MODIFY CURRENT MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE, 09/20/1995, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19960119
- Chairperson:
- A. Specter
- Committee:
- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
- Docfile Number:
- T95AF298
- Hearing Date:
- 19950920
- DOE Lead Office:
- NN
- Hearing Subject:
- MODIFY CURRENT MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE
- Witness Name:
- C. Curtis
-
Hearing Text:
-
STATEMENT
OF
CHARLES B. CURTIS
DEPUTY SECRETARY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE
THE U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON
INTELLIGENCE
September 20, 1995
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I wish to express my
appreciation for this opportunity to discuss United States national
interests and the role of intelligence in supporting national policies
in pursuit of those interests. In particular I wish to describe the
intelligence priorities and requirements of the Department of Energy
in the post-Cold War era.
At a time when all agencies are struggling to reconcile shrinking
resources with burgeoning demands, the question of how policy makers
can make most effective use of the huge amount of information
available to them is critically important. As our national security
challenges grow more complex, it is my conviction that intelligence --
properly collected, analyzed, and distributed -- can play a vital role
in meeting threats to our national security and the formulation of more
effective policy. Moreover, intelligence priorities must be carefully
and consistently reevaluated as the global security environment changes
and evolves. I commend this Committee for its contributions to this
process.
The Department and its predecessors have been both consumers and
producers of intelligence for more than 50 years. During World
War II,Los Alamos scientists analyzed the efforts by our opponents to
develop a nuclear bomb. Throughout the Cold War, intelligence
supported our primary mission of nuclear weapons development by
providing assessments of foreign nuclear threats, especially from the
former Soviet Union. Today, the Department and its National
Laboratories are in the forefront of stemming the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Our accomplishments range from assisting the
Russians to safeguard their fissile materials to providing policy
makers with timely assessments of rogue states' efforts to develop
nuclear weapons or procure nuclear materials and technologies.
As U.S. national security priorities have evolved, so too have the
Department intelligence requirements. Intelligence programs at the
Department and its National Laboratories are solidly grounded in the
President's National Security Strategy of the United States (February
1995) and his clear statement of priorities for the Intelligence
Community.
First, we must continue to monitor developments in both Russia and
China, however much we wish these countries well. Russia still
retains a capability to inflict massive and unacceptable damage to the
United States; meanwhile, China seems intent on modernizing and
expanding its limited strategic nuclear arms capability. The safety
and security of nuclear warheads, fissile materials, and expertise in
Russia remain a priority issue for the Department. The Yeltsin
government has made recent progress in this area, but much more remains
to be done.
Second, the President has made the prevention of the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction a critical national security priority.
Regional instabilities, the global explosion of information
technologies which could facilitate the rapid transmission of
nuclear know-how, the challenges to safeguarding fissile materials in
Russia and other States of the former Soviet Union, the burgeoning
global market in delivery systems, especially missiles, and the
emergence of terrorists intent on inflicting mass casualties on
innocent populations underscore the President's concern. The National
Laboratories are the repository of world class expertise on nuclear
warhead design, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear testing and stockpile
stewardship, and manufacturing, weaponization and associated use
control technologies. One of my main priorities is to ensure that this
expertise is effectively harnessed to the nonproliferation mission in
support of the Administration's objectives and the Defense Department's
Counter proliferation programs.
Third, secure access to global fossil fuels remains a primary national
security concern for the United States. Over the next 15 years,
Persian Gulf oil producing states could provide as much as 80 percent
of the anticipated increase in the worlds oil demand. These same
forecasts show Persian Gulf nations accounting for 70% of world
exports. If this occurs, we will in essence be increasing the transfer
of wealth into this politically and stability challenged region by over
$200 billion per year. As global energy market dynamics become more
complex and interdependent, we need to monitor energy supply and
distribution infrastructures throughout the world. In this regard,
assessments of energy vulnerabilities and potential supply disruptions
remain a vital intelligence information priority for the Department.
Fourth, as global interdependence grows, transnational threats come to
constitute an increasing priority for the United States. Environmental
degradation does not acknowledge national borders; a new breed of
terrorist and international organized criminals display a similar
disdain for national boundaries and customs passport authorities. The
Department s environmental remediation experience can and should be
applied to the first threat; its expertise and technologies are also
being applied to the second area, especially to the prevention of the
shipment of fissile materials across national borders. Should a
terrorist threat involving nuclear devices emerge, the Department's
nuclear terrorism response team, NEST, would be among the first on the,
scene. The Department is in the forefront of defining necessary
information requirements and potential responses to these new threats.
Finally, all would agree on the importance of meeting the new economic
challenges, which have materialized from different parts of the globe.
Economic competitiveness and science and technology intelligence have
emerged as areas in which the Department is playing an important role
for the Administration and the Intelligence Community.
How to organize, posture, and fund an effective intelligence capability
to meet these challenges is a question under active consideration
within the Department, the Administration, in Congress, and in the
public at large. I commend the Committee for its contributions to this
effort. Let me offer a few observations based upon my own experience
as a consumer of intelligence.
It is of course true that a much greater volume of information is
available to the policy maker than probably ever before. Policy
experts in their own fields, have had extensive contacts with their
foreign counterparts, and can tap into a much broader information
network than previously available. On the other hand, I must observe
that much of the publicly available information suffers a number of
shortcomings that can impair its usefulness to the policy maker. All
too often such information is unfocused and can even be of questionable
reliability with regard to its source or the motivations driving its
publication. Frequently open source information is event-driven and
lacks insight into mindsets or national cultural styles that form an
essential component of the driving factors of policy making in any
state.
In my view, intelligence must remain focused on what should be of
greatest import to the policy maker. Good intelligence analysis has
incorporated all sources of information, including open sources.
But intelligence analysis must always have as its primary focus adding
value to information regardless of its source. Moreover, much of the
critical information required by policy makers is deliberately with
held and protected by foreign governments or groups; thus there remains
a continuing requirement for covert access to such information sources.
This problem is compounded by the growing awareness of US intelligence
capabilities and resources by potential opponents and competitors.
Despite the end of the Cold War and the supposed openness of formerly
denied areas, we have witnessed growing sophistication in the worldwide
use of denial and deception to protect sensitive information. Foreign
governments and nongovernmental actors, such as drug cartels or
terrorists, are exploiting information protection technologies to deny
us access to critical information. I have concluded from this that the
tasks confronting intelligence are more complex and perhaps even more
difficult than ever before.
Finally, I believe that the benefits policy makers derive from
intelligence can be enhanced by a greater awareness of three key
factors.
o The first is accountability, that is, the direct link between the,
intelligence producer and his or her customers. Accountability
implies the creation and maintenance of a focused body of
expertise specifically dedicated to the requirements of policy
makers, with analyst incentive and rewards systems geared to
customer service and policy impact rather than quantity of
production.
o The second is reasonable access for policy makers to intelligence
information; that is, information which is both timely and
useable. The provision of intelligence support to policy makers
should mirror the policy functions, be designed to streamline the
support process, and eliminate organizational distinctions of
little importance to intelligence consumers. I am concerned that
the system of disseminating finished intelligence from centralized
intelligence organizations too often leaves analysts at these
agencies to only surmise how policy makers can benefit from their
work. I hope that the efforts of the Intelligence Community to
exploit new information technologies will facilitate access among
policy makers and intelligence analysts and accelerate the
dissemination of finished intelligence.
o Third is the importance of integration; that is, the incorporation
of intelligence throughout the decision making process. To this
end, for example, I have personally met with the leadership of
both the Central Intelligence and National Security Agencies to
encourage a shared understanding of the Department s intelligence
requirements and the capabilities of these Agencies to meet those
requirements. These Agencies have responded in admirable fashion;
the implementation of our policy priorities would be far less
successful without their support. Integration also includes
leveraging nonintelligence resources more effectively in the
analytical process. At the Department, for example, the National
Laboratories contribute not only their unique intelligence
perspectives, but can draw upon the greater laboratory population
for additional expertise. In this fashion, the labs are a force
multiplier ensuring the full extent of unique Departmental and
Laboratory expertise is brought to bear to support the policy
process.
The Department of Energy is certainly not alone in having its own
reservoir of unique technical expertise. For example, the Office of
Intelligence and Research, at the Department of State, draws upon
reporting by the diplomatic corps; Treasury benefits directly from
reports by its financial attaches and international monetary analysts;
and, the Commerce Department utilizes the National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
In short, I welcome Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch's
renewed emphasis on the joint operations of the various agencies. The
task before the Intelligence Community, it seems to me, is to provide a
high quality product, strip out obvious redundancies, while retaining
sufficient distributed capabilities to ensure that policy makers needs
are effectively served.
In closing, I hope some of these thoughts will prove useful to the
Committee as it pursues the best approach and structure for
intelligence support to policy makers. Again, thank you for this
opportunity to share my views on the future of intelligence
requirements and needs.
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