REAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT, 02/24/1994, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19940331
- Chairperson:
- J. Sasser
- Committee:
- Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
- Docfile Number:
- T94AA068
- Hearing Date:
- 19940224
- DOE Lead Office:
- NN
SUB
- Committee:
- International Finance and Monetary Policy
- Hearing Subject:
- REAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
- Witness Name:
- J. Keliher
-
Hearing Text:
-
STATEMENT OF
JOHN G. KELIHER
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
AND MONETARY POLICY
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
FEBRUARY 24, 1994
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I would like to take
this opportunity to thank you for inviting me to discuss the
Administration's proposal for the reauthorization of the Export
Administration Act.
President Clinton, in his address to the United Nations General
Assembly last September, promised that the United States would "reform
our . . . system of export controls . . . to reflect the realities of
the post-Cold War world." The Department of Energy, with other
departments and agencies involved in determining and administering
export control policy, is now actively engaged in that reform process.
One of the most important assets the Department of Energy brings
to this process is the scientific and technical expertise of its staff
and the staffs of its National Laboratories. The
Department's expertise in nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel cycle
activities is well known to Congress and the public. For this reason,
we are also involved in an effort to ensure that special nuclear
materials and the commodities and technologies necessary to produce
them are protected. My office is actively involved in monitoring
nuclear related exports and supporting international safeguards on
sensitive nu"clear materials and facilities in an effort to prevent
unauthorized transfers.
Under the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act,
the Secretary of Energy is responsible for ensuring that any U.S.
assistance, either direct or indirect, to the production of special
nuclear material outside the United States would not be inimical to the
interest of the United States. To ensure compliance with this statutory
requirement, the Department of Energy reviews all nuclear-related
dual-use cases that fall under the Export Administration Act.
To a great extent, the focus of the new system will be on
nonproliferation or, as President Clinton has put it, stopping "deadly
technologies from falling into the wrong hands." Other key elements
of reform will include an emphasis on multilateral controls, increased
international cooperation and transparency, and a limitation of
unilateral U.S. controls to those cases where their continuation in
force is essential to U.S. national security, nonproliferation, or
foreign policy interests.
In many respects, this is an auspicious time for the United States
to emphasize multilateral controls. The main nonproliferation export
regimes -- the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control
Regime, and the Australia Group -- have never been stronger. All have
recently updated their lists of controlled commodities and
technologies.
To further the Administration's goals to strengthen multilateral
nonproliferation regimes, the Department of Energy was integrally
involved in efforts to adopt controls over dual-use items and
technologies by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1992, and to
persuade NSG members to adopt the policy of requiring full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as a condition for future
transfers of nuclear material and equipment. Both measures had long
been advocated by the United States, and the Department of Energy is
particularly proud of the key role and technical expertise it provided
for the negotiation of these dual-use controls.
Nevertheless, the task of establishing and maintaining an
effective system of multilateral export controls still faces a number
of challenges and uncertainties. There is the question of the proper
role for any successor organization to the Cold-War era regime known as
the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, or COCOM.
While the primary focus of COCOM was to prevent East-West trade from
strengthening the military capabilities of Communist governments, in
practice its controls also served nonproliferation ends, sometimes when
no other controls existed. Before there was a Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, a Zangger Committee Trigger List, or a Nuclear Suppliers Group,
there was the COCOM Atomic Energy List of controlled commodities.
COCOM will formally dissolve at the end of March 1994 and, while
its members are agreed that a follow-on organization should be created
to focus on the threats to international peace and security posed by
arms and sensitive dual-use goods, there is still much discussion over
the scope and exact nature of the controls the new regime will
maintain. The Administration believes that the substance of the Atomic
Energy List should be retained for the foreseeable future, at least
until the nonproliferation consequences of eliminating it are more
fully understood. Furthermore, our national controls on such nuclear
and nuclear-related commodities reflected in the Atomic Energy List
will remain in place, irrespective of the successor regime's future.
Another challenge to multilateral export controls is raised by
"duplicitous proliferants" -- countries that formally adhere to world
nonproliferation norms, while intending to cheat on those commitments.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is key to U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation policy and provides a strong foundation to the
international nonproliferation regime. Nevertheless, the actions of
Iraq and North Korea demonstrate that the United States cannot assume
that all parties to the Treaty will actually comply with its terms.
Finally, a fully implemented multilateral regime will face
continuing concerns over the effectiveness of export controls in the
newly-independent states of the former Soviet Union. The Department of
Energy is working closely with other agencies in determining the export
control needs of the newly independent states and assisting them in
meeting those needs. For example, last June the Department of Energy
hosted in Washington a conference on nonproliferation export controls,
attended by officials from all of the former Soviet Republics. In
addition, this spring the Department will assist the Polish Government
in training government personnel from these newly independent
democracies on the principles and inner workings of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. Much remains to be done, however, before it can be
confidently assumed that nuclear related exports to the former Soviet
Republics will not be re-exported to potential proliferants.
Peaceful nuclear activities should also be subject to greater
openness, to verify to the world that they are not being diverted from
their intended purposes. Secretary of Energy O'Leary, in her speech to
the International Atomic Energy Agency last September, called for
greater transparency in all nuclear programs. Nuclear transparency can,
she noted, "provide clear proof of the refocusing of nuclear
priorities, while enhancing confidence among nations."
As part of the reform process, the Administration is also
committed to streamlining the implementation of export controls. This
is an area where communications technology can make a major
contribution. The Department of Energy and its National Laboratories
are already developing computer technology which will facilitate
the rapid international exchange of information on export decisions and
other nonproliferation matters.
A partial answer to these challenges may lie in increased
international transparency and information exchange, particularly among
supplier states that share our nonproliferation concerns. The
Department is now developing communications technologies and software
that would allow for real-time exchange of information on export
decisions and on questionable activities of potential proliferants.
Such a system (1) would reduce the danger that a commodity of
proliferation significance actually reaches a nation of concern, and
(2) ensure that economic undercutting among nations is greatly reduced.
An additional benefit would be realized in the rapid resolution of
cases where the application of controls is unclear, reducing the
processing time for export decisions in all cooperating countries.
On the domestic level, we face equally complex problems. How
should the United States handle the reality of foreign availability in
a multilateral nonproliferation context? On the one hand, it is
difficult for American exporters to watch a sale go to a foreign
supplier simply because the United States is a member of an export
regime in which the other supplier's government does not participate.
With respect to the issues involving the export of Alaskan North
Slope crude oil, it should also be noted that, subject to certain
exceptions, this bill would continue to prohibit the export of
specified domestic crude oil. The Administration has this provision
under review and may propose changes in it later this year.
It should not be forgotten that Congress, through the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978, required the United States to exercise
leadership by developing dual-use nonproliferation controls and
requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply.
Fourteen years were to elapse before other nuclear suppliers accepted
these innovations as a necessary part of nonproliferation policy. Even
in the post Cold-War world, it cannot be said that the United States
will never again have to adopt export policies in advance of its allies
and other like-minded states. We must continue our leadership in
global nonproliferation, particularly by demonstrating clear and
consistent export control policies embodied in our laws and
regulations.
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