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[Page: E369]

• Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues the recent remarks by the President's National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake.

• Of the various nonproliferation problems the United States now confronts, none is more pressing than the challenge posed by North Korea's nuclear program.

• In his remarks Mr. Lake succinctly sets forth U.S. policy for dealing with this challenge.

• I commend his speech to my colleagues and to the American people. The text of Mr. Lake's remarks follows:

It is a pleasure for me to be here at Yale University. It is also an honor to be here as a Dirk Gleysteen Fellow. Dirk, who was in the Pierson class of '51, served for over 30 years in the Foreign Service. Like Winston Lord, our Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and another Pierson alumnus, Dirk believed in the importance of public service and international engagement.

That is part of my message today. Your generation has arrived at a moment of great opportunity. The Soviet Union has disappeared. South Africa has abolished apartheid. Israel and the PLO have joined in a handshake of hope. And democracy is taking root in some of the world's roughest terrain, from Cambodia to Kyrgyzstan.

At the same time, we must contend with many dangers. Terrorism on our soil and ethnic conflict abroad. Instability within several states of the former Soviet Union. Environmental degradation.

In the face of all these changes--and in the absence of a single defining threat--some have suggested that America pull back from the world. But the fact is that the need for American leadership is greater than ever.

Over the past year, we have exercised that leadership and worked to redefine national security in terms that directly benefit Americans in their daily lives. We have opened new markets for our goods and services through NAFTA and GATT. We have worked to enlarge the world's community of market democracies. And we have adapted our security policies to this new era with a sweeping Bottom Up Review of our defense needs.

Yet no challenge is more serious than the one I want to address today: the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the missiles that can deliver them. This is not a new threat. But with advances in technology and the end of the Cold War, it is a rapidly rising threat.

Weapons of mass destruction pose a direct threat to our interests. They can destabilize entire regions. They can give dictators power on the cheap. They can allow terrorists to hold our very sense of security hostage. Consider how different the Gulf War would have been had Saddam Hussein attacked Israel with
nerve gas. Imagine if the World Trade Center bombers had weapons of mass destruction.

Soon after taking office, President Clinton ordered a comprehensive review of our non-proliferation and export control policies. And from the start of his Administration, we have taken specific actions aimed at controlling and countering weapons proliferation.

We declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and began negotiating a comprehensive test ban. We began working toward an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We submitted the Chemical Weapons Convention for Senate ratification. We pressed for a international ban on the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons purposes. And we have worked to reform our export control system to restrict the sale of dangerous technologies without unfairly burdening U.S. exporters.

At the same time, we have been working actively to reduce the threat of proliferation in specific regions. Indeed, one key test of an effective non-proliferation policy is how deeply it is woven into the fabric of our relations with other nations.

Some of the most dramatic advances have been in the former Soviet Union. In just one year, the President secured commitments from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to eliminate the nuclear weapons left in their territory when the Soviet Union dissolved. We persuaded Russia not to sell dangerous missile technology to India and to agree to international guidelines against such sales.

In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. has developed a new policy of dual containment against Iraq and Iran--both states that seek weapons of mass destruction. In the Middle East, we have sponsored historic arms control and regional security talks.

In South Asia, we have encouraged India and Pakistan to work toward capping and eventually scaling back their nuclear and missile capacities. And we have applauded South Africa's decision to abandon nuclear weapons and its missile development programs.

But while all these efforts deserve our continued vigilance, there is no non-proliferation challenge more serious than that posed by North Korea. This is one of the most pressing national security challenges we face. Today, I want to describe this challenge and the efforts the Clinton Administration is taking to resolve it.

Let me start with the events that shape our role in Korea.

Forty-four years ago, our nation went to war to help turn back communist aggression on the Korean peninsula. We succeeded, but at great cost: tens of thousands of American and United Nations soldiers killed; the Korean countryside devastated and divided. The armed peace on that peninsula remains one of the Cold War's most perilous legacies. North Korea still has over one million men in arms, most of them within 30 miles of the demilitarized zone.

In the decades since that war, South Korea has flourished. On land once pockmarked by shells and covered with rubble, a world-class economy has blossomed. And in recent years, the Republic of Korea has adopted democratic reforms that strengthen the bonds between our nations. South Korea has become a beacon of freedom and opportunity in Asia.

While the South thrived, the communist North became a hermit of history, ignoring the Cold War's end and walling itself off from the world. North Korea's police state stifles the basic freedoms of its people. Its government has supported terrorism against the South. And its failing economy depends on remittances from Koreans abroad and from the sale of deadly weapons.

Indeed, North Korea has become one of the foremost merchants of such weapons, especially to other backlash states. It has sold Scud missiles to Syria and Iran, and is actively marketing its next generation of ballistic missiles.

Most disturbing of all, North Korea has been working for many years to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Given Pyongyang's history of weapons sales and its menacing posture toward the South, we must view the North Korean nuclear weapons program as a national security concern of the first order.

North Korea has for years operated nuclear reactors. One byproduct of such operations is plutonium, a key element for nuclear weapons. In 1992 the International Atomic Energy Agency--the UN's nuclear watchdog--began to suspect the North had produced more plutonium than it acknowledged.

Indeed, North Korea may have produced enough plutonium for one or two nuclear devices.

To resolve the discrepancy, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two suspect nuclear waste sites that might provide clues about the plutonium. North Korea refused. And in March 1993, the North announced its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, raising even more suspicions about its nuclear program.

• The international community called on North Korea to stay in the NPT and to fulfill its non-proliferation commitments.

• Based on an UN Security Council resolution, the U.S. agreed to meet with North Korea to seek a resolution to the nuclear issue. After a round of talks last June, the North agreed to `suspend' its NPT withdrawal.

• We made it clear at that time that we would meet only if North Korea froze the dangerous aspects of its nuclear program, accepted safeguards and made progress during the talks. Now we have arrived at an important moment. Last week, North Korea apparently agreed to the inspections necessary for continuity of IAEA safeguards. It is important that those inspections take place promptly.

• Let me be clear about America's interests here.

• Our interests are clearly at stake: in a stable peace in Northeast Asia and in the security of our treaty allies, South Korea and Japan; in preserving the safety of our own troops in South Korea; in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; and in maintaining the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime.

• Our goals have been clear and consistent: a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and a strong international non-proliferation regime. Let me make five points about our strategy to achieve these objectives.

• First, let me lay out what we expect from North Korea. In 1985 the North joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, requiring it to identify all its nuclear-related sites and to accept regular inspections of those and other suspect sites. That is what we call `full-scope safeguards.' And in 1991 the North and South signed an accord committing them to the goal of a non-nuclear peninsula.

• What we seek now is what the North has explicitly agreed to in the past. We seek their full compliance with the NPT; implementation of full-scope IAEA safeguards, including special inspections; and implementation of the North-South denuclearization agreement.

• We cannot be confident North Korea has abandoned its nuclear weapons program unless the IAEA has full access to all relevant sites, declared and undeclared. Our first priority now is to ensure that there is no further diversion of plutonium for weapons purposes. That is why we have insisted on immediate and continuing inspections of the seven declared nuclear sites.

We will also continue to insist that all inspections requested by the IAEA take place. Access to the two suspect nuclear sites, which can disclose important information about North Korea's past actions, will be critical to any solution to the nuclear issue.

My second point is simple: If Pyongyang verifiably freezes its nuclear program and resumes nuclear talks with the South, the U.S. is prepared to engage in a broad and thorough discussion of the issues that divide North Korea from the international community. That would permit movement toward more normal relations.

I would add that this is not a policy shift; since the last Administration, the U.S. has held out the prospect of improved relations if the North abides by internationally accepted standards of behavior.

We recognize the nuclear issue is not the sole source of tension on the Korean peninsula. As the North addresses our concerns about its nuclear program and other matters--including such issues as the conventional military threat, missile exports, terrorism and human rights--we can consider steps to improve political and economic relations.

I want to make something clear: Pyongyang's isolation is self-imposed. Indeed, North Korea is coming to a crossroads. Down one path the North can expect continued isolation, insecurity and poverty. Down the other is entry into the community of responsible nations and the chance to give its people the benefits of the global economy. The choice lies with North Korea.

But my third point is this: if North Korea continues to ignore its non-proliferation obligations, we are prepared to turn to options other than negotiations, including economic sanctions. As the President has said, `our goal is not endless discussions, but certifiable compliance.' North Korea must understand the price of non-compliance.

My fourth point is that the nuclear issue is not simply or even primarily a bilateral issue between the U.S. and North Korea. It affects the entire region, and other nations have critical roles to play--including Japan, China and Russia.

For China, the North's nuclear program presents not only a challenge to national interests but a chance to exercise responsible regional diplomacy.

Of course, our most important partner in this effort is South Korea. We have fully coordinated every step we have taken with the South. As the President said to the Korean National

• Assembly last July, our commitment to South Korea's security remains unshakable. We recognize that the fate of the Korean peninsula must ultimately be resolved directly between South and North. And we share with the people of the South the faith that Korea will one day be reunified, peacefully and on terms acceptable to the Korean people.

• My last point is that we must remain focused on the long term. While we have made some progress, North Korea's pattern over the years has been one of intermittent cooperation and unpredictable hostility. This problem is not likely to disappear, even if it disappears from the front pages.

• Even if the North agrees tomorrow to the terms of IAEA inspections, we cannot simply breathe a collective sigh of relief and move on. We will have to move to the next round of talks. North Korea will continue to probe and to try to divide the U.S. from its allies. And so we must remain vigilant, patient and resolute.

• As events unfold, we must resist the tendency to lurch from panic to exultation. There is security in steadiness.

• The North Korean situation is important to all of us--especially to those of you who will spend the majority of your lives in the coming century. It is not just about defusing today's crisis. It is about setting tomorrow's precedent.

• We must demonstrate that the international non-proliferation regime is not some legal nicety but an active force for security. Because every nation with nuclear ambitions is watching closely.

• And we must remember that weapons proliferation, like so many foreign policy issues, is not prone to quick fixes or overnight solutions. This challenge requires hard work--across party lines, and across generations.

• Forty-three years ago this May, Dirk Gleysteen and his classmates walked from the Pierson courtyard into a world still plagued by war and the threat of nuclear annihilation. Today, students like you are coming of age in a new world.

• My job is in some small way to help create for you the brightest possible prospects for security and peace. Your part of the deal is simple and vital: to immerse yourselves in study of the wider world, to engage yourselves in the shaping of our foreign policy.

• When World War II ended, a few famous Yale graduates--Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, Robert Lovett and others--made the case for international engagement. The efforts of these `Wise men' paid off with our victory in the Cold War. Now, your generation, a new generation of wise men and women, must rise to the fore.

• I won't ruin this nice evening now by singing `For God, For Country and For Yale.' But I will say this: America has arrived at a defining moment in its global leadership. Events in North Korea remind us that we cannot afford to turn inward. For America to be secure and prosperous in the next century, we must choose to reach beyond our borders.

• That choice begins with you. I think I know how you will choose, and I am glad for it.

[Page: E370]

END