FY 1995 BUDGET - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, 05/03/1994, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19940810
- Chairperson:
- S. Nunn
- Committee:
- Senate Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- Q94AB193
- Hearing Date:
- 19940503
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP/NN
SUB
- Committee:
- Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1995 BUDGET - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
- Witness Name:
- C. Curtis
-
Hearing Text:
-
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Underground Nuclear Testing
Question #1: Mr. Secretary, your prepared testimony states that you
will be able to conduct "simple" nuclear test within 6
months if the President so directs. From what I
understand from your experts, a "simple" test will be
more symbolic than useful. Isn't it true that you have
taken down the infrastructure needed to conduct truly
useful tests, and it will take years to rebuild it?
Answer: No, the infrastructure for nuclear testing has not been
dismantled. However, the Department has been
periodically reviewing the maintenance requirements of
the Nevada Test Site and the national laboratories to
assure consistency with national objectives as
established by Presidential direction. Current
guidelines are to maintain the resources at the national
laboratories and the Nevada Test Site for a capability
to conduct a nuclear test within 6 months up to FY
1996, and within 2-3 years after that time. The "simple"
test currently planned as a contingency would, in fact,
provide useful technical information. Practically
speaking, it would be difficult and expensive to
maintain a highly sophisticated nuclear test unit in a
continued state of readiness for a long period.
The nuclear testing infrastructure, we believe, has been
maintained at the appropriate levels. Congress
appropriated $419.4 million in FY 1993 to support
possible continued nuclear testing. Recognizing the
new requirements of the President's nuclear testing
moratorium, the DOE provided the Congress with a
revised FY 1994 budget request of $397.4 million to
maintain a nuclear test readiness capability during the
moratorium. Congress is currently considering the
Department's FY 1995 request for $362.4 million to
continue to maintain that capability.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
DOE Support of HR 1432
Question 2: Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Lloyd from the House Armed Services
Committee has introduced a bill governing technology
transfer activities at the labs. It reportedly deals
with man), of the problems people have raised with bills
from other committees. Does the department support Mrs.
Lloyd's bill?
Answer: On April 11, 1994, Secretary O'Leary sent a letter
(attached) to Congresswoman Marilyn Lloyd supporting
the goals of H.R. 1432, the Department of Energy
Laboratory Technology Act.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Inertial Fusion
Question 3: Mr. Secretary, I am pleased that you have included the
Inertial Confinement Fusion program as part of Stockpile
Stewardship. I agree. Does this mean you can assure the
Committee that DOE will always keep this program under
Defense Programs, and not move it over to Magnetic
Fusion?
Answer: The DOE intent is to keep Inertial Confinement Fusion
(ICF) under Defense Programs. ICF is a critical
component of the science-based stockpile stewardship
program. Though the program also has the long-range
mission of investigating the potential of ICF as a
commercial energy source, the primary mission for the
foreseeable future is to perform weapon physics
experiments and weapon effects experiments and analyses
to maintain nuclear competency. This function requires
keeping the ICF program within Defense Programs.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Task Force on Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National
Laboratories
Question 4: Mr. Secretary, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
you are in the midst of a review of the laboratories.
Over the years there have been six comprehensive reviews
of the nuclear weapons programs; they have all concluded
that the nuclear weapons program should remain
independent of the DoD. Will your task force examine
this issue again?
Answer: To some extent, yes. The Task Force is exploring not
only the appropriateness of the laboratories' Missions
now and for the future, but their efficiency and
effectiveness in carrying out those missions. The
question of "ownership" of the nuclear weapons program
is natural in that context, and has already been asked
by some of the Task Force members at their April 21,
1994 meeting. The Task Force, however, has already
indicated their intent to learn from previous reports
from other such advisory groups, and they have not
expressed the need for an intensive review of this
issue.
Questions from Senator Trent Lott
Reconfiguration
Question 6: Mr. Secretary, I have to say that it is difficult to
believe that you are really serious about
reconfiguration of the nuclear weapon manufacturing
complex, when you dis-established the reconfiguration
office in Defense Programs. It certainly does not look
like one of your highest priorities.
Answer: The Office of Reconfiguration has not been disbanded,
but instead has been integrated into the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Applications and
Stockpile Support. This was done as part of the recent
reorganization of the Office of Defense Programs. The
Office of Reconfiguration remains responsible for
completing the Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS) to address weapons complex functions.
As a result of stakeholder input, the lack of any new
weapons requirements for the foreseeable future and
pressing budget priorities, the Department is no longer
considering the relocation of most weapons complex
functions or the construction of major new weapons
facilities.
Therefore, the focus of the PEIS will be on alternative
sites and technologies for providing a new source of
tritium. The technology alternatives for a new tritium
production facility are a Heavy Water Reactor, Modular
High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor, Advanced Light
Water Reactor, and a Proton Accelerator. In addition,
the PEIS will discuss the environmental impacts
associated with the purchase of irradiation services
from an existing commercial light water' reactor for the
production of tritium. The Draft PEIS will be published
for public review and comment no later than March 1,
1995, and will contain the Department's preferred
alternative site and/or technology for tritium
production and recycle facilities. The Department
currently expects a Record of Decision by the Secretary
regarding tritium production and recycle facilities in
November, 1995.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Kansas City Plant
Question 6: Mr. Curtis, the centerpiece of your non-nuclear
reconfiguration is the Kansas City Plant. It is critical
that this be an efficient and reliable part of the
complex. Yet during the fiscal year you redirected $20
million to other uses, with the result that the Kansas
City Plant had to lay off some uniquely skilled workers.
Some reports are that you plan to fire one third of the
workforce in FY94 and FY95. Already the Navy is saying
that they cannot get enough tritium reservoirs. How long
can this go on? When will we see a really viable
program?
Answer: We have not yet determined the size of the layoffs we
will have to execute throughout the nuclear weapons
complex as a result of the FY 1995 budget request. We
are taking action to increase the available FY 1995
funding for the Plant. We believe that once we have
completed non-nuclear consolidation, the nuclear weapons
stockpile support program will be fully viable.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
Omega West Reactor
Question 7: Mr. Secretary, you allowed and encouraged Los Alamos
to modify the OMEGA reactor to produce medical isotopes,
only to have forces in DOE headquarters oppose
restarting it. This is another example of the
antinuclear forces in charge of DOE doing anything,
including wasting money, rather than start a reactor.
DOE used to feel a sense of responsibility for the
production of medical isotopes in the US. Do you still
feel such a sense?
Answer: The Omega West Reactor at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory was considered the primary candidate to be
converted to production of molybdenum-99 and related
isotopes until about mid-1994. At that time, two new
discoveries, (a) the extent (cost and time) of the
required upgrades at Omega West and (b) the capability
and availability of the Annular Core Research Reactor,
caused the Department to reconsider the Omega West
Reactor.
The Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory was also identified as a possible
candidate for molybdenum-99 production.
A comparison among the three candidate reactors, Omega
West, the Advanced Test Reactor, and the Annular Core
Research Reactor, has identified the Annular Core
Research Reactor as the most appropriate choice relative
to both time and cost. Based on current estimates, the
Annular Core Research Reactor and support facilities can
be ready for production within about 18 months. Both of
the other candidate reactors are estimated to require a
longer time period and higher cost to produce molybdenum
and related isotopes.
Although a final decision has not yet been made
regarding which reactor to convert, the Department
intends to convert a reactor to the production of
molybdenum-99 and related isotopes as soon as practical.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR LOTT
Question 10: Dr. Reis, DOE seems to have completely abandoned its
policy that the government is ultimately responsible for
any nuclear accidents; now you want the operating
contractors to take full financial responsibility for
overseas accidents or accidents with Russian material.
Is this change your idea, from within DP, or did this
come down from the Secretary's level?
Answer: The Department's policy regarding nuclear
liability and indemnification generally
reflects the philosophy underlying the Price-
Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. 2210. That Act
establishes a comprehensive framework for
indemnification for liability resulting from
a nuclear incident occurring in the United States
Its applicability to nuclear incidents outside the
United States involving DOE-contractor activities is
limited, however, to activities involving U.S.-owned
material that is used by or under contract with the
United States. Furthermore, Indemnification for such
work is limited to $100 million. Recently, this
limitation on indemnification has become an Issue for
certain DOE contractors when the United States began to
engage in nuclear work involving non-U.S. owned
material, such as Russian and Ukrainian nuclear reactor
safety assistance, and when our weapons laboratories
became aware that some of their work abroad involved
non-indemnified risks.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR LOTT
Question 11: Dr Reis, in a February 24 letter, the
President of Sandia Labs notified you that he
"cannot permit SNL to undertake .. repairs
outside the US until Sandia obtains the
necessary contractual protection." This
protection, I understand, is a contract
modification that is fully in accord with
Public, Law 85-804. Have you made this
modification? If not, why not?
Answer: On May 10, 1994, we received the formal
request for indemnification from the
President of Sandia National Laboratories and
we expect that an interim indemnification
under Public Law No. 85-804 will be approved
by Secretary in the next month. The request
Is limited to indemnification for a period of
6 months, during which time we plan to seek
Administration advice on whether
indemnification should be extended beyond
that time frame. The Department is somewhat
reluctant to grant broad indemnification that
may result in the U.S. taxpayer accepting
financial responsibility for claims arising
abroad involving non-U.S. owned nuclear
materials.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR L0TT
Hydronuclear Tests and Confidence
Question 13: Dr. Reis, I understand that without hydronuclear tests,
you can never recapture the level of confidence you had
with actual weapons tests, but you will have to settle
for some lower level of confidence. Is that correct?
Answer: Our level of confidence in the stockpile is based on
theory and calculations supported by experimental proof
of the validity of those calculations. Ultimately, all
assessments are subjective judgements based on
the interplay between theory and the experimental data
available. Clearly, there is no substitute for the
absolute proof of a fully yield nuclear test. However,
in a regime where underground nuclear testing is not
available, I believe the science-based Stockpile
Stewardship Program would make a valuable contribution
to maintaining our current level of confidence in the
stockpile.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LOTT
W-48
Question 15: Dr. Reis, in a recent unclassified publication,
Livermore had a very useful discussion of the W-48
warhead that cracked during disassembly. There could
have been a plutonium dispersal, but there was not. I
understand that the cause has been isolated, and has to
do with adhesives that had to be used because this was
an artillery round. Is there likely to be a similar
problem with the W-82 or W79?
Answer: The problem with the W-48 was not due to adhesives; it
was caused by a flaw in a weld in the metallic shell
surrounding the pit which had been present since the
warhead was built. We have changed the dismantlement
procedures for this warhead to account for the
possibility of a similar flaw existing in another W-48.
There is no W-82 system, and the W-79 is of a different
design, a similar problem is highly unlikely.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR HUTCHISON
Stand Down at Pantex
Question 1: Mr. Curtis, recently Mason and Hanger, the operating
contractor at Pantex, initiated a stand down to examine
fully maintenance procedures for safety systems after
discovering a problem in one of the filter banks. This
was clearly the right thing to do. As a result of the
stand down, there is a possibility that Pantex may not
meet its dismantlement schedule. Can you assure me that
the DOE will not place production or dismantlement over
safety and penalize the contractor for taking a very
appropriate response to a safety concern? Is safety
truly the paramount concern at Pantex?
Answer: Safety is the Department's number one priority within
the nuclear weapons complex. Production or disassembly
schedules do not take precedence over insuring safety to
the worker, public, and environment. Contractor
performance is evaluated using a weighing system which
makes the importance of meeting schedules secondary to
the importance of environment, safety, and health of
workers and the public.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Inertial Confinement Fusion
Question 1(a) Dr. Reis, in the budget request for Inertial
Confinement Fusion, funding is provided for continuation
of the OMEGA upgrade and for operating activities. The
DOE- approved funding in the cooperative agreement for
OMEGA sets the operating budget for fiscal year 1995 at
$17,165,770 and the capital equipment budget for $3.6
million. In the budget request as submitted, it appears
that $13 million is provided for operating and $9.7 for
capital equipment. This is too much for capital and not
enough for operating. Should these amounts be adjusted
to reflect the cooperative agreement?
Answer: In the budget request for Inertial Confinement Fusion,
$166.7M is requested for operating expenses and
$9.7M is requested for capital equipment. Of these
totals, $2.5M of the $9.7M for capital equipment and
$16.5M of the $166.7M for operating expenses is planned
for the University of Rochester Omega Upgrade and
operating activities.
The Cooperative Agreement with the University of
Rochester, like all Government contracts, is governed by
the availability of funds. In light of all the program
priorities, the Department of Energy program office has
determined that a total funding level for the University
of Rochester of $19.0M for FY 1995 is justified if the
total program budget request is approved at $176.5M
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Inertial Confinement Fusion
Question 1b): Dr. Reis, is the overall funding level for FY 1995 for
Inertial Confinement Fusion consistent with the
National Academy of Sciences Recommendations.
Answer: The recommendations of the 1990 National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) report have been implemented. The NAS
recognized that budget realities are such that all
candidate driver programs could not be supported in
view of the cost of planning for and attempting an
ignition demonstration. However, they did establish
program priorities and those priorities have been
followed by DOE management.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Aging Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
Question 2: Mr. Curtis, in your statement you indicate that many of
the weapons that we will continue to have in the
stockpile either have or will soon exceed their design
life. Thus, we need new methods of stockpile
surveillance to be able to identify new problems that
will come with the natural process of aging materials.
(1) What are some examples of these new methods?
(2) What types of problems can we expect?
(3) Have we begun to see problems associated with aging?
(4) Can you cite some examples in an unclassified
manner?
Answer: (1) We are utilizing accelerated aging units (AAU) to
project potential problems. AAUs subject a system
to temperature cycling over a 1-year period which
will accelerate chemical reactions. This allows a
knowledgeable engineer to develop additional
monitoring methods to check for chemical
degradation over the life of a system. We have been
and continue to install environmental monitoring
devices in weapon storage locations to determine
the actual environments weapons are being stored
in. These monitors check for temperature and
humidity conditions. We are developing methods to
look more closely, at safety critical components
to verify that there is no degradation in their
functioning. We are evaluating components from
weapons that are being retired from the stockpile
that have common design features to weapons that
remain in the stockpile. This will increase our
data base and give us more information on
components that have seen longer aging effects.
(2) We would expect to see problems associated with
corrosion, chemical degradation, wear on cables,
degradation of nylon parachutes used with our bomb,
dielectric breakdown in vitamin Q impregnated
kraft paper capacitors, shorts or opens in
junctions of integrated circuits, etc.
(3) We have always seen problems associated with aging.
We would expect that the frequency of these
problems would accelerate as the stockpile goes
significantly beyond its original design life. It
is critical to maintain a viable 2nd Aggressive
stockpile evaluation program if these problems are
to be found and corrected before they have safety
impacts or significant impacts on the reliability
of the nuclear stockpile,
(4) Specific examples would be classified. Some generic
examples of problems that have been discovered
include bridgewire corrosion, depletion of the
stabilizer in propellants, and hardening of "O"
rings used to prevent leaking.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Production of Warhead Components
Question 3: Mr. Curtis, there have always been limited life
components in nuclear weapons that must be replaced,
such as tritium containers and neutron generators. These
non-nuclear components will continue to be built and
handled, primarily at the DOE sites in Kansas City and
Savannah River. If other components such as high
explosives and nuclear components must be replaced,
where will they be built? In your statement, you
indicate that much of this capability will exist only in
the laboratories. If there is a problem with the
plutonium pits in a given weapon, and they have to be
rebuilt, will that work be done at one of the labs? Is
this potential mission for the labs covered by the
existing Environmental Impact Statements for the
laboratories?
Answer: The only warhead component for which we do not have a
current production capability is the plutonium pit. The
Pantex Plant retains the capability to produce the
warhead high explosive. Los Alamos National Laboratory
has the capability to produce a small number (tens per
year) of plutonium pits, and the Department is examining
the actions we would have to take to certify this
production capability if needed for use in the
stockpile. We have not determined the actions we would
take if we had to rebuild the pits for a stockpile
warhead, but the existing Los Alamos Environmental
Impact Statement allows for such activities. Also,
options for pit re-use, using the Pantex Plant, are
available for such situations.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Pantex EIS
Question 5(3): A site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for
additional pit storage at Pantex.
Answer: In the Finding of No Significant Impact for the
Environmental Assessment for Interim Storage of
Plutonium Components at the Pantex Plant, the Secretary
committed the Department to preparing a Pantex
Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) by
November 15, 1996.
The Pantex SWEIS will address the potential
environmental impacts concerning the continued
operation of the Pantex Plant, including near to mid-
term foreseeable activities and the nuclear component
storage activities at other Department sites associated
with nuclear weapon disassembly at the Pantex Plant. The
proposed action is to continue operations at the Pantex
Plant with its current missions and storage of nuclear
weapons components at various sites. Alternatives to
continuing operations at the Pantex Plant will also be
evaluated.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Environmental Impact Statements
Question 5(4): Two Environmental Impact Statements for materials at
Savannah, one to determine what materials are unstable
for long-term storage and what to do with them and then
another EIS for long-term storage for stable materials;
Would this include or exclude spent fuel?
Answer: The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Interim
Management of Nuclear Materials at the Savannah, River
Site (SRS) will consider all nuclear materials at SRS.
This includes spent fuel as well as other irradiated
materials. This EIS will assist the Department in
determining what actions should be taken, if any, to
ensure the SRS nuclear materials remain in a safe,
interim storage condition while disposition decisions
are made for the surplus nuclear materials. To
coordinate departmental efforts for the control and
disposition of surplus fissile materials, a
Department-wide project has ben established. A Notice of
Intent announcing the preparation of a nuclear materials
programmatic EIS is to be published later this month.
It will consider a range of options for the disposition
of plutonium, but will not address spent fuel. Spent
fuel is being addressed in the Spent Fuel Management EIS
being proposed as part of the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory Site Wide EIS.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Question 5(5) An Environmental Impact Statement on Spent Fuel that
would cover the Navy spent fuel at Idaho and the return
of foreign spent research fuel. Does this EIS cover all
spent fuel stored in the complex and does it cover
storage, or disposition?
Answer: You are referring to the Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) on Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management Programs. In that
EIS, the Department is evaluating its options for two
separate but related sets of decisions pertinent to the
management of the Department of Energy (DOE) spent
nuclear fuel.
The first portion of the EIS involves analysis of
programmatic (Department-wide) approaches for the
management of DOE spent nuclear fuel until decisions are
made and implemented on ultimate disposition. While this
EIS will not result in decisions on ultimate disposition
of spent nuclear fuel, it does focus on strategies for
interim management and storage. (If ultimate disposition
is assumed to be placement in a geologic repository,
then such disposition may not be available for
Department spent nuclear fuel for 40 years.) The EIS
covers all existing and projected DOE spent nuclear
fuel inventories (approximately 2,800 metric tons heavy
metal). This includes spent nuclear fuel from the
Department's production reactors; the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program; DOE, university, and other research
and test reactors; special-case commercial power
reactors; and potential receipts from foreign research
reactors. (A separate EIS is being prepared on the
Department's proposal to renew the policy for acceptance
of U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel from foreign research
reactors.)
The second portion of the EIS analyzes Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory sitewide actions anticipated over
the next 10 years for waste and spent fuel management
and environmental restoration.
The Draft EIS is expected to be completed by June 30,
1994, and the Final EIS will be completed by April 30,
1995.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Tritium Production
Question 6: Mr. Curtis, tritium production will be discussed in
the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement that
will appear in draft in March 1995. When this PEIS is
completed, will it support a decision c)n new tritium
production? When will this PEIS be completed?
Answer: When completed, the Reconfiguration PETS will support
a decision regarding the site and/or technology for
tritium production and recycle facilities. In the Draft
PEIS to be published for public review and comment by
March 1, 1995, the Department will identify its
preferred alterative technology and, if the preferred
alternative is a new facility, the preferred location
for that facility from among the five candidate sites:
Savannah River Site, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge Reservation and
the Pantex Plant. The Department expects a Record of
Decision to be issued by the Secretary regarding future
tritium production and recycle missions in November
1995.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR EXON
Question 7: Mr. Curtis, if a reactor is chosen as a method to
dispose of excess plutonium, will production of tritium
in that reactor be considered as one of the options for
tritium production? If not, why not?
Answer: The Department is analyzing several disposition options
for surplus weapons-usable plutonium. If a reactor
option were to be chosen as the disposition method for
surplus plutonium, the selected option would be reviewed
with regard to compatibility to produce tritium. The
tritium of the two missions, the costs, technical
feasibility and cumulative environmental impacts would
likewise be evaluated.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Tritium Production
Question 8a: Mr. Curtis, when Secretary O'Leary testified, before us,
she stated that, for planning purposes, DOE is using the
amount of tritium that would be necessary to support a
START II nuclear weapons stockpile level. Is this still
the case?
Answer: Yes, tritium supply and demand calculations are based
upon compliance with START II stockpile levels.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR EXON
Plutonium Disposition
Question 9; The DOE budget request for Fiscal Year Yew 1995 does not
ask money for plutonium disposition. Was this an
oversight or is DOE planning to reprogram money in FY
1995 or should we address the funding issue in the
Fiscal Year Defense Authorization Bill?
Answer: The Department's budget submitted to Congress for FY
1995 does not request funds specifically for the Surplus
Fissile Materials Control and Disposition Project. Many
of the activities under consideration fall within the
programmatic responsibilities of existing Departmental
elements and are incorporated within the Department's FY
1995 budget request. In addition, efforts are currently
underway to review the Department's FY 1995 submission
to identify potential sources of funds for new tasks
identified by, the project, within the FY 1995 budgetary
levels already proposed. Specific funding needs for
surplus fissile materials control and disposition will
be included in the Department's FY 1996 and outyear
planning and budgeting process.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR EXON
Question: 13 Recently there have [been] some concerns raised
about the involvement of private sector
participation in the Nunn-Lugar and other
cooperative efforts, including reactor safety,
with Russia and other states of the Former Soviet
Union. There apparently is some concern about the
liability associated with such efforts. Dr.
Keliher, can you or Mr. Curtis address this? Is
this a problem? Are such concerns preventing
anything from going forward and, if so, how is DOE
addressing these concerns?
Answer: Some DOE contractors and potential subcontractors
have expressed concerns about their potential
liability exposure with respect to work for the
Department that involves the possibility of a
nuclear accident outside the United States. In
general, this work relates to (1) safety
assistance work at civilian nuclear reactors, (2)
weapons-related activities, and (3) emergency
response activities. These concerns have slowed
progress with respect to some safety work.at
Russian and Ukrainian civilian nuclear reactors.
In the area of safety work at civilian nuclear
reactors, the Department worked closely with the
State Department to secure comprehensive
indemnification provisions in our Government-to-
Government agreements with the Russian Federation
and Ukraine concerning safety assistance work at
their civilian nuclear reactors. Under these
provisions, the Russian and Ukrainian governments
have agreed (except as to individuals in the case
of premeditated conduct) not to pursue any claim
against the United States, its personnel? and its
contractors that might arise from work under these
bilateral agreements and also to indemnify the
United States, its personnel, and its contractors
for any third-party claims (including the costs of
defense) that might arise from such work. These
provisions cover all tiers of persons involved in
the work, including subcontractors, suppliers, and
consultants and cover claims brought in any forum
without regard to its location.
The Department believes the indemnity provisions
in the bilateral agreements provide a satisfactory.
framework for its contractors to conduct safety
work at Russian and Ukrainian civilian nuclear
reactors. These provisions effectively channel all
financial responsibility for any third-party
claim that might arise from such work to the
Russian Federation and Ukraine. Nevertheless,
some firms have indicated a desire for a comprehensive
indemnification guarantee from the United States
Government in addition to the provisions in the
bilateral agreements. The Department does not believe
such a guarantee, with its financial implications for
U.S. taxpayers, is necessary and currently does not plan
to provide any such guarantee. In the event no
responsible firm is willing to perform necessary safety
work at Russian or Ukrainian civilian nuclear reactors
under these circumstances, the Department will seek
guidance from the President.
With respect to weapons-related and emergency
response activities, the situation is somewhat
different. These activities involve work on
nuclear weapons, anti-terrorism and nonproliferation
that is extremely important to U.S. national security
interests. Some form of indemnification from the United
States Government may be appropriate for this work.
Accordingly, the Department is reviewing its
weapons-related and emergency response activities
outside the United States to determine which work is
essential to its national security mission. On the basis
of that review, the Department will decide whether to
recommend to the President that the United States
Government provide some form of indemnification.
Because this review may take several months to
complete, the Department is considering providing
an interim indemnification udder Pub. L. 85-804
for emergency work relating to weapons, anti-terrorism,
and nonproliferation that would be valid for 6 months.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Non-proliferation and National Security
Question 14: Dr. Keliher, a growing concern is the integrity of
weapons materials as the stock of excess materials grows
world-wide. Without getting into classified material,
is DOE looking at response to terrorist threats
involving these materials?
Answer: Yes. Part of DOE's program for monitoring the black
market in nuclear materials is to look for advance
indicators of nuclear terrorism. The program is looking
not only at the types of materials that are on the black
market but also at the buyers and probable end users. In
addition, the program provides formal assessments of
threats that use or purport to use radioactive
materials. This is generally considered the first step
in the determination of the need for deploying a Nuclear
Emergency Search Team (NEST) of DOE Assistant Secretary
for Defense Programs' Office of Emergency Response. NEST
has always considered response to an overseas nuclear
terrorist emergency a part of its operational mission.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Stockpile Stewardship
Question 15(1):Mr. Curtis/Dr. Reis, did the Presidential Decision
Directive dealing with stockpile stewardship identify
specific technologies to be included in the stockpile
stewardship program?
Answer: The November 1993 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)
initially identified several general program elements
consistent with both the old Research, Development and
Testing/Surveillance and Support program and with the
emerging science-based Stockpile Stewardship and
Stockpile Support programs. These were not really
technology-specific at that general level of
description.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Stockpile Stewardship
Question 15(2):Mr. Curtis/Dr. Reis, did the PDD establish a funding
level for stockpile stewardship?
Answer: The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) referred
to a Task Force Report which provided an approximate
funding level for the Stockpile Stewardship program.
The PDD explicitly stated that the precise funding
requirements will be determined in conjunction with the
appropriate fiscal year budget cycle." It did not
include any detail on the major new construction starts
which the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
identified through consultation with stakeholders in the
national security community beginning in February 1994.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Stockpile Stewardship
Question 15(3):Did the PDD include Inertial Confinement Fusion in the
technologies identified in the PDD?
Answer: The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) includes
several general program elements which are part of the
technology areas spanned by Interial Confinement Fusion
(ICF). The ICF program is definitely considered by DOE
to be a major component of several of the PDD program
elements.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Stockpile Stewardship
Question 15(4):Was the funding for ICF included in the PDD funding
discussion?
Answer: Since the Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF)) budget is a
separate budget line, the decision was made by the
interagency group to not mix that budget with the R&D
budget when attempting to arrive at the "approximate"
budget requirements outlined in the plan. That statement
is made in the plan attached to the Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD). However, the ICF program and
its funding requirements are definitely a component of
the evolving Stockpile Stewardship program.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Technologies for Stockpile Stewardship
Question 19: Mr. Curtis, in your statement, you said that "confidence
in and evaluation of the stockpile (in a test ban
regime) will require extensive use of "non-nuclear"
experiments." While certainly the sophisticated computer
analysis techniques fall into the category of
"non-nuclear" experiments, I understand that at least
some of the technologies that we have just discussed in
the context of the Stockpile Stewardship program use
nuclear materials. Could you explain these statements?
Answer: Nonnuclear experiments can mean two types of activities,
depending on context. First, there are experiments which
create physics conditions which mimic those occurring in
a nuclear explosion (e.g. high temperature plasma
created by an Inertial Confinement Fusion facility).
Second is a subset of such experiments which employ
nuclear material, but which are designed so that they do
not produce nuclear criticality during the course of the
experiment. In the latter types of experiments, the
conventional" physical and chemical properties of the
material are at issue, rather than the potential for its
nuclei to fission.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Personnel Skills
Question 20: The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has been
working for some time on a report on the needs and
requirements of maintaining the aging stockpile. Are the
preliminary CRS conclusions that the people who have the
necessary skills are also aging, but that as they
retire, the skills they take with them are not being
replaced. There are relatively few young physicist and
scientists coming into the program. This is a serious
problem beginning within the next five years.
Mr. Curtis/Dr. Reis, do you agree with this conclusion,
if so, what can DOE do to resolve this problem?
Answer: DOE recognizes that this is a real problem. However, it
is important to recognize that the skills we need to
cultivate are those that will sustain our new
science-based stockpile stewardship strategy at the
laboratories and our emerging stockpile support
strategy at the plant sites. Specifically, the skill
base will be more reliant on advanced physics
experimentalists, high performance computing scientists
and modelers, on advanced materials and manufacturing
technologists, and on transitioning, work assignments
from research to engineering issues or to stockpile
safety and reliability issues, as required by the
program. It will be much less dependent on large
numbers of people skilled in underground testing or
weapon engineering and production, as was the case
during the Cold War. In recognition of new, realities,
we are planning to do the weapons business in a much
different way than in the past.
One of the major features of science-based stockpile
stewardship is its emphasis on cutting edge science
facilities (physics and computing) and on understanding
high technology (materials and manufacturing). We
believe that this feature will be the essential
factor which draws the best and brightest young
scientists and engineers to this vital national security
program.
We will also assess a laboratory training program for
university students Such as that reponed out in the FY
1995 budget mark-up of the House Armed Services
Committee.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR GLENN
Weapons Material Disposal Studies
Question 1 I would like you to describe for us briefly these
various Senior Level or Policy Development Working
Groups, and Interagency Task Forces which are working on
aspects of Special Nuclear Material Production, Storage
Disposition and associated ES&H issues, which you now
have in process. I am particularly interested in what
you see as the deliverables for each group, milestones
and schedules, and the degree of public participation in
these programs through hearings, local interest groups'
observation of the process, or other appropriate
mechanism to involve and inform the public in what you
are doing?
Answer To address the urgency of matters related to the
availability of significant quantities and forms of
excess nuclear materials resulting form the end of the
Cold War, Secretary O'Leary created a Department-wide
project on January 24, 1994 to better coordinate efforts
within the Department concerning the control and
disposition of surplus fissile materials. The project
reports directly to the Under Secretary and has line
responsibility for developing Departmental
recommendations and for directing implementation of
decisions concerning the control and disposition of
excess nuclear materials. The objective of this effort
is to provide for safe, secure and environmentally sound
control, storage and ultimate disposition of surplus
fissile materials. The project will operate in an open
and transparent manner and will assure stakeholder
participation in the decision-making process. It will
carry out its responsibilities in a manner that promotes
effective nonproliferation policies and sets and example
for other nations to follow.
Key initial efforts of the project include the
preparation of a Programmatic Environmental impact
Statement for the storage and disposition of fissile
materials and the initiation of a vulnerability
assessment for the Department's plutonium inventories.
The Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
process will begin with the publication of a Notice of
Intent early this summer and proceed towards a Record of
Decision in early 1996. The plutonium vulnerability
study is underway and scheduled for completion by the
end of September, 1994. It will be followed by a similar
assessment of highly enriched uranium inventories.
In addition, the project coordinates the Department's
participation on nuclear materials matters being
addressed by the President's Interagency Working Group
The Interagency Working Group effort is chaired by Dr.
Frank Von Hippel of the President's Office of Science
and Technology Policy and includes participation by the
Departments of Energy, State and Defense as well as the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National
Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget,
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
The group provides interagency oversight over the
Administration's phased strategy for separated plutonium
disposition starting with stabilization and storage
through possible interim conversion to more
proliferation resistant forms to ultimate disposition.
The group contributes to joint discussions and
cooperation with Russia on disposition of Russian
separated Plutonium and serves as the U.S. part of
joint working group with Russia on transparency and
safeguards of surplus fissile materials.
A key milestone for the group is the negotiation of a
cooperative arrangement with the Russians on plutonium
disposition options. Members of the group were part of a
U.S delegation to Moscow during the week of May 23,
1994. The group will monitor and provide interagency
oversight over the Department of Energy's Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement process and provide
recommendations to the President on narrowing
disposition options The group held a public meeting in
Washington on May 4, 1994, and plans to release a status
report in October.
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