DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS PLUTONIUM, 05/26/1994, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19950427
- Chairperson:
- J.B. Johnston
- Committee:
- Senate Energy and Natural Resources
- Docfile Number:
- Q94AE294
- Hearing Date:
- 19940526
- DOE Lead Office:
- NM
- Hearing Subject:
- DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS PLUTONIUM
- Witness Name:
- C. Curtis
-
Hearing Text:
-
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CRAIG
Question 1: You referred to the closure of Russian reactors that
are fueled with plutonium. It is my understanding that
these reactors were military production reactors. Is
that correct?
Answer: The Russians had 13 reactors dedicated to the production
of plutonium for military purposes. These reactors were
fueled with uranium, however, not plutonium. Ten of
these already have been shut down. The three remaining
reactors, two at Tomsk and one at Krasnoyarsk, provide
process heat and electricity to both the sites.'and
nearby cities. The negotiations for the shut down of
these remaining reactors were being pursued under the
auspices of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and seek to
ensure that any associated plutonium will not be used
for military purposes.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CRAIG
Question 2: Precisely what reactors have the former Soviet Union
nations closed and what have these closures contributed
to the overall plutonium reserves of those nations?
Answer: All the power reactors supplied by the Soviet Union to
its former bloc allies remain in operation or will be
returned to service, except those,in the former East
Germany and Chernobyl Unit 4. They fall into three
categories: the RBMK (Chernobyl type); the VVER-440; and
the VVER-1000. All generate reactor grade plutonium from
their operation, but whether it is reprocessed depends
on many factors. RBMK fuel is not reprocessed;
VVER-440-fuel has been reprocessed at the RT-1 facility
in Chelyabinsk, but the ability of the former bloc
countries to pay for this service varies; VVER-1000 fuel
can only be stored and not reprocessed at this time.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CRAIG
Question 3: In Russia, by your best estimation, how many commercial
reactors are still operating?
How many burn plutonium?
What is the current reprocessing infrastructure to
separate plutonium?
Answer: In Russia, there are 29 reactors producing electrical
energy, but there are a number of special purpose
reactors (e.g., research, critical assemblies) that are
being used for commercial purposes -- i.e., production
of medical and industrial radioisotopes.
Outside of the Russian breeder reactor program, there
are no reactors fueled with plutonium.
Russia has operational reprocessing facilities at three
sites. At Chelyabirsk, the RT-1 reprocesses fuel from
the VVER-440 reactors, the naval nuclear program, and
other special purpose reactors. At Tomsk and
Krasnoyarsk, plants reprocess fuel from the three
production reactors. Also at Krasnoyarsk, the RT-2 is a
large, but unfinished reprocessing plant that would
handle VVER-1000 fuel.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BUMPERS
Question 1. Considerations of cost and timeliness would sum to argue
in favor of using proven, existing technologies for
plutonium disposition. The National Academy of Sciences
recommended two technologies: (1) burning plutonium in
combination with uranium fuel in existing nuclear
reactors and (2) mixing plutonium with high-level
nuclear waste and vitrifying the material. Given the
urgency and nature of the situation, do you believe it
is appropriate to consider other technologies which have
not even advanced beyond the R&D state and whose
development would be extremely costly to the taxpayers?
Answer: The two technologies mentioned above are methods to
achieve the "spent fuel standard" in which the
plutonium is made as inaccessible for weapons use as the
plutonium in spent fuel from commercial power reactors.
The National Academy, of Sciences also recommended
investigating deep borehole disposal.
Because plutonium disposition alternatives that involve
meeting the "Spent fuel standard" result in placing
plutonium in a form that still entails a risk of
weapons use, and because the barriers to use diminish
with time as the radioactivity decays, the Department
considers it prudent to investigate technologies that go
beyond the spent fuel standard by making the plutonium
essentially, inaccessible or destroying it.
Among the factors to be evaluated in selecting preferred
alternatives will be the technical fisk, cost of
implementation including the cost of research and
development, and the time to start implementation. Thus,
alternatives with an inordinate amount of research and
development may not rank high against the selection
criteria.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BUMPERS
Question 2: The NAS study recommended that weapons plutonium
should be converted into spent nuclear fuel or another
final form with proliferation resistance equivalent to
spent fuel. Do you agree with this recommendation? Is
this "spent fuel standard" sufficient from a
nonproliferation and arms control perspective, or
is it necessary to pursue the expensive and
time-consuming process of near complete destruction of
plutonium?
Answer: Because plutonium disposition alternative that involve
meeting the "spent fuel standard" result in placing
plutonium in a form that still entails a risk of weapons
use, and because the barriers to use diminish with time
as the radioactivity decays, the Department considers it
prudent to investigate technologies that go beyond the
spent fuel standard by making the plutonium essentially,
inaccessible or destroying it.
The Department has made no decisions on which
alternative to select. However, the Department does
consider it prudent and reasonable to examine some
alternative that go beyond the "spent fuel standard" to
determine the difference in technical risk, cost,
schedule, and proliferation resistance of a range of
alternatives.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BUMPERS
Question 3: Wouldn't a mixed-oxide program for plutonium disposition
encourage civilian plutonium programs abroad and promote
a domestic plutonium industry.
Answer: The use of mixed oxide fuel in commercial power reactors
as a means of plutonium disposition would be a
once-through process without reprocessing or recycling
the spent fuel. The United States would be taking
plutonium previously separated for weapons purposes and
would be converting it to spent nuclear fuel.
Since spent fuel reprocessing would not be used, this
approach would not encourage civilian plutonium
programs abroad nor would it encourage a domestic
plutonium industry.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BUMPERS
Question 4: What are the regulatory obstacles to the disposition of
plutonium as MOX fuel? Would the Generic Environmental
Impact Statement for Mixed Oxide Fuels proceeding have
to be reopened? What period of time would be required
to resolve the regulatory obstacles? How do these
obstacles compare with those associated with
vitrification?
Answer: The Department has initiated the preparation of a
programmatic environmental impact statement (PETS) to
evaluate alternative for long-term storage of all
weapons-usable fissile materials and disposition of
weapons-usable fissile materials declared surplus to
national defense needs by the President. Prior analysis,
such as the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for
Mixed Oxide Fuels, will be utilized as input.
The regulatory issues associated with each disposition
alternative will be identified and evaluated. For
example, an existing commercial power reactor may
require a license notification from the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to use mixed oxide fuel. A
mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility may also
require NRC licensing. The repository impacts of the
spent fuel form also will need to be evaluated.
The comparison of regulatory issues will be completed as
pari of a record of decision following completion of the
PEIS. The record of decision is scheduled to be issued
in the Spring of 1996.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BUMPERS
Question 5: What are the technical obstacles for using
vitrification as a means of plutonium disposition?
What research is being conducted on vitrification? What
is the timeline for demonstrating the feasibility of
vitrification?
Answer: Technical obstacles for using vitrification, or other
immobilization technologies for plutonium disposition,
include:
o the amount and concentration of plutonium that can be
suspended in the matrix material (glass or ceramic).
o criticality control considerations
o the ability: to dissolve plutonium metal directly in
the matrix, and
o the extent to which the spent fuel standard could be
met with existing high level waste.
These issues we being studied. Since most research and
development on immobilization technologies in the past
involved high-level waste and not direct disposition of
plutonium, some experimental work may be required. This
research and development program will be formulated as
part of the output of the present study.
The timeline for decisions on plutonium disposition is
paced by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
process and is planned to result in decisions in the
spring of 1996.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BUMPERS
Question 6. Is the Interagency Working Group on Plutonium
Disposition utilizing the spent fuel standard as a
criterion?
Answer Yes. The Interagency Working Group on Plutonium
Disposition is using as its starting point the National
Academy of Sciences report, Management and Disposition
of Excess Weapons Plutonium. In its report, the Academy
identified standards for managing the proliferation
risks associated with surplus weapons plutonium. It
recommended the "spent fuel standard" in which the
plutonium is made as inaccessible for weapons use as
plutonium in spent fuel from commercial power reactors.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR BUMPERS
Question 9: The U.S. has helped to develop many of the advanced
materials accounting and safeguard measures for Japan's
plutonium fuel fabrication facility. Given the
anticipated increase in plutonium commerce in the next
few years, stringent and effective implementation of
IAEA safeguards is more important than ever. How can the
goal of greater "transparency" for civilian plutonium
programs be achieved if information about safeguards
problems is treated as "safeguards confidential" and is
not made public?
Answer: Transparency of member states' civilian nuclear programs
is an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
objective, but the IAEA necessarily must pursue this
objective within the parameters established by
its members.
The Board of Governors of the IAEA gives the Safeguards
Department the authority to protect any data that has to
do with proprietary information, which must be
maintained in a confidential manner. The IAEA has a
specific list of documents considered safeguards
confidential. These documents are generally routine
documents and may include information related to design
or movement of materials and conclusions about what is
happening in a facility or a state. Such confidentiality
is a necessary condition for the transparency managed
under IAEA auspices.
Typically what is classified as safeguards confidential
is proprietary information or data on transfer of
nuclear materials. In addition, there are several
instances in which documents could be classified
safeguards confidential, including: 1) documents
provided by a member state which requests that they be
kept confidential, 2) highly sensitive information, and
3) documents as determined by the IAEA Deputy
Director-General of Safeguards, Safeguards Division
Director, or safeguards classification officer as
needing to be safeguards confidential.
Information on issues or "problems" with in member
states is reported to the IAEA to be handled and solved.
The IAEA has a responsibility to member states not to
compromise proprietary information that is potentially
contained in documentation of "problems" The IAEA can
only release material deemed safeguards confidential if
the country concerned has agreed.
The process of classifying documents safeguards
confidential was reviewed by the Board of Governors
three years ago and determined to be the appropriate
mechanism for protecting proprietary information.
The goal of transparency of the member states' civilian
nuclear programs continues to be an IAEA objective in
the context of sustaining access and performing their
auditing and inspection functions. The IAEA promotes
transparency between a particular member state and the
IAEA, not transparency between two member states.
Additionally, the IAEA has no capability to order a
member state to be transparent to the public of that
member state. That would be a matter of domestic law.
The "Programme 93+2" initiative at the IAEA focuses on
an expanded safeguard regime to "provide assurance
regarding both the correctness and the completeness of a
state's nuclear programme declaration." The objectives
outlined under 93+2 are aimed at making member states
even more responsible and forthcoming to the IAEA in
declarations of their nuclear activities.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Question 1: What is the view of the Department of Energy concerning
the risk to the U.S. of the current plutonium situation
in Russia? Shouldn't the program, account for, secure,
and dispose of nuclear weapons, be treated with the same
urgency as the Manhattan Project?
Answer: The United States is very concerned about plutonium
stockpiles in Russia, and has undertaken a comprehensive
approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material
from dismantled nuclear weapons and within civil nuclear
programs. The United States has established a close
relationship with Russia in addressing these urgent
problems. At the summit between President Clinton and
President Yeltsin, the two agreed to cooperate on
measures to prevent the accumulation of excessive stocks
of fissile materials and over time reduce these stocks.
At their direction, the United States and Russia have
convened working groups to develop steps to ensure the
transparency and irreversibility of the process of
reduction of nuclear weapons, and study options for the
long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly
plutonium. We are pursuing such control and disposition
measures as rapidly as possible, given the necessity for
agreement by Russia on how to proceed and their
perspective on plutonium as a valued asset rather than a
liability.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Question 2: Is the Administration dealing with the issue as a
serious national security problem or as just another
nuclear waste problem? Who in the Administration is
responsible if there is a diversion of plutonium in
Russia as a result of inaction on the part of the
Administration?
Answer: The issue of safeguarding plutonium is always regarded
as among the highest national security concerns. The
priority that this Administration has placed on
non-proliferation attests to this. The Department of
Energy, for example, has sought with considerable
success to negotiate with Russia the shutdown of
reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk and obtain assurances
that the excess plutonium would not be used for
military purposes.
Responsibility for the control of Russian plutonium lies
with the Russian Federation, which is formally committed
to this responsibility as a signatory of the
Nonproliferation Treaty. Although we cannot directly
intervene in the actions of Russia, the United States
and the international community support this commitment
by offering assistance to better control and account
for fissile materials in all of the former Soviet Union.
Examples of U.S. support include material control acid
accounting (MC&A) assistance under Nunn-Lugar
legislation and laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges on
MC&A, among others.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Question 3: When will the Department of Energy be ready to make a
definitive decision on the disposition of excess weapons
grade plutonium and actually commence a program (not
study) to start destroying these materials? What can be
done to expedite this process?
Answer: The Department is preparing a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (PEIS) to evaluate alternative for
long-term storage of all. weapons-usable fissile
materials and disposition of weapons-usable fissile
materials declared surplus to national defense needs by
the President. This PEIS process, which includes
substantial public input, will take about two years
leading to a record of decision (ROD)in the spring of
1996.
The National Academy of Sciences in its report entitled,
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
noted that, "It is important to begin now to build
consensus on a roadmap for decisions concerning long-
term disposition of excess weapons plutonium. Because
disposition options will take decades to carry out,
it is critical to develop options that can muster a
sustainable consensus". The Department is committed to
complete its work as expeditiously as possible while
assuring appropriate participation and input from the
public and elected official which will be essential to
obtaining such a sustainable consensus.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Question 4: What is the viability of implementing a program for
securing safeguarding, and destroying excess plutonium
in Russia without parallel and reciprocal activities in
the U.S.?
Answer: The United States is committed to cooperating with
Russia in addressing the control and disposition of
plutonium, and reciprocity is a key aspect of that
cooperation. As part of the material control and
accounting program with Russia, the United States has
proposed to host reciprocal visits to the plutonium
facilities at the Hanford Site in the United States and
the Mayak installation in Russia to demonstrate material
control and accounting practices. In an attempt to
enhance the transparency and irreversibility of
dismantlement; the United States and Russia have agreed
to host reciprocal inspections by the end of 1994 to
facilities storing plutonium removed from nuclear
weapons. Cooperative,efforts will continue as U.S. and
Russian experts convene a joint working group to study
options for the long-term disposition of fissile
materials, particularly plutonium.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Question 5: What is the viability of accomplishing all these
activities in Russia in the absence of a comprehensive
approach involving significant financial assistance?
Answer: The United States has undertaken a comprehensive
approach to the growing accumulation of fissile
material from dismantled nuclear weapons and within
civil nuclear programs. Key elements of this approach
include ensuring the highest standards of control of
fissile materials, limiting the stockpiling of these
materials, and developing long-term options for the
disposition of these materials. There will be
significant costs associated with implementing
these steps, some of which are addressed by assistance
programs such as Nunn-Lugar, some through
laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation and some through
the International Science and Technology Center
in Russia.
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