FY 1995 BUDGET REQUEST-NATURAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES, 03/23/1994, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19950427
- Chairperson:
- S. Nunn
- Committee:
- Senate Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- Q94AH252
- Hearing Date:
- 19940323
- DOE Lead Office:
- PO
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1995 BUDGET REQUEST-NATURAL SECURITY ACTIVITIES
- Witness Name:
- H. O'Leary
-
Hearing Text:
-
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR LEVIN
Nevada Test Site
Question #lc: Could you make more substantial reductions in support
functions at the Nevada Test Site and be ready to resume
nuclear testing with a slightly longer lead time?
Answer: Consistent with the Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD), the Department of Energy has adjusted the
resources at both the national laboratories and the
Nevada Test Site (NTS) to reflect the continuing
moratorium on underground nuclear testing and to
maintain capability to conduct a nuclear test within 6
months up to FY 1996 and 2-3 years after that time.
Major reductions have already been made to support
functions at NTS through the Test Operations Review Team
and Support Operations Review Team. These efforts are
continuing, and have enabled the Testing budget request
to be reduced from an FY 1992 congressional
appropriation of $511.5 million to the Department's FY
1995 Budget request of $374.7 million, of which $255.7
million is projected for NTS. We do not believe we could
make significant further reductions to support functions
at this time without jeopardizing the Presidential
commitment. At $255.7 million, the Department will
maintain a readiness posture consistent with the PDD
while maintaining support functions at the NTS with
funding that has been adjusted downward to relatively
fixed minimum levels over the past few years.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
Question 2: Does Japan's development of a Purex processing plant
create a proliferation threat? Has the Administration
discouraged Japan from developing the capability to
reprocess spent reactor fuel with the Purex process?
Answer: As the National Academy of Sciences has pointed out,
separated plutonium is a proliferation problem. The
policy of the Clinton Administration is not to encourage
the separation of plutonium for use in civil nuclear
fuel cycles and to limit plutonium stockpiling. At
present virtually all of Japan's commercial reprocessing
is being done in France and the U.K. Japan has a small
reprocessing facility and is building a large Purex
reprocessing facility at Rokasho. The U.S. would prefer
that Japan not separate plutonium from its spent fuel
unless it has a near term need for this material.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
Question 6: Secretary O'Leary, if we could burn plutonium and spent
civilian fuel in a safe reactor, wouldn't that reduce
the risk of nuclear proliferation? If not, why not:
Please be specific.
Answer: The policy of the Clinton Administration is not to
encourage the civil use of plutonium and to limit its
stockpiling. The U.S. does not separate plutonium for
nuclear power purposes. Separating, stockpiling, and
using plutonium for civil power purposes would be at
odds with these policies which were designed to address
the full range of proliferation problems and allow the
U.S. to provide leadership in this important issue. As
part of the U.S. effort to identify methods of disposing
of surplus weapons grade plutonium we are addressing
means of turning separated plutonium into the equivalent
of spent nuclear fuel.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
Question 15: Secretary O'Leary, if the Russians, French and Japanese
do not use plutonium in reactors, what are they supposed
to do with it?
Answer: This is an important question and the disposition of
the world's surplus plutonium is being addressed by this
Administration in the interagency group directed by
Frank von Hippel, Assistant Director for National
Security Affairs in the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy. To address this issue I have
created a DOE Fissile Material Disposition and Control
Project. At a minimum, since plutonium use in reactors
is not keeping pace with production through
reprocessing, these states should take every step to
bring plutonium separation into line with demand. To
continue,current reprocessing levels will add to the
world's plutonium surplus.
SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
Question 27: Secretary O'Leary, is it true that the National Academy
of Sciences study looked at making weapons plutonium
similar to existing stocks of spent reactor fuel? Is
spent reactor fuel a proliferation threat? If so, please
explain why.
Answer: Yes. The National Academy of Sciences' study recommended
that, "options for the long-term disposition of
weapons plutonium should seek to meet a 'spent fuel
standard'-that is, to make this plutonium roughly as
inaccessible for weapons use as the larger and growing
quantity of plutonium that exists in spent fuel from
commercial reactors."
While converting weapons plutonium to the spent fuel
standard goes a long way towards reducing its
proliferation risk, spent reactor fuel continues to be a
proliferation threat; albeit reduced. The threat results
from the fact that spent reactor fuel can be
reprocessed to extract weapons usable plutonium by
countries with established military or commercial
reprocessing capabilities. These countries would
encounter few difficulties separating plutonium from
intensely radioactive spent fuel and recovering enough
material to produce one or more nuclear weapons.
However, it is a less immediate threat than separated
plutonium which can be directly used in nuclear
weapons.
Countries without established military or commercial
reprocessing capabilities would encounter greater
difficulty in extracting plutonium from spent fuel. Some
of the problems include: a requirement for significant
engineering skill and experience, adverse health effects
to workers receiving large radiation doses and the need
to possess remotely operated equipment for many of the
separation tasks.
Questions from Senator Kempthorne
Question 31: Secretary O'Leary, do you believe our current policy
not to test our nuclear weapons will persuade Kim Il
Sung to terminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program?
Will it persuade Saddam Hussein?
Answer: Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, both North Korea and
Iraq are prohibited from developing nuclear weapons.
While Iraq and North Korea have not abided by their
commitments to the NPT, the treaty has made it possible
to determine violations and bring international pressure
to end them. We are better off with this treaty than
without it. The U.S. is abiding by a nuclear test
moratorium and seeking to negotiate a comprehensive
nuclear test ban because these activities improve the
international nuclear nonproliferation regime, including
making the indefinite extension of the NPT more likely.
It is in the best interests of the U.S. to seek a CTBT
at the earliest date and to attempt to include both
North Korea and Iraq in that Treaty. This will further
subject these states to international scrutiny and
pressure.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KEMPTHORNE
Nuclear Testing
Question #33: Secretary O'Leary, is it true that underground nuclear
tests give us greater confidence in the safety and
reliability of our nuclear weapons?
Answer: Nuclear testing has played an important and undeniable
role in establishing the current high level of
confidence we have in the safety and reliability of our
nuclear weapons. In deciding to extend the current
nuclear testing moratorium through September 1995,
President Clinton considered the contribution nuclear
testing would make in improving our confidence in
nuclear weapon safety and reliability. In arriving at
his decision he weighed this potential contribution
against several other factors: the restraint the other
declared nuclear powers have shown in not responding to
China's nuclear test last October with tests of their
own; the encouraging progress recorded in the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations since they
formally opened on January 25, 1994; and, the adverse
implications further U.S. nuclear tests would have on
our broader non-proliferation objectives, including,
most notably, our interest in securing the indefinite
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty next
year. The President will revisit this issue next year
when he reviews a further extension of the testing
moratorium.
Questions from Senator Hutchinson
Question 1c: The Department of Energy has begun to identify ways to
further reciprocity and transparency in future
agreements to destroy excess weapons grade materials and
dismantle excess nuclear weapons. What is the
Department doing to ensure both accountability of
materials [and] security of weapons design information?
Will the mechanisms on which DOE is working be
applicable at Pantex and Russian dismantlement
facilities?
Answer: The Department of Energy (DOE) is the prime implementing
agency in two important arms control and
non-proliferation initiatives: President Clinton's offer
to submit excess fissile material to International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and the
U.S./Russian joint statement on reciprocal inspections
of storage facilities for fissile material removed from
nuclear weapons. Under both initiatives, some fissile
weapon components could be inspected.
DOE is developing technologies and procedures to allow
the IAEA to inspect fissile weapon components without
revealing weapon design information. The goal of this
development effort is to maximize the confidence of
IAEA inspections without potentially contributing to
nuclear proliferation. The situation is somewhat
different in regard to the Russians because Russia
already knows how to build nuclear weapons. The U.S. may
be able to accept more intrusiveness under a bilateral
reciprocal agreement with Russia in order to increase
mutual confidence that materials being inspected are
removed from nuclear weapons and are properly accounted
for. However, as required by legislation, sensitive
weapon design information will be protected. DOE
expects all inspection measures to apply to equally to
the U.S. and Russia.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel Program
Question 4: DOE Facilities are not adequate to store all the spent
fuel that will, ultimately, be received from the
foreign research reactors. What plans has DOE made to
accommodate all the spent fuel that will be returned
under this program?
Answer: The Department is still investigating how to manage
the return of the U.S. origin foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel. The Department of Energy (DOE)
will prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
discussing the proposed return of up to 15,000 of
these spent fuel elements. The Environmental Impact
Statement will also address the question of how DOE
will accommodate spent fuel returned under this
program.
On April 27, 1994, DOE completed the Environmental
Assessment necessary to bring back up to 409 of these
15,000 spent fuel elements from eight foreign research
reactors that have run out of space to store their
spent fuel or face regulatory problems associated with
the storage of spent fuel at their sites. There is
adequate space at the Savannah River Site facility for
storage of all expected domestic and proposed foreign
research reactor spent fuel that may be received until
the Environmental Impact Statement process is
completed (December 1995). The Environmental
Assessment was a high priority task that resulted in the
issuance of a finding of no significant environmental
impact for the shipment of the 409 fuel elements.
Analysis for the Environmental Impact Statement has now
become high priority. DOE has not yet chosen the
specific interim storage location or technology.
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