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and
expertise. Subsequently, the President issued specific direction on a
variety of the government s efforts including the protection of nuclear
materials. It is the stated policy of the United States to use all
appropriate and to deter, defeat and respond to all terrorist attacks
on our territory and resources, both people and facilities, wherever
they occur. President Clinton has assigned DOE and other agencies
specific emergency responsibilities and readiness requirements to
ensure a coordinated interagency response in responding to any acts of
nuclear terrorism.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CAPABILITIES AND APPROACH
The Department of Energy (DOE) is addressing the problem of securing
nuclear materials in the NIS in as comprehensive and effective way as
possible. DOE has unique scientific, technical expertise and
innovative capability in its National Laboratories. It also has long
experience in dealing with nuclear security and technology, based on
its assets from the development and maintenance of our nuclear
stockpile. We have also adapted Departmental programs, where
appropriate, to address post-Cold War threats and missions.
My remarks here may provide some, if only modest, reassurance and
encouragement. The Department is making progress in securing
materials in the NIS where it is most needed and feasible. But the
scope of the problem remains large. It involves the efforts of other
federal agencies. And it should also be noted that in important
respects, progress remains dependent upon the capacity of states of the
former Soviet Union, and parties internal to them, to cooperate and
make this a priority concern of their own. It is a problem involving a
long-term solution but having near-term consequences.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAMS
Last week, in association with the Committee s hearing, Senator Nunn,
Chairman Roth, and Senator Lugar each provided comprehensive overviews
of the problem of nuclear security. In addition, each also identified
particular aspects of concern, which, respectively, I will summarize
here as: (1) Prevention; (2) Detection and Demand; and (3) Response
capability for countering the threat. The Department's programs span
this continuum. All these dimensions are critical. My remarks here
will touch on each aspect, although in deference to the Committee's
request, it will dwell more upon programs of prevention: securing
materials and the threat at its source.
(1) PREVENTION: SECURING MATERIALS, EXPERTISE, TECHNOLOGY
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has
efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and reduce the danger posed by
other NIS. An important step in the evolution of U.S. policy was taken
providing special funds to support cooperative security programs in the
Act of 1991, Congress established the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or
A key focus of the initial Nunn-Lugar program was to assist the NIS
governments to secure and dismantle ways of destruction. Since early
1994, we have expanded this initial mandate to include the provision of
security assistance not just for weapons and their components, but for
all nuclear materials that could be used in a nuclear weapon. To gain
the flexibility we need to speed the pace of progress, we have
developed a multi-pronged approach to cooperation that includes
complimentary programs of government-to-government agreements and
direct Laboratory-to-Laboratory cooperation. This approach has enabled
us to work around bottle-necks and tailor programs to a variety of
specific recipients, such as the nuclear weapons laboratories, civilian
nuclear research facilities, and industrial enterprises producing
nuclear materials. These efforts remain flexible, take advantage of
opportunities for progress as they present themselves, nurture
approaches that work and, most importantly, work to build the necessary
trust with counterparts in the NIS.
Specifically, I will discuss three of the Department of Energy s
prevention programs: (A) Materials, Protection, Control and
Accounting; (B) our New Independent States Industrial Partnering
Program; and (C) our collaborative work on export controls in the NIS.
These complex, multifaceted programs address aspects of the threat I
emphasized earlier. While here I will only touch on the highlights of
most interest to the Committee, I request the Chairman's permission to
submit for the record reports on each of these activities. These
programs have matured quickly and sustain critical review. The success
of some of our efforts to date, I am pleased to note, was reflected in
statements by several of your witnesses concerning our programs. Our
Materials, Protection, Control and Accounting and Industrial Partnering
Program received praise. These programs cooperatively work with the
states of the former Soviet Union in securing materials and help to
prevent migration or possible cooperation with rogue states or
terrorist groups of their weapons scientists by engaging them in
peaceful commercial pursuits. The GAO study commissioned by this
Committee and released last week, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of
U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent
States, reviewed the status of some of our key programs. In addition
to capturing accurately the magnitude of the challenge, I am pleased to
say the report is supportive of the Department s efforts and approach.
Funding needs for these innovative efforts have increased, and in
general been achieved, even in the face of real cuts in the
Department's budget. These programs also face the challenge of
sustaining domestic support for funding programs dealing with Russia.
(A) Materials, Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A)
"[T]he wisest policy," Senator Nunn observed last week, "is to secure
the material at its sources." The availability of nuclear material is
the single most critical link in preventing a determined proliferator
from making a weapon. Short of stealing an intact weapon, the shortest
route to developing a nuclear weapon is to illicitly acquire weapon-
usable fissile materials. The United States and the states of the
former Soviet Union have produced the vast majority of the world s
plutonium and highly enriched uranium. While the majority of this
material is contained within nuclear weapons, several hundred metric
tons are in non-weapon form. It can take just pounds of this material
to create a nuclear weapon. The Department's cooperative nuclear MPC&A
program has three basic elements that seek progress at both the
facility and national level:
One, seek nuclear MPC&A upgrades at facilities in the NIS that contain
weapons-useable material. Two, deploy modern technologies and
specialists needed to improve MPC&A, including nuclear material
detectors, sensors, and other security systems to detect nuclear
leakage as well as providing computers, measurement instruments, and
training to allow the accurate inventorying of these materials. In
this effort, specialists from both the United States and the newly
independent states collaborate on designing and installing improved
systems, thereby strengthening the indigenous capabilities of our
partners to produce, operate, and maintain their own modern nuclear
MPC&A systems. And three, work with the nuclear regulatory agencies in
the NIS to strengthen the national standards and systems for nuclear
materials accounting and control and help ensure an independent,
technically strong regulatory authority.
The Department's role in Russia for MPC&A started in 1993 with
Nunn-Lugar funds to support nuclear MPC&A cooperation with Russia and
the three other NIS states that had nuclear weapons on their territory
after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Specifically, the initial work
followed from an agreement signed by the Department of Defense with
MINATOM, the Russian counterpart to DOE, to improve security of certain
civil facilities with weapons-usable material. The efforts pursuant to
the government-to-government track of Nunn-Lugar at this time, however,
were too often slowed or frustrated by a combination of factors,
including: lack of trust, an inability to obtain the necessary
governmental permissions, and difficulty in the sharing of information.
Consequently, in addition to such governmental cooperation with Russia,
DOE initiated in early 1994 a complementary approach now known as our
"Lab-to-Lab" MPC&A program. This alternative approach built upon the
scientific cooperation that had been started between our National
Laboratories and Russian institutes. The program encouraged our
National Laboratories to cooperate directly with the Russian Federation
nuclear institutes to broaden a dialogue based upon the trust
established among scientists who shared an appreciation for the
problems of nuclear security.
The Lab-to-Lab Program expanded those scientific collaborations to
include additional U.S. and Russian participants and to focus on
high-priority joint work to achieve rapid progress in nuclear materials
protection and control. We reprogrammed $2M for this purpose in fiscal
year 1994 and chartered six of our labs -- Los Alamos, Sandia,
Livermore, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest and Brookhaven -- to initiate
work. These labs engaged, on a cooperative basis, with three key
Russian institutes -- Kurchatov, Arzamas-16 and Obninsk. Not long ago
this watershed dialogue would have been unthinkable. Kurchatov was the
father of the Soviet bomb and Arzamas-16, a former secret city, is
analogous to our Los Alamos.
Through our interactions with the Kurchatov Institute in 1994, it was
clear that the circumstances that had formerly secured weapons grade
material had altered and were insufficient. After reaching agreement
in October 1994, within six weeks, at a cost of less than $1M, we
secured 75 kilograms of HEU with reliable technical and physical means.
institutes in Russia were treated to a demonstration of the upgrades
and wanted to participate in similar projects at their own facilities.
Former adversaries, in the deadliest sense of the term, came together
with the common purpose of ensuring that their materials are secure
from theft or diversion. Similarly, we moved forward at the same time
with cooperation at Arzamas-16, which while very secure against an
attack from the outside, lacked the internal systems and controls
needed to ensure that a motivated insider cannot covertly remove
material from the facility.
To put the matter in perspective, the U.S. always relied upon both
personnel and technological measures to secure nuclear materials at
sites. The Soviet system exercised rigorous control of personnel and
movement, as well as gates, guards and guns. They relied less on
inventory controls and technological tools to supplement their other
measures. The demise of the Soviet state, and the associated economic
difficulties, has eroded the former underpinnings of their materials
security system. The number of guards has declined, the infrastructure
decayed, salary payments are episodic, and formerly very strict
controls over the movement of workers in-and-out of closed cities such
as Arzamas-16 have relaxed considerably. At the same time, incentives
to circumvent what remains of the security system have increased.
Thousands of nuclear weapons and tons of weapons useable materials,
pending completion of our cooperative MPC&A program, are more
vulnerable to theft or diversion than they used to be. Additionally,
research materials and reactor fuels, both civilian and military, are
potential targets for criminals, insider profiteers, or terrorists.
These circumstances spur our efforts to work cooperatively with Russia
and other NIS states to rapidly introduce cost-effective, technological
systems that quickly reduce the vulnerability of these materials.
Direct interactions between Russian and American experts, the rapid
appearance of resources directed to a problem, and the prospect of
further collaborations in other areas combined to help foster success.
implementation of the Lab-to-Lab program has had a beneficial effect on
the government-to-government agreements, as well as our programs with
other NIS states. The U.S. has not been denied access at any facility
where there has been agreement to make improvements in nuclear material
security.
Our cooperative, multiple track MPC&A approach has made rapid
improvements to the security of nuclear materials. Maintaining
multiple paths of cooperation on nuclear materials control is useful
because it maximizes flexibility in order to achieve the greatest
possible progress in the shortest time. There are roughly 40-50 known
sites where there are nuclear facilities in the NIS, at which there are
roughly 80 to 100 facilities.
In 1994, with a budget of $2 million we helped secure 1 facility with
weapons useable material measured in kilograms. In 1995, using a budget
of $26 million (including $15 million of Nunn-Lugar), we introduced
security upgrades at 26 facilities with over 8 tons of weapons grade
material.
This year, we have a budget of $70 million and we are already or will
soon be engaged at 35 or more sites, and will begin implementing
improvements to the security of many tons of weapons material.
Over the past two years, the U.S., Russia, and the other NIS states
have made impressive, concrete progress in collaborative MPC&A efforts.
agreed with Russia to improve security at 18 new locations, including
some large defense-related locations. Installation of improved
systems, including measurement equipment, portal monitors, computerized
accounting systems, and personnel access controls are well underway at
multiple sites in the NIS. Real progress has also been made in
building relationships among scientists, facility operators, key
government officials and managers in each of the cooperating countries.
In short, our strategy is showing success. We are securing weapons
grade material where it sits, providing technology to police it, and
moving forward with agreements that shape the security "culture"of the
NIS states. To date we have helped secure material that is the
potential equivalent of hundreds of nuclear weapons. Continued Russian
weapons dismantlement will make more material available at sites.
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on several occasions have jointly
underscored the importance of this collaborative effort. In addition,
he U.S.-Russian Committee on Economic and Technological Cooperation,
known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, has made this
collaboration a major agenda item and many key agreements have been
reached in this forum. Russia has also demonstrated its unilateral
attention to this matter by issuing a series of decrees and executive
orders aimed at improving nuclear material security. In addition, in
November 1995, the Federal Law on Atomic Energy was passed by the
Russian legislature and signed by President Yeltsin. This legislation
provides the legal foundation for national requirements on nuclear
MPC&A at civilian facilities.
Ultimately, only Russia and the other NIS states can ensure the
security of their nuclear materials. We can, however, act as a
catalyst to spur the development of indigenous systems for nuclear
materials security by providing experience, technology, procedures and
training where it is needed most. Our cooperation with these nations
is also a two-way street. Russian scientists have taken the initiative
to identify new opportunities for cooperation, suggesting MPC&A
approaches most likely to work well in Russia and the NIS. We have
also learned from the Russians about relevant technologies that we can
put to good use, such as methods for nuclear fingerprinting. In
addition, together we have devised methods for joint remote monitoring
of nuclear storage facilities that may have applications to lessening
costs and increasing reliability of other nuclear safeguards.
Relatedly, I would note here that we have had similar favorable
experience with our Departmental and its associated National Laboratory
programs in working to: (1) increase NIS nuclear safety; (2) help
shut-down plutonium production reactors in Russia with former military
missions at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk; and (3) develop plans for long-term
fissile materials management and disposition. In addition, we are
active in ensuring the continued success of the HEU sale agreement with
Russia -- an agreement under which Russia is currently blending down
500 tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons
into much safer low enriched uranium, which they are shipping to the
U.S. under a commercial sales contract. Legislation now awaiting
action in the Congress will ensure this agreement is placed on a long-
term, secure footing. Finally, we remain ready, when and if
appropriate, to assist in the removal of weapons material that is at
imminent risk of theft or diversion, as was done in Project Sapphire in
Kazakhstan.
(B) Industrial Partnering Program (IPP)
The New Independent States Industrial Partnering Program, or IPP, was
begun in fiscal year 1994 by the Department. Its purpose was to
stabilize personnel and resources in the NIS that represented a
proliferation risk. Other programs sought to secure the nuclear
weapons and material; IPP sought to address the incentives facing
weapons scientists, engineers and technicians operating in and around
facilities with materials and equipment of concern. Dramatic drops
in budgets at weapons institutes where these individuals work and live,
and the lack of meaningful alternate employment in peaceful pursuits,
is a proliferation threat. A desperate technician, for example, is
only a fax machine away from aiding proliferators.
The objective of IPP is to engage scientists and engineers from weapons
institutes of the NIS in peaceful applications of technology, leading
to commercial benefits in both the United States and the NIS states.
The approach of IPP is three-fold. First, our labs work with the NIS
institutes to identify and evaluate the commercial potential of
research and development at NIS institutes. Second, approved
partnerships are cost-shared by U.S. industry. Finally, the objective
is commercialization. The program leverages NIS intellectual capital,
provides seed money to speed activity and lessen delay caused by
uncertainty, and generates private sector funded, self-sustaining
projects that promote alternative peaceful employment and long-term
stability for these individuals of concern.
To date, over 200 projects have been initiated, including 175
Lab-to-Lab projects and 32 industry cost-shared projects. Of the
latter projects, DOE's $12M has been matched by $24M from the private
sector. Existing projects are employing over 2,000 weapons scientists
and engineers on projects ranging from MPC&A, to nuclear safety, to
materials science, biotechnology, instrumentation, and so on. Fiscal
year 1996 will include $10M from DOE and an anticipated $10M Nunn-Lugar
funds. A portfolio of unfunded projects remains; future work depends
upon the availability of funds. The fiscal year 1997 DOE budget for
this program is $15M. Submitted for the record is a March 1996 report,
New Independent States Industrial Partnering Program: Reducing the
Nuclear Danger, on the program s accomplishments, implementation and
current status.
I should note the broad support for this program initially sponsored by
Senator Domenici. Dr. Graham Allison, in his new book that he
discussed in his testimony before the Committee last week, urges the
U.S. to "expand the Industrial Partnering Program, the most successful
of the U.S. programs aimed at reorienting Russian nuclear weapons
enterprises toward non-military commercial activities." Dr. Frank von
Hippel, who worked on these issues for the first two years of this
Administration, recently wrote the President's Science Adviser
specifically to highly praise the IPP program, urging that "Given its
current scale, it could easily spend $50 million effectively in FY96."
The ultimate objective of the program is to spur success that, after
initial and sufficient investment, ultimately puts itself out of
business as a government program by becoming a commercially viable
project.
The Department's complimentary IPP and MPC&A activities are both
designed to foster the indigenous capability and responsibility in the
states of the NIS. Both programs are also structured to assure that
NIS military capability is not enhanced. We cannot provide the
long-term solution, but have, at an expanding number of facilities,
reduced the near-term threat.
(C) Export Controls for the Former Soviet Union
Complementary to the MPC&A and IPP programs is the Department s program
on export controls. Effective export controls make it more difficult
for groups or countries of concern to obtain the nuclear material and
nuclear-related dual-use commodities used in the production or use of
special nuclear material in either unsafeguarded fuel cycle activities
or explosive programs.
A variety of U.S. Government assistance programs are in place to
enhance or establish effective export controls in Russia and the Newly
Independent States under the policy lead of the State Department. The
Department of Energy is seeking to help Russia and other states of the
NIS enhance or create a robust export control systems one that
utilizes, to the fullest extent, the respective countries scientific
and industrial base through technical exchanges.
Effective export controls are essential for countries that have
production capability for nuclear dual-use commodities or that are
likely transfer points for controlled materials to proliferant states.
DOE developed a comprehensive export control plan designed to take
advantage of the availability within Russia and the Newly Independent
States of the nuclear weapons scientific base and integrate this into
the export control infrastructure and supplier policy. The Department
has begun implementation of the Department of Energy Plan for
Cooperation on Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union. This effort
seeks to supplement U.S. initiatives directed toward stabilizing the
Newly Independent States of this region, without limiting attention or
resources to the four inheritors of nuclear weapons. Broadening our
involvement in other former Soviet republics serves our collective
security interests and furthers U.S. nonproliferation and export
control policy. The primary avenue of cooperation for U.S. export
control initiatives has been the Nunn-Lugar program. These funds have
been allocated to support export control cooperation in Russia,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. In addition, DOE has identified the
need to engage scientific experts in the export control process.
Equally important is the cultivation of independent institutes,
academic institutions, and other grass roots organizations to serve as
voices which contribute to an overall nonproliferation and export
control policy.
These highlighted programs of prevention -- MPC&A, IPP and Export
Controls -- seek to prevent nuclear materials, expertise and
technology from ever getting into the hands of rogue states or
terrorists that would use weapons of mass destruction.
(2) DETECTION AND DEMAND
Despite the progress I have noted, a prudent fear of what we don't know
remains. Chairman Roth last week observed, "While the protection,
control and accountability of nuclear materials, weapons and technology
in the former Soviet Union is critically important....it must not be
our sole concern.
We must also train a watchful eye upon those nations, groups and
individuals who might create a demand for such items." I would
particularly like to emphasize here the Department's Nonproliferation
Research and Development (R&D) program which has developed critical
technologies for detecting and characterizing nuclear production, as
well as for monitoring and verifying nuclear agreements and activities.
technologies have direct application to the detection, identification
and prevention of nuclear smuggling and potential terrorist activities.
The testimony of our representatives from Los Alamos last week before
the Committee is illustrative of the wide range of advances and
applications resulting from such R&D. The innovations at our labs
range from detectors, monitors, sensors, assessment and forensic
capabilities and others too numerous to detail here. Many of these
capabilities were developed to apply to nuclear matters but could also
be applied to biological or chemical weapons threats. Applications
range from potentially detecting nuclear materials from overhead
platforms, to tags and seals on materials of concern, to enhanced
detection capabilities at the border.
The Department has long monitored demand for nuclear technology and
material. With an increased emphasis since early 1994, we formed a
nuclear smuggling group that draws together the Department's expertise
and resources on intelligence, nuclear matters, export controls and
safeguards and security within DOE and its National Laboratories to
address the threat, and provides support to other federal agencies.
The Department's analytical and intelligence arms in recent years have
played a leading role in the analysis of worldwide nuclear materials
security concerns, and seek to monitor the demand side of the equation
of what countries or groups of proliferation concern need or are up to.
close and effective cooperation with other governments.
(3) RESPONSE AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION
Senator Lugar last week urged the Committee to "devote some thought to
strategies for countering these threats to our national security."
In that regard, I note that the Committee will conduct a hearing on our
Nuclear Emergency Search Team, or NEST, response capability next week.
Suffice it here to say that DOE's NEST capabilities include: search and
identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and assessment of
suspected nuclear devices, and disablement and containment programs.
Our personnel -- who are volunteers from our laboratory scientists and
engineers -- can be transported quickly to anywhere in the world to
deal with finding and disarming a nuclear device.
Through our Emergency Management system and capabilities, we work
closely with other federal agencies to assess nuclear threats, and if
necessary alert NEST, or other nuclear emergency response capabilities
of the Department.
The Department of Energy is also working with the Department of Defense
in support of its counterproliferation strategy. We are using the
assets of our Department s National Laboratories to support that
program on a work for others basis through a Memorandum of
Understanding I signed with then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John
Deutch. The capabilities of the Department s National Laboratories
that support the needed work on nuclear matters are also of benefit in
dealing with chemical and biological threats.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make several observations:
We are increasing the security of material in the Newly Independent
States. We are reducing the incentive for persons with knowledge of
weapons of mass destruction to act contrary to their nonproliferation
responsibilities by helping to provide employment for them in carefully
reviewed, peaceful commercial projects.
Our strategies for preventing proliferation seek to place the ultimate
responsibility upon the Newly Independent States. In particular, our
MPC&A and IPP programs are developing the necessary indigenous
incentives, expertise, capability and constituencies to that end.
These programs are cooperative, reciprocal, and characterized by rapid
success. At the same time, we believe immediate efforts by these
programs are an investment in our national security, not foreign aid.
We can pay now, or pay later. We cannot solve the problem alone, but
we can help solve it; if we choose inaction, we may suffer the
consequences.
The progress on these fronts is now paced by multiple factors:
availability of funds, the political climate in Russia and the other
Newly Independent States, and U.S. domestic support. While we cannot
but help focusing on the near term-threats, it is also important to
orient our concerns today between the past and the future. We are
overcoming some of our old threats, as we look forward to forestall
future ones:
Where once public debate turned on the anticipated Soviet threat, we
now seek to cope with threats derived from the Soviet Union s past.
For the next several years, the security of nuclear materials in the
NIS will almost certainly lag behind what is needed, despite our best
efforts, and those of the other nations involved.
Consequently, we have joined, with Russia and the Newly Independent
States, to manage the checkered Soviet legacy on nuclear materials.
Looking to the future, the Department's projections to the year 2010
show U.S. and world oil dependency upon Middle East as growing
significantly. Other projections, such as those of the International
Energy Agency, are consistent with this. The result could well be a
massive influx -- perhaps over a trillion dollars -- of additional
revenues over this period into a highly sensitive geopolitical region.
Such projections underscore our need to make our efforts with the Newly
Independent States to secure nuclear materials in place succeed, before
any new pressures of demand have an opportunity to manifest themselves.
As Senator Nunn recently observed, the bulk of the ultimate work and
resources for securing nuclear materials must necessarily come from
within the states of the former Soviet Union, but "we can and must
serve as an equal partner and a catalyst" and "that no other nation"
than the United States "is equipped to lead this endeavor." The
Administration's programs seek to act, on a bipartisan basis, as a
catalyst to the Newly Independent States to address the immediate
threat and to establish the foundation for the long-term reduction of
the nuclear danger. In that sense, the window of vulnerability is also
one of opportunity.
I commend this Committee for contributing to informed public discussion
of this matter and hope that it will add to the sustained support
needed to meet this essential challenge in the decade ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
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