[FULL COMMITTEE PRINT]
103d Congress Report HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 103-562 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1995 June 27, 1994.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed Mr. Murtha, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany H.R. 4650] The Committee on Appropriations submits the following report in explanation of the accompanying bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense, and for other purposes, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995. FY95 HAC PAGE 1 BILL TOTALS Appropriations for most military functions of the Department of Defense are provided for in the accompanying bill for the fiscal year 1995. This bill does not provide appropriations for military construction, military family housing, civil defense, or nuclear warheads, for which requirements are considered in connection with other appropriations bills. The President's fiscal year 1995 budget request for activities funded in the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill totals $244,449,979,000 in new budget (obligational) authority. The amounts recommended by the Committee in the accompanying bill total $243,603,092,000 in new budget authority. This is $846,887,000 below the budget estimate and $3,523,447,000 above the sums made available for the same purposes for fiscal year 1994. The new budget authority enacted for the fiscal year 1994, the President's budget estimates, and amounts recommended by the Committee for the fiscal year 1995 appear in summary form in the following table: Insert offset folio 01 insert here ***TABLE GOES HERE*** FY95 HAC PAGE 4 PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE DEFENSE BUDGET POLICY IN THE POST-COLD-WAR ERA Over the years, the Committee and the Congress steadfastly supported a strong U.S. military defense posture based on quality personnel and superior technology. That strong defense posture has been a very important factor in bringing about the dramatic geopolitical events of the past five years including: -The tearing down of the Berlin Wall; -The demise of the Warsaw Pact; -The dissolution of the former Soviet Union; and -The emergence of democratic forces in many former totalitarian countries. In light of these geopolitical events, the Committee supports the downsizing of the U.S. force structure and the ensuing reductions in defense spending on the order of those proposed by the President. The Committee notes that the scope of these reductions combined with planned reductions in the years ahead will result in a very lean force. It is imperative that this force remain the best equipped and best trained force in the world. This presents a significant challenge in the years ahead under the tight budget constraints for overall discretionary spending embodied in the statutory discretionary spending caps (see p. 17). FY95 HAC PAGE 4 DEFENSE SPENDING TRENDS The President's fiscal year 1995 budget proposes and the bill implements the tenth consecutive year of reductions in budget authority for defense when measured in constant dollars.1 1Statistic does not include the one time spike in spending for Operations "Desert Shield'' and "Desert Storm''. These costs were reimbursed by donations from foreign nations. Defense spending levels are reaching historic lows. The 1995 spending level for defense as a percentage of the gross domestic product is projected to be the lowest it has been since before World War II with the exception of fiscal year 1948 (see following table). NATIONAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP/GDP [Current year dollars in billions] Fiscal year National defense outlays GNP/GDP Outlays as percent of GNP/GDP Fiscal year National defense outlays GDP Outlays as percent of GDP 1941 6.4 112.5 5.7 1971 78.9 1,050.9 7.5 1942 25.7 141.8 18.1 1972 79.2 1,147.8 6.9 1943 66.7 175.4 38.0 1973 76.7 1,274.0 6.0 1944 79.1 201.7 39.2 1974 79.3 1,403.6 5.7 1945 83.0 212.0 39.1 1975 86.5 1,509.8 5.7 1946 42.7 212.5 20.1 1976 89.6 1,684.2 5.3 1947 12.8 222.9 5.7 1977 97.2 1,917.2 5.1 1948 9.1 246.7 3.7 1978 104.5 2,155.0 4.8 1949 13.2 262.7 5.0 1979 116.3 2,429.5 4.8 1950 13.7 265.8 5.2 1980 134.0 2,644.1 5.1 1951 23.6 313.5 7.5 1981 157.5 2,964.4 5.3 1952 46.1 340.5 13.5 1982 185.3 3,122.2 5.9 1953 52.8 363.8 14.5 1983 209.9 3,316.5 6.3 1954 49.3 368.0 13.4 1984 227.4 3,695.0 6.2 1955 42.7 384.7 11.1 1985 252.7 3,967.7 6.4 1956 42.5 416.3 10.2 1986 273.4 4,219.0 6.5 1957 45.4 438.3 10.4 1987 282.0 4,452.4 6.3 1958 46.8 448.1 10.4 1988 290.4 4,808.4 6.0 1959 49.0 480.2 10.2 1989 303.6 5,173.3 5.9 1960 48.1 504.6 9.5 1990 297.9 5,481.5 5.4 1961 49.6 517.0 9.6 1991 296.7 5,673.3 5.2 1962 52.3 555.2 9.4 1992 286.1 5,987.2 4.8 1963 53.4 584.5 9.1 1993 283.9 6,294.8 4.5 1964 54.8 625.3 8.8 1994 277.0 6,641.2 4.2 1965 50.6 671.0 7.5 1995 269.7 7,022.0 3.8 1966 58.1 735.4 7.9 1996 260.5 7,418.9 3.5 1967 71.4 793.3 9.0 1997 256.4 7,841.5 3.3 1968 81.9 847.2 9.7 1998 256.6 8,284.9 3.1 1969 82.5 925.7 8.9 1999 257.5 8,750.3 2.9 1970 81.7 985.4 8.3 An additional burden faced in the defense budget is the billions of dollars of expenditures for programs which though necessary, do not directly contribute to national security. These expenditures are outlined in the following table which, in addition to this bill, includes expenditures in the Military Construction appropriations bill and the defense related portion of the Energy and Public Works appropriations bill. Program Dollars DoD Environmental Expenditures $4,800,000,000 DoD Economic Conversion 3,500,000,000 DoE Environmental Expenditures Related to Nuclear Programs 5,125,000,000 Military Construction Environmental Expenditures and Base Closure 2,875,000,000 Total 16,300,000,000 FY95 HAC PAGE 6 MILITARY PERSONNEL TRENDS (1) From fiscal year 1985 through fiscal year 1995 over 1,000,000 personnel have been reduced from the manpower levels of the active force, the Guard and Reserve and civilians employed by the DoD. (2) The projected fiscal year 1995 active duty end strength will be at the lowest point since 1950. (3) By 1999, the active duty end strength is slated to be reduced to the lowest it has been since before World War II. (4) Millions of additional jobs are being eliminated in the private sector as a result of these reductions. The following table displays the level of active duty personnel strength from 1950 to the turn of the century. FY95 HAC PAGE 6 ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL LEVELS, FISCAL YEAR 1950-99 (END-STRENGTH) Fiscal year: 1950 1,460,000 1951 3,249,000 1952 3,636,000 1953 3,555,000 1954 3,302,000 1955 2,935,000 1956 2,806,000 1957 2,796,000 1958 2,601,000 1959 2,504,000 1960 2,476,000 1961 2,484,000 1962 2,808,000 1963 2,700,000 1964 2,687,000 1965 2,655,000 1966 3,094,000 1967 3,377,000 1968 3,548,000 1969 3,459,000 1970 3,065,000 1971 2,713,000 1972 2,322,000 1973 2,252,000 1974 2,161,000 1975 2,127,000 1976 2,081,000 1977 2,073,000 1978 2,062,000 1979 2,024,000 1980 2,050,000 1981 2,071,000 1982 2,097,000 1983 2,124,000 1984 2,138,000 1985 2,152,000 1986 2,169,000 1987 2,174,000 1988 2,138,000 1989 2,130,000 1990 2,069,000 1991 2,002,000 1992 1,808,000 1993 1,705,000 1994 1,611,000 1995 1,526,000 1996 1,496,000 1997 1,469,000 1998 1,458,000 1999 1,453,000 During fiscal year 1995 DoD active duty personnel, Guard and Reserve and civilian end strength will be reduced by 180,000-i.e. 15,000 per month or 500 per day. AVERAGE MONTHLY NET PERSONNEL LOSSES DoD personnel Fiscal year 1995: Losses per month Active duty military -7,100 Reserve forces -3,800 Civilian personnel -4,100 Total per month -15,000 The Committee notes that after the large drawdown in FY 1995, DoD active duty personnel levels will start to stabilize in the 1996-1999 time frame. This will greatly reduce the potential for new defense savings to be available in future years. It will, however, have a positive effect on morale, quality of life, and overall combat readiness as the personnel "turbulence'' subsides. FY95 HAC PAGE 7 FORCE STRUCTURE The Committee is greatly concerned about the adequacy of the end strengths and force structure contemplated for the late 1990's given the range of current and potential global commitments. The major force structures now planned under the Bottom-up Review call for reductions of one-third (Navy ships) to almost one-half (Air Force wings) from the 1990 levels. U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE Cold War Base 1990 1993 1994 1995 Bottom up review plan Land Forces: Army active divisions 18 14 12 12 10 Army Reserve component divisions 10 10 8 8 5 Marine Corps (3 active/1 reserve) 4 4 4 4 4 Navy: Ship battle forces 546 435 387 373 1346 Aircraft carriers: Active 15 13 12 11 11 Reserve 1 1 1 Navy carrier wings: Active 13 11 11 10 10 Reserve 2 2 2 1 1 Air Force: Active fighter wings 24 16.1 13.4 13.0 13 Reserve fighter wings 12 11.3 8.7 7.5 7 Source: Department of Defense, February, 1994. 1Subsequent DoD budget plans reduce the total number to 331 ships by 1999. Many question whether this new force structure can meet the stated BUR objective of being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts almost simultaneously. Previous experience in Kuwait shows that under the BUR planning scenario, fighting and quickly winning one major regional conflict would absorb much of the U.S. active inventory. Little trained manpower, materiel, or mobility assets would remain to replace losses, deter other potential aggressors, or maintain a rotation base. Whether the U.S. could successfully counter a second major regional conflict almost simultaneously would depend on many factors including when, where, its size and nature, the extent of losses and duration of the first conflict, and support from other friendly countries. The Bottom-up Review accepts a higher degree of risk and uncertainty than we have had in the past which must be mitigated to the extent possible by maintaining and enhancing the quality of U.S. forces. America must continue to field well-trained, well-led forces which possess superior equipment. The Committee notes in this respect the following testimony it received on February 24, 1994 from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The forces and capabilities we are recommending and that Secretary Perry outlines are lean; in fact I would say very, very lean, but sufficient. Could we cut deeper? My answer is no. If we do, we will put our country in a straight jacket, one that will eliminate the flexibility and strategic agility that our Nation requires. The Committee expects the Department to continually review its force structure (including the roles and missions of various Service components) in view of changing world conditions and changing threats. The Department should not hesitate to recommend promptly any changes to its requirements if and when warranted. The U.S. must ensure that it does not end up with a policy-strategy-force mismatch in which commitments are made that cannot be kept. FY95 HAC PAGE 8 MODERNIZATION TRENDS The scope of the reductions in defense is especially noticeable in the procurement account as shown by the following table: BUDGET AUTHORITY FOR PROCUREMENT IN CONSTANT FISCAL YEAR 1995 DOLLARS Fiscal year: In billions 1985 $132.7 1986 122.8 1987 102.8 1988 98.8 1989 94.5 1990 93.7 1991 80.2 1992 68.5 1993 55.9 1994 45.8 1995 43.3 Reduction from fiscal year 1985 level 89.4 While the current low levels of procurement are generally acceptable given current inventory and the significant drawdown in force structure, the Committee believes it is vital that the relatively small U.S. force structure of the future retain its technological edge. Budget realities make it more important than ever that the new capabilities to be acquired address the threats of the future and not the past. It is especially important to make the modernization investments necessary for "force multipliers'' such as precision-guided munitions, sophisticated communications systems, and improved intelligence collecting capabilities. The Future Years Defense Plan depends heavily on the successful deployment of such force enhancements as: -Advanced munitions like the CBU-97B Sensor-Fused Weapon to give aircraft the capability to disable or destroy multiple vehicles in a single pass; -The Joint Direct Attack Munition to allow aircraft to accurately deliver ordnance without laser designation; -New sensors for electronic surveillance of the battlefield to provide adverse weather surveillance at increased depths and with wide-area, continuous coverage; -The MIA2 tank which can increase the lethality of a tank company by 20 percent compared to those equipped with MIA1 tanks; -Planned improvements to sealift and airlift capabilities with faster, bigger ships, and new, highly capable aircraft; -Enhanced equipment prepositioning to strengthen U.S. defensive capabilities in the critical opening phase of a conflict; -Enhanced readiness brigades in Army reserve components to provide critical depth to Army combat power; -Theater ballistic missile defense systems to better protect U.S. forces on land and at sea; -Stealth technology. These and other technology enhancements combined with new concepts of operation and organization to take advantage of this technology have the potential of giving American forces new, far-reaching and effective warfighting capabilities with relatively small numbers of personnel and equipment. Successful technology development, deployment and exploitation is key to doing "more with less'' in the years ahead. THREATS HAVE NOT EVAPORATED In historical perspective and in the perspective of America's total wealth, the funds provided in this budget for defense are comparatively modest. There are those who would argue that because of the demise of the Soviet Union, reductions in defense spending should be even deeper than the significant reductions outlined in the President's plan. Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War has not brought about a tranquil era in the world. Interestingly, the major engagements and deployments of U.S. forces in the past decade or so have had little to do with fighting communism: -The attack on Libya; -The invasion of Panama; -The Persian Gulf War; -The deployment to Somalia; and -Sanctions enforcement against the Republic of Yugoslavia. Each passing day brings home the point that the post-Cold War era may well be a volatile and dangerous time. Ethnic, cultural, and religious enmities exist and are increasing in the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East. At least 20 countries-many of them hostile to the U.S.-have now or are seeking to develop nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons and the means to deliver them. More than 12 countries have operational ballistic missiles, and others have programs to develop them. There is no question that America, as the world's only superpower, must maintain an adequate and robust national defense posture in this era of change and turbulence. The need to be prepared was expressed succinctly by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Committee on February 24, 1994: Since our Nation was founded, we have never experienced a 20-year period of uninterrupted peace. Put another way, no soldier in this country's history has ever completed a military career when the Nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once. This is the reality that underscores our need to remain ready. READINESS FY95 HAC PAGE 10 NO HOLLOW FORCE Our country has in the past allowed the combat readiness of our armed forces to lapse into a hollow force after every major war. America frequently paid a high price in lifeblood and treasure when the next conflict erupted. The Committee heard the following testimony on this point from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: All of you know what we went through after World War II, after Korea, and again after Vietnam. It was a cycle of declines followed by disaster that we cannot and we must not repeat. The Committee is concerned about early signs of new readiness problems after the end of the Cold War. For instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reported recently that: -the transfer of operation and maintenance readiness funds to support unbudgeted operations in Somalia, the Persian Gulf, the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and other contingencies has reduced the overall operational readiness of U.S. forces; -military recruiters are citing a growing negative trend in their ability to recruit the desired number and mix of qualified personnel; -the tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) which has increased over the past three years and is projected to remain high in the future, has and will continue to divert time as well as funds from necessary training and maintenance activities; -the increased OPTEMPO has caused Navy and Marine deployment times for many units to exceed optimal goals, raising concerns over morale and leaving less time for training in warfighting skills; -the combination of increased equipment operating hours and deferred maintenance due to lack of funds is creating an equipment maintenance backlog that reduces readiness; -shortages are beginning to appear for critical spare parts; -facility maintenance backlogs are growing at high rates, which reduce readiness. The Committee commends the administration for recognizing these early signs and for taking action to break this "boom and bust'' readiness cycle by proposing a defense budget that places top priority on improving readiness. The Secretary of Defense stated this objective in testimony to the Committee earlier this year: The Defense guidance for the first time in history this year called out on the first page of the guidance that readiness is the top priority of the Defense Department and went on to say, any other requirement we put forward in this document may be traded off in favor of readiness. That guidance reflects itself in services submissions to us which show increases in funding for readiness this year over previous years. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also stressed this change of priority when he testified as follows: Our O&M budget authority will rise in fiscal year 1995 and it fully funds the steaming days, the training hours, and the flight hours at the levels that military commanders believe are essential. As well, the increase in depot maintenance funding of nearly 20 percent will go a long way to ensuring that our equipment is ready to fight. The point is that we are breaking the bad habits that undermined readiness in the past. The Committee heartily endorses this administration initiative. Keeping U.S. military forces ready to fight has been a top defense priority of the Committee on Appropriations for many years. Although this is a good start, reversing the latest readiness trends will require higher funding levels over several years. The Committee is concerned that this commitment will become more and more difficult to keep in the years ahead as the cap on discretionary spending continues to cut real spending power over the next four years (See p. 17). This may require deferral or outright cancellation of important modernization acquisitions that are in the current FY 1995-1999 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The Committee expects the administration to "stay the course'' in the years ahead by continuing to emphasize readiness as a budget priority. FY95 HAC PAGE 12 COMMITTEE READINESS INITIATIVES The Committee has fully funded the administration's 1995 readiness requests in the Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance appropriation accounts. The administration's budget request increases constant dollar operating resources by +14% per Army combat battalion, +11% per Navy ship, +12% per Air Force aircraft between FY 1993 and FY 1995. To further strengthen the administration's initiative, the Committee recommends major readiness enhancements totaling over $3,400,000,000 over the budget request in the following areas: +$607,000,000 for depot maintenance; +$517,000,000 for real property maintenance; +$17,000,000 for recruiting and advertising; +$90,000,000 for war reserve spare parts; +$465,000,000 for military pay increases; +$250,000,000 for a new Korean Readiness Enhancement Account; +$400,000,000 for ammunition; +$310,000,000 for increased unit training and support; +$250,000,000 for Sealift; +$530,000,000 for civilian pay increases. The Committee notes that the FY 1994-98 discretionary budget caps call for a total $72 billion constant dollar reduction in discretionary spending over five years. This will place severe strains on maintaining necessary combat readiness levels in the years ahead. Nevertheless, the Committee believes readiness must continue to be a top budget priority in future budgets. FY95 HAC PAGE 12 IMPROVED READINESS RATINGS The Committee supports DoD efforts to develop better methods to measure the combat readiness of U.S. forces. Current readiness measures are rough guides at best in predicting how well U.S. forces are prepared to fulfill potential missions. Current readiness measures focus only on front line assets while omitting training bases and other essential overhead that amounts to 40 to 50% of the active force. These measures also focus on the status of individual units, but rarely rate the adequacy of overall force structures. They also depend on certain non-standard qualitative assessments by commanding officers who possess different degrees of experience, apply different criteria and make subjective judgements. Peacetime and wartime standards are also dissimilar in many instances. The Committee believes it would be beneficial if better readiness measures could be developed against which resources could be applied and upon which budget decisions could be based. The Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff should give high priority to ongoing efforts such as those of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council which is undertaking this task. The Committee expects the Department to work towards formalizing a budget process for the Operation and Maintenance account that is based on comprehensive and quantitative readiness measures that can be expected to reasonably predict the readiness of U.S. forces under different resource assumptions. The Committee recommends that the FY 1997 Operation and Maintenance budget justification documents contain a new readiness exhibit which displays: -historical readiness trends on a yearly basis measured by new analytical ratings; -the priority ranking of each performance measure for achieving the desired level of force readiness; -the proposed performance level against each quantitative measure for the coming budget year and the specific resources proposed to be appropriated to achieve each objective; -a detailed assessment of actual readiness performance in the previous year as measured against the performance objectives assumed in the applicable Appropriations Act including specific reasons for not reaching any of the objectives. The Committee realizes that other DoD appropriation accounts have significant impacts on force readiness. The Committee will review extending the concept of readiness budgeting for non-Operation and Maintenance accounts as new performance measures are developed and perfected. FY95 HAC PAGE 13 KOREAN READINESS ENHANCEMENT ACCOUNT Despite the recent flurry of diplomatic activities, the Committee is concerned about the increased tension on the Korean peninsula subsequent to the submission of the FY 1995 budget. The intransigence of the North Koreans regarding inspection of their nuclear facilities has ominous implications for stability in Asia. While the Committee supports the ongoing diplomatic efforts to resolve this matter, we must ensure that U.S. forces have the resources to meet any contingency that might rise. The commanders of the ROK/US Combined Forces have long recognized the threats they face and have made extensive preparations to deter, and if necessary, to defeat a North Korean attack. To buttress these preparations, the bill appropriates an additional $250,000,000 for a new Korean Readiness Enhancement Account in Title VI. A portion of these funds is for improving the logistics support system and enhancing tactical intelligence and communications capabilities. Funds are also appropriated towards the fiscal year 1995 expenses of the Administration's recent initiative to deploy Patriot missiles and Apache helicopters to the Korean peninsula. Many other Committee initiatives in numerous accounts will also enhance the readiness of U.S. forces in South Korea. This includes additional funds to maintain the B-52 bomber force at existing levels. The Committee is committed and will strongly support all necessary requirements to maintain and enhance the combat strength and readiness of U.S. forces in Korea. The Committee believes an increased level of commitment must also be shown by the Republic of Korea. The Committee has received testimony indicating that South Korea recently has made important strides in focusing its resources on key military capabilities. However, certain ROK military deficiencies still exist. The Committee believes it is prudent for South Korea to increase its financial commitment to modernize its ground forces and improve readiness in a manner that maximizes the capabilities of the ROK-US combined defense structure. Additional details on the Korean Readiness Enhancement Account appear later in the report. FY95 HAC PAGE 14 RESERVE COMPONENTS An increasingly important segment of the overall readiness of our Armed Forces is the Reserve components. For example, a comparison of the active force level vis-a-vis the Reserve components during the 1987-1997 time frame, shows that while the active force will have declined from 2.2 million to 1.5 million, the Selected Reserves will decrease from 1.2 million to 934,000. In other words, while the active force declines by 32%, the Reserve components declines by 19%. See following table: ACTIVE VS RESERVE FORCE LEVELS Actual fiscal year 1987 Projected fiscal year 1997 Difference Difference (percentage) Active 2,174,000 1,469,000 -705,000 -32 Selected Reserve1 1,151,000 934,000 -217,000 -19 1Selected Reserves do not include Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard. In recent years, the Department of Defense has placed a greater portion of the combat support and combat service support force structure in the Reserve components. The success of this concept was proven during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Based on this success, the Department plans to place an even greater reliance on the Reserve components in the future, including enhanced readiness for 15 combat maneuver brigades with deployment times reduced to 90 days. The Committee has taken initiatives to enhance the readiness and effectiveness of the Guard and Reserves including a pay raise and a substantial increase in the procurement account for high priority equipment. FY95 HAC PAGE 14 PREVIOUS COMMITTEE INITIATIVES The Committee is proud of its record of oversight of Defense activities. Over the years, the Committee has made many important adjustments to Defense budgets which have contributed greatly to the ability of our forces to successfully prosecute their mission. For instance, the Committee was responsible for changing DoD acquisition plans to add such important capabilities as: -Patriot missile batteries; -Fast "roll-on/roll-off'' sealift ships; -M1 tank upgrades; -Bradley Fighting Vehicle upgrades; and -Heavy trucks; which were all credited as major contributors towards victory in Operation Desert Storm. The Committee's insistence on higher readiness expenditures over the years has resulted in a better trained and better prepared force with higher morale. The Committee has accelerated development of the JSTARS surveillance aircraft, and in previous years has prevented the premature cancellation of such important programs as the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior armed scout helicopter, the F-16 fighter, and MLRS rockets until more satisfactory inventory postures were achieved. The Committee has initiated important programs such as Ship Self Defense to guard against cruise missile attacks, the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, the M1-A2 tank upgrade, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle upgrades, military pay raises, ammunition stockpile modernization, various health care improvements, environmental clean-up research, and simulation training technologies. Technological initiatives of the Committee such as Sematech, high definition flat panel displays, and efforts to increase the number of U.S. science and engineering students have moved forward the state-of-the-art in several critical technology areas and have protected and expanded American jobs and the American technological base. FY95 HAC PAGE 15 MAJOR FY 1995 COMMITTEE INITIATIVES For FY 1995, the Committee recommends several significant initiatives: Korean Enhanced Readiness: In light of recent events, the bill provides $250 million for a new account to enhance the readiness of U.S. forces in Korea. Funds are expected to upgrade logistics systems, improve communications and intelligence gathering capabilities, and modernize base support equipment. In addition, funds are included elsewhere in the bill to maintain the B-52 bomber force at existing levels. This is an increase of 10 primary authorized aircraft over the budget request. Depot Maintenance: The bill includes a $607 million increase over the budget request for depot maintenance to reduce the $2 billion depot maintenance backlog. This is expected to significantly enhance the readiness of field units. Real Property Maintenance: The bill includes a $517 million increase over the budget request for real property maintenance. The Committee continues to be concerned about the growth of the real property maintenance backlog and its effect on morale. The projected backlog for fiscal year 1995 amounts to over $12 billion. Since fiscal year 1993, the backlog has grown 33%. Of particular concern to the Committee is the condition of barracks and dormitories at many of the installations. In the reserve components, many of the armories and Reserve centers are also in need of repair. Ammunition Industrial Base: The Committee recommends an increase above the budget of $400 million to support and sustain the fragile ammunition industrial base. The recommended action procures additional training and war reserve ammunition, accelerates disposal of unusable munitions, and increases the level of production facility consolidation and layaway. Small Arms Industrial Base: The Committee recommends increases in production levels for six Army small arms weapon procurement programs. These increases sustain industrial production and engineering capability while filling existing requirements for these weapons. Increased Training Support: The bill includes a $310 million increase over the budget to increase training for battalion-sized units and to support exercises that foster intra/interservice teamwork. Increased War Reserve Spare Parts: The bill includes $90 million above the budget for important war reserve stocks. Military Pay Raise: The bill includes a $465 million increase above the budget to finance an additional 1 percent increase in pay for active, Guard and Reserve forces. This would bring the total increase to 2.6 percent. Civilian Pay Raise: The bill includes a $530 million increase above the budget to finance an additional 0.4 percent increase in pay for civilian employees. This would bring the total increase to 2 percent. These funds would also finance one-half of the scheduled increase for civilian locality pay adjustments. The budget proposed no increases for locality pay. Intelligence: The bill reduces funds for the National Foreign Intelligence Program by over $400 million below the budget request. Early Warning Satellite Systems: The bill includes a $180 million increase above the budget to accelerate the new ALARM missile early warning satellite system. This will permit early fielding of an improved capability to detect the firing of mobile theater ballistic missiles. DoD Space Programs: The bill strengthens DoD space programs by adding $140 million above the budget for upgrading launch vehicles. The bill also centralizes DoD-wide space procurement and research and development funding, and terminates the Titan IV program after completion of the current contract. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense: The bill includes a $102 million increase above the budget to accelerate the Sea-Based Wide Area Defense (Navy Upper Tier) program which will provide ballistic missile protection from AEGIS ships. The bill also fully funds the next-generation ERINT and Patriot programs for ground-based ballistic missile protection. Strategic Mobility: In keeping with the Committee's longstanding commitment to improve critical mobility forces, the bill provides $250 million above the budget to continue the expansion of U.S. organic sealift capability. The bill improves strategic and theater airlift capabilities by providing funds to acquire six C-17 aircraft and a total of ten C-130 aircraft for Reserve components. The bill also provides the full budget request to support continued prepositioning of heavy equipment, ammunition, and sustaining supplies both ashore in host-nation facilities and afloat in specially configured ships. TSSAM Missile: The bill provides no additional funds for the Tri-service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) program. This program has experienced large cost overruns and years of schedule delay. Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles: The bill provides $37 million to convert strategic air-launched cruise missiles that are currently in the inventory to stand-off conventional missiles. This will provide the B-52 bomber fleet with a low-cost precision guided weapon years earlier than currently planned. There was no budget request for this item. FY95 HAC PAGE 17 TRACK RECORD ON DISCRETIONARY SPENDING The Committee on Appropriations has done its job in controlling overall discretionary spending. The following table displays spending in constant dollars from 1968 through 1998. The projections for the outyears are based on the agreements embodied in law and in the fiscal year 1995 budget resolution. As the table indicates, the total growth in discretionary spending over this thirty year period is 0%. This is truly remarkable given the changes in the country and the world over this time period. The projected annual expenditure level for discretionary spending for fiscal year 1998 is over $100 billion below the fiscal year 1989 level-the year the Berlin Wall came down. There is no question that recent deficit reduction efforts which have required the discretionary spending category to bear a very large share of spending cuts have forced and will continue to force deep and perhaps unwise reductions in national security programs as well as other vital domestic and international discretionary programs. OUTLAYS FOR MAJOR SPENDING CATEGORIES FISCAL YEARS 1968-1998 [In billions of constant 1994 dollars] Discretionary spending Entitlements and other mandatory spending Deposit insurance Net interest Offsetting receipts Total outlays 1968 486.1 223.3 -2.1 44.2 -42.3 709.2 1969 464.8 234.3 -2.3 48.4 -42.1 702.8 1970 454.7 250.7 -1.8 52.5 -41.9 714.2 1971 443.4 288.4 -1.3 51.8 -49.1 733.1 1972 448.1 325.9 -2.0 52.1 -47.5 776.6 1973 437.0 363.3 -2.6 56.2 -58.3 795.5 1974 425.3 379.4 -1.8 64.0 -63.1 803.7 1975 441.1 446.4 1.4 63.1 -49.7 902.2 1976 446.5 482.5 -1.5 68.0 -49.9 945.6 1977 466.3 488.8 -6.6 70.7 -50.9 968.2 1978 486.1 507.6 -2.2 78.8 -50.7 1,019.6 1979 489.8 506.5 -3.6 87.0 -52.2 1,027.5 1980 507.7 535.4 -0.7 96.5 -53.5 1,085.2 1981 514.3 568.5 -2.3 114.8 -63.2 1,131.9 1982 508.7 581.3 -3.3 132.6 -56.2 1,163.1 1983 527.8 614.7 -1.7 134.1 -67.7 1,207.2 1984 543.9 582.0 -1.2 159.2 -63.4 1,220.4 1985 575.1 621.8 -3.0 178.9 -65.1 1,307.7 1986 591.9 619.8 2.0 183.4 -61.9 1,335.2 1987 583.1 616.2 4.1 181.7 -69.4 1,315.6 1988 585.4 622.1 12.6 191.1 -71.7 1,339.4 1989 588.4 632.3 26.4 203.4 -76.8 1,373.8 1990 574.3 649.5 66.5 210.9 -67.3 1,433.9 1991 582.7 691.0 72.3 212.0 -115.5 1,442.5 1992 566.9 752.7 2.8 210.9 -72.8 1,460.5 1993 556.8 782.3 -28.7 204.1 -68.9 1,445.6 19941 544.3 801.9 -3.5 201.2 -68.1 1,475.7 19951 530.0 832.0 -11.8 207.5 -82.4 1,475.3 19961 513.9 846.7 -13.2 216.7 -67.5 1,496.5 19971 498.7 881.9 -5.5 220.3 -68.7 1,526.8 19981 485.1 913.1 -4.3 223.3 -70.7 1,546.5 Percentage change 1968-1998 0 +309 +405 +118 1Projection (April 1994). Source: Congressional Budget Office. FY95 HAC PAGE 18 HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL The Committee recommends a total of $61,558,057,000 for military personnel, an increase of $378,754,000 above the budget request. The Committee agrees with the authorized end strength as requested in the President's budget. The Committee added $406,000,000 above the budget request, for a 2.6 percent pay increase for fiscal year 1995 for active military personnel. FY95 HAC PAGE 18 GUARD AND RESERVE The Committee recommends a total of $9,335,445,000, an increase of $39,351,000 above the budget request for Guard and Reserve personnel. The Committee agrees with the authorized end strength as requested in the President's budget, but added additional end strength in the Air Force Reserve for restoration of programs that were deleted. The Committee added $59,000,000 for a 2.6 percent pay increase for fiscal year 1995 for Guard and Reserve personnel. FY95 HAC PAGE 18 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE The Operation and Maintenance appropriation provides the resources necessary to maintain high readiness of our Armed Forces and to provide a quality of life of our military personnel, their families and civilian employees. The Committee recommends over $2 billion in increases above the budget for key readiness activities. Substantial reductions were made in lower priority programs such as consultants, auditors, environmental programs and automatic data processing. Substantial savings were also realized because of faster than projected attrition of civilian personnel. FY95 HAC PAGE 18 PROCUREMENT The Committee recommends $43,651,019,000 in new obligational authority for procurement. Major programs funded in the bill include the following: $388,559,000 for 60 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters. $225,000,000 for 36 AHIP helicopter modifications. $214,086,000 for 872 Javelin missiles. $115,858,000 for 148 ATACMS missiles. $145,438,000 for the Bradley base sustainment. $237,603,000 for the 155MM Howitzer Improvement Program. $190,129,000 for the MIA2 Tank Upgrade Program. $1,274,644,000 for Army ammunition. $145,744,000 for 4 AV-8B aircraft. $1,018,760,000 for 24 F/A-18 aircraft. $216,721,000 for 18 AH-1W helicopters. $214,000,000 for 7 SH-60B helicopters. $297,828,000 for 4 E-2C aircraft. $245,400,000 for 12 T-45 trainer aircraft. $1,161,434,000 for aircraft modifications. $696,018,000 for 18 Trident II missiles. $301,993,000 for 217 Tomahawk missiles. $249,072,000 for 202 Standard missiles. $2,446,958,000 for the carrier replacement program. $2,607,690,000 for 3 DDG-51 destroyers. $2,197,214,000 for 6 C-17 aircraft. $253,428,000 for trainer aircraft systems. $445,339,000 for 2 E-8 JSTARS aircraft. $299,462,000 for 413 AMRAAM missiles. FY95 HAC PAGE 19 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVALUATION The Committee recommends $34,467,940,000 for the RDT&E title, a reduction of $1,757,073,000 from the budget request. Specific recommendations for selected programs are as follows: The Committee provided an increase of $92,200,000 for ship-self defense efforts in the Navy and ARPA. The Committee provided $277,164,000 for manufacturing technology programs, an increase of $159,943,000 to the budget request. The Committee provided $201,391,000, the budget request, for the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program and followed the recommendation of the House Armed Services Committee to consolidate the Navy/ARPA Advanced Short Take Off and Landing (ASTOVL) program into JAST. The Committee provided a general reduction of $900,000,000 to university research due to fiscal constraints. The Committee denied all funds to continue development of the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile, a reduction of $230,183,000 to the budget request. The Committee provided $525,182,000, the budget request, for the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter. The Committee provided $175,476,000, the budget request, for the Armored System Modernization program. The Committee also added $20,500,000 to accelerate the Bradley upgrade program. The Committee provided $115,857,000, an increase of $40,000,000 to the budget request, for Digitization. The Committee has provided an increase of $237,000,000 for major Army medical research including AIDS, breast cancer and other cancers. The Committee provided $408,659,000, a decrease of $100,000,000 to the budget request for development of the New Attack Submarine. The Committee provided $1,423,875,000, an increase of $15,000,000 to the budget request for development of the F/A-18E/F aircraft. The Committee provided $496,930,000, the budget request, for the V-22 medium lift aircraft for the Marine Corps. The Committee provided $171,689,000, the budget request, for F-14 aircraft development. The Committee provided $105,154,000 for continued development and testing of the C-17 airlift aircraft, a reduction of $116,300,000 to the budget request. The Committee provided $2,443,349,000 for continued development of the F-22 fighter aircraft, a reduction of $17,800,000 to the budget request. The Committee provided $74,119,000, the budget request, for development of upgrades to the B-1B bomber aircraft. The Committee provided $408,543,000, the budget request, for development and testing of the B-2 bomber aircraft. The Committee provided $92,950,000 for development of high definition displays, an increase of $25,000,000 to the budget request. The Committee provided $2,491,762,000 for Ballistic Missile Defense, a reduction of $488,093,000 to the budget request. The Committee denied the request of $97,057,000 for a departmental level manufacturing technology program, and provided funds in the Service accounts instead. The Committee transferred $130,000,000 for the High Performance Computing Modernization Program to the Procurement, Defensewide appropriation. The Committee transferred $731,600,000 requested for defense reinvestment funds to a separate title. FY95 HAC PAGE 20 COMMITTEE BUDGET REVIEW PROCESS During the regular review of the fiscal year 1995 budget, the Subcommittee on Defense held hearings during the time period of February 24, 1994 to May 4, 1994. Testimony received by the Subcommittee totalled approximately 2,200 pages of transcript. Of the total some 200 pages will not be printed due to the security classification of the material discussed. Almost 44 percent of the hearings were held in open session. Executive or closed sessions were held only when the security classification of the material to be discussed presented no alternative. FY95 HAC PAGE 20 UNOBLIGATED AND UNEXPENDED BALANCES The following tables compare the unobligated and unexpended balances for the military functions of the Department of Defense over the past 28 years for the entire Defense Budget and the accounts covered by this bill. The unobligated balances associated with the accounts covered by this bill are projected to decrease between the end of fiscal year 1993 and the end of fiscal year 1995 from $51.4 billion to $26.2 billion. The unexpended balances at the end of fiscal year 1993 and the end of fiscal year 1995 are projected to decrease from $196.8 billion to $158.1 billion. UNOBLIGATED BALANCES, FISCAL YEARS 1967-94 [In millions of dollars] Fiscal year Total unobligated balance1 Pertaining to appropriations in the basic DoD appropriations bill At the end of fiscal year: 1967 13,725 12,244 1968 13,494 11,666 1969 13,669 12,022 1970 13,565 11,966 1971 11,463 9,689 1972 10,203 8,319 1973 10,911 9,009 1974 13,393 11,131 1975 15,375 12,795 1976 18,655 15,697 1977 17,651 15,613 1978 18,531 16,772 1979 17,862 16,158 1980 19,369 17,750 1981 23,239 21,369 1982 31,354 28,025 1983 39,710 35,716 1984 47,817 43,617 1985 54,857 50,704 1986 53,449 50,210 1987 43,336 40,528 1988 39,010 36,169 1989 39,553 34,695 1990 39,996 34,927 1991 70,355 64,538 1992 54,949 49,668 1993 57,327 51,389 1994 estimate 34,989 29,126 1995 estimate 30,476 26,160 1Basic and military construction bills Note.-Unobligated balances for revolving funds and trust funds are excluded from this table, the 1993 unobligated balance includes $10,457 for expired accounts. UNEXPENDED BALANCES, FISCAL YEARS 1967-94 [In millions of dollars] Fiscal year Total unexpended balance1 Pertaining to appropriations in the basic DoD appropriations bill At the end of fiscal year: 1967 42,541 39,937 1968 43,225 40,111 1969 40,957 38,157 1970 37,394 35,755 1971 33,814 30,953 1972 33,829 30,614 1973 37,143 33,462 1974 40,569 36,522 1975 40,515 35,977 1976 47,539 42,964 1977 58,616 53,785 1978 69,125 64,632 1979 77,423 72,619 1980 84,118 79,658 1981 102,087 96,535 1982 129,855 122,075 1983 159,792 150,605 1984 190,409 180,218 1985 226,231 214,607 1986 235,160 223,587 1987 240,141 229,140 1988 240,722 230,211 1989 234,911 223,991 1990 235,437 224,856 1991 255,332 243,112 1992 231,223 217,436 1993 207,602 196,775 1994 estimate 179,333 164,756 1995 estimate 172,558 158,143 1Basic and military construction bills. Note.-Unexpended balances for revolving funds, trust funds and unfunded contract authority are excluded from this table. A great deal of the unexpended balances represent legally binding documents calling for ultimate cash payment (unliquidated obligations) such as contracts for ship, aircraft, or missile construction. (Such major weapons systems are normally funded even though deliveries may not occur for 2 or 3 years.) The remaining unobligated balances represent amounts which are made available to fund approved programs, but which are not yet obligated in the technical legal sense. By and large, these funds are committed to the programs for which initially appropriated, awaiting the completion of the contracting or other legal prerequisites of obligations. FY95 HAC PAGE 22 REPROGRAMMING ACTIONS APPLICABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT Throughout the fiscal year, the Department of Defense is given authority to reprogram or transfer funds to programs considered by DOD to be of higher priority. As in any financial plan, funding requirements change during the fiscal year making it necessary to institute certain adjustments. While the Committee realizes a certain degree of flexibility is needed in any budget plan, it feels these reprogramming actions should be kept to an absolute minimum. The programming actions consist of reprogrammings requiring specific congressional approval, reprogrammings requiring congressional notification and reprogrammings able to be carried forth by the Department of Defense without congressional action or notification. As is reflected in the following table, for fiscal year 1993, a total of 502 reprogramming actions were implemented by the Department of Defense totaling some $3,026,000,000. REPROGRAMMING ACTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1987-93 [Dollars in millions] Fiscal year Number of actions Total amount 1987: Requiring congressional action 45 1,705 Not requiring congressional action 620 1,726 1988: Requiring congressional action 51 3,506 Not requiring congressional action 547 1,512 1989: Requiring congressional action 35 2,564 Not requiring congressional action 640 1,501 1990: Requiring congressional action 32 3,251 Not requiring congressional action 628 1,652 1991: Requiring congressional action 13 3,369 Not requiring congressional action 559 1,401 1992: Requiring congressional action 2 1,238 Not requiring congressional action 492 1,152 1993: Requiring congressional action 5 1,822 Not requiring congressional action 497 1,204 FY95 HAC PAGE 23 FORCES TO BE SUPPORTED DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY The fiscal year 1995 budget is designed to support active Army forces of 12 divisions, 2 separate brigades and 3 armored cavalry regiments, and reserve forces of 8 divisions, 14 separate brigades, 7 roundout/roundup brigades to active divisions and 1 armored cavalry regiment. These forces provide the minimum force necessary to remain a superpower, meet enduring defense needs, and execute the National Military Strategy. A summary of the major active forces follows: Fiscal year 1992 1993 1994 1995 Divisions: Airborne 1 1 1 1 Air Assault 1 1 1 1 Light 4 4 3 2 Infantry 1 1 1 1 Mechanized 5 4 4 4 Armored 2 3 3 3 Total 14 14 13 12 Non divisional Combat units: Armored cavalry regiments 3 3 3 3 Separate brigades 4 4 4 2 Total 7 7 7 5 Active duty military personnel, end strength (thousands) 611.3 575 540 510 FY95 HAC PAGE 23 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY The fiscal year 1995 budget supports ship battle forces totalling 373 ships at the end of fiscal year 1995, a decrease from fiscal year 1994. Forces in fiscal year 1995 include 16 strategic ships, 11 aircraft carriers, 292 other battleforce ships, 37 support ships, 17 reserve force ships, 1846 Navy/Marine Corps tactical/ASW aircraft, 636 Undergraduate Training aircraft, 447 Fleet Air Support aircraft, 447 Fleet Air Training aircraft, 464 Reserve aircraft, 181 RDT&E aircraft, and 482 aircraft in the pipeline. A summary of major forces follows: Fiscal year- 1993 1994 1995 Strategic Forces 24 18 16 Submarines 22 16 16 Other 2 2 0 SLBM Launchers (MIRV) 464 376 384 General Purpose 342 314 303 Aircraft Carriers 13 12 11 Surface Combatants 124 110 115 Submarines 88 87 83 Amphibious Warfare Ships 54 41 39 Combat Logistics Ships 50 47 42 Other 13 15 13 Support Forces 51 41 37 Mobile Logistics Ships 17 14 11 Support Ships 34 27 26 Mobilization Category A 18 16 17 Aircraft Carriers 1 Surface Combatants 16 16 14 Amphibious Warfare Ships 2 0 0 Mine Warfare 0 0 2 Total Ships, Battle Force 435 387 373 Total Local Defense/Misc Forces 153 156 166 Auxiliaries/Sealift Forces 136 147 154 Surface Combatant Ships 0 1 3 Coastal Defense 2 8 13 Mobilization Category B 15 0 1 Surface Combatants 8 0 0 Mine Warfare Ships 5 0 1 Support Ships 2 0 0 Naval Aircraft: Primary Authorized (Plus-Pipe) 5,333 4,841 4,503 Authorized Pipeline 629 518 482 Tactical/ASW Aircraft 2,131 1,944 1,846 Fleet Air Training 532 490 447 Fleet Air Support 490 463 447 Training (Undergraduate) 707 666 636 Reserve 613 565 464 Research and Development 231 195 181 Naval Personnel: Active 726,511 708,300 654,900 Navy 509,950 471,476 441,641 Marine Corps 184,590 181,900 174,100 Reserve: Navy 132,395 113,400 100,710 SELRES 110,937 94,031 83,200 FTS (TARS) 21,458 19,369 17,510 FY95 HAC PAGE 25 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE The fiscal year 1994 Air Force Budget was designed to support a total active inventory force structure of 52 fighter and attack squadrons, 10 Air National Guard air defense interceptor squadrons and 7 bomber squadrons, including B-2's, B-1's and B-52's. The Minuteman and Peacekeeper ICBM forces will consist of 580 active launchers. A summary of the major forces as proposed in the President's Budget follows: Fiscal year 1992 1993 1994 1995 USAF fighter and attack squadrons (Active) 58 58 52 52 Air defense interceptor squadrons (ANG) 12 12 10 10 Strategic bomber squadrons (Active) 18 15 15 7 ICBM Launchers/silos 1,000 1,000 1,000 700 ICBM Missile Boosters 912 787 667 580 USAF airlift squadrons (Active): Strategic airlift 20 17 17 15 Tactical airlift 12 11 11 11 Total airlift 32 28 28 26 Total active inventory1 7,642 7,572 7,345 7,009 1Includes Active, ANG, AFRES-Except foreign government operated aircraft. End strength 1993 1994 1995 Active duty 444,900 425,700 400,051 Reserve component 201,600 199,200 194,000 Air National Guard 119,300 117,700 115,581 Air Force Reserve 82,300 81,500 78,706 FY95 HAC PAGE 25 NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) requests growth in fiscal year 1995 when compared with actual appropriations in fiscal year 1994. As discussed under Title VII in this report and in the classified report which accompanies it, the Committee has recommended a net reduction to the NFIP of over $400 million. This will provide robust funding for critically important intelligence programs while holding the total program funding to the fiscal year 1994 level. FY95 HAC PAGE 25 SPACE AND RELATED PROGRAMS ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT INTRODUCTION In fiscal year 1995 the Department of Defense and the intelligence community will spend $13.5 billion for space programs. Even with the projected decline in overall national security spending, it is doubtful that space programs will decrease below that amount for the foreseeable future. As discussed last year, the Committee has become increasingly concerned that the basic processes which govern military and intelligence space programs have become ineffective and costly. While the individual programs are, in most instances, well designed and managed, there is inadequate coordination between programs, poor definition of greatly changed requirements, insufficient responsiveness to the users of space systems, inattention to potential cost savings in a fiscally constrained environment, and a lack of clearly defined responsibilities for space programs at the senior levels in the Pentagon. FY95 HAC PAGE 26 BUDGET REQUEST In fiscal year 1995, the Department of Defense budget-which includes the requests of both the military and the intelligence communities-totals approximately $13.5 billion for space programs. This represents 5.4 percent of the total requested budget authority of $252.2 billion. As a point of comparison, the fiscal year 1995 NASA budget request totals $14.3 billion, including its non-space programs. Thus, the annual Defense appropriations bill provides at least half of all funds for federal space programs. Over the next 5 years, DOD plans to spend $70.7 billion on military and intelligence space programs and activities. Of that amount, over 80 percent will be managed by the Air Force and over 70 percent will be for investment. FY95 HAC PAGE 26 POLICY Last year the Committee concluded that there was no clearly defined U.S. national space policy. Despite the passage of another year, no such policy has yet emerged. The Committee also cited several exhaustive studies which had been performed in recent years to address various aspects of space policy. Since that time, DOD has completed its Space Launch Modernization Plan and the Office of Science and Technology Policy is completing its Launch Policy Study. Although these two new studies document yet again the same problems, there appears to be no specific policy direction on the horizon for space launch. Moreover, the fundamental management approach still appears to be to address each space function or activity piecemeal. For example, the OSTP study will essentially propose to let DOD and NASA continue doing what they currently do, and simply encourage each agency to cooperate where possible. DOD will continue to look for ways to improve the robustness of existing expendable launch vehicles, with no direction regarding what to do with the excessively expensive Titan IV. The Committee continues to believe that there is a need for a national space vision to: (1) define the military, intelligence, civil, and commercial space sector objectives; (2) direct a clear course of action for addressing each sector's mission needs and operational requirements; (3) establish a mechanism for converging each sector's approach to satisfying its technical and funding requirements; and (4) identify potential financial, technological, and societal benefits to be achieved. Last year, the Committee expressed concern that there was insufficient coordination of space programs at the policymaking level in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Although the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Policy (ISP) has since been designated to fill this policy vacuum, little real progress has been made. The Committee strongly believes that a separate, permanent, civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Programs should be created within the office of the ASD (ISP) and is, therefore, directing that such a position be established. Historically, the military services have inadequately funded space programs that are not service-peculiar, but have a broader defense-wide mission. One solution would be to create a separate $13.5 billion appropriation. However, the Committee has, pending further consideration, decided not to pursue this option. Instead, as an interim step, the Committee has centralized into either Procurement, Defense-wide or RDT&E, Defense-wide, as appropriate, funding for the major space programs which are service non-specific. Included are all launch vehicles, and satellites and ground control systems for such satellites as MILSTAR, ALARM and DSCS. The Committee also directs that as a part of the fiscal year 1996 request such centralized funding be continued. The only space related programs that should remain in a specific service procurement or R&D account are those that are uniquely related to that specific service, such as terminals, and that do not impact on the viability of the basic system itself. FY95 HAC PAGE 27 ACQUISITION There are four major U.S. space sectors. The 1992 "Wilkening'' report, sponsored by the now defunct National Space Council, concluded that the military, intelligence, civil, and commercial sectors each has its own institutional culture which encourages overlap and discourages cooperation. Addressing only the military and intelligence sectors funded in this bill, there are six different organizations responsible for acquisition-the Air Force, Army, Navy, National Reconnaissance Office, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, and Advanced Research Projects Agency. A 1993 Air Force report concluded that these multiple space acquisition agencies create: fragmented responsibilities; duplicate facilities, staffs, and infrastructure; deficiencies in achieving economies of scale, optimizing existing capabilities, or focusing on validated operational requirements; and a lack of interoperability which complicates joint and combined military operations. The Air Force has also concluded that the cold war made space systems expensive, resulting in a crises-driven acquisition process. Because the cold war procurement rationale no longer applies, it is now time to look at today's threat and space systems in context and proceed on a more ordered and efficient path. As indicated by the Committee last year, a single integrated space investment strategy is needed. If that cannot be accomplished in a timely fashion for the entire federal government, it should be possible for the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to jointly prepare and implement such a plan for the military and intelligence sectors alone. To encourage such cooperation, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 required the Secretary of Defense to submit a space investment strategy to the Congress aimed at reducing costs and increasing efficiencies. The report is not yet complete. In addition, in the fiscal year 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, this Committee required a detailed 5-year plan by February of 1994 on needed organizational changes. This study is not scheduled to be completed until August of 1994. The plethora of studies drive toward five principal organizational changes that could be made to fix the space acquisition problem. -Place acquisition responsibility entirely with the Air Force; -Place acquisition responsibility within the Air Force, but through joint program offices; -Create a space systems procurement executive office within OSD supported by each service; -Create a quasi-independent space corps within the Air Force to separately acquire and operate space systems; and -Create a defense space agency to acquire and manage space systems. Each of these proposals has its strengths and weaknesses-as well as its proponents and opponents. There is, however, a single theme which is common to these proposals. That is, better central oversight is needed to halt the current fragmented planning, management and execution of space acquisition programs. The Committee is dismayed at the seeming inability of the Department of Defense not only to correct, but even to produce directed Congressional studies addressing the well-documented inefficiencies of DOD and intelligence space acquisition. Nevertheless, DOD and the intelligence community continue to request the appropriation of billions of dollars of funds annually. The Committee is no longer willing to wait idly for solutions that may well never be proposed. As discussed previously, the Committee has centralized all space acquisition funding into two accounts: Procurement, Defense-Wide, and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide. It is anticipated that such centralization of funding under the control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition will permit that office to play a more active role in resource allocation and program oversight across service and organizational lines without disrupting the existing contracting process. The Committee is also directing that all DOD space system acquisitions be placed under the management of a new Procurement Executive Officer (PEO) within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition who will be supported by the existing military service and defense agency acquisition organizations. It is emphasized that this central PEO will be responsible for resolution of joint requirements, resource management, and program decision making. It will not be responsible for awarding contracts; that will be left to the military service or organization designated by the PEO to be responsible for contract award and management for each space system acquisition. FY95 HAC PAGE 28 OPERATIONS Space systems are used for information warfare by multiple and varied users. Most space systems provide capabilities for joint military operations or national purposes. Commanders of joint and combined military operations are expected to rely increasingly on information from space assets in future regional conflicts, particularly given the military experience with such information during the Persian Gulf War. For example, DOD's total satellite communication requirements for 1997 (measured in millions of bits per second of throughput) are divided as follows: Percent National authorities and Commanders-in-Chief 50 DOD agencies 31 Military services 12 Non-DOD agencies 7 Total 100 The Air Force dominates the military space budget, yet generates little of the requirement. Nevertheless, its space budget competes with other service-specific Air Force requirements such as aircraft and missiles. This management structure does not appear to be in the best interest of the multiple and varied space users. An example of less than a total commitment to space is the Air Force leadership's repeated attempts not to fund the MILSTAR satellite development and acquisition. Not only does the Air Force dominate DOD space acquisition programs in terms of dollars, it also dominates space operations in terms of dedicated civilian and military personnel. Number of personnel Military Civilian Total U.S. Space Command 443 128 571 Air Force Space Command1 22,737 17,371 40,108 Navy Space Command 249 245 494 Army Space Command 401 89 490 1Includes approximately 10,400 military and 1,300 civilian personnel to support the Minuteman and Peacekeeper programs for U.S. Strategic Command. The Committee believes that space applications are inherently joint and that space information is crucial to all warfighters. The Committee is concerned about the U.S. Space Command's finding in its roles and missions study regarding the lack of a joint effort in the application of space systems to support warfighters. This became evident during the Persian Gulf War where space support was provided primarily on an ad hoc basis. No single organization had the assigned responsibility to bring space expertise to the theater commander, requiring multiple requests to different organizations in the U.S. for information. According to the General Accounting Office, significant efficiencies could result from consolidating certain space education and training programs. In addition, a January 1994 study by the U.S. Space Command discussed inadequate joint training of space applications. Despite the U.S. Space Command's theater support teams, the Air Force Space Command's Space Warfare Center, the Naval Space Command's space support teams, and the Army Space Command's program to demonstrate and exploit space systems, there is: -a lack of coordination among the commands; -little direction from U.S. Space Command to ensure consistent training across all services and commands; -no plan to establish a joint training effort or a joint space warfare center for exploiting space products by the warfighters; and -the potential for redundancies among the four space commands. Considering that military space systems are primarily used for joint purposes, the Secretary of Defense is directed to ensure that the U.S. Space Command creates a Joint Space Warfare Center in lieu of the Air Force Space Warfare Center, and that CINCSPACE take the lead in providing space applications, education and training to the warfighting forces, including the study of tactics, techniques, and procedures, including the development of annual JCS exercises designed to emphasize the uses of military and intelligence space-based assets. In addition, to ensure that space education and training is indeed joint, the director of the U.S. Space Command Joint Warfare Center should be appointed from a different military service from that of the CINC making the selection. In addition, it is expected that over the long term, any "J/G-3'', that is, joint or service director of operations, should be expected to have attended the Joint Space Warfare Center prior to his or her appointment. FY95 HAC PAGE 30 LAUNCH VEHICLES INTRODUCTION The U.S. government, primarily the Air Force, has 125 medium and heavy lift launch vehicles currently under contract as follows: -61 Delta II medium lift vehicles for various Air Force and NASA satellites; -9 Atlas II medium lift vehicles for the Defense Satellite Communications system; -14 Titan II medium lift vehicles for the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; and -41 Titan IV heavy lift vehicles for the Defense Support Program satellite, MILSTAR, and classified payloads. To date, nearly 50 of the 125 have been launched. The Air Force Space Command, with input from other agencies, prepares the National Mission Model which schedules NRO, Air Force, Navy, BMDO, NASA, and U.S. commercial launches. While the Air Force purchases launch vehicles based upon the launch dates identified in the mission model, changes in these dates disrupt vehicle acquisition schedules and increase costs. For example, Atlas II and Titan IV costs are expected to be adversely effected by launch schedule stretchouts of 3 and 9 years, respectively. In the case of Titan IV, approximately 80 percent of the $10 billion cost increase recently reported by DOD is related to the stretchout. The GAO has also found that Atlas may also experience a significant cost increase due to slow downs or adjustments in the production schedule, storage costs, additional tests for vehicle reliability, and additional launch service costs. It is clear that if DOD cannot establish more reliable launch schedules, it will continue to experience significant vehicle cost growth. A new launch system with standard interfaces and modular designs is one possible solution to coping with greater uncertainty in the launch schedules. Currently, no overall space systems model exists to aid decision makers in assessing requirements, capabilities, and effectiveness of space assets as a total system. Instead, current planning is based on individual elements such as vehicles, satellites, launch facilities, and satellite control. DOD needs to focus on the overall contribution of space systems to the warfighter, instead of making decisions on individual system objectives that may suboptimize overall space objectives. According to the GAO, the potential commercial market for medium-size launch vehicles is, and will continue to be, small. The two U.S. contractors that produce Delta and Atlas compete with foreign organizations for commercial launches which are projected to be approximately 17 per year. There is no driving requirement in the commercial community for a new launch vehicle. To the GAO, it appears that U.S. manufacturers will keep their market share in medium launch vehicles regardless of whether the Department of Defense finances an upgrade program. Future investment in upgrading or modernizing U.S. launch vehicles should be based upon national objectives rather than economic payback from the commercial market. There is currently no coherent U.S. policy on the use of Russian launch vehicle technology. Russian launch systems and technology (Proton, Energia, and Zenit vehicles, and advanced engines) are available to the U.S. to improve the current launch fleet. However, several problems need to be overcome, including: -Security and integration of U.S. payloads; -Adequacy of Russian facilities and logistics support; -Impact to the U.S. industrial base; -Stability of Russian economies and politics; -Language barriers; and -Russian incentive to maintain any business relationship. The Secretary of Defense is directed to provide no later than February 1, 1995, a policy statement for the use of Russian launch vehicle technology which provides U.S. commercial firms detailed guidance on the acceptability to DOD of such factors as: use of imported technology on critical DOD systems, licensing of technology to U.S. firms, and co-production agreements. FY95 HAC PAGE 31 NEW LAUNCH VEHICLE UPGRADE PROGRAM Over the last decade, over $2.0 billion has been spent for several different programs to develop a new "clean sheet of paper'' launch vehicle. Most-the Advanced Launch System, the National Launch System, and Spacelifter-have been canceled because of a lack of affordability. Conversely, every one of the many studies and blue ribbon panels on space launch has concluded that the current fleet of launch vehicles is too costly and inefficient. In the fiscal year 1995 DOD budget, there are no funds either for development of a brand new launch vehicle or for significant modifications to improve current vehicles or technologies. The recently completed Moorman Panel concluded a new "clean sheet of paper'' vehicle would cost between $5 billion and $8 billion to develop. On the other hand, the Panel concluded that a major evolutionary upgrade of current vehicles could achieve many of the same benefits and cost only $1 billion to $2 billion to develop. It is the Committee's belief that the expenditure of $1 billion to $2 billion could allow termination of the Titan IV heavy lift vehicle, make current medium launch vehicles more cost effective, and save billions of dollars over the next twenty years. For example, after the turn of the Century, if the average recurring launch cost of a new vehicle were $300 million, the development costs would be repaid after only two launches since the comparable Titan IV average launch costs are projected to approach $1 billion. The House-passed authorization bill included $100 million above the budget in fiscal year 1995 to start a major upgrade program based upon evolving current technologies. The Committee has, therefore, added $90 million above the budget in FY 1995 and redirects $10 million already provided to ARPA in FY 1994 to begin a major launch vehicle upgrade program with the following goals: -Use current technologies or new technologies with a low development risk to create a new family of launch vehicles; -Produce an operational vehicle that could be configured to replace Titan IV class payloads; -Produce an operational vehicle that improves the commonality of hardware, payload interface, and launch support across medium and heavy launch vehicles; and -Conduct an open competition; the Committee commends the advances of small innovative firms in developing low cost technology and directs DOD to incorporate these technologies into the competition. To ensure that those goals are met, the Committee has included section 8106 which requires in law the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan no later than September 1, 1995 "for the development of and initiation of a competition for a family of launch vehicles that is: (1) capable of launching both medium and heavy payloads, (2) fully funded in the outyears, and (3) scheduled to be available prior to the launch of the forty-first Titan IV expendable launch vehicle''. In the event that the Secretary does not comply with this legal requirement, funds cease to be available for the Titan IV program. FY95 HAC PAGE 32 REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES Conceptually, a Single Stage to Orbit (SSTO) launch vehicle would be reusable, cheap to operate, and be ready for a launch in only a matter of days after returning from space. Such a vehicle is generally referred to as "leap frog'' technology because the next evolutionary step in space launch vehicle development would logically be a new-and more traditional-expendable vehicle, not a reusable vehicle. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), now called Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), built and tested a sub-scale, suborbital model of an SSTO vehicle. The flight tests will be completed during fiscal year 1994 and the total costs of the program will be approximately $70 million. The fiscal year 1994 budget requested no funds for SSTO or reusable technology. However, the Congress appropriated $40 million to continue development of an SSTO launch vehicle. Virtually every launch vehicle study that has looked at the SSTO proposal concludes that it is unaffordable and technologically unavailable in the near future. Cost estimates for the full development program range from $10 billion to $40 billion to produce the first vehicle. The White House is expected to announce shortly that NASA, not DOD, will be responsible for developing the SSTO launch vehicle. It will not be DOD's responsibility to build an SSTO vehicle, nor would it be affordable for DOD to do so. However, there is value in DOD funding a few propulsion and materials technology development programs to determine the extent to which reusable launch vehicle components could be used to lower the cost of DOD's expendable launch vehicle fleet. The House-passed authorization bill included $100 million above the budget in fiscal year 1995 for SSTO development and reusable launch vehicle technology. The Committee has provided $50 million above the budget in fiscal year 1995 for DOD to fund selected reusable launch vehicle technologies. DOD will also be expected to release the $40 million already provided in fiscal year 1994. However, if responsibility for SSTO development is assigned to NASA, no funds should be provided to DOD for this effort. FY95 HAC PAGE 33 TITAN IV The Titan IV expendable launch vehicle (ELV) is the largest in the U.S. inventory and is capable of placing 47,000 pounds in low earth orbit. The current Air Force contract with Martin Marietta is for 41 satellites, 28 of which are classified payloads. Most of the remaining 13 belong to the Air Force MILSTAR and the Defense Support Program (DSP). After completion of the current 41-vehicle contract, the Titan IV program will exist almost exclusively to support a few classified payloads. To date 9 of the 41 Titan IVs currently under contract have been launched. The total annual budget request for the entire Titan IV program is approximately $1 billion. Phaseout of Titan IV. Although the last of the 41 Titan IVs will not be launched until after 2002 at the earliest, the Air Force fiscal year 1995 budget includes $40.9 million for advanced procurement for starting a new Titan IV buy. On April 21, 1994, the DOD Inspector General published a report that concludes that if there is a requirement for additional Titan IVs, then the Air Force would not need to start a new buy for a least 2 years. The Committee has, therefore, deleted the $40.9 million requested in fiscal year 1995 to begin a new Titan IV buy for which there is no requirement and has included within section 8106 a prohibition on the expenditure of any funds for procurement of over 41 Titan IV launch vehicles. Each Titan IV launch currently costs approximately $350 million just for the launch vehicle-excluding the satellite costs. By the year 2000 each launch may cost $750 million, and by the year 2005 each launch could exceed $1 billion-again excluding the satellite cost. By comparison, the cost in 2005 to launch a satellite on the medium class Atlas launch vehicle should be no more than $200 million to $300 million. Because of the excessive expense of using the Titan IV, all newly developed DOD satellites-for example, ALARM and the MILSTAR follow-on-are getting off of the Titan IV class vehicle. The NRO maintains that it will continue to use the Titan IV regardless of the cost. In conjunction with an initiative to develop a cheaper launch vehicle addressed in a separate recommendation, the Committee directs the Air Force to end the Titan IV program after the current contract. The Air Force is also directed to begin working with NASA to prepare Defense Support Programs satellites 21, 22, and 23 for launch on the shuttle, not on Titan IV. Significant dollar savings will result without any adverse schedule impact since these satellites are not planned for launch for at least 5 more years. In addition, the Committee has included in section 8106 specific direction that, within the existing procurement of 41 Titan IV launch vehicles, 6 will be reserved for the launch of the first 6 MILSTAR (block I and II) satellites. Transfer to NRO. Each year the Air Force budgets around $600 million for fixed Titan IV infrastructure costs and for the incremental costs of the Air Force Titan IV launches scheduled in that particular year. The NRO also budgets approximately $500 million each year only for the incremental costs of its launches in that year. Even though the NRO has most of the launches and drives most of the technical requirements, it is not required to pay for the fixed costs of the Titan IV. The NRO is also the only organization in the entire federal government that is not actively working to shift off of the Titan IV. The Committee is, therefore, assigning to the NRO the responsibility for budgeting for the fixed costs of the Titan IV. The Air Force and the NRO will each continue to budget for any incremental costs associated with their specific launches in any fiscal year. The Air Force is expected to continue aggressive efforts to downsize its large payloads such as MILSTAR. Unreimbursed NASA Support: According to information provided by DOD, NASA owes the Air Force between $100 million and $200 million in reimbursements for Titan IV support. DOD should be billing NASA for all incremental costs as they are being incurred. Because NASA negotiated the current agreement with the Air Force in good faith and plans to fully reimburse the Air Force over the next several years, the Committee will take no action that might penalize NASA. However, the Air Force is reminded that all future agreements with NASA-or any other federal or commercial organization-must comply with the longstanding Congressional and DOD budgetary policy that incremental costs are to be reimbursed no later than the same year in which the costs are incurred. Excess Titan IV Pads: The Air Force currently operates three pads capable of launching Titan IV vehicles-one on the west coast at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and two on the east coast at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. This provides the capability of launching at least six Titan IVs per year-two Titan IVs per year from each pad. While the current launch schedule shows only one future year which might require the use of both east coast pads, that schedule is being revised to slow down some Defense Support Program launches and transfer others to the space shuttle. The Committee directs the Air Force to begin closing one Titan IV launch pad on the east coast during fiscal year 1995. Any savings accrued during fiscal year 1995 may be used to offset one-time closing costs. FY95 HAC PAGE 34 LAUNCH DELAYS A 1993 Air Force Space Command study of launch operations reported that the command does not have a standard definition as to what constitutes a launch delay or a good data collection process to determine the reasons for delays. Despite these criticisms, the study identified delays through discussions with launch personnel. The general results were that hardware related problems accounted for 76 percent; launch facility and range problems, 12 percent; and weather and previous delays, 12 percent. Although launch delays seem to be of primary interest to DOD, the General Accounting Office was not able to determine if delays at U.S. facilities are excessive because of the lack of criteria. In fact, the GAO found that several contractor and military personnel involved with space launches were of the opinion that the delays were not a concern. Launch responsiveness is the time required between launches, including delays for such things as pad repair, payload processing, and vehicle assembly. Some DOD representatives say that the current average of 60 to 90 days is too long. However, some commercial representatives believe the response time is about what is expected industry-wide. The different opinions may be because DOD wants a launch-on-need capability whereas industry is satisfied with launch-on-schedule. The CINC, U.S. Space Command, has stated that DOD needs a 7-day launch-on-need capability. Although a small vehicle (Taurus) is working towards that kind of response time for very light payloads, the GAO has found that virtually all DOD personnel questioned believe the goal is unrealistic for larger payloads, given today's budget constraints and the current launch complexes and vehicles. An Air Force study estimated that response time could be reduced by as much as 30 days through actions such as: -Standardized interfaces and non-dedicated vehicles. Currently, DOD launch vehicles, except Delta IIs, are customized and dedicated to specific payloads. -Flight ready vehicles and payloads. Some vehicles and payloads are not flight ready when delivered to the launch facility, requiring modification at the pad. -Integrate-transfer-launch. All payload processing and vehicle integration is done off the pad and the assembled vehicle is transferred to the pad for launch. A large negative aspect is major changes to space launch complexes would be required at significant cost. -Reduced testing at the pads. Currently, each payload is virtually 100 percent tested twice at the pad. By February 1, 1995, the Secretary of Defense is requested to provide a determination as to the military requirement for a launch-on-need policy and an assessment of any significantly adverse impact that current launch delays have on U.S. military or intelligence capabilities. FY95 HAC PAGE 35 LAUNCH INFRASTRUCTURE The General Accounting Office estimates the total Space Launch Infrastructure Investment Program (SLIIP) costs during the 1990's to be about $2.2 billion, with 40 percent unfunded. The $2.2 billion is allocated to: range standardization and automation; launch base infrastructure fixes; vehicle safety and reliability enhancements; and launch facilities. In 1994, DOD provided the Congress a report which was essentially an update of the SLIIP, but it omitted all unfunded and certain vehicle modification costs that were part of the SLIIP. Both are shown below. SLIIP [Dollars in millions] Fiscal year- 1990-93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total Required $421 $442 $345 $331 $278 $215 $213 $2,245 Unfunded 62 93 120 192 139 121 161 888 1994 update 284 169 177 145 128 114 52 1,069 The GAO also found that the Eastern and Western Ranges, including associated systems, will be capable of meeting DOD and national launch requirements. Moreover, projections are that DOD launch rates will decline, medium-lift commercial rates will remain stable, and small-lift commercial rates are still uncertain. Considering projected launch rates, spending large sums on facility improvements may not be justified. Only critical repair and maintenance may be warranted. DOD maintains two range stations in the Atlantic (on Antigua and Ascension) to support Kennedy Space Center and Cape Canaveral and one range station in the Pacific (Kwajalein) to support Vandenberg. The two Atlantic stations are used to receive telemetry during space launches and to assist in Trident ICBM tests. The Pacific station is used to assist in Minuteman and Peacekeeper ICBM tests. There are no remote range stations supporting Vandenberg space launches. Instead, telemetry from space launches out of Vandenberg is received via an electronically equipped aircraft. Range stations are highly labor intensive and expensive to operate, which is one aspect the Range Standardization and Automation program is supposed to improve. However, it is not apparent why two range stations are required for the East Coast operations when one suffices for the West Coast. The GAO has reported that Ascension does not have destruct capability for space launches. Its role in space launches is relatively minor, with its main role as a target monitor for Navy Trident tests. It is also not apparent why an ICBM launch test facility is required on each coast. Navy Tridents could be tested from Vandenberg using Kwajalein instead of Ascension. When a missile located on an Atlantic-based submarine is selected, it could be transported via the submarine, or another ship, to the West Coast, like Pacific-based missiles are transported to the East Coast. Preliminary indications are that at least one of the Atlantic stations may be unnecessary, if the two ICBM facilities could be consolidated and located at Vandenberg. Vandenberg is the likely candidate for the consolidated operation since it is currently underutilized-about one launch per month as opposed to about 3 launches per month at Kennedy/Cape Canaveral. No later than February 1, 1995, the Secretary of Defense is requested to report to the Committee the feasibility of closing one of the Atlantic stations supporting the Eastern Range, as well as the feasibility of consolidating all ICBM testing in the Pacific. FY95 HAC PAGE 37 SUPPORT TO COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH INDUSTRY Under the Commercial Space Launch Act, as amended (49 U.S.C. 2601), the U.S. national policy is to facilitate and encourage the commercial launch industry. The Act requires that the amount to be paid to the United States for use of government property, such as for launch services, shall be actual costs that can be unambiguously associated with a commercial launch effort, and would not be borne by the United States Government in the absence of the commercial launch effort. This represents incremental costs above what DOD would normally incur for a space launch. The General Accounting Office has advised the Committee of an inconsistent practice in the way the Air Force charges commercial users of national launch facilities at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg. The Secretary of Defense is directed to provide for uniform and standardized commercial charges and recoup all incremental charges. FY95 HAC PAGE 37 COMPETITIVE COMMERCIAL LAUNCHES According to a recent investigation by the General Accounting Office, price and launch dates are considerations when commercial satellite manufacturers choose a launch facility. These factors, however, have not been major concerns with U.S. launches. Nor has the threat of military preemption been a concern, because it never happens. The GAO also found that: -U.S. launch manufacturer marketing and pricing policies are the main reasons U.S. commercial payloads have been going to Ariane. Ariane is considered to be a better and more forceful marketer than U.S. launch companies. For example, the GAO found that Ariane will launch a payload equal in weight to Atlas's maximum capability for the same price, but charge only for the payload's actual weight in kilograms at the time of launch. Thus, a payload weighing less than Atlas's maximum capability, but too heavy for a smaller launch vehicle, will cost less on an Ariane because Atlas charges basically the same per launch regardless of weight. -Launch reliability is the second most important consideration when choosing a launcher. For example, the GAO found that one manufacturer chose Ariane for its launch needs because Ariane had already completed a number of successful launches. Delta was too small and Atlas was just getting its system established. Therefore, Ariane was chosen on the basis of reliability, not price, although Ariane was slightly cheaper as well. The manufacturer said it would likely choose Atlas for its next set of launches. The GAO found that, although the U.S. has seen a decrease in its share of commercial launches, the decrease has been mainly due to an increase in the number of foreign payloads, not to a decrease in the number of commercial launches from U.S. facilities. Commercial launches (including NASA) from U.S. facilities averaged over 12 per year since 1977, the year before Ariane began, and until the Challenger explosion in 1986. During 1990 to 1992, after recovery from Challenger, the average was 11. The following table reflects and displays these trends. It should be noted that the biggest single loss of commercial launches by U.S. facilities appears to be the European Space Agency (ESA) satellites, which may have been because of political rather than economic reasons. COMPARISON: U.S. VERSUS ARIANE LAUNCHES (1977-92) 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 From U.S.: Commercial1 14 21 9 5 12 11 14 17 13 4 2 3 5 12 10 12 (ESA) (5) (2) (1) (1) (1) From Ariane: Commercial1 0 0 2 2 4 2 3 5 9 5 3 13 10 16 15 13 (ESA) (2) (2) (3) (1) (2) (2) (1) (2) (3) (1) (7) (3) 1Commercial launches are all non-DOD launches such as NASA, NOAA, U.S. commercial, and foreign. Despite the trend away from using U.S. launch vehicles, the commercial situation may be improving for U.S. launch facilities. Several factors, according to the GAO, may lead to a natural increase in the U.S. share of commercial launches. For example: -Ariane is booked through mid-1997, which is further out than most commercial manufacturers want to go when obtaining a launch date. -Atlas II has had several successful launches in recent years. -Ariane's launch failure in February has raised concern about its reliability advantage over Atlas, and it is already technically less reliable than Delta. In fact, one U.S. satellite manufacturer switched its commercial satellite from Ariane to Atlas shortly after the Ariane failure. -There is an increase in commercial launch activity at U.S. facilities. For example, one U.S. manufacturer of small launch vehicles has refurbished an unused building at Vandenberg Air Force Base to assemble its launch vehicle. Another manufacturer has begun refurbishing SLC-6 at Vandenberg to launch a new series of light to medium weight vehicles. Both companies are also planning operations at the Cape. In light of the GAO findings, the Committee believes that there is currently no requirement for DOD to finance any launch vehicle or facility improvements solely to improve U.S. commercial competitiveness. FY95 HAC PAGE 40 SATELLITES EARLY WARNING SATELLITE PROGRAMS For the past several years, the Department of Defense has been in the midst of initiating a new architecture for infra-red satellites capable of providing early warning of ballistic missile launches. With the lessons that have been learned from the Persian Gulf war, implementing this new architecture has become a high priority of U.S. military commanders-in-chief. As addressed below, the Committee recommends the following amounts for early warning satellite programs: [In millions of dollars] Request Committee Brilliant Eyes: RDT&E, Defense (BMDO) $120.0 0 RDT&E, Defense (Air Force) 0 120.0 DSP 23 Procurement: Msl Proc, AF (Air Force) 364.0 0 Proc, Defense (Air Force) 0 364.0 DSP 24 Procurement 0 0 ALARM: RDT&E, AF (Air Force) 150.0 330.0 Total 634.0 814.0 ALARM Program Acceleration. The fiscal year 1995 budget includes $150 million to begin development of the ALARM satellite. The Committee is convinced that acceleration of the ALARM program is critical to the national security of the United States. The Air Force has indicated that there are no technical or programmatic risks to accelerating the program. As a result, a total of $330,000,000, an increase of $180,000,000, has been provided to enable the Air Force to accelerate the first launch. Because of the national importance of this program, the Secretary of Defense is directed to: (1) ensure that the program is fully funded in the outyears, (2) complete the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract down-select by March 31, 1996, and (3) work toward an ALARM first launch capability of no later than the year 2000. ALARM Technology Demonstration Program. Included in the ALARM request is $30 million to begin a separate technology demonstration which is ultimately projected to cost over $150 million, has not been justified as producing information required to proceed with the ALARM program, and would not produce information in time to influence design of the ALARM payload. The Committee, therefore, explicitly directs that no funds are available for the technology demonstration program as originally proposed. However, the Air Force may conduct any technology demonstrations specifically necessary to support design of the first ALARM satellite. Without the prior approval of the Congressional defense committees, such demonstrations may either be conducted on an airborne platform or, if conducted in space, may only be performed as a part of an already planned infra-red payload such as the BMDO Miniature Sensor Technology Integration (MSTI) program. Defense Support Program. The Air Force requested a total of $364.0 million to continue procurement of DSP satellite 23. The Committee has provided the full amount. No funds were requested for continued acquisition of DSP 24. The Committee agrees with the DOD proposal to discontinue development of this specific satellite. No funds are included in this bill and no funds are available without the specific prior approval of the Committee. As discussed elsewhere in this report, the Air Force is directed to begin configuring DSP satellites 21, 22, and 23 for launch on the shuttle. FY95 HAC PAGE 41 TACTICAL SUPPORT SATELLITE The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) began development of the Tactical Support Satellite (TSS) in fiscal year 1994. The Committee fully supports this effort and has provided a total of $70.0 million in RDT&E, Defense-wide-$40.0 million under Advanced Spacecraft Technology for the Phillips Laboratory and $30.0 million under Experimental Evaluation of Major Innovative Technologies (EEMIT) for ARPA. The Committee stipulates that the entire $70.0 million is under the management control of ARPA for project execution. FY95 HAC PAGE 41 METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAMS DOD, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) recently completed a tri-agency convergence study and implementation plan for polar orbiting weather satellites. This study recommended: -A single 3-satellite constellation, with an objective of 2 U.S. and 1 European satellites; -Plans to leverage off NASA research mission EOS-PM to the greatest extent possible, but not as an "operational'' satellite; -Program synchronization for DOD and NOAA follow-on programs, DMSP Block 6 and NOAA satellites O, P and Q, respectively; -An integrated program office with participation from all three services; and -NOAA lead in satellite operations, DOD lead in satellite acquisition, NASA lead in advance satellite technology transition. Based upon the less than stellar history of jointly funded programs, the Committee believes that DOD should make every effort to prevent the migration of any of the civilian agency costs into the DOD budget. Last year, the Committee directed that DOD transfer two DMSP satellites to NOAA to synchronize the transition to an integrated program. The committee made this recommendation based upon the current projection that NOAA has only 6 satellites remaining to be launched, but DOD currently has 9 DMSP satellites remaining to be launched. In view of the recent Presidentially-approved, tri-service Implementation Plan for a Converged Polar-Orbited Environmental Satellite System, the General Accounting Office is requested to comment not later than February 1, 1995 on the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of the proposed transfer. All DOD costs incurred for environmental satellite programs will be in accordance with the Implementation Plan. To the extent that NASA conducts a separate study on the convergence of its Earth Observing System altimetry mission with the Navy Geosat follow-on program, the Navy or any other DOD agency is expressly prohibited from participating in such a study unless reimbursement is provided by NASA for the full incremental costs incurred. FY95 HAC PAGE 42 CLEMENTINE The Committee believes that management of the Clementine I project should remain at the existing facilities as management responsibility shifts from the Ballistic Missile Defense Program to the military services. If the Department proposes to continue the Clementine program by using different DOD facilities to manage the program, the existing facilities should be permitted to compete for the opportunity to continue managing the program. However, no funds were requested by DOD for additional Clementine satellites and no funds have been provided. FY95 HAC PAGE 42 LANDSAT Last year the Committee made permanent a general provision permitting DOD to procure the LANDSAT 7 satellite. However, DOD and NASA recently reached an agreement whereby responsibility for all aspects of the LANDSAT program will be transferred to NASA. Consequently, the Committee has included Section 8051 repealing DOD's LANDSAT procurement authority. FY95 HAC PAGE 43 AIR FORCE SATELLITE CONTROL NETWORK The January 1994 roles and missions study of the U.S. Space Command identified the potential for consolidating the Air Force and Navy satellite control networks. However, while the U.S. Space Command is performing a more detailed study to determine the most efficient and cost effective solution, the Air Force is planning a costly incremental upgrade to its network. The Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) performs tracking, telemetry, and command functions for 84 satellites. Operations are manually intensive, requiring a large number of highly skilled personnel, and are therefore costly. The GAO has reported to the Committee that the AFSCN centralized computer system is limited in data processing capacity, resulting in an inability to handle planning and real-time operations data simultaneously. The computer system also lacks standardization and interoperability across several satellite systems. Despite estimates that a new system could be developed for $1 billion, the Air Force plans to spend $1.5 billion over the next five years to upgrade and modify the current system. In addition, U.S. Space Command does not plan to develop an architecture for satellite control as the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked it to do. According to the GAO, the reason is because of its present inability to implement an architecture for Cheyenne Mountain Upgrades. In comparison, the Navy Satellite Control Network (NSCN) is a more modern design-a full generation ahead according to one Air Force expert-than AFSCN, but its use will substantially decline by 1997 because the TRANSIT navigational satellite is scheduled to be phased out, and only the GFO satellite is scheduled to be added. For fiscal year 1995, the Air Force requested a total of $283,857,000 in P.E. 35110F for improvement and modernization of the AFSCN. The request consisted of $101,146,000 for RDT&E, $25,810,000 for Other Procurement, $144,719,000 for O&M, and $12,182,000 for Military Personnel. Of this request, the Committee recommends deleting $256,675,000 until (1) the U.S. Space Command completes its study and provides an architecture, implementation plan, and milestones for achieving consolidation and (2) the Air Force performs a cost and operational effectiveness analysis of alternatives to the existing network that includes a new acquisition using advanced technologies, the Navy's architecture, and a long-term incremental upgrade approach. The Committee also directs the Secretary of Defense to consolidate Air Force and Navy satellite control capabilities and strive toward satellite control convergence with national and civil agencies. The GAO reports that there is also a potential for performing more cost-effectively the space surveillance mission to detect, track, identify, and catalog all man-made objects in earth orbit. The U.S. Space Command is analyzing requirements and capabilities of existing Air Force, Navy, and Army sensors to perform the mission. The overall goal of the study is unclear. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the study assesses the most cost effective ways of performing the mission. FY95 HAC PAGE 44 COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES The Department of Defense Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) encompass a diverse array of reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition programs which are primarily a functional part of the basic military force structure, and provide direct information support to combat operations. TIARA includes those activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program which respond to operational command tasking for time-sensitive information as well as to national command, control, communications, and intelligence requirements. Explanations of the Committee's specific recommendations for TIARA programs appear in the appropriate sections of this report or in the classified report which accompanies it. The funding provided for TIARA will fully support these activities in the forthcoming year. FY95 HAC PAGE 44 SINCGARS The fiscal year 1995 budget requested $367.4 million in Other Procurement, Army for various SINCGARS radios. The Army plans to spend $270.6 million for 21,636 sets of SINCGARS ground radio hardware in fiscal year 1994, an average estimated cost per unit of $12,507. The Army held a competition between the 2 producers of these radios to apportion the ground radio production between them based on price, quality, and other factors. One firm won about 54 percent of the fiscal year 1994 award and the other firm won the remaining 46 percent. The average unit price for both contractors came to $8,800. The unit costs for product improvement and other equipment amounted to approximately $1,910, bringing the total fiscal year 1994 unit price to $10,710 for SINCGARS hardware. The total quantity purchased on these contracts was 23,293 radios, including 300 initial spares. At an average unit price of $10,710 the total fiscal year 1994 cost for all radio sets amounts to $249.5 million, a reduction of $21.1 million from the $270.6 million budgeted. The 22,293 radio sets purchased for equipping troops exceeded the quantity budgeted for that purpose by 1,357 units. In the fiscal year 1995 budget the Army estimated a total cost of $285.3 million for 21,313 ground radios and associated equipment, an average unit cost of $13,386. The amount budgeted for fiscal year 1995 may be reduced based on the following factors: -The Army's fiscal year 1995 requirement of 21,313 radios can be reduced by the 1,357 purchases that exceeded the budgeted quantities for fiscal year 1994. At the Army's fiscal year 1995 unit price estimate of $13,386, the fiscal year 1995 requirement would be approximately $18.2 million less for the already procured 1,357 units. -Aggressive competition between the two firms is expected to continue in fiscal year 1995. A reasonable unit price estimate for this year would be the average fiscal year 1994 contract price plus the DoD prescribed inflation factor of 2.8 percent, producing an average price of $11,010-$2,376 less than the Army's estimate. The adjusted fiscal year 1995 requirement of 19,956 radios (21,313 budgeted less 1,357 purchased in fiscal year 1994) times the reduction in the unit price of $2,376 would yield a further savings of $47.4 million. It is recommended, therefore, that the fiscal year 1995 SINCGARS budget request be reduced by a total of $65.6 million. The Committee is pleased with the progress made in both value and quality within the SINCGARS program driven by the Army's dual source acquisition strategy. As such, the Committee fully supports the continued use of the dual source acquisition approach for this system until such time as the quantity no loner merits this method. FY95 HAC PAGE 45 COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE Last year the Committee provided $20 million for the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to continue its comprehensive review of the feasibility of using commercially available satellites and terminals to support DOD communications requirements. Based upon the favorable results, the Committee has provided $10 million to continue this effort. The Department should begin a demonstration project to begin testing how these civilian technologies can be used to satisfy existing or projected military communications requirements. The Committee directs that $5 million of the $10 million is to be used for a demonstration project to support disaster relief and military contingency requirements. The Office of the Manager of National Communications Systems, in conjunction with the Air National Guard, shall acquire not less than four complete sets-from at least two competing vendors-of commercially available transportable satellite earth terminals and supporting telecommunications equipment, including leasing of required commercial transponders time. The Air National Guard is directed to begin operational use of this equipment to document its utility in responding to national disasters and military contingencies. FY95 HAC PAGE 45 AN/PSC-7 UHF SATCOM RADIO The Committee has been advised of a requirement to modify existing Army and special operations AN/PSC-7 radios with embedded COMSEC and Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) capabilities in order to meet JCS-established standards. The Army is directed to report to the Committee by March 15, 1995, on its plans to meet this requirement. FY95 HAC PAGE 45 COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONIC MODIFICATIONS Historically, eleven electronic modifications are included under this line item. A total of $18.9 million is requested in Other Procurement, Air Force in fiscal year 1995 for six modifications, with the other five receiving funding in prior years. The MPN 14K Landing Control modification is substantially complete. Prior year funds of $1,175,000 are not needed to complete this modification because the work has cost less than anticipated. To date over $400,000 of fiscal year 1993 funds were reprogrammed from this line, and it is anticipated that $750,000 of fiscal year 1994 funds will be excess to the requirement. The fiscal year 1995 appropriation is, therefore, reduced by that amount to reflect the excess funds that will be carried over and available to satisfy the fiscal year 1995 requirement. FY95 HAC PAGE 46 THEATER BATTLE MANAGEMENT C2 SYSTEM The Theater Battle Management C2 System program requested $45.5 million in Other Procurement, Air Force to acquire state-of-the-art equipment for worldwide command and control functions. Part of the fiscal year 1995 C2 System budget request is for $13.1 million to procure four communication suites. Additional software requirements have now been added to the prototyping phase causing the expected procurement and associated funding to be delayed from fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 1996. The excess $13.1 million is, therefore, deleted from the fiscal year 1995 budget request for the C2 System. FY95 HAC PAGE 46 COMMANDER'S TACTICAL TERMINAL The Committee is concerned that the Army's plan for fielding the Commander's Tactical Terminal (CTT) does not ensure that the tactical units have the most capable intelligence communication capabilities. Current plans stretch CTT delivery into the next century. The CTT's capabilities were fully demonstrated during the Gulf War and are currently being utilized in several conflict areas with substantial results. Furthermore, CTT is an early integral part of the Army's high priority effort to digitize the battlefield. The Committee directs that the Secretary of the Army present a fully funded accelerated acquisition plan to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees within 120 days of enactment of the fiscal year 1995 Department of Defense Appropriation Act that will: (1) substantially reduce fielding time; (2) ensure that all Army and joint requirements are incorporated into the integrated acquisition plan and (3) that the plan be the most cost efficient to include eliminating ongoing duplicative efforts. FY95 HAC PAGE 46 WWMCCS/GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM The Air Force requested $12.6 million in Other Procurement, Air Force in fiscal year 1995 for the WWMCCS program. This line item includes automated data processing equipment for four command and control programs. One of the four programs is for the Air Force Command and Control System (AFC2S) Hardware. According to Air Force officials, AFC2S hardware is required to support software at 13 sites and 105 remote sites. The fiscal year 1995 budget includes a request of $4.189 million for AFC2S. However, after the budget was sent to the Congress, the Air Force canceled the program on April 29, 1994, because they considered it to be unexecutable. Accordingly, the fiscal year 1995 budget request for this line item is reduced by $4.189 million. In addition excess fiscal year 1993 funds of $746,000 are designated as an item of congressional interest and cannot be reprogrammed without prior congressional approval. FY95 HAC PAGE 46 ANTIJAM VOICE The fiscal year 1995 budget request shows that the Air Force planned to use Other Procurement, Air Force funds to buy 714 SINCGARS-V radios using fiscal years 1994 and 1995 funds at a combined cost of $10.304 million. With the fiscal year 1994 funds, the Air Force planned to buy 696 radios for $9.914 million, or $14,244 per radio. It planned to buy another 18 radios with the fiscal year 1995 funds for $390,000, or $21,667 per radio. However, the Air Force obtained better prices than originally estimated. After the budget was submitted to the Congress, the Air Force purchased 485 radios in April 1994 for $5.816 million at a unit cost of $11,992. The Air Force now expects to buy an additional 222 radios in July 1994 for $2.662 million at a unit cost of $11,992. Air Force officials stated this action will buy out its SINCGARS requirement. Because the Air Force is buying out its SINCGARS requirement in fiscal year 1994, the fiscal year 1995 budget request of $390,000 is not needed and has been deleted. Also, $1.436 million of the fiscal year 1994 funds are designated an item of congressional interest and cannot be reprogrammed without prior congressional approval. This represents the difference between the $9.914 million appropriated to the Air Force in fiscal year 1994 funds and the $8.478 million which they now expect to expend using current contract prices for the April and July 1994 buys. FY95 HAC PAGE 47 RADIO EQUIPMENT In fiscal year 1995, the Air Force has requested $19,618,000 in Other Procurement, Air Force, for Radio Equipment. This program is more commonly called Scope Command, and provides resources to modernize the Air Force High Frequency radio communications systems at world-wide locations. Because this program supports communications for the President, the military commanders-in-Chief and other high priority users, the Committee included language in last year's report expressing concern that the Air Force was inadequately supporting modernization of the Scope Command network. The Committee is encouraged that the Air Force has requested funds for this important effort and has provided the full $19,618,000 being requested. These funds are also being designated an item of specific congressional interest and may not be used for any other purpose without specific Committee approval. FY95 HAC PAGE 47 DEFENSE METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM (DMSP) TERMINALS The Air Force requested a total of $16.1 million in Other Procurement, Air Force in fiscal year 1995 for DMSP, a part of which includes the Mark IV terminal upgrade. The Air Force intended to buy with fiscal year 1994 funds seven MARK IV upgrades at a unit cost of $1.357 million each. They now plan to buy seven of a less costly upgrade at $1.2 million each. This reduces the total cost for fiscal year 1994 from $9.5 million to $8.4 million. The $1.1 million in remaining fiscal year 1994 funds has been offset by an equal reduction from the fiscal year 1995 budget request. FY95 HAC PAGE 48 HAVE GAZE The Committee has provided an increase of $8,000,000 in RDT&E, Air Force to continue development of the HAVE GAZE program. FY95 HAC PAGE 48 DEFENSE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM Management. The Committee is encouraged by DOD's efforts to coordinate the development and fielding of tactical airborne reconnaissance systems by establishing the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). However, the criteria used for determining which airborne reconnaissance systems should be managed by the DARO vice the services is unclear. The Committee believes that the development and fielding for all "joint'' tactical reconnaissance systems should be under the direct management of the DARO. Therefore, the Committee directs that all funds for GUARDRAIL and Air Reconnaissance Low (ARL) aircraft are transferred to the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP). Furthermore, the Committee directs that the funds be maintained in their respective service accounts. The Committee understands that the DARO is a new organization and going through growing pains; however, the management of DARP resources appears to be ad hoc. The Committee believes that the DARO has not adequately articulated its goals, objectives and priorities. DARO strategy does not focus on the capabilities and funding of existing sensors and platforms. The Committee is uncomfortable that programs funded in fiscal year 1994 were terminated without coordination with the Central Imagery Office and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASDC3I) or notification to the Congress. The Committee directs that the DARO submit by August 1, 1994, the justification and impact of all fiscal year 1994 initiatives that were terminated by the DARO. The Committee directs DARP projects may not be terminated without the written approval of the ASDC3I. The Committee notes that some of the cancelled initiatives were items of Congressional interest. The Committee is extremely frustrated at the DARO's inability to provide detailed budget information. Therefore, the Committee directs the DARO to provide a detailed break out of platforms, sensors, ground processing systems and datalinks funded in the fiscal year 1995 submission by August 1, 1994. The Committee intends to continue vigorous oversight over the DARP budget. One of the chief concerns is the DARO's ability to transfer funds between the various DARP projects. To ensure that the movement of funds between DARP projects is in accordance with Congressional intent, the DARO is directed to obtain prior written approval of the Committee on Appropriations of the House and Senate for all transfers exceeding $2,000,000. This restriction also applies to all program and project terminations. Air Reconnaissance Low (ARL): As stated earlier, the Committee directs that all funds are transferred to the DARO. In fiscal year 1991, Congress directed DOD to procure nine ARL aircraft. It is the Committee's understanding that funds are programmed to procure only six aircraft. The Committee directs the DARO to submit with the fiscal year 1996 budget submission an acquisition and implementation plan for the nine ARL aircraft. Last year the Congress endorsed a plan for a Unified SIGINT system. It is the Committee's understanding that the SIGINT system for the ARL platform is unique and is not integrated with the DOD plan. The Committee directs that no funds may be obligated for the integration of a SIGINT system on the ARL platform until the DARO submits a cost/benefit analysis of the planned system for ARL and rationale for using a service unique vice DOD system. Moving Target Indicator (MTI). CINC U.S. Forces Korea has a requirement for daily Indications and Warning (I&W) coverage. Currently, I&W coverage, is provided by the MOHAWK aircraft. As mandated by Congress, the aging and expensive MOHAWK fleet will be retired by fiscal year 1996. The Army is complying with Congressional direction; however, the Army has not programmed funds for a replacement of the MOHAWK. DOD has requested funds for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS); however, JSTARS full production will not occur until after fiscal year 1998. Furthermore, JSTARS is a go-to-war system. JSTARS was not developed to provide daily tactical I&W. The Committee is concerned that the readiness of U.S. Forces Korea will be hampered by the lack of a daily I&W capability. The Committee understands that there are three GUARDRAIL aircraft in Army inventory that could be integrated with an off-the-shelf MTI sensor. Ground processing and maintenance equipment for the GUARDRAIL platform is already in Korea. As addressed in the Korean Readiness Enhancement Account, the Committee recommends an increase of $15,000,000 to the DARP to integrate an off-the-shelf MTI sensor on an existing platform. By August 1, 1994 the Committee directs that the DARO submit a plan for implementing a MTI capability in Korea for fiscal year 1995. This plan should include a cost and capability comparison of various platforms and sensors. The plan should also include ground processing requirements and maintenance costs. Committee Funding Recommendations. DOD requested $528,290,000 research, development, test and evaluation funds for the DARP. The Committee recommends $609,290,000, an increase of $81,000,000. The funds are only for the following programs: $3,000,000 for the Remotely Operated Sensor System (ROSS), $8,000,000 for Electro-Optical (E/O) framing sensor development, $20,000,000 for the Medium Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Tier II), and $50,000,000 for the Low Observable-High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Tier III Minus) Details for each program follow. -The Remotely Operated Sensor System (ROSS) will provide close range target detection, battle damage assessment of obscure fixed targets, and the acquisition of moving targets. -The Committee recognizes the need for tactical imagery and fully supports the DARO's $7,000,000 budget request for the continued development of E/O framing sensors. The Committee recommends an increase of $8,000,000 to accelerate the development of an E/O framing sensor with on-chip image-motion compensation and infrared/multispectral capabilities. -The Committee endorses Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). The Committee fully supports the Medium Altitude Endurance UAV (Tier II) and recommends an increase of $20,000,000 to the program only for delivery, demonstration, employment and operations experimentation of ten additional ACTD Tier II vehicles and two ground control stations. The UAV's shall have a mix of off-the-shelf signals intelligence (SIGINT) and laser ranger-designator adjuncts to the E/O-IR sensors and shall be made ready for deployment and operations experimentation in 1995-1996. -Despite DOD's commitment to the Low Observable-High Altitude Endurance UAV (TIER III Minus) program, the program was not fully funded in the fiscal year 1995 request. Therefore, the Committee recommends an increase of $50,000,000 for Tier III Minus program. Furthermore, the Committee directs that no funds may be awarded for the High Altitude Endurance UAV (Tier II Plus) until the Tier III Minus contract is awarded. FY95 HAC PAGE 50 DIGITAL TOPOGRAPHIC SUPPORT SYSTEM The Department of Defense requested $12,835,000 for the Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS). The Committee recommends that no funds are appropriated in fiscal year 1995 for DTSS. DTSS was to be integrated on the Army's five ton truck; however, the Committee has learned that future systems will be downscaled and integrated on the HMMWV. The Army is also investigating the possibility of combining the downscaled DTSS with the QRMP. It is the Committee's understanding that the Army is currently reevaluating the program and will make a decision later this summer. Because the Army is restructuring the program, less than half of the fiscal year 1994 appropriated dollars have been obligated. Therefore, the Committee directs that the Army submit by September 1, 1994 a detailed acquisition plan, schedule, and budget for DTSS. FY95 HAC PAGE 50 COMMON HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE Last year the Committee was concerned that the transition from Common Hardware and Software (CHS) I to CHS II would not be timely and transparent. The Committee continues to monitor the progress of the fielding of CHS and still believes that it is premature to field CHS II hardware prior to completing all required pre-production testing and evaluation. Because the CHS I contract will expire prior to the completion of all CHS II qualification tests, a serious break in production will occur. Therefore, the Committee directs the Army to examine the possibility of extending the CHS I contract in order to minimize fielding interruptions and the final certification of CHS II. FY95 HAC PAGE 50 ARMY ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS SYSTEM The Army requested $42,891,000 for the All Source Analysis System (ASAS). The Committee recommends $35,891,000, a reduction of $7,000,000. The Committee directs that $3,000,000 be used only for continuing the upgrade of the communications and intelligence analysis capabilities of the Army's existing Single Source Processor and continuing the development of a light weight portable equivalent for support of contingency operations and Low Intensity Conflict activities. FY95 HAC PAGE 51 INTEGRATED METEOROLOGICAL SYSTEM The Army requested $7,004,000 for the Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS). The Committee recommends $5,000,000, a decrease of $2,004,000. IMETS interoperates with the Army Tactical Command and Control (DTSS) System (ATCCS) and the Digital Topographic Support System. ATCCS has not been fielded and DTSS production has been delayed, therefore the Committee believes that IMETS procurement can be stretched out. FY95 HAC PAGE 51 INTELLIGENCE ENGINEERING The Navy requested $4,033,000 for Intelligence Engineering. The Committee recommends that no funds be made available in fiscal year 1995. Details are addressed in the classified report which accompanies this report. FY95 HAC PAGE 51 INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM The Navy requested $28,805,000 for the Integrated Surveillance System. The Committee recommends $43,605,000, an increase of $14,800,000. Of this amount, $8,000,000 is only for the continued development of the Passive Automation and Low Frequency Active sub-system, and $6,800,000 is only for Fiber Optic Acoustic Sensor Technology. Furthermore, the Committee has learned that the Navy SURTASS program is not using the Navy Standard Signal Processor (AN/UYS-2) for the bi-static active capability. By not using AN/UYS-2, the Navy is thwarting a principal objective of the standard signal processing program. Therefore, the Committee directs that no funds may be spent to develop a bi-static active capability in the SURTASS program unless the acoustic signal processing for this capability is hosted by the AN/UYS-2. The Committee understands that the AN/UYS-2 is being integrated into multiple programs. The Navy should optimize this asset through further development and use of a standard application code. The SQQ-89 combat system the Airborne Low Frequency Sonar and the SURTASS share a common need to develop bi-static and active capabilities. These three systems are all equipped with the AN/UYS-2. The Committee believes that bi-static active software applications developed for one program can be shared with all three systems to avoid costly duplicative development. FY95 HAC PAGE 51 MARINE CORPS TENCAP PROGRAMS The Committee realized that there were funding shortfalls in the Marine Corps TENCAP programs and provided additional funds in fiscal year 1994. The Committee notes that the Marine Corps does not sustain the program in the fiscal year 1995 submission. The Committee directs the Marine Corps to submit by August 1, 1994 the amount of fiscal year 1994 funds obligated to date and detailed description of fiscal year 1995 budgeted initiatives. FY95 HAC PAGE 52 AIR FORCE TENCAP PROGRAMS The Air Force has requested $21,183,000 for Air Force TENCAP programs. The Committee recommends $13,402,000, a decrease of $7,781,000. The Committee notes that the Air Force TENCAP program has and continues to increase substantially since fiscal year 1994. The Committee directs the Department of the Air Force to submit a detailed plan for the fiscal year 1995 request by August 1, 1994. FY95 HAC PAGE 52 COBRA DANE DOD did not request funding for COBRA DANE radar operations. Data collected by COBRA DANE is of importance to the Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Subsequently, the Committee has learned that DOD will not terminate COBRA DANE operations before the end of fiscal year 1995 and is identifying funds to continue the program. The Committee requests that the Secretary of Defense submit, no later than August 1, 1994, the sources used to fund COBRA DANE. FY95 HAC PAGE 52 STU III CONVERSION PROGRAM The Committee applauds the coordinated efforts of NSA, the Services, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I that have led to an executable plan for implementing secure communications throughout DOD. The Services have budgeted for STE equipment; however, the Committee notes that of the 320,000 STU III in use, 160,000 are older models with poor voice transmission, a slow 2.4 Kbps data rate, and on Secure Access Control System capability. It is the Committee's understanding that full production of STE equipment is at least 5 years away and wide scale distribution will be after the turn of the century. The Committee recommends an increase of $4,000,000 only for a short term upgrade of 2.4 STU III units. The additional funds are provided to the service operations and maintenance accounts. Funds are allocated as follows: $2,000,000, Army; $1,000,000, Navy; and $1,000,000, Air Force. FY95 HAC PAGE 52 INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR DRUG INTERDICTION The Committee recognizes the importance and functions of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) of the Drug Enforcement Administration and does not intend for any DOD program to duplicate or conflict with EPIC in any way. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS The Defense Department requested a total of $9,782,249,000 for information technology systems. The Committee recommends $9,519,568,000, a reduction of $262,681,000. The table below provides the Committee's specific recommendations: [In thousands of dollars] Item Amount Operation and Maintenance, Army: Sustaining Base Information System -23,899 Standard Theater Army C2 System, 1994 level due to fiscal constraints -14,399 Military Entrance Processing Command Integrated Resource System, 1994 level due to utilization of SBIS contract -5,675 Personnel Enterprise System, 1994 level and defer new start for records management system -4,966 General reduction, per House Armed Services Committee -89,804 Keyboard Proficiency +5,000 Total -133,743 Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve: Personnel Electronic Records Management System -3,000 General reduction, other than RCAS -7,000 Total -10,000 Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard: Reserve Component Automation System -3,000 Distance learning +7,500 Total +4,500 Other Procurement, Army: Information Systems, general reduction due to poor budget execution -11,000 STAMIS Tactical Computers, general reduction due to poor budget execution -21,850 ADP Equipment -56,032 Sustaining Base Information System (-35,254) General reduction, poor budget execution (-15,000) Strategic Logistics System, TPN-DDN interfaces purchased by DISA instead of Army -(2,800) Personnel Electronic Records Management System -(2,978) Reserve, Component Automation System +66,900 Total -21,982 Operation and Maintenance, Navy: Electronic Military Personnel Records System -11,229 Excessive budget growth -36,000 General reduction, per House Armed Services Committee -91,514 Keyboard proficiency +5,000 Total -133,743 Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve: Naval Reserve Information Technology Modernization +3,000 Other Procurement, Navy: Computer Acquisition Program (EMPRS) -31,800 Operation and Maintenance, Air Force: Local area network management, audit findings -33,529 CAMS/REMIS +5,000 TICARRS +15,000 Automated Record Management System -1,471 Keyboard proficiency +5,000 Total -10,000 Other Procurement, Air Force: Automatic Data Processing Equipment, AFC2S cancelled by the Air Force -4,189 Operation and Maintenance, Defensewide: General reduction, per House Armed Services Committee -50,000 DISA Sustaining Base Information System -1,924 Transfer Ada Joint Project Office to RDT&E -10,800 JEDMICS, revised DOD fielding plan -13,500 Total -76,224 Procurement, Defensewide: JEDMICS, revised DOD fielding plan -13,500 Naval Reserve Information Technology Modernization +10,000 Automated Document Conversion +30,000 Subtotal, Major Equipment OSD/WHS +26,500 High Performance Computer Modernization, transfer from RDT&E +130,000 Automated Information System Equipment, general reduction per House Armed Services Committee -5,000 Total +151,000 Grand Total -262,681 CORPORATE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT The Committee commends the Department for the encouraging progress made in the area of information management and technology over the past year. The Secretary of Defense's direction to accelerate selection and implementation of migration systems, data standardization and business process improvement has been instrumental to Corporate Information Management progress. Such endorsement and direction by the Secretary of Defense is welcomed by this Committee. The leadership and actions undertaken by the Principal Staff Assistants to fulfill the Secretary's direction are commendable. Much remains to be done in this highly visible area. Technical initiatives over the past year have shown great promise. The Committee is particularly pleased with the strong Departmental support provided for the Ada programming language and with related activities such as the Ada Dual-Use Program Plan. The emphasis on the acquisition of widely-used, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software is appropriate. Whenever COTS software is not available, the Department must improve its policy enforcement on the mandatory use of the Ada programming language for all new code to be written for new and modernized systems. The report on the Software Reuse Initiative is another major step for improving software quality concurrent with reducing costs. Other important technical initiatives include the Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management, the Software Process Assessment program, the use of Computer Assisted Software Engineering tools, information technology standards, software licenses and fee-for-service, to name a few. The Department should continue to place emphasis on these areas to achieve major improvements, economies and efficiencies in the overall use of information technology. The goals of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) are laudable. The Department should continue to seek improvements in the efficiency and quality of the infrastructure where costs and benefits can be estimated with some confidence and indicate mission or economic improvements. The open and collaborative approach being taken by General Services Administration and the Department on FTS 2000 is refreshing. The Defense Information System Network (DISN) and the Defense Messaging System (DMS) must be carefully managed and security measures strongly endorsed. The advances made possible through Electronic Commerce and Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI), recently notable in the area of procurement, will require an accessible, flexible, cost-effective but secure DII. The Committee has long advocated reducing the cost of information services and it supports the Department's progress and plans in reducing the number of data processing installations via the megacenter concept as qualified in the General Provisions paragraph later in this section. GENERAL REDUCTIONS The Committee has included some of the general reductions recommended by the House Armed Services Committee in the Operation and Maintenance section of its 1995 report. In those instances where such reductions are recommended, the Committee directs that savings be achieved through improved management in any area and not necessarily be limited to reductions only in information systems modernization. In addition, since approximately one third of the Defense Department's information technology budget is funded in the Defense Business Operations fund, DBOF programs should contribute a proportionately fair share when the Department applies these general reductions. The Committee does not agree to a general reduction to the Air Force since it is the only service whose budget declined significantly from fiscal year 1994 to 1995. The Committee does not agree to a general reduction of the magnitude proposed by the House Armed Services Committee to the Defensewide account since many of the Department's initiatives to improve financial and business practices are funded in that account. KEYBOARD PROFICIENCY A January 1994 Air Force audit makes the observation that there are over 288,000 personal computers in the Air Force alone, yet only personnel whose job description specifically requires keyboard training receive such training. The implication is that through simple training techniques applied to a broader population within the Services, a significant productivity gain might be achieved. The Committee recommends a total of $15,000,000 in the three Service operation and maintenance accounts to provide such training to all employees who might need it. AUTOMATED DOCUMENT CONVERSION The Committee is concerned with the proliferation of automatic document conversion systems in the Defense Department. In the personnel function alone, each Service has its own unique records management system underway at significant cost with little or no coordination with the other services: Army has the Personnel Electronics Management System for the Reserve Forces and the Personnel Enterprise System for the active Army, Navy has the Electronic Military Personnel Records Management System, and Air Force has the Automated Record Management System. This is a good example of where the Department's highly touted Corporate Information Management initiative is not working as well as it should, primarily because the functional proponent for personnel systems in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has apparently failed to act. The Committee recommends that the requests for funds for these systems be denied because they do not conform to section 8021 of the bill, which was also enacted into law last year and apparently had no effect on these uncoordinated and wasteful acquisitions. The Committee also finds it hard to believe that there is no alternative to the Navy other than sole-sourcing its EMPRS system which is large part based on commercial, off-the-shelf technology. The Committee is gratified that the logistics community within the Office of the Secretary of Defense has endorsed the Congressionally directed Automated Document Conversion System and wishes to now integrate its technology into the Joint Engineering Data Management and Information Control System. DOD currently has hundreds of thousands of drawings and hybrid documents relating to weapon systems in its archives. There is a constant and current requirement to utilize many of these documents for weapon system upgrades as well as to develop new systems. Currently, before such documents can be utilized on computer aided design, many hours of human intervention are required after machine scanning of documents to put them into a "vector'' format which then can be manipulated on a CAD system. Manual conversion costs hundreds of millions of dollars a year. The Automated Document Conversion System, which was initiated by the Committee in its fiscal year 1994 bill, directly addresses this problem by eliminating the need for further human intervention once documents are scanned. The Committee recommends an additional $30,000,000 in the Procurement, Defensewide appropriation to purchase additional ADCS equipment once initial testing of the system has been completed. The Committee wonders, however, why the JEDMICS acquisition strategy and its predecessors (EDMICS, DESREDS, EDCARS) did not allow for the integration of modern technology into this multi-hundred million dollar system in the first place. The Committee is concerned that the personnel community within the Defense Department is making the same mistake that the logistics community wants to now rectify in its automated document conversion program: namely, the need to digitally organize the information once it is scanned. This is another reason not to proceed further with the individual service personnel document conversion systems. Once the Department identifies a "best-of-breed'' for its personnel records management system, it should seek to ensure that sufficient technology is included in the system acquisition so that the information that is scanned can be digitally manipulated in an optimum way. An even larger problem is the proliferation of the technology outside the logistics and personnel communities, which at least apparently can identify when such duplication occurs. The Committee is aware that the Defense Information Systems Agency is soliciting a document imaging system with fiscal year 1994 funds. The Committee recommends that this acquisition not proceed until the Defense Department has complied with section 8114 of this bill. Section 8114, a new general provision, requires the Defense Department to formulate a master plan for automated document conversion systems. The plan should encompass all automated document technology within the Defense Department, to include purchase of equipment, procurement of services, development of technologies, or development of information systems. RESERVE COMPONENT AUTOMATION SYSTEM The Committee is pleased that both the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense plan to field the Reserve Component Automation System by 1998, as indicated in the most recent report to Congress in December, 1993. The Committee recommends funding reductions in the Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard appropriation due to excess funds. The Committee recommends an increase of $70,000,000 in procurement to accelerate system fielding, offset by a decrease of $3,100,000 for a help-desk that was scaled back after the budget was submitted to Congress. The Committee recommends that the bill language which established the acquisition strategy for this program be retained, to maintain the stability which has in part contributed to RCAS being considered as being a model acquisition by the General Services Administration and others. SUSTAINING BASE INFORMATION SYSTEM The Committee is concerned about disturbing trends in the Army's Sustaining Base Information System. A press article indicated that the program only has two problems: hardware and software. The Committee S&I staff reports that only 6 of 300 SBIS contract deliverables were delivered on time, the number of sites for deployment has been reduced from 128 to 70, that the number of lines of code for just the first SBIS increment has increased from 350,000 to 1,200,000, and that the hardware has yet to pass a systems acceptance test. The Army recently removed its program manager after an alarming increase in the number of lines of software code, which could potentially trigger an avalanche of cost growth since such software is developed on a cost-plus basis. The Committee does not object to the Army's strategy of involving potential system users in the incremental development of a functional description which governs this acquisition. However, the Army plans to invest over $400 million in this system in the next five years, yet does not have a complete functional description through which the Army, its contractor, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress can know with certainty the scope of the job to be done in this program and its attendant cost. The Committee's Surveys and Investigations staff also reported that procurement funds for SBIS in fiscal year 1995 are premature since the system will not have accomplished sufficient testing to warrant commencing production in fiscal year 1995, and that the SBIS MAISRC is now not scheduled until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1995 which makes contract award within the fiscal year highly unlikely. The Committee has included a new general prohibition (Section 8113) which prohibits the development of SBIS until the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I certifies to Congress that a complete and comprehensive functional description has been published by the Army and the Army has received from the SBIS contractor an estimate of the number of lines of software code to be developed and an estimate of the attendant cost of producing them. The general provision also prohibits the Army from shifting work that had been competitively awarded under the SBIS program through a government in-house activity to another contractor without competition. The Committee recommends a reduction of $23,899,000 to the Army Operation and Maintenance request, which consists of reductions to fielding support ($3,500,000), long distance telephone circuits ($1,000,000), post-deployment software support ($14,399,000), and award fee ($5,000,000). The Committee also recommends a reduction of $5,675,000 to the Military Entrance Processing Command's Integrated Resource System, to hold growth to the 1994 level since this acquisition utilizes the SBIS contract. The Committee recommends no funds for the Defense Information Systems Activity to use the SBIS contract, a reduction of $1,924,000 to the Operation and Maintenance, Defensewide appropriation request. The Committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence to submit a report to the Appropriations Committees of Congress providing a comprehensive economic analysis which includes a detailed definition of the total SBIS program and a reassessment of the return on investment for the life-cycle of the program. The report should also address Army plans to reorganize the SBIS program development office. ARMY RESERVE The Committee recommends a reduction of $10,000,000 to the Army Reserve operation and maintenance appropriation. Of this amount, $3,000,000 of the reduction is to the PERMS acquisition as previously explained in the automated document conversion section of this report. The Committee recommends a general reduction of $7,000,000 since the Reserves have no strategic plan for automation, and have not implemented an interim automation policy which balances how interim computer purchases will be coordinated with the Reserve Component Automation System. NAVAL RESERVE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MODERNIZATION The Committee has provided $13,000,000 above the request in Navy Operation and Maintenance and Defense-Wide procurement and directs the Department of Defense and the Navy to use this funding only for automatic data processing equipment or software, in-house central design development and operation and maintenance of such equipment and software for the Naval Reserve Force Information Systems Office, the Naval Reserve Personnel Center, the Enlisted Personnel Management Center and the collocated Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station. The Committee has provided $3,000,000 of this amount in Navy operation and maintenance funding and $10,000,000 in Defense-Wide procurement for program development to be executed by these commands and bill language in a new general provision (sec. 8107). In last year's bill and report, the Committee identified a number of initiatives and missions for these commands to perform. The Committee directs DoD and the Navy to seriously consider those missions and additional workload for these commands as described in the fiscal year 1994 House and conference reports, especially regarding the establishment of a central management and control site for local area networks along the Gulf Coast. In response to a Committee initiative in last year's conference report, the Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense has begun an analysis for having the Department of Agriculture's National Finance Center (NFC) provide some financial management and personnel support services through cross servicing arrangements for the Department of Defense. The Committee is encouraged by this action and is aware that the Military Department Comptrollers have identified the systems at the NFC as a potential alternative for "substantially lowering civilian payroll and civilian personnel system processing costs'' while eliminating the need for DoD efforts to spend millions "to develop a unique Department of Defense integrated personnel and payroll system''. To meet National Performance Review recommendations, these comptrollers have also recommended implementing a prototype implementation for using some NFC services. The Committee strongly supports implementing, as quickly as possible, such a prototype or other actions that would utilize NFC services and local military command capabilities. The Committee is also aware of possible DoD requirements for central design activity software and development for DoD finance and accounting consolidations and other efforts. The Committee expects these local commands, including, if feasible, the local defense accounting office, to be utilized to develop any requirements identified by DoD for such efforts. The Committee would support DoD efforts and any necessary funding for these DoD efforts. The Committee is supportive of Department or Service efforts to standardize many of its information management systems and functions by migrating them to one or fewer systems. However, the Committee is concerned that not enough emphasis is being placed on identifying existing service systems that can be modified at a lower cost to meet most if not all departmental standardization goals. The Committee understands that in the area of recruiting DoD is seriously considering a more costly new development or another new system called the joint recruiting information system as opposed to existing operational systems that are already deployed. The Navy Reserve's Command Integrated Recruiting Information Management System (CIRIMS) is a proven system that is currently deployed and is cost effective. Prior to making any final decisions on the Department's effort to standardize or choose a migration system for its recruiting functions, a fair and full evaluation of CIRIMS shall be conducted, and DoD shall submit to the Committee on Appropriations a report detailing the systems being considered and the cost effectiveness analysis for each system. In choosing recruiting or other migration systems for standardization, the Committee fully expects the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments to primarily weigh the cost effectiveness and customer efficiency of systems including life cycle or outyear software and hardware development costs. Last year the Committee directed the Navy to utilize the Enlisted Personnel Management Center and collocated commands to provide support for the Navy's total force concept and to improve personnel placement, processes, readiness systems and mobilization capabilities. The Committee still supports this direction, but the Committee is not aware that the Navy has followed these recommendations. The Committee directs the Department of the Navy to establish the Navy Reserve Force Information Systems Office, the Enlisted Personnel Management Center and the collocated Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station as the designers, developers, managers, integrators, and central design activities for the software development and maintenance of the Navy active and reserve single Source Data Collection system. It is also the Committee's firm intent that the Navy shall continue information systems support for the Reserve Personnel and Mobilization Data Base at the Navy Reserve Force Information Systems Office. The Committee also expects that the operations, functions, and management of the Reserve Standard Training Administration and Readiness, the Reserve Financial Management, and other Reserve specific automation systems shall remain collocated with and under the operational control of the Commander, Naval Reserve Force. AIR FORCE AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS This Committee has, for several years, endeavored to motivate the Air Force to improve its automated maintenance management systems. Last year the Congress directed that TICARRS-92 be implemented prior to the end of FY94. While the Air Force has notified the Appropriations Committees of its inability to accomplish this direction, the Committee is pleased with the good-faith effort made by the Air Force. Nevertheless, the net result has been the lack of progress in providing more accurate maintenance data and in reducing the data entry burden of flightline personnel. In revisiting this matter, the Committee reviewed the Institute for Defense Analysis report, A Comparison of Air Force Data Systems, dated August 1993. This report reaffirmed this Committee's concern that action needs to be taken by the Air Force to enhance and evolve its current maintenance management information system. The Report further states, however, that neither TICARRS nor CAMS/REMIS represents the ultimate solution. Rather, the Integrated Maintenance Information System (IMIS) project at Armstrong Laboratory evolved to an open systems architecture appears to offer the greatest potential to improve efficiency of maintenance information systems and support modern on board diagnostics and interactive technical information. The Committee, therefore, directs that the Air Force demonstrate this concept at one base/wing each for TICARRS and CAMS/REMIS, preferably on the same type aircraft (e.g., F-16), in FY95. The proof-of-concept shall evaluate current systems baselines, evaluate improved business processes, and demonstrate the migration from a closed system architecture to a standards-based, open systems architecture. The migration plan from TICARRS/CAMS/REMIS to IMIS shall be congruent with the Air Force plans for Base Level Systems Modernization and shall demonstrate compatibility with JCALS. Pending implementation of the migration plan and replacement of TICARRS/CAMS/REMIS, these systems shall be maintained at a level of sufficiency to assure that aircraft readiness is not compromised. Accordingly, the Committee appropriates $15,000,000 for continued support of TICARRS, $5,000,000 for improvements and corrections to REMIS, and an additional $8,500,000 on the RDT&E account to conduct the proof-of-concept demonstrations. FY95 HAC PAGE 61 LOCAL AREA NETWORKS A December, 1993 Air Force audit discusses problems with the management of local area networks. In anticipation of management improvements in this area, the Committee recommends a reduction of $33,529,000. GENERAL PROVISIONS The Committee has included a new general provision, sec. 8030, concerning the Naval Reserve Personnel Center. The Committee has repeated bill language again this year, now in the general provision. This center is already collocated with the operations of the Commander, Naval Reserve Forces. Many of the center's operations are managed and most of its funding is provided by the Naval Reserve. Therefore, the Committee has provided bill language again placing operational control of the Naval Reserve Personnel Center, including all functions and responsibilities, under the command and control of the Commander, Naval Reserve Command. The Committee has also included a general provision, sec. 8017, on certain Naval Reserve activities. The Committee prohibits funds from being used by the Navy and Department of Defense for certain data processing center, Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 918, information infrastructure, and personal consolidations, plans, disestablishments, or realignments that adversely impact the Naval Reserve Personnel Center (NRPC), the Naval Reserve Force Information Systems Office, the Enlisted Personnel Management Center (EPMAC) and the collocated Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station (NCTS). This prohibition on funding remains in effect until 60 legislative days after the Secretary of Defense and Comptroller General provide a report to the Committees on Appropriations justifying and validating DOD actions.
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