LIMITING WEAPON-USEABLE NUCLEAR MATERIAL, 03/23/1994, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19940531
- Chairperson:
- T. Lantos
- Committee:
- House Foreign Affairs
- Docfile Number:
- T94AF094
- Hearing Date:
- 19940323
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP
SUB
- Committee:
- International Security, International Organizations and Human
- Hearing Subject:
- LIMITING WEAPON-USEABLE NUCLEAR MATERIAL
- Witness Name:
- R. Degrasse, Jr.
-
Hearing Text:
-
Statement of
Robert W. DeGrasse, Jr.
Director, Surplus Fissile Materials Control & Disposition Project
U.S. Department of Energy
before the
Subcommittee on International Security,
International Organizations and Human Rights
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
March 23, 1994
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear
before you today to discuss the risk to international security posed by
the rapid accumulation of plutonium, and the Department of Energy's
efforts to reduce this threat. As you asked in your letter, my
testimony covers alternatives to civil reprocessing of spent fuel and
the application of safeguards to the burgeoning stocks of plutonium.
NUCLEAR MATERIALS CONTROL
With the end of the Cold War, significant quantities and forms of
nuclear materials have become excess to national defense needs both in
the United States and Russia. On September 27, 1993, President Clinton
announced the establishment of a framework for U.S. efforts to prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This policy commits
the U.S. to undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing
accumulation of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons and
within civil nuclear programs. As key elements of the President's
policy, the United States will:
o Seek to eliminate, where possible, accumulation of stockpiles
of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and to ensure that
where these materials already exist they are subject to the
highest standards of safety, security, and international
accountability.
o Propose a multilateral convention prohibiting the production
of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear
explosives purposes or outside international safeguards.
o Encourage more restrictive regional arrangements to constrain
fissile material production in regions of instability and
high proliferation risk.
o Submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed for our
deterrent to inspection by the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
o Pursue the purchase of highly enriched uranium from the
former Soviet Union and other countries and its conversion to
peaceful use as a reactor fuel.
o Explore means to limit the stockpiling of plutonium from
civil nuclear programs, and seek to minimize the civil
use of highly enriched uranium.
o Initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for
plutonium disposition, taking into account technical,
nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary and economic
considerations. Russia and other nations with relevant
interests and experience will be invited to participate in
the study.
BACKGROUND
Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment technologies
have long been considered sensitive technologies. However, until the
1970's, the United States did not object to adoption of plutonium
recycling in civil nuclear programs if strict and effective
controls could be ensured. In the late 1970's, President Carter
effectively ended plutonium recycle in the United States and attempted
to persuade Japan and Western Europe to do likewise. U.S. efforts to
dissuade other nations from pursuing civil uses for plutonium were
unsuccessful because of concerns regarding energy dependence, waste
disposal and resource utilization, and also perceptions that U.S.
persuasion was an attempt to interfere with the decisions of other
nations.
The enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 stipulated
that the new peaceful, nuclear cooperation agreements should contain
U.S. consent rights over reprocessing of U.S.-origin nuclear fuel. This
was the basis for the current Agreement for Cooperation with Japan in
which the United States granted long-term prior consent to nuclear fuel
reprocessing referred to in President Clinton's policy. The EURATOM
agreement, which expires at the end of 1995, does not have a
reprocessing consent right and its operation has required a yearly
presidential waiver of consent rights since 1978. Negotiations on a new
agreement with EURATOM are ongoing.
President Clinton's Nonproliferation and Export Control policy
specifically addresses concerns regarding the accumulation of civil
plutonium and directs the Executive Branch to explore means to limit
the stockpiling of plutonium from civil nuclear programs, and seek to
minimize the civil use of highly-enriched uranium. In addition, the
United States no longer reprocesses plutonium for either nuclear power
or nuclear explosive purposes. The United States, however, will
maintain its existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in
civil nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan with regard to prior
consent rights.
DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
During the next 10 to 20 years, civil plutonium will be separated
faster than it will be used in reactors. This is partly due to the
limited capacity for mixed oxide fuel fabrication. As a result,
approximately 20 tons of plutonium will be separated each year, and at
most, less than one-half of this would be used in the reactors.
Further, the recent National Academy of Sciences report notes that
there are already roughly 80 to 90 tons of excess separated civilian
plutonium in store around the world today. Security and accountability
of plutonium stockpiles are extremely important. Given economic,
environmental, geographic and proliferation concerns, many question
whether additional plutonium should be separated.
PROLIFERATION CONCERNS
These expanding stockpiles of plutonium resulting from civil
reprocessing are a growing proliferation concern. All nuclear reactors
fueled with natural or low enriched uranium generate plutonium. When
spent fuel from power reactors is recycled, uranium and plutonium are
separated for use in fabricating mixed oxide fuel. Plutonium separated
from reprocessing of spent fuel can be used to make nuclear weapons,
even though it is more radioactive and less sophisticated from a
military standpoint. One spent fuel load from a typical nuclear power
plant contains enough plutonium for many weapons. Hence reprocessing is
a sensitive technology.
At this time, large numbers of nuclear weapons are being dismantled in
the U.S. and Russia. Countries reprocessing civil spent fuel point to
this military plutonium as a much bigger proliferation risk than any
amount of civil plutonium under IAEA safeguards.
REDUCING THE RISKS WITH THE SPENT FUEL STANDARD
Spent fuel is highly radioactive and must be handled remotely.
Plutonium in spent fuel is considered a relatively low proliferation
risk because the radioactivity in the fuel is a tremendous danger to
anyone who is exposed to it, and because it must be reprocessed before
it is available for weapons use. This level of proliferation resistance
provides a standard against which to evaluate alternative measures for
plutonium disposition. It is referred to as the 'spent fuel standard'.
The degree of difficulty of handling spent fuel decreases with time as
the spent fuel cools. After about 50 years, the spent fuel is still
lethal at close distances, but it can be handled with much less
equipment. This underlines the need for an ultimate disposition
strategy for spent nuclear fuel.
SAFEGUARDING OF PLUTONIUM
The two commercial reprocessing facilities in France and United Kingdom
are subject to EURATOM safeguards and a substantial inspection effort
is carried out at those facilities, including resident inspectors.
Certain areas of these facilities are also safeguarded by the
International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, other nuclear
facilities in the European community at which plutonium is used,
including fuel fabrication facilities and power reactors, are also
subject to EURATOM and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
under the terms of the International Atomic Energy Agency/EURATOM New
Partnership agreement. In Japan and Switzerland, which are parties to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards apply to all the plutonium activities. All these
countries operate effective state systems of accounting and control for
nuclear materials as required to facilitate the application of IAEA
safeguards. Finally, these states are parties to the Convention on the
Physical Protection of nuclear materials and maintain physical security
measures consistent with those required by international standards.
CUSTOMERS AND SUPPLIERS OF REPROCESSING MARKETS
France and Japan are widely considered the most strongly committed to
recycling plutonium (and uranium) for their nuclear energy programs,
and are the largest users of reprocessing. The United Kingdom and
France are the largest suppliers of reprocessing services, with
construction of large capacity planned in Japan in the future. Other
countries, such as Switzerland, Germany and Belgium have equities as
either customers for or suppliers of reprocessing of spent fuel. Russia
may seek to expand reprocessing to satisfy domestic needs in
mixed-oxide fuel and future breeder programs and may consider it for
commerce with other states. The U.S. strongly discourages reprocessing
in regions of proliferation risk.
MOTIVATIONS FOR REPROCESSING
When today's reprocessing plants were planned, it was assumed that they
would be needed to separate the initial plutonium loads for breeder
reactors. Breeder reactor designs were planned to reduce the need for
uranium in nuclear power generation by as much as 99 percent. However,
nations attracted by this rationale have underestimated the time,
environmental and waste consequences, costs and political consensus
required to develop a viable production-scale breeder reactor. In
addition, the high-level waste produced from reprocessing is very
difficult and dangerous to worker health, safety and the environment.
This has left nations in the position of needing to utilize their
separated plutonium in mixed oxide fuel for light water reactors which
generates a uranium savings of 35 percent at best. The marginal
economics of this cycle as well as the high costs and inconveniences
of storing and utilizing the separated plutonium, have caused many
inside and outside the United States to question the viability of
plutonium recycling.
Other reasons for reprocessing have included management of limited
on-site fuel storage capacity. In the 1970's and 1980's, countries with
growing nuclear energy programs sought to match spent fuel discharge
rates with reprocessing capacities. However, the economics of plutonium
recycling and its commercial viability have not materialized.
Licensing criteria in some countries have been changed to allow
reactors to operate only if there is a way to dispose of or recycle the
spent fuel. In cases where spent fuel storage is limited, these
regulations effectively forced utilities to have their fuel
reprocessed. However, in the last 2-3 years there has been much greater
acceptance of and interest in spent fuel storage and so has joined
reprocessing as a 'live option' for many European utilities.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Recently, there has been much discussion concerning the fact that many
countries are struggling to justify reprocessing technology, but cannot
find the technical, environmental and policy solutions for disposition
of spent nuclear fuel and its byproducts.
From the Department of Energy's perspective, a very difficult problem
confronting the world community is the existing surplus stocks of
plutonium. Even if total cessation of reprocessing were to occur, there
would still be a large stockpile for disposition. Continued
reprocessing simply adds to those stockpiles.
Because plutonium from spent fuel reprocessing can be used in nuclear
weapons, its accumulation creates serious proliferation and security
dangers. Consistent with Presidential policy, the Department will seek
technical, environmental, economically attractive alternatives to offer
for plutonium disposition.
In the President's September 27, 1993 speech at the United Nations, he
noted: "The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium
and accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for
either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes" The Department of
Energy has concluded that continued support, even at an early stage of
development, of a technology that has its probable application in the
exploitation of plutonium from commercial sources as a fuel source for
commercial energy is inconsistent with the example to be set by the
Administration in reducing the fissile materials traded in commerce to
fuel reactors. It is difficult to urge others not to deploy
technologies for burning plutonium for commercial applications if we
subsidize, development of those or related technologies. Accordingly,
the Administration decided, shortly before transmittal of the FY 1995
budget request, to propose the termination of the Actinide Recycle
Program at the end of this fiscal year.
CONTROL AND DISPOSITION OF EXCESS WEAPONS PLUTONIUM
In addition to President Clinton's Nonproliferation and Export Control
Policy, the agreements reached with Russian President Yeltsin in
January set an ambitious agenda for the control and disposition of
excess plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons. This agenda includes
transparency and irreversibility in weapons dismantlement, as well as
ultimate disposition options.
RECENT AGREEMENTS
Just last week, the Department announced two historic agreements
reached with the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) of the Russian
Federation. These agreements will further the goals of reducing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. First, in a protocol, DOE has agreed
to help find ways to provide alternatives to plutonium production
reactors for district heating and electricity at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk.
Within one year after creation of an alternate source of energy, the
Russian side would cease production and chemical separation of
weapons-grade plutonium.
In addition, the Russian side proposed that, upon approval by the
Government of the Russian Federation, the heads of the Russian and
U.S. governments enter into a mutual agreement to cease military use of
plutonium separated after the date of the agreement. The Russian side
noted that both of these cessation and compliance provisions must be
met and that the agreement would require that each side permit
inspection of its relevant plutonium production facilities as well as
storage sites for the plutonium produced by the reactors in Tomsk and
Krasnoyarsk.
Second, in a joint statement, DOE and MINATOM declared their intention
to conduct inspections of facilities containing plutonium removed from
nuclear weapons by the end of 1994. A meeting of experts to establish
the procedures for these visits will take place within two months. The
Department will work cooperatively with the Departments of State and
Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in implementing
these agreements.
Also last week, the final step was taken to allow implementation of our
purchase of Russian highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapons. On
March 18, the Department of Energy and the Ministry of Atomic Energy
signed a transparency agreement on the provisions to provide confidence
that U.S. purchases of low- enriched uranium come from blended-down
highly enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons while respecting
Russian security and sovereignty needs. This agreement helps form the
foundation of future follow-on fissile materials verification
initiatives.
The Department has also announced its intention to begin International
Atomic Energy Agency inspection of some amount of highly enriched
uranium located at Vault 16 at the Y-12 Plant by the end of September,
and has formally requested the Department of State to take the
necessary steps to add Vault 16 to the voluntary safeguards list. In
addition, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed to on January
14, 1994 to establish a joint working group to pursue additional steps
to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the process of
reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of putting a
portion of fissionable material under IAEA safeguards.
SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT
The Department of Energy is involved in many critical aspects of the
safe, secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet
Union. These activities include:
o Fissile Material Containers -- designing and manufacturing
containers for transportation and storage of fissile material
from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons;
o Railcar Upgrade Kits -- designing and modifying existing
Russian railcars to enhance the security and safety of
nuclear weapons during rail transport;
o Soft Armor Blankets -- providing soft armor blankets to
enhance nuclear weapons protection;
o Material Control and Accounting and Physical Protection --
developing and implementing enhanced national systems of
material control and accounting and physical protection of
special nuclear materials in Russia; and
o Fissile Material Storage Facility -- assisting the Corps of
Engineers in design of a Material Control and Accounting and
Physical Protection System, safety analysis for the facility
and other design assistance related to fissile material
storage as required.
DOE ORGANIZATIONAL ALIGNMENT
During the past few months, the Secretary has concluded that an
innovative organizational approach was needed within the Department to
help improve the coordination and implementation of efforts to address
fissile materials management. In response, the Secretary created a
high-level cross-cutting project reporting to the Under Secretary. The
project is staffed full-time by experienced people from across the
Departmental organizations who deal with fissile materials management
issues. The project team has the talent and capacity to reach across
and"promptly engage all elements of the Department on fissile materials
issues. Key objectives of the Department-wide project include:
1) Provide safe, secure, and environmentally sound control,
storage and ultimate disposition of surplus fissile materials;
2) Promote effective nonproliferation policies and set an example
for other nations to follow; and
3) Operate in an open and transparent manner and ensure
stakeholder participation in the decisionmaking process.
In addition, the project coordinates the Department's participation in
the Interagency Working Group activities involving fissile materials
management. The President has tasked the Interagency Working Group to
initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium
disposition taking into account technical, nonproliferation,
environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations. The Department
is a key contributor to these efforts.
CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
Comprehensive control and management of nuclear materials must include
safeguards on the production of new materials, existing inventories of
materials and nuclear materials resulting from the weapons assembly and
disassembly process. In each of these areas the Department will examine
the unilateral, bilateral and international monitoring options.
On March 15, 1994, Secretary O'Leary took an important step in
establishing baseline information about the status of plutonium stocks
by directing DOE's Office of Environment, Safety and Health to conduct
a comprehensive assessment of the environment, safety and health
vulnerabilities associated with the entire inventory of plutonium in
storage outside of intact nuclear weapons. This assessment will serve
as the information base to identify corrective actions and options for
the safe management of surplus fissile materials. This assessment
should be completed by September 30, 1994.
Last year, the Office of Technology Assessment identified that a
continuing lack of public credibility may have a major impact on
progress on dismantlement and on implementing key operational
decisions. The President has tasked the Nuclear Weapons Council to
identify those quantities of nuclear materials which are excess to
national security needs and can be subjected to external inspection.
Our goal is to be able to declassify sufficient information about
these surplus materials to allow informed public debate on storage and
disposition options. However, we will continue to protect information
that could assist a potential proliferant.
Declassification of sufficient information about fissile materials is
part of the Secretary's efforts to build public trust by providing
information that is important to the current debate about the proper
management and disposition of these materials. Release of this
previously secret information will be used to encourage other nations
to reciprocate and declassify similar information.
The Department is also establishing an international nuclear material
tracking capability and to integrate international and domestic
capabilities. When implemented, in early 1995, this system will greatly
contribute to the world-wide control of nuclear materials.
DISPOSITION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
As part of the Interagency review directed by the President, the
Department is evaluating a number of options for plutonium and highly
enriched uranium disposition. Options being considered involve the
interim, long term and ultimate solutions. Our goals are to reduce the
global nuclear danger by providing a basis for engaging the Russians on
arrangements to safely dispose of weapons capable fissile materials,
and to provide comprehensive technical, environmental, economic and
scheduling data to support decisions on plutonium disposition options.
The recent National Academy of Sciences report on Management and
Disposition Excess Weapons Plutonium provides a useful framework for
addressing these issues. To support the Interagency review, the
Department of Energy will begin a public scoping process on the options
for plutonium control and disposition and develop criteria for
screening out unacceptable options. We will then begin technical
evaluations of a reasonable range of options to support informed policy
decisions.
The Department's ultimate objective is to provide safe, secure, and
environmentally sound control, storage and ultimate disposition of
surplus nuclear materials. In accomplishing this goal, DOE will operate
in an open and transparent manner and ensure stakeholder participation
in the decisionmaking process. In so doing, the Department's efforts
will promote nonproliferation policies and set an example for other
nations to follow.
CONCLUSION
Reducing the continuing and new nuclear dangers that the world faces;
responding with programs that build upon and enhance the technical and
operational strengths of the Department and its laboratories and
emphasizing commitments to environment, safety, and health are the
essence of the Department's implementation of the President's national
security strategy. The Department is committed to remain a full
participant in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, materials, and
expertise and in supporting safe, environmentally sound control and
disposition of nuclear materials that could contribute to
proliferation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. At this time, I
would be happy to answer any questions the subcommittee members may
have.
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