Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to again thank Senator Stevens for his leadership role in bringing together a group of Senators who wanted to put the finishing touches on the declarations here and to do that in a very short period of ti me. I appreciate his leadership in bringing the group together and getting this job done so that we could begin the discussion of the treaty now prior to the end of the year.

Mr. President, let me begin by asking unanimous consent to have printed in the Record several items which pertain to the matters which I will be discussing relative to the START II Treaty.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record as follows:

Baseline START I Force

For purpose of amendment No. 2

ICBM:

Minuteman III

500

Peacekeeper

50

Total

550

Submarines:

Trident I

8

Trident II

10

Total

18

Bombers:

B-52H

66

B-1B

96

B-2

20

Total

182

1. Decontrol upon receipt--sensitive but unclassified--protect accordingly.

2. Summary: The Embassy recently acquired an internal state Duma study of the START-2 treaty that recommends ratification certain important amendments (copy being faxed to EUR/RUS). The amendments are designed to correct what the authors see as imbalan ces in the treaty in favor of the United States. The report recommends that the Duma ratify the treaty while stressing the link between strategic weapons reduction and observance of the ABM treaty. It also recommends amending the treaty to:

Permit each side to keep Mirved ICBM's with four warheads or less, rather than banning Mirved ICBM's altogether;

Provide for the controlled liquidation of warheads removed from Mirved ICBM's and SLBM's as part of the process of meeting treaty-mandates levels of weaponry;

Require liquidation of old launch platforms and their replacement with platforms designed specifically to bear fewer warheads;

In order to reduce the cost of reconfiguring the land-based leg of Russia's deterrent, permit utilization of 154 launch silos built for heavy ICBM's to house single-warhead missiles;

Delete the requirement to fill with concrete such ICBM launch silos;

Permit redefinition of all 170 RS-18 missiles as single-warhead missiles;

Push back the implementation deadline for START-2 by 2-3 years.

START-2 AND THE ABM TREATY

3. The Duma study, written by the parliament's analytical center before the July START-2 hearings, strongly attacks U.S. plans to develop limited anti-missile defense systems. It states that, `In Reality, deployment of such a limited ABM system, coupled with radical cuts in strategic nuclear forces, is no less destabilizing a factor than constructing a full-scale ABM system. Since a limited ABM system requires establishing a full infrastructure (Information Systems, Communications, and Military Command), it can grow very quickly to a size at which a retaliatory strike by our strategic nuclear forces could be neutralized.' Thus, the report concludes, it is essential for the duma to lay down an unbreakable link between strategic force reductions a nd observance of the 1972 ABM treaty.

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ABM RECOMMENDATIONS

4. Thus, the study recommends that, `When ratifying the START-2 treaty, the state duma of the Russian Federation should declare that the `exceptional circumstances' mentioned in paragraph 4, article VI of the treaty include as well circumstances arisin g in connection with one of the parties ceasing to observe the 1972 ABM treaty, or its substantial violation.' The report goes yet further, and also recommends that, `Attainment of a coordination and officially confirmed agreement on demarcation of strate gic and `nonstrategic' ABM systems should precede ratification of START-2.' The report states that such an agreement on the demarcation issue must include `precise quantitative limitations on deployment of `nonstrategic'ABM systems.

MIRVED ICBM'S

5. The report notes that the current text of the START-2 treaty calls for total elimination of MIRVed ICBM's. It calls this provision unacceptable, because it is contrary to Russia's National Security interests and favorable to the interests of the U.S . The study's authors note that 50 percent of Russia's strategic forces consist of land-based MIRVed ICBM's They recommend that the treaty be amended to ban only MIRVed ICM's with more than 4 warheads

6. The authors admit that the effective life of Russia's SS-18 and SS-24 missiles will run out in 10-15 years, and that production of more such missiles will be next to impossible, since the facilities for doing so are in Ukraine. Russia cannot today afford to build a comparable defense industrial infrastructure for producing new SS-18's and SS-24's on its own soil, they note. However, they call for developing a new, Mirved sea-based missile that could also be deployed on land. In the future, they believe, Russia will need to maintain a proper balance between Mirved and single-warhead ICBM's in both its strategic rocket forces and fleet.

ELIMININATING LAUNCH PLATFORMS AND WARHEADS

7. The Dama study states that START-2 would permit the U.S. to maintain essentially intact a large number of launch platforms for nuclear weapons that, while formally speaking no longer used for nuclear purposes, could in a `Crisis Situation' be rapidl y refitted with nuclear warheads. The report charges that, under the treaty, `the U.S. would assure itself of a favorable regime for reducing nuclear weapons that would not require liquidation of the carriers of nuclear weaponry, except for 50 MX ICBMs an d part of its older B-52 heavy bombers.' Russia, on the other hand, would have to undertake an expensive reconfiguration of much of its strategic forces. It adds: `The START-2 Treaty allows the possibility of rapidly deploying the nuclear potential of the U.S. in all components of the Strategic Nuclear triad.'

8. The study asserts that the U.S. would quickly be able to redeploy previously removed nuclear warheads on still extant Minuteman-3 and Trident-2 missiles in a crisis. Similarly, nuclear weapons could be quickly reloaded onto B-LB bombers, since `START-2 does not require them to be refitted in order to be re-oriented toward non-nuclear tasks.' `After realization of START-2 the U.S. will have the possibility in a crisis situation of operationally increasing its nuclear potential by more than 4000 nuclear warheads. Russia cannot compensate such an increase.' Hence, the report's authors recommend amending the START-2 Treaty to require liquidation of warheads removed from M irved ICBM's and SLBM's as part of the process of meeting treaty-mandates levels of weaponry. They also call for altering START-2 to require liquidation of old launch platforms and their replacement with platforms designed specifically to bear fewer warhe ads.

REDUCING THE FINANCIAL COST OF IMPLEMENTATION TO RUSSIA

9. The Study charges that START-2 essentially favors the U.S., permitting it to reduce its nuclear forces in the most economical way, while imposing an unacceptably high burden on Russia. It calls treaty provisions permitting Russia to re-fit 90 launch silos for heavy ICBM's and re-utilize them for single-warhead missiles insufficient. Its answer is to call for amending the treaty to permit Russia to re-use 154 launch silos built for heavy ICBM's to house single-warhead missiles, to delet e the requirement to fill with concrete such ICBM launch silos, and to permit redefinition of all 170 RS-18 missiles as single-warhead missiles.

DELAYING TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

10. Finally, the study's authors also call for delaying implementation of the START-2 treaty by 2-3 years. The report argues that, since the seven-year implementation period for START-1 will end in 2001, only one year will remain for completing impleme ntation of START-2. This is not enough time, and so, when ratifying START-2. This is not enough time, and so, when ratifying START-2, the Duma should `extend' the implementation period by 2-3 years, in order to avoid `significant financial and production difficulty.'

COMMENT

11. This study was prepared as a guide for Duma deputies by the Duma's Analytical Center, and thus reflects the views of the Duma's in-house defense and security analysts. While pro-ratification in principle, they are clearly eager to see changes in th e treaty that would substantially alter its character in ways that appear to be unacceptable from the standpoint of U.S. policy. In the first round of START hearings in July, deputies did not raise the kind of fundamental amendments addressed in this pape r, though they did stress the link between START-2 and the ABM Treaty. The upcoming second round of hearings will show whether many deputies agree with the views outlined in the START study, and, indeed, whether the Duma is willing to ratify START-2 in an y form before the December parliamentary elections.

12. The START study also indicates that Russian Government analysts are thinking carefully about how to restructure the country's nuclear deterrent to adapt to the Government's current straitened economic circumstances while maintaining the force's eff ectiveness. If this study is any indication, at least some analysts are envisaging a Russian deterrent that would still contain significant numbers of Mirved ICBM, both land-based and at sea--in contradiction of what START-2 calls for.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, in considering whether the United States should ratify the START II Treaty, I believe it is critical that the terms of the treaty be reviewed in the context of the national deterrent strategy of the United States.

Further, it is important to recall why this treaty came about and how it was intended to complement the strategic posture of the United States.

The treaty, in other words, Mr. President, is based on assumptions. If these assumptions change, we have to reassess our position with respect to the treaty. What are some of these assumptions? First, the Bush legacy, how the treaty came into being. As the Soviet communism and the Warsaw Pact were collapsing, President Bush moved to establish a new framework for U.S. strategic forces, and it had two key elements. First involved a restructuring and downsizing of U.S. offensive nuclear forces and operati ons. This was the precursor for START II.

Second, it involved refocusing the strategic defense initiative from the previous Reagan administration to provide protection against ballistic missile attacks on the United States, our troops deployed abroad, and United States allies, and an offer to work cooperatively with Russia and the allies in developing and fielding such defenses.

President Bush's commitment to a new strategic framework based on fewer but still potent nuclear forces and the development and deployment of effective ballistic missile defenses was perhaps best highlighted during June 1992 when he and Presiden t Yeltsin had their famous summit. At that meeting, the two Presidents reached an agreement on the outlines of the START II agreement which committed both sides to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads, significantly below the fo rce levels permitted by START I. Importantly, they also agreed to explore creation of a global ballistic missile defense system and to cooperate in the development of missile defense technologies.

The administration's framework rightly retained a strong commitment to ensuring nuclear deterrence and supporting infrastructure over the long term. President Bush and his advisors correctly believed that nuclear weapons should retain a legitimate, alb eit more limited, role in U.S. national security policy. They also recognized that efforts to delegitimize or to eliminate nuclear weapons could have the paradoxical effect of increasing national instability and the likelihood of conflict.

Finally, they prudently believed that given the possibility of reversal of reform in Russia, the United States should retain a healthy nuclear capability as a residual deterrent.

In sum, President Bush and his advisers understood that there was simply too much uncertainty in the international arena to justify eliminating what was a central element of U.S. national security policy.

Likewise, President Bush's support for a more prominent role for ballistic missile defenses in the United States and allied security policy was correctly seen as a means of bolstering, not replacing, nuclear deterrence at reduced strategic offen sive force levels. Such defenses also could protect our allies and forward-deployed United States troops from threat posed by short and medium-ranged missiles and provide substantial population defense in the event of an accidental, unauthorized or limited attack on the American homeland from Russia or any other country.

From that foundation, we come to the Clinton administration. This administration has essentially rejected the Bush framework and instead has embraced what I believe is a dangerous and ill-conceived policy of proactive denuclearization. The administrati on has taken steps to lock in perhaps for decades to come America's vulnerability to missile attack and has used the arms control process to impede development and deployment of effective defenses against short and medium-ranged missiles and has used the arms control process to impede development and deployment of effective defenses against short- and medium-ranged missiles.

The Clinton administration's antinuclear sentiments are perhaps best illustrated by reviewing the declining health of the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure. America's core nuclear competency is made up primarily of skilled and motivated people, moder n facilities, adequate funding, and continued nuclear testing.

I would like to discuss each of these briefly. The concept, Mr. President, is this: When we draw our forces down from a very large component of nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems to a much more modest one under START I, and an even mo re modest level under START II, we have to be in a position to guarantee that what we are left with will work for the purpose for which it is intended, to deter anyone from a nuclear attack. That is why it is necessary to ensure that our infrastructure is not eroded or dismantled.

I mentioned that the first critical element of this group are the people themselves. The critical skill base, or the expertise of individuals at the weapons laboratories, is rapidly eroding and poses an immediate problem, Mr. President.

As noted in a recent Congressional Research Service report:

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The experience gained from testing is irreplaceable, and aspects of it may be lost unless it is passed on to the next generation. Yet demographic data . . . indicate that skill base is eroding rapidly. The weapons program is losing skills as many exper ienced scientists retire and few new ones are hired. As a result, gaps in the skill base are opening that have adverse consequences for stewardship.

This means the stewardship of our nuclear stockpile.

The weapons programs face further strain from a budget that is shrinking no end in sight and from a growth in mandated non-programmed risks.

The CRS report further notes that a majority of weapons designers will be facing retirement within the next 10 to 15 years and that the labs have already lost certain experimental capabilities, and in other areas the labs are only one person deep.

The next critical element of our U.S. nuclear infrastructure are the facilities. Currently the United States has no capacity to produce tritium, a critical gaseous element not only for our new nuclear warheads but also for replenishment of the active i nventory.

In sum, Mr. President, our weapons do not work without tritium, which decays at such a rapid rate that it must constantly be reinterjected into the weapons.

Energy Secretary O'Leary has twice delayed a decision to select a new production reactor technology as a replacement for the K reactor at Savannah River, SC. The Department of Defense now indicates that a decision on the selected technology for a futur e tritium production capability will be made soon. But given the numerous delays by the Department of Defense, I hope you will forgive my skepticism.

For all practical purposes, the United States has lost its capacity to produce critical plutonium components, including the vital pits of our nuclear warheads. And yet the Department of Defense has not decided on where such a production facility will b e located.

Meanwhile, the Pantex facility in Texas is so overloaded with the task of dismantling warheads for disposal that it risks not being able to conduct a rigorous program of stockpile surveillance.

The next component for a robust stockpile, Mr. President, is nuclear testing. The Clinton administration continues to embrace a nuclear testing moratorium and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as central to its arms control policy.

Contrary to President Clinton's beliefs, I believe that a moratorium, a continued moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing will do nothing to aid in the fight against proliferation. Extension of the NPT matters little to the pariah nations that are or at lea st should be the primary object of our nuclear proliferation efforts. And with these states, U.S. nuclear testing has no bearing on their nuclear ambitions and programs.

In fact, Mr. President, Charles Krauthammer captured the essence of this point in a Washington Post op-ed of July 16, 1993, of which he said:

There is something lunatic about saying that if we devalue and degrade our arsenal, nukes will then have less value for the North Koreas of the world. On the contrary. . . . The future nuclear weapons reliably held by the great powers, the greater the premium--the power--conferred upon the have-not who acquires them.

At the same time, Mr. President, nuclear testing is needed to assure the long-term safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, and with it our ability to deter Russian nuclear aggression and to convince our allies, such as Germany and Japan, that ab staining from the acquisition of nuclear weapons makes sense as well. Even though U.S. nuclear weapons are at present safe and reliable, it is only through the continued explosive testing that the United States will be able to monitor and improve the stoc kpile safety and reliability well into the future.

I talked before, Mr. President, about U.S. missile defense plans. And as I said, all of the premises of the START II Treaty are important to understanding why the START II Treaty is believed to be advantageous, but in the event these assumptions change, our position would obviously have to be reassessed.

To the issue of a combination of offense and defense, which was contemplated by the Bush administration at the time that the treaty was signed, I would note that following the Persian Gulf war, which certainly focused attention on the proliferation of missile defenses and weapons of mass destruction, the Congress passed the Missile Defense Act of 1991 to continue this movement toward the development of a robust missile defense system in the United States.

The act urged accelerated deployment of effective theater missile defense capability. Perhaps more importantly, it served as a sign of intent that the Congress was prepared to adequately fund and support a robust U.S. missile defense capa bility, both the theater missile system and a national missile defense.

But the consensus was short lived. One of the first casualties of President Clinton's quest to cut defense spending in order to pay for costly social programs was the budget for ballistic missile defenses. The DOD Bottom-Up Review of 1993 cut th e fiscal year 1994 to 1999 5-year budget for the Strategic Defense Initiative by approximately 60 percent from $41 billion to $18 billion. Hit hardest by this cut was the National Missile Defense Account. DOD not only rejected the option to deploy a defense of the American homeland, but also rejected even a robust research and development effort.

The Clinton administration has also used arms control to further erode the U.S. ability to effectively deploy TMD and NMD systems. Since November 1993, the administration has been engaged in negotiations with Russia and other states of the former Sovie t Union in an effort to demarcate the line between permitted TMD systems and those activities and systems that are banned under the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty.

In those talks, the United States has taken the following positions: First, we are no longer seeking to amend the ABM Treaty to allow multiple ground-based ABM sites in the United States, nor is the United States continuing to propose that the treaty b e amended to allow space-based interceptors; for example, the so-called Brilliant Eyes program, to perform direct battle management functions or otherwise substitute for ABM radars. This is despite the fact that the space-based system offers unique capabi lities for sensing and intercepting missile threats that ground-based systems simply do not have.

As described above, the United States needs to begin fielding a national missile defense system now in order to be able to have it in place by the time the new threat is deployed.

Second, the administration has agreed to multilateralize the ABM Treaty and accept as treaty partners any of the former 10 Soviet states who want to be secessionites. And this means that all former Soviet Union states will be required to approve any ch anges to the treaty. So the administration approach will make it much more difficult for any future administration modifying the treaty, for example, to permit multiple ground-based ABM sites or space-based interceptors since, of course, these modificatio ns must be blessed, not only by Russia, but also several other former republics of the Soviet Union.

Third, in November 1993, the administration proposed a standard for determining compliance of TMD systems with the ABM Treaty based on the demonstrated capability of such systems. More recently, however, the administration has accepted specific design/ performance limitations on TMD systems and is considering numerical and deployment-area limitations on such systems as well.

The limitations now under discussion are more restrictive than the ABM system limitations already in the treaty. If accepted, such new limitations would effectively transform the ABM Treaty into a Theater Missile Defense/ABM Treaty and would pre clude the United States from deploying one or more promising concepts for countering the growing threat posed by theater missiles.

I have reference to the Navy Upper Tier program. Despite five letters from Senate Republicans and clear language from the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House National Security Committee, the administration has kept up its assault on theater < B>ballistic missile defenses.

A clearly stated objective of the Nuclear Posture Review, which was publicly released by the administration on September 22, 1994, was to provide planning stability for the U.S. strategic forces between now and the year 2003, the year that START II is to be fully implemented.

This raises the next important point with regard to the assumptions underlying the START II treaty, Mr. President, because, of course, the Nuclear Posture Review is the document which determines the number and nature of our nuclear warheads and the tar gets to which they would be assigned.

The administration in this review embraced a force structure of 66 nuclear-capable B-52H bombers, down from previously 94; 450 to 500 ICBM's--currently the number is 550--and 14 missile-carrying Trident submarines, down from 18, all to be backfi tted with the D-5 missile.

This force structure was linked to the so-called `hedge strategy' designed to take into account the possibility of a reversal of reforms in Russia and the much slower paced nuclear drawdown there. But no sooner had the Defense Department released the r esults of the nuclear posture review, the President moved to overturn it. Just 5 days after the NPR was released, President Clinton stated his willingness to begin discussions with Russia on a possible START III agreement to reduce strategic forces below the 3,500 weapons permitted by START II and to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from combat status.

The President's declarations served to undermine whatever hoped-for planning stability associated with U.S. strategic forces existed as a result of the NPR. Since 1988, U.S. strategic nuclear forces have been reduced by approximately 50 percent and U.S . nonstrategic nuclear forces by approximately 90 percent.

Furthermore, the annual budget for strategic forces has been reduced from roughly $50 billion per year at the height of the cold war to below $13 billion today, and the United States has no new strategic systems under development.

By contrast, Russia continues to modernize its strategic arsenal. The Russian program involves the development for deployment of two new ICBM's, one new SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile, and continuation of deep underground bunkers for control and command and leadership survivor. This seems to indicate, despite severe economic difficulties, Russia intends to modernize down to lower force levels.

In addition, Russia's new doctrine places much greater emphasis on retaliation against conventional attacks on targets in Russia. That brings us to where we are today in consideration of the START II treaty.

START II on January 3, 1993, President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the treaty. START II builds on the START I treaty which reduces strategic offensive arsenals on both sides by about one-third and which focuses on the convers ion and destruction of missile launchers--bombers, silos, submarine launchers--rather than the missiles and the warheads.

START II reduces both countries' nuclear arsenal to about 3,300 warheads for the United States and about 3,000 for Russia. The treaty requires Russia to eliminate all MIRV'd missiles. These are the missiles that have more than one warhead on top of them and present a special threat launched by either side. But it does allow the country to download 105 of the six-warhead SS-19's to a single warhead each, and to make 90 SS-18 silos inoperable by partly filling them with concrete, but it all ows Russia to house the less powerful SS-25 missile in the converted silo.

In addition, the treaty allows Russia to inspect, for the first time, the bomb-bays of the B-2, the U.S. bomber, to ensure that the warhead limits are adhered to. It actually also counts the warheads on the B-1 bomber cruise missiles, and it ens ures that 100 U.S. bombers have been reassigned to conventional use.

START II requires the United States to scrap or modify its 50 MX missiles, which have 10 warheads each, and to cut by about one-half the number of warheads on its submarine-launched missiles from 3,456 to 1,728.

START II is to be implemented in two phases: the first is to be completed within 7 years of ratification and the second by the year 2003. When reductions are complete, the U.S. level will return to those of the 1960's and the Russian levels to those of the 1970's.

Mr. President, I want to make it very clear that while I believe the START II treaty is fair and is advantageous to the United States, it is only in the interest of the United States if certain key provisions of the treaty are not changed or are not we akened in any way.

I do not think it is too much to expect those in the Senate who ratify this treaty, who support ratification, to expect that the treaty will be adhered to by both sides and will not be changed or weakened in any way. I know that some in the defense com munity have real concerns with provisions of the treaty. The Washington-based Center for Security Policy, for example, has listed the following provisions as particularly troublesome:

First, the right on the part of the Russians to retain the SS-18 silos. As I said, the START II treaty will not eliminate the infrastructure associated with this most dangerous of the former Soviet Union MIRV'd missile, SS-18 heavy ICBM's. Inste ad, it allows Moscow to retain 90 of the SS-18 silos and associated launch facilities and support complexes. As the United States has no idea how many SS-18 missiles the Russians actually have in their inventory, even the monitored destruction of ` declared' heavy ICBM's could leave Moscow in a position to utilize these silos in the future to launch SS-18's. So this is a matter of some concern.

The right to retain the SS-19's: Under START II, Moscow may retain as many as 105 deployed SS-19's as long as these missiles are `downloaded,' a process by which five of the six warheads are removed. Unfortunately, as long as the Russians retain replacement warheads, it can, with little fear of U.S. detection, rapidly reverse the downloading process. In this manner, the Russians can retain a militarily significant breakout capability. This is an obvious concern. Since there are no limits on eith er START I or START II on the number of `nondeployed' SS-19's, the Russians may be able to keep as many of these missiles, even in a fully loaded status, as they wish.

As I said before, the United States agreed to onsite inspections of the B-2. The effect of this provision, though considered necessary for the agreement of the treaty, will be to degrade the deterrent value of this air-breathing leg of the U.S. strateg ic triad.

This is by no means a comprehensive list of some of the problematic aspects of the treaty. I call my colleagues' attention to the testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee by one of the critics of the treaty, Sven Kraemer, former Director of Arm s Control at the National Security Council, in which he lists a comprehensive listing of some of the more troublesome aspects of the treaty.

I note these simply to indicate, Mr. President, that while I believe this treaty, on balance, represents a fair and constructive way to approach the problem of reducing the number of these dangerous weapons as to the interests of the United States, tha t it is not without concern and that those of us who support the treaty, I think, should be respected in our delineation of these concerns, because, as I have said, much depends on the assumptions that underlie the treaty, and if those assumptions later c hange, obviously we would have to reassess our position under the treaty.

President Reagan said it well: `Trust but verify.' The problem here is that it is not easy to verify. There are some things that are just very, very difficult to verify in this treaty, difficult if not impossible. So, to some extent, there is an elemen t of trust required, and I suspect that all of us base some of our position here on an element of hope as well.

But the point is that as we bring the number of these weapons down to a relatively lower number, much smaller number, we better make sure that they work, we better make sure that the other side does not cheat, because cheating, when both sides only have a few, is much more dangerous than if we both have very large components in our nuclear arsenal.

I also note, Mr. President, that the Russians have certain concerns with START II. This would be, I think, obvious in any negotiation where both sides give and take. So we are not the only ones who have concerns. As a matter of fact, an internal Duma r eport prepared by the Duma's analytical center and reporting in an unclassified memo from the American Embassy, we note that there are seven specific amendments recommended to the treaty.

I will not go into these, although I will be submitting my entire statement for the Record, which identifies these particular proposed changes from the standpoint of the Russian Duma. None of these amendments, suffice it to say, would be acceptable to the United States. In fact, if any one of these were to be accepted by the Russian Duma, it would gut the central provisions of START II. That is why, despite the fact that there are those who believe that some amendments might have made the treaty more acceptable from the United States' perspective and urged that we actually offer amendments to the treaty in that regard, I think others of us felt that it was better to keep the treaty as it was negotiated and signed by the two parties, be cause we did not want to begin the process of amendment which would then give those in the Russian Duma a greater capability to argue the appropriateness of making amendments from their perspective.

That is why it is important that there be no amendments from either side. We have declarations and one condition, which we think help to establish the basis of the treaty from our perspective. Clearly, no amendment to the treaty, along the previously s uggested lines, by the Russian Duma would be appropriate. That would be a basis for our withdrawal from the treaty.

I want to make it very clear that there is one thing in particular I would very strongly oppose. I will very strongly oppose any attempt by the administration, or anyone else, to walk back the MIRV downloading provision of the treaty, to allow the Russ ians to either increase the numbers of SS-18's, or to modify the structural changes to the SS-18 silos, or to delay the implementation of START II. I believe that any changes to the treaty, especially in these two key areas, would obviously require Senate advice and consent.

Mr. President, if there is anyone who, during the course of this discussion, disagrees with that, I would like them to say that. I would like to have a dialog with that individual. I doubt that anyone could conceivably come to that conclusion. But, cle arly, we have to have it established, as we vote to ratify this treaty, that in those two most important respects the U.S. Senate would have to provide advice and consent.

I know the administration has agreed with that proposition as of now. I cannot imagine any disagreement. I note, for the Record, that with regard to walking back the MIRV downloading, Mr. Bob Bell, Special Assistant to the President, and an individual well known here in the Senate, who has assisted Senator Nunn for many years, has written, `This report is totally unsubstantiated and pure fantasy.' By the way, he was referring to a report that there may be some move toward some MIRV dow nloading in the treaty. `The administration is not planning and does not have under consideration any such proposal.'

Mr. President, I accept that statement from Mr. Bob Bell, and I certainly would not oppose the treaty based on assurances from the administration that MIRV downloading will not occur. But, it is an illustration, Mr. President, of the kinds of things wh ich at least have been talked about as possible changes and which I think we have to be very, very careful in considering prior to the ratification of the treaty, so that if those kinds of changes should ever be suggested to us, the record has been very c lear that, A, it would require the advice and consent of the Senate, and, B, it would not be in the best interest of the United States.

One more note about Russian compliance with the arms control agreement, Mr. President. Questions about verifiability of the treaty are important because of concerns about whether the Russians will, in fact, abide by the terms of START II. Obviously, we all hope and require that the Russians fully comply with START II. But their record, and the record of the former Soviet Union, with respect to compliance with arms control agreements is somewhat dubious. I will note just a few of the areas of violation in the past:

The Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Agreements, the Missile Technology Control Regime, START I, and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaties. All of these agreements have provisions that Russia has, in one way or another, f ailed to comply.

I mention this and the previous arms control agreements to underscore the importance of assuring that the Russians comply with the START II Treaty--not that they intend to comply, but that they are complying. An assumption of Russian compliance with th e terms of START II is one significant consideration in my decision to support the treaty. I have confidence that they will comply, and that is the basis for my support of the treaty.

The final substantive point, Mr. President, I would make is this, and it has to do with linkage to the ABM Treaty.

There is no linkage between the ABM Treaty and the START II Treaty--although this is a favorite argument of some members of the administration and of opponents of ballistic missile defenses in the Russian Duma. There is no linkage between these two treaties. There never was and never will be.

There are those who believe that the ABM Treaty and START II are linked; further, that action relating to ballistic missile defenses in the United States will somehow affect ratification of START II in Russia. In fact, the preponderance of the e vidence suggests that the Russians have concerns about ratifying START II irrespective of Senate action on the ABM Treaty.

It is incontroverted by a variety of Russian spokesmen themselves, who have made the point crystal clear that their concerns about START II have to do with the treaty itself, with their requirements under the treaty, and with the costs that their compl iance will entail, and not with the United States position with respect to the ABM Treaty.

For example, chairman of the Duma's Foreign Relations Committee, Vladimir Lukin, said `We need big money to carry out these reductions [in START II], and we don't have it. We do not want to ratify this Treaty and then not be able to comply with its ter ms. We will have to wait until we see how to pay for our promises.' As quoted by Jim Hoagland in the Washington Post, July 2, 1995.

Other Russians tie START II ratification to other international issues. Speaker of the Federation Council [upper chamber], Vladimir Shumeyko, stated, `We closely link [START II] ratification with the overall situation existing between Russia and NATO. We consider the perseverance of NATO as a stumbling block to our cooperation in the area of disarmament and advancement on the road to peace.'--Interfax, 1255 GMT, April 3, 1995.

And, still others see START II as inimical to Russian interests. Viktor Ilyukhin, Chairman of the State Duma Security Committee, commented, `If this treaty [START II] is fully implemented, the United States will almost double its superiority, while the damage to Russia's national security will be unrecoverable.'--ITAR-Tass, 1849 GMT, February 18, 1995.

There are also political problems with Russian ratification of START II. Aleksander Konovalov, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences USA and Canada Institute, observed, `The outlook for the treaty's [START II] ratification by the Russian Federati on's Federal Assembly is not at all promising. Some deputies support the treaty in its current version, but they are obviously the minority in parliament. A sizable group of opposition deputies will probably vote against the ratification of START II for p urely political reasons.'--Segodnya, November 15, 1994, p.10.

Sergei Karaganov, adviser to President Yeltsin, was quoted as saying, `There is widespread feeling now that the United States pushed too hard when Russia was weak and that the treaty is unfair.' As quoted by Jack Mendelshon, from ACDA, week of July 3, 199 5.

The U.S. ambassador to the START II talks, Linton Brooks, wrote in a memo dated November 5, 1995 about other factors affecting Duma consideration of START II. Brooks said, `The major reason START II is in trouble in the Yeltsin government is not pushin g it. Indeed, the government has been unable to say what the Russian force structure will be under START II, how much it will cost, or how Russia will pay for it.'

Brooks further stated, `The bluntest political analysis I heard came from Alexei Mitrofanov of the Liberal Democratic Party. He argued that running against START II was good politics. In the LDP analysis, the Russian public associates the `reforms' whi ch have ruined their country with the United States. As a result, there is growing, deep-rooted, exploitable, anti-American sentiments in the Russian electorate. START II is associated with the United States and thus no politician will want to support it. '

Finally, Brooks correctly concluded `without more action by the Russian government, nothing that the United States does will matter.' I say `amen' to any further discussion about the negative impact of Senate action on the ballistic missile defe nses and the negative impact on Duma passage of the START II Treaty.

Now, I want to move from those substantive points to the final point of my presentation, which has to do with the nine managers' amendments to the resolution of ratification--not treaty amendments, but rather declarations, and, in one case, a condition . Again, I express my appreciation to Senator Stevens, who is chairman of the Arms Control Observer Group, who called the group together to consider these ideas, and Senator Lugar, who was active in participating in the d iscussions, and to all of the Members on the other side of the aisle, who were active in negotiating and, in fact, also to Bob Bell, representing the administration's point of view.

As a result of these discussions, we were able to agree to these nine managers' amendments. They will be discussed shortly, and I hope they will be agreed to because they express, in important ways, the substance of what I have been saying here. For ex ample, that there is no linkage between the START II Treaty and ballistic missile defenses; that the President must consult closely with the Senate if he changes the nuclear force structure; that the President must submit for advice and consent any material modification or amendment or reinterpretation of the START II Treaty; that the Senate is concerned about the impact of allowing Russia and Ukraine to use excess ballistic missiles for space launch vehicles; and that the Senate is concerne d about the maintenance and preservation of the nuclear weapons stockpile and the attendant facilities.

These are important declarations, and I believe that in adopting them, the Senate is putting the administration and Russians, and everybody else, on notice that this drawdown must be accomplished carefully and with full cognizance of the impact on the future deterrent posture of the United States.

The declarations also place the administration on notice that the Senate must be closely consulted with while it continues to negotiate with the Russians about the precise implementation of START II.

Mr. President, in conclusion, I think President Bush got it right when he moved to reduce nuclear force levels and the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy. But he was also correct in maintaining a strong commitment to ensurin g the long-term viability and efficacy of U.S. nuclear deterrent and supporting infrastructure. Likewise, his determination to refocus the SDI program on providing defenses against limited missile strikes reflect the widespread proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and the apparent willingness of regional aggressors to use those weapons.

Furthermore, once the United States' ability to manufacture and test new nuclear weapons and repair unsafe or unreliable old ones has disappeared, then neither we nor our allies will be able to count on our arsenal or deter aggression. At that point, w e will have become effectively disarmed. Such a situation would result in a rethinking by our allies of their current commitment not to build their own nuclear arsenal--although they are technically capable of doing so--with dramatic consequences for U.S. national security.

Likewise, the administration's abandonment of President Bush's plan to effect the TMD and NMD systems as a means of protection from strikes, at least on the timetable and in the way we believe is important, based on its view of the world, I think, repr esents a strategic blunder of major proportions.

I will be working in the future to try to readdress that issue so that we can, at the same time we are drawing down our strategic offensive forces, provide a robust national and regional missile defense system.

Mr. President, I hope that in the discussion of the declarations and the condition that will transpire in just a moment, that it would be clear to all of our colleagues that we have tried to express our concerns about the context in which the treaty mu st be considered, and that our colleagues will agree with us that these are all important declarations and it is an important condition that we place upon the treaty. I, of course, strongly urge the acceptance of that document.

Finally, Mr. President, I, too, would like to make some comments when this matter is finally debated and voted on because I think it is important for all of our colleagues to hear something of the background of this treaty prior to the time--I say imme diately prior to the time--that the treaty is voted upon.

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Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to commend Senators Helms, Lugar, and Pell for their fine work on the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks II [START II] Treaty. I rise to support this treaty, which builds on the reductio ns established under the START I Agreement.

Taken together, START I and START II will reduce the deployed strategic offensive arms of the United States and Russia by more than two-thirds. This treaty, signed by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin in 1993, limits both sides to between 3,500 and 3,000 deployed warheads, Moreover, START II obligates Russia and the United States to ban all land-based, multiple warhead ballistic missiles and limits the number of warheads deployed on submarine launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs]. In addition, START II achieves a long-standing U.S. goal of eliminating the threat of Russia's heavy ICBM missile, the 10 warhead SS-18 missiles and their launch canisters.

At the same time, however, the START II Treaty is not without loopholes. For instance, while the Russians are obligated to eliminate their heavy SS-18s ICBM by January 2003, the treaty allows Russia to retain 90 SS-18 silos to be converted to accommoda te only single-warhead missiles of the SS-25-type. Of course, the United States is allowed to inspect such conversion to ensure Russia retains only single-warhead missiles, as outlined by the Treaty. But one concern I have is that the `new t ype' SS-25 missile Russia is now testing is an advanced follow-on Topol-M missile, larger than the U.S. MX Peacekeeper missiles.

On the whole, however, I support this treaty, particularly in light of the conditions and declarations added to the Resolution of Ratification by the Foreign Relations Committee, and those proposed in the form of the `Manager's Amendment.' I believe th ese amendments provide a historical record of the Senate's view on a number of national security issues associated with the START II Treaty. It is with this understanding that I can conditionally support ratification of the START II Treaty.

I will address a few what I believe are the most important conditions and declarations proposed by the committee and the managers' amendments.

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1. START II AND THE 1972 ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

The Foreign Relations Committee Resolution of Ratification contains a condition stating that the U.S. government does not accept the view implied by the Russian Federation that Russian ratification of START II is contingent upon continued adherence by the United States to Russian interpretations of United States obligations under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This condition makes clear that U.S. ratification of the START II Treaty does not obligate the United States to accept any modification, change in scope or extension of the ABM Treaty.

This condition is wholly warranted, given Russian attempts to expand the scope of the ABM Treaty to include systems never intended to be covered by that Treaty--theater ballistic missile defenses. Further, by giving its advice and consent to the START II Treaty, the Senate is only agreeing to those limitations, eliminations and reductions of strategic offensive weapons contained in that Treaty.

At the same time, I believe it is important to be on record stating the converse. Namely, that Senate ratification of START II must in no way be construed by Russia as changing our rights to renegotiate changes to the ABM Treaty or our right to withdra w from that Treaty should supreme national interests warrant it. Which is why I believe the Managers's amendment, in the form of a declaration, is an essential supplement to the language already contained in the Committee's resolution of ratification.

This manager's amendment adds a new section to specify that ratification does not change any of the rights of either Party with respect to Articles 13 (which allows continual United States/Russian consultation on changes in the strategic situation and their meaning for the ABM Treaty); Article 14 (allowing either Party to propose amendments to the treaty), and Article 15 (allowing either Party to withdraw if supreme national interests are jeopardized).

I believe Articles 13, 14, and 15 are critical provisions of the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty is outdated. It may have been relevant to the strategic situation in 1972, when deterrence was based on Mutual Assured Destruction [MAD]. But MAD is completely irrelevant to the strategic environment of the 1990's. The Soviet Union no longer exists. Ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction are proliferating throughout the Third World. In a 1994 speech, Secretary of Defense William Perry declared that, `we now have the opportunity to create a new relationship, based not on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.' [Speech before the Harry L. Stimson Center, 9/20/94]. The United States a nd Russia should, as the ABM Treaty envisioned, be discussing plans to deploy a mutual protection system against these growing threats, including the possibility of amending the ABM Treaty to allow more than one missile defense site.

2. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

One particular concern of mine is whether and when the Russian Duma will ratify START II. Perhaps the worst of all possible worlds would be if the United States began drawing down its strategic nuclear arsenal to conform with the limits established und er START II, and Russia had not yet ratified the treaty.

I believe, however, that this concern is addressed by a declaration on implementation arrangements proposed in the managers' amendment. Specifically, the language states that the START II Treaty shall not be binding on the United States until such time as the Duma has ratified the Treaty and the Treaty has entered into force. Equally important is the two-step process set up if the President plans to go below the number of forces currently planned and consistent with the START II Treaty. Under these cir cumstances, the President is called upon to: First, consult with the Senate on how these reductions would effect U.S. national security; and second, take no such action until a Presidential determination is sent to the Senate stating that such reductions are in the U.S. national security interest.

3. NONCOMPLIANCE

Recognizing that compliance is critical to the integrity of any arms control agreement, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Resolution of Ratification contains a condition on noncompliance. This condition states that if the President determines that a Party to either START I or START II is acting inconsistently with the object and purpose of either Treaty, the President shall submit a report to the Senate detailing the impact of such noncompliance on the Treaty and seek to bring the noncompliant Par ty into compliance through diplomatic means. Further, any modification or change in obligations shall be submitted for Senate advice and consent. If such noncompliance persists, the President is called upon a to seek a Senate resolution in support of cont inued U.S. adherence to the Treaty or Treaties in question.

I believe this condition is important for several reasons. First, it sets a standard for evaluating noncompliant behavior. Second, underlying the reporting requirement is the understanding that noncompliant behavior by Russia could actually affect the United States continuing as a party to that treaty. Third, and most important, is that this condition answers the decade-old question of what should be done after a violation is detected. In the case of persistent noncompliance, the Senate, at the Preside nt's request, is to vote on whether to remain a party to that treaty.

While this condition addresses a number of compliance concerns, the managers' amendment builds on this language by adding several declarations. Each of these declarations will help ensure the Senate is apprised of compliance concerns the United States Government may raise with the Russian Federation through various channels and the outcome of such discussions.

And finally, this language declares that the Senate expects the Russian Federation to be `in strict compliance with the terms of START II, as presented to the Senate for advice and consent.'

4. NATURE OF DETERRENCE

In addition to the declarations offered by the Foreign Relations Committee in its Resolution of Ratification, is a declaration, proposed by the managers, on the nature of deterrence. This declaration recognizes that offensive forms of deterrence alone cannot address the emerging threats to U.S. national security and states that missile defenses are `a necessary part of new deterrence strategies.'

I believe missile defenses make sense not only for addressing growing proliferation threats, but also within the strategic equation where the United States is reducing its nuclear arsenal to significantly lower levels.

The START II Treaty could actually create conditions conducive to deploying effective ballistic missile defenses. As the United States and the Russian Federation deploy only single warhead missiles, the old argument that missile de fenses could be saturated by multiple warheads becomes moot. Further, at the low levels of warheads required by START II, both sides should have an incentive to pursue mutual missile defense deployments. Finally, as with other arms control treaties , START II contains loopholes Russia could exploit to retain a larger, more lethal arsenal, ballistic missile defenses could provide a hedge, or insurance policy against possible Russian treaty violations.

My concerns about the impact of START II on U.S. national security have been adequately addressed by the Foreign Relations Committee's actions and the Managers' amendments which add important conditions and declarations to the Resolution of Ratificatio n. With this in mind, I will support the START II Treaty Resolution of Ratification, with the understanding that these conditions and declarations specify certain U.S. obligations to be fulfilled.

The START II Treaty is a continuation of the substantial reductions in strategic weaponry brought about by the signing of the START I Treaty. The signing of the START I Treaty occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the cold war, the diss olution of the Soviet Union, and the development of democratic movements and free elections in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. These events have transformed the longstanding bipolar relationship between the United States and the now vanished Sovi et Union.

Given these historic changes, ratification of the START II Treaty is a very logical step. Upon entry into full force, the START II Treaty will further reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads held in the active inventories of the United States a nd Russia from about 8,000 weapons in START I levels, to between 3,000 and 3,500 weapons, a reduction of more than 50 percent.

By the time START II is fully implemented, the START I and START II Treaties will have led to more than a threefold reduction in the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads online in both sides. Moreover, the entry into force of this country will elimina te all of the land-based multiple warhead or MIRV intercontinental ballistic missiles from the arsenal of both sides.

It has long been a goal of U.S. arms control policy both under Republican and Democratic Presidents and Congresses to eliminate these poised for instant launch MIRV ICBM's from the inventories of both sides. There was too much incentive on both sides i f there was warning of some attack to feel that these weapons had to be used or lost in large numbers, and the ratios gave the wrong incentives. Elimination of these land-based ICBM's, a required measure of the START II Treaty, will help avoid a return to hair-trigger strategic posture on both sides and put an end to any conceivable incentive for a bolt-from-the-blue attack.

Ratification of the START II Treaty is a highly cost-effective way to reduce the threat to the United States' national security interest posed by nuclear weapons. It will eliminate 5,000 warheads from the Russian force. Our modest verification costs wi ll be dwarfed by U.S. defense budget savings that will flow both from the reduced threat and the retirements of our excess nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the ratification of the START II Treaty today and to work to build support and understanding of the advantages of the START II Treaty among the members of the Russian Duma prior to the consideration of the treaty next year.

There is considerable work that has to be done, Mr. President, by I think Members of this legislative body if we are going to see the Russian Duma ratify this treaty. They are very dubious about the treaty. They are very concerned about the antiballist ic missile developments and discussion and legislation in this country, and it is going to take a considerable amount of effort on the part of the United States and our other allies, as well as friends of Russia, to see that they ratify this treaty also. It is their decision. We cannot force it. But certainly we ought to have every dialog we can with them on this because this treaty is truly in the interests not only of both the United States and Russia but also of mankind.

Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of ratification of the START II Treaty.

I would like to begin by summarizing what I see as the three major features of this treaty. First, given that Russia remains the only country that presents a serious nuclear strategic threat to the United States, the treaty effectively addresses three key aspects of this threat: It will eliminate all Russian heavy inter-continental ballistic missiles [ICBMs], it will ban all multiple-warhead ICBMs, and it will put a ceiling of 1,750 on the number of nuclear warheads deployed on submarine-launche d ballistic missiles. Second, the treaty continues a process of arms reductions that is vital not just to U.S. national security but that is also good for the U.S. economy: It will require a two-thirds reduction of the number of deployed United Sta tes and Russian strategic nuclear stockpiles by the year 2003. Third, reductions in nuclear stockpiles will help to curtail the global proliferation of nuclear weapons both by helping to fulfill America's commitment under the NPT to seek an end to the nuc lear arms race.

In these times of partisan bickering on all sorts of issues, I am gratified to see that this treaty had the support of all 18 members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In my remarks today, I will speak about the importance of the Senate provid ing its advice and consent to the START II ty Treaty--I will not address today any of the specific non-binding policy declarations that appear in the resolution, some of which I find agreeable, and some I do not support. Instead, I believe it is better to focus on the overall attributes of the Treaty and how it advances the U.S. national security interest.

A VERIFIABLE TREATY

As with all of our arms control and nonproliferation agreements, the United States will depend heavily (but not exclusively) on `national technical means' to verify the START II treaty. Though I cannot discuss in any great detail the nature of these me thods, I am gratified at the confidence that the Joint Chiefs and other members of our national security community have shown in the verification measures in this treaty.

On March 1, 1995, Gen. John Shalikashvili, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:

We believe that the verification procedures are adequate to ensure that we will be able to detect any significant violations. Conversely, we also believe that the verification provisions are sufficiently restrictive to protect ourselves against unneces sary intrusion.

Similarly, on May 17, 1995, Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark, the JCS Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that:

We are confident that the majority of monitoring requirements for START II can be accomplished with high confidence and there is little chance that the Russians can engage in militarily significant cheating. Further, the Joint Staff judges that the mil itary risk to U.S. security associated with any monitoring uncertainties is low. In short the START II Treaty is effectively verifiable.

Echoing General Shalikashvili, General Clark added that:

I am confident that the Treaty verification procedures are sufficiently restrictive to protect ourselves from unnecessary intrusion.

The treaty follows closely the extensive verification regime established to monitor the START I Treaty. In addition, START II includes some new verification measures, such as: U.S. observation of SS-18 silo conversion and missile elimination pro cedures; exhibitions and inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm weapon loads; and exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to confirm their observable differences.

The START verification regime for conducting on-site inspections is not an anytime, anywhere type of regime. As a result, both parties to the treaty must always be on the watch for covert facilities or activities. Last February 28, CIA Deputy Director Douglas MacEachin testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:

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. . . when estimating our chances of detecting and correctly interpreting potential cheating, we judged that the increased openness of Russia and the former Soviet republics makes cheating increasingly difficult to conceal.

He added later that:

The Intelligence Community continues to doubt that Russia will be able to initiate and successfully execute a significant cheating program.

The use of the term `increasingly difficult' rather than impossible, however, only underscores the vital importance of maintaining America's intelligence capabilities (both for collection and analysis) to monitor compliance with this treaty. I think th is conclusion equally applies to all of America's arms control and nonproliferation agreements.

From my vantage points on the Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence, I will do my best to ensure that our country has the resources it needs to ensure a high standard of compliance with all of these agreements, most particul arly START II.

LOOKING AHEAD

Ratification of this treaty will constitute an important arms control milestone--it does not, however, constitute the end of the road by any means. Ratification will set the stage for several additional arms control measures that are vitally needed to strengthen U.S. national security. The treaty should thus not be viewed in isolation, but should instead be seen as a key stepping stone toward a safer world. By any measure, the agenda ahead is a lengthy one.

We need to get on with ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We need to strengthen the safeguards that are used to monitor compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We need to ensure the conclusion in 1996 of a treaty banning all underground nuclear explosions. We need to ensure that our export controls and sanctions policies are enforced and implemented in a manner that is consistent with our treaty obligations--and we have a long way to go, I am afraid, before we achieve that p articular goal. We need to bring the British, French, and Chinese nuclear stockpiles into the global arms reductions process, particularly in the context of START III Treaty negotiations. We need to recognize the continuing value of the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty in stabilizing nuclear deterrence and in holding down defense expenditures in a post-cold war world.

We need to do more--much more--to strengthen controls over bomb-usable nuclear materials that are being produced particularly in Europe, Russia, and Japan for commercial uses. It is not enough merely to pursue a treaty banning the production of such ma terials for bombs or outside of safeguards--the security-related and environmental hazards of plutonium recognize no national borders or spurious distinctions between civilian and military uses. We should not seek to facilitate or to legitimize large-scal e commercial uses of plutonium--whether safeguarded or not--but should instead explore new measures to discourage such uses before the nuclear terrorist threat catches up with us.

Above all, we need to recognize the relationships that exist between all of these important arms control regimes.

If the nuclear-weapons states fail to live up to their obligations to reduce their strategic stockpiles, this will inevitably have an effect on the rate of the proliferation of such weapons to additional countries.

If the United States abandons the ABM Treaty, this will inevitably affect in a most negative way the calculations of Russian leaders on both offensive and defensive nuclear strategies.

If we succeed in reducing the stockpiles of the nuclear weapons states, but fail to curb the burgeoning production of new bomb-usable nuclear materials (especially plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) for commercial purposes, we should not be surpris ed to find ourselves facing new nightmares of nuclear terrorism, blackmail, proliferation, and extortion down the road.

If we neglect the importance of traditional approaches to nonproliferation (in particular export controls and sanctions) and concentrate our energies and resources merely on developing offensive and defensive military countermeasures to proliferation, we will again face a more dangerous world--our priority must remain to prevent, rather than to manage, the global spread of weapons of mass destruction.

CONCLUSION

With these terms in mind, I urge all my colleagues to vote in favor of ratification of the START II Treaty. I would like to take this occasion to recognize the debt that this treaty owes to the persistent work of Senators Pell, Levin, and other long-time supporters of the START II Treaty in the Senate. I also credit the leadership of President Bill Clinton in encouraging timely action by the Senate in ratifying this important treaty.

I can only hope that the bipartisanship the Senate is showing today in voting, I hope overwhelmingly, to approve this treaty will echo into the next session, where I am sure it will be needed as much if not more than the treaty itself.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the START II Treaty which has finally been brought to the floor of the Senate after a long, unnecessary, and perhaps fatal delay. I will elaborate on that last point in a moment.

But first, let me say that START II represents an unprecedented opportunity to dismantle the Soviet nuclear arsenal. I say `Soviet,' Mr. President, because START II would, if implemented, eliminate the most devastating nuclear missiles built by the Soviet Union in the 1970's and 1980's: Hundreds of multi-warhead missiles of cataclysmic destructive power--among them, the infamous SS-18, which became the very symbol of the Soviet threat.

Even as we speak today, these missiles remain deployed in launching silos scattered across a Russian nation undergoing enormous political turmoil. They could at a moment's notice be targeted on the United States of America.

For the American people, the future of those missiles is a fundamental, compelling national security question.

The salient feature of START II is its planned elimination of every land-based multi-warhead missile in the Soviet-now-Russian arsenal. These were the weapons that, for years, so worried our defense establishment that we expended hundreds of bil lions of dollars to counter their first-strike potential.

Mr. President, that apocalyptic potential remains today.

As matters now stand, this threat carries with it considerable irony. For months, the Senate has engaged in yet another round of controversy over whether to build an anti-missile system intended to protect the United States from missile a ttack.

Earlier this week, this body passed a defense authorization confernece report that would require deployment of such a system by 2003, putting us on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, which has been the basis for all strategic arms controls agreeme nts over the past two decades.

Any such system, if built, would be monumentally expensive, of highly uncertain reliability, likely to provoke additional offensive deployments, and available, at best, only sometime in the next century. Yet, the START II Treaty during that same period would eliminate with verifiable certainty the one serious missile threat the United States has ever faced.

The effort over the past several months to eviscerate the ABM Treaty has been driven by those who do not favor the limits in START II, and, correspondingly, never much cared for the ABM Treaty. They believe that the ABM Treaty prevents us from construc ting an impenetrable shield against all types of ballistic missiles.

I admit--a ballistic missile shield is a comforting image. But, as our experience with star wars in the 1980's demonstrated, it is not grounded in reality.

Unfortunately, that ballistic missile shield, if it could ever overcome awesome technical and financial barriers--and I doubt it would, would provide a false sense of security.

That is because it would not alleviate a much greater threat--a terrorist transporting a nuclear device or its components into the United States through very conventional means, and detonating that device near an important landmark.

Our focus ought to be in preventing that possibility by improving our capabilities to tract terrorists and securing the many tons of fissile material spread across the territory of the former Soviet Union.

My colleagues know that last Sunday, the Russian people went to the polls and decided to elect a Duma apparently dominated by Communists and nationalists who are skeptical about START II and suspicious about American motives on the ABM treaty. They do not regard as a mere coincidence that 2003 is the year established for final compliance with the central limits in START II, as well as the target date for deployment of a national missile defense system in the Republican plan.

From their perspective, START II will take away their most effective means of countering a national missile defense--overwhelming it with offensive missiles.

While Russian concerns alone should not determine our policy decisions, it would be shortsighted, to say the least, to ignore them altogether when Russian behavior and Russian missiles can have a direct bearing on our national security.

If the Russians decide that we are intent on abrogating the ABM Treaty, then they will likely refuse to ratify START II, halt START I implementation, and begin a strategic build-up. We would have to follow suit and waste vast sums of money on deploying more offensive missiles and developing more missile defenses.

How ironic that would be--in the post-cold war era when we are on the verge of ratifying a historic reduction in strategic nuclear weapons--to set off an offense-defense spiral that the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent, and did prevent for over 20 ye ars.

For the past several months many here saw the Communist and nationalist clouds building in Russia, and for that reason we repeatedly called for early United States ratification of START II in order to encourage similar action by the Duma. That could ha ve locked in the gains promised by START II. Unfortunately, we did not act.

Now, some reports suggest that the new Duma may wait to see the results of our presidential election before approving START II. I hope that is not the case, because between now and then Russia will hold its own presidential election. That election has the potential to rearrange Russian politics in ways we cannot predict.

Our action today can send a clear signal that we are serious about implementing START II, and provide the incentive for quick action by the Duma.

It is my hope that the Senate's advice and consent to START II will encourage the Duma to act in kind prior to the G-7 Nuclear Safety Summit in Moscow next April. Due to the crowded political calendar in both countries later in the year, the summit wou ld be the ideal, and maybe last, opportunity for Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to exchange instruments of ratification. I would also hope that the two leaders can at that time agree to begin negotiations toward a new agreement on even further reductions.

I would just like to add here that I am concerned with some of the hortatory language that is contained both within the committee report and the proposed managers' amendment. In particular, I find the language on missile defenses and nuclear tes ting to be particularly problematic. However, I have decided not to object at this time because I believe it is absolutely critical that we act quickly and favorably on START II. I think it is also important to emphasize for all concerned that the languag e to which I and many of my colleagues object is non-binding.

Mr. President, the ultimate entry into force of the START II Treaty may well depend on a choice we must make in the months ahead: Do we pursue a technically questionable and prohibitively expensive national missile defense which would doom START II, or do we pursue a path that promises with greater certainty and less cost to eliminate the very missiles such a system would defend against?

In my view, there is not much of a choice. Star Wars technology is uncertain, costly, and likely to undermine our national security. On the other hand, arms control agreements like START II are proven, cost-effective, and will reduce the nuclear threat to the United States.

The American people, having sent us here to protect the security of their homes and children, are entitled to the only rational choice: We should ratify START II and abandon the reckless plans for an ABM Treaty-busting national missile defense s ystem.

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Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, today is a very important day in the history of the modern world. It is a crucially important day in the history of human-kind's efforts to achieve peace and avoid armed conflict.

For over 50 years following the end of the World War II, the United States was locked in what came to be known universally as the cold war. That war, while it only occasionally broke into open armed conflict, was a very destructive conflict. It consume d the wealth of much of the world as armaments were stacked upon armaments to prepare for the open conflict that we hoped would never come.

There have been countless periods in the history of the world during which there have been uneasy periods of standoff of one power against another. But there has been none even nearly approximating the cold war. The reason is terrifyingly simple. The cold war was the first time in the world's history when human beings possessed weapons of mass destruction in the form of thermonuclear weapons. First the United States and then the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics obtained the ability to manufacture and u se nuclear weapons. Eventually that capability was acquired by other nations. The use of just one such weapon is sufficient to annihilate an entire city.

The use of many not only could obliterate an entire nation and all its people from the face of the earth, but arguably might set in motion natural reactions which could lead to the extinguishment of most if not all life on this planet.

All of us in this Chamber endured most if not all of the cold war. We know of many of its human costs,

although they will never be fully calculated. We also know today that there were a number of occasions where the world teetered on the very brink of the use of such weapons, which very likely would have been followed by a general exchange between the U nited States and the Soviet Union, and which very likely would have involved use of their nuclear weapons by the other nations possessing them.

What we also know, Mr. President, is that there was and is no higher objective--while preserving the liberties for which this Nation was founded and for the preservation of which so many have sacrificed so greatly--than to reduce both the threat of and the ability to wage nuclear war.

This objective has been reflected in numerous efforts initiated by both Republican and Democratic administrations to negotiate limits on the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons, to negotiate limits on the types, capabilities, and numbers of weap ons systems armed with nuclear devices, and to negotiate various other measures designed to reduce the likelihood that a nuclear weapon will be used in anger.

The treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms--the so-called START II Treaty--which is before the Senate today is one of the most significant milestones among these efforts. It builds upon the foundation established by the original START Treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in 1991.

That first START Treaty was the first treaty that provided for real reductions--rather than just limits on further growth--of strategic

offensive arms of both nations. It provided for overall reductions of 30 to 40 percent, and reductions of up to 50 percent in the most threatening systems. That treaty now acts to emphasize and enhance stability in times of international crisis. It pro vides for rough equality of strategic forces between the two sides, and was painstakingly crafted to be effectively verifiable. That treaty will result in the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems from the territories of Belarus, Kazak hstan, and Ukraine and accession of these three states to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [the NPT] as non-nuclear state parties. As a result, after 7 years, of the states formed upon the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, o nly Russia will possess deployed strategic offensive arms.

START II adds to these very significant accomplishments. It increases the stability of the nuclear balance. It bans deployment of the most destabilizing type of nuclear weapons system--land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads [or MIRV's]. Under its terms, Russia and the United States will reduce the number of nuclear weapons each possesses to 3,500.

Mr. President, some believe that with the passing of the former Soviet Union, and the economic weakness and chaos that have in many respects permeated its successor states, there no longer is a danger of nuclear conflict. Some would argue that these na tions and their people, already struggling to make their way in a world that passed them by during the cold war period, would never risk losing literally everything they are and have by initiating a nuclear conflict. But that is an incomplete if not naive view of the world situation.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a danger they will be used. Disagreements can escalate, and sometimes become dangerously personalized as national leaders struggle to maintain power and control. It is conceivable that rogue elements of a nation' s military could gain control of one or more weapons--or even the entire nuclear apparatus of a nation--and launch one or more or many of those weapons. There are countless scenarios where those weapons could be employed. There is no better reason than th is simple reality, Mr. President, for putting in place the reductions contained in the START II Treaty.

As we seek to bring to a conclusion the business of the Senate prior to this weekend of great significance to families and religions, I will not take the Senate's time to exhaustively detail all of the reason why this treaty will provide increased stab ility to the world, will reduce the danger of nuclear conflict and nuclear accidents, and will do this while preserving the defensive capability of the United States so that it unquestionably can effectively defend our democracy and liberties that are so precious to us. The legislative record of the treaty is available for all to see, and other Senators already have spoken eloquently to these issues.

There is simply no question, Mr. President, that the immediate ratification of this treaty is in the best interests of the United States and, indeed, the world. All of our most senior national security leadership concurs. The Chairman of the Joint Chie fs of Staff joined by all the Chiefs have so testified. Our intelligence leadership has so testified. Our diplomatic leadership has to testified. The agreement is neither partisan nor regional. While exceedingly little of vital importance occurs with abso lutely unanimity, the START II Treaty comes as close as any major foreign policy or national security issue of which I am aware.

It is for this reason, Mr. President, that I was distressed, and remain distressed, that the Senate's action on this treaty was delayed for many months when the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee held it hostage in an attempt to compel Members of this body to acquiesce to his plan to constrain the diplomatic capacity and media that are of critical importance to our Nation and its leaders--regardless of their party affiliation. For months many other Members of this body and I struggled to free this treaty for Senate action.

Finally, last month, the negotiation effort succeeded, and we were assured the Senate would at least take up the treaty before the end of this year. I am pleased to have helped accomplish this.

It is not just that it was and is regrettable that, because of this hostage-taking, the United States did not do everything in its power to speed this beneficial treaty into effect, and thereby the increased safety and security it offers have been unne cessarily delayed. That is regrettable enough--and I only hope that history does not show that this failure resulted in loss of life. The delay, in fact, has placed the entire treaty in jeopardy. While I think there is virtually no doubt that the Senate, when it is permitted to finally act on this treaty, will vote overwhelmingly on a bipartisan basis to approve it, the deteriorating situation in the Russian Federation makes approval by the Russian Duma increasingly uncertain. As nationalists and reconstr ucted Communists push successfully for greater influence in Russia, it is quite possible they will reject an treaty they see as resulting in too great a reduction in power-projecting weapons systems.

So, ironically, in the very kind of situation where the reduced threat of nuclear conflict would be most significant and valuable, the short-sighted actions here in the Senate could deny us and the world the heightened security this treaty offers. That would be a catastrophe of monumental proportions, Mr. President. If it comes to pass, history will properly and caustically criticize those who have delayed Senate action or acquiesced in that delay.

Before I complete my remarks, Mr. President, I want to address a related issue that is of great importance. There are some who would draw a connection between this treaty and the establishment of a ballistic missile defense. That, in turn, raises q uestions of continued adherence to the anti-ballistic missile or ABM Treaty. Such a linkage of this treaty to the question of ballistic missile defense is not necessary, is inappropriate, and could be tremendously counterproductive.

I have long and strongly supported development of effective defenses against theater and short-range ballistic missiles . Our troops and sailors deserve such protection whenever they are sent into harm's way. But I have equally fervently support ed the ABM Treaty as a critical link in the chain of United States-Russian relations. So much about the cold war--and so much in our new and still unfamiliar post-Soviet relationship--is dependent on each nation feeling confident of its ability to protect its homeland and repel aggressors. The ABM Treaty has made and continues to make an absolutely vital contribution to that confidence. The treaty provides confidence that, in case of an attack launched by the other side, the attacked nation would be able to effectively counterattack with its ballistic missiles. This uneasy but effective balance acted to keep the cold war from ever going hot.

Now, in the form of the START Treaty and the START II Treaty, we are reducing the terror arrayed on both sides, and reducing the likelihood that what remains will be used in anger. But the confidence must remain. The START II Treaty increases confidenc e on both sides. Nothing in it prejudices the consideration of how to provide for defense against theater and short-range ballistic missiles while maintaining the critical balancing tool of the ABM Treaty. Ratification of the START II Treaty certai nly does not increase the need for a national missile defense that would be in violation of the ABM Treaty--to the contrary, it reduces the danger of attack and removes the most threatening of the Russian nuclear delivery systems.

Mr. President, immediately is not too soon to provide the Senate's overwhelming approval of this treaty. All who labored in its negotiation are to be commended for their service to the security of this Nation, the security of the world, and the safety of our citizens and those around the globe. I compliment especially the distinguished Senator from Indiana, Senator Lugar, and the distinguished ranking Democratic member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, and their staffs, for their roles in managing the treaty and moving it toward approval by the Senate. I urge the majority leader, and the Democratic leader, to ensure that the Senate acts finally and expeditiously on the treaty just as soon as the Senate returns to session after the holidays.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

[Page: S19219]

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, today--at long last--we discuss START II. I urge this body to ratify it quickly.

START II is a truly historic treaty. It will cut the number of the world's nuclear weapons in half, getting rid of nearly 4,000 deployed H-bombs in Russia and about the same number here. An overwhelming number of our citizens favor implementing this tr eaty, and a large number of elected officials on both sides of the aisle have expressed their support for it.

Mr. President, START II should be ratified for many reasons. First, START II destroys weapons. This reduces the risk of an accidental launch. Second, every Russian weapon destroyed is a weapon we don't need to defend against. The following table, which I ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record, shows the numbers and kinds of ICBMs that can be eliminated under START II.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[Page: S19220]

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles--Eliminated Under START II

Delivery system Launchers Warheads 

SS-18                 188    1,880 

SS-19               1 170    1,020 

SS-24                  46      460 

SLBM's                       2 600 

Total                 304    3,960 

Mr. HARKIN. Additionally, destroying weapons saves taxpayers' money. Just look at the current defense authorization bill. As my friend from New Mexico pointed out in the report to the Defense Authorization Act, the act `proposes a nuclear weapons manuf acturing complex sized to meet a need of a hedge stockpile far above the active START II stockpile of 3,500 weapons.' The total cost of producing our nuclear weapons to date is about $4 trillion. Compare that with our $5 trillion national debt. In 1995 al one, $12.4 billion was spent to build, operate, and maintain strategic nuclear weapons. If we ratify START II we can give taxpayers the double peace dividend of higher security at lower cost.

Even if START II were fully implemented, we would have more than 3,000 deployed strategic missiles--500 warheads on missiles in silos, 1,680 warheads on submarine-launched missiles, and 1,320 on airplanes. Furthermore, an additiona l 4,000 nuclear weapons would remain in our stockpile. Surely, this will be more than enough atomic fire-power to counter any conceivable threat to the United States.

Mr. President, Russia and other former Soviet Republics are more open than ever before. We have all seen the unprecedented pictures on television of Russian missiles and airplanes being destroyed. This new openness will make START II even more v erifiable then START I. With the recent Russian elections and the presidential election season just starting, we must act now to keep this olive branch from withering.

In conclusion, Mr. President, we need to ratify START II quickly. It is not in the national interest to play politics over the ratification of any treaty. Russian President Yeltsin needs quick American ratification of START II to help get the Russian P arliament to ratify it. We need the security of fewer Russian warheads now. We need to stop spending so much money making our nuclear weapons now. We can use the warheads we have now to defend America. We need to ratify START II now.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we have checked with both sides of the aisle to make certain that all parties are in agreement, and after that, I ask unanimous consent that the START II Treaty be advanced through its various parliamentary procedure stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, and the managers' amendments which I will offer after consultation with Senator Pell be deemed agreed to, and that no further amendments be in order to the resolution o f ratification.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the treaty will be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, which the clerk will state.

The bill clerk read as follows:

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That (a) the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993, including the following protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the `START II Treaty' (contained in Treaty Documen t 103-1), subject to the conditions of subsection (b) and the declarations of subsection (c):

(1) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Lim itation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the `Elimination and Conversion Protocol').

(2) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the `Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol')

(3) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the ` Memorandum on Attribution').

(b) Conditions: The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:

(1) Noncompliance: If the President determines that a party to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1991 (in this resolution referred to as the `START Treaty') or to the START II Treaty is acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the respective Treaty or is in violation of either the START or START II Treaty so as to threaten the national security interests of the United States, then the President shall--

(A) consult with and promptly submit a report to the Senate detailing the effect of such actions on the START Treaties;

(B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;

(C) in the event that a party other than the Russian Federation is determined not to be in compliance--

(i) request consultations with the Russian Federation to assess the viability of both START Treaties and to determine if a change in obligations is required in either treaty to accommodate the changed circumstances, and

(ii) submit for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification any agreement changing the obligations of the United States; and

(D) in the event that noncompliance persists, seek a Senate resolution of support of continued adherence to one or both of the START Treaties, notwithstanding the changed circumstances affecting the object and purpose of one or both of the START Treati es.

(2) Treaty Obligations.--Ratification by the United States of the START II Treaty obligates the United States to meet the conditions contained in this resolution of ratification and shall not be interpreted as an obligation by the Unit ed States to accept any modification, change in scope, or extension of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (commonly referred to as the `ABM Treaty').

(3) Financing Implementation.--The United States understands that in order to be assured of the Russian commitment to a reduction in arms levels, Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the implementation of the START II Treaty. The costs of implementing the START II Treaty should be borne by both parties to the Treaty. The exchange of instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty shall not be contingent upon the United States providing financial guarantees to pay fo r implementation of commitments by Russia under the START II Treaty.

(4) Exchange of Letters.--The exchange of letters--

(A) between Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on the territory of Kazakstan,

(B) between Secretary of State Eagleburger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992, regarding heavy bombers, and

(C) between Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, dated December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, making assurances on Russian intent regarding the conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers of RS-20 heavy intercon tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (all having been submitted to the Senate associated with the START II Treaty),
are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the START II Treaty. The United States shall regard actions inconsistent with obligations under those exchanges of letters as equivalent under international law to actions inconsistent with the STA RT II Treaty.

(5) Space-launch vehicles.--Space-launch vehicles composed of items that are limited by the START Treaty or the START II Treaty shall be subject to the obligations undertaken in the respective treaty.

NTM and cuba.--The obligation of the United States under the START Treaty not to interfere with the national technical means (NTM) of verification of the other party to the Treaty does not preclude the United States from pursuing the q uestion of the removal of the electronic intercept facility operated by the Government of the Russian Federation at Lourdes, Cuba.

(c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:

(1) Cooperative threat reductions.--Pursuant to the Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, agreed to in Moscow, May 10, 1995, between the President of the United States and t he President of the Russian Federation, it is the sense of the Senate that both parties to the START II Treaty should attach high priority to--

(A) the exchange of detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials, and on their safety and security;

(B) the maintenance at distinct and secure storage facilities, on a reciprocal basis, of fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to national security requirements for the purpose of confirming the irreversibility of th e process of nuclear weapons reduction; and

(C) the adoption of other cooperative measures to enhance confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material stockpiles.

(2) Asymmetry in reductions.--It is the sense of the Senate that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the START or START II Treaty, the President should, within the parameters of the elimination schedules provided for in the START Treaties, regulate reductions in the United States strategic nuclear forces so that the number of accountable warheads under the START and START II Treaties possessed by the Russian Federation in no case exceeds the comparable number of accountable warhe ads possessed by the United States to an extent that a strategic imbalance endangering the national security interests of the United States results.

(3) Expanding strategic arsenals in countries other than russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that, if during the time the START II Treaty remains in force or in advance of any further strategic offensive arms reductions the Presiden t determines there has been an expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party to the START II Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States, then the President should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to deter mine whether adherence to the START II Treaty remains in the national interest of the United States.

(4) Substantial further reductions: Cognizant of the obligation of the United States under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 `to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at any early date and to nuclear disarmament and
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control', it is the sense of the Senate that in anticipation of the ratification and entry into force of the START II Treaty, the Senate calls upon the parties to the START II Treaty to seek further strategic offensive arms reductions consistent with their national security interests and calls upon the other nuclear-weapon states to give careful and early consideration to corresponding reductions of their own nucl ear arsenals.

(5) Missile technology control regime.--The Senate urges the President to insist that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technolo gy Control Regime (MTCR). For purposes of this paragraph, the term `Missile Technology Control Regime' means the policy statement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, anno unced April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive missile relevant transfers based on the MTCR Annex, and any amendment thereto.

(6) Further arms reduction obligations: The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval international agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.

(7) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF Tre aty. For purposes of this declaration, the term `INF Treaty' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together w ith the related memorandum of understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

Mr. Pell. Mr. President, the amendments the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar] and I will accept today, represent a bipartisan effort to reach a reasonable consensus in the committee and with regard to the floor action. In particular, I would note the effective and valuable role played in this process by the bipartisan Senate Arms Control Observer Group at the initiative of its administrative cochairman, the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens], who worked very closely with a number of the group's members in the START II issue, including Senator Lugar, Senator Levin, and myself.

The package also includes an amendment included on behalf of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requiring a Presidential certification that we have sufficient national technical means to verify Russian compliance. The amendment is a positive a ddition, and we accept it.

[Page: S19221]

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous consent that when the Senate resumes executive session to consider the resolution of ratification, there be 6 hours for debate, to be equally divided in the usual form, with unlimited additional time un der the control of Senator Thurmond; and following the conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to vote on adoption of the resolution of ratification, without further action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. PELL. Certainly.

Mr. STEVENS. I think we should show that Mira Baratta, working with Senator Dole, has been very helpful in working with this group.

Mr. PELL. I concur in your thought.

Mr. LUGAR. A point of parliamentary clarification. Am I correct to assume that the report of the Foreign Relations Committee resolution ratification is before the body?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the Chair's understanding of the unanimous-consent propounded.

AMENDMENT NO. 3111

Mr. LUGAR. The unanimous-consent request stated I would submit, as a manager, amendments. I have submitted those to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. For the information of the Senate, the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], for himself and Mr. PELL, proposes amendments en bloc numbered 3111.

Mr. LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:
In section 1(b)(2) of the resolution of ratification, insert `(A)' after `START II Treaty'.
In section 1(b)(2), before the period at the end, insert `, and (B) changes none of the rights of either Party with respect to the provisions of the ABM Treaty, in particular, Articles 13, 14, and 15'.
At the end of section 1(b) of the resolution of ratification, add the following new condition:

(7) Implementation arrangements: (A) The START II Treaty shall not be binding on the United States until such time as the Duma of the Russian Federation has acted pursuant to its constitutional responsibilities and the START II Treaty enters into force in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

(B) If the START II Treaty does not enter into force pursuant to subparagraph (A), and if the President plans to implement reductions of United States strategic nuclear forces below those currently planned and consistent with the START Treaty, then th e President shall--

(i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such reductions on the national security of the United States; and

(ii) take no action to reduce United States strategic nuclear forces below that currently planned and consistent with the START Treaty until he submits to the Senate his determination that such reductions are in the national security interest of the U nited States.
In section 1(c)(2) of the resolution of ratification, insert `(A)' immediately after `Reductions: '.
At the end of section 1(c)(2), insert the following:

(B) Recognizing that instability could result from an imbalance in the levels of strategic offensive arms, the Senate calls upon the President to submit a report in unclassified form to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Sen ate not later than January 31 of each year beginning with January 31, 1997, and continuing through such time as the reductions called for in the START II Treaty are completed by both parties, which report will provide--

(i) details on the progress of each party's reductions in strategic offensive arms during the previous year;

(ii) a certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the START II Treaty or specifies any act of noncompliance by the Russian Federation; and

(iii) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance endangering the national security interests of the United States exists.
In section 1(c)(4) of the resolution of ratification--

(1) strike `the parties' and all that follows through `national security interests' and insert `the President to seek further strategic offensive arms reductions to the extent consistent with United States national security interests'; and

(2) strike `it is the sense of the Senate that' and insert in `and'.
At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of ratification, add the following new declarations:

(8) Compliance: Concerned by the clear past pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and continued cases of noncompliance by the Russian Federation, the Senate declares that--

(A) the START II Treaty is in the interests of the United States only if both the United States and the Russian Federation are in strict compliance with the terms of the Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, suc h compliance being measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to comply;

(B) the Senate expects the Russian Federation to be in strict compliance with its obligations under the terms of the START II Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification; and

(C) Given its concern about compliance issues, the Senate expects the Administration to offer regular briefings, but not less than four times per year, to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services on compliance issues related to the START II Treaty. Such briefings shall include a description of all U.S. efforts in U.S./Russian diplomatic channels and bilateral fora to resolve the compliance issues and shall include, but would not necessarily be limited to, the following:

i. Any compliance issues the United States plans to raise with the Russian Federation at the Bilateral Implementation Commission, in advance of such meetings;

ii. Any compliance issues raised at the Bilateral Implementation Commission, within thirty days of such meetings; and

iii. Any Presidential determination that the Russian Federation is in non-compliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner inconsistent with the object and purpose of the START II Treaty, within thirty days of such a determination, in which case the President shall also submit a written report, with an unclassified summary, explaining why it is in the national security interests of the United States to continue as a party to the START II Treaty.
At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of ratification, add the following new declaration:

(8) Submission of future agreements as treaties: The Senate declares that following Senate advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty, any agreement or understanding which in any material way modifies, amends, or reinte rprets United States or Russian obligations under the START II Treaty, including the time frame for implementation of the Treaty, should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of ratification, add the following new declaration:

(8) Nature of deterrence: (A) On June 17, 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin issued a Joint Understanding and a Joint Statement at the conclusion of their Washington Summit, the first of which became the foundation for the START II Tre aty. The second, the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System, endorsed the cooperative development of a defensive system against ballistic missile attack and demonstrated the belief by the governments of the United States and the Russian Fede ration that strategic offensive reductions and certain defenses against ballistic missiles are stabilizing, compatible, and reinforcing.

(B) It is, therefore, the sense of the Senate that:

(i) The long-term perpetuation of deterrence based on mutual and severe offensive nuclear threats would be outdated in a strategic environment in which the United States and the Russian Federation are seeking to put aside their past adversarial relati onship and instead build a relationship based upon trust rather than fear.

(ii) An offense-only form of deterrence cannot address by itself the emerging strategic environment in which, as Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in January 1994, proliferators acquiring missiles and weapons of mass destruction `may have acq uired such weapons for the express purpose of blackmail or terrorism and thus have a fundamentally different calculus not amenable to deterrence. . . . New deterrent approaches are needed as well as new strategies should deterrence fail.'.

(iii) Defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should deterrence fail. Because deterrence may be inadequate to protect United States forces and allies abroad, theater missile defe nse is necessary, particularly the most capable systems of the United States such as THAAD, Navy Upper Tier, and the Space and Missile Tracking System. Similarly, because deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States against long-range missile threats, missile defenses are a necessary part of new deterrent strategies. Such defenses also are wholly in consonance with the summit statements from June 1992 of the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation and t he September 1994 statement by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who said, `We now have the opportunity to create a new relationship, based not on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.'.

(iv) As the governments of the United States and Russia have built upon the June 17, 1992, Joint Understanding in agreeing to the START II Treaty, so too should these governments promptly undertake discussions based on the Joint Statement to move forw ard cooperatively in the development and deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles.
At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of ratification, add the following new declaration:

(8) Report on use of foreign excess ballistic missiles for launch services: It is the sense of the Senate that the President should not issue licenses for the use of a foreign excess ballistic missile for launch services without first submitting a report to Congress, on a one-time basis, on the implications of the licensing approval on nonproliferation efforts under the Treaty and on the United States space launch industry.
At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of ratification, add the following new declaration:

(8) United states commitments ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces: The Senate declares that the United States is committed to ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces. To this end, the United States undertakes the following additional commitments:

(A) The United States is committed to proceeding with a robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, that will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuc lear arsenal at the START II levels and meet requirements for hedging against possible international developments or technical problems, in conformance with United States policies and to underpin deterrence.

(B) The United States is committed to reestablishing and maintaining sufficient levels of production to support requirements for the safety, reliability, and performance of United States nuclear weapons and demonstrate and sustain production capabilit ies and capacities.

(C) The United States is committed to maintaining United States nuclear weapons laboratories and protecting the core nuclear weapons competencies therein.

(D) As tritium is essential to the performance of modern nuclear weapons, but decays radioactively at a relatively rapid rate, and the United States now has no meaningful tritium production capacity, the United States is committed to ensuring rapid ac cess to a new production source of tritium within the next decade.

(E) As warhead design flaws or aging problems may occur that a robust stockpile stewardship program cannot solve, the United States reserves the right, consistent with United States law, to resume underground nuclear testing if that is necessary to ma intain confidence in the nuclear weapons stockpile. The United States is committed to maintaining the Nevada Test Site at a level in which the United States will be able to resume testing, within one year, following a national decision to do so.

(F) The United States reserves the right to invoke the supreme national interest of the United States to withdraw from any future arms control agreement to limit underground nuclear testing.

[Page: S19222]

CONDITION

(a) Conditions: The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the following condition, which shall be binding upon the President:

(1) Presidential certification and report on national technical means: Within ninety days after the United States deposits instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty, the President shall certify that U.S. National Technical Mea ns are sufficient to ensure effective monitoring of Russian compliance with the provisions of the Treaty governing the capabilities of strategic missile systems. This certification shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate of the United States indicating how U.S. National Technical Means, including collection, processing and analytic resources, will be marshalled to ensure effective monitoring. Such report may be supplemented by a classified annex, which shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would note that under the previous order those amendments are now agreed to.

So the amendment (No. 3111) was agreed to.

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Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.

Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. STEVENS. Was there a summary of those amendments and a explanation along with the Senator's submission?

Mr. LUGAR. I respond to the distinguished Senator that a summary was not included with the text.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent that we be permitted to insert in the Record an explanation of each of the provisions within that amendment.

There being no objection, the explanation was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Amendment Summaries

Amendment No. 1: Nothing in START II changes the rights of either party to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

Amendment No. 2: Adds the condition that the U.S. shall not implement START II reductions until the Treaty has entered into force.

Amendment No. 3: Requires the President to report yearly on symmetrical nuclear weapons reductions.

Amendment No. 4: Calls upon the President to consider whether to seek only those strategic future reductions consistent with U.S. National Security interests.

Amendment No. 5: States the compliance expectations of the Senate and asks for periodic updates from the administration on compliance issues.

Amendment No. 6: States the requirement for Senate advice and consent to any possible future amendments to START II.

Amendment No. 7: Discusses the compatibility of offensive deterrence and defenses against ballistic missiles, and calls upon the United States and Russia to implement the Bush/Yeltsin Joint Statement on a Global Protection System.

Amendment No. 8: Requests that the President suspend licenses for the use of foreign excess ballistic missiles until he submits a report to the Congress on the implications of the licensing approval on the American space launch industry and on n on-proliferation efforts.

Amendment No. 9: Declares the United States commitment to ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces. This includes declaring support for a new production source of tritium and maintaining the capability of resuming undergrou nd nuclear testing if there is a national decision to do so.

Amendment No. 10: Reviews Intelligence Committee issues.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, one more point of parliamentary inquiry. Is the status now of the START II Treaty proceedings at a point at which no further amendments are in order and the next stage of activity will be when the Senate is next in executive s ession and this is called forward, that 6 hours of debate plus potential unlimited time allotted to Senator Thurmond would be in order at that time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct, to the Chair's understanding.

Mr. LUGAR. Followed by disposition of the treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the Chair's understanding.

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.

I ask my distinguished colleague if he has further comment?

Mr. PELL. No, no further suggestions. Just to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Stevens, on guiding this legislation through. I thank my own staff, Bill Ashworth, very much indeed.

Mr. LUGAR. I join the distinguished Senator in thanking the minority staff. Of course I thank Kenny Myers and Lindon Brooks, who has been an able backup negotiator of this treaty.

In particular, my colleague from Alaska, Senator Stevens, who, in his cochairmanship of the Arms Control Observer Group, did a remarkable job in pulling this together for four sessions, with many Senators from both sides of the aisle, to think through the implications of this treaty, to refine the language of the managers' amendment that has been submitted and adopted today.

Does Senator Stevens have further comment?

Mr. STEVENS. No, Mr. President. I do not have. I am grateful for the comments of my two friends. I do have another statement if we are finished with this matter, though.

Mr. LUGAR. Is it relevant to START II?

Mr. STEVENS. No.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, for the moment I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. Let me ask the Chair, is it proper now to make statements on another matter?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will inform the Senator the Senate is still in executive session.