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- Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, North Korea, one of the few remaining hardline Stalinist countries in the world, appears intent on developing a nuclear weapons arsenal.
- Should it succeed, stability on the Korean peninsula, where 36,000 American troops stand guard along the demilitarized zone, will be threatened. Our friends in Japan and South Korea will face heightened pressures to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. And our global nonproliferation efforts will suffer a serious setback.
- Several days ago, the Washington Post published an essay by Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis, which sets forth many of the basic tenets of U.S. policy on this dangerous issue.
- Since I know that many of the Members of this House have been following this matter with concern, I ask that a copy of Ms. Davis's article be reprinted in the Record.
Charles Krauthammer's column of Jan. 7 [`Capitulation in Korea'] is so full of flaws and distorts American policy so badly that the record must be set straight. The president has been steady and firm in his objectives: a nonnuclear Korean peninsula and a strong international nonproliferation regime.
The stakes in Korea are high. Nuclear weapons there could destabilize all of Northeast Asia and undermine the global nonproliferation regime. If the North launched military operations, it would be defeated, but we would be engaged alongside our South Korea allies in a major war that could leave destruction throughout much of the peninsula. So there is good reason to give diplomacy a responsible chance before turning to other alternatives.
Before outlining our diplomatic tasks let me correct four misconceptions contained in Krauthammer's article.
First, his views are based on the erroneous premise that we have agreed to `one-time' inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to maintain continuity of safeguards. The number and scope of inspections required is a matter for the IAEA, not the United States, to decide. And North Korea knows it must permit continuing, periodic inspections for the IAEA to be able to certify that the continuity of safeguards has been maintained.
Second, Krauthammer mistakes an interim step for final resolution of this problem. Our immediate task has been to ensure that no more fissile material is diverted. Maintaining IAEA safeguards does that. We will then press North Korea for inspection of suspect sites and dismantling of nuclear facilities.
Third, Krauthammer unjustifiably attacks the integrity of the IAEA, IAEA Director Hans Blix has been beyond reproach in his handling of this issue. The United States had insisted that North Korea deal directly with the IAEA so that the inspectors will be able to obtain the kind of access they need to maintain the continuity of safeguards. The IAEA's integrity remains fully intact.
Finally, Krauthammer called the suspension of the U.S.-South Korean Team Spirit exercise for 1994 a `huge payoff' for North Korea. He is wrong again. The United States and South Korea agree that Team Spirit '94 should be suspended only if progress on the nuclear issue reduces the threat faced by our allies. Even if Team Spirit '94 is not held, we plan to continue our other major joint exercises in South Korea. As the president told the South Korea National Assembly last July, our defense commitment to the Republic of Korea remains unshakable.
So how will we seek to achieve our goals?
Our immediate task has been to ensure no further diversion of plutonium. For that reason, in June we told the North Koreans we would meet with them only as long as they met certain conditions: no refueling of their nuclear reactor without IAEA inspectors present, and no breaks in the continuity of IAEA safeguards. Talks between the IAEA and North Korea in Vienna are now going on, and we urged rapid agreement on the IAEA inspections required to maintain continuity of safeguards at the seven sites in Yongbyon.
It is essential that North Koreans comply fully with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the safeguards agreement they signed. This includes inspection of the two suspect nuclear waste sites that triggered North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in the first place.
During our first negotiating round, the North Koreans agreed to `suspend' their withdrawal from the NPT, but they are not now living up to all of the treaty's provisions. After the second round, the North agreed to begin consultations with the IAEA on `outstanding safeguards issues,' but agreement was not reached on the IAEA's request for a special inspection at the suspect waste site. We will continue to press the North to comply with all the NPT's provisions, including access to the waste sites.
Further, North and South Korea must fully implement their Denuclearization Declaration, which includes a ban on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing on the peninsula. The North has agreed to resume North-South talks that would include discussion of this agreement, but progress has been slow. We will proceed with further U.S.-North Korean negotiations only after North-South exchanges and IAEA inspections.
We also seek the decommissioning and dismantling of North Korea's graphite moderated nuclear reactors and its reprocessing facility. The North would then be unable to use these facilities to produce the plutonium needed for weapons. The reprocessing plan is prohibited by the North-South agreement, and North Korea has indicated its willingness to convert from graphite moderated reactors to a less dangerous type of light reactors for its energy needs.
North Korea must also address our concerns about other matters, including its support for terrorism, violation of human rights, export of ballistic missiles and hostile policy. If it does, North Korea should understand that it can change from being a rogue state to an accepted member of the international community.
Krauthammer is right in asserting that we still have a long way to go, but he is wrong in claiming that the United States lacks resolve and a clear strategy. We are pursuing a course that gives North Korea a clear choice and tests its true intentions. We are prepared to take steps to help bring North Korea into the family of nations, but only as it meets our conditions.
North Korea also knows that the patience of the United States and the international community has its limits. We will not tolerate continued stalling or repeated instances of bad faith. If North Korea fails to comply with its international obligations, we will have to take other steps, including seeking a range of international sanctions. The firm diplomatic strategy that the United States has been pursuing will help ensure that the international community will endorse such sanctions if they were needed.
The United States has led the international community to a consensus that gives North Korea a clear choice between opening doors and increased international isolation. North Korea has no illusions about what it must do to remove concerns about its nuclear intentions. Mr. Krauthammer should have no illusions that there is an easy fix to a complex and dangerous dispute.
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