NON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, 06/23/1993, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19930830
- Chairperson:
- J. Exon
- Committee:
- Senate Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- T93AI200
- Hearing Date:
- 19930623
- DOE Lead Office:
- IS
SUB
- Committee:
- Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence
- Hearing Subject:
- NON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
- Witness Name:
- J. Keliher
-
Hearing Text:
-
STATEMENT OF
DR. JOHN G. KELIHER
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE THE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES SENATE
JUNE 23, 1993
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity
to present the Department of Energy's priorities and programs in
support of the Clinton Administration's plan to combat the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems.
The Department of Energy has historically played a vital national
security role. Let me begin with a brief overview of the Department's
historical role and assets. The Department of Energy and its
predecessors provided the scientific and technological foundation upon
which our nation's strategic nuclear arsenal was built. Science and
technology initiated the nuclear age and will now provide the means to
reduce its dangers. The President's counter proliferation objectives
are to ensure the security, control and safe dismantlement of nuclear
weapons of the former Soviet Union; to halt the spread of the weapons
of mass destruction; to strengthen the existing international
nonproliferation regimes; and to develop.new and effective nuclear
weapons control and nonproliferation strategies for the Post-Cold War
era.
There are three organizations under my office in the Department that
are directly involved in nonproliferation activities. The Office of
Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the Office of Intelligence and the
Office of Research and Development which maintains research and
development efforts that support our counter-proliferation objectives.
These offices are closely supported in their efforts by the
Department's national laboratories.
These DOE national laboratories marshall the world's best scientific
and technical talent to serve our nation's needs. They are of course
well known for the creation of the nuclear weapons which are the
foundation of our nation's strategic deterrent ind for pushing of the
frontiers of science and technology in projects such as ballistic
missile defense, inertial confinement fusion, and the applications for
super computers.
What is perhaps less apparent, is that the national laboratories in the
course of the Cold War, also developed intelligence monitoring and arms
control verification technology and procedures which significantly
contribute to addressing the nuclear proliferation challenges facing the
United States.
In the following testimony I will describe the Department of Energy's
activities in policy support, intelligence, and research and
development.
APPLYING SCIENCE MD TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT POLICY
Combatting the spread of weapons of mass destruction requires that
policy makers be given a full measure of technical and scientific
support in analyzing the policy implications of complicated
intelligence and technical information, and in the development and
implementation of policy decisions.
To provide these scientific, technical, and analytical resources,
the Department of Energy is an active participant at all levels in the
inter-agency process of nonproliferation policy formation and
implementation. We are deeply involved in the inter-agency policy
process and the international arena addressing such issues as: dealing
with the nuclear proliferant threat; international export control
regimes; international safeguards and inspections; and regional arms
control problems and initiatives.
In the policy arena the Department of Energy's major activities
include the following:
- Activities in Former Soviet Union
The disintegration of the former Soviet Union raised new
proliferation concerns: 1) the creation of four states with
nuclear weapons on their territory where previously one had
existed, 2) degradation in control, accounting, and physical
protection of both nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, and
3) the increased possibility of political instability in the
vicinity of nuclear weapon and material storage sites and of
outright attempts to take control of these items by force.
Both the Administration and the Congress have taken important
steps to address these situations through ground breaking
legislation such as the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of
1991, the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act and the
Freedom Support Act of 1992. The importance of assisting the
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union in the
destruction of their nuclear warheads and safeguarding the
nuclear materials removed from the dismantled weapons as well as
those weapons which are not yet destroyed cannot be overstated.
Understanding this importance, the Department of Energy provides
membership and technical assistance to the United States
delegations involved in negotiating assistance agreements with
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as well as providing
technical experts to carry out the implementing agreements for
assistance.
In particular, we assist the Department of Defense in the
execution of Nunn-Lugar responsibilities in such projects
as : 1) design of a safe and secure fissile material storage
facility, 2) design, development, and procurement of
IAEA-certifiable containers for storing and transporting fissile
material, 3) design, development, and procurement of safety and
security upgrade kits for railcars used for transporting nuclear
weapons and 4) providing equipment and training in support of
nuclear weapon accident response. We also directly apply our
expertise to our own activities such as: 1) providing equipment,
training, and technical consultation needed for both state and
facility systems for control, accounting, and physical protection
of nuclear material, and 2) providing equipment, training, and
technical consultation needed for improved systems to control
exports of items which have potential nuclear proliferation
risks.
A separate effort is to redirect the work of former Soviet
Union weapons scientists to peaceful research. Two centers are
being established for this purpose: The International Science and
Technology Center (ISTC) in Russia, and the Science and Technology
Center in the Ukraine (STCU). These centers will develop, approve,
finance and monitor proposals for projects designed to engage
FSU weapons scientists in peaceful activities. DOE Laboratory
experts fluent in Russian provide on-site scientific support to
the centers. These experts will help in project development, visit
Russian and Ukrainian laboratories, and match U.S. scientists with
appropriate Russian and Ukrainian scientists on projects. Although
the U.S., Japan, the EC, and Russia signed the agreement creating
the ISTC last November, implementation awaits ratification by
Russia's Supreme Soviet, which's expected within a few I
weeks. The agreement creating the Ukrainian Center has lagged
behind that of the ISTC, and is expected to be signed in the near
future.
The parties to the ISTC agreement have pledged approximately $70
million. Of this, the U.S. is providing $25 million of Nunn-Lugar
funding. DOE support for the ISTC including two experts at the
Moscow Center, totals approximately $1 million in 1993. This may
rise to $1.3 million in 1994.
- Foreign Deployments
Drawing on its laboratories, the DOE has the capability to field
teams of experts to conduct on-site inspections or provide
emergency response to nuclear incidents. The most recent example
of this is the destruction of Iraq's nuclear weapons program
under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, which directed the
International Atomic Energy Agency to eliminate the nuclear
weapons program in Iraq. The IAEA draws on its member states for
the technical expertise and personnel to inspect, understand,
eliminate, and monitor the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The
U.S. as a member state, and the Department of Energy, have
contributed very substantially to support this activity.
Over two dozen DOE Headquarters and laboratory employees have been
inspectors in Iraq.
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Support
The IAEA, is responsible for the implementation of the
international nuclear safeguards regime. It is facing
unprecedentedly difficult challenges including the noncompliance
of North Korea with its safeguards agreement with the Agency,
and South Africa's declaration of having produced and subsequently
dismantled at least six nuclear weapons. Another major challenge
is that as a result of Iraq's nuclear activities prior to the
Gulf War, the Agency will undertake 'special inspections" of
member countries when required. Moreover, the IAEA faces new
responsibilities resulting from: the acceptance of full-scope
safeguards by Argentina, Brazil and South Africa; the expected
acceptance of full-scope safeguards in the Republics of the
Former Soviet Union; and the need to strengthen safeguards
worldwide in order to maintain confidence in the nonproliferation
regime. Despite all these new responsibilities, the IAEA, like
other international organizations, has been subject to a
"zero real growth" budget policy, which heightens the importance
of support to the IAEA from member states.
The success of the IAEA is critically dependent upon support from
the United States for its assessed budget. The U.S. also provides
voluntary contributions to the IAEA, and the Department of Energy
plays an important role in this area. The Department provides
crucial technical and financial assistance to the IAEA to maintain
and strengthen international safeguards, special inspections, and
physical protection of special nuclear materials. DOE recently
established a 5-year cooperative arrangement with the IAEA. Under
this arrangement DOE will continue to provide in-kind safeguards
support to the IAEA in the way of training and technical
assistance. In 1993 $1 million of extrabudgetary assistance was
provided under this program. Specific research projects focus on
the implementation of IAEA safeguards at DOE facilities
pursuant to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement; technology
development for IAEA safeguards at advanced nuclear facilities
(e.g. facilities for reprocessing, enrichment, plutonium fuel
fabrication); new inspection scenarios; long term monitoring;
special inspections; and environmental sampling.
DOE also co-sponsors international training courses with the IAEA
for foreign nationals in physical protection and national systems
for accounting and control of nuclear materials. Argentine and
Brazilian officials have credited their participation in these
courses as an important factor in helping establish the
Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials under a treaty signed at Guadalajara, Mexico, in July
1991. This Agency provides critical support for this IAEA
safeguards agreement which in December 1991 opened all Argentine
and Brazilian nuclear facilities to comprehensive safeguards
inspections by-the IAEA. The FY93 funding allocated for
international training courses was $700,000 and $800,000 is being
requested for FY94.
- Regional Nonproliferation Initiatives
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction occurs in regional
contexts. The Middle East, South Asia, and the Korean Peninsula in
particular are areas of concern. The Department of Energy is
working closely with the Department of State to support regional
initiatives and arms control agreements in which the United States
offers up its technical resources to encourage regional
adversaries to learn from the verification and peace-making
procedures developed by the U.S. during the Cold War. We are
currently working particularly closely with the Department of
State in supporting such activities in the Middle East and Far
East. DOE has provided extensive briefings and assistance to two
international workshops on confidence-building measures which
have been arranged by the Department of State for participants in
the Middle East Arms Control talks. Arabs and Israelis are working
with DOE technical experts in considering how verification
technology and procedures can be demonstrated and evaluated for
Middle East applications. Similar presentations are planned for
presentation at upcoming State Department conferences bringing
together states from the Far East.
- Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
DOE manages the program of U.S. bilateral consultations on
physical protection of nuclear material and leads the U.S.
teams in these consultations. The Departments of State and
Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency participate. These consultations provide a
channel for regular discussions of physical protection issues
and informing other countries of U.S. technical developments in
physical protection and have contributed to strengthening physical
protection of nuclear materials worldwide over the past decade.
Funding for this effort was $100,000 in FY93 and $150,000 is
being requested for FY94 due to increased efforts in the
bilateral discussions.
- Reduced Enrichment for.Research and Test Reactors
The Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR)
program has the objective of converting research and test
reactors to run on low enriched uranium (LEU) rather than
weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). This reduces the
traffic in weapons grade uranium and the risk of diversion or
theft. IS-40 has worked through Argonne National Laboratory to
implement a program to develop high density fuels to supply to
foreign research reactors. Recently the Russian government
agreed to cooperation in a program to convert Russian research
reactors to LEU. Exploratory talks have been planned with China.
This program was funded at $2.1 million in FY93 and $2.6 million
has been requested for FY94.
- Export Control Computer Network
DOE has developed a nonproliferation data base, known as the
Proliferation Information Network System (PINS). PINS is a
nation-wide computer network dedicated to real-time sharing of
export licensing and nonproliferation information among involved
U.S. government agencies. Presently PINS is being utilized by
DOE and the Department of Commerce to process dual-use cases. The
network supports comprehensive exchanges of proliferation data
including identification of procurement patterns by clandestine
procurement networks. A large number of databases in support of
U.S. government nonproliferation policy, including supporting
PINS workstations will be made available at the State Department,
the Department of Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
DOE's National Laboratories, as well as other U.S. government
agencies. Funding for PINS by my office for FY93 is $7,200,000.
$7,117,000 is requested for FY94.
- Export Control
In the export control area DOE remains a key participant in the
development and implementation of controls on U.S. nuclear, nuclear
related, and dual-use items under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.(NNPA). DOE is firmly committed to
President Clinton's goal of arresting nuclear proliferation and
cooperating with other U.S. government agencies to undertake major
efforts to achieve this objective. DOE plays a vital role in U.S.
nonproliferation expert control, by providing technical expertise
to the interagency forum. DOE's National Laboratories are
indispensable in assisting with the formulation of U.S. export
control policies and in reviewing specific exports to assure they
are not inimical to U.S. national security interests.
The effectiveness of U.S. export control. efforts depends upon the
cooperation of other supplier countries. Therefore, DOE has
actively supported various international export control regimes
including the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM), the NPT Exporters Committee (or Zangger
Committee) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
The collapse of Communism, the breakup of the Soviet Union into
independent states, and political transformations in Eastern
Europe have led to liberalization of COCOM export controls. DOE
has provided the technical analysis used to formulate U.S.
Government positions regarding these changes.
Similarly DOE provides the technical base for international
negotiations to upgrade the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) Exporters Committee's "trigger list". Article III of the
NPT requires that items "especially designed or prepared" for
nuclear use be subject to safeguards by the International Atomic
Energy Agency when exported. These items make up the "trigger
list" because their export triggers international safeguards.
Revisions of this list are necessary to counteract clandestine
procurement activities by proliferant states.
DOE has taken an active role in the rejuvenated Nuclear Suppliers
Group, taking the lead in developing the Dual-Use List of
controlled commodities. One of the NSG's goals is effective
implementation of its new nonproliferation controls over dual-use
exports. During this year, DOE has provided recommendations for
additions to the NSG's specific "trigger list" regarding controls
of equipment and processes for the enrichment of uranium. DOE
also is set to begin work on a comprehensive guide to the NSG
Dual-Use List. Funding for export control activities was
$6,526,000 in FY93 and $7,170,000 is requested for FY94.
- Safeguards Cooperation Agreements
As part of U.S. support for international cooperation in research
and development on safeguards the Department has concluded a number
of cooperative bilateral agreements. These cover activities such
as testing and evaluation of technologies, equipment, and
procedures to improve nuclear material control, accountancy,
verification, physical protection and advanced containment and
surveillance. The parties to these agreements include: the Japan
Atomic Energy Research Institute, the Japan Power Reactor and
Nuclear Fuel Development Company, the German Ministry of Science
and Technology, the French Atomic Energy Commission, the European
Community (EURATOM), and Australia. The Department also has letter
agreements for cooperation with the Argentine Atomic Energy
Commission, the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission, and the
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. We are also negotiating
agreements with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus;
This activity was funded at $1,500,000 for FY93 and $2,010,000 is
requested for FY94.
- Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
DOE supports negotiation of agreements and their implementation in
both the chemical weapons and biological weapons areas. DOE
participates in the interagency activities to guide USG policy in
areas of DOE expertise. In support of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention
(BWC), DOE provides experts in areas that affect DOE laboratories
and facilities and, where requested, provides experts to support
negotiations in specific technical areas.
Department expertise has been provided in support of the
multilateral CWC in the general areas of chemical sampling and
analysis, general chemical production processes, chemical
weapons production, and challenge inspection procedures. DOE
will be active in presenting DOE-developed equipment, including
non-destructive evaluation (NDE) equipment and specialty
analytical instrumentation, for consideration by the CWC for
use in inspections. Support has been provided to the multilateral
BWC experts group in the general areas of sampling and analysis,
remote sensing and general facility monitoring procedures using
instruments.
In the U.S.-Russian bilateral chemical weapons.negotiations, DOE
has been involved in developing USG policy for inspections under
the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and in providing
assistance in areas of special DOE expertise, including chemical
weapons production and related (e.g., pesticide) chemical
production. The Office presented DOE-developed non-destructive
evaluation (NDE) equipment to the Russians during the negotiations
and will provide policy representation in the NDE equipment
demonstration to be provided to the Russians in preparation for
joint use of this equipment.
This activity is coordinated and funded at the interagency level,
with DOE as the lead agency. Current funding expenditures are
minimal, consisting of travel and per them expenses for the
interagency participants. Not until the Memorandum of
Understanding between the U.S. and Russian governments is
implemented will expenditures increase.
- Missile Technology Control Regime
DOE is a member of the U.S. Government's missile
nonproliferation interagency community. DOE representatives
provide technical support for policy formulation, negotiation,
and implementation of the USG's efforts to strengthen the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
APPLYING SCIENCE MD TECHNOLOGY TO INTELLIGENCE
The intelligence analysis capabilities of the Department of Energy also
began with the Cold War and, although initially focused on the Soviet
Union, quickly expanded to address the full range of nuclear weapons
safety, security, command and control, and proliferation issues we face
today. Analysis of the nuclear weapons programs of other countries,
including nuclear weapons states and proliferants, represents an area
"Where the Department has made significant national contributions in
both policy formulation and execution of intelligence analysis.
The Office of Intelligence supports policy makers in the Department of
Energy, particularly those in the Offici of Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, as well as throughout the Executive Branch with
intelligence analyses of nuclear weapons,and proliferation issues. The
Office of Intelligence is supported by research and analyses at several
national laboratories field intelligence elements, which have the
technical experience and expertise to evaluate nuclear proliferation
activities and to put them in broader socio-economic and political
contexts. By bringing to bear the nuclear expertise resident in the
national laboratories, the Office of Intelligence provides the
technical basis for most of the nuclear intelligence analysis provided
to policy makers by the Intelligence Community.
In the inter-agency process, DOE provides technical and analytical
support to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the planning
and implementing of the National Foreign Intelligence Program and
similarly supports all members of the Intelligence Community (IC). DOE
interfaces with the IC through participation in many committees,
subcommittees, and working groups as well as contributing to the
National Intelligence Estimate process. The majority of the
nonproliferation responsibilities are accomplished through or in
coordination with the DCI's Nonproliferation Center, the Joint
Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the recently formed
Community Nonproliferation Committee. DOE's skills and expertise
support IC efforts to detect and assess foreign nuclear energy and
weapons-related activities. Formulation and implementation of U.S.
nonproliferation policy are directly affected by the proliferation
intelligence effort, particularly in the negotiation and monitoring
international nuclear agreements and the review of proposed,
nuclear-related exports.
In the past year the Office of Intelligence has lead the Intelligence
Community effort to address the issue of nuclear weapons surety
(safety, security, and use control) in the former Soviet Union and
provided the technical analytic foundation and co-drafted the recent
National Intelligence Estimate on the subject. The National
Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Dr. Larry Gershwin,
remarked that this estimate is the most important one done in years.
The Department is very pleased to have played a leadership role in its
formulation and drafting.
The Intelligence Office also provides extensive support to international
organizations. In the past year this support included providing
briefings on North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and South Africa at the request
of the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
The Office of Intelligence also provides five staff members to the
Director of Central Intelligence's Nonproliferation Center (NPC), the
Intelligence Community organization created last spring to provide a
centralized focus for proliferation intelligence issues. Our NPC
contribution represents over ten per cent of the Office's nuclear
nonproliferation budget.
In addition, the Office provides Executive Agent services for nuclear
export control to the Proliferation Interdiction Panel, one of NPC's
sub-elements. Also, the Office of Intelligence is conducting a survey
of nuclear proliferation detection technology on behalf of the NPC.
We believe this survey will provide the Intelligence Community with its
most complete and comprehensive data base on this important collection
issue.
Finally, senior officials in other Executive Departments frequently
call upon the Office of Intelligence's Proliferation Intelligence
Program for briefings on proliferant countries' programs. Energy
Department experts often brief Ambassadors being posted to countries
of concern, Congressional Committees and their staffs, and other
government officials on the status of proliferant countries' nuclear
programs.
Funding for these intelligence activities was $15,400,000 for FY93 and
the FY94 request is $15,100,000.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
In the decades of the 70's and 80's the DOE national laboratories were
increasingly called upon to develop innovative techniques for arms
control treaty implementation and verification. Each arms control
treaty entered into by the U.S. required a capability to monitor and
verify its compliance by the other parties. The question of
verification, that the Soviets were complying with their obligations,
became a central political and technical question. To verify these
treaties, the DOE has developed a broad range of intelligence
collection and arms control verification capabilities.
These technologies are available today as the product of
our moderate but sustained investment in long-term research and
development. To support treaty verification capabilities, it is
necessary to maintain such a technology base support program in
fundamental research and development.
DOE expertise in this area is not limited to verification and
inspection activities in other countries. We also have developed
expertise in assisting the United States in accepting foreign
verification activities at U.S. sites. Many DOE locations are subject
to possible foreign inspection under treaties such as Open Skies,
the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the U.S. voluntary offer to
accept inspections at certain nuclear facilities by the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
This expertise and capability in verification and inspection has been
drawn upon in the U.S. program to assist the International Atomic
Energy Agency in developing and implementing routine international
safeguards inspections, special inspections in Iraq and elsewhere, and
the development of guidelines for conducting chemical weapons
inspections.
DOE's Detection Technology Program can be divided into
four functional areas: (1) On-Site Verification; (2) Regional
Measurements; (3) Remote Sensing; and (4) Advanced Concepts/Technology
Development.
On-site Verification activities use systems and
technologies to monitor treaties with the cooperation of the inspected
party. The DOE technical community has further utilized its broad
scientific resources to apply technological measurements and methods
to verification regimes negotiated for the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty and START 1 Treaty. We are now examining how
U.S. experience in on-site verification can be applied to
nonproliferation treaties and regional agreements. Funding for this
activity was $18,883,000 for FY93. For FY94 $24,025,000 has been
requested.
Regional Measurement activities include developing seismic
verification systems and data processing capabilities to detect,
identify, locate and characterize underground nuclear explosions,
emphasizing regional (close by) rather than teleseismic (long range)
monitoring. Regional Measurement activities also include many
projects to detect and analyze the effluents given off in the
development or production of nuclear and chemical weapons. Funding for
FY93 was $43,124,000. For FY94 $43,135,000 is requested.
Remote Sensing activities have been underway for over thirty years.
These activities use systems and technologies that are used to monitor
treaties and agreements normally without the cooperation of the other
party. One example of DOE verification efforts in this area is the
satellite instrumentation program for worldwide monitoring of the
Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. We have placed high priority on developing new
satellite sensing techniques to enhance our capabilities for
independently monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Funding for this critical activity was $72,225,000 for
FY93 and for FY94 $87,135,000 has been requested.
In the Advanced Concepts/Technology Development activity the
DOE scientific community is encouraged to use imagination and
initiative to investigate new concepts and technologies that could be
useful in extending our capabilities in the
verification/nonproliferation mission. These activities are often high
technical risk, proof-of-concept efforts that provide the start point
for future detection technology programs. An example is the
development of an airborne multisensory pod system to detect chemical
signatures of effluents related to nuclear and/or chemical
proliferation activities; another is the development of algorithms to
automatically focus and enhance synthetic aperture radar images. This
program turns good ideas into useful applications. Funding in FY93
was $82,784,000. In FY94 $62,705,000 is requested.
CONCLUSION
Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a primary goal
of this administration. To accomplish this goal, our nation needs to
draw upon the same foundation of scientific and technological skills
that helped bring a successful end to the Cold War.
This is a complicated and new challenge. It requires the use of
traditional means such as quality intelligence, effective team work
among U.S. Government agencies, and continued cooperation with
international organizations. It also requires support for global
regimes such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Chemical
Weapons Convention, as well as meeting specific regional proliferation
challenges circumstances in Korea, South Asia and the Middle East. It
requires the use of IAEA safeguards inspections and export controls,
as well as the development and implementation of satellite systems,
remote sensing technology, special inspections, regional
nonproliferation regimes, and world-wide computer networks to track
proliferation.
In this critical area of proliferation, the Department of Energy is
working to assure that the nation's best and most innovative scientists
and technicians are fully committed to this vital effort.
Finally, there is another relationship which is crucial
to this effort. That is the relationship between the Department and the
Congress. An open and cooperative relationship with the Legislative
Branch is vital to securing understanding and support in this time of
change. Both the Secretary and I look forward to working with.the
Congress and members of this Committee in furthering our Nations
capabilities to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
This concludes my statement and I welcome any comments or questions
from members of the Committee.
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