FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL, 03/15/1994, Question and Answer

Basis Date:: 19950213
Chairperson:: T. Bevill
Committee:: House Appropriations
Docfile Number:: Q94AN301
Hearing Date:: 19940315
DOE Lead Office:: DP/NN SUB
Committee:: Energy and Water Development
Hearing Subject:: FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL
Witness Name:: V. Reis/J. Keliher
Hearing Text:

PRODUCTION AND MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY Mr. Bevill. Dr. Reis, how can DOE maintain a viable nuclear weapons production and maintenance capability if there is no requirement for new nuclear weapons and no nuclear testing? Dr. Reis. Assuring our continuing production and maintenance capability is one of the biggest challenges facing the Department as we reduce the Nuclear Weapons Complex infrastructure in response to declining budgets. There are two separate factors involved here, production capability and production capacity. Production capability reflects technical competence in essential manufacturing processes, but not necessarily the capacity (personnel and production line equipment) to produce large quantities of components. Production capacity implies capability plus the capacity for quantity production. Maintenance of the enduring stockpile is of paramount importance. We are attempting to maintain the required production capacity to meet requirements through the nonnuclear reconfiguration activity, by consolidating the nonnuclear production infrastructure. Maintenance of our overall production capability is even more difficult. In 1993, we implemented a Production Capability Assurance Program, which allowed us to maintain at least a minimum technical capability in essential production processes. To date, the program has been successful, but further personnel reductions planned for 1994 and 1995 will cause the loss, at least temporarily, of some capabilities. We are attempting tb mitigate the potential impact of these losses by ensuring the national laboratories retain their competence in the basic technologies as part of the Stockpile Stewardship program. REPLICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON Mr. Bevill. Dr. Reis, if it were necessary, would it be possible to replicate a nuclear weapon and certify its capability and performance within the existing resources of the DOE nuclear weapons complex? Dr. Reis. There are several caveats to this answer. The first is, it would depend on the weapon requiring replication. Since we have no current capability to produce new pits, the replicated design would have to be an older one, for which we could reuse the pit (from storage at Pantex). To achieve quantity production would require additional fiscal resources. Today, except for the production of Limited Life Components necessary to maintain the enduring stockpile, the nuclear weapons complex is maintaining only the minimum capability to exercise key production processes. To achieve quantity production capacity, we would have to hire additional production personnel, process their security clearances, and train and certify them; we would also have to restore idled production equipment from its current standby condition to production readiness. Obviously, we would not be able to replicate a nuclear weapon until we completed the consolidation of nonnuclear production facilities at Kansas City and the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. TRITIUM PRODUCTION STATUS Mr. Bevill. Dr Reis, based on current stockpile requirements, when must a decision be made to build a new tritium reactor? Dr. Reis. There are several options for meeting tritium requirements other than building a new tritium reactor. If one assumes, however, that a new facility is to be built, then based on the current stockpile plan and the conservative view that a new tritium production source could take as long as 15 years to produce new tritium, a funding decision would be necessary in Fiscal Year 1996. That would allow the facility to be in production 3 years before strategic reserves of tritium are exhausted. Currently, the Department of Energy is pursuing four tritium production options in its Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). These options include heavy water, modular high-temperature gas, and light water reactors and a proton accelerator. The draft PEIS will be available for review in March 1995. STATE OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES Mr. Bevill. Can you describe the state of the Russian nuclear weapons laboratories? Dr. Keliher. Deleted Deleted Deleted DIVERSION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS Mr. Bevill. How concerned should we be about the possible diversion of Russian nuclear weapons scientists to other countries? What can be done to mitigate the danger? Dr. Keliher. Observations to date by the DOE's National Laboratory scientists, as they interact on a project working level with their counterparts in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), indicate that this is not presently a major concern. However, economic conditions are rapidly deteriorating and the desire of FSU weapons scientists to feed themselves and their families will increase the probability that some will leave. Since early 1992, the Department of Energy has strongly encouraged technical collaborations between its laboratories and FSU weapons institutes. As of this date, initial technical exchange visits in March 1992 have led to over $5,000,000 in direct contracts between DOE and FSU weapons institutes. This contracting is employing thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians in non-weapons related work that maintains their professional integrity. Professional relationships are being established that provide a continuing basis for education in market economics. The success of direct laboratory-to-institute contracting is now leading to other programs that include U.S. industrial and academic participation, which will foster long- term commercial enterprises. This direct contracting for goods and services benefits Newly Independent States (NIS) institutes with employment and education in western business practices and provides the U.S. access to a large highly talented scientific pool of knowledge. These activities should be strengthened and given long-term support so as to minimize the developing proliferation risk and establish lasting economic benefits. In addition to these laboratory-to-institute exchanges, the DOE is supporting the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow. The Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation is the U.S. representative to the board of governors and two National Laboratory scientists are providing technical support to the center. The DOE strongly supports the nonproliferation goals of the ISTC and we encourage enhanced support to the center. CAPABILITIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES Mr. Bevill. Dr. Reis, how can we maintain the capabilities of the nuclear weapons laboratories in the absence of new weapons requirements? Dr. Reis. I have instituted a science-based Stockpile Stewardship program at the weapons laboratories. Important elements of this program are: (1) enhanced above-ground experimentation to retain and attract the best and the brightest to the weapons program, (2) acquisition of state-of-the-art computation capabilities, (3) programs to capture and centralize more than 40 years of weapons research, design, and testing experience, (4) a forward-looking facilities strategy, and (5) dual use/technology transfer with U.S. industry. Enhanced aboveground experimentation will increase our understanding of the performance of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing. The acquisition of state-of-the-art computation capabilities focuses on the purchase of massively parallel processor computers and the support to convert our existing weapons design codes to operate oh these machines. Activities to capture weapons experience are vital because much of this experience rests in an aging cadre of scientific personnel. Also, the dual-use Technology Transfer program in cooperation with U.S. industry is designed to assist the nuclear weapons laboratories in maintaining their core competencies while benefiting U.S. economic competitiveness. DEPARTURE OF SCIENTISTS FROM THE WEAPONS LABORATORIES Mr. Bevill. How many scientists have left the weapons laboratories in the last 2 years and how many are expected to leave in FY 1994 and FY 1995? What were the ages of these scientists? Dr. Reis. In the interest of brevity, I have some information from Los Alamos as an example. I will provide similar information from Livermore and Sandia separately. It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict who will leave the weapons programs at the national laboratories in the next 2 years through retirement or for other reasons. This is because of the many (unknown) variables involved in a personal choice such as this. Based on the information that is available, however, we can say who is eligible to retire in FY 1994 and FY 1995. The major portion of staff leaving the nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos in the past 2 years occurred last year as a result of the University of California's Voluntary Early Retirement Incentive Program (VERIP III). A total of 237 scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrative support personnel took this retirement incentive. Of the 1,948 Research, Development and Testing staff currently employed, 550 or about 36 percent are over 50 years of age. Within the next 2 years, another 155, or 8 percent of the current staff will become eligible to retire, assuming no changes in this age group. It is, however, expected that few staff will choose to retire at an early age because of the strong incentives built into the retirement programs to wait until one is 60 years or older to retire. DEMOGRAPHICS OF LABORATORY WEAPONS SCIENTISTS Mr. Bevill. Please provide for the record the demographics of the laboratory weapons scientists showing the current age-of the work force and the ages of those who have left recently. Dr. Reis. I will use some information from Los Alamos. I will provide similar information from Livermore and Sandia separately. The age distribution of current staff at Los Alamos, which includes scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrative support personnel, is shown in Figure 1, entitled "Los Alamos FY 1993 Age Distribution." The age distribution of the workers, including scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrative support personnel, who have left recently is shown in Figure 2, entitled "VERIP III PARTICIPANTS." This shows that most of those who left were in the 55-60 age bracket. VERIP III was the voluntary early retirement incentive program offered last year by the University of California Retirement Plan. Retirements became effective October 29, 1993. I would like to insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 into the record. (The information follows:) ****Figure 1 Los Alamos FY 1993 Age Distribution and Figure 2 VERIP III Participants charts are attached to original document**** CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE NATION NUCLEAR DETERRENT Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, could you describe what DOD perceives to be the capabilities which must be retained at the nuclear weapons labs to maintain the Nation's nuclear deterrent? Dr. Smith. We must be able, at a minimum, to maintain a safe, reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. In order to accomplish this the DOE nuclear weapons laboratories must maintain a capability second to none to identify problems in weapons, repair those problems, certify the repairs or replace warheads that cannot be repaired, all without nuclear testing. Even though not explicitly stated above, the ability to dismantle weapons and dispose of the resulting hazardous materials in an environmentally responsible manner is also critical as the U.S. downsizes its nuclear arsenal. In summary, the DOD must continue to rely on the DOE laboratories to be the stewards of the nuclear weapons stockpile; provide the expertise to design, engineer, provide surveillance, repair, fabricate, and dismantle the nuclear arsenal. The labs have also provided technical vision for the future in nuclear and many nonnuclear areas and DOD expects that to continue. NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what is the current DOD thinking on the most likely national security threat this Nation faces? Dr. Smith. We believe that there are four new post-cold war dangers faced by the Nation. These are: regional threats to U.S. interests, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and possible failure of democratic reforms (both in Russia and elsewhere in the world,). The fourth, although not a traditional military threat, but one that could have significant impact, is negative national economic trends. FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what type of nuclear weapons is DOD looking at for future development? How far in the future do you see the need to produce a new nuclear weapons? Dr. Smith. The DOD has no requirement to develop a new nuclear weapon. However, we need to maintain the ability to produce nuclear weapons. Based on past experience, we can expect to find problems with weapons in the enduring stockpile. If the problem seriously degrades weapons performance, we may need to remanufacture or replace that weapon, thus requiring new production. We cannot predict when such a need will occur. But as long as nuclear deterrence remains a vital part of our national security, we must maintain the capability to produce new weapons. MEDICAL RADIATION EXPERIMENTS Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what is the status of DOD's review of medical radiation experiments? Dr. Smith. The services and DOD agencies are involved in an on-going effort to aggressively search for records at archives, libraries, record centers, laboratories, contractor organization, government agencies, university facilities, medical centers, and military installations. This is a time-intensive, cumbersome task; however, DOD is committed to a full accounting of its role in this matter. The Department has moved forward on a broad front to confront the issues associated with human radiation experiments. DOD is an active participant in the deliberations of the President's Human Radiation Interagency Working Group; Department policies and procedures are in place to guide our efforts; a Command Center that is the Department's focal point for information is operational; and the services and Department agencies have provided information that we are in the process of collecting, reviewing and categorizing. By no means an all inclusive description of the Department's actions, these activities do highlight the priority with which we are treating -- and continue to treat -- this issue. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the NPR? Dr. Smith. The DOD's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is not well underway. It is examining the role of nuclear forces in the security policy of the United States in light of the new and enduring dangers of the post-cold war era. The NPR is the first study of nuclear policy in 15 years, the first in the post-cold war world, and the first study ever to include policy, doctrine, force structure, command, and control in a single review. The NPR will be ready to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early summer. Nuclear Safeguards and Security COORDINATION WITH DOD ON DECLASSIFICATION Mr. Bevill. How is DOE coordinating with DOD in its current efforts to declassify information? Are there any instances of disagreement between the two organizations on how the declassification effort should proceed? Dr. Keliher. DOE coordinates its declassification efforts with two primary offices in the DOD: The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, and the Assistant Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy. DOE has notified DOD of current declassification efforts thorough DOE's Defense Program Office. DOD was also invited and participated in DOE's internal review of declassification proposals on March 3, 1994. A formal memorandum of recommended declassifications will be sent to DOD by April 1, 1994. We anticipate a response from DOD by the end of April 1994. There have been no disagreements between the two organizations on how the declassification effort should proceed; however, there have been disagreements on certain declassification proposals in the past. COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA Mr. Bevill. Please describe any programs in which the U.S. weapons laboratories are cooperating with their counterparts in Russia. For those programs using DOE funds, describe the specific agreement and the source and amount of funding in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995. Dr. Reis. The Department of Energy (DOE) weapons laboratories are cooperating with institutes and laboratories in the Russian Federation in several areas. These interactions include DOE funded laboratory-to-laboratory efforts, safe, secure dismantlement effort& using Department of Defense funding under the "Nunn-Lugar" appropriations, industrial partnering activities funded through the Department of State and the FY 1994 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act, and proposed weapon surety technology exchanges yet unfunded. The following are descriptions of each effort. DOE FUNDED ACTIVITIES: The Department of Energy laboratories have been encouraged to enter into contractual interactions with entities of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) when these interactions.are in agreement with the general policies of DOE and benefit DOE-programs. In this regard, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) established about 120 contracts with 35 FSU institutes for about $1 million in FY 1993. The major LLNL interactions were focused in the areas of laser,technology, inertial fusion, and optics. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) also established interactions with FSU institutions. Major LANL effort has been focused in the areas of explosively driven pulse power and accelerator based conversion and accelerator transmutation of waste. LANL recently completed joint pulsed power experiments with Arzamas-16 scientists using one of the FSU's large electromagnetic generators. These LANL efforts were funded at about $325 thousand in FY 1993. Similarly, the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has recently begun significant interactions with the FSU in the areas of pulse power technology, materials technology, and surety related technologies. These SNL efforts were funded at about $1.45 million in FY 1993. The projected expenditures of DOE funds by the weapons laboratories to support expanded interactions with the FSU are $6.5 million in FY 1994 and $8.6 million in FY 1995. SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT (SSD) SUPPORT TO DOD: The DOE weapons laboratories are providing support to the Department of Defense (DOD) in the Nunn-Lugar funded program to assist the FSU in SSD efforts. The DOE efforts fall into several categories: design support for procurement of fissile material containers; fissile material storage facility design and equipment assistance; railcar safety and security modification; emergency response equipment; and soft armor blankets. In FY 1993 approximately $38.6 million of DOD funds was expended in support of these activities with the Russian Federation. The funding distribution for the SSD efforts for FY 1994 and FY 1995 have not yet been decided and amounts are not available at this time. INDUSTRIAL PARTNERING EFFORT: The DOE laboratories (including the weapons laboratories) expect to be initiating efforts with the scientific and engineering institutes in the FSU under the program of cooperation provided for in the FY 1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. This effort, funded at $35 million in FY 1994 funds, will include qualified U.S. academic institutes and partners from U.S. industry. These programs are intended to stabilize the technology base in the cooperating states of the FSU and assist in the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The proposal that has been accepted by the Department of State includes three elements: a Stabilization Element with near term efforts between DOE laboratories and FSU institutes; a Cost-Shared Industrial Partnering Element to establish long term stability and commercialization technologies converted from the FSU weapons establishment; and the Academic Support Element to develop telecommunications, and provide business training and administrative support to the industry coalition. This effort is just beginning, and specific efforts are being defined for funding within the $35 million appropriation. TECHNICAL INFORMATION EXCHANGES ON NUCLEAR WARHEAD SAFETY AND SECURITY: The DOE and the weapons laboratories have recently begun an effort to establish technical cooperation in the area of nuclear warhead safety and security between the United States (DOE) and the Russian Federation (Ministry of Atomic Energy). This DOE Defense Programs led initiative will involve a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in accordance with the formal State Department Circular 175 Process for negotiating international agreements. We believe there are also numerous other activities funded by the Offices of Energy Research and Environmental Restoration and Waste Management and the laboratories. STOCKPILE MEMORANDUM Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the latest Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum? Dr. Reis. The FY 1994"1999 Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum containing the stockpile plan was approved by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy in late December 1993, and forwarded to the National Security Council on January 4, 1994. This stockpile plan was approved by President Clinton on March 1, 1994. Current scheduling calls for submission of a new Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum forwarding a new stockpile plan for the period FY 1995-2000 to President Clinton in the fall of 1994. UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING Mr. Bevill. Under what conditions would the U.S. consider performing an underground nuclear test? Dr. Reis. The decision to resume underground nuclear testing will be made by the President. Deleted Deleted Deleted NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST BAN Mr. Bevill: If the President chose to end the current nuclear weapons test ban, what type of weapon would DOE test and why? Dr. Reis: There has been no advance determination of the type of weapon that would be first tested if the President decided that nuclear testing should be resumed. Such a determination would depend on the circumstances at the time and would be made in consultation with the Department of Defense. Consistent with the Hatfield/Mitchell/Exon legislation, the Congress would also be consulted. OTHER COUNTRIES' NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAMS Mr. Bevill. What is the status of other countries' nuclear testing programs? Do you anticipate any countries performing nuclear tests in FY 1994 and FY 1995? Dr. Keliher. China is the only country among the five major nuclear powers with an active nuclear testing program. China last conducted a nuclear test in October 1993. Russia, however, has not conducted a nuclear test within the past 3 years and has been a willing participant in nuclear testing moratoria with France, the U.S. and the U.K. since 1992. France and the UK last tested in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Deleted HYDRONUCLEAR EXPERIMENTS Mr. Bevill: Please describe the role hydronuclear experiments could play in ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile. Dr. Reis: Hydronuclear experiments provide an experimental method to directly measure the safety and reliability characteristics of a nuclear weapon primary. These experiments, in which the nuclear energy generated is much smaller than the chemical energy expended by the high explosives, were used to address stockpile safety concerns during the 1958-1961 U.S. nuclear testing moratorium. Historically, we have seen one to two defects per year that require changes in the stockpile. As the smaller stockpile ages, we expect to find changes that will require remanufacturing, replacement, or substitution of stockpile components. Therefore, hydronuclear experiments can provide valuable support to our stockpile surveillance program. Near-term baseline experiments would provide standard data to compare against data from future experiments to examine aging effects and to verify corrections or changes made to the primary. PLUTONIUM AND TRITIUM PRODUCTION Mr. Bevill. Are any other nations still producing plutonium? Dr. Keliher. Yes. Plutonium is produced as a result of normal power reactor operation. Russia has three dual-purpose production reactors still in operation, two at Tomsk and one at Krasnoyarsk, that provide heat and electricity to their respective sites and nearby communities. We believe these reactors are producing weapons grade plutonium. However, we do not believe the recovered plutonium is being used to produce additional nuclear weapons. On March 16, 1994, the Department of Energy and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) of the Russian Federation agreed to work together to find ways to replace the Tomsk reactors (by using gas turbines) and the reactor at Krasnoyarsk (by finishing construction on a coal-fired plant). COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS Mr. Bevill. Please identify all countries known or suspected to have nuclear weapons and include the number of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons held by each. Dr. Keliher. The countries known to have nuclear weapons are the Former Soviet Union, China, France and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States. Countries suspected of having nuclear weapons are Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. Estimates 'on the numbers of weapons are classified. DEFENSE PROGRAMS NEPA DOCUMENTS IN PREPARATION Mr. Bevill. Provide a brief description and milestones for all Defense Programs environmental impact statements and environmental assessments currently being prepared by Defense Programs. Dr. Reis. Listed below are all Defense Programs National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) actions (environmental impact statements or environmental assessments) for which there has been a formal determination to prepare one of the two documents. (The information follows:) PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: Programmatic EIS for Reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons Complex Description: To propose reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons Complex to be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive than that of today. The reconfigured complex would have fewer individual sites, generally lower capacity facilities, and would fully comply with applicable environmental, safety and health laws, regulations and orders. This will include the Department's preferred alternative for the technology and location for a new tritium supply. Milestone: March 1995 Draft EIS for Public Review (Secretarial Commitment). SITE-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: Note:Consideration is ongoing for Site-wide EISs at a number of Defense Programs sites where current NEPA coverage is non-existent or out-dated. Pantex Site-wide EIS Description: To evaluate all current and proposed facilities and activities at Pantex including dismantlement and storage of the resulting nuclear materials and classified weapons components (pits). Milestone:Record of Decision, November 15, 1996 (Secretarial Commitment). ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site Description: To evaluate nuclear materials currently at the Savannah River Site. The nuclear materials would be placed into one of three categories: (1) materials that should be stabilized based on the risk they pose to workers, the public or the environment; (2) materials proposed to be converted to a useable form for a programmatic need; and (3) materials that are stable and not required for a programmatic need. Milestone: March 1995 Upgrade of the F & H Canyon Exhaust Systems at the Savannah River Site Description: To evaluate the impacts of the upgrade of existing canyon ventilation exhaust systems for the F- and H-area chemical separations facilities. Milestone: July 1995 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS: Total: 32 Kansas City Plant (1) Separate Process Wastewaters, Part A, Contaminated Flow Collection and Treatment System Description: To construct and operate a collection and treatment system for contaminated wastewaters and groundwaters at the DOE operated Kansas City Plant. Milestone: July 1994 (expected completion) Pantex Plant (1) Construction and Operation of Environmental, Safety and Health Analytical Laboratory Description: To meet the need for increased testing and analysis capability of environmental, waste, and explosive samples by constructing and operating a new analytical laboratory at Pantex and subsequently demolishing the existing laboratory facility. Milestone: October 1994 Pit Reuse Project Description: Develop and demonstrate the capability at Pantex to modify certain pits generated from the nuclear weapon dismantlement process to enhance safety and to allow reuse of pits by integrating existing technology at Pantex with new technology developed specially for this project. Milestone: January 1995 Savannah River Site (4) D-Area Powerhouse Life Extension Description: Line #:95-D-157, to upgrade and renovate the existing SRS powerhouse in order to extend the facility life, upgrade system controls to current industry standards, and ensure production reliability. Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design Domestic Water System Upgrades Phase I & II Description: Line #:93-D-147, to upgrade the existing 28 SRS domestic water supply systems by improving.and consolidating them as necessary to cost-effectively comply with South Carolina primary drinking water regulations. Eleven of the existing systems would be consolidated and replaced by a central water supply treatment facility and a new 24-mile main distribution system. Milestone: July 1994 Storage of Plutonium Metal in the Building 247-F Vault Description: To provide additional interim capacity to store plutonium at the SRS. Milestone: Under review Uranium Solidification Facility, Building 221 H Description: Line #:85-D-145, to provide the facilities to process liquid, highly-enriched uranyl nitrate for the production of solid uranium oxide. Milestone: Suspended pending outcome of the study to look at alternate methods to disposition uranyl nitrate hexahydrate. Oak Ridge Y-12 (2) Interim Storage of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium Description: To provide interim storage of nuclear weapons highly enriched uranium from weapons dismantlement at Pantex. In August 1994, the amount to be stored will exceed the previous historical high amount of material stored at OR/Y-12 facility. Milestone: August 1994 Hydrogen Fluoride Supply System in Building 9212 Description: Line # 94-D-124, to update the current Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride Process at OR/Y-12. Milestone: Fiscal year 1995 (Construction starts the 1st Quarter, 1995). Los Alamos National Laboratory (9) Fire Resistant Pit Project Description: To provide an indoor bench-scale research project for Fire Resistant Pits. The project will involve heating weapons components (pits) under controlled conditions in a hot cell to determine the behavior of a weapon in an accidental fuel fire scenario. Milestone: Under review Chemistry Metallurgy Research Building Upgrades Description: Line #:95-D-102, to upgrade the Chemistry and Metallurgical Research (CMR) Building in order to meet current standards in the areas of health, safety, environmental protection, and security and safeguards. Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design High Explosive Material Test Facility Description: Line #:94-D-102, to construct a new High Explosive Material Test Facility building. The facility will be used for mechanical and thermal tests on materials and assemblies containing high explosive materials. Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design Isotope Separator Building Description: To relocate one isotope separator and to install a new one at TA-48. The isotope separators will be housed in a pre-engineered building. Milestone: Under review Low Level Waste Drum Staging Facility Description: To place a prefabricated storage building adjacent to the existing Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility at TA-16. The building will be used as a staging site for sealed 55-gallon drums (up to eight) of noncompactible waste, contaminated with low levels of tritium classified as low-level waste, prior to moving the waste to TA-54. Milestone: June 1994 Deactivate, Disassemble and Decontaminate, High Pressure Tritium Laboratory, at Building 86 at TA-33 Description: To deactivate, disassemble, and decontaminate High Pressure Tritium Laboratory at TA-33. Programmatic operations in the building were suspended in 1990. Milestone: As soon as possible Accelerator Prototype Laboratory Description: To erect pre-engineered a building in an existing developed area within Technical Area (TA)-53 for research, development, and testing of accelerator components, primarily continuous ion source generators. Milestone: April 1994 Weapons Component Testing Facility Description: To relocate an existing physical properties testing laboratory, without changing the scope of operations, from Building 450 to 207 within TA-16. A small enclosure will be built to house hydraulic pumps. Milestone: Under review Increase of Special Nuclear Material Storage Level at Nuclear Material Storage Facility Description: Original Line #:84-D-104, to replace and upgrade facility components to permit full operation of the Nuclear Material Storage Facility (NMSF). Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design Sandia National Laboratory (7) Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory Description: Line #:94-D-102/Subproject-06, to construct a laboratory to collocate activities dealing with materials and processes research; waste reduction; management of hazardous materials; and environment, safety, and health which are currently dispersed throughout Sandia National Laboratories. Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design Robotic Manufacturing Science and Engineering Laboratory Description: Line #: 92-D-102, to construct and operate a new building that will provide office and laboratory facilities for robotics research and testing. Milestone: April 1994 Technology Support Center/Gamma Irradiation Facility Description: Line #:90-D-102/Subproject-06, to design, construction, and operate a new Gamma Irradiation Facility located in Tech Area V, and the removal of the existing Gamma Irradiation Facility to consolidate gamma irradiation sources in a single, dedicated facility, reducing the potential for radiation exposure of personnel. Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design Aerial Cable Site Facility Operation Description: To operate a facility consisting of steel cables suspended across Sol se Mete Canyon in the Coyote Test Field Area to provide a means of conducting air-to-ground tests of aircraft deliverable ordnance, ground-to-air missile, and other air defined material tests under controlled and instrumented conditions. Milestone: Under review Neutron Generator/Switch Tube Prototyping Relocation Project Description: To relocate the prototyping of neutron generators and switch tubes from Building 891 to the East Annex of Building 870, both within Technical Area I. New equipment will be purchased and set up in Building 870. Building 891 will be decommissioned for use in another project. Milestone: April 1994 Coyote Canyon Test Complex Operation Description: To modify and expand activities within and adjacent to Technical Area III for Coyote Canyon Test Complex Operations. Testing programs will continue to involve the use of explosives and propellants to test the reliability,of weapons, weapons components, and support end articles. Milestone: Under review Modification and Operation of the Neutron Measurements Laboratory, Building 984 Description: To modify and allow the operation of the Neutron Measurements Laboratory that was completed in February 1990. Its primary purpose is to provide a location to conduct time-of-flight measurements of neutrons created by inertial confinement fusion target implosions in Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II. Milestone: Under review Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (3) Explosive Waste Storage Facility at Site 300 Description: Line #:94-D-414, to construct a facility that would be used to store all explosive wastes generated by the Weapons Testing Programs at LLNL and Site 300 before treatment at Site 300 or shipment off site. Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design Contained Firing Facility at Bunker 801, Site 300 Description: Line #:94-D-102/Subproject-03, to enclose the firing operations at the principal Site 300 weapons test facility, Bunker 801, which would reduce the amount of hazardous and other wastes generated at the bunker, minimize emissions of noise and hazardous materials into the environment, and enhance the overall safety of the operations. Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design General Atomics Target Fabrication and Technology Support of the Inertial Confinement Fusion Program Description: To create Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Target Fabrication and Tritium Handling Facilities to be operated by General Atomics (GA) in San Diego, California. GA would use these facilities to manufacture ICF targets under a contract for the Department of Energy. These targets would be used in laser or particle beam experiments performed by various U.S. Inertial Fusion Laboratories. Milestone: Under review Nevada Operations (2) North Las Vegas Facility Including the Proposed Construction of the Nevada Support Facility Description: Line #:93-0-102, to construct the Nevada Support Facility (NSF) at the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and to operate,and maintain the NLVF, which includes the implementation of the Five-Year Facilities Plan for the facilities owned by DOE and operated by EG&G. Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design Opening and Operation of Combined Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site Description: Line #:85-D-105, to provide state-of-the art facilities for nuclear explosive operations that require the handling of high explosives (HE) in combination with Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), and to reduce the environmental impact and personnel exposure in the unlikely event of an accident. Milestone: Before decision to proceed with detailed design Fernald and Hanford (1) Sale of Excess Depleted, Normal, and Low Enriched Uranium Material Description: To study the sale, packaging, loading, and shipment of approximately 3,626 metric tons of depleted, normal, and low enriched uranium stored at the Fernald and Hanford sites. Milestone: April 1994 (to allow evaluation of contract based on bids received) University of Rochester (1) Tritium Filling Station at the Lab for Laser Energetics Description: To provide a facility capable of filling hollow microspheres with deuterium and tritium for use as targets on the existing UR/LLE OMEGA laser system. Milestone: As soon as possible Pinellas Plant (1) Leasing of Buildings and Facilities Description: To modify existing facilities for non-defense reuse applications. Utilization of existing technical personnel resources would be encouraged. Milestone: June 1994 LABORATORY FUNDING Mr. Bevill: Please provide a breakout by laboratory or site of DOE funding for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995. Dr. Reis: The breakout by laboratory or site of Weapons Activities funding for FY 1993, FY 1994, FY 1995 is shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) WEAPONS ACTIVITIES BY LABORATORY/SITE TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Albuquerque $ 308.9 $ 303.0 $ 283.7 Kansas City 331.4 329.8 252.6 LANL 524.7 457.3 430.9 LLNL 476.8 410.3 357.0 Mound 97.6 73.9 30.3 Nevada 340.6 325.0 311.8 Oak Ridge (Includes Y-12) 519.1 443.1 364.6 Pantex 238.7 240.7 253.5 Pinellas 96.5 87.3 30.9 Rocky Flats 505.0 253.6 67.5 SNL 665.6 632.4 686.3 Savannah River 129.6 108.1 106.8 HQ/Other 471.0 374.8 172.8 TOTAL $4,705.5 $4,039.3 $3,348.7 LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING Mr. Bevill. By laboratory, identify.the number of FTE's funded in the weapons program for each year since 1980, al.so provide total laboratory funding for each laboratory by year. Dr. Reis. The FTE information and total laboratory funding for each laboratory by year is shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS LLNL LANL SNL TOTAL 1980 3,457 2,766 3,778 10,001 1981 3,705 2,964 3,739 10,408 1982 3,704 3,000 3,806 10,510 1983 3,957 3,015 3,883 10,855 1984 3,889 3,082 3,914 10,885 1985 3,970 3,099 4,122 11,191 1986 3,757 2,956 3,953 10,666 1987 4,240 3,016 3,899 11,155 1988 3,841 2,853 3,676 10,370 1989 3,742 2,645 3,606 9,993 1990 3,550 2,585 3,632 9,767 1991 3,156 2,421 3,134 8,711 1992 3,322 2,441 3,480 9,243 1993 3,133 2,744 3,158 9,035 1994 est. 2,872 1,850 2,899 7,621 1995 est. 2,589 1,770 2,845 7,204 LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OPERATING FUNDING (Dollars in Millions) LLNL LANL SNL TOTAL 1980 $145.1 $125.1 $213.3 $483.5 1981 181.5 154.3 148.0 483.8 1982 216.0 193.8 290.1 699.9 1983 235.2 215.5 316.5 767.2 19'84 310.6 283.1 378.1 971.8 1985 356.2 309.9 421.4 1,087.6 1986 373.5 304.3 427.2 1,105.0 1987 319.8 292.0 433.8 1,045.6 1988 314.6 287.8 444.0 1,046.4 1989 342:0 291.2 464.6 1,097.8 1990 366.1 307.7 467.0 1,140.8 1991 347.4 291.7 465.8 1,104.9 1992 374.8 323.6 506.1 1,204.5 1993 386.0 364.4 472.2 1,222.6 1994 est. 340.4 282.5 435.5 1,058.4 1995 est. 318.9 270.6 402.4 991.9 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING Mr. Bevill. Please provide a detailed breakout of activities and associated costs funded using DOD funds by individual DOE laboratory for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995. Dr. Reis: The DOE laboratories provide DOD technological support utilizing unique facilities and technical capabilities. Examples of activities include: defense systems research, advanced conventional munitions research, armor/anti-armor research, defense nuclear research, arms control and verification research, security systems development, weapons related experiments and tests, and environmental studies for restoration of facilities, subsurface detection technology research, computer code development and analysis, materials research, weapons related training materials, reentry vehicle technology, weapon trainers, miscellaneous weapons related hardware development, and advanced manufacturing technologies. DOD funding by laboratory is shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Actual Estimated Estimated Obligations Obligations Obligations Los Alamos National $ 137.5M $ 116.6M $ 100.0M Laboratory Sandia National $ 315.2M $ 285.7M $ 285.7M Laboratories Lawrence Livermore $ 149.6M $ 131.4M $ 98.3M National Laboratory Total $ 602.3M $ 533.7M $ 484.0M RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING Mr. Bevill: Provide a breakout by location of FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995 funding,for weapons RD&T by program element. Dr. Reis: A breakout by location of FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995 funding for Weapons Research, Development and Testing is shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) ****Research, Development & Testing FY 1993 by Site by Program Element chart is attached to original document**** WEAPONS ACTIVITIES Mr. Bevill. Please describe the system and explain the need for all weapons systems currently in Phase I and Phase 2 of weapons development. Dr. Reis. The Department of Energy is not participating in any Phase I studies. There are two Phase 2 studies, High Power Radio Frequency (HPRF) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Replacement Warhead. The purpose of the HPRF study is to determine the feasibility of developing a non-lethal, ICBM-delivered, and nuclear-driven HPRF device intended to damage electronics and/or electrical components. This study was approved and requested by the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Committee based on the results of the previous HPRF Phase I study. The Air Force was requested to lead the study with DOE as a participant. U.S. Air Force Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command are the intended customers for this device and fully support the Air Force and DOE in their efforts. The Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Replacement Warhead Phase 2 Study is essentially complete. The Navy Strategic Systems Program Office (SSP) will issue the final report after briefing the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Committee. The Navy requested the SLBM study to identify and quantify technical alternatives to the MK4/W76 and MK5/W88 reentry systems. The Navy requested the study because of the expected long stockpile lifetime for SLBM warheads and to explore safety enhancements that may be desirable in the enduring stockpile. While both the W76 and the W88 are safe, neither has the most modern safety features of Insensitive High Explosive (IHE) or Fire Resistant Pits (FRP). NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list by type and number of warheads of the total nuclear weapons stockpile in FY 1993 and proposed for each year through FY 2003. Dr. Reis. The stockpile plan is approved only through Fiscal Year 1999. The table below provides the information requested for this period. NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE DATA (END OF FY) FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 ACTIVE STOCKPILE B53 STRATEGIC BOMB B61-3 NONSTRAT BOMB B61-4 NONSTRAT BOMB B61-7 STRATEGIC BOMB Deleted Deleted B61-10 NONSTRAT BOMB W62 MINUTEMAN III W69 SRAM A W76 TRIDENT C4 W78 MINUTEMAN III W80-0 SUB CRUISE MSL W80-1 AIR CRUISE MSL B83 STRATEGIC BOMB W87 PEACEKEEPER W88 TRIDENT D5 ACTIVE TOTAL INACTIVE STOCKPILE Deleted Deleted NUCLEAR WEAPON RETIREMENTS Mr. Bevill. Describe the DOD nuclear weapons retirement program in FY 1994 and FY 1995. Provide a list showing the type and number of warhead systems proposed to be retired each year through 2003. Dr. Reis. The Department of Defense is planning to retire fewer weapons than in the recent past because many facets of previous Presidential nuclear initiatives (such as retirement of all ground-launched nuclear weapons) have been Implemented. However, the stockpile plan is approved only through Fiscal Year 1999. Thus, the table below provides information only for FY 1993-1999, NUCLEAR WEAPON RETIREMENTS FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 B53 STRATEGIC BOMB W56 MINUTEMAN II B57-2 NONSTRAT BOMB B61-0 NONSTRAT BOMB B61-2 NONSTRAT BOMB Deleted Deleted B61-3 NONSTRAT BOMB B61-4 NONSTRAT BOMB B61-5 NONSTRAT BOMB B61-7 STRATEGIC BOMB B61-10 NONSTRAT BOMB W62 MINUTEMAN III W68 POSEIDON W69 SRAM A W76 TRIDENT C4 W78 MINUTEMAN III W80-0 SUB CRUISE MSL W80-1 AIR CRUISE MSL Deleted Deleted B83 STRATEGIC BOMB W84 GROUND CRUISE MSL W87 PEACEKEEPER W88 TRIDENT D5 RETIREMENT TOTAL WEAPON DISMANTLEMENT Mr. Bevill. How many weapons have been disassembled at Pantex by year since FY 1988, and how many are scheduled for FY 1994 and FY 1995? Dr. Reis: Quantities of disassembled weapons by year are: Fiscal Year Disposals 1988 581 1989 1,208 1990 1,154 1991 1,595 1992 1,856 1993 1,556 In FY 1994 and 1995, we plan to dismantle 2,000 weapons each year. PANTEX ANALYTICAL LABORATORY Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the proposed Pantex Analytical Laboratory? Are funds included in FY 1995 for this activity? Dr. Reis, The Department sees a real benefit in having a National Resource Center for Plutonium located in the Amarillo area to interpret for the public, and especially for the State of Texas, information on the environmental and biological effects of plutonium, high explosives, and hazardous materials generated from nuclear weapons assembly and dismantlement. Also, research on international controls of fissile material and evaluation of fission options for plutonium disposition. Currently, the Department is exploring the concept and approach for the establishment and operation of the Center, and we expect to reach a decision on the approach in the near future. We will advise the Committee when this occurs and the source of funding is identified. VEHICLE REPLACEMENT Mr. Bevill. Justify the need for replacing 22 police-type vehicles. Dr. Reis. We are seeking to replace 22 vehicles configured with a Police Package for use by the Safeguards and Security Department, Protective Services Division, at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. These units will replace Security Police Officer patrol/response vehicles that are currently under lease until the end of FY 1994. Due to the age and maintenance costs of the leased vehicles, it will be more efficient to purchase new vehicles than the currently leased vehicles. Police-type vehicles continue to be needed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the protection of Defense Programs assets at the facility. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING Mr. Bevill. Describe the nonproliferation activities funded in this program and explain why they are not included in the Department's arms control and nonproliferation budget. Dr. Reis: As part of our effort to make the Research and Development budget justification more accurately descriptive of the work performed by the laboratories in support of the weapons program, certain high priority, high visibility programs were broken out as separate activities within Research and Development. Among these Programs and Initiatives is N-PACTA, Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Threat Assessment. N-PACTA is a relatively small activity, $11.7 million in FY 1994 and $6.4 million in FY 1995, but because of the high priority the Congress and the President are placing on nonproliferation activities we have chosen to highlight it. The activities collected within this category are not duplicative of the activities funded within the Materials Support and Other Defense Programs account. Rather, they are concentrated around nuclear weapons design-specific engineering and technology concepts and issues, and therefore a part of the R&D budget. In general, these activities are activities which are captured by the Department's Nonproliferation crosscut but which do not fall under the purview of the Office of NonProliferation and National Security because the requirement for these activities is driven by the.needs of the U.S. stockpile, as opposed to the need to monitor non-U.S. weapons activities. Specifically, the activities within the N-PACTA category either are activities that are necessary for the Weapons Research and Development program to meet its responsibilities and fit under a broad definition of nonproliferation, such as international device design assessments, military implication assessments, and limited R&D efforts to guard against technology surprise; or they are efforts in support of the Department's treaty negotiation efforts which utilize the weapons program's unique talents and capabilities, such as technical support for the nuclear test talks. In no case does this category support activities which should be, or are, funded through the Materials Support and Other Defense Programs account which is primarily involved in the monitoring of non-U.S. weapons stockpile activities. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Bevill: Has the rationale for this program changed since the U.S. ceased nuclear weapons testing? Dr. Reis.: The rationale for the Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) program has strengthened with the advent of the nuclear test moratorium. ICF offers a laboratory environment similar conceptually in many respects to nuclear weapons. The cessation of nuclear weapons testing has increased the importance of all types of aboveground experimental facilities in maintaining the stockpile. Further, cessation of U.S. nuclear testing has enhanced the role of the ICF program in supporting the National Security Strategic Plan (NSSP). The ICF program supports the NSSP by providing nuclear-weapon related data as well as helping to maintain and enhance nuclear weapon expertise. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Bevill: What is the status of the review of the classification policy as it pertains to the Inertial Fusion program? Dr. Reis: On December 7, 1993, Secretary O'Leary announced declassifications in several areas. One of these was the declassification of major parts of the Inertial Fusion program. Interim classification guidance has been sent to the participating laboratories, and a classification guide is nearing completion. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Bevill. What is the FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995 funding proposed for each laboratory and facility in the Inertial Fusion program? Please provide the breakout by program; i.e. glass laser, gas laser, and pulsed power. Dr. Reis. Funding proposed for each laboratory and facility in the Inertial Fusion program is contained in the following table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) INERTIAL FUSION FUNDING BY PROGRAM (Dollars in Thousands) FY 1993 FY 1994 ADJ. ADJ. FY 1995 APPROP APPROP REQUEST Operating Expenses Indirect Drive (Glass Laser) Oakland/NIF * 6,000 6,000 LLNL 89,928 77,627 79,267 LANL 18,078 16,546 16,692 SNL 840 1,500 Direct Drive (Glass Laser) Oakland - University of Rochester 15,590 14,950 13,000 Total Glass 124,436 $115,123 $116,459 KrF Laser (Gas Laser) LANL 2,462 1,800 0 Oakland/NRL 9,157 7,250 8,000 Total Gas $ 11,619 $ 9,050 $ 8,000 Light Ion Beams (Pulsed Power) SNL 28,410 25,921 25,559 Capsule Fabrication & Development Supporting Activities LANL 4,260 3,973 4,087 SNL 645 900 1,550 Oakland Operations General Atomics 9,519 9,000 9,000 KMS Fusion 3,838 ** Headquarters/Other 2,411 1,400 2,100 Total Supporting Activities 16,835 19,111 16,737 Total Operating Expenses $181,300 $169,205 $166,755 Capital Equipment LLNL $ 3,500 $ 3,560 $ 3,800 LANL 800 400 400 SNL 1,400 900 700 Oakland/General Atomics 500 300 0 Naval Research Laboratory 400 450 0 University of Rochester 23,410 9,950 4,818 Oakland Operations Office 1,000 300 0 Total Capital Equipment $ 31,010 $ 15,860 $ 9,718 TOTAL INERTIAL FUSION $212,310 $185,065 $176,473 * NIF conceptual design funding distributed as follows in FY 1993: LLNL, $4,000; LANL, $1,000; and SNL, $1,000. ** Includes Internal Reprogramming of $838,000 from the R&D program. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Bevill. At the same level of detail as the previous question, provide a chart showing for FY 1994 the original budget request, the appropriated amount, the application of any general reduction, or use of prior year balances, the application of any reduction of funding used for the KMS settlement, the application of any reduction for NIF conceptual design costs, and any other funding reductions. Dr. Reis. The difference between the ICF budget request and the appropriated amount was the realignment of funding to provide an additional $1,000,000 for the University of Rochester, $3,000,000 associated with the KMS Fusion, Inc., settlement, and a reduction of $4,186,000 for contractor salary savings. There was no use of prior year balances and the funds for NIF conceptual design were included in our budget request. The information is shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) ****The FY 1994 INERTIAL CONFINEMENT FUSION FUNDING chart is attached to original document**** INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Bevill. Describe the accomplishments of the Inertial Fusion program in FY 1993, and describe program plans by individual laboratory and facility for FY 1994 and FY 1995. Dr. Reis. In FY 1993, ihe Inertial Fusion program (ICF) obtained DOE approval of mission need (Key Decision 0) for the National Ignition Facility (NIF) and began the Conceptual Design. Precision Nova improvements to the Nova laser were completed allowing the beginning of precision experiments of the Nova Technical Contract (NTC). The NTC contributes to the scientific readiness to proceed with the NIF. Further NTC experiments leading to scientific readiness have been positive. Construction of the Omega Upgrade glass laser at the University of Rochester and the Nike gas laser at the Naval Research Laboratory proceeded in a timely manner. The light-ion program at Sandia National Laboratories was reviewed by the Inertial Confinement Fusion Advisory Committee (ICFAC) and subsequent milestones were pursued. A brief description of plans for FY 1994 and FY 1995 by laboratory and facility is shown in a chart which I would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:) LLNL - Complete NTC and continue NIF target design work, complete Beamlet laser, and complete NIF Conceptual Design. LANL - Complete NTC and continue NIF target design work. Close out Mercury KrF laser project. SNL - Continue light-ion beam focusing research on PBFA-II and produce 100 eV hohlraum temperatures by March 1995. Continue efforts to demonstrate light-ion beam accelerator as "target-qualified" driver. UR/LLE - Complete Omega Upgrade laser and begin direct-drive spherical implosion experiments. NRL - Complete Nike KrF laser and begin direct-drive planar-foil experiments. GA/WJSA - Provide target-fabrication support to the ICF laboratories. Develop cryogenic target fabrication techniques. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the National Ignition Facility, including funding and milestones for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995. Dr. Reis. The Secretary of Energy, serving as the Acquisition Executive for the Energy Systems Acquisition Advisory Board, approved the Key Decision Zero (KD-O, Approval of Mission Need) for the National Ignition Facility on January 15, 1993. In the approval letter, the Secretary constrained the cost of the conceptual design effort to $12 million. The funding is planned as follows: FY 1993 ($6 million) and FY 1994 ($6 million). The Conceptual Design will be completed and a report issued in April 1994. The next major milestone of the NIF is the request for Key Decision One (KD-l, Approval of New Start), currently scheduled for May 25, 1994. In FY 1994 and FY 1995, following approval of KD-l, a modest advanced conceptual design effort, will proceed in anticipation of a line item approval in FY 1996. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Bevill: What is the status of the closeout of the KMS program? Please describe the remaining issues to be resolved. Dr. Reis: All of the property and facilities-related issues have now been resolved with KMS Fusion, Inc., (KMS). On January 14, 1994, KMS turned over to the Department occupancy and control of the KMS facility in Ann Arbor, Michigan, along with all of the inertial confinement fusion equipment, systems, and other property contained within that facility. The Department paid KMS $2.2 million as part of the settlement agreement. The Department is proceeding with removal and redeployment of the Government-owned equipment. This will be followed by decontamination and decommissioning of the facility and its return to the landlord for unrestricted use. The Department will also focus on resolving the remaining administrative and contractual issues with KMS in order to close out the KMS contract. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Bevill: What performance measures should the Committee use to evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness of this program? Dr. Reis: The Congress should use performance measures related to the accomplishment of the strategic goals of this program. For FY 1995, these would be (1) whether the DOE has made a decision to proceed with the construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and (2) completion of the OMEGA Upgrade project on cost and schedule. Within Defense Programs, we will use numerous other performance measures in support of those major measures mentioned above. For example, contributing to whether the DOE decides to proceed with the NIF we will consider the following other performance measures: operation of the NOVA laser and experimental results; operation of PBFA-II and results; target fabrication techniques developed in support of NIF regimes; and successes in computational codes. The NOVA Technical Contract in place with LLNL is a good example of our approach to performance measurement. Specific programmatic objectives and milestones are negotiated and agreed between the contractor and the program office, and are programmed and monitored over a number of years. Technical contracts are also in place for Sandia and the University of Rochester; we are currently developing technical contracts for the other the participants in the inertial confinement fusion program as well. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION Mr. Bevill. What is the current status of the nuclear and nonnuclear weapons complex reconfiguration? Dr. Reis. The Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement is being prepared. for the nuclear portion of the reconfiguration program. The draft PEIS will be available for public review by March 1995. This will include the Department's preferred alternative for the technology and location for a new tritium supply. A Finding of No Significant Impact was issued September 8, 1993, on the Environmental Assessment for nonnuclear consolidation. Implementation has proceeded with the donor sites working on inventory builds to support the enduring stockpile and the transfer of equipment, people, and records to the receiver sites. In FY 1995, process qualification at the receiver sites will begin with all qualifications to be completed by the end of FY 1999. The engineering design work associated with the facility modifications at the receiver sites is proceeding on schedule. We expect to have about 40 percent of facilities design and construction activity completed by the end of FY 1995. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION Mr. Bevill. What funding is allocated to nuclear versus nonnuclear reconfiguration activities in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995? Dr. Reis. Funding for reconfiguration activities for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995 is shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) Reconfiguration Activities ($ in thousands) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Operating Expense Program Direction $ 3,875 $ 3,850 $ 5,600 Program Support (PEIS Support) $ 66,131 $ 58,081 $ 9,671 Nonnuclear Consolidation $ 56,499 $ 65,100 $ 79,000 Nuclear Reconfiguration $ 20,555 $ 11,150 $ 0 Nuclear Material Disposition $ 0 $ 30,000 $ 0 Total Operating Expense $147,060 $168,181 $ 94,271 Construction Nonnuclear Consolidation $ 26,000 $ 25,000 $ 58,000 Total Obligational Authority $173,060 $193,181 $152,271 Use of prior year balances $ 0 $-41,000 $ -6,765 New Budget Authority $173,060 $152,181 $145,506 NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current process for preparation of the Programmatic EIS on the future nuclear weapons complex including funding and milestones. Dr. Reis. In preparing the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS), the Department published a revised Notice of Intent in the Federal Register in July 1993 describing the scope of the PEIS. Twelve public scoping meetings were held near the weapons complex sites in September and October 1993. A revised Reconfiguration PEIS Implementation Plan will be issued this summer based on the public's comments, budget realities, and workscope projections. The environmental analysis and the Department's preferred alternatives will be set forth in a draft PEIS by March 1995. Following a series of public hearings held near each of the candidate sites, the PEIS will be placed in final form by the end of the year. A Record of Decision will be issued about 30 days following the issuance of the final PEIS. Approximately $85 million will be costed in FY 1994 and although the pending Reconfiguration budget request contains minimal funding for these activities in FY 1995, it is expected that savings can be achieved in FY 1994 to provide for a total of approximately $26 million for environmental analysis, feasibility studies, and cost estimates of the options to support the Record of Decision. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION Mr. Bevill. Please describe the process for nonnuclear consolidation including activities to be performed in FY 1994 and FY 1995 and associated costs. Dr. Reis. The donor sites are now working on inventory builds required to support the enduring stockpile. When these are finished, equipment, people, and records that are also required to support the enduring stockpile will be transferred to the receiver sites. After the transfer has been made, the equipment will undergo process qualification to assure that it will operate within specifications. The engineering design work associated with the facility modifications at the receiver sites is proceeding on schedule. Following design and construction modifications the equipment will be placed in service. Twenty- five activity transfer groups were created to develop the detailed plans. Each group will proceed as the plans and modifications are ready, thus a combination of design, modifications, transfer of equipment and people and process qualification will be occurring within each of the next few years. All qualifications are scheduled to be complete by the end of FY 1999. The costs for FY 1994 are anticipated to be approximately $120 million. Part of this cost will be from FY 1993 funds that were carried over due to the completion of the Environmental Assessment late in the fiscal year. The requested funding for nonnuclear reconfiguration for FY 1995 is $137 million. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION Mr. Bevill. Describe the Defense Programs activities at Rocky Flats, Mound, and Pinellas in FY,1994 and FY 1995. Dr. Reis. Inventory builds in support of the enduring stockpile are occurring at all three plants. All Defense Programs production will cease not later than the end of FY 1994 at the three plants. Preliminary work is underway for transferring the facilities from Defense Programs to Environmental Restoration and Waste Management within the Department. Following the completion of the production activity the equipment will be prepared for transfer to the receiver sites. Most of the transfer activity will occur in FY 1995. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. Please list the technology transfer activities which will be conducted by each laboratory in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995, including funding for each task. Dr. Reis. The attached sheets identify the Defense Programs technology transfer activities that are being conducted at Defense Programs laboratories and production facilities. Individual projects are grouped into major technical activity categories that support laboratory and facility core competencies. The FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995 funding associated with the activities is shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) ****DP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACTIVITIES Chart is attached to original document**** EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. Describe the performance measurements which the Committee should use next year to evaluate the effectiveness of this program? Dr. Reis. Program effectiveness should be based upon the ability to meet stated program objectives. The objectives listed below and their respective program metrics should be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Defense Programs Technology Transfer Program. 1. Leveraged WR&D Dollars. An increase in leveraged weapons research and development dollars from a baseline value at the end of FY 1994. 2. Quality of Existing Partnerships. An improving trend in customer (industry) satisfaction as measured by a customer feedback survey. 3. R&D Investment. An increasing percentage of private sector cost-share. 4. Access to Facilities. Increased ability to access Defense Programs Laboratories and Facilities as evidenced by: the establishment of new Deployment User Facilities; and, increasing ease of access as reported by a customer feedback survey. 5. Process Improvements. Continued improvements in the technology transfer process as evidenced by: a reduction in the time to negotiate and implement a technology transfer activity; and increasing quality of the collaborative processes as reported by a customer feedback survey. 6. Industrial Partner Impacts. Increasing positive impacts reported by industrial,partners in areas such as: productivity; profitability; job retention/creation; product development; processes improvement; market share increases; patents generated; licenses granted; and royalty income. While the above shows actual program measurements to evaluate program performance, a number of other activities are taking place in the Department to measure the output of DOE's technology transfer programs. The Secretary has established an inter-program group to establish a process to measure the output of the broad range of DOE technology transfer activities. A program has been developed and will be implemented to collect technology transfer output and impacts data from all of the Departments technology transfer programs. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FUNDS Mr. Bevill. How do you ensure that these funds are not used to fund projects which have been turned down by other DOE program organizations? Dr. Reis. Defense Programs has implemented a process to ensure that projects which have been turned down by other DOE program organizations are not funded. This process is implemented prior to the actual selection of the project for funding. While the technical review of the projects are being performed, the Office of Economic Competitiveness assembles a review panel comprised of representatives of other program offices. This includes representatives from Energy and Efficiency, Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Energy Research, Nuclear Energy, and Fossil Energy. This review panel evaluates the projects to determine whether the project was rejected by that program office, or-complements or overlaps similar projects currently being funded. This not only enables us to evaluate whether a project has technical merit, but also allows us to coordinate the project with other program offices where it makes sense. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER SUCCESS Mr. Bevill. How would you characterize the success of this program to date, and what lessons have been learned to improve future partnerships? Dr. Reis. The program has been very successful to date in benefits accrued to both the private sector and the weapons complex. Over 200 dual benefit projects have been funded since this program began in FY 1990. During FY 1993, the National Security Economic Competitiveness Program (NSECP) funded 88 new projects with a total cost sharing of about $200 million. During FY 1994, the NSECP is using $218 million to fund projects in Major Programs which include the American Textile Industry Partnership, National Center for Manufacturing Sciences, USCAR, SEMATEC and lithography, as well as partnerships with industry at DP laboratories and facilities in the form of CRADAs, and other technology transfer mechanisms. New Deployment User Facilities also have recently been implemented including one at the Sandia National Laboratory (Electronics Quality and Reliability Center) and one at the Mound, Plant (Manufacturing Technology Deployment Center). These centers will facilitate access by outside industry to available technologies through the use of pre-approved user facility agreements that can be implemented in days rather than months. A user facility program previously approved by Defense Programs at the Y-12 facility has allowed for assistance to over 700 small business and academia in the past year of operation. The following are examples of issues that have been addressed to improve future partnerships. In the past, misunderstandings have arisen between the Department of Energy, the laboratories, and our industrial partners because issues regarding the technical, funding, and conditions of the agreement had not been addressed early in the process. Presently, great emphasis is being given to up-front discussions with industry to allow for potential problems to be identified and resolved early. We have also learned that our partnership agreements will have greatest leverage on U.S. competitiveness and more benefits to the weapons complex if they are focused on specific technological areas. Defense Programs will be targeting specific technical areas via focused calls that will enhance the core competencies and technological infrastructure necessary to meet the DOE National Security mission, and will also advance industrial competitiveness- and economic security through satisfying industry needs identified in industry specific technology "road maps". A number of industrial advisory boards have been created to provide an industrial focus to the technology transfer program. Another lesson learned has been that in many instances industry does not distinguish between governmental agencies. They see the federal government as a single entity. Consequently, better ties are needed between similar programs within the federal government. To meet this need, numerous joint partnerships with the Departments of Defense, Energy and Commerce have been formed. An example of this is the National Machine Tools Partnership which combines the Machine Tool expertise of the Department of Energy with the manufacturing extension capabilities of the Department of Commerce to reach out to those business needing &his type of assistance. I have provided for the record a number of more specific examples of technology transfer program successes. (The information follows:) EXAMPLES OF RECENT DP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROGRAM SUCCESSES o During September 1993 approximately $5 million worth of technology transfer projects from the Defense Programs weapons and materials production facilities were approved. These twenty-two projects from the Mound, Pinellas, Rocky Flats, Pantex, Nevada Test Site, Kansas City Plant, and the Savannah River Site were selected from 51 submitted proposals. o Defense Programs provided $12 million to support activities that develop non-defense uses for the sites, technologies, and workforces at Mound, Rocky Flats, and Pinellas production facilities to help mitigate the effects of phasing out the weapons missions. The funding was used to assist the community through technology-based activities to promote local economic development, with the goal to make new, innovative use of facilities, equipment, employee skills, or deploy technologies to the local area that create new commercial products, processes, or services. o The weapons laboratories have implemented a program to provide technical assistance to the machine tool industry under the National Machine Tool Initiative. The objectives are to enhance the research and development efforts and technical capabilities of the machine tool industry. During FY 1993, approximately 900 companies made inquiries and approximately 500 projects were initiated to provide technical assistance. o An improved machining system which can cut hard-to-machine materials to new levels of accuracy and precision has been developed through a CRADA between the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and a small business, Industrial Tools Inc. The system can be used to slice materials such as ceramics, carbides, glass, and plastics twice as accurately as the company's earlier machining system. Manufacturers of computer disk drives will be able to use the machine to more accurately manufacture disk-drive heads made from carbide materials. The technology can also be used by the U.S. semiconductor industry for slicing silicon wafers and has applications in the defense and aerospace industries as well as the medical equipment field. Industrial Tools Incorporated has forecast about $25 million in revenue over the next five years from the improved machining system. Six systems have already been sold to computer disk-drive makers. o Sandia National Laboratories and Rockwell International Corporation have collaborated on a CRADA to develop sensor-based controls to address methods of precisely locating workpiece features in small lot manufacturing. The Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell manufactures Delta rocket booster engines consisting of hundreds of brazed tubes. Automation of the brazing process is being developed. A non-contact sensor has been developed and combined with software control algorithms to produce a successful control solution to problems associated with the brazing process. The automated process combines the precise motion control of a robot with precision braze dispensing equipment. Based on the success of the sensor and control system, Rocketdyne will begin to move this technology to the production floor in FY 1994. Work is underway to locate a commercial supplier to produce the sensor. A patent application was filed in March 1993. o Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant, in collaboration with Coors Ceramics Company, Caterpillar, Diacraft Corporation and Landis Corporation continued work to provide improved manufacturing methods, precision inspection techniques, and materials characterization for ceramic materials used in a variety of applications, particularly for internal combustion engine components. Improved machining and inspection techniques and improved substrate manufacturing processes have been developed and incorporated into the existing production processes. o The DOE's Defense Programs and Allied Signal Corporation, Kansas City Division, have cooperated on a Regional Technology Outreach Development Program for small and medium-sized businesses. The program, which is designed to provide technical assistance to businesses in Kansas City and surrounding regions, helped more than 400 companies in FY,1993. A similar program with Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant has provided technical assistance to small and medium-sized businesses throughout Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) region. Another agreement has been signed with the state of Florida which will provide technical assistance throughout that state in the near future. o Federal law mandates the reduction of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and other pollutants caused by automobile exhaust. The National Laboratories at Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos together with Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant are participating in a maj,or effort to help GM, Chrysler, and Ford solve the "lean-burn" catalyst problem. Catalysts could easily be developed using very expensive metals which are resistant to corrosion, but the cost would be prohibitive. Technologies are being developed to make catalysts effective and rugged yet also affordable. Currently, both the materials and processes used to manufacture the final products are being studied. o The weapons laboratories in partnership with industry are developing advanced lithography technology that will leapfrog foreign competition to help the U.S. recapture the integrated circuit (IC) production market. The program goals are to develop a compact, cost-effective soft x-ray (140 angstrom wavelength) projection lithography technology that is readily compatible with existing IC production systems. Soft x-ray lithography will extend the fabrication of IC feature sizes to less than 0.1 millionth of a meter. Decreasing IC feature size significantly increases the computing power of microprocessors and memory capacity of solid-state memories such as DRAMS. In Defense Programs' lithography program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National Laboratory are teamed with a host of industrial partners -- AT&T, Grumman, Ultratech Stepper, KLA, Tropel, Intel, AMD, Micrion, and Jamar -- representing the wide range of technologies needed to successfully develop and establish a premier x-ray projection lithography capability in the United States. o The National Laboratories of DOE's Defense Programs, in partnership with industry, are developing advanced flat panel display (FPD) technology that will outpace foreign competition to help the U.S. gain a competitive position in the international flat panel display market. Projects at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National Laboratory are addressing field emission, plasma, and electroluminescent display technologies and the associated manufacturing processes. Facilities and expertise resident in the laboratories provide indepth computer modeling, materials processes, and analysis capabilities that enable industry to proceed toward commercialization of FPD technologies at greatly reduced technical risk. Defense Programs' FPD program will be expanded in FY 1994 to include a greater segment of the industry and contribute more aggressively in the development of advanced phosphor and electroluminescent materials. o To help meet the critical challenges facing the electronics industry, the Defense Programs' National Laboratories are working with industry to maintain, and in some areas to regain, a competitive U.S. position in the international electronics market. Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Y-12 Production Facility at Oak Ridge are working with industry in small feature size (less than 0.25 micrometer) integrated circuit fabrication processes and materials, high density interconnections, contamination-free manufacturing, modeling of semiconductor physics and manufacturing methods, and advanced opto-electronics technology. A key element of the Defense Programs' project is a joint program with SEMATECH. Defense Programs' activities in microelectronics and photonics are responsive to an Industry Advisory Board and adhere to the Semiconductor Industry Association and the Optoelectronics Industry Development Association (OIDA) Industry Roadmaps. Defense Programs coordinates with other government electronics programs, primarily the Advanced Research Project Agency and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, to ensure that its effort is well coordinated with the government's overall role in maintaining a strong U.S. position in microelectronics and photonics. o Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos,, Sandia National Laboratories and the Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant have been working on an initiative to develop information technology critical to the National Information Infrastructure (NII). This,initiative consolidated ongoing technology transfer work that supports the NII and has also started work with the gas and oil industrial sector. The intent is to develop information technologies for the gas and oil industry that will be useful to other industrial sectors such as manufacturing, health care and financial services. The gas and oil NII initiative has established a testbed working on seven information technologies: networking, data security, visualization, mass data storage, computer input/output, distributed computing and collaborative tools. The first application to be used on the testbed will be the development of a synthetic, three-dimensional seismic data set usable across a network. Key facets of the project were demonstrated at the Supercomputer 1993 Conference. Industrial partners include Amoco, Schlumberger and the Society of Exploration Geophysicists. o A collaboration between Sandia National Laboratories and a small business, BIOSYM Technologies, under the sponsorship of Defense Programs has developed a commercial software package to allow the molecular engineering of polymer alloys. This software models the molecular interaction of polymers thus providing accurate predictions of alloy performance. BIOSYM has released a preliminary version on the commercial software that won a 1992 R&D 100 award. o Los Alamos National Laboratory has established the Computational Testbed for Industry (CTI), a DOE user facility thai provides U.S. industry with convenient access to the world-class computational capabilities of the laboratory. The CTI allows industry and national laboratory interests to support one another in many disciplines such as applied mathematics, atomic and nuclear physics, seismology, fluid dynamics, and materials and structures, among others. A number of industrial partners have already signed agreements to use the CTI including Dow Chemical, Schlumberger, and BIOSYM. o Sandia, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories as well as the Y-12 Plant under the sponsorship of Defense Programs, are working on the development of technologies of the gigabit networks. One such activity recently installed desktop video teleconferencing capabilities at several AT&T XUNET sites. Desktop video teleconferencing utilizes Sandia National Laboratories' Distributed Audio Video Environment (DAVE). This environment allows video teleconferencing to be set up in a manner similar to installing a home stereo system by combining a variety of modules. o Two major thrust areas were identified for the application of advanced materials to benefit both the Defense Programs' weapons research, development and test program, and key industrial sectors. A series of integrated CRADAs between the Martin Marietta Energy Systems Y-12 Plant, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories and the automobile industry were initiated to develop lightweight materials for automotive applications. A second series of CRADAs is being negotiated with aircraft engine manufacturers for the development and implementation of advanced materials for the aerospace industry. Based on the acknowledged expertise of the Defense Programs' national laboratories in metal alloy design, development and processing, several other CRADAs are under way in modeling and development of process control systems for metal forming, joining, heat-treating, and processing for primary and specialty metals. o The Specialty Metals Processing Consortium continued another successful year of collaboration with the Sandia National Laboratories, conducting R&D at the Liquid Metal Processing Laboratory to improve process control technology for the melting processes for important defense- related metals such as titanium and nickel alloys. Using onboard computers and analytical equipment in a specially modified truck, formerly used to transport weapons, Sandia researchers also visited consortium members to gather research data to assist productivity improvements at member-owned production facilities. o Sandia National Laboratories has been collaborating with a major U.S. manufacturer on an intelligent processing system to control distortion in thin-section welded assemblies. The system integrates material response and thermo-mechanical models, advanced sensors and image processing technology, and on-line controls to predict and provide real-time control for weld quality. Sandia also collaborated with a specialty metals producer to develop and test a commercially appropriate welding technology for advanced borated stainless steels used in structural applications. Although the technical objectives for the first phase of this CRADA were successfully accomplished, the industrial partner made a business-based decision not to commercialize this class of alloys. Despite the early termination, the accomplishments will be valuable to the weapons R&D program in the development of a welding process for advanced particulate-loaded metals. o Through a CRADA with a U.S. manufacturer of electronic instrumentation and communication systems, the Los Alamos National Laboratory used unique materials characterization capabilities to perform low- temperature heat capacity measurements to assist the development of an advanced cryocooler. The success of this effort will contribute to advances in communications systems and instrumentation being pursued through other CRADAs with Defense Programs' laboratories. The CRADA also resulted in the transfer of materials measurement techniques to the graduate engineering department of a major university. Los Alamos also assisted a small manufacturer in the development an automated pulsed laser deposition system with superior processing performance and reproducibility. The system will provide the capability for thin-film deposition applicable to many advanced materials used in microelectronics devices. o The Defense Programs Small Business Initiative (SBI) involves Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge and focuses on the manufacturing and advanced-technology development segments of the small business community. For Fiscal Year 1993, the SBI was funded at $8 million. The SBI consists of the following four basic but interrelated program elements: -Technical Assistance While Technical Assistance can take a variety of forms, typically the DOE facilities respond to specific needs of small businesses by providing technical consultation, technical information, and/or access to specialized or unique facilities for evaluation of new processes or equipment. Technical Assistance may be provided by a one-on-one relationship with a small business, via a small business association or consortium, or through the use of an intermediary whose purpose is to assist with the technology transfer process. Technical assistance efforts expend less than $5K in DOE funds per request. -Partnership Agreements When requests for technical assistance from small businesses exceed the constraints of short-term assistance, it may be beneficial for the small business firm to enter into a collaborative Partnership Agreement with the DOE facility. These agreements can serve a variety of purposes and can include cooperative research and development agreements (CRADA), technology licensing, longer-term technical assistance, and user facility agreements. Partnership Agreements are limited to less than $50 K in DOE funding per agreement. -Relationships with Intermediaries Intermediaries can be organizations, such as state and local government, universities and community colleges, not-for-profit- economic development organizations, small business development centers, and business incubators. These intermediaries facilitate the process of transferring technology to small businesses by providing outreach to and needs-identification for small businesses. They link the small businesses and the DOE facilities by pre-qualifying requests for technical assistance and partnerships, forecasting and analyzing the requirements of small businesses and providing periodic feedback and evaluation of the effectiveness of program results and opportunities for,improvement. Less than 10 percent of the total program dollars shall be used for intermediary relationships. -Facility Utilization Facilities and equipment at the DOE locations involved in the SBI represent significant resources that can be utilized by small businesses for hands-on training to acquire special skills, for building one-of-a-kind prototype products, or for use in developing a special or unique technology or process that will help improve their economic competitiveness and survival. This component of the SBI encourages the establishment of such facilities by identifying existing infrastructure that could have commercial benefit. PERCENTAGES OF FUNDS USED Mr. Bevill. What percentage of the funds in FY 1994 and FY 1995 are used to fund mortgages and what percentage for new projects? Dr. Reis. The percentage of the FY 1994 funds estimated to be used for mortgages is 65 percent. The percentage used for new projects is 35 percent. The majority of the new project funds have been committed to an area such as National Machine Tool Initiative, Small Business, or Lithography. The percentage of the FY 1995 funds estimated to be used for mortgages is 80 percent. The percentage to be used for new projects is 20 percent, all of which have been committed to an area such as National Machine Tool Initiative, Small Business, or Lithography. LABORATORY-DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (LDRD) Mr. Bevill. What amounts are included for the discretionary funding of the laboratory directors for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995? By laboratory, please provide the amount of funding provided and the percentage of total funding allowed for discretionary purpose. Dr. Reis. The amounts and percentages of funding for LDRD by each laboratory are shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Lawrence Livermore $58.5M (5.9%) $52.7M (6.0%) $52.2M (6.0%) Los Alamos $63.4M (6.0%) $62.0M (6.0%) $60.0M (6.0%) Sandia $50.7M (4.0%) $62.0M (4.7%) $75.0M (5.6%) LABORATORY-DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (LDRD) Mr. Bevill. Please provide a complete listing by laboratory of each task or project funded from the discretionary accounts for FY 1993 and FY 1994 and the amount provided for each task. (Examples are not acceptable. It must be a complete listing.) Dr. Reis: Listings of LDRD projects giving project title and amount of funding for each of the laboratories for FY 1993 and FY 1994 are attached. (The information follows:) ****The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Charts are attached to RATIONALE FOR USING LABORATORY FUNDING Mr. Bevill. Please explain the rationale for using laboratory discretionary funding to fund work with Russian scientists. Dr. Reis. Of approximately 600 LDRD projects being conducted by the three laboratories, three involve-some work with Former Soviet Union (FSU) scientists. The projects are selected because of their value to the laboratory with no special consideration given to FSU involvement. When LDRD work involves the FSU it is because of unique capabilities that exist there, and such work is in the best technical interest of the laboratories. Lawrence Livermore has one LDRD project that involves collecting data on the Chernobyl disaster for study of iodine dosimetry. Los Alamos has two LDRD projects involving evaluation of advanced Russian technology: one in the area of high magnetic field/high energy density physics-for possible weapons application and another in accelerator-based conversion of plutonium. Sandia has no LDRD projects involving FSU scientists. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Mr. Bevill. Please describe all defense programs considered to be "emergency response or operations" including the location, number of FTES, and funding for each activity in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995. Dr. Reis. Emergency response activities that are funded by Defense Programs are consolidated under the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application, Office of Emergency Response. The Emergency Response Program is composed of seven emergency response assets, representing the principal United States capability to respond to a nuclear weapon or civilian radiological accidents or incidents and are the technical teams which would be deployed to the incident site within the United States or worldwide. Staffing, location, and funding requirements for each of the emergency response assets is somewhat different than for other programs within Defense Programs. While each of the emergency response assets have a dedicated number of FTES, the majority of scientific and technical personnel who staff the assets are volunteers from the weapons complex, having extensive expertise derived from their full-time positions as weapon physicists, engineers, and technical support staff. Although day-to-day oversight of the deployable assets is conducted by our field offices, personnel and equipment are located at sites throughout the weapon complex, mostly at Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories. Consolidated Emergency Response Program Funding and FTES FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 (Dollars in Millions) R&D FUNDING $ 38.6 $ 51.5 $ 52.6 Lab FTEs 100 118 140 STOCKPILE SUPPORT Emergency Response $ 9.1 $ 11.8 $ 13.4 Emergency Operations 8.9 8.8 5.6 Total $ 18.0 $ 20.6 $ 19.0 FTEs 142 107 84 * Includes requirements associated with the planning, coordination, implementation, and conduct of the Emergency Response Program activities to include: the Accident Response Group, Radiological Assistance Program, and Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site. Accident Response Group The Accident Response Group (ARG) is the Department's main response to accidents or incidents involving United States nuclear weapons or components in a peacetime environment. The ARG is composed of weapons program scientists, engineers, and technicians, along with specialized equipment derived from the weapons complex. The ARG is responsible for advising the on- scene commander concerning weapon status, safety, stability, Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) and shipment, if necessary. The ARG might also be requested to assist a foreign nation in response to accidents/incidents involving their nuclear weapons or components. Field Program Management for ARG is performed by the Albuquerque Operations Office. STOCKPILE SUPPORT ACCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 $ 6.6 $ 8.8 $ 10.0 Aerial Measuring Systems The Aerial Measuring Systems (AMS) is composed of scientists, engineers and other technical personnel, along with unique equipment which collectively provide an aerial radiological survey and search capability for responding to radiological emergencies, and is also used to monitor the environment at Department of Energy and other Federal and commercial sites. Aerial radiological surveys are performed with large arrays of sodium iodide detectors linked to a geo-referenced, time-resolved, gamma spectrometry mounted on fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft. Specially designed air sampling and monitoring equipment incorporated onto AMS fixed-wing aircraft provide airborne air sampling and cloud tracking capabilities, which can detect and collect samples of airborne radioactive gas and particulates as a result of a release. AMS aircraft are maintained on emergency standby basis at both Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada and Andrews AFB, Maryland. Research and development activities are conducted at the Department's Remote Sensing Laboratory, Nellis AFB, and the Special Technologies Laboratory in Santa Barbara, California. Field Program Management for AMS is performed by the Nevada Operations Office. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AERIAL MEASURING SYSTEMS FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 $ 8.9 $ 9.0 $ 8.8 Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) is a centralized computer-based prediction system located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California. It provides estimates of transport, diffusion, and deposition of radioactive material released into the atmosphere and associated dose projections. This predictive capability is based upon meteorological, topographical, and source-term data providing plume and footprint deposition information. In addition to DOE sites, ARAC is used by the Department of Defense at weapons storage locations worldwide and Naval nuclear reactor facilities. It is available to support emergency response requirements of DOE's NEST, ARG, and RAP assets and to support other Federal agencies or foreign governments for radiological emergencies. Field Program Management for ARAC is performed by the Oakland Operations Office. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE ADVISORY CAPABILITY FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 $ 2.4 $ 8.5, $ 7.4 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center To meet responsibilities for radiological monitoring and assessment as set forth in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the Department of Energy is responsible for establishing and managing the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). The FRMAC is an operational center at or near the scene of a radiological incident, which provides a focal point for coordination and compilation of all offsite Federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities. All Federal, State, and local agencies concerned with the radiologic incident are represented in the Center. Information related to offsite radiological risks resulting from accidents/incidents is consolidated and analyzed in the FRMAC. This information is made available to the lead Federal agency, State, and/or local official(s) to aid in formulating policy decisions and for taking appropriate protective actions. Field Program Management for FRMAC is performed by the Nevada Operations Office. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 $ 1.5 $ 1.0 $ 1.1 Nuclear Emergency Search Team The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is a group of diverse and specially trained engineers, scientists, and technicians from the weapons complex, along with specialized equipment providing technical assistance in response to a malevolent nuclear threat. NEST provides the Department with the unique capability to assess communicated nuclear threats and to counter any attempts by terrorists or extortionists to achieve their objectives by utilization of stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radioactive dispersal devices. Within the United States and its territories, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has primary responsibility for such incidents. In the event of deployment to a foreign country, the Department.of State would be the lead Federal agency for the United States. NEST assets are located primarily at the Department's facility at Nellis AFB, Nevada, with a smaller initial response/advanced party capability located at Andrews AFB, Maryland. Field Program Management for NEST is performed by the Nevada Operations Office. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 $ 25.8 $ 33.0 $ 35.3 Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) provides direct or consultative assistance with medical and health physics support following radiation accidents. REAC/TS provides DOE with a core capability for handling the medical aspects of radiation accident/incident response, training of professional and technical personnel in related specialty areas, and in resolving medical-legal issues relating to alleged radiation exposure and subsequent health issues. REAC/TS is designated by World Health Organization as the World Collaboration Center for Radiation Accident Management. A comprehensive medical assistance/treatment course for accidents involving radiation, which is sponsored by DOE, is offered at the training site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and is open to all government agencies as well as the private sector. Field Program Management for REAC/TS is performed by the Oak Ridge Operations Office. STOCKPILE SUPPORT RADIATION EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE CENTER/TRAINING SITE FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 $ 0.7 $ 0.7 $ 0.7 Radiological Assistance Program The DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides a Federal emergency radiological response capability at the local level. Eight RAP regions provide initial "first responder" assistance, as they are located at DOE field or area offices, providing regional coordination and serving as the point of contact for providing the initial DOE response. RAP teams are usually staffed with certified health physicists and registered radiation protection technicians, providing an excellent resource to assist state, local, and tribal governments with expert advice and support for accidents involving radioactive materials. A RAP Team's assistance is scenario-dependent and consists typically of the ability to conduct localized searches with hand-held instruments to identify nature and extent of local contamination and to provide non-clinical advice on health affect of radiation. Field Program Management for the RAP is performed by geographical regions: Brookhaven Area Office (Region 1); Oak Ridge Operations Office (Region II); Savannah River Operations Office (Region III);,Albuquerque Operations Office (Region IV); Chicago Operations Office (Region V); Idaho Operations Office (Region VI); Oakland Operations Office (Region VII); and Richland Operations Office (Region VIII). STOCKPILE SUPPORT RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 $ 1.8 $ 2.3 $ 2.7 STOCKPILE SUPPORT FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Field (Emergency Operations Center) $ 8.4 $ 8.3 $ 5.1 Field Emergency Preparedness 0.5 0.5 0.5 The funding includes the Space Nuclear Power and Emergency Operations Center activities in support of Emergency Operations and continuity of Government activities reflected in the Stockpile Support Emergency Operations budget. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Mr. Bevill: What emergencies did NEST respond to in the past three years? Dr. Reis. Over the past 3 years, there has been one Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) deployment in response to a suspected sophisticated improvised explosive device, in Sparks, Nevada. While this device had no nuclear component associated with it, DOE assisted the FBI and local authorities in characterizing the extortion threat, utilizing its technical capability to determine that the threat was indeed a hoax. In addition to the one deployment in August 1993, NEST has conducted seven threat assessments over the past three calendar years to alleged nuclear or radiation dispersal devices and participated regularly in exercises, in addition to its training and readiness requirements. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Mr. Bevill. How are these programs coordinated with the Office of Emergency Management? Dr. Reis. The "Emergency Management" activities funded under Atomic Energy Defense Activities maintain the Department's seven emergency response assets which include: the Accident Response Group; Aerial Measurement System; Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability; Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center; Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site; and eight Radiological Assistance Program Teams. These departmental assets represent the principal United States capability to deal with a nuclear weapon or civilian radiological accident or incident and are the teams which would be deployed to the incident site in the United States or worldwide. The physicists, engineers, and other technical personnel from the weapons complex constitute these all-volunteer teams. Because extensive expertise is derived from nuclear weapons technology, the organizational assignment is appropriate for Defense Programs. The other emergency management functions within the Department are the responsibility of the newly created Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, Office of Emergency Management, and are involved with certain aspects of all emergencies of concern to the Department. This organization operates the Headquarters Emergency Operations Center and ensures integration and compatibility of all Departmental emergency operations facilities. The management of Defense Programs' radiological response program is the responsibility of the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Support. Coordination between Defense Programs and the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security takes place as required--primarily to assure the effective functioning of the operations centers to support radiological accidents or incidents. GENERAL ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES Mr. Bevill. Please provide by type of aircraft and location a table showing the inventory of aircraft funded by Atomic Energy Defense Activities appropriations. What additional purchases are planned in FY 1994 and FY 1995. Dr. Reis. I would like to submit a table for the record which provides information regarding the type and location of aircraft funded by Atomic Energy Defense Activities. These aircraft are used for i number of missions, including hazardous materials transport, nuclear emergency response, and security patrol. The Department of Energy plans no aircraft purchases in fiscal year 1994 or fiscal year 1995 for Atomic Energy Defense Activities appropriations. (The information follows:) ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITY FUNDED AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT TYPE LOCATION DC-9 (N29AF) Albuquerque, New Mexico DC-9 (N66AF) Albuquerque, New Mexico DC-9 (N79SL) Albuquerque, New Mexico Lear 35A (Nl35DE) Albuquerque, New Mexico DHC-7 (N54026) Albuquerque, New Mexico B-200 (N7232R) Albuquerque, New Mexico DHC-6 (N35062) Albuquerque, New Mexico DHC-6 (N72348) Albuquerque, New Mexico DHC-6 (N229SA) Albuquerque, New Mexico F-27F (N768RL) Livermore, California CE-550 (N1OEG) Las Vegas, Nevada Convair 580 (N30EG) Las Vegas, Nevada BO-105 (N40EG) Suitland, Maryland BO-105 (N50EG) Las Vegas, Nevada BO-105 (N60EG) Las Vegas, Nevada BO-105 (N70EG) Las Vegas, Nevada BO-105 (N7EG) Las Vegas, Nevada B-200 (N654ID) Las Vegas, Nevada B-200 (Nl85XP) Las Vegas, Nevada MBB BK-117 (Nll6SR) Savannah River, Georgia MBB BK-117 (Nll7SR) Savannah River, Georgia DEFENSE INDIRECT AND OVERHEAD EXPENSES Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing indirect and overhead expenses for this appropriation by activity and location for FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995. Please show the components that comprise the indirect and overhead expense accounts and then provide the indirect and overhead expenses as a percent of the laboratory or site funding. Mrs. Smedley. Actual FY 1993 and projected FY 1994 and FY 1995 overhead and organizational burden costs for this appropriation, shown by activity, location, and component, and as a percentage of total laboratory or site funding, are currently being submitted, collected, analyzed, and summarized. This information will be provided as soon as it is available. GENERAL ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES Mr. Bevill. For each defense facility by appropriation account, please identify the amount of reimbursable work performed 1) for other Federal agencies and 2) other than Federal agencies in FY 1993, FY 1994 and estimated for FY 1995. Dr. Reis. I would like to submit tables for the record which show the amount of reimbursable work performed for other Federal agencies and other than Federal agencies in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995 at the DOE defense facilities. (The information follows:) REIMBURSABLE WORK PERFORMED - FEDERAL AGENCIES Weapons Activities (obligations in thousands) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Actual Estimate Estimate Amarillo Plant $ 1,625 $ 501 $ 831 Ames Laboratory 635 567 682 Argonne National Laboratory 37,319 32,650 35,550 Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory 4,622 5,200 5,200 Brookhaven National Laboratory 4,142 6,938 6,882 Idaho Natl Engineering Lab 34,827 51,550 63,550 Kansas City Plant 1,059 4,777 11,075 Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 5,900 7,000 7,000 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 11,737 15,500 15,600 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 149,646 131,491 88,349 Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 137,510 138,280 144,140 MMES-Oak Ridge Central 269,679 198,142 171,616 Mound Laboratory 1,322 600 450 National Renewable Energy Lab 1,633 313 313 Nevada Test Site 135,558 153,869 149,151 Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education 6,198 3,193 3,061 Pacific Northwest Laboratory 52,100 72,200 72,200 Pinellas Plant (826) 878 255 Rocky Flats Plant 2 1,500 1,500 Sandia Laboratories 315,191 284,577 285,600 Savannah River Laboratory 1,827 3,464 2,951 TOTAL FEDERAL AGENCIES $1,171,706 $1,113,190 $1,065,956 REIMBURSABLE WORK PERFORMED - NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES Weapons Activities (obligations in thousands) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Actual Estimate Estimate Amarillo Plant $ 155 $ 100 $ 100 Idaho Natl Engineering Lab 150 500 517 Kansas City Plant 205 550 550 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 495 0 0 Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 8,550 13,500 13,500 Lovelace Biomed & Environmental Res Lab 800 0 0 MMES - Oak Ridge Central 9 708 708 Mound Laboratory 1,000 2,000 2,000 Nevada Test Site 41,065 43,000 89,100 Pinellas Plant 12,000 6,100 5,100 Rocky Flats Plant 1,550 500 250 Sandia Laboratories 11,659 29,000 34,000 TOTAL - NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES $ 77,638 $ 95,958 $ 145,825 GENERAL ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing uncommitted obligations for each appropriation by program and location at the end of fiscal year 1992, 1993 and estimated for 1904. Dr. Reis. Prior to FY 1992, uncommitted operating expense obligations were not captured by the Department's accounting system. Beginning with the September 30, 1992 accounting reports, the Department now collects more definitive data on uncommitted obligations for the integrated management and operating (M&O) contractors by operating, capital, and construction funds. These reports are compiled three times a year; i.e., as of March 31, June 30, and September 30. I would like to submit tables for the record which provide uncommitted obligations for each appropriation at the end of fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993. The Department has performed a thorough analysis of FY 1993 uncommitted obligations and significant portions have been applied to offset FY 1995 budget requirements or earmarked for proposed FY 1994 reprogrammings. While forecasted FY 1994 year end data is not available in this new reporting system, we are continuing to monitor the uncosted balances throughout the year and will do so again at year end to determine if uncommitted balances are sufficient to warrant further reductions. (The information follows:) Uncommitted Obligations (dollars in thousands) End of Year End of Year Appropriation Location Program FY 92 FY 93 Weapons Activities Albuquerque Research and Development $129,552 $102,483 Testing 3,504 734 Stockpile Support 334,923 187,611 Program Direction 6,119 33,483 Other* 1,234 828 TOTAL, AL $475,332 $325,140 Chicago Research and Development $142 $111 Testing 56 313 Stockpile Support 523 793 Program Direction 241 705 TOTAL, CH $962 $1,923 Idaho Research and Development $1,207 $978 Stockpile Support 92 18 Program Direction 995 1,250 TOTAL, ID $2,294 $2,245 Nevada Research and Development $11,885 $3,558 Testing 35,238 28,764 Program Direction 3,007 4,431 Other* 588 1,460 TOTAL, NV $50,718 $38,213 Oak Ridge Research and Development $7,279 $14,212 Stockpile Support 148,464 50,703 Program Direction 1,453 2,073 Other* (1,279) 1,856 TOTAL, 0R $155,917 $68,844 Richland Research and Development $148 $2 Stockpile Support 375 361 Program Direction 12 554 Other* 231 262 TOTAL, RL $766 $1,179 San Francisco Research and Development $96,984 $111,723 Testing 220 454 Stockpile Support 240 256 Program Direction 793 984 Other* 0 595 TOTAL, SF $98,237 $114,013 Savannah River Research and Development $0 $501 Stockpile Support 42,828 16,886 Program Direction 340 4,214 Other* 1,365 0 TOTAL, SR $44,533 $21,601 TOTAL, Weapons Activities $828,759 $573,156 "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers. Uncommitted Obligations (dollars in thousands) End of Year End of Year Appropriation Location Program FY 92 FY 93 New Production Reactor Albuquerque NPR $739 $38 Other* 98 11 TOTAL, AL $837 $49 Chicago NPR $830 $48 Other* 66 740 TOTAL, CH $896 $788 Idaho NPR $13,711 $13,441 Other* (2,523) (1,401) TOTAL, ID $11,188 $12,039 Oak Ridge NPR $1,776 $173 Other* 1,886 1,880 TOTAL, OR $3,662 $2,053 Richland NPR $1,959 $390 San Francisco NPR $107 $3 Other* 22 920 TOTAL, OR $129 923 Savannah River NPR $444 $1,170 Other* 0 97 TOTAL, SR $444 $1,267 TOTAL, New Production Reactor $19,115 $17,509 * "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers. Uncommitted Obligations (dollars in thousands) End of Year End of Year Appropriation Location Program FY 92 FY 93 Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Albuquerque Corrective Activities $18,984 $23,359 Environmental Restoration 30,921 43,172 Waste Management 54,962 82,855 Technology Development 9,456 10,852 Transportation Management 278 17 Program Direction 63 22 Facility Transition 0 3,506 Other* 1,275 (24) TOTAL, AL $115,939 $163,758 Chicago Corrective Activities $9 $0 Environmental Restoration 3,423 3,462 Waste Management 8,274 8,229 Technology Development 5,223 4,070 Transportation Management 351 39 Program Direction 302 378 Facility Transition 0 29 TOTAL, CH $17,582 $16,207 Idaho Corrective Activities $6,147 $2,042 Environmental Restoration 20,452 5,994 Waste Management 185,690 212,940 Technology Development 6,060 6,436 Transportation Management 3 3 Program Direction 0 35 Facility Transition 0 165 Other* 34 0 TOTAL, ID $218,386 $227,615 Nevada Corrective Activities $1,963 $188 Environmental Restoration 7,089 540 Waste Management 3,735 2,677 Technology Development 1,303 773 Transportation Management 5 30 Other* 218 566 TOTAL, NV $14,313 $4,775 Oak Ridge Corrective Activities $7,525 $2,592 Environmental Restoration 147,059 6,449 Waste Management 48,513 42,604 Technology Development 15,847 9,932 Transportation Management 560 457 Program Direction 283 1,746 Facility Transition 0 616 Other* (2,069) 0 TOTAL, OR $217,718 $64,398 Richland Corrective Activities $4,363 $3,563 Environmental Restoration 9,254 13,878 Waste Management 183,936 281,372 Technology Development 18,988 36,475 Transportation Management 537 1,157 Program Direction 457 288 Facility Transition 0 348 Other* 247 0 TOTAL, RL $217,782 $337,082 San Francisco Corrective Activities $6,746 $20,451 Environmental Restoration 754 322 Waste Management 6,333 14,427 Technology Development (65) 1,933 Facility Transition 0 15 TOTAL, SF $13,768 $37,148 Savannah River Corrective Activities $8,888 $107 Environmental Restoration 7,675 12,575 Waste Management 146,643 122,429 Technology Development 6,352 6,852 Program Direction 55 50 Facility Transition 0 635 TOTAL, SR $169,613 $142,648 TOTAL, Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Mgmt. $985,101 $993,631 * "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers. Uncommitted Obligations (dollars in thousands) End of Year End of Year Appropriation Location Program FY 92 FY 93 Materials Support and Other Defense Programs Albuquerque Materials Support $6,479 $3,891 Verification and Control Tech 12,945 7,499 Nuclear Safeguards & Security 1,061 390 Office of Intelligence 1,329 1,447 Education 327 321 Nuclear Safety 0 58 Other* (314) 117 TOTAL, AL $21,827 $13,723 Chicago Materials Support $1,115 $1,491 Verification and Control Tech 1,635 5,453 Nuclear Safeguards & Security 680 337 Office of Intelligence 152 82 Education 212 747 Nuclear Safety 0 933 Other* 88 89 TOTAL, CH $3,882 $9,132 Idaho Materials Support $139,414 $37,209 Verification and Control Tech 2,490 2,399 Nuclear Safeguards & Security 196 166 Office of Intelligence 652 555 Naval Reactors 13,249 9,316 Education 67 227 Nuclear Safety 0 41 Other* 1,718 607 TOTAL, ID $157,786 $50,519 Nevada Materials Support $432 $7 Verification and Control Tech 988 2,716 Nuclear Safeguards & Security 107 9 Security Evaluation 571 34 Office of Intelligence 55 1,090 Naval Reactors 1 0 Other* (11) 0 TOTAL, NV $2,143 $3,856 Oak Ridge Materials Support $46,158 $44,148 Verification and Control Tech 1,275 5,044 Nuclear Safeguards & Security 821 1,195 Security Evaluation 4 0 Office of Intelligence 827 1,495 Naval Reactors 2 6 Education 551 982 Nuclear Safety 0 1,676 Other* (1,520) 169 TOTAL, OR $48,118 $54,715 Pittsburgh Naval Reactors $26,306 $19,636 Other* (1,724) $0 TOTAL, PITTSBURGH $24,582 $19,636 Richland Materials Support $8,161 $15,685 Verification and Control Tech 2,361 8,504 Nuclear Safeguards & Security 501 460 Security Evaluation 3,087 639 Office of Intelligence 384 1,428 Education 0 395 Nuclear Safety 0 37 Other* 294 1 TOTAL, RL $14,788 $27,149 San Francisco Materials Support $361 $305 Verification and Control Tech 1,296 7,910 Nuclear Safeguards & Security 761 488 Security Evaluation 7 2 Office of Intelligence 381 921 Naval Reactors 14 19 Education 340 295 Other* 37 0 TOTAL, SF $3,197 $9,941 Savannah River Materials Support $315,150 $450,602 Verification and Control Tech 15 935 Nuclear Safeguards & Security 8 12 Office of Intelligence 87 116 Education 97 27 Nuclear Safety 0 15 Other* 7,579 (82) TOTAL, SR $322,936 $451,624 Schenectady Naval Reactors $27,969 $17,733 TOTAL, Materials Support and Other Defense Programs $627 228 $658,029 * "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers. USE OF PRIOR YEAR BALANCES Mr. Bevill: Provide a table showing the source of the prior year balances proposed to offset FY 1995 funding requirements. Dr. Reis: The prior year balances which are proposed to offset the FY 1995 funding requirements are shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) DEFENSE PROGRAMS USE OF PRIOR YEAR BALANCES (Dollars in Thousands) Offsets to FY 1995 Funding Requirements Research & Development Operating Expenses Core R&D $ -27,840 Technology Transfer -12,549 Inertial Fusion - 3,300 Capital Equipment - 2,272 Construction 90-D-102, RD&T Revitalization, Phase III - 2,028 Testing Operating Expenses -12,323 Reconfiguration Operating Expenses - 6,765 Weapons Program Direction Operating Expenses -10,000 Total Weapons Activities -77,077 Materials Support: Operating Expenses -158,500 Capital Equipment - 49,600 Construction - 61,000 Total Materials Support -269,100 Total Defense Programs $-346,177 NUCLEAR MATERIALS REACTORS AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE Mr. Bevill: Please describe the status of each of the nuclear materials reactors at the Savannah River Site. Dr. Reis: I would like to summarize the status of the five nuclear materials production reactors at the Savannah River Site. The K-Reactor has been placed in a cold standby condition, with no planned provision for restart. Cold standby is a minimum cost, low maintenance condition which maintains systems important to public and worker health and safety, but does not maintain other systems. It is estimated that an attempt to restart K-Reactor at this point would take 4-5 years and would cost $300-$350 million per year which would be $1.2-$1.4 billion total. The P, L, C, and R Reactors have been placed in cold shutdown, with no capability for restart. The majority of activities at these reactors involve preparations to transfer these reactors to the DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management for decontamination and decommissioning in FY 1994. NUCLEAR MATERIALS SUPPORT Mr. Bevill. The existing inventory of tritium will support weapons stockpile requirements through what year? How many weapons does that assume in the stockpile? Dr. Reis. The current tritium supply is sufficient to meet all requirements (stockpile, reserves, sales, R&D, etc.) through Fiscal Year 2008. The tritium supply and demand calculations assume a stable, post-START II stockpile of Deleted weapons. PU-238 MISSION AT SAVANNAH RIVER Mr. Bevill: Please describe the status of the Pu-238 mission at Savannah River. What is the total program cost of the Pu-238 program by year? How is the funding split by program and appropriation account? Dr. Reis: Phases I and III of the HB-Line facility and the Frames Waste portion of the H-Canyon facility are operating to process Pu-238 for NASA's Cassini mission. This operation recovers scrap Pu-238 left from the manufacture of heat sources from previous missions, and processes it to make it suitable to be used in the manufacture of new heat sources. Processing for the Cassini mission is expected to continue until early CY 1995. The Department is conducting an environmental assessment in,preparation for continuing operations following the Cassini campaign to process 5 kilograms (kg) of Pu-238 purchased from Russia (on hand now at Savannah River) and the remaining U.S. civilian inventory (approximately 35 kg). This post-Cassini campaign would last about 1 1/2 years and the material would be used to meet future NASA needs. Detailed outyear projections are not yet available but similar funding levels would be required to complete the Pu-238 processing in FY 1996 and to support cleanout and decontamination and dismantlement activities through the late 1990s. The funding split by program and appropriation account is shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) PU-238 MISSION AT SAVANNAH RIVER FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Millions) FY 1994 FY 1995 Atomic Energy Defense Activities, Defense Programs $ 19.7 $ 20.6 Energy Supply Research and Development Nuclear Energy $ 12.8 $ 11.8 Total $ 32.5 $ 32.4 Pu-238 REQUIREMENTS Mr. Bevill. Please identify total Pu-238 requirements by year and customer through the foreseeable future and the available inventory of material. Will any material be purchased from Russia to meet NASA needs? Dr. Reis. Mission requirements through the year 2000 are estimated to be 53.5 kgs. for flight units. An additional 24 kgs. is also required to cover fuel fabrication pipeline requirements, safety test units, processing losses, and annual decay to support fabrication of the flight units. Most of this additional material is recycled and used in subsequent program operations. These Pu-238 requirements are based upon NASA's most recent projection of potential missions as provided to DOE in 1993. The missions identified include: Cassini, Pluto Flyby, and Mars Environmental Survey Network. The Pu-238 inventory available for use to support these mission requirements total 68 kgs. This includes 4.9 kgs. recently received from Russia under our contract with the Mayak Production Association. This foreign source of Pu-238 was arranged since requirements exceed available inventory. It permits the purchase of up to 40 kg of Pu-238, the first 4.9 kg. of which was delivered in February 1994. DOE has the option to order Pu-238 in 5 kg. increments subject to availability of funds and need for material. The purchased material supplements the available U.S. inventory of fuel and will also be used to blend up the assay value (concentration of Pu- 238) to levels specified as necessary for the proper functioning of radioisotope thermoelectric generators. DEFENSE PROGRAMS HEALTH STUDIES Mr. Bevill: What health studies and associated funding are included in this request, but are managed by the Office of Environment, Safety and Health? Dr. Reis: The health studies managed by the Office of Environment, Safety and Health but funded in the Defense Programs budget request include $6,100,000 for Marshall Islands resettlement activities, and a total of $2,888,000 for dose reconstruction activities. These dote reconstruction efforts are comprised of $200,000 for the Nevada Test Site; $1,000,000 for the Rocky Flats and $560,000 for the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant's enhanced medical surveillance for chronic beryllium disease effort; and $1,128,000 for a State agreement with Colorado for dose reconstruction, toxicological review, and possible epidemiological studies. The Weapons Activities Appropriation Account provides the funding for these activities. MATERIALS PRODUCTION SITES - EMPLOYMENT Mr. Bevill: Please provide the employment levels at all Materials Production sites in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995. Dr. Reis: The employment levels funded by the Materials Support program for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995 are shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) CONTRACTOR EMPLOYMENT FOR SITES FUNDED BY MATERIALS SUPPORT SITE FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Idaho 922 50 50 LANL 63 60 60 Oak Ridge (Includes Y-12) 144 130 120 Richland 398 380 380 Savannah River 11,230 10,030 8,590 All Other 39 40 30 Total Materials Support 12,796 10,690 9,230 The FY 1994 and FY 1995 columns reflect end-of-year estimates rounded to the nearest multiple of ten. SAFETY MEASURES AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE Mr. Bevill: A recent report by the Office of Security Evaluations was critical of current security measures at the Savannah River Site. What steps have been taken to address these concerns. Dr. Reis: The comprehensive inspection of the Savannah River Operations Office (SR) and its contractors, Westinghouse Savannah River Company and Wackenhut Services Incorporated, was conducted by Security Evaluations (SE) during the period of August 2-18, 1993. The inspection identified 30 findings within 14 inspection areas of safeguards and security. The protection of nuclear material located at the site, however, was not found by SE to be at risk due to the findings. The Savannah River Operations Office has responded to all identified findings with an aggressive schedule for correction and has indicated that they have implemented corrective action for all but three findings. The three remaining findings are to have corrective actions completed by July 30, 1994. They include assuring all SR safeguards and security operations are carried out consistent with departmental policy, completion and approval of facility specific planning documents, and development of a system for secure distribution of passwords. NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY Mr. Bevill: Why is funding for nonproliferation activities contained in the weapons program? How does that work differ from the work funded by this program? Dr. Keliher: The Weapons Research and Development program has a budget element they call "Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Threat Assessment." Broadly speaking, these Weapons R&D activities are nonproliferation activities that do not fall within the responsibilities of my office, but under the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs. Whereas our activities are designed to monitor and verify non-U.S. weapons activities, the Weapons R&D activities insure that the U.S. stockpile is not endangered by those activities. For example, while we work to insure non-U.S. compliance with nuclear weapons treaties, Weapons R&D works to insure that any potential non-compliance does not place the deterrence value of the U.S. stockpile at risk. TOTAL AMOUNT OF DOE FUNDING FOR ASSISTANCE TO STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IN FY 1993, FY 1994, AND FY 1995 Mr. Bevill. By type of funding, what is the total amount of DOE funding for assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union in FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995? Dr. Keliher. The total amount of DOE funding for assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union was $8,700,000 for FY 1993. For FY 1994, the total amount of DOE funding is $12,631,000. For FY 1995, we estimate the total amount of DOE funding will be $15,668,000. Of these totals, the Defense Programs' amounts are $2,775,000 in FY 1993; $6,500,000 in FY 1994, and $8,600,000 in FY 1995. These amounts are reflected in the Analytical Support Category for lab-to-lab interaction. The remainder of the funds are provided by the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. The break-down by activity is as follows: International Safeguards (assistance to states of the former Soviet Union to develop effective national material control and accountability systems): FY 1993 $2,705,000 FY 1994 $1,992,000 FY 1995 $3,000,000 Analytical Support (weapon dismantlement, Laboratory-to-Laboratory interactions, International Science and Technology Center in Russia and Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, HEU Purchase Contract): FY 1993 $4,752,000 FY 1994 $8,574,000 FY 1995 $10,713,000 Export Control Operations (assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union to develop effective national export control systems): FY 1993 $ 833,000 FY 1994 $1,430,000 FY 1995 $1,430,000 Technology Research and Development (employing world class scientists in nonproliferation technology development): FY 1993 $ 410,000 FY 1994 $ 635,000 FY 1995 $ 525,000 CHANGE IN FOCUS OF VERIFICATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM SINCE THE BREAKUP OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the breakup of the former Soviet Union? Dr. Keliher. As a result of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the Verification and Control Technology Program has shifted its focus from the verification of arms control agreements primarily with the USSR to activities to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on a global scale. The threat of proliferation had always existed, but events of the past few years have brought the subject to the top of the arms control agenda. With the collapse of Communism and the break-up of the former Soviet bloc, we can confront the ambitions which fuel proliferation not through the prism of Cold War alliances, but through the examination of regional tensions which cause such ambitions. The program has adapted significantly to confront the proliferation threat from successor states of the former Soviet Union themselves, which has resulted from decades of militarized economies and is worsened now by economic hard times. As a result, the program has extended its training programs to encourage consolidation of residual nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and to help selected states of the former Soviet Union develop improved nuclear material control and accountability and export control systems. These new types of assistance were initiated through intensive diplomatic bilateral dialogue in 1992, approximately one year after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.. As such, the focus of this assistance program to enhance or establish national export control and nuclear material and accountability systems in all of the former republics has remained constant, with workplan adjustments found primarily in funding levels and project priorities as articulated by each recipient country, (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan). In addition, since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the program has been active in the effort to establish the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Russia and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) and to facilitate direct U.S.-Russian Laboratory-to-Laboratory interactions. The purpose of these three activities is to provide non-weapons collaborative research projects to former Soviet weapons scientists to prevent "brain drain" to proliferant states. It should be mentioned that technical support for negotiations to verify arms control agreements with the primary successor state of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, Russia, remains a high priority in the Verification and Control Technology Program. Partly a nonproliferation and partly an arms control measure, the U.S. purchase of 500 metric tons of Russia highly-enriched uranium and its corresponding revenue-sharing agreement with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan continue to be subject for negotiation and supported by the program. Transparency measures between the U.S. and the Russians have been agreed upon to ensure that HEU being purchased is actually derived from dismantled nuclear weapons. The program also supports negotiation of transparency measures relating to the entire nuclear weapon dismantlement process. The program is now exploring new technology Which will allow our dismantlement process at Pantex to be more transparent without revealing sensitive nuclear weapon design information. The program has supported efforts to provide more direct assistance to the Russians on dismantlement., including assistance for the design of a storage facility for fissile material derived from dismantled weapons. NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY Mr. Bevill. Please describe your current role with respect to control, storage, and dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. Dr. Keliher. In November 1991, a Soviet Union delegation was invited to Washington to discuss measures for cooperation and assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement of Soviet nuclear weapons. DOE participated in the delegation meetings, as well as in a technical working group meeting. At this first U.S./Soviet meeting on such technical issues, the U.S. presented an overview of how the U.S. manages nuclear weapons, with particular emphasis on control, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. In this meeting, as well as in all following meetings, Soviet (and subsequently, Russian) delegations insisted that direct assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement of their nuclear weapons was neither necessary nor desired. The sensitivity of weapon design information, as well as the reluctance to reveal any possible weakness with respect to nuclear weapons issues, were believed to be the basis for this Russian position. The Soviet delegation informed the U.S. that the most important way in which the U.S. could help the Soviet Union achieve its goal of dismantling tactical, INF, and START nuclear warheads by the year 2000 was to support construction of a specially designed storage facility and procurement of containers for nuclear materials removed from dismantled weapons. The U.S. is providing assistance in both these areas. This assistance includes a design of the system of control, accounting, and physical protection of fissile material stored in the facility. Many Department of Energy and national laboratory staff members are working to apply the very best technical expertise to these problems. Since November 1991, DOE has provided technical and analytical support for several U.S. follow-up visits to Russia and has participated in technical information exchanges both in Russia and in the U.S. to discuss related issues (on average of at least monthly). An agreement between the U.S. and the Russian Federation in the field of Nuclear Warhead Safety and Security is in the final negotiating.stage. This agreement will provide a framework for controlled and supervised technical exchanges between the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories and the Russian nuclear weapon institutes on subjects pertaining to safe secure transport, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. These exchanges may include conferences, meetings, seminars, workshops, joint studies, projects, and experiments. In all these interactions, we have placed emphasis on providing assistance which will help Russia to maintain control, safeguard stored weapons, and perform safe and ecologically sound dismantlement of their nuclear warheads. As our technical dialogue with nuclear weapon states develop, and we are able to become increasingly open with each other in addressing these problems of mutual concern, it is realistic to expect further initiatives in these areas. Agreements with Russia that directly involve DOE include: - Technical assistance in design of a fissile material storage facility (now being implemented) - Fissile material storage containers (now being implemented) - Flexible armor blankets for secure transport/storage of nuclear warheads (delivered) - Security upgrade kits for nuclear weapons railcars (now being implemented) - Nuclear weapons/material accident response equipment (now being implemented) - International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow to engage FSU nuclear weapon scientists in non-nuclear weapon research (now being implemented) - Purchase of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled FSU nuclear weapons (agreement signed, cont?act being negotiated) - Equipment for the nuclear storage facility (now being implemented) - Technical assistance for establishing a state system for nuclear material control, accounting, and physical protection (now being implemented) Agreements with Belarus that directly involve DOE: - Nuclear weapon/material emergency response equipment (now being implemented) - Assistance with nuclear material export control regime (now being implemented) Agreements with Ukraine that directly involve DOE: - Nuclear weapon/material emergency response equipment (now being implemented) - Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical protection (now being implemented) - Assistance with nuclear material export control regime (now being implemented) - Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev to engage FSU nuclear weapon scientists in non-nuclear research (awaiting Ukrainian approval) Agreements with Kazakhstan that directly involve DOE: - Nuclear weapon/material emergency response equipment (now being implemented) - Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical protection (now being implemented) - Assistance with nuclear material export control regime (now being implemented) TREATIES Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties under negotiation and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in which DOE will be involved. Dr. Keliher. DOE is involved in support of treaties, agreements, and reciprocal unilateral initiatives either under negotiation or anticipated. Treaties that are in effect include: - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian ratification) - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both U.S. and Russian ratification) - Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty - Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) - Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) - Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) - Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) - Bilateral U.S./Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement (awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - Wyoming MOU and BOA - Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty - Open Skies Treaty Treaties and agreements that are under negotiation include: - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission - African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties, agreements, and initiatives we expect to come to fruition through the 1990's include: - Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for Nuclear Weapons Purposes - U.S. voluntary offer to place fissile materials no longer needed for nuclear deterrence under international safeguards RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES Mr. Bevill. What performance measurements can be used to measure the effectiveness of the research and development program? Dr. Keliher. The performance measures useful to gauge the effectiveness of our technology research and development programs include: o Upon annual assessment, the percentage of technology prototypes developed over the previous five years which are in use o The number of favorable external peer reviews over the past year of our ongoing research and development activities relative to any unfavorable assessments o Upon annual assessment, the percentage of technology development programs which are completed and documented o The long-term quality of the technologies and systems delivered to customers as quantified by abnormally good or abnormally poor failure rates o Upon annual assessment, the number of technology development efforts which are good candidates for transfer to industry as indicated by the number of Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAS) or other formal or informal industrial partnerships, or patents issued under the auspices of the National Laboratories o The monies directed on an annual basis from the Verification and Control Technology (V&CT) Program into the Department of Energy's Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Business Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program, and the return on this investment to the V&CT effort. IMPACT OF PROPOSED DECLASSIFICATION Mr. Bevill. How has the proposed declassification of some of the U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear materials information impacted this program? Dr. Keliher. There have been no impacts to date. IMPACT OF THE ARREST OF A SUSPECTED SPY Mr. Bevill. Has the arrest of a suspected spy at the CIA impacted this program? Dr. Keliher. The arrest of the CIA employee and the subsequent media coverage has made the foreign intelligence service threat message more credible to DOE employees and contractors. While the end of the Cold War caused many employees to become skeptical concerning the existence of an espionage threat, employees are now more receptive to the message of the Department's counterintelligence awareness program. No other impacts have been observed. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL ACCESS WORK-FOR-OTHERS PROJECTS Mr. Bevill. The Inspector General issued a report criticizing the Department's classified intelligence and special access work-for-others projects. What steps has the Department taken to address these concerns? Dr. Keliher. The Office of Nonproliferation and National Security has coordinated a Departmental position and Action Plan to implement the Inspector General's recommendations. The Departmental position concurs with the 46 Inspector General recommendations. All recommendations have been accepted and assigned Target Completion Dates. Eleven recommendations have already been implemented. PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS Mr. Bevill. What performance measures can be used to measure the effectiveness of intelligence programs? Dr. Keliher. There are four primary measures of the effectiveness of intelligence programs: "timeliness, accuracy, impact," and the "cost/benefit ratio." For strategic warning and finished intelligence, the measures should be applied to the products each program produces. For current intelligence, the measures should be applied to the aggregated function. "Timeliness" addresses the receipt by the customer in time to influence a targeted decision. "Accuracy" examines whether the correct issue was addressed in the analysis; if the appropriate analytic approach was applied; if the research appears to be exhaustive and if appropriate data was located and incorporated; and, if the answer was correct (if validated by events). "Impact" measures the level of influence the product had on a customer's decision, asking if actions were taken that otherwise would not have been and assessing the outcomes of those actions. "Cost to benefit ratio" addresses whether or not the impact (benefit) justifies the cost. REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR Mr. Bevill. How many foreign research reactors are still using highly enriched uranium (HEU)? Dr. Keliher. There are 52 operating foreign research reactors that use HEU of US origin as of March 1994. Twenty-eight of which have a power level greater than I mw with the remaining twenty-four being below 1 mw. Of the twenty-eight operating foreign research reactors with a power level above 1 mw; six have partially converted or have ordered LEU fuel for conversion; for fifteen reactors, conversion is feasible; three cannot be converted and the remaining four have either a lifetime core or plan to shut down. For the twenty-four reactors with a power level below 1 mw, conversion is feasible and in fact two have started conversion. REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR Mr. Bevill. What is the status of Russian research reactors using HEU? Have any research reactors been converted? Dr. Keliher. There are twenty-seven soviet-built research reactors using HEU fuels as of March 1994. No soviet-built reactors have been converted to LEU fuels at this time. However, three reactors (1 in North Korea, I in Poland and I in the Czech Republic) have been converted from 80% to 36% enriched uranium fuel under the Soviet RERTR Program in the 1980s'. REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR Mr. Bevill. Describe the total cost and schedule necessary to design low enriched uranium fuels for the remaining foreign reactors using HEU. Dr. Keliher. Argonne National Laboratory estimates that the total cost of a program to develop and demonstrate an improved type of highly loaded LEU fuel plate for research reactors with a uranium loading equivalent to the highest currently used HEU plate types (the three remaining reactors) would be about $19,650,000 over a period of 6 years. REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR Mr. Bevill. What type of research effort is currently being conducted at what cost and which DOE site? Dr. Keliher. Argonne currently is conducting a research and development program for using LEU instead of HEU in targets for production of fission product molybdenum-99 for use in medical applications in cooperation with current commercial producers. Current plans are to allocate $765,000 to this activity during FY 1994, followed by comparable amounts,during the next two years. Discussions are under way with Argonne National Laboratory regarding proposals to restart development of high-density LEU fuels for possible use in the three remaining foreign research reactors and in HEU reactors built and supplied by the former Soviet Union. In addition, new high flux reactors being designed in the U.S., Germany, Russia, and China could require these new fuels to operate with. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT Mr. Bevill. What performance measurements should be used to measure the effectiveness of this program? Dr. Keliher. The following list can be used to measure the effectiveness of the program: - Zero incidents of theft of nuclear materials and/or nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons design information. - Zero public health and safety problems encountered as a result of theft, sabotage, and terrorist activity. - Minimum accountability problems and Special Nuclear Materials domestic violations are encountered. - Zero penetration of nuclear facilities by terrorist groups. - Zero fatalities as a result of terrorist attack or hostage situations. - Zero theft or diversion of nuclear weapons, and/or special nuclear materials. - Review of approximately 650,000 documents for the declassification program. - Central Training Academy will conduct 112 courses with 176 iterations in support of a trained and qualified workforce. - Technology and Systems development activities address approximately 60 percent of customers' needs. - Program analysis activities should result in a 7-10 percent crosscut savings and cost avoidance consistent with cost-effective policy implementation. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY THREAT POLICY Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current threat assessment. Have any DOE facilities experienced any threat in the past five years that approaches the threat guidance now in effect? Dr. Keliher. The current Department of Energy (DOE) threat policy is founded on a January 31, 1992, DOE/Department of Defense, (DOD) "Memorandum of Agreement on the Security Threats to DOE and DOD Nuclear Weapons Programs and Facilities." The Memorandum of Agreement was based on a Defense Intelligence Agency review of worldwide threats to United States Government interests. The 'Design Basis Threat Policy for Department of Energy Programs and Facilities" dated July 28, 1993 describes a spectrum of threats to DOE Programs and activities ranging from terrorist threats to Departmental nuclear weapons and production programs to the threats posed by criminals, psychotics, radical environmentalists, foreign agents, and other insiders. The Design Basis Threat Policy, classified Confidential, National Security Information, provides guidance on the characteristics of the various threats types and describes the capabilities of the adversary. The Design Basis Threat Policy also describes Safeguards and Security Program strategies for addressing the threat spectrum. It requires the development of site specific considerations in mitigating threats. The Office of Security Affairs performs an annual review of the threat policy for validity and currency. The current policy replaces an April 1, 1992 version. These revisions replaced the 1983 Generic Threat Statement. Both the April 1992 and July 1993 versions are consistent with the January 1992 interagency Memorandum of Agreement. Currently, the Office of Security Affairs is working with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to draft a document similar to the 1992 agreement with the Department of Defense. A review of incidents at DOE facilities since 1990 indicates that several events categorized as insider threat activity have occurred. These incidents vary from tampering with systems, vandalism and threats directed against other personnel. A series of incidents at one facility were believed to have been caused by disgruntled employees resulting from labor/management disputes. Because of the significant insider controls, these incidents were quickly identified, investigated and resolved with no significant negative or adverse impact to the safeguard and security systems of the facility or the public's health and safety. These incidents were referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further action. Threats of violence to individuals have occurred at several DOE facilities. To the best of our knowledge, however, none have been carried out. There are also clear indications that the Department continues to be actively targeted by foreign interests in the areas of nuclear proliferation and advance technology.- The Department maintains active security and counter intelligence programs that protect against such threats. There have been no incidents of terrorism directed at DOE facilities. There is a growing concern for terrorism in the United States, particularly in light of the World Trade Center terrorist bombing. The ability and readiness of safeguards and security programs at field and Headquarters facilities to detect and respond to terrorist events continues to be frequently tested and certainly provides a deterrence to any group considering such an act. One of the objective's of the program is to provide a high degree of assurance of the programs' ability to successfully respond to the spectrum of threats to include terrorism. The strategy to guard against threats to facilities emphasizes providing a high degree of assurance of a capability to detect, assess, delay, and inhibit unauthorized access to nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons design information. Safeguards and security measures are also designed to prevent acts of sabotage. THREATS TO DOE FACILITIES Mr. Bevill. What is the most likely threat to DOE facilities and what is the least likely? Dr. Keliher. Notwithstanding the 1993 World Trade Center bombing attack, terrorist acts directed against DOE programs and facilities, while potentially resulting in catastrophic consequences, are the least likely to occur partly due to the,deterrence in place. The threat posed by cleared and authorized insiders is perhaps the most likely and includes theft of material and equipment, espionage and sabotage. The threat posed by insiders is also potentially exacerbated by the current downsizing of some Departmental programs, as well as other major changes in our programs. Some Departmental locations have also been targeted by anti-nuclear and/or radical environmental extremist groups. Those actions have resulted in demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience and trespass. DECLASSIFICATION EFFORT Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current effort to declassify information including the funding for each year and milestones. Dr. Keliher. As a followup to the Secretary's December 7, 1993 press conference, the Office of Declassification issued a second call for information declassification proposals at the end of December 1993. The first joint DOE/DOD meeting to discuss these new proposed declassifications was completed on March 3. A new call will be issued for additional information declassification proposals by July 1994. Additionally, we are involved in a comprehensive, fundamental review of DOE classification policy to determine what information is still truly sensitive and requires protection. This review is scheduled to be completed within 12 months after initiation. To assist in accomplishing this review, four additional full-time employees and four additional contractor support personnel have been selected and should be on the job within the next 45 days. This policy review will be followed by a review and revision of DOE classification guidance, scheduled to be completed at the end of one additional year. This classification guidance consists of detailed instructions describing what is classified and is used as the basis for the declassification review of documents. To accelerate the review and declassification of documents, additional derivative declassifies must be trained. Therefore, a substantial increase in the number of authorized derivative declassifies required to support this initiative in the field are in the process of being trained (as many as 300 more). Each authorized derivative declassifier must attend a training course conducted by DOE Headquarters. Funding for the declassifies is not included in this budget request; they are funded by the program offices. In addition, there will be a substantial increase in the number of Headquarters Office of Declassification Federal positions as well as support contractors who will require training as derivative declassifies. Current program expectations for declassifying documents in the following areas are as follows: Responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests - At the end of FY 1993, the backlog in FOIA classified documents was approximately 2 years. By the end of FY 1994, provided the public demand for access does not increase, the backlog should be reduced to 18 months, and by the end of FY 1995 and future years the backlog should be less than 1 year. Support to Declassify Historical Documents at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) - In FY 1994, we will hire and train six qualified document reviewers. By mid-March 1994, we plan to have an average of three document reviewers to directly support NARA in the review of DOE and predecessor agency documents. During FY 1995, the target is to support NARA with six fully qualified and trained document reviewers. Other Document Reviews (includes documents involved in litigation, congressional testimony, draft documents intended for public release, etc.) Maintain the close support of operational needs of our clients. Funding to support the information declassification initiative is as follows: FY 1994 - $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000. CENTRAL TRAINING ACADEMY OPERATING COSTS Mr. Bevill. What is the total cost of operating the Central. Training Academy and the FTEs in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995? Are funds provided from any sources other than this budget? Dr. Keliher. The costs for the Central Training Academy (CTA) are as follows: FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 (In Thousands of Dollars) Program $ 7,323 $ 7,933 $ 8,867 Program Direction/Other Services 393* 700 709 Total Central Training Academy $ 7,716 $ 8,633 $ 9,576 FTEs 5 5 5 *In FY 1993, the funding for Program Direction was provided by the Weapons Production and Surveillance budget. In FY 1994, Program Direction funding increases due to the funding of janitorial services and costs associated with replacement of mechanical systems. In addition to the above funding, CTA receives approximately $200,000 annually from other Departmental programs to cover CTA staff travel and adjunct costs related to specially requested Mobile Training Team activities. These Mobile Training Teams are in addition to normally scheduled and budgeted CTA classes. Since the establishment of the CTA, the Albuquerque Operations Office has provided funding for CTA's rent, electricity, etc. (it is estimated that approximately $500,000 is expended annually). In FY 1993, the CTA received $2,000,000 in General Plant Project funding. The CTA in FY 1994 and FY 1995 has zero General Plant Project funding. GUARD OVERTIME COSTS Mr. Bevill. There have been reports of excessive overtime costs for guards at several facilities. Can you discuss this issue? Dr. Keliher. Based upon data from the Rocky Flats Operations Office, there are indications that protective force personnel at this location are working excessive overtime hours based upon existing protective force contract allowances. Based on Fiscal Year 1992 data, in some instances, the annual wage of an armed guard is supplemented in excess of 90 percent by overtime compensation. Based upon data compilation, information analysis, and research by Department of Energy Headquarters staff personnel and an independent research group, the following working hour guidelines are being examined to help standardize duty hour application: - No more than 12 total hours worked per continuous 24 hour period, inclusive of shift change briefings and uniform and equipment outfitting. - No more than 60 total hours worked per seven day week. These guidelines are intended as a tool that can assist managers and contract officers in future negotiations dealing with protective forces. It is believed that cost savings can be realized from the enactment of these guidelines. RESOURCE REVIEW INITIATIVES Mr. Bevill. Describe the actions taken to date to reduce Department-wide Safeguards and Security (S&S) costs. Dr. Keliher. In fiscal year 1993, DOE mandated a complex-wide S&S resource review designed to identify opportunities for program savings while ensuring appropriate and effective security for DOE assets and personnel. This effort was coordinated by the Office of Security Affairs. This effort identified over 400 cost saving initiatives. These initiatives offer a potential estimated cost-savings of approximately $200M in FY 1995 when compared to the original FY 1992 cost estimate for complex-wide expenditures of $1.2B. Estimated complex-wide S&S expenditures for FY 1995 are approximately $62M below actual FY 1993 expenditures. In addition to the 400 specific initiatives submitted by the Operations Offices, the Office of Security Affairs resource review identified consolidation of special nuclear materials as a significant opportunity for resource savings. Examples are: - fewer hardened storage facilities. - reduced equipment and accountability requirements. - smaller number of protective force personnel. The Office of Security Affairs has instituted measures to assure the continuation of an ongoing system to identify and pursue cost saving activities. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CROSSCUT Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and Security funding throughout the Department for FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995. Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FY 1995 Congressional Budget Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates BY FACILITY (in thousands) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Organization/Facility Actuals Estimate Request ---------------------------------------- --------- --------- -------- Albuquerque Albuquerque Direct 83,911 86,676 85,954 Allied (Kansas City) 6,994 7,516 6,203 Central Training Academy 9,186 8,857 9,639 Grand Junction Project Off. 932 1,055 1,091 Los Alamos Natl. Lab. 66,934 74,385 74,677 Mound 8,603 6,885 5,673 Pantex 34,356 56,284 54,858 Pinellas 4,974 4,450 1,523 Rocky Flats 76,661 75,129 65,820 Sandia Natl. Lab. 52,768 64,443 63,452 --------- -------- --------- Total, Albuquerque 344,629 385,680 368,890 Chicago Chicago Direct 1,493 1,445 1,532 Ames Natl. Lab. 448 215 223 Argonne Natl. Lab. 13,390 14,098 14,839 Brookhaven Natl. Lab. 7,016 7,518 7,766 Fermi National Lab. 2,065 2,365 3,351 New Brunswick Lab. 4,253 4,215 4,295 Princeton Plasma Physics Lab. 1,213 1,212 1,291 --------- -------- --------- Total, Chicago 29,878 31,068 33,297 National Renewable Energy Laboratory 675 1,000 1,049 Superconducting Super Collider 1,300 1,400 1,446 Idaho 40,093 39,141 43,148 Nevada 68,434 73,083 67,081 Naval Petroleum Reserves 1,180 1,245 1,269 Oak Ridge Oak Ridge 24,271 25,975 25,952 Cont. Electron Beam Accelerator Fac. 330 345 355 FERMCO 3,025 2,788 2,644 Oak Ridge Institute for Sci. & Ed. 851 714 925 Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. 6,950 7,726 7,304 Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 11,560 3,888 1,323 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion 22,532 22,059 10,463 Y- 12 40,905 27,921 29,344 --------- -------- -------- Total Oak Ridge 110,424 91,416 78,310 Pittsburgh Naval Reactors 12,342 12,223 10,774 File Name: BYSITE95.WK3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FY 1995 Congressional Budget Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates BY FACILITY (in thousands) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Organization/Facility Actuals Estimate Request -------------------------------------- --------- ---------- --------- Richland 60,865 56,311 39,693 San Francisco San Francisco (Oakland Ops Office) 8,014 7,617 8,158 Lawrence Livermore Natl, Lab. 37,370 34,842 35,177 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 1,137 1,033 1,062 Stanford Linear Accelerator 834 812 852 --------- --------- --------- Total, San Francisco 47,355 44,304 45,249 Savannah River 140,331 110,781 125,567 Schenectady Naval Reactors 13,208 13,534 14,182 Bartlesville Project Office 61 232 239 Office of Scientific & Tech. Infor. 635 725 760 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Off. 19,468 16,801 16,250 Western Area Power Admin. 870 870 890 Morgantown Energy Tech. Ctr. 499 725 529 Pittsburgh Energy Tech. Ctr. 1,600 1,600 1,515 Headquarters 101,640 93,629 83,012 --------- -------- ------- Total DOE Safeguards & Security 995,487 975,768 933,150 File Name:BYSITE95.WK3 GUARD FORCE SIZE AND EXPENDITURE Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995. Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided: ****PROTECTIVE FORCES LEVELS AND OPERATING BUDGETS chart is attached to original document**** ADDITIONAL SUPPORT DETAIL Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995. Dr. Keliher. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows: ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TASKS AND FUNDING (In Thousands of Dollars) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Chicago Field Office S&S Staff $ 1,445 $ 1,503 $ 1,532 Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade Technical Assistance 313 313 313 Technical Support to Headquarters and Field Assistance 2,825 3,054 2,946 Support Services Contracts 7,174 9,165 7,695 AOSS Modernization 0 900 1,200 Maintenance of HQ Security Alarm 0 290 350 Total Additional Support $11,757 $15,225 $14,036 Security Investigations SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and level of clearances throughout the Department? Dr. Keliher. As a result of the general downsizing of classified activities within the Department, particularly in the nuclear weapons program, the number of active security clearances were reduced during the interval of April 1993 to March 1994 from about 166,000 to about 154,000. Additional reductions will be realized again this year consistent with the national laboratories' direction to eliminate corporate policies that require all employees to be cleared as a condition of employment at a Department of Energy owned site. As in the past year, the Department's contractor employees will be processed for a DOE clearance only when such an action can be justified based upon the duties of the employee's position. Efforts continue at DOE contractor sites to consolidate classified and special nuclear material inventories, which will result in the need for fewer clearances by their employees. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other Federal employees in FY 1993 and FY 1994. Dr. Keliher. There are just under 154,000 clearances currently held by DOE Employees, contractors, and other Federal employees. Current information will be provided for the record. ****CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1994 chart is attached to original document**** PERSONNEL CLEARANCE PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. How will the change in mission at Rocky Flats, Mound and Pinellas impact the number of security clearances in FY 1995? Dr. Keliher. I would like to submit the following information for the record. - Rocky Flats. Mission change will have very little impact in FY 1995 due to the continued need to consolidate material and classified matter. - Mound. Mission change will result in the downgrading of a significant portion of the work force from "Q" to "L" but current estimates do not indicate that the total number of security clearances will be affected. - Pinellas. Mission changes will result in a 25 percent reduction in the number of security clearances in FY 1995 (400 clearances). SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency, of investigations and reinvestigations performed for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995? Describe the reasons for the increases or decreases. Dr. Keliher. The following data on investigations and reinvestigations is inserted for the record: (The information follows:) INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 ACTUAL ESTIMATED REQUEST FBI Initial Investigations 21 18 15 OPM Initial Investigations Single Scope Background 9,456 7,144 4,600 Background 45 50 50 Limited Background 936 550 300 OPM Reinvestigations Periodic - Single Scope 13,517 16,978 13,345 Limited Background 7,809 0 0 OPM National Agency Checks Initial 3,551 5,210 5,500 Reinvestigations 5,460 7,635 7,900 TOTAL INVESTIGATIONS 40,895 37,585 31,710 FBI investigations have decreased as that agency is now being used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who occupy positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (150 positions have such designations within the Department). The number of Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI's) continues to decline as the Department emphasizes the need to reduce the number and levels of DOE access authorizations to a minimum consistent with operating requirements. OPM Background Investigations (BI's) decreased beginning in FY 1993 when the SSBI became available. Currently a BI is only conducted on DOE employees who occupy critical sensitive positions, but do not require access to classified material in order to perform their official duties. OPM Limited Background Investigations (LBI's) conducted for reinvestigations have been discontinued as a result of the adoption of the Periodic Reinvestigation - Single Scope Background Investigation (PRIS) in December 1992. LBI's are currently used only for initial L and Secret clearances for DOE employees or if the PRIS must be expanded due to special circumstances. OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACC) will increase as the need for the number of initial Q clearances is reduced. PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. Describe the effort to develop an electronic transfer program for security clearances, including the timetable for completion and cost by year. Dr. Keliher. The current time between the DOE request for a background investigation and receipt of the completed product from the investigative agency (Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) is approximately 75 days. However, depending on the geographic location, it takes another 15 to 30 days in mail time to send and receive the case papers and completed investigation. This project will implement an electronic transfer system (including appropriate safeguards of data) between each of the DOE Operations Offices and the OPM's Office of Federal Investigations in Boyers, Pennsylvania, which will allow DOE to electronically transfer the paperwork requesting a background investigation (including fingerprints) to OPM, and when the background investigation is completed, to have it electronically transferred to the appropriate DOE Operations Office for adjudication. This will also allow transfer of security files between DOE Operations Offices. The electronic transfer system will eliminate the mail time between DOE and OPM. The FY 1995 Security Investigations budget includes $2,200,000 for this project. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET, Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs. Dr. Keliher. There is approximately a 50/50 split of the FY 1995 Security Investigations budget allocation between defense and other than defense activities, as shown below in the table which I would like to insert into the record. (The information follows:) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS FY 1995 Defense/Environmental Activities $19,801,770 Other than Defense/Environmental 19,025,230 Total SI Budget 38,827,000 Use of Prior-Year-Funds -4,000,000 FY 1995 REQUEST $34,827,000 SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakout, by activity, of the $3.6 million requested for Related Security Investigations Activities. Dr. Keliher. The breakout of our request for Related Security Investigations Activities is shown on a table which I would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:) RELATED SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITIES FY 1995 Electronic Transfer Program $2,200,000 Implementation of Accelerated Access Authorization Program (AAAP) 1,300,000 National Industrial Security Program (NISP) support 50,000 TOTAL - Related SI Activities $3,550,000 EFFECTIVENESS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE Mr. Bevill. Please describe how this office has increased the effectiveness of emergency response activities throughout the Department. Dr. Keliher. The Office of Emergency Planning and Operations has been re-organized into the Office of Emergency Management within the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The Office of Emergency Management has retained the responsibilities for the Department's Emergency Management System, which is the framework for all the Department's emergency planning, preparedness, and readiness assurance activities. The Office of Emergency Management has increased the effectiveness of emergency response activities throughout the Department by providing a consistent framework for emergency planning, preparedness, and response activities for multiple hazards which threaten workers, the public, the environment, and national security. Effectiveness of emergency response activities has been increased through: (1) standardization of terminology and concepts, most importantly the development of specific hazards assessments to be used to define emergency management programs; (2) development of detailed guidance for appropriateness and consistency in the implementation of Departmental requirements for emergency management activities; (3) development of an active training program for emergency management activities, ranging from introduction to the Emergency Management System to specific courses on hazards assessments and event classification; and, (4) an aggressive readiness assurance program which includes reviews of emergency plans, evaluations of emergency response exercises, appraisals of site-specific emergency management programs, and the development of a performance test program for all components of the Emergency Management System. COORDINATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND OPERATIONS Mr Bevill. How are efforts of this office coordinated with the emergency response and operations funded in the defense programmatic areas? Dr. Keliher. The Office of Emergency Planning and operations has been re-organized into the office of Emergency Management within the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The Office of Emergency Management has retained the responsibilities for the Department's Emergency Management System, which is the framework for all the Department's emergency planning, preparedness, and readiness assurance activities. The Emergency Management System has been established to ensure a fully coordinated and integrated emergency preparedness program is maintained by the Department. Emergency response and operations activities funded in the defense programmatic area include the unique radiological emergency response assets (i.e., the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, the Accident Response Group, the Aerial Measuring System, the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the Radiological Assistance Program, and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site) managed by the Department for its defense-related facilities, operations, and activities. Program management responsibilities for the response assets are solely within the defense programmatic purview, subject to periodic review, appraisal, and evaluation by the Office of Emergency Management, as are the emergency management programs for the Department's defense-related facilities, operations, and activities. Coordination is accomplished by the Office of Emergency Management through a number of mechanisms and activities, including: chairing the Department's. Emergency Management Advisory Committee, which is comprised of representatives of all Departmental elements with emergency preparedness responsibilities and interests; participation in the directives development process which sets Departmental responsibilities, authorities, and requirements; review and concurrence on emergency readiness assurance plans; and, concurrence in selection of Departmental representatives to interagency and international committees, work groups, and task forces. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS Mr. Bevill. Please provide a Department-wide crosscut of emergency preparedness funding and associated FTEs for FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995. Dr. Keliher. I would like to provide tables for the record which list the funding and associated FTEs for the Department's emergency response and preparedness programs. The individual program descriptions and associated funding levels are also provided. (The information follows:) ****Department of Energy Emergency Crosscut Table Charts is attached to original document**** ORGANIZATION: Defense Programs PROGRAM: Research and Development APPROPRIATION: Weapons Activities EMERGENCY RESPONSE *($52.6M) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) provides a capability to effectively address counterterrorist or extortionist attempts to utilize stolen nuclear Weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radioactive dispersal devices to achieve their objectives. The NEST responsibility was mandated by Executive Order. ($35.3M) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) provides assistance to state and local governments to counter the offsite consequences of all types of nuclear or radiological accidents and relies heavily on equipment and systems developed by other weapons program emergency response capabilities. FRMAC was established by the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. ($1.1M) Aerial Measurements System (AMS) provides an airborne, remote sensing capability to be used to monitor short and long-term environmental impacts at major DOE installations, to track plumes and map radiation deposited in the event of an accident, and to conduct routine surveys for the Nation's nuclear facilities. ($8.8M) Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) is a centralized computer-based system that is used for both emergency planning and response, provides estimates of transport, diffusion, and deposition of radioactive and other hazardous material released into the atmosphere and assists in developing dose projections. ($7.4M) * includes operating expenses and capital equipment ORGANIZATION: Defense Programs PROGRAM: Stockpile Support APPROPRIATION: Weapons Activities EMERGENCY OPERATIONS *($13.4M) Accident Response Group (ARG) is specifically designed to address an emergency involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in the custody of the DOE or DOD. The ARG is staffed with scientist;, engineers, and other technical personnel from the Department's national laboratories and Management and Operating (M&O) contractors. ($10.0M) Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides immediate regional radiological emergency response support throughout the U.S. and its territories. The RAP teams are divided into eight RAP Regional Coordinating Offices and are made up of highly qualified and trained personnel from DOE field elements and its M&O contractors. ($2.7M) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) is a recognized World Health Organization center located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, providing medical training and advice regarding radiological injuries and is capable of treating radiation related injuries at its Oak Ridge center or at the site of the emergency. ($0.7M) EMERGENCY OPERATIONS *($5.6M) Field Emergency Operations Center includes the,operations and maintenance of the Albuquerque EOC, the development and installation of enhanced EOC capabilities, the training of EOC personnel and management oversight of production plant EOCs. ($5.lM) Field Emergency Preparedness includes management oversight of emergency preparedness and crisis management capabilities at all production sites, emergency preparedness appraisal and training activities, EOC exercises, the development of plans and procedures, and the management of the emergency operations vital records protection program. ($0.5M) * includes operating expenses and capital equipment ORGANIZATION: Nonproliferation and National Security PROGRAM: Program Direction APPROPRIATION: Weapons Activities EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ($17.3M) o Program serves as Department's focal point and interagency point-of-contact for emergency preparedness and response activities. o Principal mission is to assure an integrated and coordinated DOE response to all emergencies. * includes operating expenses and capital equipment ORGANIZATION:, Nonproliferation and National Security PROGRAM: Emergency Preparedness APPROPRIATION: Emergency Preparedness EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ($ 4.6M) o The Emergency Preparedness Program leads the Department's efforts to develop and direct energy emergency preparedness and operational programs to minimize the adverse impacts of supply disruptions on national security, public safety and the energy infrastructure. o Principal activities: o Use management information and support systems to anticipate and assess energy emergencies and shortages of energy supplies, inform senior management, and execute responses. o Exchange information among all responsible groups (media, Congress, Federal agencies, States and industry) in the event of an emergency affecting the Nation's energy supplies. o Test plans, procedures and capabilities to respond to energy emergencies. ORGANIZATION: Policy, Planning and Program Evaluation PROGRAM: Emergency Planning APPROPRIATION: Emergency Preparedness EMERGENCY PLANNING ($3.6M) Insure nation,al preparedness to prevent, mitigate, and/or respond to energy emergencies. Preparation for a test of the IEA's Coordinated Emergency Response Measure (CERM). In conjunction with the IEA, conduct a full scale CERM test. Expand review of natural gas monitoring, with emphasis on gas trade and potential disruptions. Support full review and modification of the IEA emergency response mechanisms. ORGANIZATION: Office of Nuclear Energy PROGRAM: Nuclear Energy Research and Development Oak Ridge Landlord APPROPRIATION: Energy Supply Research and Development EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER ($1.65M) The Emergency Operations Center is responsible for emergency management at Oak Ridge Operations Office required by orders, federal laws, and regulations such as development of plans and procedures necessary for emergency management activities; development of training programs; design/development/ implementation of drills and exercises; integration of plans and procedures with offsite authorities; installation/maintenance/test/operation of radios, alarms telephones, video telecommunications, etc.; assessment of impacts of airborne releases of hazardous, toxic, and radioactive materials for all Oak Ridge sites, etc. ORGANIZATION: Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management PROGRAM: Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act Section 180(c) Implementation APPROPRIATION: Nuclear Waste Fund TRAINING ($0.2M) Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Section 180 (c), the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management is conducting a program to "provide technical assistance and funds to States for training for public safety officials of appropriate units of local government and Indian tribes through whose jurisdiction the Secretary plans to transport spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste under subtitle A or under subtitle C. Training shall cover procedures required for safe routine transportation of these materials, as well as procedures for dealing with emergency response situations. The Waste Fund shall be the source of funds for work carried out under this subsection." ORGANIZATION: Fossil Energy PROGRAM: Strategic Petroleum Reserve APPROPRIATION: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Emergency Response ($244.0M) The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is the Nation's front line of defense incase of an oil supply disruption. That being the case the entire SPR budget of $244 million and 166 FTE's is considered an emergency response area. ORGANIZATION: Fossil Energy PROGRAM: Fossil Energy Research & Development APPROPRIATION: Fossil Energy Research & Development Emergency Response ($0.4M) METC Emergency Responses/Preparedness Program provides the teams, training, equipment, and interface agreements to respond to hazardous situations which could credibly occur on the Morgantown Energy Technology Center (METC) site. The purpose of the Program is both to protect Government personnel/equipment and also to protect the surrounding community from any hazard propagation. PETC Emergency Responses/Preparedness Program provides the teams, training, equipment, and interface agreements to respond to hazardous situations which could credibly occur on the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center (PETC) site. The purpose of the Program is both to protect Government personnel/equipment and also to protect the surrounding community from any hazard propagation. BPO Emergency Responses/Preparedness provides the teams, training, equipment, and interface agreements to respond to hazardous situations which could occur on the Bartlesville Project Office. The purpose of the Program is both to protect Government personnel/equipment and also to protect the surrounding community from any hazard propagation. ORGANIZATION: Fossil Energy PROGRAM: Naval Petroleum Reserves APPROPRIATION: Naval Petroleum Reserves Emergency Response ($0.3M) NPR Emergency Response/Preparedness Program provides the teams, training, equipment, and interface agreements to respond to hazardous situations which could credibly occur on the Naval Petroleum Reserves (NPR) site. The purpose of the Program is both to protect Government personnel/equipment and also to protect the surrounding community from any hazard propagation. ORGANIZATION: Environmental Management PROGRAM: Waste Management APPROPRIATION: Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Waste Isolation Pilot Plant ($1.9M) The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Program budget in FY 1995 includes $1.9 million for emergency response activities including exercises and training of Local, State, and Indian tribe response personnel. Funding and equipment are provided through the Western Governor's Association, through the Stipulated Agreement with New Mexico, and through REAC/TS and other training from Westinghouse, the WIPP, management and operating contractor. ORGANIZATION: Environmental Management PROGRAM: Environmental Restoration' APPROPRIATION: Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Fernald ($1.6M) Emergency Preparedness at Fernald Maintains an emergency preparedness and management program at the Fernald Environmental Management Project in Fernald, Ohio, in compliance with all applicable DOE Orders and Federal and State Regulations. Conducts monthly cooperative planning and training committee meetings and coordinates monthly tests of the Offsite Emergency Warning System. Attends Butler/Hamilton County Local Emergency Planning Committee meetings each quarter; conducts annual Emergency Duty Officer (EDO) training, conduct emergency drills and exercise,s, including bi-annual backshift drills, annual building evacuation drills, annual criticality response drills, and Joint Response Drill conducted annually. ($1.6M) ORGANIZATION: Environmental Management PROGRAM: Technology Development APPROPRIATION: Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Emergency Management ($23.0M) Emergency Management provides for a comprehensive program to plan for, respond to, and mitigate incidents and emergency situations which occur at Environmental Management facilities or during DOE-wide transportation activities. This includes an occurrence notification and reporting program to track and analyze off normal, unusual, and emergency occurrences at EM-managed facilities and activities to include DOE-wide transportation activities. It also includes the development and maintenance of emergency plans, systems, and capabilities including an Emergency Management Team, emergency training emergency exercises, and a Readiness Assurance Program. The overall program has three major components; (1) Transportation Emergency Preparedness, (2) Environmental Management Facility Emergency Preparedness, and (3) Environmental Management Occurrence Reporting and Processing. A major activity, started in FY 1994, is the evaluation of a program to manage hazardous materials and hazardous materials emergency response (Hazardous Materials Training Program). Management of this program will transfer to the EM Office of Oversight and Self Assessment in mid-FY 1994. ($23.0) ORGANIZATION: Environmental Management PROGRAM: Facility Transition and Management APPROPRIATION: Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Idaho Operations Office *($8.7M) Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Emergency Preparedness provides for the review and update of hazard assessments, emergency planning zones, and emergency actions levels; review and update of Emergency Preparedness (EP) training; review and update of EP drills and exercises; and procurement of incident response team materials. ($0.5M) INEL Emergency Response Facility Project will complete Title II design activities for the Central Facilities Area Fire Station; bid and award construction subcontract; and initiate construction activities. ($6.7M) INEL Firefighters will provide structure and wildland fire fighting services, emergency medical services, hazardous material incident response, heavy and confined space rescue services, and mutual aid to surrounding communities. (This project is funded by indirects.) ($0.lM) Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) Emergency Preparedness will administer the formal emergency management program assuring that the procedures and the emergency manual are kept up to date and provide for adequate protection of ICPP personnel and equipment in emergency situations; maintain the emergency control center and the emergency vans and associated equipment; conduct emergency drills, exercises, and training to assure ICPP personnel are capable of handling emergency situations; and direct the multi-year plan for the implementation of the DOE Order 5500, emergency preparedness series. ($1.4M) * Includes operating expenses and construction. ORGANIZATION: Environmental Management PROGRAM: Facility Transition and Management APPROPRIATION: Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Richland Operations Office *($4.6M) Field Emergency Operations Center and Field Emergency Preparedness includes the operations and maintenance of the Hanford site and Joint Information Center and the management oversite of the information center. It also includes the management of emergency preparedness and crisis management capabilities at the site. Emergency exercises, the development of plans and procedures, and the management of the emergency operations vital records protection is also included. (This project is funded by indirects.) ($4.6M) * Includes operating expenses. ORGANIZATION: Environmental Management PROGRAM: Facility Transition and Management APPROPRIATION: Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Rocky Flats Office *($1.0M) Emergency Operations Center includes the operation and maintenance of the site Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the development and installation of enhanced EOC capabilities, and the training of EOC personnel and management oversight. (This project is funded by indirects.) ($0.3M) On-Site Emergency Preparedness includes the support for the development of building emergency procedures, building emergency plans, building emergency drills, and hazard assessments. (This project is funded by indirects.) ($0.4M) Off-Site Emergency Preparedness includes all off-site interfaces, development of plans and procedures for state and local emergency response coordination, and emergency planning zone studies. (This project is funded by indirects.) ($0.3M) * Includes operating expenses. ORGANIZATION: Environmental Management PROGRAM: Facility Transition and Management APPROPRIATION: Energy Supply, Research and Development Richland Operations Office *($1.0M) Field Emergency Operations Center and Field Emergency Preparedness includes the operations and maintenance of the Hanford site and Joint Information Center and the management oversite of the information center. It also includes the management of emergency preparedness and crisis management capabilities at the site. Emergency exercises, the development of plans and procedures, and the management of the emergency operations vital records protection is also included. (This project is funded by indirects.) ($l.0M) * Includes operating expenses. WORKER TRAINING AND TRANSITION PROGRAM Mr. Bevill: Please describe the Worker Training and Adjustment Program. Dr. Reis: This program has been renamed the Worker and Community Transition Program. In April 1993, the Secretary established a Task Force on Worker and Community Transition to manage this program which implements section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. Section 3161 requires the Secretary to consult with stakeholders on the development of a work force restructuring plan for a defense facility whenever there is a change in the work force, and to submit the plan to Congress. The work force restructuring plans include initiatives that respond to objectives in section 3161 including minimizing layoffs through early retirement and other benefits, retraining assistance, preference to displaced workers in any hiring by the Department and relocation assistance, outplacement assistance, and local community impact assistance through economic development. These initiatives are worked out by the Department's applicable field organization in consultation with the local stakeholders. For FY 1994, the Department estimated budget requirements based on a reduction of 8,000 jobs at an average cost of $25,000 per job, for a total of $200 million. The program was funded in two accounts: $100 million in the Worker and Community Transition Program account, and $100 million was set aside in the Weapons Program Direction account. For FY 1995, the Department has requested a total of $140 million, with $125 million in the Worker and Community Transition account, and $15 million from the Environmental Restoration and Waste Management program. APPROVED WORK FORCE RESTRUCTURING PLANS THROUGH FEBRUARY 1994 Mr. Bevill: Provide a chart showing by site the number of employee reductions in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995, the costs of the program, and the average cost per employee. Dr. Reis: To date, the Department has approved and sent to Congress seven work force restructuring plans. The job reductions per site, the costs per fiscal year, and the average cost per job lost are shown on the attached chart. Currently, work force restructuring plans are in various stages of development at several sites, and the Department is developing estimates of costs for these plans. The approved work force restructuring plans through February 1994 is shown in a table which I would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:) ****Worker and Community Transition Program Approved Work Force Restructuring Plans Through February 1994 chart is attached to original document**** FUNDING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES Mr. Bevill: Describe the project and the amount of funding provided for each economic development initiative funded in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995. Dr. Reis: The project and amount of funding provided for each economic development initiative are shown in a summary which I would like to insert for the record. Please note that the FY 1993 funding came from the applicable Defense Programs account for a site since the Worker and Training Adjustment account did not exist. (The information follows:) Economic Development Initiatives Summary Funding to help mitigate the phasing out of non-nuclear defense activities at Mound, Pinellas and Rocky Flats. With the decision to phase out the mission at Pinellas and Mound, and the nonnuclear mission at Rocky Flats, the Department committed to provide $500 thousand to each of these three sites to match $3 for $1 provided by the respective community for economic development planning. The Department also agreed to provide $4 million to each of these sites or a total of $12 million to develop non-defense uses for the sites aimed at self-sufficiency., To date, during FY 1994 the full $4.5 million reserved for Pinellas has been authorized, $4 million was authorized for Mound, and $1 million was authorized for Rocky Flats. Planning Grant to Establish and Support the Tampa Bay Defense Transition Task Force. The Department provided $110 thousand in FY 1993 Defense Programs funds to support this Task Force which represents all economic development stakeholders surrounding the Pinellas Plant. Commercialization Study of the Mound Facility. The Department provided $200 thousand in FY 1993 Defense Programs funding to support phase II of a commercialization study of Mound. Planning Grant to the East Tennessee Economic Council (formerly Roane- Anderson). The Council serves as a liaison between regional stakeholders, Martin Marietta Energy Systems and the Department of Energy (DOE) to develop plans and programs relating to the changing missions of DOE facilities and the impact on communities in the region. The Council received $150 thousand in FY 1993 to support its establishment and planning activities. Oak Ridge Manufacturing Skills Campus. This proposal was included in the Oak Ridge Work Force Restructuring P,lan which was submitted to Congress August 31, 1993. The skills campus develops highly qualified trainers from the existing work force on advanced manufacturing skills and technologies. The trainers will then train workers at Oak Ridge for new missions at the site as well as for private sector companies who would send their own operators or trainers to the campus. Local academic institutions would. also be customers of the campus as well as participate in the training. Estimated cost: $10.8 million, with $427 thousand in FY 1993, $7.3 million in FY 1994, and $3.1 million in FY 1995. Oak Ridge Technology 2020. This project will develop three integrated business units to: utilize telecommunications to transfer unique technological resources in the region to interested partners, help businesses apply emerging telecommunications technology and to create new partnerships to create new technologies and applications, and establish an innovative business incubator to stimulate the creation of new, technology-oriented businesses. Local stakeholders committed $2.9 million to the project including building a Technology 2020 facility. The Department contributed $1.5 million in FY 1994 as our share of support for the project. Planning Grant to establish the Savannah River Regional Diversification Initiative. In FY 1993, a $100 thousand grant was issued to the Lower Savannah Council of Governments to establish the Savannah River Regional Diversification Initiative. The Initiative is composed of a regional group of community, business, education and government leaders formed to develop an economic development plan to focus Department of Energy and regional efforts on the impacts of defense restructuring. The group was assembled under the leadership of regional members of Congress: Butler Derrick (SC), Floyd Spence (SC), Don Johnson (GA) and Cynthia McKinney (GA). Support for the Savannah River Regional Diversification Initiative (SRRDI). This proposal was included in the Savannah River Work Force Restructuring Plan which was sent to Congress on August 31, 1993. The SRRDI will develop a regional economic development plan, then solicit and fund proposals with the highest potential to achieve the vision in the plan. Estimated cost: $4.2 million, with $1.4 million in FY 1993, and $2.8 million in FY 1994. Congress identified $6 million in the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act (Worker Training and Adjustment Account) for economic assistance and development funding for five counties adjacent to the Savannah River Site, with $1 million targeted for economic development planning and $5 million for funding partnership proposals with designated state agencies, educational institutions and other entities for economic expansion based on site technologies and technology-based programs. Reclamation and Reduction of Nuclear Residuals Program at the Savannah River Site. This proposal was developed by the non-profit South Carolina Research Authority to provide a technical assessment of a concept for comprehensive management of the residues from the use and production of nuclear materials in South Carolina. The assessment is the first phase of a potential multi-phase project to define a nuclear materials management program at the Savannah River Site that greatly improves nuclear materials storage and disposal. The Department provided a grant for $298,602 for the assessment which is funded from FY 1993 carryover funds designated for economic development activities. Nevada Economic Development Communication Network. This communications network will facilitate communications and coordination among economic development activities in Nevada. The Department provided $200 thousand as a $3 to $1 match with Nevada stakeholders. Hanford Agribusiness Technology Commercialization and Development (ATCD) Center. This project establishes a facility in Richland, Washington, to support agricultural research and stimulate creation of new businesses in the communities surrounding the Hanford Plant. The Department provided $100 thousand in FY 1994 in support of this project, and expects a request for another $100 thousand in FY 1995. NUCLEAR MATERIALS DISPOSITION Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Department's nuclear materials disposition project. Dr. Reis. The Nuclear Materials Disposition project is a departmentwide effort, reporting directly to the Under Secretary, with responsibility for developing departmental recommendations and implementing decisions concerning control and disposition of excess nuclear materials. The project's objective is to help provide for the safe, secure, and environmentally sound control, storage, and ultimate disposition of surplus fissile materials in a manner that promotes effective nonproliferation policies and sets an example for other nations to follow. The project coordinates the Department's participation on nuclear materials issues being addressed by a subgroup of the President's Interagency Working Group. The Department's project will operate in an open manner and assure stakeholder participation in the decisionmaking process. FISSILE MATERIAL INVENTORIES Mr. Bevill. Please provide a chart showing the inventory of fissile materials by site and type of material. Dr. Reis. The attached charts provide information on the following materials: americium-241, neptunium-237, plutonium-239, uranium-233, and uranium-235. ****Inventory of Americium-241 (gm AM-241), Inventory of Neptunium-237 (gm Np) Inventory of Plutonium-239 (kg Pu), Inventory of Uranium-233 (kg U-233), Inventory of Highly Enriched Uranium (kg U) charts are attached to original document**** NUCLEAR MATERIALS DISPOSITION FUNDING Mr. Bevill. No funding has been requested for this activity in FY 1995. Will funding be required? Dr. Reis. Yes, funding will be required. The Department's budget request submitted to Congress for FY 1995 does not specifically identify funds for the Department's surplus nuclear materials control and disposition efforts. However, a number of such efforts are covered within the amounts requested for individual programs. Additional control and disposition activities, identified subsequent to the FY 1995 budget submission, are under consideration. The Department is reviewing the FY 1995 budget submission to identify the range of funds which would contribute to these efforts from within the proposed FY 1995 levels. NUCLEAR MATERIALS DISPOSITION FUNDING Mr. Bevill. Describe how the Department has used the funding provided for this activity in FY 1993 and FY 1994. Dr. Reis. The Department's Office of Nuclear Energy used FY 1993 funds to complete an-initial phase of studies to evaluate the feasibility of using Advanced Light Water and Modular High Temperature Gas Reactors to dispose of plutonium, produce tritium if needed, and produce electricity. In addition, the Liquid Metal Reactor was evaluated using a separate source of funds. This was done in order to have an assessment of all the advanced reactor technologies for purposes of burning plutonium. The Department has expended approximately $16 million through March 1994 of the $19 million planned for these activities. DOE is in the process of identifying additional light water and gas reactor evaluation activities that will be conducted in FY 1994 and FY 1995 with the remaining funds of approximately $12 million. The detailed funding allocations are shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) ****FY 1993 PU Disposition Funds chart is attached to original document**** For FY 1994, $30 million was.provided to the Department's Defense Programs for research and evaluation activities related to the production of tritium and to initiate a systematic review of options for plutonium disposition. These funds were also provided to examine storage issues. The Department's plutonium disposition review activities will include a full range of reactor and nonreactor technologies as well as disposal options for plutonium such as vitrification. The Department is using these funds to complete work on tritium production under its Weapons Complex Reconfiguration program. In addition, this funding is being used to perform a vulnerability assessment of plutonium inventories; environmental and technical analysis of long-term storage and disposition options; and to obtain independent evaluations of these efforts. The Department is in the process of identifying additional plutonium storage and disposition activities that will be undertaken with the remaining funds and the related FY 1995 and outyear funding needs for this effort. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION Mr. Bevill. Please describe the accelerator production of tritium program including funding by year and milestones. Dr. Reis. The goals of the project are to quantify the safety and environmental characteristics of a linear proton accelerator used for producing tritium, develop the life cycle cost estimate, and demonstrate the technical feasibility of the system. In FY 1992 $21 million was provided for the development of a preconceptual design. An additional $9 million was made available in FY 1994. This brings the total funding through FY 1994 to $30 million. The major areas of interest have been accelerator design, lithium-aluminum target design, helium 3 target design, balance of plant design, confirmatory experiments, and an environmental safety and health assessment. These areas of interest continue during this year with emphasis on the analysis of data collected during physics and material experiments conducted last year. While other development work could be useful, with the conclusion of the work scheduled through FY 1994, sufficient information will be available for comparison with the reactor technologies for producing tritium. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Fazio. The National Ignition Facility (NIF), constructed through the Department's Inertial Confinement Fusion Program in Defense Programs, would be such an experimental facility. Can you describe its role in the scientifically based stockpile stewardship program? Dr. Reis. The National Ignition Facility will be an aboveground facility which will provide the capability to conduct thermonuclear ignition and burn experiments in the laboratory. As such it will provide an unsurpassed capability for studying many phenomena that occur in nuclear weapons. It will supply experimental data relevant to nuclear weapons in the areas of weapon physics and weapon effects. Some of this data cannot be obtained at any other facility except through underground tests. Furthermore, the NIF will help to improve computer modeling of nuclear weapons, transfer sophisticated technologies to the weapons program, and help to maintain and enhance our nuclear weapon expertise. It will provide a state-of-the-art technology capability in high-energy-density physics and will, therefore, enhance our capability to research advanced nuclear weapons should that become necessary. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Fazio. What additional implications has the National Ignition Facility (NIF) for energy production and basic science? For the boosting of the U.S. laser and optics industry? Dr. Reis. Recent studies of potential inertial fusion power plants funded by the Department of Energy have shown that inertial fusion energy has the potential to be a clean, economical source of energy in the future. The National Ignition Facility will provide the single most important demonstration in support of inertial fusion energy - the demonstration of fusion ignition in the laboratory. In addition, NiF is prototypical of an inertial fusion energy power plant in size, radiation field spectra, and intensity. Thus, NIF will provide a testbed for inertial fusion energy research in technical areas such as materials research, target design, target fabrication, and target chamber engineering. Basic science will clearly benefit from the information gained in a wide spectrum of areas such as laser-plasma interaction physics, atomic and radiation physics, hydrodynamics, and high energy density physics, as well as providing basic science information on the physics of ignition and fusion burn. Other indirect benefits will result from the "cutting-edge" technology that is inherent in this project. The design and construction of the NIF will drive advances and improvements in: electro-optics and fiber optic applications; flashlamp design and optimization; power conditioning and capacitor technology; and high power/energy laser beam control and diagnostics. The optics industry will also directly benefit from additional development of high damage threshold coatings and high production rate, high quality, large optics. INERTIAL FUSION Mr. Fazio. In addition to its role in the stockpile stewardship program, is the National Ignition Facility (NIF) also needed to achieve these other purposes? Dr. Reis. Yes, NIF is a unique facility that in addition to its role in stockpile stewardship, energy production, and basic science contributes to other areas highlighted in the draft National Security Strategic Plan. In the drawdown and disposition of nuclear weapons, the NIF will help to encourage international collaboration, particularly with Russia, that should reduce the spread of nuclear weapons expertise to other countries. In the technology infrastructure and core competencies focus area, NIF design, construction, and operation will help keep the fabrication, optics, and other industries competitive. Finally, in the nonproliferation and arms control focus area, NIF will help keep the Department of Energy as a preeminent research and development organization, capable of anticipating nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and arms control needs. In terms of need, the NIF is essential to inertial fusion energy and contributes in a manner unequaled by other current or proposed facilities. The demonstration of laboratory fusion ignition is a basic requirement for inertial fusion energy success. The high power/high energy density afforded by the facility is likewise required for several classes of basic science experiments, as well as weapons physics and weapons effects testing. DEFENSE PROGRAMS' ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP LEGACY Mrs. Meek. Previous testimony has concerned the environmental cleanup at various Department nuclear weapons facilities and laboratories. About $6 billion is being requested for FY 1995 and there will be comparable requests for many years to come. If the nuclear material had been handled properly in the first place, the taxpayers would not be facing these bills. Will we be facing future bills for environmental cleanup from current activities and, if so, how much and why? Dr. Reis. The enormity of the cleanup effort is due to the fact that hundreds of metric tons of special nuclear materials and hazardous and toxic chemicals were either produced, or processed, or stored at DOE sites for nearly 50 years. The sheer volume of these materials and the complexity of the processes used in the weapons program at many facilities that are outdated has contributed to the need for a massive cleanup and restoration effort. Over the past 30 years, there have been many changes in legislation and regulations at both the Federal and local levels to protect the environment, the public, and the workers at and around Federal facilities. In order to comply with these laws and regulations, and to protect the environment, the Department has embraced source reduction as the national strategy of first choice to reduce the generation of pollution. Pursuant to the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, the Department has implemented innumerable enhancements to its current operations that will minimize, and in some instances obliterate, the generation of hazardous waste. For example, the Department is no longer using toxic chemicals in its machinery cutting oils at the Kansas City Plant and has constructed effluent treatment facilities to purify liquid discharges from the separations and fuel fabrication facilities at the Savannah River Site. Therefore, we foresee nominal, prospective environmental cleanup costs relevant to current operations of the Department's nuclear weapons facilities and laboratories. DEFENSE PROGRAMS' ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP LEGACY Mrs. Meek. What steps are being taken to prevent future environmental restoration costs? Dr. Reis. One of the pivotal principles the Department endorses in its operational enhancements is waste minimization and pollution prevention. Our aggressive waste minimization and pollution prevention program will minimize the impact of our operations on the environment, as well as improving safety of operations and energy efficiencies. The Department also supports the priority that the President has given pollution prevention by his issuance-of several Executive Orders pertinent to pollution prevention, such as Executive Order 12856, "Federal Compliance with Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements;" Executive Order 12843, "Procurement Requirements and Policies for Federal Agencies for Ozone-Depleting Substances," and Executive Order 12873, "Federal Acquisition, Recycling, and Waste Prevention." This action will diminish and/or render unnecessary, certain future environmental restoration costs. WOMEN AND MINORITY HIRING AND CONTRACTING Mrs. Meek. I have been asking each witness questions concerning women or minority hiring and contracting. Due to the classified nature of your work, a contractor must meet rigorous security scrutiny which is expensive. Many of the contractors operate governmental owned facilities which are contractor operated -- the so-called "GOCOs." What percentage of the employees at GOCOS under your jurisdiction are women or minorities? (List by GOCO.) Dr. Reis. Each GOCO must have an affirmative action plan that addresses their manifest imbalance and/or conspicuous absence of women and minorities at their site. For example at Wackenhut (Savannah River Field Office site) they have begun a tuition reimbursement program to enhance the growth and development of women and minorities. Allied Signal implemented a new training program, "Effectively Managing Diversity" to address myths and stereotypes which serve as barriers to full and effective use of all human resources. Pie charts by GOCO are shown in the attachment which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) ****Department of Energy Defense Programs GOCOs Albuquerque Field Office, GOCOs Men and Women Albuquerque Field Office, GOCOs Savannah River Field Office, GOCOs Men and Women Savannah River Field Office, GOCOs Nevada Field Office, GOCOs Men and Women Nevada Field Office, GOCOs Oak Ridge Field Office, GOCOs Men and Women Oak Ridge Field Office charts are attached to original document**** WOMEN AND MINORITY HIRING AND CONTRACTING Mrs. Meek. I assume that the percentage will be somewhat low. What steps are you taking to insure that the percentages increase at these GOCOS? Dr. Reis. The Department monitors the employment profile of GOCOS. Since June 1992, Defense Programs began to review the affirmative action initiatives and request an update on each contractor initiative toward alleviating discriminating barriers. Defense Programs began such reviews through a departmental initiative that published the report on the Advancement of the Status of Women. This booklet outlines the successful benefits to women and minorities, as well as the barriers of the Agency. In addition, the Department requires each GOCO to submit an affirmative action plan each year. All problematic areas must be identified and appropriate action items must accompany each identified barrier. Scheduled program reviews are conducted at each major field site. During the months of January and February, 1994, the Director of the Office of Economic Impact and Diversity, together with the Acting Director of Civil Rights, visited DOE field installations and met with all of DOE's contractors to help them develop diversity plans. PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES AT THE LABORATORIES Mrs. Meek. Since there are son laboratories under your jurisdiction, what is the percentage of women or minorities in positions requiring at least the equivalent of a baccalaureate degree at each laboratory? Dr. Reis. Total percentages of women or minorities in positions requiring at least the equivalent of a baccalaureate degree at each laboratory are listed below: Percent of Percent of Women Minorities Los Alamos National Laboratory 21% 15% Lawrence Livermore National Lab. 28% 05% Sandia National Laboratories 17% 17% INCREASING WOMEN AND MINORITIES AT THE LABORATORIES Mrs. Meek. I suspect that this percentage will also be rather low. What steps are you taking to increase these numbers at each laboratory? Dr. Reis. Several actions have been taken by the laboratories to enhance representation of women and minority employees. For example, the University Recruiting Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory contacts minority students' and women's organizations to increase their applicant base. During the first thirty months of the program, 96 job offers were made, 64 for regular staff member positions and 32 for postdoctoral and graduate research assistants. Women received 28 percent of the regular staff member offers and minority members received 20 percent. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's supports special employment programs to assist managers in achieving affirmative action goals, by providing training and work experience. A recent study shows that these programs have been effective in increasing the number of women and minorities in representative job groups and in encouraging the pursuit of careers in technical fields. Of all hires during FY 1993, 49 percent were women and 25 percent were minorities. Women and minorities comprised 23 percent and 17 percent respectively, of the total technical job hires during this period. This includes classifications that do not require four year degrees or equivalency. Sandia National laboratories conducts or participates in several minority education development and support programs. Some examples are: DOE's Science and Technology Alliance, the University of New Mexico Minority Engineering Program, and "Expanding Your Horizons in Science and Mathematics", targeted for high school aged women. Although statistics on minority group participation are not collected, the scope of Sandia's math and science outreach program in New Mexico and California grows annually, both in numbers or programs and individuals who benefit. WOMEN AND MINORITY HIRING AND CONTRACTING Mrs. Meek. Will a laboratory chief receive a lower evaluation if the number of women or minorities in professional positions dogs not increase? Dr. Reis, The laboratory directors are evaluated by the governing board of the Management and Operating Contractor. One of the elements against which they are rated is equal employment opportunity, an element which has recently been strengthened. The laboratory directors performance against this element will certainly have a bearing on the overall rating. WOMEN AND MINORITY HIRING AND CONTRACTING Mrs. Meek. What action will you take against a GOCO contractor who does not increase the number of women or minorities at its facility? Dr. Reis. It is the policy of this Agency that if a contractor intentionally engages in discriminatory practices, the Department would terminate the contract. Defense Programs is committed to equal employment opportunity and intends to carry out the full intent of the Department's policies as well as abide by all Federal employment rules and regulations. USE OF THE NEVADA TEST SITE Mr. Myers. A press release put out by the Department last week indicated that a DPE-sponsored study to turn the Nuclear Test Site into a solar energy facility, mandated by the 1993 Defense Authorization bill, has led to a DOE-sponsored task force to further study this proposal. If any area of the Test Site is used for another purpose, how can there be a capability to fully resume testing if necessary? In your opinion, is this a wise use of the site? Were you consulted in this study? Dr. Reis. The Nevada Test Site is very large -- larger in area than the State of Rhode Island. If the Nevada Test Site can be used as a resource for solar energy without precluding its use for nuclear testing, it would be a very wise use of the Site. One of the purposes of the DOE study is to examine the details of this notion and to determine whether or not use of the Site for solar energy is in the overall national interest. Mr. Nick C. Aquilina, Manager of the DOE's Nevada Operations Office, is in charge of the readiness capability. Mr. Aquilina will be a member of the national task group and will assure that compatibility exists in any proposed future actions. After the study is finished, I will be happy to report on the findings. NUCLEAR TEST READINESS Mr. Myers. The 1995 budget request contains no funding for testing. Should the need for testing be determined, how long would it take to conduct a full underground nuclear test? Dr. Reis. The Department's FY 1995 budget contains funding to maintain a readiness capability to conduct a simple underground nuclear test within six months of an order by the President to do so. Resuming a full scale underground testing program would require a lead time of 2-3 years and redirection of funds from other programs. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA Mr. Myers. The 1994 E&W Conference Report included language directing the Department to consider developing a cooperative agreement with Russia to explore methods of plutonium disposal and power production. Have any actions on that directive taken place? Dr. Reis. A delegation from the Russian Federation visited DOE March 14-16, 1994, for discussions on the shutdown of Russia's three remaining plutonium production reactors. Russia continues to produce plutonium because it needs the heat and power generated by the reactors to service the Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk areas. The purpose of this week's meetings was to examine opportunities to assure the speediest possible replacement of the reactors' heat and power, in order to allow the shutdown of the reactors. The protocol of the meeting, a report of the working group on nuclear reactors, the working group report on Krasnoyarsk, the U.S./Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Replacement Study, and the joint statement on inspection of facilities containing fissile materials are shown in the attachments, which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) ****Protocol of Meeting Between The United States and The Russian Federation on the Replacement of Russian Plutonium Production Reactors is attached to original document**** WEAPON DISMANTLEMENT Mr. Myers. Your stockpile support plan supports a level of 1500 to 2000 nuclear warhead dismantlements a year through 1996. How many warheads will be dismantled this year? Is 2000 the goal or the actual amount that will be dismantled? Dr. Reis: We plan to dismantle 2000 warheads this year, and in 1995 and 1996. 2000 warheads per year is our goal, but the actual number dismantled may be slightly larger or slightly smaller. NUCLEAR WEAPON DISMANTLEMENTS Mr. Myers. How much of a backlog in dismantling weapons currently exists and when will the backlog be eliminated? Dr. Reis. At the end of Fiscal Year 1993, there were Deleted weapons awaiting dismantlement. Our current plans call for the elimination of this backlog in Fiscal Year 1997. LABORATORY SUPPORT OF NUCLEAR TESTING Mr. Myers. Since the President has announced a moratorium on underground nuclear testing, are any activities taking place at the laboratories that would support the testing program? Dr. Reis. In accordance with Presidential direction, the Department is maintaining a readiness capability to conduct an underground nuclear test within six months of an order by the President to do so. An essential element for the maintenance of this capability is the retention of scientists and engineers with the necessary and sometimes unique expertise required to design and field nuclear tests. At the laboratories, this includes staff and facilities for the design and manufacture of nuclear devices, for design and fabrication of the diagnostic rack assemblies, for diagnostic instrumentation fabrication and calibration, for nuclear chemistry, and for data acquisition and analysis. Test readiness exercises are planned to maintain the skills of the machinists, mechanical engineers, radiochemists, experimental physicists, and weapon designers involved. Work at the laboratories to preserve and further analyze data from past nuclear tests is also planned. ABILITY TO CARRY OUT MISSION Mr. Myers. Dr. Keliher, your request for intelligence activities is decreased by $2.3 million from the 1994 level of $45.4 million. What impact will this decrease have on your ability to carry out your mission? Dr. Keliher. The FY 1995 Request will enable the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to meet its intelligence responsibilities to the Department in its objectives of ensuring the continued credibility of the Nation's nuclear deterrent, assessing conditions that pose a nuclear threat, and executing its responsibilities for nonproliferation., Although the FY 1995 Request is about five percent below our current year funding level, I am confident that we can fulfill our intelligence responsibilities within expected fiscal constraints by satisfying high priority Departmental intelligence needs through effective interaction with the intelligence Community. SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS/CLASSIFIED INFORMATION Mr. Myers. Is your decrease in requested funding for security clearances due to less information needing to be.classified? Are you still doing updates on existing clearances? Dr. Keliher. No, the FY 1995 request is not lower due to less information being classified. Information declassification involves declassifying the facts, data, or knowledge itself. We are involved in a comprehensive, fundamental review of the Department of Energy's classification policy. The decrease is a result of reduced numbers of clearance requirements, facility consolidation efforts, low turnover rates, and elimination of the reinvestigations backlog. The Department is continuing to do updates (reinvestigations) on existing clearances. DECLASSIFICATION FUNDING Mr. Myers: Is any of the funding for nuclear safeguards and security activities being used to declassify material? If so, how much? Dr. Keliher: Funds within the nuclear safeguards and security budget which directly support the declassification of material are as follows: FY 1994 $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000. OTHER CABINET-LEVEL AGENCIES Mr. Bevill. How does the size and funding for this activity within the Department of Energy compare to that of other Cabinet-level agencies in FY 1994 and FY 1995? Dr. Keliher. The Department of Energy, in comparison with other Cabinet-level agencies, ranks a distant third in funding behind the Departments of Defense and Justice/FBI, respectively. Regarding this Department's personnel strength, it ranks a distant fourth behind the Departments of Defense, Justice/FBI, and State.

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL, 03/15/1994, Question and Answer