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Cooperative Threat Reduction

Senator Sam Nunn

13 March 1996
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Today, there is no greater threat to our nation's, or our world's, national security than the illicit spread of weapons of mass destruction.

During the Cold War, our national security, and that of the Soviet Union, was premised upon a dangerous but well-understood balance of terror, and well-traveled avenues of diplomacy. Both the U.S. and the Soviets maintained formidable nuclear arsenals so there was a high risk that conflict would result in certain and unacceptable losses no matter who the initial aggressor. If conflict appeared possible, diplomatic channels were available as a relief valve to avoid escalation of tension. Although living in a climate of high risk, we enjoyed a high degree of stability.

The collapse of Soviet Communism and the end of the Cold War eliminated what many considered to be the gravest threat to world security. Yet, today the concerns of the Cold War have been replaced with new and far different threats. We have moved from an era of high risk, but also high stability, to an era of much lower risk, but also much less stability.

Indeed, in many ways, the world is a far more unstable place today than it was a decade ago. Ethnic, religious, racial, and political conflicts have led to an increasing level of violence and terrorism around the globe. It seems no place is immune today -- not the subways of Tokyo, not the busses of Jerusalem, not the office buildings of New York or Oklahoma City. Zealotry in the name of a cause has led individuals, groups, and rogue nations to be increasingly willing to do the unthinkable, often for no other reason than to cause destruction and terror.

The break-up of the Soviet Union and the growth of democracy in Eastern Europe were hopeful signs for international tranquility. However, the political meltdown of the former Soviet Union and the loss of command structures throughout Europe, has created scenarios which, even if anticipated, are unfathomable in their scope. Never before has an empire disintegrated while in possession of some 30,000 nuclear weapons, at least 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, significant biological weapons capability, tons of fissile materials, and tens of thousands of scientists and technicians who know how to make these weapons, but do not know how to make a living in a collapsed economy.

As the remnants of that empire struggle to achieve democratic reforms and build a free market economy, thousands of weapons scientists and technicians, including nuclear scientists, now face unemployment and are looking for new ways to earn salaries with which to feed their families. Military officers, used to being treated as among their country's elite, now face economic hardships with which they have never experienced. And plant managers and workers at some of the most sensitive civilian research facilities now labor under conditions which makes it difficult for them to maintain an adequate standard of living. The challenge facing the Russians, and the rest of the world, is to ensure that the former Soviet Union does not become a vast supermarket for the most deadly instruments and technology known to man.

Unfortunately, this threat is no longer merely theoretical. The leakage of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union is now a fact. On several occasions, Russian authorities recovered weapons-usable nuclear material which had been diverted from civilian research institutes by individuals who intended to sell the material. In four other cases weapons-usable material, including highly enriched uranium and plutonium, made its way from the former Soviet Union into Europe before authorities finally seized it.

Slightly over two years ago, I directed the Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to conduct an in-depth examination of this issue in order to determine the likelihood of such diversion and trafficking occurring. In May 1994, their efforts led to a hearing which brought together for the first time before Congress the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the President of Germany's BKA, Germany's equivalent to our FBI, and the Head of Russia's of Organized Crime Control Department. The testimony of these officials revealed a high level of concern about the threat posed by organized crime in the former Soviet Union and the possibility that, under the right circumstances, organized crime could become involved in either facilitating or creating a nuclear black market. At this rate, amateur "nuclear marketeers" are emerging and beginning to network.

Following this hearing, the Staff embarked on an inquiry which entailed hundreds of interviews with members of our law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities, including the FBI, the Customs Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and various offices within the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, and Justice. The Staff also met with dozens of academics and scholars throughout the United States. Last year the Staff traveled to both Western and Eastern Europe to meet with law enforcement, intelligence, parliamentary, and regulatory officials in Germany, the Czech Republic, the Ukraine, and Russia.

During the course of the Staffs investigation, events which occurred in the heart of downtown Tokyo made the idea of a terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction a chilling reality. On the morning of March 20, 1995, at the height of the morning rush hour, several members of a religious cult which preached Armageddon between the United States and Japan unleashed a sarin gas attack on the innocent civilian riders of the Tokyo subway system. The attack specifically targeted a central station which served the Japan's major government agencies. Twelve persons were killed and over five thousand injured. Had the cult's delivery system been slightly more efficient, tens of thousands may have perished.

The revelation that the Aum had viewed Russia as a source for the critical materials, equipment, and technology necessary to bring about its version of Armageddon only served to underscore the importance of addressing the situation in the former Soviet Union with respect to the control of nuclear and other materials of mass destruction.

Today and next week the Subcommittee will examine this issue. At our hearing today, the Subcommittee will hear five new reports from recognized authorities who will discuss the illicit "leakage" of nuclear materials and know-how. Next week we will turn to the potential end-users for these weapons and materials of mass destruction: CIA Director John Deutch will talk about the challenges in the Middle East and in other regions where American interests are in peril. Also, I am pleased to announce that joining us in next week's hearing will be Rolf Ekeus, Chairman of the U.N. Commission that is inspecting the lraqi weapons program. This will be the first time Mr. Ekeus has addressed Congress. Finally, prior to next week's hearing, the Staff will release the written report of its two year investigation into this issue with findings and recommendations.

I believe today's panel of experts, though looking at different aspects of this concern, will deliver a strikingly similar message: the threat of nuclear diversion and trafficking is one that we dare not ignore -- not only because what we know about it is frightening, but because the specter of what we don't yet fully know is even more ominous. The conclusions that will be reported include:

• The threat of nuclear diversion and trafficking is real, as evidenced by the documented seizures of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium in both Russia and Europe. There are confirmed cases of illicit smuggling of uranium and plutonium, and we know that key system components have also been diverted from Russia to Iraq.

• The protection and control of nuclear materials, and to some extent even nuclear weapons, continues to be great challenge. Despite efforts by Russia, and joint projects with the U.S., GAO will release its report that explains how there is still not even an inventory for the hundreds of tons of nuclear materials that are spread out over more than 80 civilian facilities in the former Soviet Union.

• Some of our witnesses will discuss the imposing challenges of securing these materials and the need to concentrate these materials in the smallest number of locations.

• Border and export controls throughout the former Soviet Union are lax. The porousness of the borders is evident by the number of smuggling cases of all types of goods. The U.S. government is working closely with the Russians and to a lesser extent the Baltic countries and Ukraine, to help them develop more rigorous export controls and tighten their borders. My staff, however, has determined that there has been little emphasis on the countries in the south of the former Soviet Union.

• Central Asia and the Caucasus. We have found out that while almost all proliferation experts agree that these countries are likely transit routes for fissile material coming out of Russia, little work has been done to determine what is coming out of these countries and to help these countries with border and export controls. These countries, however, border Iran and China and are close to Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and India.

Equally important as the "leakage" of fissile materials from the former Soviet Union, is the disbursal of the technical know-how and expertise as held by the 60,000 or so weapons scientists and technicians that were once part of the very substantial Soviet weapons program. Today's witnesses will explain how these scientists are subject to the same economic dislocation that is effecting all the citizens of the former Soviet Union.

The Staff has obtained examples of various entities attempting to exploit this situation for money. The Staff obtained a "solicitation letter" from a Hong Kong company, that was found in the Middle East. The letter states: "...we have detailed files of hundreds of former Soviet Union experts in the field of rocket, missile and nuclear weapon(s). These weapon experts are willing to work in a country which needs their skills and can offer a reasonable pay." You do not need too much imagination to fathom the effect this "brain drain" can have on our national security.

As economic conditions in the former Soviet Union continue to deteriorate, the likelihood of a theft of nuclear materials is increasing more rapidly than our ability to secure and protect these lethal materials. However, all experts agree that the wisest policy is to secure the materials at its source. We must therefore redouble our commitment to combat this threat. Our expenditures in this regard are not foreign aid, they are expenditures in pursuit of our own national security.

Despite our commitment, the vast majority of work and resources must still come from within the nations of the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we can, and must, serve as an equal partner and a catalyst in this effort. We must accept the notion that no other nation is equipped to lead this endeavor.