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Rep. Curt Weldon, Chair, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development

Clinton Administration's Response to the Threat Posed by Proliferation
20 June 1996 - House National Security Committee
Military Procurement Subcommittee and Military Research and Development Subcommittee

The Research and Development and Military Procurement Subcommittees meet jointly this morning to receive open testimony from government witnesses on the Clinton Administration's response to the threat posed by the proliferation of strategic technology, including missiles and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Subcommittees just heard from Dr. Gordon Oehler from Intelligence Community's Non-Proliferation Center on recent developments in proliferation.

In this regard, and I would venture to guess that my colleagues would agree with me on this, there is only one conclusion one can draw from the presentation we've just seen -- and that is, the threat posed by the proliferation of strategic technology is real and growing.

The Administration talks a good game when it comes to proliferation. Secretary Perry, for example, has stated, (quote)

"We received a wake-up call with Saddam Hussein's use of Scud missiles during Operation Desert Storm and new information on his ambitious nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs. The proliferation of these horrific weapons presents a grave and urgent risk to the United States and our citizens, allies, and troops abroad "

(end quote) In addition, Secretary Christopher and President Clinton have highlighted the threat posed by proliferation of strategic technology to American interests. -

But talk is cheap. When confronted with some admittedly difficult decisions in fighting proliferation, this Administration has time and again failed to make the right choice. And, as a result, its actual record in fighting proliferation can hardly be viewed as a success.

Let's look at that record in some detail. Consider the following specific cases:

-- First, the Administration's top policymakers have willfully disregarded clear and convincing evidence of proliferant behavior to avoid having to consider imposing legally-mandated sanctions on countries that violate nonproliferation norms. Nowhere is this dangerous pattern clearer than in its handling of the evidence associated with China's transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan.

In the M-11 case, Administration officials either pretend that the missiles in Pakistan simply don't exist, or they argue that, well, just maybe, they haven't become "operational." In fact, the missiles are there -- our intelligence community has affirmed this beyond a reasonable doubt -- and, for the purposes of U.S. law it is irrelevant whether the missiles have become "operational."

-- Second, the Administration has stubbornly refused to impose sanctions,, as required by U.S. law, on known proliferators because doing so, they argue, would "complicate U.S. relations" with such proliferant countries. The case involving the transfer by China to Pakistan of nuclear "ring magnets" is a prime example here. Administration officials argue sanctions need not be imposed on China in this case because senior Chinese officials were unaware of the transfer. Simply put, this contention strains credulity. After all, the Chinese company involved is owned and operated by the Chinese government. This sale sadly repeats a pattern of nuclear weapons cooperation between China and Pakistan that is all too familiar to those who follow this issue.

Another example can be found in the Administration's handling of Russia's transfer of intercontinental-range missile components -accelerometers and gyroscopes to be precise -- to Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. This event was reported in the newspaper in December of last year. When I visited Moscow the following January I asked senior officials in the American Embassy whether the U.S. had issued a "demarche" to the Russian Government about this blatant violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Not only had we not issued a protest to Mr. Yeltsin's government, U.S. Embassy officials in Moscow didn't even know about the transfer that had been reported a month earlier in the Washington media!

Now, the U.S. Government has finally issued a demarche on this transfer, but Administration policymakers contend, once again, that senior Russian officials did not know of the transfer and therefore we need not impose sanctions. Policymakers are basing this claim, at least in part, I am told, on the fact that no senior Russian official has admitted knowing of the transfer in advance. In other words, we're simply taking their word on it.

-- Which leads to the third major problem with this Administration's record in fighting proliferation -- namely, it has aggressively pushed to lower the standards for membership in the various multilateral nonproliferation regimes. Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center has likened this approach to asking known criminals to join the local "Neighborhood Watch" program.

For example, despite Russia's inability or refusal to control the export of dangerous technologies to rogue regimes, the Administration lobbied hard to include Russia in the Missile Technology Control Regime. Perhaps this is because U.S. law prohibits the imposition of sanctions against regime-member states.

To become a member of the MTCR, the President certified that Russia has in place "effective export controls". Now, you can't have it both ways -- you can't argue that Russian leaders don't know about the hemorrhaging of technology out of Russia -- and therefore, can't be held accountable -- and at the same time argue that they have effective export control laws and mechanisms in place. But that is precisely the type of legal and diplomatic gymnastics this Administration has adopted in order to minimize the import of proliferant behavior by Russia and others.

Even more incredible, however, is the recent revelation that the Administration would like to bring China and even North Korea -- perhaps the two greatest proliferators of modem times -- into the club. This is simply mind-boggling given China's continuing missile cooperation with Iran and North Korea's missile cooperation with terrorist regimes in the Middle East -- not to mention the fact that Pyongyang has on-going a "crash" program to deploy ICBMs that can destroy American cities. But it is, I guess, at least consistent with the previous pattern -- after all, how could one argue against making these countries MTCR members if one has already made Russia and Brazil members and Ukraine an "adherent" to the regime.

-- The Fourth and final criticism I would levy against this Administration's record in fighting proliferation is its practice of subsidizing known proliferators. Today's Washington Post carries a story that notes that the Administration is proposing to use the Export-Import Bank to guarantee a $137 million sale of advanced nuclear equipment needed to complete a nuclear reactor being built by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation. According to the Post, this firm (quote) "attracted attention when a lengthy U.S. intelligence investigation concluded this spring that some of the firm's officials had knowingly approved the sale of ring magnets to Pakistan for use in a facility to enrich uranium for Pakistani nuclear arms." (end quote)

Likewise, in the case of missiles, the U.S. Commerce and State Departments have continued to approve transfers of U.S.-made communications satellites to the same firms in China most responsible for missile proliferation to Pakistan and Iran. What are these satellites launched on? The same booster China uses as an ICBM. Here, the United States is affording a double subsidy to China's strategic modernization; it not only is giving money to help pay for strategic rocket modernization -- missiles that can be used to target American cities -- it is helping China learn how to make these rockets more reliable and sophisticated.

In sum, I think the record is clear. I'm certain our witnesses Administration witnesses will have plenty to say in response to these assertions -- and I welcome such a dialogue.