[Page: S532]
Mr. McCAIN (for himself, Mr. Dole, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Bond, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Mack, Mr. Gramm, Mr. Kempthorne, Mr. Craig, Mr. Cohen, and Mr. thurmond) proposed an amendment to the bill S. 1281, supra; as follows:
On Page 179, after line 6, insert the following new section:
SEC. 714. POLICY REGARDING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On February 10, 1993, North Korea refused to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct special inspections, as permitted under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), of two undeclared nuclear-related sites to clarify discrepancies related to North Korea's nuclear program, and on March 12, 1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT effective on June 12, 1993, due to the insistence of the IAEA on exercising inspection rights under the NPT.
(2) On April 1, 1993, the IAEA declared North Korea to be in noncompliance with the NPT; on April 2, 1993, the IAEA voted to refer North Korean violations of the Treaty to the United Nations Security Council; and on April 7, 1993, the IAEA issued a formal censure on North Korea for its noncompliance with the NPT, the first censure in the history of the IAEA.
(3) On May 11, 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution asking North Korea to allow IAEA inspections under the NPT, and on May 12, 1993, North Korea rejected the request of the United Nations Security Council and has since impeded or refused access to any of its sites by IAEA inspectors.
(4) On June 2, 1993, the United States and North Korea initiated a series of meetings in New York to discuss the impasse in nuclear site inspections, which continued until January 4, 1994, when Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis announced that North Korea had agreed to inspections of seven declared nuclear-related sites.
(5) Discussions between the IAEA and North Korea to implement the announced agreement to permit inspections in North Korea have reached an apparent impasse, and the issue is anticipated to be discussed at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on February 21, 1994.
(6) The People's Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly stated it would not support any action of the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea, and the PRC may not be cooperating fully and effectively in seeking a resolution of this issue.
(7) The United States must clearly communicate its firm resolve to compel North Korea to comply with the inspections required under the NPT and has instead offered to cancel 1994 Team Spirit joint military exercises with South Korea; indications are that numerous other concessions, such as diplomatic
recognition and economic assistance, are also being considered.
(8) The development of nuclear weapons by North Korea would significantly increase the already serious threat to the safety and security of South Korea and the stability of the Pacific region posed by North Korea's military forces, which include--
(A) an army of 1,200,000 men, such of which is positioned near the border with South Korea;
(B) an estimated 250 tons of biological and chemical weapons; and
(C) extended range SCUD-C missiles reportedly armed with chemical warheads, No Dong missiles, and possibly a much longer range intermediate-range ballistic missile in development.
Policy.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons program and fully comply with the terms of the NPT and the January 30, 1992, full-scope safeguards agreement agreed to by North Korea and the IAEA;
(2) the President should seek international consensus to isolate North Korea economically until North Korea halts its nuclear weapons program and reaches acceptable agreement with the IAEA on inspections of its nuclear facilities and those inspections have begun;
(3) the President should support United States-South Korea joint military exercises as an expression of commitment of the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954;
(4) the President should ensure that sufficient United States military forces are deployed in the Pacific region, including the deployment of Patriot batteries in South Korea, in order to be prepared to effectively defend South Korea against any offensive action by North Korea;
(5) the President should make resolution of this issue a matter of urgent national security priority; and
(6) an `acceptable agreement' between the IAEA and North Korea should include regular inspection of all declared nuclear sites as well as special inspections of any suspected nuclear-related site, as agreed to by North Korea in the January 30, 1992, full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
(c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) the term `IAEA'means the International Atomic Energy Agency;
(2) the term `NPT' means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done on July 1, 1968 at London, Moscow, and Washington; and
(3) the term `safeguards' means the safeguards set forth in agreement between a country and the IAEA, as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
END
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