Dr. Mitchel B. Wallerstein,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy
Clinton Administration's Response to the Threat Posed by Proliferation
20 June 1996 - House National Security Committee
Military Procurement Subcommittee and Military Research and Development Subcommittee
Introduction
Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am Dr. Mitchel Wallerstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy. Thank you for the invitation to appear before this joint meeting of the Subcommittees on Military Procurement and Research and Development of the House National Security Committee to discuss the steps that the Department of Defense has taken--and is taking--to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery systems (principally, ballistic and cruise missiles) and to be prepared to deal with the consequences of such proliferation in those cases where it has already occurred.
With the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear holocaust has been reduced dramatically, but we are confronted today with the threat of NBC weapons and missile proliferation to countries in many parts of the world. Recognition of this growing security challenge, which was accelerated by review of the lessons learned in Desert Storm, motivated the development in 1993 of a counterproliferation program, which is among the highest priorities of the Defense Department.
U.S. conventional forces are the best in the world, and we believe that they are capable of deterring--and, if necessary, defeating--any other armed force which the United States might confront. A proliferated world introduces, however, a potential wild card into the equation: acquisition or indigenous development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by rogue nations as a way to try to "even the odds" in future conflicts and thereby to deter U.S. involvement. Threatened or actual use of NBC weapons might be seen by a proliferant state as perhaps the only means to neutralize the vastly superior U.S. conventional force projection capabilities. Thus, to maintain our superiority, we must ensure that no country or sub-state actor attempts to test whether these weapons actually can be used as equalizers against our forces, to induce the United States to stay out of--or withdraw from--some future regional conflict.
How do we respond to this problem? Our first response is always to try to prevent proliferation; second, to deter the threat that we cannot prevent; and finally, if necessary, to defend our forces, our interests and our allies and coalition partners against threats.
Recent Successes
There is a tendency to focus on the negatives when discussing the profiferation of NBC weapons and their delivery systems. I would like to begin my testimony by mentioning some of our successes.
First, we are attacking the problem at the source. For proliferants, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union has increased the potential for access to NBC weapons technology, material, and expertise, although the newly independent states are taking steps to maintain -- and expand -- their export controls and nuclear safeguards. Maintaining control over the accountability of these capabilities and materials presents a daunting challenge. We are working closely with the Governments of Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program to reduce proliferation threats from the region.
To date, over $1.5 billion has been notified to Congress for the CTR program. We are assisting these countries in over 30 different projects such as improving their export controls and nuclear safeguards, helping dismantle ICBM silos and heavy bombers, and helping eliminate the infrastructure associated with NBC weapons. The CTR program has helped make possible the now completed withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Kazakstan and Ukraine, and we expect the remaining nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from Belarus before the end of the year. Another major success story, closely related to CTR, was Project Sapphire -- which involved the purchase of highly enriched uranium from Kazakstan and the transportation of that material to the U.S. for safe storage.
Going from four nuclear states to one reduces the problem of trying to control proliferation. The CTR program will continue to address issues related to weapons dismantlement and security on the territory of the former Soviet Union, both by continuing existing projects and by developing new ones, adapting to new and changing requirements.
We are also working with our long-standing Allies in Europe to develop common approaches on counterproliferation. NATO has moved counterproliferation to the top of its post-Cold War agenda. Ensuring that the Alliance is prepared to meet the threats I posed by NBC proliferation is now seen as one the fundamental missions of the Alliance and is a key aspect of NATO's adaptation to the new security environment. NATO Heads of State and Government in January 1994 established a special body, the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP), to examine the defense implications of NBC proliferation. Defense Ministers just this month approved an accelerated plan of action recommended by the DGP to improve Allied military capabilities to counter proliferation risks. This will be reflected in NATO's defense planning process, which will be modified to take account of the growing proliferation problem on NATO's periphery and to early deployment of key capabilities for addressing the unique military challenges posed by NBC threats.
This year, we will increase our efforts to stem nuclear smuggling and terrorism. Under a mandate from Congress, we are working with the FBI to establish an anti-trafficking program to train law enforcement authorities in the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and Former Soviet Union countries.
When fully implemented, the North Korean Framework Agreement will exemplify a successful effort to roll back a program that was well underway and was intended to produce nuclear weapons. The Framework Agreement already has succeeded in stopping that program dead in its tracks. And we are monitoring the program carefully to insure that the North Koreans live up to their obligations.
Our success in achieving the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, without conditions, has established a permanent global norm against the spread of nuclear weapons. We now need to complement this achievement in the nuclear area with a parallel success regarding chemical weapons by ratifying and bringing into force the Chemical Weapons Convention as soon as possible.
Non-Proliferation Policies
Technological developments also have played a key role in raising the proliferation threat to the top of our agenda. As was demonstrated by the case of North Korea, no matter how backward a country may be economically, it can still have (or develop) the capability to build nuclear reactors and produce plutonium In addition, some technology and products that were once controlled, are now readily available. The pace of technological change and growth in world trade has therefore complicated our efforts in trying to control proliferation
Export controls are another key mechanism through which DoD plays a large role in preventing proliferation of NBC weapons and delivery systems. Over the last few years we have undertaken a very substantial reform of our export control system. I wish to emphasize three major components of the Administration's efforts. First, the Administration is focusing its export control efforts on chokepoint items and/or technologies that are critical to developing and deploying military capabilities. By focusing our efforts on items that are truly controllable, we can make the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as well as conventional arms and associated dual-use technologies much more difficult. Second, we have moved effectively to improve the efficiency and transparency of the export control process. A recently issued Executive Order ensures appropriate interagency review of all categories of licenses. This reform has given DoD a stronger role in licensing decisions than existed previously, thereby enabling us to bring our technical expertise to bear more effectively and responding to Congressional concerns that the Department of Defense has sometimes lacked the opportunity to express its views on certain sensitive exports. Third, we are strengthening the system of multilateral export control regimes dedicated to stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons.
We are working with our partners to make existing multilateral regimes as effective as possible. We are also moving to complete the establishment of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. US leadership has brought together 31 countries to establish the Wassenaar Arrangement, a new international regime to increase transparency and responsibility for the global market in conventional armaments and dual use goods and technologies. This regime aims to deal firmly with threats to security through restraints in trade to the pariah countries and to prevent future accumulations of arms.
The Administration is committed to strong non-proliferation policies. We have sanctions currently in force against Iran, Iraq, and Libya. DoD provides much support to UNSCOM in Iraq. It is our equipment and expertise that was used in the design and monitoring of the chemical weapons and missile manufacturing facilities in Iraq. Finally, we are working to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime to help limit the spread of missile-related technology.
So, I think you will agree that we are doing a great deal to prevent proliferation from occurring in the first place. But realistically, we cannot expect to be successful under ALL circumstances. In these cases, we want to deter NBC use and to defend our forces against the effects of these weapons if they are used.
Deterrence
In deterring the threat, we depend both on strong conventional military force and a smaller--but still powerful--nuclear force. Secretary Perry stated earlier this year that the U.S. response to the use of NBC weapons against U.S. forces would be devastating and overwhelming. We have, in fact, a broad spectrum of force options available with which to respond to WMD use against us.
There is another aspect of deterrence that is often overlooked, however. If our forces are equipped and prepared to deal with the effects of chemical or biological weapon use against them that defensive capability takes on a deterrent effect of its own. Thus, effective active and passive defenses take away the advantages that an adversary might otherwise perceive it could gain by employing such weapons.
Counterproliferation Initiative
Two years ago we initiated the Defense Department's Counterproliferation Initiative (CPI), both in response to the lessons of the Gulf War and the conclusions reached as part of the Bottom Up Review, which reoriented U.S. defense strategy from an East-West Cold War orientation to a focus on Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). The CPI supports our national counterproliferation policy, first by contributing to USG efforts to prevent the acquisition of NBC weapons or reverse it when it has occurred. If prevention fails, we must have the capabilities needed to deter the use of NBC weapons and to defend against the use of such weapons. The purpose of the CPI is to ensure that our forces will be able to prevail in future MRCs -- recognizing that our nuclear deterrent will always be a factor but should not be the only response option.
I would like to provide you with some examples of ways that we are improving our capabilities. We are not as good in all areas as we would like to be, but we are setting better. The first example is the protective suits that our forces wear if they fear they are about to come under chemical or biological weapons attack. The suits that our forces wore in DESERT STORM were heavy and very hot. As a result of the Counterproliferation Initiative, we have accelerated the procurement of a new suit for chemical and biological protection that is much lighter, more comfortable, which will not slow down or hinder our forces as much under war-time conditions, particularly under extremely hot climatic conditions.
A second example is improved detection equipment for chemical weapons. During DESERT STORM we had 1970's vintage detectors, which had a high false alarm rate. This created unnecessary anxiety among our troops, and required them to put on and take off their protective suits many times for no apparent reason. Next year, as a result of accelerated development under the CPI, we will field a new chemical weapons detector that has a much smaller false alarm rate.
A third example is the development of capabilities to attack and destroy hardened or deeply buried targets. This is among the hardest military problems we face in dealing with proliferation threats. We have under development a number of efforts to address this difficult challenge, using a variety of new technological approaches, which we would be happy to brief you on in closed session.
A fourth example is our new version of the Patriot, the PAC-3, which will be fielded in 1999. This is a significant improvement over the PAC-2 that we used in DESERT STORM. It has a hit-to-kill warhead, not a fragmentation warhead, which gives it a far greater lethality than the PAC-2. It has an increased range because it is a different interceptor and has a different radar. Thus, we will be fielding a much more capable defense against SCUD-like missiles than we had just a few years ago.
The result of the Counterproliferation Initiatie will be the enhancement of two capabilities: a war-winning combat capability for two, near-simultaneous MRCS, and a closely related capability for civil response to NBC that can be used to protect rear areas in a theater of conflict. the populations of coalition partners. or U.S. cities threatened by NBC terrorism.
Counterterrorism
DoD's NBC capabilities, especially those associated with civil response capability -- equipment, trained personnel, technical experts -- can and will be made available for responding to terrorist incidents. Overseas, DoD would follow the lead of the State Department, and domestically we would follow the lead of the Department of Justice (normally through the FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The procedures for accomplishing these missions are currently being worked out, including both a DoD biological/chemical emergency response capability that is functionally equivalent to the Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) program and a much broader counter-terrorism capability. In the case of domestic, NBC emergencies, especially those associated with civil response capability -- i.e., equipment trained personnel, technical experts -can and will be made available to civil law enforcement and emergency response authorities for responding to a domestic terrorist incident.
For crisis management, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is prepared to provide its Special Mission Units to help resolve terrorist incidents. These units are always on alert, are trained in handling BW and CW agents and effects, have state-of-the-art protective suits and masks, and can render safe and recover of BW and CW agents. These SOCOM units are supported by a specialized Chemical/Biological Response Unit, consisting of a Technical Escort Unit which is trained to search, sample, recover, and transport agents; and on-call teams from the Army's and Navy's laboratories and CW/BW commands for expert knowledge on the scene. For consequence management, DoD would provide through FEMA, the capabilities of Army NBC Defense Units, together with military medical care capabilities and supplies. A number of initiatives exist for upgrading these capabilities, as well as for strengthening their links to civilian agencies, which would be the first to respond to such incidents, and to foreign governments.
DoD Counterproliferation Council
As part of our preparations, we are working to insure that counterproliferation pervades everything we do in DoD. It is not just a matter of acquiring new system capabilities; it also requires new doctrine and increased emphasis on realistic training in NBC conditions so that the forces themselves understand that this is part of the war that we are calling upon them to be able to wage and win. To accomplish our coal of integrating the counterproliferation concept into the thinking of the Services, Joint Staff, Policy and Acquisition communities, we have recently established a Counterproliferation Council to coordinate DoD-wide counterproliferation-related activities. This Council is chaired by Deputy Secretary of Defense White and will have among its members the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as senior officials from the Services, OSD, and the Joint Staff.
Conclusion
I have described a selection of our initiatives in the Counterproliferation area. We have many activities underway, but we know that we have more to do. Proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems present a daunting challenge. We will need perseverance, patience, and imagination to combat this threat. It is possible to prevent proliferation, at least in some cases. We have had a dramatic reduction in the threat from the former Soviet Union, in large part through U.S. cooperative efforts. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been extended indefinitely. Since the beginning of the decade, six countries: Ukraine, Kazakstan, Belarus, North Korea, South Africa, and Iraq, that might have been nuclear powers have turned away from that path.
In the current global security environment, we recognize that, despite our strong and continuing pursuit of nonproliferation diplomacy, it will not be , possible to prevent proliferation all the time and in all places. When proliferation occurs and U.S. interests and commitments are involved, it is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to make certain that we are able to prevail on the battlefield, even against opponents who possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and missile delivery systems.
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