FY 1997 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL, 03/13/1996, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19960419
- Chairperson:
- S. Thurmond
- Committee:
- Senate Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- T96AG085
- Hearing Date:
- 19960313
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP
SUB
- Committee:
- Strategic Forces
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1997 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL
- Witness Name:
- J. Rohlfing
-
Hearing Text:
-
STATEMENT OF JOAN B. ROHLFING
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE THE STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
13 MARCH 1996
Statement of Joan B. Rohlfing
Director
Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
Department of Energy
Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
Senate Armed Services Committee
13 March 1996
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. It is my
pleasure to address you today as the Director of the Office of
Nonproliferation and National Security at the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE).
In recent years, the worldwide proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) and their missile delivery systems has emerged most
serious dangers confronting the United States. This is a continuing and
evolving problem with broad consequences for international security and
stability. At least 20 countries some of them hostile to the United
States already have or may be developing WMD through the acquisition
of dual-use technology, indigenous development and production, and/or
support from rogue supplier states. Additionally, safety and security
of existing nuclear weapons and materials are of increasing concern as
economic and social pressures mount in countries such as Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus.
The President has made nonproliferation one of this nation's highest
priorities. As the preeminent agency in nuclear materials and weapons
technology and protection, the Department of Energy, through the Office
of Nonproliferation and National Security, is uniquely suited to
provide leadership in national and international efforts to reduce
nuclear weapons worldwide; secure and prevent the spread of nuclear
materials, technology and expertise; roll back nuclear weapons
development programs; avoid proliferation surprise; and respond to
nonproliferation emergencies. We particularly draw upon 50 years of
science and technology expertise resident throughout the DOE National
Laboratory complex to help us achieve these goals.
To reduce the international proliferation threat, the Office of
Nonproliferation and National Security is focusing its resources and
expertise on the following near-term priorities: securing nuclear
materials, technology and expertise in Russia and the Newly Independent
States; maintaining effective protection, control and accountability
of nuclear materials, technology and expertise in the United States;
limiting weapons-usable fissile materials worldwide; ensuring
transparent and irreversible reductions of global nuclear stockpiles;
supporting the completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996;
developing and integrating a program for preventing, detecting and
responding to nuclear terrorism and smuggling; controlling nuclear
exports; and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Through the unique scientific, technical, analytical and operational
capabilities of the Department and its National Laboratories, we are
working to effectively and efficiently accomplish these near-term
priorities by marshaling and integrating our resources and
nonproliferation activities. Some of our most important international
activities include: conducting the government-to-government and
laboratory-to-laboratory programs of cooperation between U.S. nuclear
experts and their counterparts at nuclear facilities and institutes in
the former Soviet Union to improve the protection, control and
accountability of nuclear materials; assisting Russia and the Newly
Independent States in establishing and enhancing nuclear material
export control systems; developing advanced technologies and systems to
detect the indigenous proliferation of WMD, to enable the verification
of arms control treaties, and to facilitate the collection of
intelligence information in noncooperative environments; conducting
critical operations in cooperation with the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea to stabilize and safely store spent nuclear fuel
thereby both freezing the North Korean nuclear weapons program and
enabling the application of effective International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards; working with the private sector to engage WMD
weapons scientists, engineers and technicians in the former Soviet
Union in activities which reduce the proliferation threat; and
providing technical support of long-term monitoring of Iraqi facilities
and other nuclear safeguards and emergency programs of the IAEA. In
addition, we are providing unique and in-depth technical, arms-control,
intelligence, research and technology expertise as part of the U.S.
Government s integrated efforts to conclude negotiations, prepare for
entry into force, and implement a CTBT.
The Department s unique technical and analytical capabilities allow us
to play a pivotal role in the weapons of mass destruction arenas of the
U.S. Intelligence Community. For example, DOE continues to contribute
to National Intelligence Estimates and to support the Intelligence
Community s Non-Proliferation Center in assessing the activities of
emerging nuclear weapons states and terrorist organizations, the
activities of states that supply nuclear materials and expertise, and
theft and smuggling of nuclear material.
In concert with our international activities, we are responsible
conducting a wide range of domestic activities that support our
nonproliferation and national security goals. These activities
include: directing a rigorous safeguards and security program for the
entire Department of Energy complex, thereby ensuring the demonstrated
security of our own nuclear materials, technology and expertise;
declassifying millions of DOE documents while protecting critical
information that has the potential to facilitate the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction; and maintaining a security investigations
and reinvestigations program for both Federal and contractor employees
of the Department. We also provide technical, analytical, policy and
implementation support to the efforts of the nation s policy community
to deal with nonproliferation issues.
We also ensure the Department has a robust emergency management and
response capability for nonproliferation, energy and nuclear
emergencies. Through this program, we provide assistance to other
government agencies as well as state, tribal and local governments.
Over the past year, we have been providing emergency response experts
to assist other foreign governments in reviews of their emergency
preparedness plans and capabilities. Through the Partnership for
Peace, we have been working with the Departments of State and Defense
to assist Russia and the Newly Independent States to plan for and
manage energy and radiological emergencies. We also have been working
with the International Atomic Energy Agency, International Energy
Agency and Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to develop
procedures and support plans for any radiological emergency.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Over the past year, we have demonstrated leadership and achieved
significant accomplishments in each of our near-term priorities:
our cooperative efforts with Russia and the Newly Independent States in
securing nuclear materials, technology and expertise, has protected
over 8 tons of direct-use nuclear material with upgrades to 26
facilities material protection, control and accounting programs.
Before the end of 1996, we expect to broaden this effort to over 35
facilities and protect hundreds of tons of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium. Additionally, we have begun discussions with the
Russian Navy to begin upgrades on their nuclear facilities as well.
We have engaged nearly two thousand weapons scientists, engineers and
technicians on 219 scientific projects at 77 institutes in Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus to prevent a brain-drain of these
scientists to other countries that would employ them for their own
indigenous nuclear weapons programs.
Our work in North Korea has effectively stopped their indigenous
nuclear weapons development program. We have a team currently in
country canning the spent fuel to prevent its reprocessing for use in
nuclear weapons. Additionally, we have enabled the IAEA to apply
international safeguards on the existing nuclear facilities remaining
in North Korea.
We are the sole agency responsible for developing monitor and verify a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In 1995, we demonstrated significant
progress in each of the sensor technologies required to support an
international monitoring system: seismic monitoring, radionuclide
monitoring, hydroacoustic monitoring, on-site inspection, space-based
monitoring, and automated data processing. One particular success is
ur improvement of the capability to more easily distinguish nuclear
explosions from earthquakes a formidable step toward a greater
verification capability.
In 1994, the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security completed
installation of sensors on all Global Positioning Satellites that allow
the United States to continuously detect near-earth and atmospheric
nuclear explosions and verify treaty compliance worldwide. In 1995 we
began developing and deploying the next-generation of sensors to
improve our detection capability.
We have also completed the first comprehensive assessment of all the
chemicals that might be used in a nuclear weapons life-cycle. This
positions the United States to develop better techniques to detect an
indigenous nuclear weapons program.
Our declassification program has also played an instrumental in
furthering U.S. nonproliferation goals, especially in the initiative to
achieve a bilateral agreement with Russia for the exchange of
classified information to facilitate confirmation of transparent and
irreversible nuclear weapons reductions.
The Department s safeguards and security functions that were previously
spread across the DOE complex are now consolidated within the Office of
nonproliferation and National Security. This achievement is an
important step toward creating a responsive and efficient focal point
for the Department s nuclear safeguards and security program and
providing a national-level technical resource which is capable of fully
supporting multilateral nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
LOOK TO THE FUTURE
With our many achievements, there is much work to be done in our
term priority areas. We cannot rest on our laurels and expect the
global nuclear danger to reduce on its own. The programs of the Office
of Nonproliferation and National Security seek to broaden their effects
wherever they are able.
In the coming year and a half, the Department will accelerate efforts
to provide enhanced materials protection, control and accounting for
fissile materials in Russia and the Newly Independent States. We hope
to complete all MPC&A improvements in former Soviet Union states
outside of Russia by the end of calendar year 1997 (with the majority
of work being completed by the end of the fiscal year). In Russia, we
intend to expand cooperation to the remaining facilities in the civil
nuclear complex while continuing work with facilities related to the
nuclear weapon complex. Our efforts with Gosatomnadzor (the Russian
agency equivalent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to design
and promote an indigenous MPC&A standards system will ensure that
Russian weapons usable material will be protected after the U.S.
involvement has been completed. The program as a whole anticipates
upgrades at 50 locations in Russia and 13 locations in the Newly
Independent States completed by the year 2002.
We are working to improve regional arms control and nonproliferation
regimes through programs such as the Cooperative Monitoring Center
(CMC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. At the CMC, we assist political and
technical experts from around the world acquire the technology-based
tools they need to assess, design, analyze and implement
nonproliferation, arms control and other security measures in their own
regions. This particularly fosters regional security and lessens the
desire for nations to acquire or develop their own weapons of mass
destruction. We plan to further expand this effort with states of the
Middle East, South Asia, the Koreas, and China.
In 1996, we hope to conclude an Agreement for Cooperation and a
Stockpile Data Exchange Agreement with Russia that will allow us
insight into warhead dismantlement. These agreements will build
confidence between our two nations that our mutual nuclear arms
reductions are in fact occurring and irreversible.
These examples show that our activities are truly beneficial. Through
our robust and cost-effective programs, we are able to provide
leadership in the nonproliferation community, further the
nonproliferation goals of the United States, and ensure the national
security.
BUDGET REVIEW
The table below summarizes the fiscal year 1997 budget request for the
Office of Nonproliferation and National Security from the Energy and
Water Development Appropriation as compared with the fiscal year 1996
adjusted appropriation (in thousands).
***Chart is not available in this format. Contact the Information
Management and Administration Office at (202) 586-5115 to obtain a copy
of this chart.
The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development budget
request for fiscal year 1997 reflects a savings of $15.3 million. This
savings in part is a result of our effort to eliminate duplication
between agencies and within DOE, improving coordination between
sponsoring agencies, streamlining operations and generating a
meaningful cost savings.
The Arms Control and Nonproliferation budget request includes a
increase of $36.1 million concentrated in the area of
material protection, control and accounting. This increase is
due to the rapid pace of expansion of cooperation with Russian
facilities and is important to ensure early safeguarding of weapons
usable material at their source. We are also expanding efforts in the
Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) and Industrial
Partnering Programs. The increase will also allow us to ensure that
the canned spent nuclear fuel in North Korea is not used in an
indigenous nuclear development program. Finally, the increase will
provide increased analysis and support to: U.S. nuclear arms control
olicies in the Middle East, Asia and South Asia, nuclear energy
security issues in Asia, South Asia and Europe, and U.S. policies to
eal with excess civil plutonium.
The Intelligence budget request reflects a modest reduction from fiscal
year 1996 resulting from realized efficiencies. The request will
provide for timely, high-impact analysis and reporting on the
proliferation implications of selected nuclear weapons states
programs, emerging nuclear proliferants, nuclear suppliers, and global
impacts to the U.S. energy security.
The Nuclear Safeguards and Security budget request for fiscal year 1997
includes a net increase of slightly over $1 million.
Through a requested increase and reprioritization of funding needs, we
intend to increase the Classification and Declassification budget by
approximately $2.3 million. This increase seeks to further develop
advanced automation technology in support of the Declassification
Productivity Initiative program and implement Executive Order 12958 on
Classified National Security Information.
Finally, the Emergency Management budget request for fiscal year
1997 is unchanged from the fiscal year 1996 appropriation. The change
reflected in the summary table above is exclusively a result of
consolidation of Program Direction funds.
CONCLUSION
Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a crucial
aspect of our national interest, and the Office of Nonproliferation and
National Security is uniquely capable to serve this national interest,
especially through the efforts of our national laboratories. Our
science and technology base enables us to provide unique solutions to
national and international nonproliferation problems. The work we do
benefits the nation s security across a broad spectrum: protecting
nuclear material in the United States and worldwide; rolling back
existing nuclear weapons development programs internationally; ensuring
the verifiability of nuclear treaties, especially a CTBT; and
responding to energy and nonproliferation emergencies.
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