FY 1996 DOE BUDGET - FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION, 03/15/1995, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19950714
- Chairperson:
- J. Myers
- Committee:
- House Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- T95AM089
- Hearing Date:
- 19950315
- DOE Lead Office:
- NN
SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1996 DOE BUDGET - FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION
- Witness Name:
- G. Rudy
-
Hearing Text:
-
Statement of Gregory P. Rudy
Acting Director
Office of Fissile Material Disposition
U.S Department of Energy
FY 1996 Appropriations Hearing
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear
before you to discuss the Department of Energy's Fiscal Year 1996
budget request for Fissile Materials Disposition.
Today the community of nations faces an evolving nuclear danger that in
many ways is more onerous than the nuclear danger we all lived under
through the ears of the Cold War. During the Cold War the principal
nuclear danger was nuclear war between the superpowers. The danger was
clear, visible, and well characterized. The end of the Cold War has
brought the arms and nuclear materials production race to a close
between the superpowers and, as a result, significant quantities of
plutonium and highly enriched uranium have become surplus to defense
needs in both the U.S. and Russia. Continued implementation of arms
reduction agreements will result in further weapons dismantlements and
increases in surplus stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic and social
challenges faced by the newly forming democracies of its former states,
there is a serious risk of nuclear proliferation from these growing
stockpiles. Nuclear weapons or materials could fall into the hands of
terrorists or non-nuclear nations through theft or diversion of these
fissile materials in the former Soviet states. The National Academy of
Sciences report on the management and disposition of excess weapons
plutonium characterized this as a "clear and present danger". This
nuclear danger is in many ways more diffuse, harder to manage and more
dangerous than the nuclear tensions of the Cold War era.
In response to the growing threat of nuclear proliferation, the
Administration has established a comprehensive nonproliferation policy
and framework for action. Consistent with the President's
Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy of September 1993, the focus
of our nonproliferation efforts is five-fold: secure nuclear materials
in the former Soviet Union; assure safe, secure long-term storage
storage and disposition of surplus fissile materials; establish
transparent and irreversible nuclear reductions; strengthen the nuclear
nonproliferation regime; and control nuclear exports.
The Department Energy's national security programs and its national
laboratories are contributing unique scientific and technological
skills and facilities to support U.S. efforts within each of these
areas. We are applying our expertise in the development and
implementation of unproved systems for the control and disposition of
nuclear materials, in both a domestic and international context. The
very source of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials
development is also the center of the scientific and technological
effort to help contain and minimize the threat of nuclear
Proliferation. We have a clear understanding of the sense of urgency
for this mission, and we have the ability and resolve to accomplish it.
THE DEPARTMENT'S PROGRAM
FOR FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION
Within the Department of Energy, the Fissile Materials Disposition
Program directs the Department's technical and management efforts aimed
at providing for the safe, secure, environmentally sound long-term
storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of
weapons-usable fissile materials declared surplus to our national
defense needs. The Program's efforts include technical, schedule,
cost, and environmental analyses, as well as research and development
necessary to support and then implement long-term storage and
disposition decision. For Fiscal Year 1996, the budget request for
this Program is $70 million which will be discussed later in the
testimony. The sections which follow describe the current and planned
activities for the Department's Fissile Materials Disposition Program.
Last year, as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Department
helped provide analysis and support for deliberations within the
Council on the initial quantities of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium in the U.S. stockpile that could be declared surplus to
defense needs. On March 1st, to further demonstrate commitment to the
goals of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the President announced
that he has ordered that 200 tons of fissile material (plutonium and
highly enriched uranium) be permanently withdrawn from the U.S. nuclear
stockpile. This is in addition to the 10 tons of highly enriched
uranium made available last year for international safeguards at the
Oak Ridge, Y-12 facility. The Department's Fissile Materials
Disposition Program provides the technical and management focus to make
and implement decisions on the long-term storage disposition of the
directly weapons-usable fissile materials.
The Department's Fissile Material Disposition Program also provides the
lead technical support to the President's Interagency Working Group on
Plutonium Disposition. The Interagency Working Group coordinates the
U.S. Government's evaluation of options for the disposition of surplus
plutonium taking into account national and international security and
policy considerations. The Working Group is co-chaired by the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security
Council. In addition to the Department of Energy the working group
includes the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
the Office of Management and Budget. As directed by the President,
efforts of the Interagency Working Group include conducting joint
technical studies with Russia concerning disposition options for
surplus plutonium. The Department of Energy has the technical lead for
these joint U.S./Russian studies.
DEFINING THE PATH FORWARD
FOR LONG-TERM STORAGE & DISPOSITION
The Program's efforts are focused on completing the analyses and
research necessary to enable informed decision on long-term storage and
disposition of surplus fissile materials. The Program is completing
technical, schedule, and cost analyses and environmental analyses
consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act. The result of
the environmental analyses together with information from technical and
economic studies, national policy objectives, and public input will
form the basis for Record(s) of Decision regarding the long-term
storage os all weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of
weapons-usable fissile materials declared surplus to national defense
needs.
ANALYSES UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
In June of last year, the Department issued a Notice of Intent (NOI)
to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) on the
storage and disposition of fissile materials. As part of this effort,
the Department announced its intent to hold public meetings to assist
in determining the appropriate scope of the PEIS. These scoping efforts
included a series of public meetings which provided for substantive
dialogue, and direct public and industry involvement in the formulation
of the scope of the PEIS. In total, 12 scoping meetings were held
across the country between August and October of 1994. These scoping
meetings were attended by over 1,200 attendees and generated thousands.
of comments and suggestions regarding the proposed scope of the PEIS.
In addition, numerous written comments were received. Subsequent to
the formal scoping meetings, separate public meetings focusing on
plutonium disposition options and highly enriched uranium disposition
options were held. These meetings were likewise well attended by the
public and industry and served to advance the dialogue on fissile
materials storage and disposition.
STANDARDS FOR MANAGING THE RISKS OF SURPLUS FISSILE MATERIALS
At the beginning of the scoping process, the Department noted its
intent to use the National Academy of Sciences report, Management
and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, as the starting point for
evaluating the alternative for the long-term storage and disposition of
fissile materials. In its report, the Academy recommended standards
for managing the risks associated with surplus weapons plutonium. The
Department obtained public comment on the appropriateness of these
standards during its PEIS scoping efforts. The standards noted by the
National Academy of Sciences include:
The Stored Weapons Standard: The high standards of security and
accounting applied to storage of nuclear weapons should be
maintained for weapons-usable fissile materials throughout the
process of dismantlement, storage and disposition. The Academy
concluded that storage should not be extended indefinitely
because of nonproliferation risks and the negative impact that it
would have on arms reduction objectives.
The Spent Fuel Standard: Options for long-term disposition of
plutonium should seek to meet a "spent-fuel standard" in which the
plutonium is made as inaccessible for weapons use as the much
larger and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in spent
nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.
For world-wide context, slightly more than 100 metric tons of separated
plutonium we in commercial stockpiles today. Projections show that the
rate of use of this plutonium will catch up to the rate of separation.
at the earliest at the year 2000, with a peak accumulation of about 150
tons of separated plutonium remaining in commercial stockpiles.
Annually, approximately 70 metric tons of plutonium is produced in
world-wide commercial reactor operations. By the year 2000, a total of
approximately 1,390 metric tons of plutonium will have been produced in
the spent fuel of commercial reactors. This compares to an approximate
total of 100 metric tons of surplus plutonium in U.S. and Russian
weapons stockpiles. If all the surplus plutonium were converted to
spent fuel in reactors, it would contribute only a few percent to the
plutonium in spent fuel.
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REASONABLE LONG-TERM STORAGE & DISPOSITION
ALTERNATIVES
In the scoping and subsequent public meetings, the Department also
received input on proposed screening criteria for determining the
reasonable alternatives that should be further evaluated in the PEIS
for long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile
materials. The screening criteria for long-term storage and
disposition options are based on the policy objectives articulated in
the President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy of September
1993 and the January 1994 "Agreement between the United States and
Russia on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means
of Their Delivery" as well as the analytical framework established by
the National Academy of Sciences in their study on the disposition of
excess weapons plutonium. These criteria serve to address the growing
nuclear danger of surplus fissile materials in Russia in a manner that
also meets U.S. domestic and policy interests and provides visible
evidence of irreversible disarmament. A summarized listing of the
screening criteria follows (the order does not reflect relative
evaluation importance):
Resistance to Theft or Diversion by Unauthorized Parties: Each
step in the process must be capable of providing for comprehensive
protection and control of weapons-usable fissile materials.
Resistance to Retrieval, Extraction and Reuse by the Host Nation
(disposition only): The surplus material must be made highly
resistant to potential reuse in weapons to reduce the reliance on
institutional controls and demonstrate that arms reductions will
not be easily reversed.
Technical Viability: There should be a high degree of confidence
that a facility and site infrastructure can provide storage of
nuclear components and materials for at least 50 years; or in the
case of disposition, there should be a high degree of confidence
that the disposition alternative will be technically successful.
Environmental, Safety and Health (ES&H) Compliance: High
standards of public and worker health and safety, and
environmental protection must be met, and significant new burdens
should not be created.
Cost Effectiveness: The option should be accomplished in a
cost-effective manner.
Timeliness: Long-term storage should be implemented in a timely
manner, and for disposition the time that the materials remain in
weapons-usable form should be minimized.
Fostering Progress and Cooperation With Russia and Other
Countries: The options must establish appropriate standards for
the storage and/or disposition of international weapons-usable
material inventories, support negotiations for bilateral or multi-
lateral reductions in these materials, and allow for international
verification.
Public and Institutional Acceptance: An alternative should be
able to muster a broad and sustainable consensus.
Additional Benefit (disposition only): The ability to leverage
government investments for disposition of surplus materials to
contribute to other national or international initiatives should
be considered.
The formal PEIS scoping process and subsequent public meetings served
to inform the Department on the appropriateness of the spent fuel
standard and the screening criteria as a guide for further evaluations
and analyses of long-term storage and disposition options. This
scoping process also underscored the strong public support for starting
and completing the fissile materials disposition mission on an urgent
basis promptly.
DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
In the course of the PEIS public scoping process and through subsequent
meetings with the public and industry on highly enriched uranium (HEU)
disposition, the Department concluded that it would be more appropriate
to analyze the environmental impacts of the disposition of surplus
highly enriched uranium separate from the environmental analysis of
plutonium disposition options. Surplus highly enriched uranium can be
rendered non-weapons-usable by blending it down to low enriched
uranium. This is the most rapid path for neutralizing the
proliferation threat of surplus highly enriched uranium consistent with
the President's Nonproliferation Policy. This would also demonstrate
the United States nonproliferation commitment to other nations and is
consistent with the course of action initiated by the U.S. and now
underway in Russia to reduce their highly enriched uranium stockpiles.
The blending of HEU does not require further study or technology
development and many of the facilities needed to perform the required
blending operations already exist. Once blended down, some of this
surplus uranium could be used in commercial reactor fuel. Decisions on
surplus HEU disposition do not impact or preclude other decisions which
may be made regarding disposition of surplus plutonium. Thus, an
environmental analysis of this proposed course of action on HEU
disposition can be accomplished on an expedited basis.
The Department held a public meeting on November 10, 1994, to obtain
comments on the approach of preparing a separate environmental analysis
for disposition of surplus highly enriched uranium. While many views
were expressed in this meeting, there was substantial support for
proceeding with a separate environmental analysis of highly enriched
uranium disposition. We believe that an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) can be completed on a significantly shorter schedule than the
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. This EIS will evaluate
three alternatives for surplus highly enriched uranium disposition: (1)
continued storage as highly enriched uranium; (2) blend-down to low
enriched uranium for use in commerce reactors; and blend-down and
disposal as waste. Accordingly, the Department will soon issue a
formal notice of this process to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement on the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium. The
draft EIS will be published this summer with a final EIS and subsequent
Record of Decision following by early 1996.
TRANSFER OF SURPLUS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM TO THE UNITED STATES
ENRICHMENT CORPORATION
This EIS and subsequent Record of Decision will also address the
proposed transfer to the United of States Enrichment Corporation (USEC
of approximately 50 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and other
uranium materials which have been declared surplus to national defense
needs and can be blended together to yield commercially usable low
enriched uranium. When the United States Enrichment Corporation is
privatized through sale, receipts from the sale will accrue to the U.S.
Treasury. This will include an estimated $400 million from sale of the
surplus highly enriched uranium and other uranium. We will continue to
work with USEC and U.S. industry to develop cost effective and
innovative methods to disposition the surplus highly enriched uranium
in a safe, secure, environmentally sound manner. Successful efforts in
this regard will directly advance our nonproliferation objectives,
reduce stockpiles and associated safeguards and storage requirements,
and provide financial returns to the U.S. Treasury.
LONG-TERM STORAGE OF ALL FISSILE MATERIALS
AND DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS PLUTONIUM
The Department used the input received during the public scoping
meetings, technical analyses by the National Laboratories and
industry, and review within the Department and the Interagency Working
Group on Plutonium Disposition to assess five options for long term
storage of weapons-usable fissile materials and 37 options for the
disposition of surplus plutonium. As a result, the Department has
identified a range of reasonable long-term storage and surplus
plutonium disposition options for further evaluation in the PEIS.
A discussion of the range of options and the schedule for the PEIS
follows:
LONG-TERM STORAGE
Until final disposition cab be implemented, surplus fissile materials
must be stored in a safe, secure and environmentally sound manner which
also protects worker and public health. The PEIS will evaluate
environmental impact of alternatives for long-term storage of all
plutonium, highly enriched uranium required for national defense
purposes, and other weapons-usable fissile materials. This primarily
includes materials to be retained for the strategic stockpile, reserved
for naval nuclear propulsion, or retained for other programmatic needs,
as well as surplus quantities of plutonium. Alternatives being
assessed for long-term storage include: (1) continued storage in
existing facilities (no action alternative assessed under NEPA); (2)
upgrade of certain interim storage facilities; and (3) consolidation at
DOE site(s).
Under the upgrade alternative, certain existing interim storage
facilities would be brought into compliance with DOE standards for
nuclear material storage. Five candidate sites are being considered
for this upgrade alternative: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
Oak Ridge, Pantex, Hanford, and Savannah River. This alternative would
include the potential for some limited consolidation of weapons-usable
fissile materials at these sites to reduce the total number of sites
and overall costs associated with this storage. Under this
alternative, the Rocky Flats site would no longer be considered for
long-term storage of weapons-usable plutonium as it is presently being
phased-out of all nuclear work.
Under the consolidation alternative, one or more new storage
facility(s) would be constructed to store current and future DOE
weapons-usable fissile material inventories. Six candidate sites for
a new consolidated long-term storage facility are being considered.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge,
Pantex, Hanford, and Savannah River.
The PEIS analyses will provide the environmental information to support
a Record of Decision (ROD) on whether to upgrade existing storage
facilities or to build new, consolidated storage facilities for the
long-term storage of weapons-usable fissile materials. The PEIS will
also support a decision on the location of any new, consolidated
storage facilities. The subsequent decisions will also take into
account technical nonproliferation budgetary and economic
considerations as outlined in the President's Nonproliferation and
Export Control Policy. The Department's implementation of long-term
storage decisions will promptly follow its Record of Decision.
SURPLUS PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION
Technically viable and available alternatives which can achieve the
spent fuel standard are appropriate for further evaluation as surplus
plutonium disposition options under the environmental Impact Statement.
Since such options have a path forward for ultimate disposal along with
spent fuel from commercial nuclear power plants and defense high level
waste, options that achieve the spent fuel standard are adequate and
would not require additional steps or processes to increase the level
of proliferation resistance. Options which go beyond the spent fuel
standard, such as deep burn reactors and accelerators would require
increased costs and time, in order substantial additional research and
development with attendant to provide assurance of technical viability
and ultimate disposal.
Accordingly, from the 37 disposition options initially identified, 11
have been selected for further evaluation in the PEIS. All of these
plutonium disposition alternatives would have paths forward for
ultimate disposal, either in a high-level waste repository or in a deep
borehole. Five involve reactor options; for involve immobilization,
and two involve direct geologic disposal. In addition, under the
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and
Recycling, the Department is currently evaluating additional reactor
technologies for the new tritium production supply as well as for the
multi-purpose mission of producing tritium and disposing of plutonium.
A draft of the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium
Supply and Recycling was issued by the Department at the end of
February. The combination of environmental analysis in the tritium
PEIS along with technical, nonproliferation, budgetary and economic
analyses will form the basis for a decision on a multi-purpose reactor
as early as the end of this year. The decision on a multi-purpose
reactor will therefore be made by the Department in the context of its
Record of Decision on a new tritium supply source.
Subsequently, the environmental information from the PEIS on long-term
storage and disposition of plutonium as well as technical,
nonproliferation, budgetary and economic analyses will factor into a
Record of Decision on surplus plutonium disposition at the end of
1996. The Secretary of Energy, with interagency coordination, will
issue the Record of Decision. A decision to commence implementation
will be made in a broad domestic and international context, involve
other executive branch agencies, and will ultimately reside with the
President. The Department's technical efforts and analyses and its
Record of Decision will provide the essential foundation to effort the
President the credible basis and flexibility to initiate implementation
of disposition efforts either multilaterally or bilaterally through
negotiations, or unilaterally as an example to other nations. The
implementation of the decision will be carried out in a manner that
ensures that the surplus plutonium is subject to the highest standards
of safety, security, and international accountability.
PEIS SCHEDULE
Within the next several weeks, the Department will issue the
Implementation Plan (IP) for the PEIS for long-term storage of weapons-
usable fissile materials and disposition of surplus plutonium. The
implementation plan will identify those options which will continue to
be evaluated in the PEIS. A draft of the PEIS will be made available
for public comment by the end of this year. Subsequent to the release
of the draft PEIS, public meetings will be held and a final PEIS and
subsequent record of Decision will follow near the end of FY 1996.
I would now like to discuss other key Program efforts that are
contributing to this Nation's nonproliferation objectives and helping
to reduce the nuclear danger, followed by specific measures that we
will use to evaluate program performance during FY 1996.
OTHER KEY PROGRAM EFFORTS
PROJECT SAPPHIRE
Last November, then-secret Project Sapphire concluded with the arrival
of approximately 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the Ulba
Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan for safe storage at the Department's
Oak Ridge facility in Tennessee pending blend-down to low enriched
uranium. The basis for this bold action was established by the
President in his September 1993, Policy on Nonproliferation and Export
Control. Part of this policy calls for U.S. action to pursue the
purchase of HEU from the Former Soviet Union and other countries and
its conversion to peaceful use as reactor fuel.
Left over from the Soviet era, this cache of weapons-grade uranium in
Kazakhstan has been vulnerable to acquisition by parties who could use
it to build nuclear weapons. A 27 member team of Department experts,
with approximately 120 tons of equipment, flew to Kazakhstan in early
October to repackage the material for safe transport and secure storage
in the United States. The uranium was transported to the Y-12 facility
at Oak Ridge for interim storage until it is ready for conversion to
peaceful use as reactor fuel. This effort is a testimony to the
skills, courage and dedication of all the people involved.
The Department's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is
coordinating efforts with the United States Enrichment Corporation to
seek commercial bids to blend this material down to low enriched
uranium for use in commercial nuclear power plant fuel. A request for
proposals was issued on February 7 of this year and a bidders
conference was held at Oak Ridge on February 16. Bids for the
blend-down closed on March 10 and the winning bid will be selected
later this month. Prior to proceeding with disposition actions, and
Environmental Assessment will be completed to confirm that there are no
significant environmental impacts.
PROGRESS IN JOINT TECHNICAL STUDIES WITH RUSSIA ON THE DISPOSITION OF
SURPLUS PLUTONIUM
In their January 1994, Summit in Moscow, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
agreed to task their experts to study jointly options for the long-term
disposition of plutonium, taking into account the issues of
nonproliferation, environmental protection, safety, and technical and
economic factors. Under the leadership of the Interagency Working
Group on Plutonium Disposition, an initial meeting was held in Moscow
on May 1994 to establish the framework for this effort. The Department
of Energy, supported by its National Laboratories, have assumed the
lead technical role in supporting this joint effort.
At the end of January of this year specialists from the U.S. and
Russia met at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for a three day
exchange of technical presentations on scientific research that has
been conducted on possible plutonium disposition alternatives and on
promising prospective investigations. During this meeting the U.S. and
Russian sides reviewed the standards and decision criteria for
plutonium disposition. Both sides agreed to conduct joint work to
develop consistent comparisons of various alternatives for the
disposition of plutonium, taking into account the factors noted in the
Summit statement of the two Presidents. The sides agreed that their
joint activities include a series of technical visits to occur in the
course of the technical group's work. A visit to the TA-55 plutonium
handling facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory occurred on January
25 as the first of these planned exchanges. This initial exchange
provided the opportunity to share with Russian technical counterparts,
advanced practices and procedures for plutonium handling. The meeting
and facility visit also served to help strengthen the growing spirit of
trust between our nations. The joint technical studies will continue
into FY 1996 and help maintain productive dialogue with Russia on
plutonium disposition alternatives.
MEASURING PERFORMANCE IN FY 1996
The focus of our fissile materials disposition efforts in FY 1996
remains centered on advancing U.S. nonproliferation objectives. In
FY 1996, we will measure our performance by the thoroughness and timely
completion of the technical, cost and schedule analyses and the
Program's NEPA analyses on long-term storage and disposition of fissile
materials. The Department will complete the EIS on disposition of
surplus highly enriched uranium and the PEIS on long-term storage and
disposition of other weapons-usable fissile materials and issue records
of decision. We will initiate the technical and design work necessary
to implement decisions on both long-term storage and disposition.
Additional performance measures include the establishment of a working
dialogue and completion of joint technical studies with Russia on
fissile materials disposition options.
We will also gauge our performance by the quantities of surplus highly
enriched uranium that will be in the process of conversion to peaceful
use as reactor fuel and we will work with USEC and U.S. industry
regarding alternative to blend down the highly enriched uranium
proposed to be transferred to the Corporation in FY 1996. In this
regard, our efforts in FY 1996 can also provide measurable returns to
the taxpayer on the funds being invested in this program. When the
United States Enrichment Corporation is through sale, the U.S. Treasury
will receive the receipts of the proposed sale which would include an
estimated $400 millon from the surplus highly enriched uranium and
other uranium which the Department proposes to transfer to USEC. In the
end, our efforts to dispose of the surplus materials and provide for
its efficient and environmentally sound long-term storage will result
in savings from reduced safeguards and security costs and improved
environment, safety and health performance.
We appreciate your past and continuing support of these important
efforts. The balance of my statement covers the Fissile Materials
Disposition Program's budget request in more detail.
FISCAL YEAR 1996 BUDGET REQUEST
The Fiscal Year 1996 budget request for the Fissile Materials
Disposition Program (MD) totals $70.0 million in new spending authority
as reflected in the following table.
FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION
FY 1996 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)
FY 1996
PROGRAM ACTIVITY REQUEST
LONG-TERM STORAGE OPTIONS 10.9
DISPOSITION OPTIONS 21.7
TECHNICAL INTEGRATION, SUPPORT
& ASSOCIATED TECHNOLOGIES 19.7
NEPA COMPLIANCE 9.0
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 6.7
PANTEX SAFETY STUDIES 2.0
TOTAL $70.0
LONG-TERM STORAGE OPTIONS
Work on the evaluation of long-term storage options for weapons-usable
fissile materials includes the preparation and evaluation of facility
designs for long-term storage of plutonium, highly-enriched uranium and
U 233 in order to meet the stored weapons standard for these materials
and to fully comply with environment, safety and health standards. The
stored weapons standard would maintain the high standards of security
and accounting applied to the storage of nuclear weapons for
weapons-usable fissile materials throughout the process of
dismantlement, storage and disposition.
Alternatives being assessed for long-term storage include: (1) no
action (a baseline condition assessed under NEPA); (2) upgrade
of certain interim storage facilities; and (3) consolidation at DOE
site(s). The results of the environmental analysis in the Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement combined with information from technical
and economic studies and national policy objectives will form the basis
for a Record of Decision in 1996 regarding which long term storage and
disposition options the Department will employ.
The FY 1996 funding request for long-term storage options is $10.9
million of operating expenses to begin the conceptual design activities
for upgraded and new plutonium and uranium storage options selected in
the Record of Decision. Included within this amount is $0.6 minion to
continue to analyze and study the long-term storage of other fissile
materials.
DISPOSITION OPTIONS
The alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium and certain
other surplus weapons-usable fissile materials are focussed on meeting
the meeting the spent fuel standard. The spent fuel standard involves
making the surplus fissile material as difficult to retrieve and use as
the residual plutonium in spent nuclear fuel from commercial power
reactors. Surplus weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) can be
made non-weapons usable by blending it down with natural or other
assays of uranium into low enriched uranium. If this material were to
be used as a reactor fuel, it could also result in economic benefits
and could help offset the costs associated with implementing this
alternative. The FY 1996 efforts will result in completion of the
technical cost, and schedule analyses of candidate disposition options.
The overall funding request for disposition activities in FY 1996 is
$21.7 million. Of this amount, $21.2 million is for operating expenses
and $0.5 million is for capital equipment to support disposition
research and development. The increased funds are required to complete
the technical, economic, engineering, cost and schedule, and
environmental studies and documents to support the Programmatic
Environmental impact Statement and Record of Decision and to continue
research and development of immobilization technologies. Other
activities being funded in FY 1996 include completing the development
of reference nuclear fuel fabrication processes for nuclear reactor
options and beginning research and development and engineering and
design activities for disposition technologies selected in the ROD.
Included within this amount is $5.5 million to fund continuation of
technical and industrial support to enable the blending of highly
enriched uranium and its conversion to peaceful use as reactor fuel and
$0.8 million to continue detailed systems planning for other surplus
fissile materials disposition options.
TECHNICAL INTEGRATION, SUPPORT & ASSOCIATED TECHNOLOGIES
This work encompasses technical project coordination and oversight,
technical analyses, modeling, systems engineering, support of the
public outreach activities, agency/interagency coordination, and
project control. A major portion of this work includes studies,
analyses, research and development of technologies common to and
supportive of all storage and disposition options, including plutonium
stabilization, and pit disassembly and plutonium conversion. This
effort also supports the decision criteria and analysis process and the
systems analysis necessary to accomplish the evaluation of options and
subsequent Record of Decision.
In FY 1996, $19.7 million in operating expenses is being requested for
Technical Integration, Support & Integrated Technologies activities.
Within this amount, $2.9 million is requested to complete all necessary
systems analysis, decision analysis, records and documentation to
support the Record of Decision scheduled for late summer of 1996; to
continue tracking research and analyses to ensure that technical goals
and milestones are being completed without redundancy, and to provide
implementation support for post-ROD activities. In addition, $5.0
million is requested within this amount to continue the coordination,
integration and oversight of technical implementation activities being
performed by participating DOE laboratories, sites and contractors.
This also includes selected conceptual design efforts and $11.8 million
to complete studies, research, development, and testing on pit
disassembly and plutonium conversion as well as engineering evaluation
for crosscutting technical areas such as safeguards and security,
transportation & containers, automation $ robotics, and pit
disassembly and plutonium conversion.
NEPA COMPLIANCE
We will complete an EIS on the disposition of surplus highly enriched
uranium and a PEIS on long-term storage and disposition of other
weapons-usable fissile materials and issue records of decision. The
purpose of this NEPA evaluation is to support a Record of Decision on
whether to upgrade existing storage facilities or to build new
consolidated storage facilities for the long-term storage of weapons-
usable fissile materials. The evaluation will also support a decision
on the location of any new, consolidated storage facilities.
Implementation of these long-term storage decisions will promptly
follow the Record of Decision.
This NEPA evaluation will also support a Record of Decision on
the technologies which will be used for the disposition of surplus
weapons-usable fissile materials. A decision to commence
implementation of surplus plutonium disposition will be made in a broad
domestic and international context, involve other executive branch
agencies, and will ultimately reside with the President. The
Department's technical efforts and analyses and its Record of Decision
will provide the essential foundation to afford the President the
credible basis to enter into negotiations on bilateral or multilateral
reductions in surplus weapons-usable fissile material inventories, or
to implement disposition options unilaterally as an example to other
nations.
The analyses and subsequent decisions will be based on the President's
Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy of September 1993 and the
January 1994 agreement between the United States and Russia on
Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their
Delivery. The analyses will take into account technical
nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary and economic considerations.
The Records of Decision will be implemented in a manner that ensures
that these fissile materials are subject to the highest standards of
safety, security and international accountability.
The FY 1996 request of $9.0 million in operating expenses for NEPA
Compliance will enable the Program to complete and issue the draft and
final PEIS and issue the Record of Decision for storage and disposition
of weapons-usable fissile materials; prepare and issue the
environmental impact statement for the disposition of highly enriched
uranium and prepare other NEPA analyses as appropriate.
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Program Management & Integration provides funds for the following
activity groupings: 1) Program Direction (Federal salaries, benefits,
and travel), 2) External Relations (public outreach and education
activities), 3) Program Control & Administration (Program cost &
schedule control, budget activities, and administrative support), 4)
interface with the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and
industry for disposition of highly enriched uranium, and 5) Lead for
Departmental support to the Interagency Working Group (IWG) and
technical task lead for the joint plutonium disposition study with
Russian technical experts.
Prior to Congressional action in FY 1995 to create a line-item
organization to address fissile materials disposition, line
organizations budgeted for FTE's i.e., salaries and benefits, in their
respective budget request. Beginning in FY 1996, the budget request
contains a total of $6.7 million in operating expenses for Program
Management activities to support 30 program FTE's, continue public
participation and outreach efforts to be able to disseminate program
information and to carry on technical/administrative and analytical
support services at the FY 1995 level.
PANTEX SAFETY STUDIES
The Plutonium Resource Center (PRC) in Amarillo, Texas will provide
scientific and technical information on issues relating to the storage,
disposition and potential utilization, and transportation of high
explosives and other non-nuclear hazardous materials generated from
weapons assembly and disassembly operations.
In FY 1996, a total of $10 million in operating expenses is being
requested for the Plutonium Resource Center. Of this amount, $2.0
million will be used for safety studies described above and the balance
of funds ($8.0 million) is integrated throughout the budget for
activities related to fissile materials storage and disposition.
CONCLUSION
Nonproliferation and reducing the global nuclear danger are among the
Administrations highest priorities. The nuclear danger today is in
many ways. more onerous and harder to manage than the nuclear danger
that existed during the Cold War. Growing stockpiles of weapons-usable
fissile materials and the economic and social challenges faced by the
evolving democracies of the former States of the Soviet Union have
greatly increased the risk of proliferation. The manner and
effectiveness with which we deal with these concerns is clearly one of
the key challenges of our time and the outcome will likely be the
basis on which history judges our contributions to world peace and
security.
The unique scientific and technical skills of the Department and its
national laboratories are being brought to bear to deliver measurable
results and a foundation for lasting progress in the safe, secure and
environmentally sound long-term storage and disposition of weapons-
usable fissile materials. The efforts of the Department's Fissile
Materials Disposition Program and other nonproliferation programs will
directly contribute to advancing U.S. and international
nonproliferation interest and to improving the cost-effectiveness of
the Department's management of stockpiles of surplus fissile materials.
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