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Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if history teaches us anything about modifying the behavior of dictators, it is that the efficacy of incentives depends on the simultaneous employment of disincentives. To get a mule to move, you must show it the carrot and hit it with a stick at the same time.
Throughout the confusion and sudden reverses that have plagued the Clinton administration's attempts to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions, one quality of administration diplomacy has remained constant. The administration's approach to resolving this crisis has consistently reflected the mirror opposite of North Korea's efforts to realize their aspirations for membership in the nuclear power club. Our diplomacy employs only carrots; theirs, only sticks.
On the many occasions when the administration's carrots have failed to prevent North Korea's violations of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, the Clinton administration has limited its choice of sticks to the withdrawal of the carrot. For instance, the administration responded to North Korea's discharge of the remaining fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor by canceling their offer of a third round of high level talks.
Yes, they also began consulting with U.N. Security Council members about the imposition of sanctions against North Korea. But their attempts were half-hearted at best; were limited to the consideration of symbolic sanctions; and were, in effect, dropped once former President Carter succumbed to the charms of that avuncular dictator, Kim Il-song.
Using sticks such as their threatened withdrawal from the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency, North Korea has consistently intimidated administration diplomacy. To divert the administration from taking punitive measures in response to North Korea's violations of the NPT, Kim Il-song has raised, then withdrawn his stick, masking his forbearance in the disguise of a carrot. That tactic was on full display during the Carter visit.
Thanks to former President Carter's performance as an innocent abroad in North Korea, the administration now feels that it has no choice but to pursue the purported openings to resolve the crisis offered by Kim Il-song. The practical effect of President Carter's public embrace of the Great Leader is that the administration effort's to secure even a symbolic sanctions regime would fail at the present time. Thus, President Carter's effect on the international politics of this crisis requires President Clinton and the South Korean Government to spend the time necessary to call the North's bluff.
I can understand why President Clinton might have wanted to make a virtue of necessity, by announcing that North Korea's offer was tempting enough to explore in a third round of high level talks. But I had hoped that a sense of humility and an appreciation for North Korea's long record of broken promises would have restrained administration exuberance when announcing their decision to resume negotiations. That announcement should have been understated, released on paper, and colored with great skepticism about the North's sincerity.
Instead, President Clinton greeted North Korea's specific promise to freeze their nuclear weapons program and to refrain from expelling the last two IAEA inspectors as if North Korea had, at least, offered the United States a concession worth celebrating. The President publicly identified himself with the Carter initiative and all of the former President's overstated rhetoric about personally saving Korea from war.
Mr. President, what, in fact, has North Korea given up in this offer? Nothing. The fuel rods which North Korea would use to make weapons grade plutonium cannot be used until they cooled down for at least another month. Neither can the reactor be refueled until the rods have cooled. In other words, North Korea's nuclear program is, of physical necessity, frozen.
What North Korea has done is withdraw a threatened stick regarding the expulsion of the inspectors and offered to refrain from utilizing a capacity that it presently does not have. For this, they received a celebration in the White House press office, and President Clinton's enthusiastic embrace of President Carter's diplomacy. While the talks drag on, the North Koreans will be granted sufficient time to reach the point when they can convert the fuel into weapons grade plutonium. During this time they will not be constrained by economic sanctions or the buildup of United States military forces on the Korean peninsula. The most critical reinforcements necessary to diminish North Korea's ability to destroy Seoul with artillery fire will now be held in abeyance while the United States finds itself trapped in negotiations with the North, leaving Seoul a hostage to Pyongyang's future belligerence.
I say we will be trapped because the Carter initiative is now the Clinton initiative. Had it failed before yesterday, the administration could have plausibly blamed the whole mess on President Carter's naivete. Now, the blame will be placed squarely on President Clinton--as it should.
This political reality, I suspect, will cause President Clinton to become a coconspirator with Kim Il-sung in dragging the talks out even if it becomes apparent that North Korea is only stalling until it can develop four to six additional nuclear weapons.
After the President's overreaction to what is at best a dubious offer from North Korea, President Clinton's reputation as a world leader will be permanently injured in public opinion if the talks fail. He now has a rather significant personal political stake in preventing the perception that the talks have failed from taking hold in the public's mind. I greatly fear that the President will allow this political imperative to override national security concerns.
Yet, it is at least an even money bet that the talks will fail, Mr. President. Although the administration will attempt to obscure a failure, we will reach a point when it is apparent to all. That point will be apparent when North Korea suddenly violates the last of its obligations under the NPT by resuming operations in its reprocessing plant and converting the fuel now in cooling ponds into weapons-grade plutonium.
Should they begin reprocessing, our only means to deprive the North Koreans of an additional four to six nuclear weapons would be to immediately destroy the reprocessing plant with air strikes. President Clinton may have only hours to make that decision. Does anyone believe that he will choose air strikes?
He will not choose that necessary option, Mr. President, because he has neglected to reinforce our counter battery defenses to a level sufficient to spare the city of Seoul from complete destruction by North Korean artillery. He has done so irrespective of the concerns of military commanders in Korea. Consequently, the United States will have to learn to live with North Korea's possession of as many as eight nuclear weapons, just as the President is apparently prepared to live with their possession of two nuclear weapons.
Those who doubt the acuity of my speculation should know that we will have an early test of the administration's resolve. The first agenda item in the negotiations to begin the first week of July will be access to two nuclear waste sites where the IAEA might gain at least a partial understanding of how much plutonium was diverted to weapons production in 1989.
You will remember, Mr. President, that it was North Korea's destruction of the means for an accurate measurement of that past diversion that caused the administration to drop its original offer of a third round of talks and to go to the Security Council for a sanctions resolution. Administration officials have assured me that the first order of business in the forthcoming negotiations will be North Korea's commitment to partially remedying their violation of the NPT by allowing challenge inspections of the two waste sites. They assured me that if North Korea does not satisfy their concerns on this issue that the talks will not go forward.
As recently as last Friday, North Korea's Foreign Minister said that his government would never allow IAEA access to the waste sites. If the North Koreans stay true to form, they will reject the administration's first agenda item in Vienna. If the administration allows this priority to be set aside to discuss other items on the agenda, we will then know that President Clinton has abandoned his public commitment to a nonnuclear North Korea. North Korea will know that they have prevailed in the overmatched contest between Kim Il-song's and President Clinton's diplomacy. And the United States vital interests in Asia will have been almost irreparably damaged.
Mr. President, there may yet be a way to prevent this nightmare scenario I have outlined from becoming reality. It will require from the administration a greater degree of resolve than it has heretofore shown during this crisis. It will require the President to employ simultaneously both the carrot and the stick.
The United States should open the discussions with North Korea in Vienna by informing the North Koreans that while we welcome Kim Il-song's commitment to former President Carter, we are not relying on their good faith to make these talks successful by abiding by their obligations under the NPT. Accordingly, we have taken a precautionary and purely defensive action aimed at denying Pyongyang the capital of South Korea as a hostage. We have deployed additional counter battery artillery to our defenses north of Seoul sufficient to greatly diminish North Korea's present ability to reduce that city to ashes should they choose to pursue their nuclear ambitions by further violating the NPT.
This prudent and necessary approach should enlighten the North Koreans about our commitment to achieving a nonnuclear Korean peninsula by whatever means necessary. Should they suddenly commence the reprocessing of the fuel now in cooling ponds, the President's decision to exercise a military option will not be hindered by his concern over North Korea's present artillery advantage.
Should we fail to follow such a sensible course I expect that the North Koreans will delay a resolution of this crisis until it becomes impossible to resolve. They will then have the means to achieve the only strategic objective we have ever been certain that North Korea wants--the reunification of the Korean peninsula under Kim Il-song's authority.
To those who reject this dire prediction, I leave one historical anecdote. In the spring of 1950, Kim Il-song proposed that he and South Korean President Sygman Rhee hold summit talks in August 1950, just as he has now proposed to meet with the current South Korean President, Kim Young Sam in August.
In June 1950, the North invaded South Korea, and the United States was dragged into a long and bloody war for which we were not prepared. Should President Clinton wish to avoid such a fate for our country, he would be wise to exercise a little more caution and a little more resolve in his future dealings with the great leader, Kim Il-song.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
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Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I wish to commend my distinguished colleague. That was a brilliant resume of the situation today, and a clear direction of what procedures should be followed.
END
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