FY 1995 BUDGET - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, 03/23/1994, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19940810
- Chairperson:
- S. Nunn
- Committee:
- Senate Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- Q94AP193
- Hearing Date:
- 19940323
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP/NN
SUB
- Committee:
- Military Application of Nuclear Energy
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1995 BUDGET - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
- Witness Name:
- H. O'Leary
-
Hearing Text:
-
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
Question 8. Secretary O'Leary, what other nation currently
reprocesses spent reactor spent fuel? What nations are
expected to develop this capability in the next 10 to 20
years? What is our policy towards nations who seek the
capability to reprocess spent reactor fuel?
Answer: Currently only Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and
Russia reprocess spent power reactor fuel for plutonium
recycle. India has a program of uncertain direction
since its facilities are not currently operating. It is
not expected that any additional nations will develop
the capability to reprocess spent reactor fuels for
plutonium recycle. This stems largely from the fact that
the "once-through" fuel cycle is projected to be more
economical for the next several decades. "Once through"
refers to the fact that uranium is used as fuel once,
and there is no reprocessing to recover plutonium or
uranium. Some states may develop reprocessing for
military programs. These states could include North
Korea, Pakistan, or Iran. Our policy is to discourage
spent fuel reprocessing universally. However, as stated
in the President's Non-proliferation policy the U.S.
will maintain its existing commitments regarding the
use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in Western
Europe and Japan.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR HUTCHISON
Pantex
Question lb: Are there any unresolved or outstanding safety issues at
Pantex, with respect to disassembly of nuclear weapons
or additional storage of plutonium pits?
Answer: On April 5, 1994, Pantex operations were placed in a
maintenance mode upon discovery of a faulty filter in a
secondary air filtration system. All operational
activities, such as disassembly, were halted. Only
activities associated with corrective or preventive
maintenance of the facility and equipment or safety
system surveillance and checks were allowed to take
place. Since all bays and cells have a similar
filtration system, all were transferred to a maintenance
mode. The contractor has finished the required
corrective actions, to include consolidation of safety
documentation and conducting additional training on
facility safety systems. The Department is in the
process of completing its validation of the contractor's
actions and is expected to concur shortly on the
contractor's request to transfer the facilities back to
an operational mode to continue disassembly of weapons.
Nothing is more important than providing a work
environment that is safe for plant employees and that
does not pose a threat to the public or the environment.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR EXON
Question 8c: Will environmental restoration and management
contractors be treated the same as or differently from
more traditional site operating contractors?
Answer: Under the contract reform initiative, contracts for
environmental restoration and management will include
essentially the same key components of performance-
based contracting as the contracts for the management of
the Department's production and laboratory facilities.
These components are aimed at improving contractor
performance and accountability and improving the
Department's management of its contract resources. In
particular, both clean-up contracts for environmental
restoration and waste management activities and
management contracts that support the environmental
management program will include performance measures and
criteria that clearly state the Department's
expectations for contract performance and provide
incentives to meet or exceed the performance criteria.
In addition, the Department will review contractual
requirements for such activities to determine whether
such activities can be contracted on a fixed price
basis.
The Department already has moved to implementing the
Contract Reform initiatives in its environmental
restoration contracts. Under the Contract Reform
initiative, the Rocky Flats site has been identified as
a pilot project for implementing performance-based
contracting and other reform initiatives.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
Question 9: Secretary O'Leary, is reprocessing spent reactor fuel
considered a proliferation risk by this Administration?
If so, what are we doing to discourage nations from
reprocessing spent fuel?
Answer: Reprocessing of spent reactor fuel is considered a
proliferation risk by this administration as it has been
by every previous administration. Any production of
fissile material involves some proliferation risk, which
is why the U.S. is such a strong supporter of
international safeguards and the International Atomic
Energy Agency which administers safeguards. Safeguards
are intended to minimize the proliferation risks raised
by peaceful nuclear activities.
As you know, under current U.S. law, the U.S. must cease
nuclear cooperation with any state which provides
reprocessing technology to or receives reprocessing
technology from another state. In addition, the U.S.
strongly opposes reprocessing of spent fuel in regions
of tension, and discourages it in all other regions
because it raises proliferation concerns without
any proven economic benefit or necessity.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
Question 13: Secretary O'Leary, is it true that the Japanese will
soon begin operation of their Monju breeder reactor
which will use plutonium to produce electricity.?
Answer: Yes, the Monju prototype fast breeder reactor was
started, at least on a low-power basis, last month. It
is expected to generate 280 megawatts of electricity and
is fueled with mixed- oxide fuel containing plutonium.
We are advised that it will begin full power operations
by the end of next year.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
IFR Reactor Safety
Question 17: Secretary O'Leary, is it not true that the IFR
technology is safer than the fast reactors currently
used in Russia?
Answer: Results from the safety demonstration tests performed
on April 3, 1986 in the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II
in Idaho, and published in Nuclear Engineering and
Design, demonstrated that the IFR technology, which
uses metal fuel, is safer than oxide fuel technology,
which is used in Russian fast reactors. The key safety
component of the IFR technology and the associated
Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) is the metal fuel.
Russian fast reactors are based on oxide fuel that has
significantly different properties and behavior during
transient events. The IFR/ALMR system incorporates the
passive safety features of the EBR-11.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR DIRK KEMPTHORNE
National Academy of Sciences Study
Question 23: Secretary O'Leary, please comment on the National
Academy of Sciences recent study "Management and
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium." Did this study
address the IFR technology?
Answer: The National Academy of Sciences study provides an
excellent framework for grappling with the difficult
challenge of safely and securely managing the
radioactive materials that are a legacy of the Cold War.
The Department will use the Academy study, as well as
other input, in its efforts to develop recommendations
and arrive at a broad-based consensus on actions for the
control and disposition of surplus fissile materials.
The study did not specifically address Integral Fast
Reactor (IFR) technology. It noted that building new
reactors is a long-term disposition option but that the
high costs and long lead times required for new reactors
would be justifiable only if problems of licensing and
public acceptance made existing reactors unavailable.
Preferred approaches for long-term plutonium
disposition noted in the study include: existing
reactors, deep boreholes, accelerators and/or
vitrification.
All of these options will be appropriately considered
within the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act. A decision to select any option (existing
reactor, new reactor, accelerator, vitrification,
etc.) would need to include considerations of need,
timing, cost, nonproliferation goals and environmental
impacts and issues.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
Destruction of Plutonium
Question 28: Secretary O'Leary, can any other technology, beside the
IFR, completely destroy plutonium?
Answer: Neither IFR nor any other technology is capable of 100%
destruction of plutonium. Significant destruction of
plutonium can potentially be achieved with at least two
technologies other than the current IFR system. These
technologies are the Accelerator-Based Converter System
(ABC) and the deep burner Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor
with zirconium/plutonium fuel. Both of these
technologies are in the conceptual design phase and
would require additional research and development to
qualify the acceptability of the concept.
All of these technologies (including IFR), employed to
maximize destruction of plutonium, would involve
considerable chemical processing and generate
radioactive and mixed waste.
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