Statement of Hazel R. O'Leary
Secretary of Energy
U. S. Department of Energy
Before the
Committee on Armed Services
Military Application of Nuclear Energy Panel
U. S. House of Representatives
May 18, 1993
INTRODUCTION
Mister Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear
before you today to discuss the Department of Energy's Fiscal Year 1994
budget request for atomic energy defense activities identified in the
defense, intelligence and national security, and environmental
restoration and waste management programs. I would like first to
summarize the Department's priorities and plans for the future, and
then discuss particular areas of interest such as the K-Reactor,
weapons complex reconfiguration, and cleanup activities.
Recent world changes, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Cold War continue to shape DOE's changing roles
and priorities. Who would have believed that today we would be
dismantling thousands of weapons and buying highly enriched uranium
from the Russians? Evolving international events have provided the
Department an opportunity to redirect funds from weapons production
activities to other critical DOE missions.
Through the Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM)
program, DOE is responsible for cleaning up 4,000 sites that represent
26,000 acres of weapons- related hazardous wastes, contaminated soil ,
groundwater, and structures. As the weapons complex is consolidated
and downsized, facilities no longer needed will be turned over to
EM for decontamination and decommissioning.
The main tasks of the nuclear weapons complex will be the dismantlement
of weapons, the protection of nuclear materials, and the maintenance
and surveillance of the residual nuclear weapons stockpile. As the
complex i s consolidated, however, we plan to retain the capability to
produce components for the stockpile if certain weapons deteriorate
with age or we find that we must rebuild our arsenal.
SAVINGS
The Administration is proposing significant savings in the atomic
energy defense activities account. Programmatic savings resulting
from the redirection of National Defense Programs total $1.3 billion.
Of this amount, $634 million is offset by the increased request in
Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, and $100
million is offset by a comprehensive worker retraining assistance
program for a net reduction of $598 million in the FY 1994 Atomic
Energy Defense Activities budget request.
Savings will accrue from reduced requirements, delaying non-nuclear
consolidation reconfiguration initiatives, reducing laboratory
nuclear weapons research and development, and transitioning
K-Reactor to a cold standby status. DOE is also demonstrating
innovative cleanup technologies such as sensors, that can greatly
improve characterization/monitoring of contamination and save resources
in the future. We have developed a remote tank inspection system to
characterize tank waste in-situ, eliminating any potential for
exposing workers to the wastes from tanks similar to those at Hanford.
The system can save an estimated $270 million over conventional
solutions to this problem.
BUDGET OVERVIEW
The Department's FY 1994 budget request for atomic energy defense
activities is $11.5. Of this amount, the Department is requesting $4.7
billion for the Office of Defense Programs (DP) and $5.5 billion for
the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM).
The remainder of the atomic energy defense activities request totals
$1.3 billion, which includes funding for activities such as the Naval
Reactors development, the Office of Intelligence and National Security,
worker retraining, and waste disposal.
Funding increases for energy-related activities, environmental
restoration and waste management, and science and technology programs
are more than offset by the major decrease in funding for national
defense. The Department will continue its expansion of the nuclear
weapons nonproliferation program that was initiated in FY 1993 as well
as provide additional support for current and prospective arms control
treaties and agreements.
The FY 1994 funding request for weapons, research, development, and
testing activities supports an estimated 16 percent decline in
laboratory staffing for those activities from the FY 1993 level,
although not all mission areas are projected to decline equally. Total
employment at the three defense labs will be relatively stable as work
shifts to other programs. The Department has requested $4.7 billion
for Defense Programs activities under the defense account. Emphasis
will be placed on accelerated warhead dismantlement, storage, and
disposal activities; preparation for limitations on underground
testing; and technological support for reconfiguring the nuclear
weapons complex.
The Department's FY 1994 budget request for Intelligence and National
Security is $527.5 million, a six percent increase from the FY 1993
appropriation. This increase will support nuclear proliferation
activities and strengthen the Department's assessments of worldwide
nuclear weapons proliferation. In addition, the request will
enhance the Department's role in export controls, international
safeguards, and other policy countermeasures.
This request focuses on improving analyses of intelligence on nuclear
supplier nations and their attendant procurement networks; on worldwide
nuclear material production technology; and on proliferating countries'
efforts to match warhead designs to delivery systems. The
Intelligence and National Security budget request also supports 390
full-time-equivalents and includes $19.6 million for capital
equipment.
The Department's FY 1994 budget proposal for Environmental Restoration
and Waste Management totals $6.5 billion. Of this amount, $5.5 billion
constitutes the Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
request. The Department will continue many Federal facility cleanup
activities, initiate new projects, and complete a number of other
environmental management activities. This request represents an
increase of approximately $600 million, 12 percent above the amount
appropriated in 1993 for defense atomic energy activities.
Specifically, this increase includes $373.7 million of transfers
for shutdown from Defense Programs.
More detailed information on the FY 1994 budget request and
related accomplishments can be found in the written statement and
background material provided to the Panel by Mr. Grimm, Dr. Beckner,
and Dr. Keliher in the April 28 hearing. I will now summarize an
important new safety and health initiative, and then discuss particular
areas of interest in the Office of Defense Programs, the Office of
Intelligence and National Security, and the Office of Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management.
DOE SAFETY AND HEALTH INITIATIVE
The Administration wants to solidify its commitment to protect the
health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment. This
month, I announced a comprehensive nuclear and occupational safety
initiative to emphasize the Department's strong dedication to these
issues. As part of this initiative, DOE will develop a Comprehensive
Departmental Safety and Health Policy that clearly establishes the
responsibility of DOE and its contractors to protect the health and
safety of workers "inside the fence." We will accelerate our process
for issuing critical Price-Anderson Nuclear Safety Rules, and
reinstate the authority of the Assistant Secretary for Environment,
Safety, and Health (EH) to force cessation of unsafe operations
involving imminent health and safety concerns. In addition, the
Department will cancel the 60-day Notice requirement for scheduling
field assessments, and develop a fatality policy with strengthened
investigation procedures. Employees will be empowered to participate in
this initiative site-wide through the establishment of
Employee-Management Health and Safety Committees.
The Department also plans to review current classification procedures
and infomation policies to find ways to improve how we release
environment, safety, and health information. The public has a right
to receive free and timely information as long as it is in accordance
with legitimate national security interests.
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
I created this office with two goals in mind. First, to consolidate
related functions so the Department can more efficiently support
national security objectives and respond to areas of concern such as
the proliferation dangers posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. And
second, as part of the President's plan for re-inventing Government, to
improve the daily effectiveness of the Department by reducing the
number of organizations which report directly to the Secretarial
level.
The Office of Intelligence and National Security is composed of four
offices: Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Security Affairs,
Intelligence, and Emergency Management.
The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation utilizes the
Department's unique technical and analytical resources in support of
the Administration's program to detect and monitor proliferation
problems, verify treaty requirements, and control use of United
States nuclear, nuclear- related, and dual-use technologies. The
office also supports activities of such organizations as the
International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls. The Office
of Arms Control and Nonproliferation is especially active now in
assisting the former Soviet Union republics on safe and secure
transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear warheads.
In addition, it seeks to prevent the "brain drain" of their nuclear
weapons scientists and engineers.
The Office of Security Affairs directs the Department's safeguards and
security program which includes responsibilities to establish
policies for the classification and declassification of information;
create sensible, cost- effective safeguards for the Department's
facilities and technologies; and manage our security clearance
program.
The Office of Intelligence participates in government-wide activities
to thwart attempt s by foreign intelligence to acquire classified and
sensitive Departmental technology. It also evaluates likely threats
to our facilities and operations; and collect information on nuclear
weapons security and proliferation.
Finally, the Office of Emergency Management coordinates our response
to energy-related emergencies and emergencies at Departmental
facilities; serves as the Department's focal point and interagency
contact for emergency preparedness and response activities; and
maintains systems to detect emergencies, assess their severity and
provide for effective response.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS MISSION
The mission of Defense Programs is to maintain the Nation's nuclear
deterrent. Defense Programs supports the enduring nuclear weapons
stockpile with a focus on safety and security of existing weapons;
research, development, and testing, and weapons dismantlement. The
office also focuses on effective management of nuclear materials;
environment, safety, and health compliance; emergency response
preparedness; and reconfiguration of the weapons complex.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Due to the continuing, though changed, threat of nuclear weapons
worldwide, it is important to recognize that reductions in the nuclear
stockpile and a potential moratorium on nuclear testing can yield some,
but not necessarily proportional reductions in weapons research and
development (R&D). Even with a much smaller stockpile, appropriate
R&D is still required to ensure the continued safety, security, and
reliability of the stockpile. Research and development will also
reassure our allies that this nation remains committed to its role of
nuclear deterrence. The Departments' weapons laboratories will play key
roles in the evolving requirements of the nation's nuclear weapons
program and in the reconfiguration of the weapons complex to meet new
challenges.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the potential proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction has become an increasingly important
security threat. Recent events in North Korea, Iraq, and the other
parts of the world remind us that nuclear uncertainties still exist
in four important areas: proliferation; arms control; dismantlement;
and nuclear terrorism. Research and development at the laboratories is
required to develop and maintain technologies to support our interests
in all these areas.
The DOE defense laboratories are the key repository of the technical
understanding and the technologies required to control proliferation
of nuclear weapons. In addition, their expertise in verification and
safeguards technologies, including satellite- and earth-based detection
and monitoring, are critical to international efforts to monitor and
control nuclear materials and/or device testing.
Looking further into the future requirements of the Department, I have
recently established a series of teams, comprised of policy-level and
career officials throughout the Department, to address cross-cutting
Departmental priorities. One of these teams will examine the roles,
missions and core competencies of the multiprogram laboratories and the
major program-dedicated laboratories. The team will focus on how these
laboratories can be utilized to achieve the Department's priorities.
Emphasis will be placed on viewing the laboratory system as a whole,
with an eye toward maximizing the systems benefit to the Department and
the Nation, while reducing redundancy and cost. The laboratories will
be full participants in this review.
SAVANNAH RIVER K-REACTOR
Based on a stockpile consistent with the START II Agreement, there is
sufficient tritium in the inventory to meet projected tritium needs
for DoD weapons and to maintain a reserve level well into the next
decade. Therefore, the Department plans to transition the K-Reactor
this year to a cold standby status with no planned provision for
restart.
Between now and the time when a new production source for tritium
becomes available, the United States will rely on weapons
dismantlements, recycling, and existing inventories of tritium to
support weapons stockpile requirements. Sufficient time is available
for the Department to plan responsibly for an appropriate and
cost-effective replacement source for tritium to maintain our nuclear
deterrent.
NUCLEAR TESTING
The FY 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations Act places restrictions on
nuclear testing, resulting in a test ban beginning October 1, 1996. The
legislation allows the Department to conduct up to 15 tests, with no
more than 5 tests per fiscal year during the period July 1, 1993, to
September 30, 1996. This testing is subject to further Congressional
approval of annual testing plans which would be submitted by the
President.
In January 1993 the previous Administration submitted a report to
Congress as required by the FY 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations
Act. This report lacked the required testing plan. On February 12,
1993 President Clinton notified Congress of his intent to submit a
new testing plan to Congress. This plan is now being finalized by
the National Security Council, Department of Defense, the Department
of Energy, and other Federal agencies for submittal to the Congress
later this spring. It is inappropriate for me to comment further at
this time.
RECONFIGURATION OF THE WEAPONS COMPLEX
The current Weapons Complex is inefficient and burdened with excessive
overhead costs compared to direct production costs. The goal of the
reconfiguration program is to restructure the complex into a smaller,
less diverse, and less expensive operation.
That notwithstanding, the high level of technical excellence and
sophistication that exists today at the weapons laboratories and
production plants must not be compromised. The existing expertise can
be utilized for normal stockpile surveillance, evaluation and
maintenance, and to make nuclear weapons repairs when required. It can
also be used to guard against technological surprise or to resume
production, if directed by the President.
Reconfiguration of the nuclear elements of the Nuclear Weapons Complex
is being addressed through preparation of a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (PEIS). Since the initial public scoping meetings on
the Reconfiguration PEIS in the Summer of 1991, significant changes in
the future direction and needs of the weapons program have occurred.
The Department is evaluating these changes and plans to discuss them
and propose modifications to the scope of the PEIS in a revised Notice
of Intent. The revised Notice of Intent will be published in the
Federal Register this summer and distributed widely to affected
stakeholders and the public for input and comments. Following this, a
draft PEIS is scheduled for release to the public for comment late
this year. The Department will then proceed to complete the PEIS in
late 1994, and to issue a Record of Decision based on environmental,
safety, and health analyses, costs, and other socioeconomic and
technical factors in the PEIS.
The nonnuclear aspects of the weapons complex are being addressed in
the Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment, which was
completed and distributed to affected States and Indian tribes for
preapproval review on December 1992. These States and Indian tribes
have provided comments, and the Environmental Assessment is being
revised as appropriate.
The preferred alternative analyzed in this Environmental Assessment
would lead to the consolidation of most nonnuclear manufacturing
activities at the Kansas City Plant. Tritium work would be consolidated
at Savannah River where it is presently performed. If the proposal is
adopted, all weapons complex activities would be terminated at the
Mound and Pinellas Plants, including nonnuclear manufacturing
activities at the Rocky Flats Plant. Under this scenario, certain
selected technologies would be preserved at the weapons laboratories
during the forthcoming period of reduced or no production. The
Department has prepared a number of separate analyses and studies which
discuss this matter.
One such study, the Nonnuclear Reconfiguration Cost Effectiveness
Report, has been challenged by several parties. In order to address
these concerns, I directed the initiation of reviews by three
independent consultants to evaluate the findings which support the cost
effectiveness certification in the.report. These consultants were
selected out of discussions with elected officials of the affected
States. The consultants began their work in early April; I expect to
receive their final reports by June 1, 1993.
In the meantime, the Department is proceeding with internal review of
the Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment. The results of
the consultants' independent reviews could have a bearing on
Environmental Assessment analyses. The Department will not finalize
the Environmental Assessment and issue a proposed Finding of No
Significant Impact until the consultants' reviews are complete and a
decision is made on whether to proceed.
WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT
The Department will continue to focus on the dismantlement of nuclear
weapons and the management of the resulting inventory of special
nuclear materials (plutonium and uranium). The disassembly of a nuclear
device is a very exacting procedure and is conducted in a controlled
environment at the Pantex Plant under strict supervision. Following
disassembly, the plutonium and uranium components must be retained in
controlled storage.
In order to execute the large, planned stockpile reductions, Pantex
disassembly operations need additional storage for pits. The Department
has prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) to address increased pit
storage on an interim basis (six to ten year period). If there are no
significant environmental impacts identified in the EA, the Department
expects to issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). Upon
issuing a FONSI, the Department would then proceed to increase the
number of pits stored at Pantex by utilizing existing storage
facilities and increasing their pit storage capacity.
Until recently, long-term storage facilities for special nuclear
material had not been addressed because we envisioned a large weapons
stockpile. Disassembled components had simply been recycled back into
new weapons. However, we are now faced with a much larger number of
weapons retirements. As a consequence, long-term storage capacity for
plutonium and highly enriched uranium is a necessity for the future
weapons complex. Alternative sites for such facilities will be
evaluated in the Reconfiguration PEIS which is scheduled for release
and public comment late this year with a Record of Decision (ROD)
following in late-1994.
ROCKY FLATS PLANT
With no requirement to build new weapons in the foreseeable future,
the continuing decline in stockpile requirements, and the focus on
weapons dismantlement, there is no need to maintain a production
capability for plutonium components at the Rocky Flats Plant. Instead,
the Department will redirect funds toward environmental restoration and
cleanup of the site, including worker and community assistance. The
Department anticipates that a capability for plutonium component
fabrication will be reestablished at another site early in the next
decade as a part of the reconfiguration program for the weapons
complex. In the meantime, any requirements for additional plutonium
components for weapons will be met through pit reuse.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The Defense Programs dual-use technology transfer program is designed
to support the Department's nuclear weapons laboratories to maintain
their core nuclear competencies, which are critical to ensuring a safe,
secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile at a time of decreasing defense
budgets. At the same time, the Department seeks to provide American
industry with increased access to the world-class science and
engineering talent of the laboratories. Leveraging the skills and
limited research and development dollars of the weapons laboratories
with those of American industry is an effective investment of
resources.
The weapons laboratories have traditionally worked on the leading edge
of advanced technologies necessary to maintain the Nation's nuclear
deterrent. Among others, these technologies include: microelectronics
and photonics, precision engineering and manufacturing, computational
modeling of processes and products, high performance computing,
advanced materials development and processing, and the development of
nondestructive analytical tools. All of these technologies have
application to American industry and are critical to competitive
industrial activities.
Our vision gives the Department a more focused direction that will
strengthen the Nation's preeminence in scientific institutions. This
can be achieved by structuring our research and development activities
to support not only mission-oriented defense, science, and energy
research, but long-term benefits to the United States public in jobs
and quality of life.
WORKER AND COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE
As I mentioned previously, the Department is preparing a comprehensive
worker retraining and economic adjustment assistance program for
workers and communities affected by layoffs or other restructuring
actions due to changes in the Department's priorities. This effort will
address such matters as plans for work force retraining and
reassignments; community economic adjustment plans; worker involvement
in work force change decisions; retirement incentives; retraining;
preference in hiring at other DOE facilities; outplacement services;
training assistance in coordination with the Department of Labor and
affected states; relocation assistance; and continuation of health
benefits for 3 years. The key to success in our efforts will be direct
involvement and coordination with Federal, State and local agencies,
unions, industry, and other interested parties.
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
The task of struggling with the environmental consequences of defending
our nation over the last five decades has been and will continue to be
difficult. The technical challenges are demanding. The managerial
problems of building an efficient, cost effective organization are more
demanding. Finally, the job of persuading the American people that the
Department is honestly committed to the protection of the public health
and the environment is perhaps the most difficult and necessary task of
all.
CHALLENGES
Before I review the various activities of the Environmental Restoration
and Waste Management program, I would like to describe our specific
challenges and possible solutions to current problems. I will also
discuss plans for land use and review the steps we are taking to
improve contractor accountability.
The Administration has dedicated itself to honor the Government's
obligation to clean up the DOE nuclear weapons complex to protect our
environment and the health and safety of our citizens and workers. As
previously stated, many obstacles exist, such as the magnitude and
complexity of the cleanup task. The Department is also faced with
incomplete land use planning, unspecified cleanup standards, and a lack
of cost-effective, innovative technologies. There is excessive focus on
characterization of sites rather than cleanup of sites, a lack of
certainty in the availability of treatment and disposal sites, and a
need for greater contractor accountability.
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES & SOLUTIONS
The job now is to reshape an environmental program that will sustain
over long-term pressures. This can be done with a clear strategy
followed by implementation that will gain the trust and confidence of
Congress, the States, and our citizens. We must work hard to
effectively address the truly urgent risks that exist at our sites.
Although large sums of money have been spent to characterize and
understand the problems in our system, we need to extend ourselves in
this area to bring these problems under control. We must also
confront the problems with worker safety and health that exist
throughout the system. It is our obligation to provide safety to our
employees and contractors - not only to minimize risks, but to maintain
a loyal and efficient workforce.
The Department must develop a system with better management and
financial controls. Congress and other parties are asking us how we are
spending taxpayers dollars. The Department is working to implement
improved financial and accounting controls and earn more in terms of
progress for each dollar that is spent.
The Department needs to negotiate with Federal and State regulatory
agencies and work toward reasonable, health- and risk-based standards.
In order to establish sound standards, we must attempt to understand
the risks posed by the contaminants and take into consideration
site-specific issues including background concentrations, land use
issues, and technological limitations.
The Department plans to seek external independent evaluation of health
and environmental threats of the defense complex. In this regard, DOE
can better understand the risks at the existing facilities by reaching
out to the academic and public health communities, States, regulators,
citizens, and other stakeholders for their input.
The Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialogue Committee
(Keystone) Report has a number of valuable insights and recommendations
to support this approach and provides a good example of how parties can
be brought together to address competing interests.
LAND USE
The development and selection of a particular site's ultimate end state
will require extensive interactions with various stakeholders. The
Department has achieved some success in considering the level of
cleanup at the Hanford, Washington site with the Hanford Future Site
Uses Working Group. This group was comprised of numerous stakeholder
including regulators, concerned citizen groups, Indian tribes,
environmentalists, labor, industry, and DOE representatives. This
approach may be a useful model for land use planning and
decision-making at other sites.
While these decisions involve local participation, there is also a need
to bring a national perspective to the ultimate fate of these lands.
Through integrated risk management and long-range planning, we must do
what we can to address potential threats. Land use restrictions may be
"temporary" while new technologies are developed or while contamination
is naturally decaying. Our first priority must always be safety and
the protection of human health and the environment.
CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
The Department needs a better system of managing, overseeing, and
reviewing cost estimates made by its contractors. In addition,
contractors need to be held to a higher standard of accountability. We
must improve the way we estimate the scope of work needed to meet our
commitments in addition to the costs of performing that work so we can
better understand and control cost growth. The Department will also
work to make better use of independent estimating to help assure the
validity of initial scope and cost estimates.
Historically, DOE has been seen as deficient in the administration of
its most significant contracts. In the past, management and operating
(M&O) contractor costs short of "criminal actions" or "willful
misconduct," were generally paid by the Government. Costs resulting
from negligence were often paid, and the Department did not adequately
consider performance when awarding fee to an M&O. In response, the
Department is developing mechanisms to emphasize the importance it
places on the responsibility and accountability of its M&O contractors.
The evaluation standard is used to promote excellent performance,
particularly in the areas of environment, safety, health, and cost
performance.
In order to assert control over the authorization of work, negotiated
costs, and to deliver schedules under its M&O contracts, DOE published
a final rulemaking in June, 1991. Under the rule, profit-making
contractors and subcontractors are required to assume the financial
risk for certain avoidable costs and expenses resulting from negligent
actions or inactions. The penalty to the contractor is a reduction in
award fee for the amount of loss - this number could reach the
contract's maximum fee amount. The primary purpose of establishing this
penalty is to provide DOE with another management tool under which M&O
contractors would be encouraged through financial incentives to achieve
higher levels of performance than were experienced in the past. Just as
an award fee can be a positive tool, the penalty for negligence is an
important device to encourage quality work from contractors.
Although deficiencies still exist, we are making progress in several
areas of contractor accountability as well as our management of
contractors. We conduct periodic program management reviews and
analyses, have established internal program tracking systems, and carry
out independent self-assessments. Each month, the program offices use
the DOE Approved Funding Program financial system to distribute funds
to the Field Offices and then use the DOE Financial Information System
to track fiscal performance against the amounts allocated. Headquarters
program managers conduct periodic, in-depth reviews of Field Office
activities. Additionally, we are examining alternatives for
strengthening EM's management of contractors at the site level, which
requires optimizing the mix of resources and skills between
headquarters and the field.
In summary, the Department will ensure greater contractor
accountability and expand upon previous efforts. Firm deadlines will be
set for the establishment of project baselines that define the costs,
schedules, and technical details of activities. These baselines will
make it easier to measure contractor performance. Quantifiable cost
objectives will be established to assure that management and cost
controls are used effectively to achieve outcomes that are consistent
with expectations. Performance will be measured by the containment of
costs within established cost objectives, and managers will be held
accountable at all levels for the success of program operations.
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET EFFICIENCY
The Department is committed to work toward the goal of continuous
improvement by implementing stringent management and cost controls.
We must first recognize our mistakes, and then correct them. For
example, the cleanup program has received numerous recommendations for
improvement in the form of reviews and reports issued by the General
Accounting Office and other organizations. Although these reviews have
pointed out areas of weakness, the Department has made many changes and
is committed to further improvements to address the concerns that have
been raised.
In January 1991, because of concern over increasing costs, EM
Headquarters line organizations mounted a unique budget validation
effort in cooperation with field counterparts. Review teams went to the
field to review the scope, schedule, and cost of the Field Office
budget requests. Because of these reviews, the baseline process has
resulted in updated and revised cost estimates for the entire program.
Although the Department is making progress in the areas of cost
estimating and funds tracking, we realize many more enhancements must
be made in the future.
WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
The mission of the Waste Management program is to provide for the
safe, environmentally sound, and cost-effective treatment, storage, and
disposal of radioactive, hazardous, mixed, and sanitary wastes
generated by Departmental activities. The program has substantially
upgraded the waste management systems at DOE sites and is correcting
many instances of non-compliance.
WASTE TYPES
The Department is responsible for effectively managing many kinds of
waste, including (1) high-level, (2) low-level mixed, (3) low-level,
(4) transuranic, (5) hazardous, and (6) sanitary wastes.
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
High-level radioactive wastes (HLW) are stored in large underground
tanks at DOE's Hanford, Savannah River, Idaho, and West Valley sites.
Some of these wastes have been stored for almost 50 years. Age, the
results of inadequate waste management practices, and poor maintenance
have taken their toll. As a result, the resolution of tank safety
issues is one of the Department's highest priorities. We have
identified and prioritized issues relating to tank safety at the
four high-level waste sites. In addition, the Tank Waste Remediation
System has been formed to integrate all activities related to
high-level waste stored at Hanford, including safety issue resolution,
waste retrieval, treatment, and disposal.
LOW-LEVEL MIXED WASTE
In the area of low-level mixed waste, DOE continues to provide safe
storage for approximately 70,000 cubic meters of waste. A current
inventory report was recently completed and submitted to the States and
EPA as required under the Federal Facility Compliance Act. Draft site
treatment plans will be completed and submitted to the States in FY
1994.
LOW-LEVEL WASTE
The DOE sites dispose of an estimated 55,000 cubic meters of low-level
waste (LLW) each year. Shipments of this waste are expected to continue
from smaller generator sites to disposal sites at Nevada and Hanford.
At the Mound Plant, construction will begin on low-level waste storage
facilities, and DOE plans to upgrade the Oak Ridge low-level liquid
waste system.
TRANSURANIC WASTE
The Department stores safely 61,600 cubic meters of transuranic waste
at Los Alamos, Idaho, Nevada, Oak Ridge, Richland, Rocky Flats, and
Savannah River. This waste decays slowly and requires long-term
isolation. As the Department continues to take actions required under
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act and plans to meet
the requirements of 40 CFR191, construction of the Idaho Transuranic
Waste Storage Modules will begin.
HAZARDOUS WASTE
In the area of hazardous waste management, DOE accumulates, stores, and
then ships the waste to commercial facilities for treatment and
disposal. In FY 1991, a moratorium was imposed by the Department on
off-site shipments of hazardous waste stored in radiologically
controlled areas. The ban is now being lifted on a site-by-site basis
as sites demonstrate their ability to meet Department-wide requirements
for identifying radioactively-contaminated waste.
SANITARY WASTE
There are essentially two types of sanitary wastes: (1) solid sanitary
waste such as garbage and rubble and (2) liquid sanitary waste such as
sanitary sewage and industrial wastewater. The management of sanitary
waste is regulated by Federal and State laws and regulations.
WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT
The enactment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act
in FY 1993 imposed new statutory requirements on DOE, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and other Federal agencies. The FY
1994 request allows the Department to meet its Land Withdrawal Act
requirements and to continue moving toward a disposal decision. At the
same time, DOE will maintain the readiness of the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant site to begin and conduct a multi-year Test Phase with limited
quantities of transuranic waste when all statutory conditions have been
met, including the requisite approvals by EPA.
PLANNED ACTIVITIES
With its FY 1994 funding for waste management, DOE will continue
studying Tank Waste Remediation Systems technology options and
treatment concepts for the Hanford site, and continue resolving tank
safety issues there during fiscal year 1994. DOE also plans to continue
calcining operations at the Idaho site and to start radioactive
operations at the Defense Waste Processing Facility at Savannah River.
In addition, DOE intends to treat 32,000 drums of raw sludge at the
K-25 site in Oak Ridge.
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION
The objectives of the Environmental Restoration program are to conduct
necessary remedial actions, stabilize radioactive waste, and carry out
decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) at Departmental and
statutorily authorized non-government facilities and sites. The
environmental restoration program is responsible for conducting site
characterizations and assessments for the Department, and is also
responsible for implementing appropriate remediation remedies at the
majority of Department sites and numerous off-site locations across the
country.
PLANNED ACTIVITIES
As part of DOE's environmental restoration activities planned for FY
1994, interim actions will be conducted at the Idaho Field Office,
including Pit 9 remedial design and remedial actions. A groundwater
characterization-program is being implemented at the 1,350 square mile
Nevada Test Site, and environmental monitoring will continue at eight
off-site nuclear testing areas.
In Colorado, the Department is supporting several remediation efforts
to protect the environment and surrounding population. Off-site
activities being performed will protect the Standley Lake from plant
run-off and replace the Great Western Reservoir with a new water
supply.
At the Hanford site, characterization and interim remedial actions
will continue into FY 1994, and decontamination and decommissioning
efforts will begin at several contaminated facilities. In addition,
site-wide well plugging and remediation will be carried out at the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory.
The Department will also initiate all field investigations at the
Pantex Plant in Texas, complete all groundwater contamination
assessment activities at the Pinellas Plant in Florida, and expects to
receive approval of the first Record of Decision for the Mound Plant in
Ohio. In addition, we will perform remedial actions at 133 vicinity
properties at the Climax Mill site at Grand Junction.
DOE also plans to issue the final Site 300 Site-Wide Remedial
Investigation Report at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which
consolidates- assessment and characterization activities for six
operable units. DOE intends to complete the final feasibility study
documents for each operable unit and provide them to EPA and the State
during FY 1994.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
The EM Office of Technology Development's primary mission is to
establish and maintain program for applied research, development,
demonstration, testing, and evaluation. This program aims to address
the technical, regulatory, institutional, and economic issues
associated with waste management and remediation by improving current
technologies that are incomplete, expensive, or pose unnecessary safety
risks.
The Department uses the resources of the national laboratories,
management and operating contractors, industry, universities, and the
international community to generate innovative technology concepts for
implementation at DOE sites. Since 1990, the Department has signed 19
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements and technology
licenses to successfully transfer advances to the private sector.
The Department also analyzes compliance agreements to identify dates by
which its.research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation
activities must be completed. The results point to a narrow window of
opportunity within which to introduce new and innovative technology
solutions. If DOE is to realize significant returns on United States
investment in technology development, then research, development,
demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities must be near
completion by the late 1990s.
PLANNED ACTIVITIES
In the area of technology development, the Department plans to close
out the first of EM's Integrated Demonstrations for cleanup of volatile
organic compounds in non-arid soils. In addition, we will also conduct
scaled-up field tests of technologies for treating Fernald uranium pit
sludge into stable final waste forms. In the area of waste retrieval
and processing, the Department will demonstrate characterization and
retrieval systems for contaminated buried waste and deploy a remotely
operated excavation system to retrieve waste and soil at three DOE
labs/sites.
Last year, DOE signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
Western Governors and four Federal agencies. The MOU committed the
Administration and the Western Governors to speed the development,
demonstration, and transfer of innovative technologies. In June of this
year, I will meet with the Western Governors and members of the
Clinton Administration to continue discussions on how to accelerate
the application of advanced cleanup technologies at Federal sites in
Western States. This first-of-a-kind initiative will bring together
Federal agencies, States, regulators, private industry, and public
interest groups to jointly develop innovative solutions to the
pressing environmental problems that face the Nation.
FACILITY TRANSITION AND MANAGEMENT
The end of the Cold War has accelerated efforts to identify facilities
that are surplus to the defense mission and to redirect programs toward
long-term safe shutdown. Key facility transition issues include the
change of DOE focus from production to cleanup, the transfer of
management responsibility, and the implementation of a graded approach
to standards for deactivation. Once facilities are transferred, the
necessary decontamination and decommissioning activities will commence.
Sensitivities such as work force concerns, economic impacts to local
communities, and stakeholder involvement will be considered when
redirecting programs from production to cleanup.
The Office of Facility Transition and Management, established in July
1992 within the Environmental Restoration and Waste Management program,
has been given responsibility for deactivating key facilities at the
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant and the Rocky Flats Plant.
Responsibility for the Fast Flux Test Facility at Richland has also
been transferred to this office, along with landlord functions at the
Hanford and Idaho sites.
PLANNED ACTIVITIES
In FY 1994, the office will assume responsibility for 16 former
isotope production facilities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and
EM will become the landlord at Rocky Flats.
The magnitude of the FY 1994 budget request primarily results from the
transfer of funding from Defense Programs and Waste Management. The
budget request supports future transition activities at 10 sites,
including the following: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Plant,
Pinellas Plant, Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, part of Y-12 and the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Richland, Rocky Flats, San
Francisco, and Savannah River.
CONCLUSION
Many challenges lie ahead for the Department. We are confident,
however, that the obstacles can be identified and overcome before they
become barriers to progress. My aim is to build a strong consensus
among internal and external stakeholders on Departmental priorities and
to find ways of achieving measurable results rather than merely
managing programs.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address the Armed
Services Committee regarding the 1994 budget request for atomic energy
defense activities and the Department's programs and plans in this
area.
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