NON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, 06/23/1993, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19940315
- Chairperson:
- J. Exon
- Committee:
- Senate Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- Q93AP365
- Hearing Date:
- 19930623
- DOE Lead Office:
- IS
SUB
- Committee:
- Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence
- Hearing Subject:
- NON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
- Witness Name:
- J. Keliher
-
Hearing Text:
-
Question from Senator J. James Exon
Consolidation of Activities Under the Office of Intelligence National
Security
Question 1: Dr. Keliher, you have been recently appointed to head a
new organization at the Department of Energy, the Office
of Intelligence and National Security. Creation of this
new office consolidates the Offices of Security
Investigations, Security Evaluations, Intelligence and
Arms Control. Last year this Committee and the House
Armed Services Committee had concerns about the apparent
overlap of the activities of these then independent
organizations; this consolidation effort should move
toward streamlining some of these activities. What do
you see as the problems confronting your new
organization and how will you address these issues?
Answer: The consolidation of the Office of Intelligence,
the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the
Office of Security Affairs, and the Office of Emergency
Planning and Operations under the Office of Intelligence
and National Security will allow us to eliminate any
overlap in activities and reduce infrastructure by
placing these formerly stand alone elements under a
single management which can then structure each activity
for a specific role. The primary problem confronting the
new organization will be the amount of time that will be
required to properly structure the organization for
efficiency, effectiveness, and to insure that there is
no overlap in activities. The reorganization is being
addressed in two phases, the first of which was the
organization of the Office of Intelligence and National
Security. The second phase now starting is the review
and appropriate redirection, as required, of roles,
missions, and resources to create a more effective
entity. We believe that the combination of the previous
offices into the new IS structure will prove to be a
more productive and efficient organization.
Question from Senator J. James Exon
Coordination of Work for Others
Question 2: Dr. Keliher, the Department of Energy does not currently
have a good understanding of all the work that the
various laboratories do in this area when that work is
performed at the request of other agencies and paid for
by the requesting agency. How will you go about ensuring
that you have a good understanding and ability to track
all of the work at the laboratories?
Answer: The Office of Intelligence and National Security (IS) is
engaged in a two step process to insure that duplication
and/or overlap at the national laboratories is
minimized. The first step is the consolidation of all
research and development (R&D) for IS under the Office
of Research and Development (IS-20). The second step is
the technical review by IS-20 of all R&D work for others
(WFO) to insure that the WFO is not duplicative of
existing IS activity or of other WFO at the
laboratories. This two step procedure is currently being
reviewed by IS-20 to determine the best administrative
process to accomplish these objectives. A similar
approach is in place in the Office of Intelligence and
will be implemented as required in the other offices of
IS.
Question from Senator J. James Exon
Coordination with NEST
Question 3: Dr. Alessi, do you in your arms control work,
particularly your research and development, work with
the Office of Defense Programs emergency responders? Do
you coordinate with or support the Nuclear Emergency
Support Team (NEST)?
Answer: The research and development program which supports the
DOE Office of Intelligence and National Security (IS)
does not directly support or fund the Nuclear Emergency
Search Team or other operational DOE emergency response
assets. However, there is a technical synergism between
the programs because they share a common technical base.
In an attempt to coordinate programmatic decision-making
between the Verification and Control Technology (VC&T)
program and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Military Applications, we have solicited their
participation at the semiannual Radiation Detection
Panel meetings. Also, staff from the IS Office of
Research and Development program are on the distribution
of the NEST newsletter and participate as observers in
the Search and Diagnostic Working group.
Question from Senator J. James Exon
Coordination with the Office of Safeguards and Security
Question 4: Dr. Alessi, the office which you head, as well as the
Office of Safeguards and Security, conduct research and
development. Since some of the goals are the same
detection of concealed special nuclear materials --
how do you coordinate with that office and do you
collaborate on research and development projects? Do you
have any examples of a joint effort?
Answer: Over the past two years, the Security Affairs R&D
organization (SA-134) has participated in the Arms
Control and Nonproliferation Detection Technology
Radiation Detection Panel which serves as an
interlaboratory coordinating and review group for
current and future technology development of nuclear
sensors for treaty verification and proliferation
detection. These semiannual meetings have been used to
identify common requirements and to avoid project
redundancy. The DOE Office of Intelligence R&D
program has also been attending these meetings.
The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
participates in annual meetings and symposia supported
by Safeguards and Security such as the "Physical
Protection Meeting" (October 1992), held in Albuquerque,
and the "34th Annual Meeting of the Institute of
Nuclear Materials and Management" (July 1993), held in
Phoenix.
The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation surveys
Safeguards and Security domestic measurement,
accountability, and physical protection systems and
devices utilized throughout DOE materials and weapons
dismantlement plants. These activities are helpful to
determine their applicability to arms control and to
agreements such as the HEU Purchase Agreement and the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (formerly SSD) Act.
Joint efforts between the Office of Arms Control and
Nonproliferation and the Office of Safeguards and
Security include the development of a modular micro
multichannel analyzer (MMMCA). The same basic circuit
will be used by both organizations, but the circuit
applications and interfaces will be different. Another
example is the high level neutron coincidence counter.
The vulnerabilities of the Active Well Coincidence
Counter (AWCC) were assessed by BNL, LANL and ORNL under
the Office of-Arms Control and Nonproliferation (AN)
oversight. This counter is under consideration for use
to verify dismantlement of nuclear weapons. The
resulting uranium is earmarked for purchase by the U.S.
from the former Soviet Union.
Under a reorganization plan for the Office of
Intelligence and National Security (IS), all R&D for IS
will be managed by the Office of Research and
Development (IS-20) thereby minimizing any overlap which
might occur in separate offices.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR J. JAMES EXON
Question 5: Dr. Keliher, one of the research areas that the office
of Nuclear Safeguards and Security has been working on
is in the area of computer security. Because this is a
government concern across the government, how is this
effort coordinated government wide? Is there an
interagency working group that is focused on computer
security?
Answer: The primary interagency working group for computer
security is the National Security Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security Committee. This committee
is responsible for the initial objectives, policy and
directives in classified information security
(telecommunications and computer security) across the
government. Each agency (including the Department of
Energy) has representation on this committee and it's
associated subcommittees on secure telecommunications
and information systems security.
Activities of the National Security Telecommunications
Information Systems Security subcommittees include
collaborating on research and development security
activities between the member agencies on computer
security. In addition, the Department of Energy and
Department of Defense (Defense Information Systems
Agency) periodically brief each other on developmental
projects being planned. This helps to avoid duplication
of effort and promotes complementary developmental work.
In fact, first with the U.S Air Force and now with the
Defense Information Systems Agency, the Department of
Energy has had complementary computer security
developmental efforts ongoing for several years. The
Department is also involved with other agencies through
its Computer Incident Advisory Capability.
This is a team that researches vulnerabilities that can
be exploited by viruses or hackers. The team compares
vulnerabilities with similar teams in other agencies to
coordinate research and avoid duplication of effort.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR J. JAMES EXON
Declassification of Environment, Security and Health Documents
Question 6: Dr. Keliher, in the past several years there has been an
effort to make more information available to the public
through increased efforts to declassify Department of
Energy documents and limit the amount of new documents
that are classified. Many believe that declassified
information will be of assistance to the Department of
Energy in dealing with local communities to help them
understand the nature and the scope of environmental
contamination and to identify cleanup methods. How can
you speed up the declassification process, and what are
the special concerns that you must take into account as
you declassify documents?
Answer: DOE occupies a special place in the classification
community due to its unique statutory responsibility for
Restricted Data. Over the years, we have developed
management systems including detailed classification
guides for various subjects. Authorized classifiers and
declassifies are trained, tested, and certified for
technical classification competency before being
permitted to apply these classification guides when
identifying sensitive information. However, the key
information release issue is the review of documents and
the surgical removal of sensitive classified
information. This process is referred to by DOE as
document sanitization. Often the public sees this as
being synonymous with declassification. By definition,
declassification involves specific information to be
removed from Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted
Data, such as particular nuclear weapon design
information or military utilization of nuclear weapons.
When such information is officially declassified,
documents containing this information, which
invariably is commingled with other highly sensitive
classified information, must be reviewed to identify the
still classified information and excise same to
declassify or sanitize the documents in question. The
process is similar to the review of classified testimony
before a congressional committee so that the classified
information can be removed and the testimony published
as unclassified.
Now the circumstances have changed significantly in the
last few years. Not only has our perception of the DOE's
basic mission been drastically altered by changed world
circumstances but with that have come new priorities.
Among these are a desire to make substantial
improvements in the way DOE relates to its customer
base, both outside of and inside the Government. How
much information we classify and how fast we review the
information when requested for sanitization need to be
changed. The Department has streamlined the information
declassification procedures which reduced the time
required for declassification by more than 70 percent.
However, we plan to improve it further.
A plan has recently been approved by the Secretary to
meet the objectives of releasing more information to the
public more quickly and to protect only essential
national security information. There are almost 15
interrelated elements to the plan. It includes training
more declassifies, reviewing the collection of
information called Restricted Data, and using that
designation only for information which currently can be
effectively protected by the Government by such a
designation, etc. This fundamental review of Restricted
Data has never been done in DOE's almost 50-year
history. We expect a number of very positive benefits to
result from such a review. This would include reducing
the amount of information we protect by
declassification, thus making more information available
to the public, improving the nonproliferation
effectiveness of classification by better protecting
that remaining information which really justifies
protection and looking to the future, using state of the
art computer and optical scanning capabilities, to try
and develop advanced expert systems which we hope will
turn out to give us an effective artificial intelligence
capability for document reviews. We may do this in
conjunction with a Cooperative Research and Development
Agreement or similar mechanism, because successful
research in this area could have substantial commercial
value. In addition, it is important for the Atomic
Energy Act to be updated in order to help us with
managing the problems we face today.
In summary we agree with the thrust of your question and
we intend to both make the process even more responsive
to requests for sanitized documents and at the same time
to make sure we don't underclassify information and thus
aid a proliferant or terrorist.
Question from Senator J. James Exon
Chemical and Biological Weapons Technologies
Question 7: Dr. Alessi, could you please describe what type of work
the Department of Energy is conducting and how much
money the Department of Energy is spending in fiscal
year 1992 and plans to spend in fiscal year 1994 on
verification, detection, and control technologies for
chemical and biological weapons?
Answer: The DOE Detection Technology program has not sponsored
biological weapon detection technologies.
The Department supports ongoing negotiations related to
agreements regarding chemical weapons (CW) such as the
Chemical Weapons Convention and the U.S./Russian
Bilateral Agreement. The DOE does not participate as a
lead player in establishing U.S. policy or
implementation, however, DOE remains a key player in the
interagency process to assure that the nuclear weapon
production and national laboratory institutions are not
compromised by the terms of any agreement.
The DOE research and development program supports
national arms control and nonproliferation initiatives
and provides advanced detection and analytical
technologies from the DOE national laboratories by
exploiting the technical base of the nuclear
weapon program.
The program goal is to develop detection technologies to
determine the status of both declared and/or suspected
chemical weapons and production facilities. These
technologies will be transferred to the DOD and the
treaty implementation community. There are three areas
of technology development:
1) Non-Destructive Evaluation technologies as a
reliable means to identify and screen chemical
weapons without the need for direct sampling.
2) Analytical technologies to provide sensitive and
accurate field methods to detect and identify
compounds associated with chemical weapon
production.
3) Technologies to detect and identify, and control CW
agents during weapon destruction processes.
The funding profile is:
Fiscal Year Funding Level (including Capital Equipment)
1989 $1,950K
1990 $1,965K
1991 $2,662K
1992 $4,659K
1993 $5,767K
1994 $4,222K (proposed)
QUESTION FROM SENATOR J. JAMES EXON
Relationship between Department of Energy's Independent Intelligence
Activity and Other Intelligence Activities Elsewhere in the Government
QUESTION 8: Dr. Keliher, the Department of Energy has an
independent intelligence activities. Could you
please explain has it relates to other
intelligence activities elsewhere in the
government?
ANSWER: Pursuant to Executive Order 12333, DOE
participates fully in the intelligence production
activities of the U.S. intelligence community. To
that end, the Department is a contributing member of:
0 The Intelligence Community Executive
Committee
0 National Foreign Intelligence Board
0 National Intelligence Production Board
0 National Intelligence Collection Board
0 Community Nonproliferation Committee
0 Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
0 Science and Technology Intelligence Committee
0 Economic Intelligence Committee
0 Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence
Committee
0 the full range of collection committees
(HUMINT, SIGINT, Open Source, COMIREX,
MASINT)
0 Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism
0 Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Office
The Department of Energy produces finished,
national-level intelligence on issues for which it
has cognizance and technical expertise: nuclear
proliferation, nuclear weapons, fossil and nuclear
energy programs, environmental activities, and
science and technology. DOE intelligence officers
interface routinely with their counterparts at
other agencies to ensure that DOE's research
program complements theirs and that other
agencies' programs respond to DOE's needs.
Working through the DCI's Nonproliferation Center
and the Department of Defense, DOE makes its
nuclear weapons and materials expertise available
to appropriate international organizations and
contingency planning entities.
DOE's counterintelligence program is designed to
detect, deter, and defeat foreign intelligence
service actions to acquire classified or sensitive
DOE information. DOE provides analytical support
to both CIA and the FBI. DOE's initiative in
developing initial community reporting from DOE
employees who may have been targeted by foreign
intelligence services has disclosed targeting
trends. Initial DOE inquiries may be referred to
the FBI for investigation and possible joint
operational action.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR EXON
Question 9: Dr. Keliher, in your statement you discuss the PINS
computer system that is designed to assist with export
controls. From a practical perspective, how does PINS
aid in controlling the export of technologies that could
be used for weapons of mass destruction?
Answer: The Proliferation Information Network System (PINS) is
being developed as a nationwide secure network by the
Export Control Operations Division within the Office of
Arms Control and Nonproliferation. The implementation of
PINS will accomplish two objectives: (1) facilitate and
enhance the Department of Energy (DOE) dual-use nuclear
export license processing and export control analysis,
and (2) enhance nonproliferation data, and analysis
coordination and cooperation between DOE and the U.S.
Government nonproliferation community. In addition, an
unclassified computer system, designed by DOE, has been
proposed by the U.S. Government to the Nuclear Suppliers
Group to facilitate and enhance information sharing,
including export denials, among the 28 member countries.
The objective is to help ensure that dual-use
commodities are not provided to a would be proliferator
by any member state.
A substantial increase in government effort and in
interagency and international cooperation on
nonproliferation is imperative to counter the spread of
weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, missile,
chemical, and biological. As world concerns about
proliferation have grown, export controls have closed
the most obvious routes to nuclear weapons. This has
forced would be proliferants to build from more basic
imports, i.e. dual-use commodities, including many
uncontrolled, but useful, items when combined with
controlled commodities. Therefore, analysis of
proliferant country programs has become much more
complex; hundreds of nuclear and nuclear-related items
which could be used within a weapons program must be
considered, particularly, within the context of a
specific country. PINS will provide an important
link between U.S. Government agencies and the DOE
National Laboratories, enhancing the analyst's more
traditional tools. PINS is designed to encourage users
to build proliferant profiles including the
identification of procurement patterns and clandestine
networks. This will allow comprehensive exchanges of
proliferation data within the U.S. Government. Future
plans call for the development of a PINS compatible
prototype" incorporating a Special Compartmented
Information level database.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR J. JAMES EXON
Transportation, Storage, and Control of Nuclear Materials and Weapons
QUESTION 10: Dr. Keliher and Dr. Alessi, most of the Department of
Energy's discussions with Russia have to date focused on
the near term transportation, storage, and,control of
nuclear materials and weapons. Do you plan to discuss
the ultimate disposition of the nuclear materials,
particularly plutonium, at any time?
ANSWER: As a part of the original iniatives for joint technical
cooperation in the safe and secure transportation,
storage, and control of nuclear weapons and materials
with the former Soviet Union, discussions were begun
with Russia in March 1992, on the possible purchase of
highly enriched uranium and on plans for disposition of
plutonium removed from dismantled former Soviet Union
nuclear weapons. Purchase of highly enriched uranium was
of straightforward commercial interest to Russia and an
agreement for such purchase was signed and contract
arrangements are now being finalized. However, Russian
officials were not forthcoming on the subject of
plutonium disposition options, except for long term
storage and possibly conversion of plutonium for use in
mixed oxide reactors. Subsequently, only peripheral
discussions of plutonium disposition have occurred.
These discussions have been in the context of technical
information exchanges addressing the Russian fissile
material storage facility design. In these discussions,
Russian plans for ultimate plutonium disposition appear
to be developing slowly, if at all. Several possible
options have been suggested, but the requirement for
long term storage of plutonium, at least as long as
several decades, continues to be stated by Russia.
Russia has indicated interest in cooperating in advanced
reactor technologies which have been advocated by United
States private sector firms. However, none of these
technologies is yet viewed as being sufficiently mature
that long term plans can be developed, including
possible U.S. financial assistance. It is difficult to
know whether Russia is driven in this matter by a
quest for Western hard currency or by real concern for
plutonium disposition.
The Department of Energy, in collaboration with other
U.S. government agencies, will continue to interact with
Russian officials in discussions on purchase of highly
enriched uranium. Formal discussions on ultimate
disposition options for plutonium are not presently
planned.
Questions from Senator Robert C. Byrd
Satellite Program Coordination
Question 11: Dr. Keliher, in your testimony, you place high priority
on developing new satellite sensing techniques to
independently monitor the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and you are requesting an increase of
almost $15 million for this program in FY94. Is your
development program consistent with and coordinated with
the sensor roadmap developed by the intelligence
community?
Answer: We assume that the sensor roadmap you are referring to
is the Terms of Reference issued by the Director of
Central Intelligence Nonproliferation Center in January
1993. Our proposed development program is fully
consistent with that guidance. In keeping with the
strategies outlined in the guidance, our development
program has been, and is being, coordinated with the
Nonproliferation Center committees, the Central
Measurements and Signatures Intelligence Technology
Coordination Office, the National Reconnaissance Office,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Advanced Research Projects Agency, and various elements
of the United States Air Force, especially the Air
Force Technical Applications Center, the Space and
Missile Systems Center, and the Defense Landsat Program
Office. In addition, the proposed program has been
specifically reviewed by the JASONS, a group of eminent
scientific experts drawn from academia, and by our own
Research and Development Advisory Group.
Question from Senator Robert C. Byrd
Nuclear Proliferation Detection Technology Program Review
Question 12: Dr. Keliher, in your testimony, you also note that the
Office of Intelligence is conducting a survey of nuclear
proliferation detection technology on behalf of the
Nonproliferation Center. While I agree that a
complete and comprehensive data base on this collection
issue is important, I would suggest that it should be
used as the starting point for a review of these
programs, with a view to downselecting and continuing
only a few of the most valuable and cost-effective
programs that meet the goals outlined in the sensor
roadmap for non-proliferation detection technologies. Is
such a review planned, and, if so, what is the schedule
for its completion? What community elements will
participate in such a review?
Answer: While the survey of nuclear proliferation detection
technology by the Department of Energy is a continuing
process, the first step in the evaluation of the
efficacy of different technologies is the identification
of the signatures associated with all parts of the
nuclear weapon development process. This first step
should be completed this fiscal year. The second step is
the quantification of these signatures. When these steps
are completed, then we will be in a better position not
only to identify promising technologies, but also to
identify technological shortfalls. These steps will lead
to an exchange of technical information within the
Research and Development Working Group (RDWG) of the
Community Non-Proliferation Committee. This RDWG is a
group of interagency R&D organizations and of the
Intelligence Community. Coordination of these
proliferation detection technology capabilities and
shortfalls will be a continuing process for the RDWG.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
QUESTION 13: Dr. Keliher, in her recent appearance before this
Committee, Secretary O'Leary testified that the
Department's FY 94 budget request included $538.7
million, a six percent increase over FY 93, for the
Office of Intelligence and National Security. This
request supported 456 full-time-equivalents positions.
Can you provide details about this personnel growth? It
appears that you are enlarging your in-house analytical
staff despite the creation of a Community
Non-Proliferation Center, which you note is supported by
only five DoE personnel.
ANSWER: In the FY 94 budget request, the number of
full-time- equivalents positions actually declines by
eight positions compared with FY 93 as outlined in the
table below:
FTEs FTEs
FY93 FY94
Verification & Control Technology (V&CT)
--Arms Control and Nonproliferation 69 68
--Intelligence 80 78
Nuclear Safeguards & Security 214 211
Security Investigations 0 0
Energy Management 28 28
Emergency Preparedness 73 71
Total Office of Intelligence &
National Security 464 456
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR WARNER
Counter-Proliferation "Czar"
QUESTION 14: Last year, in the FY 1993 Defense Authorization Act,
Congress directed the Administration to conduct a review
of counter-proliferation activities and responsibilities
in the Executive Branch and to report to Congress on
current and proposed efforts to coordinate these efforts
to prevent and control proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and advanced conventional weapons. What is
the status of this Administration's review of these
issues? What efforts have so far been made to improve
cooperation and coordination among the various
government agencies and entities to ensure an effective
policy-making and implementation process for this
important issue? Has an office or individual been
designated as the "Czar" for counter-proliferation
issues within the Executive Branch as a whole, and if
so, who is that individual or office?
ANSWER: Pursuant to section 1503 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L. 102-484),
on May 11, 1993, a joint report was submitted to the
Congress by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the
Department of Energy (DOE) describing the role of the
DoD and DOE with respect to the nonproliferation policy
of the United States. The report also discussed existing
and planned mechanisms for improving the integrating of
DoD and DOE nonproliferation activities with those of
other Federal departments and agencies and noted a
number of changes that have occurred under the Clinton
Administration within DoD and DOE and the interagency
process for enhancing U.S. nonproliferation efforts.
These include:
- DoD has established the position of an Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Security and
Counter-proliferation who will oversee all DoD
nonproliferation programs and activities.
- DoD chartered a Task Force to examine how
Nunn-Lugar priorities, organization and
procedures could be revised to meet the programs
overall objective of assistance to Russia and
the other states of the former Soviet Union most
efficiently and effectively. The recommendations
of this Task Force are now being implemented
with DoD.
- DOE established an Office of Intelligence and
National Security that includes its Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation, Office of Security
Affairs, Office of Intelligence, Office of
Emergency Planning and Operations, and a newly
established Office of Research and Development.
This new DOE office, inter alia, will enhance the
interaction of the Department's Arms Control and
Nonproliferation and Intelligence activities and
the integration of DOE's research and development
programs in support of U.S. and international
nonproliferation efforts.
- The Director of Central intelligence's
Nonproliferation Center has established a Research
and Development Subcommittee. This subcommittee,
which is co-chaired by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the DOE, will identify, monitor, and
guide research and development (R&D) in technical
collection and analysis methodologies related to
proliferation. In addition to Intelligence
Community R&D offices and the DOE, the DoD and the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are also
members of this subcommittee.
- In the previous Administration, the principal
interagency policy coordinating mechanism for
nonproliferation and export control were the
Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on
Nonproliferation and the PCC on Technology
Transfer. To better focus U.S. efforts in these
areas, these PCC's have been replaced by the
Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Nonproliferation
and Export Control and includes representatives
from the DoD and DOE.
As to whether an office or individual has been
designated as the "Czar" for counter-proliferation
issues within the Executive Branch as a whole, the
aforementioned Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export
Controls, Daniel Poneman, provides such leadership for
the interagency nonproliferation process.
Question from Senator John Warner
LIDAR
Question 15: Last year, Congress directed the Department of Defense
to develop a LIDAR system for detection of weapons
proliferation and allocated $11.8 million for the
first year of its development. Since then, we have
learned of a proliferation of LIDAR programs throughout
the government, including DOD, DOE, and the Intelligence
Community. Could you briefly summarize for us the status
of your efforts to coordinate these somewhat duplicative
programs and to provide adequate funding in the
appropriate agency budgets to develop near-, medium-,
and long-term proliferation detection capabilities
utilizing LIDAR technology. If possible, please provide
cost estimates and timelines, as well as performance
goals, for each such program.
Answer: The term LIDAR encompasses a broad range of technologies
and applications. DOE program managers and researchers
at the DOE laboratories have been communicating with
other agencies and laboratories engaged in LIDAR
programs and, to our knowledge, none of the LIDAR
programs funded by other government agencies is
duplicative with the DOE program. The objectives and
technologies of the DOE program are distinct from all
other currently funded programs of which we are aware
and is a laser development program focused on chemical
effluent detection applications and is not a "LIDAR"
program per-se.
In particular, we are aware of the DOD program for which
Congress has allocated $11.8 million, and have been
communicating with the researchers at the Air Force
Phillips Laboratory who are executing that program.
Their objective is to develop a LIDAR system capable of
locating and characterizing hard objects in space
and in Tactical Missile Defense scenarios. The objective
of the DOE program is markedly different; namely, to
develop the capability to remotely detect and
characterize chemical effluents from facilities
producing materials for use in weapons of mass
destruction. The DOE program is called "Chemical
Analysis by Laser Interrogation of Proliferation
Effluents (CALIOPE)". This will be accomplished by using
laser spectroscopic techniques such as differential
absorption, fluorescence and Raman scattering. The
CALIOPE program breaks out laser systems according to
their different detection frequencies on the
electromagnetic spectrum and different techniques based
on characteristic responses of chemicals to laser
interrogation.
We are aware of several other LIDAR programs funded,by
other agencies. These include programs funded by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
the Army, and the Navy. The NASA programs (QUICKLAWS),
the Navy program (Gatekeeper), and one component of the
Army program, are either hard body reflection or
backscatter LIDAR development efforts and are not
intended for proliferation detection. The other Army
program is developing a system for detection of specific
chemical warfare agents in battlefield reconnaissance
applications. The relevant concentrations, ranges, and
chemical species, and thereby the appropriate
technologies, all differ from those suitable for
proliferation detection.
The Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Nuclear Agency are
establishing proliferation detection technology
development programs, but, to our knowledge, none of
these programs includes LIDAR- The Air Force Technical
Applications Center has expressed an interest in the
area but their program is still in planning. In order to
help avoid duplication, DOE has briefed its CALIOPE
program to all of these agencies and will continue to
provide updated briefings as the CALIOPE program plan
progresses.
DOE does not have cost estimates, time lines or
performance goals for the programs of other agencies.
The cost estimates, time lines and performance goals for
the DOE CALIOPE program are still under development and
will appear in the CALIOPE program plan by the end of
the summer. That plan will be forwarded to the
appropriate Congressional committees as requested.
Question from Senator John Warner
Non-Proliferation Detection Technologies
Question 16: Another part of the FY 1993 Defense Authorization Act
required the Departments of Defense and Energy to
prepare a coordinated report on the wide variety of
issues and problems associated with nonproliferation
policy, detection, response, and prevention. One portion
of that law mandated that DOD and DOE review and report
on the specific technologies available to detect
proliferation regimes now and in the future. What is the
current status of that report, and would you please
summarize the major finding of your review,
particularly in the following areas:
a. What are the most egregious.duplications of effort which
have been discovered during that review, and what
actions have been taken to eliminate such duplication?
b. What are the most significant shortfalls, if any, in our
current capability to detect and monitor weapons
proliferation, and which agency is responsible for developing
a budget plan for meeting such shortfalls in our
capabilities?
c. What is your assessment of the past and current coordination
between DOD and its agencies, such as SNA, ARPA, DIA, and
the Services, with DOE and other Executive Branch entities,
including CIA and the Department of State? What are your
plans to improve such coordination?
Answer: The Department of Energy (DOE) in coordination with the
Department of Defense (DOD) provided a report titled,
"The Role of the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy with Respect to the
Nonproliferation Policy of the United States," to
Congress on May 11, 1993, in response to the FY-1993
Defense Authorization Act, Section 1503. This report was
submitted to the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and to the
Committee of Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce
of the House of Representatives. The report addressed in
detail all matters covered in Section 1503 of the Act.
In addition, in May 1992, the DOE Office of Arms Control
and Nonproliferation submitted to Congress a detailed
Strategic Plan for Nuclear Proliferation Detection
Technology Development, citing specific technologies,
current and projected to detect proliferation
regimes. For the most part, this,latter document remains
a valid description of on-going and emerging
proliferation detection technologies within DOE's newly
established Office of Research and Development under the
Office of Intelligence and National Security.
The major findings of the report indicate that the
international community has placed a high priority on
the problem of the proliferation of the weapons of mass
destruction, and that the multifaceted capabilities of
the DOD and the DOE complement each other in responding
to the requirements for detecting, monitoring, and
countering the proliferation of the weapons on mass
destruction (WMD).
The nonproliferation technologies review process used in
the DOE is one of periodic evaluation and assessments to
ensure that technology programs and R&D efforts are
keyed to the intelligence and national security needs of
the USG. This continuous review and scrutinizing of the
strategic plan referred to above, among other factors,
is the basis for guiding our current and projected
detection technology choices.
a. While our most recent review did not uncover any blatant
duplications of effort, it did nonetheless afford us the
opportunity to better define and execute our programs. In
this manner, we are better able to direct the combined work
of our National Laboratories and focus them toward common
objectives. A prime example is in the laser technology area
under a program called Chemical Analysis by Laser
Interrogation of Proliferation Effluents (CALIOPE). Through
coordination and clarification of activities distributed
across five laboratories we have effected a collective and
cohesive laser nonproliferation detection program. While the
effort is one of management cooperation which eliminates the
potential for duplication, the real benefit will result-from
the collaborative technical efforts of scientists And
engineers of our laboratories. Beyond its principal purpose
of nonproliferation we fully expect this effort to result in
spin-off applications that can address other technical
shortfalls in the intelligence, defense, and environmental
areas as well.
b. Perhaps the most daunting shortfall and technical challenge
of proliferation detection is the development of monitoring
strategies and affordable systems that can deal with the
magnitude of the global geopolitical dimension of
proliferation. DOE's approach to nonproliferation detection
technology developments in light of these challenges is to
have available to the USG a broad base of technologies
options ranging from close-in-hands-on sensors to distant
remote satellite detection. The specific technologies and
systems are then down selected for application to what are
determined to be the priority threats or proliferant targets.
We are addressing through R&D the known specific
technical shortfalls in areas such as discrimination between
underground nuclear tests and other seismic events, remote
detection of effluents related to the development of weapons
of mass destruction, improved sensitivity in detecting
atmospheric nuclear events, and multi-sensor data fusion.
Subsequent to the United Nations Security Council Resolution
#687 regarding Iraq, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Board of Governors, authorized the IAEA Secretariat to
use "special inspections" to seek out undeclared nuclear
activities. "Special inspections" will entail a greater need
for better information as well as detection and monitoring
technologies. The intelligence community and the Department
of State are appropriate partners with DOE for developing the
best mix of overt and covert detection and monitoring systems
that best supports U.S. policy on nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons.
The DOE Strategic Plan for Proliferation Detection Technology
Development has been used as the basis for presenting a
budget request to Congress for nonproliferation initiatives
in FY-1993 and the following years. While there is no formal
budget crosswalk between Departments or Agencies at the
detection technology level, there is close coordination on
program and issues of common concern that ultimately impact
the budget build. The joint DOE/DOD report to Congress
pursuant to Section 1503 on Nonproliferation describes in
detail the extent of coordination that goes on in the
interagency arena. These on-going activities as highlighted
in the report undergo frequent review, some formal and many
informal. Management is constantly alert to the opportunity
for improvements to this process. Within the Office
of Intelligence and National Security it is a matter of
policy and routine program management to continually seek to
improve detection technology coordination, cooperation, and
collaboration in its detection technology efforts.
c. In an effort to improve the past informal coordination
between DOE and other government agencies a formal mechanism
has been established within the Executive Branch. This
process is the Research and Development Working Group (RDWG)
under the Intelligence Community Nonproliferation Committee.
This RDWG is co-chaired by the DOE and the Nonproliferation
Center and serves as the forum for interagency review and
coordination of all R&D associated with proliferation
detection technologies. We believe that this mechanism can
serve to improve the interagency coordination for all
elements of the executive branch.
Question fran Senator John Warner
North Korean Nuclear Program
QUESTION 17: While the U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks at the
United Nations did succeed in preventing immediate
withdrawal of North Korea from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the talks did not result in an
agreement to allow inspection by the IAEA of North
Korea's suspected nuclear materials production and
storage facilities. Please give us some insight into
the Administration's plans to continue to press for such
access and when we might reasonable expect a definitive
outcome. Also, please give us your assessment of the
potential threat inherent in continuing lengthy
discussions, in view of some publicly released estimates
that North Korea may have sufficient nuclear material to
produce a small number of nuclear weapons within a year
or two. Finally, these bilateral discussions are being
led by Assistant Secretary of State Bob Gallucci; what
is the process by which the concerns and recommendations
of the Departments of Defense and Energy are reflected
in Mr. Gallucci's discussions with the North Koreans?
Was the possibility of a nuclear-armed North Korea
considered in the development of the "win-hold-win"
strategy of the Aspin Pentagon?
ANSWER: The importance of access to suspected nuclear facilities
has been made clear to the North Koreans and they will
continue to be pressed on this matter. In particular,
access to the locations in North Korea which we believe
are associated with nuclear reprocessing is critical.
Without such access the International Atomic Energy
Agency Inspectors and the international community will
be unable to determine how much reprocessing may have
occurred in North Korea. These facilities are important
to inspect because the volume of nuclear wastes that
they may contain are a key indicator of the amount of
plutonium that may have been obtained through
reprocessing.
The importance of a delay caused by lengthy discussion
depends upon how much plutonium has been obtained
through reprocessing. If North Korea has not obtained
sufficient material for a nuclear device, then delay
will not be of great technical concern, as long as it
does not allow them to do any additional reprocessing to
acquire any more material. This is where continued
routine IAEA inspections are valuable. We believe that
covert reprocessing cannot occur as long as routine
monitoring of the reactor and reprocessing plant by the
IAEA continues. Such inspections effectively cap
the production capabilities of the facility.
However, if North Korea has already obtained sufficient
plutonium for one or two devices, then a lengthy delay
may permit them to make considerable progress in
weaponization - designing and fabricating a nuclear
explosive device. If this is the case, then a lengthy
delay could have very serious consequences.
The Department of Energy is in regular communication
with the State Department on Korean issues. To assure
that the State Department is fully informed of the
technical views of the Department of Energy on the
situation at the North Korean facility, the DOE has
assigned a nuclear reprocessing and inspection expert
from Oak Ridge National Laboratory to the State
Department on an as-needed basis for analysis and
advice.
DOE defers to DOD on whether a nuclear armed North Korea
was considered in the "win-hold-win" strategy of the
Aspin Pentagon.
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