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Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program has been of public interest for over a year. On some days it appears on the front page of every major newspaper in America.
After conducting a recent energy committee fact-finding tour in Asia last month, officials in all the countries I visited raised the seriousness of a nuclear Korean peninsula.
What has not been made clear, Mr. President, is the risk which the North Korean nuclear weapons program poses for all of us. That is, why should we be so concerned? After all, we learned to live with the threat of nuclear weapons from the now-defunct Soviet Union. How is the anticipated behavior of North Korea any worse?
A geopolitical answer would suggest that a nuclear device in the hands of North Korea raises the prospect that it would be used or threatened to be used against South Korea. Further, some might suggest that a frightened Japan would reverse almost 50 years of policy prohibition against the development of nuclear weapons.
Frankly, I do not buy either argument. North Korea knows that use of a nuclear weapon anywhere would have the most dire consequences. And, I have faith in the good judgement of the Japanese people. As the only country to suffer from a nuclear attack, a democratic government in Japan will not choose the nuclear option.
What then is the problem?
The problem is, Mr. President, was ably set out by Washington Post columnist Lally Weymouth in her column of February 17. As she notes, extracted plutonium is `a lot more valuable than cocaine.' For a desperate regime like North Korea, with a history of selling every major weapons system it has ever produced, the temptation to sell to the highest bidder could be too much. The danger to our national security from a North Korean nuclear device in the hands of one of the antidemocratic regimes in the Middle East is clear-cut and unassailable.
Ms. Weymouth also points out that the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran, the distinguished Senator from South Dakota, Senator Pressler, and the distinguished Senator from Colorado, Senator Brown, recently visited the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency to discuss the North Korean problem with IAEA Chairman Hans Blix. Our colleagues deserve enormous credit for their personal concern over this vital issue.
Finally, Ms. Weymouth recounts Chairman Blix' statement to our colleagues: his agency wants to be able to go `anywhere, anytime' to inspect suspected North Korean nuclear weapons sites. His demand is both reasonable and prudent and deserves to be supported by the administration. To his credit, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord has made it clear that the recent reluctant agreement by North Korea that it will allow the IAEA back on a limited basis is just that: limited. There is more to come and the Congress anticipates that the administration will not make any final agreement with North Korea which allows it to escape its full obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the February 17, 1994, Washington Post column by Lally Weymouth be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
From the Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1994
North Korea's Hard Bargaining
Last December the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hans Blix, was talking to three conservative senators about the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program. In describing what the IAEA needs to make certain that North Korea doesn't violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--to which it is a party--Blix told Sens. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) and Hank Brown (R-Colo.) that the IAEA must have the right to go `anywhere, anytime' to inspect North Korean nuclear facilities. Nothing short of this would do, said the former Swedish foreign minister, begging the senators not to let Washington undercut the IAEA during U.S.-North Korean bilateral talks.
Since November, there had been no progress in achieving Blix's goal. North Korea kept the IAEA inspectors out of the country. IAEA cameras installed at North Korean nuclear facilities actually stopped functioning. As a result, Blix issued a statement a few weeks ago that all but said the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had violated IAEA safeguards. It had been widely expected that at the upcoming IAEA board of governors meeting in Vienna, which starts on Monday, Blix would declare safeguards broken and ask the United Nations to impose economic sanctions.
Then, just as the international community appeared prepared to unite on the need for sanctions against North Korea, the IAEA suddenly declared a breakthrough this week. After eight rounds of talks between IAEA and North Korean officials in Vienna, North Korea agreed to what U.S. officials describe as `a bridging deal.' It amounts to this: North Korea consents to let the IAEA verify that no nuclear material has been diverted from officially declared nuclear facilities since its last inspection in August 1993. Also, the IAEA will be allowed to replace its batteries, reload its cameras and change the seals on the seven nuclear facilities involved to ensure `continuity of safeguards.' The key North Korean facilities in question are a plant
for reprocessing plutonium and a nuclear reactor.
By giving the IAEA this limited access to its nuclear facilities, North Korea--according to one U.S. official--has bought `a ticket to attend the third round of the bilateral talks.' (During the Clinton administration, the United States and North Korea have held two rounds of bilateral talks.)
What Clinton administration officials, anxious to claim total victory, play down is that the IAEA doesn't usually limit itself to inspections of this type. It mounts `regular' inspections of declared nuclear sites in member countries--inspections of sites the host country declares to be relevant to its nuclear program. The IAEA also pursues `special' inspections--which involve facilities the IAEA asks to inspect, based on its suspicion that these locations may somehow be involved with the country's nuclear program.
But North Korea hasn't even agreed to allow regular inspections to resume--nor is it considering the so-called `special inspections.' Pyongyang has merely agreed that these two types of inspection will be on the agenda at the third round of U.S.-North Korean talks.
If this week's announcement is really a `step'--as Clinton administration officials claim--toward persuading North Korea to rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a full member, it should be welcomed. But the dangers, can't be ignored. The administration originally declared its policy was to make sure North Korea would not develop a nuclear weapon. Thus it's worth addressing a question posed by a recent Rand Corp. study: Has the administration moved from prevention to containment?
North Korea bargains hard. It agreed to join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1985, but not until April 1992 did it sign and ratify the safeguards agreement. (NPT usually gives a country 18 months to sign the safeguards agreement.) IAEA subsequently conducted six `regular' inspections to check on the declared materials. The agency concluded there were inconsistencies in the information it was receiving, and sought to send a team of experts to visit two suspect sites. The purpose was to see whether there were traces of plutonium there. How much plutonium, in short, had North Korea produced?
Pyongyang rejected this request and suspended its membership in the NPT. Having threatened to withdraw from the NPT last March, North Korea claims it currently has a `special status' as an NPT member--a status the IAEA is refusing to recognize.
The U.S. intelligence community and others endeavoring to combat proliferation deem it imperative that North Korea comply with its NPT obligations. Aware that Pyongyang is hard-pressed for cash and that its best hope for securing hard currency consists in arms sales, American officials and experts note with concern that North Korea has sold every weapons system it has manufactured. One fear of U.S. experts is that Pyongyang may sell either a nuclear device, fissile material or the nuclear technology and know-how to rogue states like Iran. The extracted plutonium, notes one U.S. official, `is a hell of a lot more valuable than cocaine.'
The IAEA must not be bludgeoned into accepting a phony deal on North Korea. America, meanwhile, needs to remember that North Korea is playing for time to complete its nuclear program. In his December meeting with the three U.S. senators, Blix explained that if North Korea is allowed to block special inspections and fails to comply in full with the NPT's provisions, other countries will feel they can follow its lead. Blix's warnings should not be ignored.
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