FY 1995 BUDGET - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, 05/03/1994, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19940810
- Chairperson:
- J. Exon
- Committee:
- Senate Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- Q94AC193
- Hearing Date:
- 19940503
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP/NN
SUB
- Committee:
- Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1995 BUDGET - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
- Witness Name:
- C. Curtis
-
Hearing Text:
-
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Hydronuclear Tests
Question #12: Dr. Reis, is there a policy disagreement within DOE on
whether hydronuclear experiments, with very small
amounts of fissile material, should be covered by the
test moratorium or a test ban? Who holds such a view?
What is the view of the weapon designers? What is your
view?
Answer: Whether or not it is in our best national interest to
conduct these experiments in the near term is an issue
that is currently being discussed within the
Administration and has not yet been settled. It is not
known if such experiments will be permitted under a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since the specific terms
of a Treaty have yet to be determined.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Tritium Reservoirs for Navy Requirements
Question 16: Dr. Reis, were we correctly informed that DOE is unable
to deliver new tritium reservoirs on the schedule the
Navy needs?
Answer: Because of the decision to terminate non-nuclear
component production at the Rocky Flats, Pinellas, and
Mound plants one year earlier than originally planned,
there will be a shortage of tritium reservoirs for some
non-deployed Navy warheads. We are working with the
Navy and the Department of Defense to minimize the
impact of the shortfall.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Reconfiguration
Question 4
and 5(1): Mr. Curtis, is the Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement for nuclear reconfiguration going to address
anything other than plutonium storage and tritium
production? You indicate in your statement that the
scope of the PEIS is undergoing review due to budget
constraints. Could you please explain this statement.
Answer: Last fall, the Department conducted a series of public
scoping meetings and a comment period to receive input
on the then-current reconfiguration proposal. At the
time, the Department was planning to analyze, in the
Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS), alternative sites at which to relocate
weapons complex functions, including new plutonium and
uranium/lithium component fabrication facilities and new
assembly/disassembly/high explosives facilities. As a
result of the input received from stakeholders, the lack
of any new weapons requirements for the foreseeable
future, and pressing budget priorities, the Department
will no longer consider relocation of most weapons
complex functions or major new weapons facilities in the
PEIS.
In addition, as of last fall, alternatives for the
long-term storage of fissile nuclear materials were to
be considered in the Reconfiguration PEIS. However, the
Secretary recently initiated a Nuclear Materials
Disposition Project within the Department to study
alternatives for the storage and/or disposition of
weapons usable fissile materials. Because decisions
regarding long-term storage and disposition of these
materials are closely linked, these alternatives will
now be evaluated in a separate PEIS for Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials. A
Notice of Intent will be issued this summer to initiate
the public comment process on the scope of the PEIS.
Comments will be received and considered through the
fall of this year. An Implementation Plan would follow
in early 1995 and a Draft and Final PEIS would then be
completed by early 1996.
Therefore, the Reconfiguration PEIS will focus on
alternatives for tritium production and recycle
facilities. Four technologies will be evaluated for a
new tritium production facility: Heavy Water Reactor,
Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor, Advanced
Light Water Reactor, and Proton Accelerator. The
candidate sites being examined for new tritium
facilities are the Savannah River Site, the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, the Oak Ridge
Reservation, the Nevada Test Site and the Pantex Plant.
In addition, the PEIS will contain an analysis of the
environmental impacts associated with the purchase of
irradiation services from an existing commercial reactor
for the production of tritium. The Department will
publish a Draft PEIS for public review and comment
no later than March 1, 1995. The Draft PEIS will contain
the Department's preferred alternative site and/or
technology for tritium production and recycle
facilities. The Department expects to have a Record of
Decision regarding these facilities in November, 1995.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR EXON
Question 5(2): Mr. Curtis, I am trying to get straight all of the
Environmental Impact Statements. From your statement, I
believe I have identified the following:
(2) An Environmental Impact Statement for Plutonium
disposition that mill support a decision on a method for
plutonium destruction and or disposal in June 1996.
Answer: Our initial approach for the Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement for Storage and Disposition of Fissile
Nuclear Materials contemplates environmental analyses of
a range of options for long-term storage of all
separated, weapons-useable fissile materials inventories
under the cognizance of the Department (principally
plutonium and highly enriched uranium) whether stored
for national security needs or stored as surplus to
these needs pending disposition. This approach would
enable analysis of cumulative environmental impacts of
long-term materials storage irrespective of the reason
for retention. In addition to analyzing storage of all
these fissile materials, we would analyze a range of
options for the eventual disposition of the materials
which are surplus to national security needs. This PEIS
is presently scheduled for completion by early 1996.
In addition, the Notice of Intent for the PEIS addresses
other National Environmental Policy Act documents
currently being prepared by DOE that have a direct
bearing on this PEIS. These are: the Pantex Sitewide
EIS, the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration PEIS, the Spent
Fuel PEIS, and the PEIS for Nuclear Materials Storage
and Disposition. The Notice of Intent was published in
the Federal Register on June 21, 1994.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Non-proliferation and National Security
Question 10: Dr. Keliher, if an additional $100 million was available
to spend on non-proliferation and counterproliferation
activities at the DOE weapons labs, could this money
be well spent and on what would you recommend spending
it?
Answer: For fiscal year (FY) 1995, the high-priority
nonproliferation activities have been funded in the
Fiscal Year 1995 budget request. We believe the
President's Budget adequately funds these high-priority
actions which the Department will undertake in this
important area next fiscal year. However, additional
funds over the requested amount would have the dual
benefit of enhancing and expediting already planned and
existing activities and/or funding lower priority
activities for FY 1995.
The following is a review of the pertinent projects
which the Department has planned or is considering for
FY 1995, dependent upon the level of funding received.
The dollar amounts shown indicate the distribution of
the hypothetical $100 million.
I. Technical and Analytical Support - $34 Million
Additional funding would serve to initiate new programs
or accelerate current nonproliferation and
counterproliferation activities across the National
Laboratory structure, specifically:
$1,000,000
Increase the capability at Argonne National Laboratory
(ANL) for development of high density low enriched
uranium fuels, and reduction of the need for and
proliferation risk from civilian use of highly enriched
uranium.
$500,000
Enhance efforts at ANL to reduce and eliminate
proliferation risk from growing stockpiles of excess
civilian plutonium.
$1,500,000
Creation of a Cooperative Monitoring Center for
development, testing, and certification of confidence
building and verification measures at Sandia National
Laboratory (SNL).
$4,000,000
Accelerate completion of the Proliferation Information
Network System, a Secret/Restricted Data national
computer network accessible to interagency users
involved in weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation
efforts. Development and implementation of this system
is being undertaken by Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL), SNL, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL), Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL), and ANL.
$3,840,000
Increase critical nuclear technical studies and
implementation of measures to help minimize the impact
of dual-use export controls on U.S. industry
competitiveness at ORNL and LANL.
$1,000,000
Expedite development of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
Information Sharing System (NISS): International
computer system to facilitate harmonized application of
nuclear export controls. LANL is presently developing
NISS for use by the NSG and would be capable of
expanding system parameters to include other
nonproliferation regimes if necessary.
$4,000,000
Accelerate introduction of effective Special Nuclear
Material (SNM) controls in the former Soviet Union
(FSU). Allows LANL, ORNL, SNL, PNL, and Brookhaven
National Laboratory (BNL) to provide training,
equipment, and technical assistance such as discussion
and development of a national level and facility level
material control and accounting program and physical
protection program to the FSU. Implementation of these
programs significantly decreases the danger associated
with the diversion of nuclear materials to proliferant
countries, as well as supports national and DOE
strategic objectives for nonproliferation.
$2,000,000
Enhance support to regional nonproliferation regimes in
unstable and high risk regions. Additional funds would
enable PNL, LANL, SNL, and ORNL to provide expanded
technical assistance, inspector training, and
development of advanced nonproliferation options to the
Korean Peninsula, Latin America, and South Africa.
$5,000,000
Accelerate implementation of the U.S./International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Voluntary Safeguards
Agreement, enabling LANL, SNL, ORNL, BNL, and PNL to
provide examination techniques for evaluating sensitive
weapons components, training and assistance in
determining impacts and implementation requirements, and
information to assist in negotiations concerning IAEA
inspections of excess fissile material at DOE
facilities.
$750,000
Strengthen technical support for global and bilateral
SNM production cutoff treaty negotiations. Intensify use
of former DOE production complex facilities as "test
beds" for cooperative development of transparency
measures and verification regimes with Russia, selected
newly independent states, and others, (PNL, INEL and
Savannah River Plant (SR)) including interactions to
benefit from the International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards experience (LANL, ORNL, and BNL).
$750,000
Reinforce analytical and technical support for
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations and
implementation. Augment calculational and hydronuclear
analyses plus policy option formulation, verification
methodology development and expert technical negotiation
support from LANL, LLNL, and SNL.
$3,220,000
Resource base for purchase/take back of SNM caches
being. discovered in former Soviet Union republics and
other locations. Would include all planning,
safety/environmental assessments, action plans for
protecting, packaging, transporting, and long-term
storage of the weapon-usable materials in question and
involve ORNL and SNL, SR.
$2,000,000
Increase non-nuclear weapon related employment
opportunities for FSU weapon scientists ("Brain Drain"
and "Laboratory-to-Laboratory" projects). Funding base
for mutually beneficial research in areas such as laser
applications, environmental remediation, reactor safety,
medical instrumentation, etc.
$1,250,000
Enhance implementation support for the full package of
Gore/Chernomyrdin and O'Leary/Mikhailov nonproliferation
initiatives (long-term plutonium disposition and
transparency/irreversibility of the nuclear weapon
reduction process). Provide initial program assets to
accelerate projects at Rocky Flats and Pantex. Objective
would be early-as-possible conclusion of supporting
agreements, facility lists, equipment lists and
methodologies, familiarization and demonstration visits,
data exchanges, and establishment of regime for
conducting reciprocal inspections of dismantled weapon
material/component storage inspections of dismantled
weapon material/component storage.
$250,000
Chemical Weapons Convention: Upgrade technical support
for inspection regime negotiation and implementation
planning including training for and demonstrations of
non-destructive evaluation instrumentation and
analytical equipment at LANL, PNL and LLNL.
$300,000
Development and technical negotiation support for
Biological Weapons Convention transparency measures at
LLNL and LANL.
$1,000,000
Technical assistance/collaboration with Russia in the
cessation of plutonium production from the three
remaining production reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk,
which continue in operation to provide heat and power to
the civil population. Assessment of production reactor
design, operating condition, and safety requirements, as
well as discharged fuel storage options. Assessment of
reactor replacement and conversion options, including
associated follow-on design efforts (PNL and ANL).
$1,080,000
Reinforce support to ANL for the Reduced Enrichment for
Research and Test Reactors fuels program.
$560,000
Enable LANL, SNL, ORNL, and PNL to provide safeguards
training for international inspectors and foreign
nationals in state systems of accounting and control and
physical protection. Additional funds would allow course
curricula to be more comprehensive, and would allow
course to be taught to a wider range of participants,
enhancing physical protection and state systems of
accounting and control in other countries, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency's capabilities.
II. Research and Development - $55 Million
Additional funding would enable the DOE National
Laboratories to expand from the current nuclear
nonproliferation R&D program to include other WMD and to
apply their expertise in conjunction with the Department
of Defense to improve the effectiveness of detecting and
monitoring activities to enhance a counterproliferation
response.
With additional funding, DOE would be prepared to
undertake a research and technology development program
to address the priority shortfalls in operational
capabilities as identified in the recent report to
Congress on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation
Activities and Programs. The United States Government
requirements for sound technical solutions and
scientific analysis are a recognized strength for the
DOE laboratories.
This additional funding would expand technology
development and analysis capabilities in:
o Remote detection of suspected and declared
proliferant activities;
o Enhanced traditional international safeguards of
fissile materials through transparency and
confidence-building measures;
o U.S./Russian initiatives to dismantle nuclear
weapons in a safe, secure manner;
o Detection and characterization of underground
structures associated with WMD;
o Monitoring of treaties such as a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty.
Examples of major activities that could be expanded are
the development and testing of prototypes of advance
sensors and detection technology to.improve the
threshold of detection, to augment battlefield and
special operational assessment capabilities, to improve
the data processing capabilities for the Intelligence
Community, and to expand the analytical tools available
to support timely decisionmaking. Many of these
technologies ire under long-term development by DOE
and would be accelerated with the additional resources.
III. Intelligence - $11 Million
The additional funds would provide for increasing the
effectiveness of National Laboratory intelligence
programs in the nonproliferation/counterproliferation
efforts of the U.S. Government to meet this post-Cold
War challenge to our national security.
As a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, DOE
would greatly benefit by additional funding for projects
listed in a classified report submitted through separate
channels. At the heart of U.S. nonproliferation and
counterproliferation efforts, DOE's Headquarters and
National Laboratory analytical teams would accelerate
their programs to meet what appears to be an
acceleration of proliferation efforts involving both
supplier and proliferant countries.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Non-proliferations and National Security
Question 11: Mr. Curtis, if an additional $100 million was available
to be spent at the DOE weapons labs, would there be a
higher priority for all or part of the money rather than
non-proliferation and counterproliferation activities
such as stockpile stewardship?
Answer: The Department of Energy could certainly put an
additional $100 millon to good use to increase its
investment in science-based stockpile stewardship
activities as well as non-proliferation and
counterproliferation activities. Given the potential
availability of an additional $100 million, DOE would
review the most significant proposals from each mission
area to identify the most effective use of these
potential resources. Since this review has not taken
place, I cannot tell you which of our mission areas
would receive the highest priority.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR J. JAMES EXON
Question 12: Dr. Keliher, you are working on new technologies that
will be necessary for verification of a comprehensive
test ban treaty. What are some of the challenges that
you face in developing these technologies?
Answer: Some of the most important challenges we face in
developing new technologies for verification of a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty include:
o Identifying nuclear tests, at very low yield levels
with few false alarms, in a background of thousands
of earthquakes, other natural phenomena, and
conventional explosions that occur annually.
o Developing the on-site inspection regime, to narrow
the search area and to then find forensic evidence of
the testing.
o Developing automated data processing techniques to
handle the very large data volume and take advantage
of synergies in the technologies (seismic,
radionuclide, hydroacoustic, etc.) to provide an
integrated assessment of an event.
o Improving sensitivity for detecting and measuring
radionuclide particulates and noble gases by
increasing the volume of air samples, while minimizing
power and maintenance requirements.
o Removing background atmospheric constituents, e.g.
radon and radon daughters, etc., to eliminate
interference with the xenon detection and measurement.
o In addition, challenges exist such as 1) providing a
cost-effective open monitoring system of technologies
while ensuring data surety required for verification,
2) providing cost-effective communications from the
monitoring sites, 3) assuring complete coverage in
areas of interest, and 4) assuring the data obtained
is shared with the scientific community.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Stockpile Stewardship
Question 16: Is it accurate to conclude that although Inertial
Confinement Fusion (ICF) is the single most important
alternate to underground testing, the DOE has been
working on ICF for many years and was, therefore, not
included in the DPP, the focus of which was toward
identifying new programs?
The bottom line appears to be that the stockpile
stewardship program is underfunded by $200-300 million?
Answer: Resources for the ongoing DP Inertial Confinement Fusion
(ICF) Program were not included in the original resource
estimates for funding the Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD). Preliminary estimates of resources
required for the ICF technology based National Ignition
Facility (NIF) were included as an over target new
construction item in the original resource estimates for
funding the PDD. Continued ICF funds are essential for
NIF.
The bottom line is that the FY 1995 budget for Research,
Development and Testing (RD&T), which includes resources
for the ICF Program, is $270 million less than the
estimate for the long-term RD&T budget needed to sustain
science-based stockpile stewardship and a capability to
return to underground testing, according to the
interagency working group PDD plan in autumn 1993. The
FY 1995 budget is nonetheless within the Presidential
directed guidelines and will not impair the safety and
reliability of the stockpile.
However, with the responsibility of implementing
science-based stockpile stewardship in lieu of
underground testing, we foresee the need for additional
investments beyond the FY 1995 level in the future.
These are to fund NIF and other needed science-based
initiatives, while maintaining our core science and
technology competencies.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Stockpile Stewardship
Question 17: Mr. Curtis, in your testimony, you state that DOE is
working on a long-term program strategy for Stockpile
Stewardship that should be completed by July 1994, in
time for development of the FY 1996 budget. You also
indic-ate, however, that the 1995 budget request is
driven by this document.
(1) Does this mean that we may need to modify the FY
1995 budget?
(2) Will this strategy document identify technologies
that are alternatives to underground testing?
Answer: The Stockpile Stewardship Plan to be completed in July
1994, will identify all the essential program activities
which underpin the new science-based stockpile
stewardship strategy.
All of this information will be considered in the FY
1996 DOE internal budget review process. As the plan
evolves, we certainly expect that our FY 1995 laboratory
activities will be reoriented toward those activities
which are emphasized in the DOE's FY 1996 budget
submittal to Congress. We do not believe that we need to
modify the FY 1995 budget for stockpile stewardship.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Technologies for Stockpile Stewardship
Question 18: There are several technologies that have been identified
as necessary for long-tenn monitoring of the aging
nuclear weapons stockpile. What is the purpose of each
technology; what do we gain from each technology; the
current status of development of or planning for each;
their relative importance; an estimate of construction
and operation costs?
Answer: In the present budget parlance, several broad areas of
Research and Development, Testing and Surveillance, have
been identified within the Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD). These encompass a very large number of
diverse technologies. During FY 1994, the Assistant
Secretary for Defense Programs has been working with
other agencies, particularly with the Department of
Defense, with inputs from the DOE defense laboratories,
to identify and plan for special technologies and
associated facilities which need greater emphasis in
dealing with the absence of underground testing. We
anticipate that the top level future oriented,
science-based Stockpile Stewardship Plan will be
available later this year.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR GLENN
Fissile Material Disposition Analysis
Question 2: I am aware that DOE is in the process of determining its
"holdings" of all forms of Special Nuclear Materials
including Fissile Materials. This would include, I would
assume, any collections of scrap, waste, discarded
materials and other residues.
Once you have this list, what are you going to do with
it? Will you conduct a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement, or a Proliferation analysis, which
could provide policy direction on the return to
Reprocessing or Processing? These issues should have
wide discussion both within DOE and with the congress,
public, and community or national interest groups What
are your plans in this regard?
Answer: On March 15, 1994, Secretary O'Leary directed DOE's
Office of Environment, Safety and Health to conduct a
comprehensive assessment of the environment, safety'
and health vulnerabilities associated with the
Department's inventory of plutonium in storage. The
results of this effort will serve as the technical
information base to identify corrective actions and
options for the safe management of surplus fissile
materials. This assessment, which will also be provided
to the Congress, is scheduled to be completed by
September 30 and will be followed by an assessment of
highly enriched uranium.
Materials of interest include all isotopes and forms in
the inventory of plutonium, including process residues,
pits from the disassembly of nuclear weapons, and
separated plutonium previously in the weapons production
pipeline, however, plutonium housed inside intact
nuclear weapons is excluded from this vulnerability
assessment. It is entirely likely that, at the
conclusion of the assessment, some of the resulting
corrective actions will require separate site specific
environmental analyses and have significant
nonproliferation implications. The Department will
consider each of these on a case-by-case basis after
consultation with the appropriate public and private stakeholders
The conduct of the vulnerability assessment will involve
discussions and input from numerous external
stakeholders such as Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Environmental Protection Agency, National Academy of
Sciences, International Atomic Energy Agency, Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Congress and state
representatives, and public interest groups
The Department previously evaluated the environmental,
safety and health vulnerabilities associated with spent
nuclear fuel and irradiated nuclear targets, and found
serious problems with these stored materials. The
Department is currently implementing corrective actions
to improve the management of spent fuel and targets,
with the goals of minimizing worker exposure, reducing
environmental risks, and safeguarding the public.
Moreover, new technologies are needed to stabilize these
materials to minimize human health and environmental
impacts and optimize tong-term stability without
traditional separations reprocessing.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR GLENN
Restart of Savannah River Reprocessing Plants
Question 3: We have heard rumors recently that DOE wants to restart
the Savannah River Reprocessing Canyons, in order to
clean them up for ultimate shutdown. The 'Safe Shutdown'
issue has been raised for some time in regard to those
facilities.
What are your short-term and long-term plans for restart
or shutdown of the Savannah River Reprocessing
facilities, and where are those plans reflected in the
budget?
Answer: H-Canyon and its associated finishing line (HB-Line) are
operating to process plutonium-238 for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's Cassini mission.
Other ongoing activities at the Savannah River Site's
Site's (SRS) F-Canyon and H-Canyon are limited to those
actions necessary to ensure the safety of the facility,
Its materials, and the workers, the public and the
environment. No spent fuel or other irradiated material
(i.e., targets) reprocessing activities are currently
taking place. Our short-term plans are to continue to
maintain the existing SRS inventories of nuclear
materials in a safe, stored condition. An environmental
impact statement (EIS) to continue the safe management
of these materials is under preparation; it is entitled
the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the SRS.
This EIS will be considering what actions, if any, the
Department of Energy (DOE) should take to ensure the SRS
materials remain safely stored and managed until
disposition decisions can be made. A Department-wide
special project has been established to coordinate
efforts for the control and disposition of surplus
fissile materials. A separate nuclear materials
programmatic EIS will be prepared to assist the
Department in decisions associated with the plutonium
disposition. Upon the completion of determined necessary
actions for the stabilization and/or disposition of DOE
nuclear materials, we expect the SRS canyons will be
permanently shutdown.
The decisions to prepare the environmental impact
statements for nuclear materials management were made
after the preparation of the FY 1995 budget submission,
and, as such are not directly reflected in the
submission. Nonetheless, the preparation of the related
National Environmental Policy Act documentation, is
required in order to meet the objectives of ensuring the
safe storage and/or disposition of nuclear materials at
the Savannah River Site as identified in the FY 1995
budget request, and the eventual cleanout and shutdown
of the SRS canyon facilities. The SRS canyon facilities
activities are included within the Materials Support
category of the Defense Programs portion of the budget.
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