FY 1994 BUDGET OVERVIEW - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, 04/28/1993, Question and Answer

Basis Date:: 19930805
Chairperson:: T. Bevill
Committee:: House Appropriations
Docfile Number:: Q93AK181
Hearing Date:: 19930428
DOE Lead Office:: DP, et al SUB
Committee:: Energy and Water Development
Hearing Subject:: FY 1994 BUDGET OVERVIEW - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
Witness Name:: E. Beckner, et al.
Hearing Text:

NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Beckner, with nuclear weapons requirements changing
so rapidly, can you assure this Committee that you are reviewing all
ongoing activities throughout the weapons complex to see if the work
being performed is still a valid requirement and that decisions are
being made quickly to prevent wasting funds?
Dr. Beckner. In the process of developing the FY 1994 and FY 1995
budget plans, Defense Programs (DP) conducted a complete validation of
all ongoing activities throughout the weapons complex. Additionally,
per my direction, responsible offices in Defense Programs are
continuously reviewing ongoing activities in the weapons complex to
ensure that work satisfies valid requirements that we make the most
effective use of available funding.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Deutch, why do we need nuclear weapons when the
accuracy of conventional weapons has been significantly improved and
improvements are continuing?
Dr. Deutch. We need nuclear weapons for two reasons. The first is
to deter nuclear aggression by other nations. The second reason is that
there are many military targets that cannot be held at risk by even
the most accurate conventional weapons. [Deleted]
[Deleted)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Dr. Deutch, what type of nuclear weapons is DoD
looking at for future development? How far in the future do you see
the need to produce a nuclear weapon?
Dr. Deutch. The DoD has no requirement to develop a new nuclear
weapon. However, we need to maintain the ability to produce nuclear
weapons. Based on past experience, we can expect to find problems with
weapons in the enduring stockpile. If the problem seriously degrades
weapon performance, we may need to remanufacture or replace that weapon,
thus requiring new production. We cannot predict when such a need will
occur. But as long as nuclear deterrence remains a vital part of our
national security, we must maintain the capability to produce new
weapons.
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe any programs in which the U.S. weapons
laboratories are cooperating with their counterparts in Russia.
Dr. Beckner. This is a rapidly evolving situation. For this
reason the attached lists of such activities for the DP weapons
laboratories may change.
Furthermore, those activities listed are funded with Department of
Energy (DOE) resources, not with Department of Defense (DoD) resources
derived for the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Those DoD sponsored activities
between the DOE weapons laboratories and Russian government agencies
and/or institutes can be provided by the Office of the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense/Atomic Energy. The activities of the weapons
laboratories are grouped in the following seven areas.
Lasers and Laser Technology: The laboratories have purchased from
Russia reports on the physics of laser generation in crystals, on
technologies for the destruction of toxic chemicals and the treatment of
contaminated waste streams, and a report describing the ISKRA-5 high
power laser system. The laboratories have concluded an agreement to
acquire Russian data bases of interest to laser physics. The
laboratories have solicited proposals to support the release or exchange
of information relating to microshell technology and other issues of
laser-matter interaction and target performance.
Computation and Modeling: The laboratories are negotiating to
obtain reports on methods of equation-of-state construction, models of
material strength, methods of modeling hydrodynamic flow, and of
research into software applications for parallel computing.
Environmental Monitoring, Characterization, and Remediation: The
laboratories are working to develop isotope purity criteria for the
production of radioisotopes to be used in environmental and nuclear
science studies. The laboratories have proposed collaboration on the
Ground Based Earth Observing Network (GEONET), which involves extensive
data acquisition, regional and global modeling and prediction, and
world-wide dissemination of information obtained from the studies. The
laboratories have also proposed their Russian counterparts develop a
gamma ray spectrometer for field use to characterize soil samples. The
laboratories have also proposed funding Russian scientists to become
familiar with graphical information systems currently in use in this
country.
Nuclear Reactor Safety and Radioactive Material Processing: The
laboratories are exchanging information on criticality benchmark
experiments and calculations, criticality accidents, and burst reactors.
National Security, Nonproliferation and-Counter-Terrorism: The
laboratories are continuing to support ongoing activities involving the
NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE),
the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), and the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC).
Accelerator Based Conversion (ABC) and Accelerator Transmutation of
Waste (ATW): The laboratories are proposing an initiative to jump start
ABC/ATW research in Russia.
High Energy Density Science and Technology: The laboratories are
proposing an extensive collaboration, including technology exchange, in
the field of megagauss technology for pulsed power applications.
PIT REUSE
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the "Pit reuse"
alternative.
Dr. Beckner. With the termination of the plutonium production
capability at Rocky Flats, the only source of pits to satisfy any
future production requirements are those returned from dismantled
warheads. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is currently
developing the equipment which will allow us to do so. When
development work is complete, we plan to install the equipment at the
Pantex Plant. The schedule currently calls for completing the
installation by the end of FY 1995.
STOCKPILE MEMORANDUM
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the latest Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile Memorandum?
Dr. Beckner. The FY 1993-FY 1998 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
Memorandum (NWSM) was approved by former President Bush on January
19, 1993. Current scheduling calls for submission of a new NWSM
covering the period FY 1994-FY 1999 to President Clinton in the fall
of 1993.
NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the Department's nuclear
testing program.
Dr. Beckner. On February 12, 1993, President Clinton notified the
Congress of his intent to submit a report concerning nuclear testing
pursuant to section 507 of Public Law 102-377. Currently, the Department
of Energy is working with the Administration in a review of questions
concerning negotiations for a comprehensive test ban and the related
question of resuming a limited program of U.S. nuclear testing after
July 1, 1993, as provided for under this legislation. A report to the
Congress should be ready later this spring.
As the Agency responsible for the nuclear testing activity in the
U.S., the Department has taken steps to maintain our core nuclear
testing capability so we will be able to respond to whatever options
are determined most appropriate on the basis of this review. These
options require the expenditure of funds in the following broad areas:
(1) Activities to prepare to conduct specific nuclear tests in
the near-term consistent with section 507, Public Law 102-377,
including maintenance of the infrastructure to conduct nuclear
and nonnuclear tests for the U.S. and the United Kingdom; and
(2) Activities to prepare for the cessation of nuclear testing
after FY 1996.
STATUS OF RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of Russia's nuclear testing program?
Dr. Alessi. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and Moscow's loss
of administrative control over the Semipalatinsk Test Site in
Kazahkstan, Russia, has only one nuclear test site: Novaya Zemlya, two
islands located about 300 km north of the Arctic Circle.
Russia declared a moratorium through the end of 1992 and later
extended it to coincide with the U.S. moratorium (the last Soviet test
was October 1990 at Novaya Zemlya).
[Deleted]
TEST BAN
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the impact of a comprehensive test ban
on the United States. What programmatic and funding changes would be
required?
Dr. Beckner. If an indefinite and complete ban on nuclear testing
were adopted by the U.S., DOE would still be responsible to maintain and
certify the continued safety and reliability of the Nation's enduring
stockpile. Confidence in the stockpile, as well as our capability to
respond to new nuclear-related threats, is based on the unique technical
expertise of the DOE laboratory scientists and engineers.
Past U.S. experience with the nuclear test moratorium of 1958-61
and the suspension of nuclear testing by the United Kingdom between 1966
and 1973 indicate that there would likely be a loss of scientific
personnel at the weapon design laboratories. Without the ability to
prove or disprove theories and models in nuclear experiments, many
scientists will choose to move on to other fields. Under a
comprehensive test ban, the loss of testing capabilities will likely
be rapid and the equipment and engineering skills of nuclear testing
soon atrophy. Furthermore, it is expensive to maintain large equipment
and facility resources in a state of high readiness, with uncertain
mission needs.
The enduring stockpile is currently judged to be safe and reliable;
therefore, there is no anticipated short-term impact of a CTB on U.S.
strategic nuclear capability. U.S. strategic forces would continue to be
capable of conducting all options under current deterrent policy. In the
long term, it is impossible to predict the rate at which this confidence
in the safety and reliability of the stockpile may erode. The
degradation may be gradual; however, swings in confidence have
historically been dramatic as a result of unexpected findings.
Today, the U.S. is not developing new nuclear weapons systems for
force modernization. As a result, it is expected that weapons in the
current stockpile will be deployed for much longer periods of time
(perhaps 50 years) than in the past. In the event a problem (and
problems can be expected) affects the credibility of a weapon in the
stockpile, a CTB potentially could (depending on the nature of the
problem) prevent recertification of the weapon with.the level of
confidence provided by nuclear testing.
In summary, the pace and magnitude of the long-term effect of a CTB
cannot be predicted; however, history has shown that we should expect
problems with the stockpile. Any changes to correct a stockpile problem
during a CTB will adversely affect the confidence in the stockpile. Such
a reduced confidence would reduce strategic options in a changing
political environment and therefore could have a negative effect on
U.S. nuclear deterrent.
PLUTONIUM PIT STORAGE
Mr. Bevill. Describe the current plan to store the plutonium pits
from retired weapons. When will you run out of storage capacity?
Dr. Beckner. Pending construction of a new storage facility in the
reconfigured nuclear weapons complex, we are temporarily storing the
pits from dismantled warheads at the Pantex Plant. We will reach the
current capacity of Pantex early in FY 1994. We are currently
completing an Environmental Assessment under the National Environmental
Policy Act on the effects of making more storage space available at the
Pantex Plant within existing facilities. If the Environmental Assessment
supports a Finding of No Significant Impact, the increased capacity will
allow us to store all the pits from currently planned warhead
dismantlements until a new facility is available.
TRITIUM AND PLUTONIUM
Mr. Bevill. Are the Russians still producing tritium and Plutonium?
Mr. Ford.
Deleted
Deleted
There are three dual purpose reactors
still in operation, two at Tomsk and one at Krasnoyarsk. These supply
electricity and process heat to their respective nuclear sites and
neighboring cities as well as producing plutonium. The Russians have
indicated they will shut these reactors down by the year 2000.
COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. Please identify all countries known or suspected to have
nuclear weapons and include the number of strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons held by each.
Mr. Ford. The countries known to have nuclear weapons are the
Former Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom. Countries
suspected of having nuclear weapons are Deleted and South
Africa. The following table provides a summary of the information.
(The information follows:)
Deleted
Deleted
* Includes warheads from deactivated systems which are candidates for
dismantlement but are still viable.
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the activities performed by the
Department's representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board.
Mr. Whitaker. Public Law 100-456 dated September 29, 1988, amended
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) by establishing
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). The Director and
staff of the Office of the Departmental Representative to the DNFSB
(Short title "Defense Board Liaison") assists the Secretary of
Energy in carrying out Departmental responsibilities to cooperate
fully with the Board as mandated by law. The Office represents the
Secretary of Energy in regular and continuing interactions with the
Board Chairman and members regarding Board matters. The Office provides
advice and guidance to Heads of Departmental Elements and the principal
Secretarial Officers covering the entire scope of the responsibilities
and functions of the Board. In performing these functions, the Office
in no way detract from the role and functions of Program Secretarial
Officers and Departmental oversight groups to deal directly with the
Board,on specific matters.
The Office is the focal point to facilitate DNFSB interactions
with senior Departmental management. The Office also monitors and
maintains general oversight of internal Departmental actions to ensure
compliance with Chapter 21 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
and respond to or take actions i.n consonance with DNFSB
recommendations, concerns, or observations.
Some specific activities that are performed by this office and its
staff are to:
Maintain liaison with the DNFSB and its staff to ensure an
understanding of Board priorities, plans, and actions in performing
its mandated oversight of DOE facilities and operations.
Provide a communication and information link between the Board
and all elements of the Department.
Provide assistance to the DNFSB and staff as necessary to obtain
information or facilitate access to Departmental officials and
facilities.
Contact the appropriate Program Secretarial Office with respect to
the sites to be visited to establish agenda, to schedule inspection
tours of appropriate areas, and to schedule interviews with principal
Department and contractor personnel.
Provide assistance to appropriate Department staff to clarify the
technical feasibility and to consider ramifications of the Board's
concerns, findings and recommendations.
Review proposed responses by the Secretary to Board recommendations
to assure quality, timeliness, completeness, and compliance with law
and Board policies.
Be a point of contact for other correspondence that is forwarded
routinely to the Board by different elements in DOE.
Be a point of contact for other correspondence that is forwarded
routinely to the board by different elements in DOE.
Maintain a close working relationship with Departmental line
programs and field managers and with internal staff oversight offices
to assist in understanding and facilitating actions necessary to
comply with accepted Board recommendations.
Coordinate analysis of Board recommendations, concerns, and
suggestions in order to assure the widest possible applications of
standards and guidance for all Departmental operations.
Maintain a calendar of events to record and track Board plans for
site visits, meetings, public hearing, etc.
Maintain a management information system (MIS) as appropriate to
record incoming Board recommendations, communications, requests for
information and track status of Departmental actions to assure full
and timely responses. The MIS must also track DOE commitments made to
the Board during public hearings, public meetings, briefings, or as
otherwise required by law, as well as follow-up action.
Report periodically to the Secretary on the status of Departmental
actions related to the Board.
ROCKY FLATS
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the Rocky Flats Plant?
Dr. Beckner. Since there are no new weapons build requirements,
the Department has decided to no longer maintain a nuclear component
production capability at the Rocky Flats Plant. Therefore, the site is
currently undergoing transition from a defense mission to one of
environmental restoration, waste management, and economic development.
Effective January 15, 1993, the Office of Defense Programs
transferred management responsibility for five buildings (771, 776/777,
779, 865 and 886) to the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management. All residues, including liquids, were also transferred to
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management. The next phase,
tentatively scheduled for implementation in the June/July timeframe,
will transfer the remaining plutonium facilities, including the
previously retained nuclear production contingency buildings (707,
559, 371). Environmental Restoration and Waste Management will assume
landlord responsibilities for the Rocky Flats Plant upon
implementation of the second phase. Buildings 440, 444, 460, 883, and
their support buildings will be retained by Defense Programs to support
their nonnuclear production responsibilities. These buildings will be
retained by Defense Programs until a decision is reached on nonnuclear
consolidation within the Department of Energy complex.
ROCKY FLATS
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current plan for the Rocky Flats
Plant.
Mr. Grimm. The Rocky Flats Plant is transitioning in mission from
Defense Programs to the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management. Responsibility for five former weapons production buildings
was transferred January 15, 1993. Landlord responsibilities and the
nuclear weapons production contingency buildings currently are planned
to be transferred in June 1993. While the non-nuclear weapons production
facilities will remain the responsibility of Defense Programs, the
transition at Rocky Flats will focus on environmental cleanup. Major
activities will include the deactivation of the former production
buildings, removal of plutonium residues, and the management of
radioactive, chemically hazardous, mixed wastes, environmental
restoration, and the cleanup and possible reuse of selected buildings
for economic development. These efforts are moving forward in parallel
with efforts to retrain displaced workers and minimize economic impact
to the local communities.
ROCKY FLATS
Mr. Bevill. What non-nuclear components are being produced at Rocky
Flats in FY 1993 and FY 1994? Provide type and number of units as well
as total cost of non-nuclear program for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. The following nonnuclear components, all components
of gas reservoir systems, are being produced at Rocky Flats in FY 1993
and FY 1994:
Type System 1993 1994
SP800 W62 115 255
SP981A W76 535 471
LF7 W78 0 68
1K W80 205 430
SP1041 W87 0 19
SP1042 W87 165 297
Test Stems Misc 9525 6000
Total 10,545 7540
The total operating cost of the nonnuclear program at Rocky Flats
is as follows:
1992 1993 1994
$127.1M $102.5M $102.3M
REPLACEMENT TRITIUM FACILITY
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the Replacement Tritium
Facility. When will it,be operational?
Dr. Beckner. On April 2, 1993, the Westinghouse Savannah River
Company requested startup approval. The request was endorsed by the
DOE Savannah River Operations Office on April 9, 1993, and is
currently under review at Headquarters.
At the present time, the onsite facility staff and management are
carrying out facility operations without tritium in accordance with
Conduct of Operations procedures and the Technical Safety
Requirements. These same requirements will be imposed once approval
for actual operation with tritium is authorized. The operations
demonstration run was completed in late April 1993, and the facility
is ready in all aspects for tritium introduction for testing purposes.
However, the Secretary will make the decision on facility startup
once she is satisfied that all relevant considerations have been
thoroughly evaluated.
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and staff were briefed
on the status of startup efforts for the Replacement Tritium Facility on
April 12, 1993. During the week of April 19, 1993, the Board and staff
reviewed onsite the order compliance effort and the Replacement
Tritium Facility's accident analyses.
We expect the remaining technical issue involving seismic upgrades
to be resolved with our internal oversight organization shortly.
FUNDING FOR THE NATIONAL ATOMIC MUSEUM
Mr. Bevill: How much funding is provided for the National Atomic
Museum in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994?
Dr. Beckner: The National Atomic Museum received $411,000 in FY
1992, and will receive an estimated $504,000 in FY 1993, including
$70,000 to move one exhibit, and an estimated $465,000 in FY 1994.
SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES RADIO STATION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Sandia National Laboratories radio
station, including the need for the activity and the funding in FY 1993
and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. Operating under license from the National
Telecommunications and Information Agency, Radio Sandia uses a 10-watt
AM signal to broadcast a 10-to-12-minute program every work day; that
program is repeated constantly until the next work day. Thus, Radio
Sandia provides an effective way for employees of both Sandia/New
Mexico and DOE's Albuquerque Operations Office to keep up with key
developments and program directions affecting the laboratory. In
addition, the station provides a means for Sandia's Emergency
Preparedness team to communicate immediately with employees. The
budget for Radio Sandia is,$166,000 in FY 1993 and $169,000 in FY 1994.
VERIFICATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM FOCUS
Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the
breakup of the former Soviet Union?
Dr. Alessi. Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the
focus of the Verification and Control Technology (V&CT) program has
been reoriented to reflect the increasing importance of the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and
the means to deliver them to U.S. national security interest.
Specifically the development of arms control-related verification
technologies and systems under our Detection Technology activity has
been reoriented to include the development of technologies and systems
for enhancing U.S. and international capabilities for detecting the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Our
Analytical Support activity has been reoriented to include
establishing a baseline technical analysis program at the national
laboratories in support of U.S. and international nonproliferation
efforts.
In addition, under our Analytical Support activity, we have been
playing an increasing role in coordinating Department of Energy
efforts in support of U.S. activities aimed at assisting Russian
and other states of the former Soviet Union, in a number of
critical areas such as nuclear warhead dismantlement and emergency
response capabilities.
Lastly, beginning in FY 1994, funding for the Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation's Offices of Nonproliferation Policy
and Export Control and International Safeguards is included in the
V&CT program rather than under the Departmental Administration and
Nuclear Safeguards and Security programs as in previous years. As
reflected in our FY 1994 budget request, funding for these offices
will be significantly increased to: expand our activities in support
of U.S. regional nonproliferation efforts; accelerate development and
implementation of a U.S. national and international Proliferation
Information Network System; expand other activities needed to support
U.S. and international export control regimes; expand International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and other safeguards and
physical protection support activities; and expand technology
development programs needed to enhance safeguards and IAEA special
inspection activities.
VERIFICATION & CONTROL TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bevill. Please describe any role you have had in discussions
with Russia regarding control, storage and dismantlement of their
nuclear weapons.
Dr. Alessi. In November 1991, a Soviet Union delegation was
invited to Washington to discuss measures for cooperation and
assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement of Soviet nuclear
weapons. DOE participated in the delegation meetings, as well as in
a technical working group meeting. At this first U.S./Soviet meeting
on such technical issues, the U.S. presented an overview of how
the U.S. manages nuclear weapons, with particular emphasis on control,
storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. In this meeting, as
well as in all following meetings, Soviet (and subsequently, Russian)
delegations insisted that direct assistance in control, storage, and
dismantlement of their nuclear weapons was neither necessary nor
desired. The sensitivity of weapon design information, as well as
the reluctance to reveal any possible weakness with respect to
nuclear weapons issues, were believed to be the basis for this
Russian position.
The Soviet delegation informed the U.S that the most important
way in which the U.S. could help the Soviet Union achieve its goal
of dismantling tactical, INF, and START nuclear warheads by the year
2000, was to support construction of a specially designed storage
facility and procurement of containers for nuclear materials
removed from dismantled weapons. The U.S. has agreed to provide
assistance in both these areas. This assistance also includes, among
other things, a design of the system for control, accounting,
and physical protection of fissile material in the facility. Many
Department of Energy and national laboratory staff members are
working to apply the very best technical expertise to these
problems. Since November 1991, DOE has participated in frequent
U.S. delegations to Russia and technical information exchanges both
in Russia and in the U.S. to discuss issues associated with
facilitating dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons (on average
at least monthly).
In summary, we have placed emphasis on providing assistance
which is believed important to Russia in maintaining control,
safeguarding stored weapons, and performing safe and ecologically
sound dismantlement of nuclear warheads. The attached table lists
agreements in which DOE is involved in implementing or on-going
negotiations. As our technical partnership as nuclear weapon states
improves and we are able to become increasingly open with each
other in addressing these problems of mutual concern, it is realistic
to expect further initiatives in these areas.
Agreements with the states of the Former Soviet Union:
Agreements with Russia:
- Technical assistance in design of a fissile material
storage facility (now being implemented)
- Fissile material storage containers (now being
implemented)
- Flexible armor blankets (now being implemented)
- Security upgrade kits for railcars (now being
implemented)
- Accident response equipment (now being implemented)
- International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
in Moscow (awaiting Russian signature)
- Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) purchase (agreement
signed, contract being negotiated)
- Equipment for the storage facility (awaiting Russian
signature)
- Technical assistance for establishing a state system
for nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
protection (awaiting Russian signature)
- Assistance in the elimination of strategic offensive arms
(awaiting Russian signature)
Agreements with Belarus:
- Emergency response equipment (now being implemented)
- Government-to-government communication link equipment
(now being implemented)
- Assistance in export control (now being implemented)
Agreements with Ukraine:
- Emergency response equipment (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
- Government-to-government communication link equipment (awaiting
Ukrainian approval)
- Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical
protection (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
- Assistance in export control (awaiting Ukrainian approval)
- Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev (awaitin
Ukrainian approval)
Agreements with Kazakhstan:
- Emergency response equipment (now being negotiated)
- Government-to-government communication link equipment
(now being negotiated)
- Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and
physical protection (now being negotiated)
- Assistance in export control (now being negotiated)
DOE ACTIVITIES IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the activities of DOE in arms control
negotiations. What activities will be conducted in FY 1994.
Dr. Alessi. DOE serves on U.S. delegations involved in bilateral
and multilateral consultations and negotiations related to arms control.
For example:
DOE representatives served on the Nuclear Testing Talks, the START,
Defense and Space, and Chemical Weapons Convention and US/Russian
bilateral Chemical Weapons delegations and on U.S. delegations for
Review Conferences on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the
Biological Weapons Convention. DOE also provides representatives
and/or expert advisors to consultative committees associated with
the completed treaties, e.g. START, INF, and TTBT.
DOE expertise is often requested by the interagency in preparing
for negotiations and other arms control related meetings.
For instance, in preparation for international meetings on
potential verification measures which might be applied to the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), DOE was asked to prepare a
series of papers evaluating specific types of technologies. The
papers were prepared by the Laboratories, coordinated with the
interagency through DOE's Office of Arms Control and will be
presented as U.S. papers at the BWC meeting in Geneva next month.
Assistance to the Former Soviet Union
DOE is heavily involved in the U.S. effort to assist the Former
Soviet Union in activities related to Safe Secure Dismantlement (SSD)
of its nuclear weapons. DOE-laboratories are providing technical
support to production of containers for shipment and storage of
fissile materials, emergency response equipment, security upgrades
for railcars, and technical assistance in design of a secure storage
facility for special nuclear materials. Moreover, DOE weapons
laboratories have held several meetings with their Russian counterparts
and identified a series of peaceful activities on which they can
collaborate.
1994 ACTIVITIES
Treaty Negotiations DOE will provide policy and technical support,
including experts for delegations and analytical studies of policy
and technical issues as noted above for on going negotiations,
including: review of verification proposals for the Biological
Weapons Convention, the Preparatory Commission for the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Conference on Disarmament and the Preparatory
Committee meetings for the Nonproliferation Treaty Extension Conference
to be held in 1995. In addition, the Department will continue to
prepare for expected negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban and for
the possibility of negotiations on a global ban on production of
fissile materials for weapons purposes. In that regard, the Office
of Arms Control will continue to call on Laboratory scientific and
expertise both for analytical support of technical issues and
identification and application of technologies to meet specific
treaty needs.
Treaty Implementation DOE facilities are subject to overflights under
Open Skies and to suspect site inspections under the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The Department must prepare to meet its obligations both
under the treaties and under U.S. laws protecting Secret Restricted
Data (SRD). The Office of Arms Control must play a significant role
in that effort. Among the activities which will be pursued are:
(1) analytical tools for assessing treaty requirements and SRD
vulnerabilities and,
(2) strategies for demonstrating treaty compliance without
revealing SRD
As in Fiscal Year 1993, DOE again will provide policy and technical
support for consultative commissions associated with existing treaties
such as START, INF and TTBT.
LABORATORY ROLES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the roles performed by each DOE
laboratory or facility for arms control activities. Who has the lead
in each programmatic area?
Dr. Alessi. The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation
conducts research and development (R&D) to support national-level
arms control and proliferation policies. Detection Technology is
being developed for current and future nuclear and chemical weapons
arms reduction treaties and for proliferation detection via on-site
verification, regional effluent monitoring, and remote (satellite)
detection. Listed below are the laboratories and the major projects
currently underway. At the end of this section there is a table
addressing lead laboratories.
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL):
The major projects support warhead dismantlement and
detection of nuclear material. Technology is being developed
to track containers and treaty limited items using commercial
technology and to develop a detector which will remotely
measure emission signatures of key molecules released from
exhaust and vent stacks of a plant.
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL):
Current R&D projects will develop a Raman Spectrometry/Chemical
Analysis system to detect chemical effluent in concentrations
of less than 10 parts per million at a one kilometer range.
Also under development is a Controlled Intrusiveness
Verification Technology (CIVET) to identify, with a
high-confidence level, nuclear warheads while minimizing
intrusiveness and protecting classified information.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL):
Major projects focus on supporting the Chemical Weapons (CW)
Bilateral Agreement and the START II requirements for on-site
inspection of re-entry vehicles. Development is underway
on-the Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS) system
as a nondestructive assay system to identify the contents of
suspected or declared CW containers or munitions. INEL is
developing an experimental system, Fission Assay Tomography,
as a passive verification tool for counting nuclear warheads
on missiles without moving the missile or shroud. In support
of proliferation detection, INEL is developing a Surface
Analysis Molecular Beam ion trap mass spectrometer for rapid
detection (<5 minutes) and chemical identification of
nonvolatile and low volatility compounds.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL):
Major projects here are in the following program areas:
- Development of technologies which will improve our ability
to detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne
observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal
imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level
imagery, and others.
- Development and fabrication of satellite instrumentation
which supports nuclear detonation detection for nuclear treaty
verification, proliferation detection, and collateral military
goals.
- Development of advanced Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR)
systems for noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios.
- Development of Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus
Time Experiment (CORRTEX) and advanced hydrodynamic yield
technologies for nuclear threshold testing treaties.
- The study of the generation and propagation of shock waves
in a geologic media surrounding underground nuclear tests.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL):
The major R&D projects support current and future treaty
verification requirements and the development of new
proliferation detection technologies. The major projects are:
- Development of a Temperature Imaging System Infrared Camera
which corrects atmospheric effects so that temperature
determinations to 0.1 degree C (absolute) and 0.01 degree C
(relative) are feasible. This system will have broad
application in analyzing thermal emission from CW and nuclear
suspect sites and possibly in detecting nuclear warheads.
- Development of an advanced seismic verification and analysis
capability to distinguish nuclear from chemical explosions.
- Development of an Advanced Forensic Science Laboratory to
advance the knowledge base for optical characterization and
mass spectrometry technologies for effluent signatures and
chemical collection/analysis.
- Development of on-site monitoring technologies for
measurements of nuclear testing sites as prescribed by a
very low-yield threshold treaty, comprehensive test ban
treaty, or an enhanced nonproliferation treaty.
- Development and commercialization of high security
electronic tags and seals for treaty applications.
Nevada Operations Field Office (NV)/Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL):
The R&D projects here support the development and engineering
of airborne applications of technologies for the experimental
collection of data for testing data/knowledge fusion concepts.
RSL also develops advanced radiometric detection technologies.
Concurrently, NV is leading the operational/logistical support
for a one kilo-ton underground chemical test experiment to
evaluate ground motion data. This test will enhance
discrimination between chemical explosions and decoupled
low-yield nuclear explosions.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL):
Major R&D supports the development of field portable
instrumentation for.future bilateral/multilateral
international inspections. Technologies include Microchip
Liquid Chromatograph and Surface Enhanced Raman Scattering
Monitors which can theoretically provide chemical resolving
power equivalent to conventional laboratory devices, but with
much less sample preparation. ORNL is also developing a
Centrifugal Concentrator for organic molecules to enhance
sample collection and analysis.
Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL):
Major projects here include:
- Development of advanced radiation detection technologies and
effluent collection and analysis for nuclear proliferation
detection.
- Leading in a tag and seal demonstration project to support
the U.S. purchase of highly enriched uranium from Russia.
- Development of a rigorous statistical assessment for both
current and future analytical methodologies to enhance
monitoring of proliferation and testing weapons of mass
destruction.
- Improving commercial technologies for arms control and
noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios. Ultrasonic
measurement and acoustic technology is investigated to verify
selected liquid properties (e.g., speed of sound, density, and
viscosity).
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL):
Major projects include:
Development of technologies which will improve our ability to
detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne
observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal
imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level
imagery, and others.
- Development of detection/sensor technologies for satellite
flight systems. This program provides a number of operational
payloads supporting DOE requirements for continuously
monitoring and categorizing atmospheric nuclear events.
- Development of seismic instrumentation and analysis methods
to ensure effective monitoring of underground nuclear testing.
- The SNL Tags/Seals program is the lead developer of new
concepts for treaty and nonproliferation application.
- SNL is developing signal and image processing algorithms to
improve and augment national technical means (NTM) and
advanced remote sensing technology.
- SNL is responsible for fielding a pod mounted synthetic
aperture radar and integrating optical and hyperspectral
instruments in an accompanying airborne pod.
Savannah River Technical Center (SRTC):
The major R&D projects at SRTC are to develop systems to
support nonproliferation initiatives by improving
analytical methods. SRTC is developing a method for
chemical analysis by fiber optic spectrometry. This
technology will be designed into an automated
in-line/in-tank analytical system capable of identifying
chemical agents and measuring their concentration in disposal
incinerators and in phosphate based pesticide manufacturing
plants. Also SRTC is developing an improved Radio Frequency
Glow Discharge/Fourier Transform Mass Spectrometer with
resolving power necessary to unambiguously identify the
isotopes present in bulk and/or particulate samples.
Lead Laboratories. The lead laboratory in each programmatic area
is not in all cases discernable, but is generally reflected as
follows:
= On-site Monitoring: Lead - LANL, Second - LLNL.
= Satellite Instrumentation: Joint lead - LANL/SNL.
= Seismic Verification: Lead - LLNL, Second - LANL/SNL.
= Samples/Debris Detection and Analysis: Multilaboratory program
area with no clear programmatic leader, but the larger
laboratories dominate (LANL/LLNL/PNL/SNL).
= Nonseismic Verification: Lead - LANL.
= Directed Energy Verification: Lead - LANL.
= Technology and Advanced Concepts: Multilaboratory program
with no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate.
= Radiation Detection Technology: Multilaboratory program with
no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ARMS CONTROL BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a lead table as shown in the budget that
includes only arms control funding, excluding intelligence activities.
Dr. Alessi. [Deleted)
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITY
Mr. Bevill. In the treaty implementation activity, how many U.S.
and Soviet tests were monitored in FY 1992 and how many planned for
FY 1993 and FY 1994?
Dr. Alessi. During FY 1992, Russia monitored one U.S. underground
nuclear test. That test was named JUNCTION. No Russian (Soviet) tests
were conducted.
No decisions have yet been made about the U.S. FY 1993 and FY 1994
test programs. Because of the TTBT Protocol requirements, it is now too
late for any Russian monitoring of U.S. tests in FY 1993 and too early
to project activities for FY 1994.
Current guidance provides for the United States to exercise all of
its verification rights under the TTBT Protocol. This would mean
conducting on-site verification activities for all eligible Russian
nuclear tests.
A Russian test is in the planning stage and the United States plans
to exercise its full monitoring rights when it is executed.
TREATY VERIFICATION BUDGET ASSUMPTIONS
Mr. Bevill. What are the treaty verification assumptions on which
the budget is based?
Dr. Alessi. The Treaty Implementation activity budget request for
FY 1994 assumes: (1) that the U.S. will exercise its full spectrum of
monitoring and inspection rights on every Russian test or explosion
under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
Treaty verification protocols; (2) that the Department of Energy will
continue to be required to maintain a capability to support three
verification deployments; and (3) that the Department of Energy will
maintain a capability to support three verification efforts by the
Russians at the Nevada Test Site.
LIST OF TREATIES IN EFFECT, UNDER NEGOTIATION, AND ANTICIPATED THROUGH
THE 1990'S IN WHICH DOE WILL BE INVOLVED
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties in effect; treaties
under negotiation; and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in
which DOE will be involved.
Dr. Alessi. The treaties and agreements which are in effect
include:
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian
ratification)
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both U.S.
and Russian ratification)
- Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
- Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)
- Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)
- Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
- "Hot Line" Agreement
- "Hot Line" Modernization Agreement
- "Hot Line" Expansion Agreement
- "Accidents Measures" Agreement
- Incidents at Sea Agreement
- Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
- Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement
- Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement
- Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement
- U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
- Outer Space Treaty
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
- Bilateral U.S.-Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement
(awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature)
- Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare
- Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
- Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
- Open Skies
- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
- Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Document
- Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD)
- Seabed Arms Control Treaty
- Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin-American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone)
- Treaty of Raratonga (South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone)
- Antarctic Treaty
The treaties which are under negotiation include:
- Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission
- Radiological Weapons Convention (RWC)
The treaties we anticipate DOE will be involved with through the 1990's
include:
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for
Nuclear Weapons Purposes
FUNDING AND FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THRESHOLD
TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATY (PNET)
Mr. Bevill. Provide the total funding by program activity included
in the budget for implementation of the TTBT and PNET in FY 1992,
FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Alessi. The attached chart shows by major areas of activity
(maintenance of core capability, support for Russian verification
activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and support for U.S.
verification deployments in Russia) and organization (Nevada Operations
Office contractor support, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National
Laboratories) the budget for implementation of the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) in FY 1992,
FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Mr. Bevill. How many FTEs support each activity?
Dr. Alessi. Also, the Full Time Equivalents supporting each
activity are indicated on the chart.
FUNDING AND FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THRESHOLD
TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATY (PNET)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
DOLLARS FTE DOLLARS FTE DOLLARS FTE
IN THOUSANDS IN THOUSANDS IN THOUSANDS
Nevada Oper Office
-Core Capability $4,300 30.8 $3,716 27.04 $3,400 24.74
-NTS Activities 665 4.6 - - 300 2.08
-Deployments - - 35 0.30 35 0.30
------- ----- ------ ----- ------ -----
Subtotal $4,965 35.4 $3,751 27.34 $3,735 27.12
Lawrence Livermore
-Core Capability $1,150 5.03 $1,100 4.40 $ 800 3.20
-NTS Activities 800 5.0 - - 400 2.50
-Deployments - - 250 1.07 250 1.07
------- ----- ------ ----- ----- -----
Subtotal $1,950 10.03 $1,350 5.47 $1,450 6.77
Los Alamos
-Core Capability $2,845 10.32 $2,788 10.85 $2,600 10.12
-NTS Activities 1,040 3.80 - - 515 1.88
-Deployments - - 911 3.33 500 1.83
------ ----- ------ ----- ------ -----
Subtotal $3,885 14.12 $3,699 14.18 $3,615 13.83
Total $10,800 59.55 $8,800 46.99 $8,800 47.72
FOLLOW-ON EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
Mr. Bevill. What is the Status of the Follow-on Early Warning
System?
Dr. Alessi. In light of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the
shift in emphasis to detecting emerging proliferants, the intelligence
community has been reevaluating monitoring requirements for nuclear
tests in space. Awaiting final decisions, the Department of Energy
(DOE) has ceased almost all effort related to the Follow-on Early
Warning System, except for minimal coordination with the Air Force
and its related contractors. In the absence of a strong statement
supporting exoatmospheric monitoring requirements from the intelligence
community or the Department of Defense, DOE has no plans to continue
funding this program in FY 1994.
ONSITE MONITORING ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
Mr. Bevill. In the absence of nuclear testing in this country and
Russia, what onsite monitoring activities are being conducted and at
what funding levels in FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Alessi. [Deleted]
As called for in the Coordinated Schedule for carrying out activities
related to verification of the Russian test that has been agreed upon
by Russia and the United States, [Deleted] Total DOE
funding in FY 1993 and FY 1994 for these monitoring activities is
estimated to be $1.2 million. Should the Russians conduct additional
tests (Deleted] similar funding would be required for DOE monitoring
activities for each test conducted. These costs are incremental costs
for actual onsite monitoring activities and do not include the costs
for maintaining a core capability for conducting such monitoring
activities. In addition, should the Russians decide to monitor any
U.S. tests conducted in FY 1993 or FY 1994, additional funding would be
required to support their monitoring activities at the Nevada Test Site.
SATELLITE INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Please describe fully each of the activities being
conducted under the Satellite Instrumentation program including
milestones through completion, annual funding requirements, and total
estimated cost of each.
Dr. Alessi. The activities being conducted under the Satellite
Instrumentation program are described in our draft plan for that
program, which is included in the written material we are providing.
That draft plan describes a program which is undergoing a major shift
in emphasis. The draft plan will be reviewed by the Community
Nonproliferation Committee Research and Development Subcommittee
before it is implemented. The review will assure that the plan
addresses the most urgent needs of the U.S. nonproliferation community.
While we will continue to provide space-borne instrumentation to detect
and characterize atmospheric nuclear explosions, most new investment
will be directed at technologies for detecting proliferation
activities prior to the occurrence of any nuclear test.
******DRAFT (SATELLITE INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM PLAN) IS ATTACHED
TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT*****
FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bevill. The budget request for detection technology consists of
many separate tasks to be performed by the Department. Can you discuss
the overall framework for this request; explain how the components fit
together; and discuss what the overall priorities of the program are?
Dr. Alessi. As shown in the attached chart, the Detection
Technology activities are grouped in three program areas: on-site
verification, regional measurements, and remote sensing. This
programmatic structure is organized around the primary physical arenas
in which the technologies are likely to be deployed. The program areas
cover the spectrum of our technology development programs that are
aimed at providing technologies and systems to enhance U.S. and
international capabilities that range from cooperative on-site
inspections and monitoring to remote satellite verification and
monitoring. The overall priorities of the program have shifted from
arms control verification to the development of technologies for
detecting proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction as a result of the increasing importance of weapons
proliferation to U.S. national security interest.
******DETECTION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT*****
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
AND DOE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
Mr. Bevill. How does the international safeguards program differ
from the activities performed by the nuclear safeguards and security
program?
Mr. Alessi. The International Safeguards Program, administered by
the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and the Nuclear
Safeguards and Security Program, under the Office of Safeguards and
Security, have unique missions and serve fundamentally different
national security goals. The two programs differ substantially in the
threats they address and the technologies they use to accomplish their
objectives. The International Safeguards Program is managed expressly
to support the international nonproliferation regime, International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and U.S. government initiatives
in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The Program provides the DOE technical basis for
development of nonproliferation policy. It also provides the long-term
technology base for U.S. support of IAEA and other international
safeguards activities.
In addition, DOE's International Safeguards Program implements U.S.
technical exchanges and cooperation with other countries in
international safeguards, including training programs conducted in
support of IAEA objectives and as part of the U.S. Government's
ongoing nonproliferation policy objectives. International safeguards
are implemented by the IAEA to assure, through detection and deterrence,
that all declared nuclear material under safeguards is used for
peaceful purposes. International safeguards provide for independent
verification by the IAEA of a country's commitment to peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, and continuity of knowledge of peaceful nuclear
activities.
On the other hand, DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS)
implements safeguards and security measures for DOE's nuclear assets
(including the nuclear weapons complex). The OSS safeguards and security
program aims to protect DOE nuclear material and facilities against
theft or sabotage by external or internal adversaries (e.g.,
terrorists, criminals, etc.). This contrasts with the objective of
international safeguards to verify that declared nuclear material in
countries accepting safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities has
not been diverted to some non-peaceful use.
Because international safeguards objectives and philosophy differ
from the safeguards and security measures employed at DOE for its own
facilities, the technologies employed to implement the two programs
also differ. Domestic safeguards in the United States are based on
rigorous, technically intrusive control and accountability for
nuclear material, and physical protection of nuclear material and
facilities which address a specific "design basis threat." Conversely,
international safeguards rely primarily on material accounting,
complemented by methods of material containment and surveillance.
Information on the status of nuclear material is collected and analyzed
through periodic inspections by IAEA staff.
IMPACT OF NO TESTING IN FY 1994
Mr. Bevill. How will treaty implementation funding be impacted
if there are no nuclear weapons tests in FY 1994?
Dr. Alessi. Should there be no nuclear weapons tests in FY 1994
funding required for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion Treaty implementation would decrease by about
$2.0 million to about $6.8 million in FY 1994. This funding level
would support Nevada Operations Office contractor personnel and
personnel at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
that are required to maintain a core capability for Threshold Test
Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty verification
implementation.
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill: Please provide a breakout by laboratory or site of DOE
funding for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner: The breakout by laboratory or site of the Department
of Energy funding for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 is shown in a table
which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES BY LABORATORY/SITE
TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Albuquerque $ 347.8 $ 355.5 $ 340.0
Kansas City 352.6 332.7 314.7
LANL 488.4 538.4 469.2
LLNL 455.8 500.4 431.0
Mound 151.9 97.4 71.2
NV 397.5 340.1 368.9
Pantex 241.5 247.9 236.8
Pinellas 126.1 105.2 85.3
Rocky Flats 624.7 527.0 260.2
SNL 735.5 701.6 666.2
SR 117.3 126.6 94.0
Y-12 (OR) 616.4 573.0 449.6
HQ/Other 185.9 258.1 337.5
TOTAL $4,841.4 $4,703.9 $4,124.6
LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING
Mr. Bevill: By laboratory, identify the number of FTE's funded in
the weapons program for each year since 1980, also provide total
laboratory funding for each laboratory by year.
Dr. Beckner: The information is provided for the record. (The
information follows:
LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS
LLNL LANL SNL TOTAL
1980 3,457 2,766 3,778 10,001
1981 3,705 2,964 3,739 10,408
1982 3,704 3,000 3,806 10,510
1983 3,957 3,015 3,883 10,855
1984 3,889 3,082 3,914 10,885
1985 3,970 3,099 4,122 11,191
1986 3,757 2,956 3,953 10,666
1987 4,240 3,016 3,899 11,155
1988 3,841 2,853 3,676 10,370
1989 3,742 2,645 3,606 9,993
1990 3,550 2,585 3,632 9,767
1991 3,156 2,421 3,134 8,711
1992 3,322 2,441 3,480 9,243
1993 est. 3,049 2,129 3,242 8,420
1994 est. 2,689 1,816 2,539 7,044
LABORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING
OPERATING FUNDING
(Dollars in Millions)
LLNL LANL SNL TOTAL
1980 $145.1 $125.1 $213.3 $483.5
1981 181.5 154.3 148.0 483.8
1982 216.0 193.8 290.1 699.9
1983 235.2 215.5 316.5 767.2
1984 310.6 283.1 378.1 971.8
1985 356.2 309.9 421.4 1,087.6
1986 373.5 304.3 427.2 1,105.0
1987 319.8 292.0 433.8 1,045.6
1988 314.6 287.8 444.0 1,046.4
1989 342.0 291.2 464.6 1,097.8
1990 366.1 307.7 467.0 1,140.8
1991 347.4 291.7 465.8 1,104.9
1992 374.8 323.6 506.1 1,204.5
1993 est. 400.4 373.2 495.0 1,268.6
1994 est. 361.3 298.7 458.0 1,118.0
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a detailed breakout of activities and
associated costs funded using DOD funds by individual DOE laboratory for
FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. The DOE laboratories provide DOD technological support
utilizing unique facilities and technical capabilities. Examples of
activities include: defense systems research, advanced conventional
munitions research, armor/anti-armor research, defense nuclear
research, arms control and verification research, security systems
development, weapons related experiments and tests, and environmental
studies for restoration of facilities, subsurface detection technology
research, computer code development and analysis, materials research,
weapons related training materials, reentry vehicle technology, weapon
trainers, miscellaneous weapon related hardware development, and
advanced manufacturing technologies.
DOD funding by laboratory is as follows:
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Actual Estimated Estimated
Obligations Obligations Obligations
Los Alamos National
Laboratory $ 128.7M $ 118.lM $ 116.6M
Sandia National
Laboratories $ 299.1M $ 311.7M $ 312.3M
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory S 198.7M S 200.0M S 200.0M
Total $ 626.5M $ 629.8M $ 628.9M
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Is the Department funding development of a warhead
which could be used on an earth penetrating weapon?
Dr. Beckner. The Department of Defense has not requested
development of such a warhead, and the Department of Energy is not
developing one. However, many warhead designs could be used in such
an application. As part of the Phase 1 feasibility study for a
Precision Low-Yield Warhead Design, we are examining whether the
earth-penetrating mission might be feasible for such a design.
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill: Provide a breakout by location of FY 1992, FY 1993,
and FY 1994 funding for weapons Research, Development and Testing by
Program element.
Dr. Beckner: A breakout by location of FY 1992, FY 1993, and
FY 1994 funding for weapons Research, Development, and Testing is
shown in a table which I would like to insert for the record.
(The information follows:)
******CHART ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT********
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the system and explain the need for all
weapon systems in Phase I or Phase 2 of weapons development.
Dr. Deutch. There are currently four development programs in
Phase 1 or Phase 2. It should be pointed out that Phase 1 and Phase 2
studies are concept and feasibility studies and are not necessarily
tied to a specific Identified need. The four programs are as follows:
Phase 2 - Navy SLBM Replacement Warhead Study
Phase 2 - Air Force High Power Radio Frequency Weapon Study
Phase 1 - Air Force Precision Low Yield Weapon Study
Phase I - DOE Advance Safety and Security Study
The Navy Phase 2 and the DOE Phase I studies are devoted to the
topics of improved safety and security technology for possible future
replacement warheads. The Navy Phase 2 is also considering possible
changes driven by the reduced numbers of warheads allowed per missile
under the new arms control agreements and potential increased service
life for the existing SLBM warheads. The DOE sponsored Phase 1 is
designed to look at revolutionary, as opposed to evolutionary,
improvements in safety and security technology to be applied to a
cruise missile sized warhead and a B-61 diameter gravity bomb.
The two Air Force programs are devoted to investigating possible
new technologies for use in advanced and/or replacement weapons systems.
All four programs are joint programs between the DoD and DOE. DoD
provides the technical requirements and DOE provides the technology
development. Together they determine the suitability of the advanced
concept and recommend further study or termination of the project at
the end of Phase I and/or Phase 2.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list by type and number of warheads
of the total nuclear weapons stockpile in FY 1992 and proposed for each
year through FY 2003.
Dr. Deutch. The Presidentially directed nuclear stockpile plan
is currently approved through FY 1998. It is described in the table
that follows:
Summary of Stockpile: Approved Period
[Deleted]
As part of developing the FY 1994-FY 1999 nuclear stockpile plan,
we are currently in the process of reviewing stockpile requirements
with the unified commanders and the military services, considering both
operational requirements and treaty obligations.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Bevill. Describe the DoD nuclear weapons retirement program
in FY 1993 and FY 1994. Provide a list showing the type and number of
warhead systems proposed to be retired each year through 2003.
Dr. Deutch. The information is provided in the table below.
Summary of Retirements: Approved Period
[Deleted]
WEAPONS STORAGE
Mr. Bevill. How many weapons were disassembled at Pantex in FY
1992, FY 1993, and scheduled for FY 1994?
Dr. Beckner. In FY 1992, Pantex dismantled 1303 warheads (the DOE
total of 1857 includes 554 units at Y-12). In FY 1993, Pantex will
dismantle between 1431 and 1800 warheads, with the uncertainty being
due to safety issues which may not be resolved before the end of the
fiscal year. In 1994, Pantex plans to dismantle up to 2000 warheads.
NUCLEAR TESTING
Mr. Bevill. Are any countries currently testing nuclear weapons?
Dr. Beckner. The only country testing nuclear weapons that has not
officially declared a moratorium is the People's Republic of China.
NUCLEAR TESTING
Mr. Bevill. Which countries are currently imposing a moratorium
on testing nuclear weapons?
Dr. Beckner. The countries that are currently imposing a
moratorium on testing nuclear weapons are the United States, Russia,
and France.
Mr. Bevill, Describe the nuclear weapons test program including
for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994, a list of each test performed, a
brief description, the purpose, the weapon system, and the specific
program supported by the test.
Dr. Beckner. The following table associates the names of these
nuclear tests with the primary category to which they are directed.
The categories are: TECH - Technology Base and WDEC - Weapon
Development, Engineering, and Certification. Some of these tests have
more than one purpose and could be associated in part, with other
categories. The tests listed for FY 1992 have already been conducted.
Of these, the JUNCTION test was of an Improved safety device designed
for the Deleted
Deleted missile system. The other tests employed experimental
nuclear devices. Due to the requirements of Public Law 102-377, the
test program for FY 1993 and FY 1994 is still being coordinated.
FY 1992 LAB DESIGN
TEST NAME SPONSOR YIELD(kt) CATEGORY
LUBBOCK LANL TECH
JUNCTION LANL Deleted WDEC
GALENA LLNL WDEC
VICTORIA LANL Deleted TECH
DIVIDER LANL WDEC
MARSHALL ISLANDS RESETTLEMENT
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Marshall Islands program
including the resettlement process on the Rongelap Atoll.
Mr. Brush. The Department of Energy has been working with the
Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Local Government Councils in
the fulfillment of the Department of Energy's responsibilities
delineated in the Compact of Free Association, Public Law 99-239.
Specifically, the Department of Energy continues to conduct
radiological monitoring and environmental characterization of the four
effected atolls (Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik) and to provide
medical care to the exposed population and control group of Rongelap
and Utrik.
During the last year each Department of Energy environmental
mission in the Marshall Islands visited Bikini Atoll for the collection
of samples in support of our agricultural research projects. The data
and knowledge gained in the conduct of this research will have
application throughout the Marshall Islands and will contribute to
resettlement activities. Since the agricultural research project data
collected at Bikini is reaching a level of near completion, the need
for resident Department of Energy personnel to maintain the
agricultural gardens at Bikini after 1993 will diminish. Since Bikini
has not been resettled the maintenance of the Bikini Field Station will
have continuing benefits and the Department of Energy is working
closely with the Bikini community to establish when and under what
circumstance the transition should occur. Sampling will also continue
on a mission basis to facilitate the completion of environmental data
needed to publish the final findings on the potassium fertilizer option
and the environmental half-life studies. The Department of Energy will
commence grid surveys of Enue Island this fall and will do grid surveys
of Bikini Island based on the resettlement option decided upon by the
people of Bikini.
Consistent with the desires of Congress, the Department of Energy
was successful this last year in the transition of ownership and
operation of the Enewetak Field Station to Local Government ownership
and control. Additional data was also collected to further our
initiative to fully characterize - radiation in the environment through
the completion of grid surveys on the islands.
The Department of Energy continues to aggressively pursue
activities in support of the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Department of Energy, the Department of Interior, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands and the Rongelap Local Government Council that
established the Rongelap Resettlement Project. During this last year,
members of the Republic of the Marshall Islands Nationwide Radiological
Study once again accompanied two Department of Energy environmental
missions to conclude environmental sampling and grid surveys to provide
radiological characterization of the southern islands of Rongelap
Atoll. Preliminary results of environmental samples that were split
with the Republic of the Marshall Islands Nationwide Radiological Study
for independent verification of the Department of Energy protocols and
procedures indicate close agreement. The evaluation of the Department
of Energy protocols and procedures by the National Academy of Sciences
continues with a preliminary report from the National Academy of
Sciences anticipated this summer and a final report by the end of this
year. Completion of our studies and the National Academy of Sciences
report by the end of this year and completion of the Republic of the
Marshall Islands studies indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding
and supporting Scientific Work Plan will support decisions on
resettlement of the southern portion of Rongelap Atoll in early 1994.
This last year, the Department of Energy has completed an
environmental mission to Utrik for the conduct of detailed grid surveys
and collection of environmental samples (e.g., coconuts, pandanus,
breadfruit, etc.) to further characterize the presence of radiation oh
Utrik.
Two Department of Energy medical missions were conducted this
last year in the Marshall Islands to provide necessary medical care to
the exposed populations of Rongelap and Utrik. Over 80 per"cent of the
exposed population availed themselves of the voluntary medical
examinations to identify any medical conditions which could be of
radiogenic origin. During the last year, exposed people needing
additional diagnoses or medical care were referred to Hawaii for more
extensive examination and treatment of medical conditions found during
the conduct of the DOE medical missions. These missions also provide
medical examinations to a control group of local citizens selected by
age and sex to closely match the exposed population. The Department of
Energy also provided logistical support to the Republic of the
Marshall Islands Section 177 physicians and nurses who joined the
Department of Energy medical missions to provide medical examinations
and care to the unexposed population of the outer islands visited.
Over the past year, the Department of Energy conducted a
bioassay and whole body counting mission to the Marshall Islands,
visiting the islands of Enewetak and Majuro. Another mission, scheduled
for this July, will visit the islands of Majetto, Utrik, Majuro and
Ebeye. These missions are conducted to measure the amount of radiation
in individuals of the Marshall Islands. This data assists the
Department of Energy in determining radiation exposures to the
populations.
NEVADA SUPPORT FACILITY
Mr. Bevill: On what basis did the Department obligate funds for
the Nevada Support Facility when the funding was not authorized by
Congress?
Dr. Beckner: The Department failed to recognize that the
authorization did not include first year funding for the Nevada Support
Facility. Instead the Department proceeded on the basis of the earlier
FY 1993 Energy and Water appropriation which did include $2,000,000 to
begin Title I Engineering and Design. In retrospect, DOE should have
recognized the difference between the authorization and the
appropriation and requested clarification from the Congress prior to
obligating any funds associated with this project. We are now working
with the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee to resolve this
situation.
As of the end of March 1993, $1.875 million of the $2 million
appropriation has been committed. The amount that has been costed is
$556,000. Termination of current workorders and contracts would entail
some cost, estimated to be perhaps as high as $300,000.
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the work being done between Sandia
and the Diagnostic Instrumentation and Analysis Laboratory.
Dr. Beckner. The Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management and DIAL do not anticipate the direct participation of
Sandia in this project at this point.
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the Department's role in the Department
of Defense's "timberwind" program, including funding and activities for
FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. The DOE Defense Programs Office has no involvement in
a "timberwind" program in FY 1992, FY 1993, or FY 1994.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the defense requirements which the IF
program is seeking to meet.
Dr. Beckner. The IF program has a threefold mission, of which two
specifically support defense requirements: (1) to play an essential
role in accessing physics regimes of interest in nuclear weapon design
and provide nuclear weapon related physics data, particularly in the
area of secondary design; (2) to provide an aboveground simulation
capability for nuclear weapon effects on strategic, tactical, and space
assets (including sensors and command and control); and (3) to develop
inertial fusion energy for civilian applications (e.g., industrial
competitiveness and economic growth, civilian energy production,
etc.).
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. Describe the accomplishments of the Inertial Fusion
program in FY 1992, FY 1993, and proposed for FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. The Inertial Fusion Program has continued to
accomplish milestones in program management and technical achievements
at the laboratories. The program has successfully implemented the
recommendations of the 1990 National Academy of Sciences panel and
focused activities toward the demonstration of ignition and gain in the
laboratory by the year 2000. All the recommendations of the report are
being implemented by the Department within budgetary constraints.
A program strategy was developed and implemented that identified
the next step as the National Ignition Facility (NIF). The NIF is to
demonstrate ignition and gain in the laboratory by 2002 using glass
laser technology. Conceptual design of the NIF was authorized by the
Secretary January 15, 1993, and is expected to be completed in FY 1994.
The NIF is envisioned as a multi- user facility involving
multilaboratories in the conceptual design and associated activities
(i.e., siting study, etc.).
In FY 1992, the Inertial Confinement Fusion Advisory Committee
for Defense Programs (ICFAC/DP) was established and the first meeting
of ICFAC/DP was held in December 1992. In March 1993, the ICFAC/DP held
its second meeting to review the progress of the ICF pulsed power
program. Two additional reviews are currently scheduled: the next one
to review the KrF laser program is scheduled for late FY 1993 and
the following review of the target physics program is scheduled for
early FY 1994.
The NOVA laser at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
continues to operate with pulses of more than 120 kilojoules of energy.
Experiments are establishing the target physics data base for
proceeding with the National Ignition Facility. In FY 1992, NOVA
improvements resulted in improved beam power balance, targeting
accuracy, pulse shape contrast ratio, and diagnostics. Collectively,
these improvements termed "Precision NOVA" will be completed in FY
1993. In addition, a single beam laser (beamlet) prototype is being
built to validate an advanced laser architecture for the NIF and is
expected to be complete in FY 1995. Successful completion of the
target physics experiments and successful operation of the beamlet
will support program request for acquisition executive authority for
new start status of the NIF and initiation of NIF preliminary design.
At the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the Particle Beam
Fusion Accelerator II (PBFA-II) continued to operate up to full
energy. Light-ion beams were focused to 5 terawatts per square
centimeter and radiation dominated hohlraum experiments were conducted.
A major review of PBFA-II program by ICFAC/DP was held March 1993 with
the conclusion that, while some technical milestones were met and some
were not, overall progress since 1990 has been very good. The ICFAC/DP
final recommendation was that "The Sandia program and the laser ICF
program are, in our opinion, resource limited. In view of the
importance of the ICF for both weapons physics and weapons effects and
the prospect of test ban limitations, increased resources in this area
may be in the national interest." In FY 1994, hydrodynamic target
experiments on PBFA II and beam development on SABRE will continue.
Starting in FY 1991 and continuing into FY 1993, the LANL ICF
program has been reconfigured to support target physics experimentation
on NOVA, to support KrF laser development at the Naval Research
Laboratory, to-advance glass laser development' and enhance ICF
contributions to weapons studies. In FY 1992, LANL made a major
computational advancement by calculating from first principles,
experimental results. The Trident glass laser became operational in
FY 1993 and is being used for experiments, experiment staging, and
diagnostics equipment design and development. In FY 1994, LANL will
perform: experimental and theoretical predictions of NOVA target
behavior as part of the technical readiness for the NIF; participate
in NIF conceptual design; provide high precision targets for NOVA;
and other experimental efforts.
The University of Rochester Laboratory for Laser Energetics (LLE)
is exploring the feasibility of direct-drive for ICF. LLE has achieved
a number of significant accomplishments on the existing OMEGA laser
facility, including the implosion of cryogenic capsules from 100 to 300
times liquid deuterium- tritium density, implosion of gas filled
capsules in agreement with one dimensional calculations, the development
of techniques to smooth high power laser beams by spectral dispersion,
the development of novel fabrication techniques for plastic fuel
capsules, and the development of optical components and techniques for
application in the national program. In FY 1992, laser and target
experiments continued in support of the OMEGA upgrade and the
Department authorized the University to initiate detailed design of the
OMEGA Upgrade Project. In FY 1993, OMEGA was shut down so that OMEGA
Upgrade construction could start. In FY 1994, OMEGA Upgrade
construction will continue.
In FY 1992, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) continued
development and fabrication of NIKE, a Krypton Fluoride (KrF) gas laser
for short wavelength, flat target experiments. In FY 1993 a
comprehensive review of the KrF program by independent consultants was
conducted with the conclusion that the NIKE system will be a unique
facility that can provide valuable data to the ICF program. In FY 1994,
NIKE fabrication will be completed and target performance testing will
start.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the review of the
classification policy as it pertains to the Inertial Fusion program?
Mr. McFadden. The Office of Security Affairs sent a letter to
Mr. Daniel Poneman on March 10, 1993, at the National Security Council
requesting a review of the proposed new inertial confinement fusion
classification policy at the next meeting of the Nonproliferation
Interagency Working Group. The letter to Mr. Poneman contained a
summary of the proposed new policy on inertial confinement fusion, a
synopsis of the recommended declassifications, and the relevant portion
of the report from the Technical Evaluation Panel upon which the
recommendations are based.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill: What is the FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 funding
proposed for each laboratory and facility in the Inertial Fusion
program? Please provide the breakout by program; i.e. glass laser, gas
laser, and pulsed power.
Dr. Beckner: Funding proposed for each laboratory and facility in
the Inertial Fusion program is contained in the following table. (The
information follows:)
INERTIAL FUSION
FUNDING BY PROGRAM
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
ACTUAL APPROP. REQUEST
Operating Expenses
Glass Laser
LLNL $ 80,000 $ 89,700 $ 82,053
LANL 13,800 14,700 13,900
SF-University of Rochester 12,600 15,590 14,000
Total Glass
$106,400 $119,990 $109,953
Gas Laser
LANL 5,900 6,200 6,400
SF-NRL 5,900 10,457 8,000
Total Gas $ 11,800 $ 16,657 $ 14,400
Pulsed Power
SNL 31,500 29,840 27,900
Supporting Activities
LANL 4,000 3,900 3,200
SF Operations
NLUF 700 700 0
Target Contractor 10,400 9,500 9,000
Subtotal SF 11,100 10,200 12,200
HQ Other 500 713 8,100
Total Supporting Activities 15,600 $ 14,813 $ 20,300
Total Operating Expenses $165,300 $181,300 $172,553
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT
LLNL $ 3,500 $ 3,500 $ 3,760
LANL 1,500 800 400
SNL 3,200 1,400 700
Target Fabrication Contractor 0 500 300
Naval Research Laboratory 330 600 200
University of Rochester 20,300 23,410 10,000
SF Operations Office 670 800 500
Total Capital Equipment $ 29,500 $ 31,010 $ 15,860
TOTAL INERTIAL FUSION $194,800 $212,310 $188,413
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. Specifically describe program plans by individual
laboratory and facility for FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. The Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) program plans
by individual laboratories and facilities for FY 1993 and FY 1994 are
as follows:
FY 1993 FY 1994
LLNL LLNL
Continuation of the NOVA Operation of NOVA, beamlet
target experimental campaign, development driver optimization
development of the advanced studies, and limited experimental
beamlet, and other work in campaigns associated with the NIF
connection with the National decision.
Ignition Facility (NIF) decision.
LANL LANL
Continuation of supporting NOVA support operations at
target design theory, solid and limited KrF laser effort.
laser experiments, and experiments
associated with the Mercury
KrF laser.
SNL SNL
Continue activities related to Maintain the PBFA-II program
program goals recommended by as a driver candidate and
National Academy of Science and continue target experiments,
carry out activities of the data toward weapon system
Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator performance and safety.
weapon safety simulating.
FY 1993 FY 1994
UR/LLE UR/LLE
Continuation of direct drive Continuation of the Omega
experimental activities on laser upgrade project and
on the Omega laser. advanced driver studies
in accordance with NAS
recommendations.
NRL NRL
Continuation of NIKE laser Completion of NIKE laser project
development in accordance with NAS and initiation of experimental
recommendations, exploration of studies related to direct-drive.
the process of beam smoothing,
and continuation of computational
studies of physics phenomena for
direct-drive capability.
GA GA
Continuation of target fabrication Continuation of target
activities by a private contractor fabrication activities by a
to support the laboratory private contractor
experimental programs. support the laboratory
programs. experimental programs.
FY 1993 FY 1994
Other Other
Establishment and operation of Continuation of support for NIF
ICFAC for the review of Conceptual Design and ICF
technical and programmatic activities associated with ICFAC
issues and commencement of NIF review of technical and
Conceptual Design activities. programmatic issues.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the National Ignition
Facility, including funding and milestones.
Dr. Beckner. Conceptual design of the National Ignition Facility
(NIF) was authorized by the Secretary on January 15, 1993. The NIF is
to be a multiuser facility that addresses the needs of the nuclear
weapon community, the nuclear weapons effects community, and civilian
community (i.e., energy, etc.). NIF conceptual design is to be based on
glass laser technology with a driver capability of 1-2 MJ. Conceptual
design is planned to take 18 months at a cost of $12 million. The costs
will be borne by the ICF program operating funds in FY 1993 and FY
1994. The next major milestone of the NIF is Key Decision 1, that is
acquisition executive authorization for a new start and initiation of
preliminary design.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the closeout of the KMS
program?
Dr. Beckner. In December 1991, KMS Fusion, Inc. (KMS) lost on
their bid for a new DOE contract which was for the continued support of
the DOE Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) program. Since then, KMS has
consistently refused to return about $5 million of Government-owned
property from the KMS facility in Ann Arbor, Michigan, without
settlement on a number of contract closeout issues. In addition to
causing extra expense and delay in getting the winning bidder started
on the new contract, the failure to reach closeout of the old KMS
contract is delaying commencement of decontamination and
decommissioning (D&D) of the KMS Ann Arbor facility. This, in turn, is
raising congressional concern for the safety of people in the vicinity
and their environment.
On September 18, 1992, KMS proposed a "global settlement" which
included payments by the Government to KMS totaling approximately $35.7
million for resolution of the following outstanding issues:
- DOE assumption of all D&D obligations and indemnification
of KMS on all environmental issues;
- DOE purchase of KMS-owned assets;
- DOE buyout of KMS lease commitments;
- KMS demands for $20 million for intellectual property.
Meanwhile, on February 1,-1993', DOE offered KMS a fixed-price
contract modification in the amount of $1 million to have KMS remove
the Government-owned property. On March 11, 1993, KMS rejected the
offer. If KMS had accepted, property removal could have been completed
by July 1993, clearing the way for commencement of D&D.
On April 14, 1993, representatives of DOE met with KMS. At that
time, KMS, which had been pressing DOE to negotiate the "global
settlement," was informed that DOE would not negotiate any remaining
issues until the return of the Government-owned property had been
settled. KMS was told that they could accept the Government's February
1 proposed contract modification, or a similar modification, or they
could agree to give the Government access to the KMS facility for the
purpose of retrieving the Government-owned property
is DOE's position that once the property issue is resolved DOE will
enter into good faith negotiations with KMS on all other outstanding
issues. KMS was told that if the property issue is not resolved the
Government is prepared to go to trial. The trial date is set for June
28, 1993.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. What equipment still being held by KMS is still needed
for target fabrication activities by the new contractor?
Dr. Beckner. KMS continues to hold several thousand items of
Government-owned equipment and other property valued at approximately
$5 million and consisting of essentially all of the equipment
previously used by KMS in the performance of the ICF target support
contract. The Government-owned equipment still held by KMS includes
dozens of specialized scientific items such as lasers, coaters, tritium
filling apparatus, as well as microscopes and other diagnostic
measurement equipment. Also included are numerous items of general
laboratory equipment such as computers, printers, pumps, compressors,
fume hoods, as well as lathes, mills, and other standard shop
equipment. Other items of Government-owned property still held by KMS
include about 40 small radioactive sources used for calibration
purposes, approximately 12,000 Curries of tritium, 3 depleted uranium
beds (for storage of the tritium), hundreds of small containers of
chemicals (including many hazardous materials), and a small inventory
of precious metals.
Approximately 1/3 of this Government-owned property has been
identified as a high priority need for General Atomics (GA) in its
performance of current and planned tasks under the new ICF target
support contract. The unavailability of this equipment adversely
effects the contractor's ability to meet some of the highest priority
requirements of the five ICF laboratories (LLNL,-LANL, SNL, UR/LLE, and
NRL). In addition, the difficulty in obtaining this equipment from KMS
and the subsequent equipment "workarounds" at GA add a significant
cost to the ICF program. Approximately another 1/3 of the
Government-owned property held by KMS has been identified as
valuable/useful to the new contractor. The remaining 1/3, while still
of value to the Government, is considered of marginal utility for
application to the scope of work under the GA contract.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current plan to ensure that
cryogenic targets are available for use as soon as the OMEGA upgrade is
ready to operate. What is the cost of the program by year?
Dr. Beckner. The schedule, cost, and overall scenario to ensure
that cryogenic targets are provided for the OMEGA Upgrade facility at
UR/LLE depend upon the specific technical approaches chosen and the
overall cryogenic target handling system design developed for this
facility. A multiyear task was assigned to General Atomics (GA), the
ICF target support contractor, in early February 1992 to develop the
system requirements and begin the conceptual design of the OMEGA
Upgrade facility cryogenic target handling system. This task was
continued and expanded in FY 1993 to include critical requirements in
cryogenic layering and characterization R&D and to continue the overall
systems engineering effort. Very preliminary data from the FY 1993
work in progress indicates a system cost of approximately $14 million
over the next 4 years.
The results of this major FY 1993 target support contractor task,
plus the complementary cryogenic R&D efforts at LLNL and LANL, will
further define the OMEGA Upgrade facility cryogenic target handling
system as well as the remaining R&D necessary to meet the OMEGA Upgrade
technical performance requirements and schedule. The estimated cost and
schedule and a strategy to implement the system, consistent with
program priorities and resources, will be developed in late FY 1993 and
early FY 1994.
INERTIAL FUSION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the recent review of the Sandia ICF
program. Were the established milestones met? What is the next step?
Dr. Beckner. On March 8-10, 1993, the Inertial Confinement Fusion
Advisory Committee (ICFAC) reviewed the Sandia ICF program. The purpose
of the review was to evaluate the progress of the program against the
Sandia goals for reducing ion beam divergence, and to evaluate the
scientific quality and significance of Sandia target physics
experiments and associated diagnostics. The review afforded the
Committee a thorough look at the status and progress of light-ion ICF
at Sandia as well as worldwide. The conclusions of the Committee were
that, while some technical milestones were met and some were not,
overall progress at Sandia since 1990 has been very good. While they
did not achieve their on-target intensity goal, Sandia demonstrated a
good theoretical understanding of the problem and sound near-term
experimental plans for overcoming the problem. Sandia was praised for
the significantly improved scientific quality of its ICF program by the
Committee as well as other laboratories of the ICF program. The next
step involves (1) establishing with DOE a technical contract with
definitive milestones; (2) identifying means for increasing the shot
rate on the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator II (PBFA II) by about 50
percent; and (3) identifying the mechanism for the significant
parasitic losses in PBFA II, as well as means for reducing these
losses.
RECONFIGURATION
Mr. Bevill. What is the current status of the nuclear and
nonnuclear weapons complex reconfiguration?
Dr. Beckner. The Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment
was completed and distributed to affected States and Indian Tribes for
preapproval review in December 1992. These States and Indian Tribes
have provided comments and the Environmental Assessment was revised
accordingly. The preferred alternative analyzed in this Environmental
Assessment would lead to the consolidation of most nonnuclear.
manufacturing activities at the Kansas City Plant. Certain selected
technologies would be preserved at the weapons laboratories. Tritium
work would be consolidated at Savannah River where most tritium work is
presently performed. All weapons complex activities at the Mound and
Pinellas Plants, and nonnuclear manufacturing activities at the Rocky
Flats Plant would be terminated if the proposal were adopted. The
Department has prepared a number of separate analyses and studies, the
results of which support the preferred alternative.
The findings of the Nonnuclear Reconfiguration Cost Effectiveness
Report, submitted to Congress in January 1993, have been challenged by
representatives of several of the affected States and communities. In
order to address their concerns, the Secretary initiated reviews by
three independent consultants to evaluate the findings which support
the cost effectiveness certification in this report. These consultants
were selected in consultation with elected officials of the affected
States. The consultants' reports will be completed by June 1.
In the meantime, we will proceed with internal departmental review
and finalization of the Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental
Assessment. If supported by the analyses in the Environmental
Assessment, a proposed Finding of No Significant Impact would be
published for public review and comment. However, issuance of a
proposed Finding will await the completion of the consultants'
reviews and a decision whether to proceed. No final decision
regarding nonnuclear consolidation will be made until after
these reviews and completion of the Environmental Assessment process.
Reconfiguration of the nuclear functions and research, development
and testing facilities associated with,the nuclear weapons complex is
being addressed through preparation of a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (PEIS) and a series of preconceptual design studies.
The PEIS will address the environmental impacts associated with a
number of alternative configurations for the future weapons complex.
The five sites currently being considered as candidates for future
weapons complex nuclear facilities are Hanford, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Pantex, Oak Ridge Reservation and the Savannah
River Site. Nuclear functions of the weapons complex which are being
analyzed at these potential sites in the PEIS and for which design
concepts and cost estimates are being developed include plutonium
processing and storage, uranium/lithium processing and storage, weapons
assembly/disassembly, and tritium supply and processing. Consolidation
of some functions of weapons complex research, development and testing
currently performed at the national laboratories is also being
considered.
Alternative configurations and sites for the future complex are
being examined in light of the arms reduction initiatives which have
resulted in significant reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile.
The draft PEIS is currently scheduled to be available for public review
and comment in late 1993. The final PEIS is currently scheduled to be
completed in late 1994 with the Record of Decision following shortly
thereafter.
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current process for preparation of
the Programmatic EIS on the future nuclear weapons complex including
funding and milestones.
Dr. Beckner. The process for preparing the Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement on reconfiguration of the nuclear
weapons complex began wit,h the issuance of a 'Notice of Intent" to
prepare the document in February, 1991. That Notice initiated a public
scoping period during which 15 public meetings were held at the weapons
complex sites and over 37,000 comments received regarding the scope of
the PEIS and the issues to be addressed. A PEIS Implementation Plan was
issued in February, 1992 to document the results of the scoping process
and provide a "work plan" for the PEIS.
At the time work on the PEIS was begun, the Nation was still
envisioning a large nuclear weapons,stockpile for the foreseeable
future. However, in September, 1991, former President Bush made the
first of his announcements of significant reductions in the nuclear
weapons stockpile. Shortly thereafter, the Department deferred any
decision regarding a new tritium production reactor, and directed that
the environmental analysis of the potential tritium production
alternatives be incorporated into the PEIS. In January 1992, in the
State of the Union message, the President announced further reductions
in the stockpile and cessation of the production of new weapons for
the immediate future. This was followed in June 1992 by the
Bush/Yeltsin arms reduction agreement (since codified in the START II
Treaty), containing the most significant cuts in both Nations' arsenals
to date.
The combined affect of these announcements was lo cause a
fundamental reevaluation of (1) the capabilities and functions required
for the future complex, (2) the siting alternatives for each weapons
complex function to be analyzed in the PEIS, (3) the technology
alternatives for new tritium supply capacity, and (4) the appropriate
sizing for new weapons complex facilities. In this regard, long-term
storage of special nuclear materials had not previously been a
contemplated requirement for the future weapons complex, the
significant reductions in the planned future stockpile will result in a
much larger number of weapons retirements than previously envisioned.
As a consequence, long-term storage of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium, along with its associated processing and analytical laboratory
capability, was determined to be required for the future weapons
complex. In addition, because the complex will be required to make far
fewer weapons in the future, the Department is reevaluating whether
some weapons-related research and development functions, previously
performed at the national laboratories separate from
fabrication/processing facilities, should now be integrated with those
fabrication/processing facilities.
Given the impact of world events on future weapons requirements and
the resulting changes required in the way the Department is approaching
the analysis in the PEIS, a revised "Notice of Intent" is being
prepared to announce proposed changes in the scope of the PEIS, and to
afford the public an additional opportunity to comment on the proposed
revisions to the scope of the document. In addition, the Department is
currently planning to hold additional scoping meetings at each of the
candidate sites for future weapons complex nuclear functions.
Following the additional scoping period, the Department plans to
issue a revised PEIS Implementation Plan. A draft PEIS is expected to
be completed by late 1993, followed by an opportunity for public review
and comment, including a series of public hearings. The final PEIS is
expected to be completed before the end of FY 1994, followed shortly
thereafter by a Record of Decision (ROD). In the ROD, the Secretary
will announce her decisions regarding the facilities and sites which
will become a part of the future weapons complex. Following the ROD,
project-specific National Environmental Policy Act documents will be
prepared prior to construction of new facilities on the selected sites.
Funds in the amount of $7.4 million remaining from FY 1993
appropriations will be used for the environmental analysis in FY 1994.
NONNUCLEAR CONSOLIDATION
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the process for nonnuclear
consolidation including activities to be performed in FY 1993 and FY
1994 and associated costs.
Dr. Beckner. In brief, the process involves four major steps
including: the preparation of an Environmental Assessment, preparation
of receiver sites, transfer of activities, and activity qualification.
A pre-approval Environmental Assessment was provided to the affected
States and Indian Tribes for review and comment in December 1992. These
States and Indian Tribes provided comments and the Environmental
Assessment is being revised accordingly. The Department is currently
reviewing the Final Environmental Assessment. If supported by.the
Environmental Assessment, a proposed finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) will be published for public comment.
Since the Secretary has chosen to have the cost effectiveness of
the proposed consolidation reviewed by three independent consultants, a
proposed FONSI would not be published until after the results of their
reviews are available and any changes made.
If the Department proceeds with nonnuclear consolidation, sites
receiving activities transferred from other.sites will perform design,
long-lead procurement and modification to facilities to prepare for
incoming activities. The design of modifications would begin in August
1993, after the final FONSI has been issued. The Department would
spend approximately $25 million on these actions in Fiscal Year 1993
and 1994.
When preparations have been completed at receiver sites, activities
would be transferred from designated sites. Actions would include the
transfer of inventories, equipment, tools, gauges, testers,
documentation and personnel. The Department would spend approximately
$35 million on these transfers in. Fiscal Year 1993 and 1994.
To ensure that activities have been successfully transferred, the
receiver sites will demonstrate the capability to build a small
quantity of war reserve quality product. The Department would spend
approximately $5 million on these actions in Fiscal Year 1994.
NUCLEAR-DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current DOE Nuclear-Directed
Energy Weapons program and recent accomplishments. How does this fit
within the framework of DOD's SDIO program?
Dr. Beckner. The Department has conducted research on several
Nuclear Directed Energy Weapons-(NDEW) and Nuclear Directed Energy
Systems (NDES) concepts as part of the threat assessment mission to
determine the potential threat to strategic deterrent forces and
possible strategic defense architectures. In the past several years the
research on most concepts (i.e., x-ray laser, hypervelocity
projectiles, and the nuclear weapon-driven optical frequency laser) has
been terminated except for low levels of effort that supports the Core
Technology Base. The only NDES concept that continues to be seriously
researched is the reactor-driven optical frequency laser (FALCON) at
Sandia National Laboratories. During this past year, the FALCON effort
has focused on preparation for critical flow experiments that will be
conducted later this fiscal year., The FALCON program will continue to
investigate critical flow issues and scaling issues over the next
several years. Research to date indicates that the FALCON Laser Concept
is potentially one of the simplest ways to achieve mega-watt-class
continuous-wave lasing for long run times. There are possible
commercial applications to the FALCON concept, such as power beaming
to satellites, in addition to possible strategic and theater missile
defense missions. At this time FALCON is not included within the
framework of DOD's SDI program.
NUCLEAR-DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. What are the DOD and DOE budgets for the Strategic
Defense Initiative program in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994?
Dr. Beckner. The Department of Energy (DOE) does not have a
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. However, since the former
research on Nuclear Directed Energy Weapons (NDEW) for threat
assessment provided some useful threat information to the Department of
Defense (DOD) SDI program, I will include in my answer NDEW and Nuclear
Directed Energy System (NDES) activities that have been integrated into
the Core Technology Base since FY 1991. I would like to submit for the
record appropriations/requests for the DOD SDI program and the related
portion of DOE research programs. Information about the DOD SDI budget
was obtained from the SDI Organization.
DOD STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Approp. Approp. Request
DOD SDI $3,936.9 $3,725.4 $3,760.6
DOE RESEARCH FUNDING
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Approp. Approp. Request
DOE/DP $66.0 $13.15 $5.05
DOE/NE $40.0 - -
NUCLEAR-DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a detailed listing of all SDI related
activities performed by DOE laboratories for FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY
1994. Indicate funding amounts and whether the funds are DOE or DOD
appropriations.
Dr. Beckner.. Beginning in the mid-1980's, The Department of
Energy (DOE) directly funded.an assessment of potential nuclear threats
to our strategic deterrent forces and potential strategic defense
architectures in our Nuclear Directed Energy Weapons (NDEW) activities.
Since FY 1991, due to significantly reduced funding for NDEW, these
activities have been returned to the Core Technology Base. The funding
for these activities follows:
DEFENSE PROGRAMS FUNDED ACTIVITIES
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
APPROP. APPROP. REQUEST
X-ray Laser $47.4 $4.7 $0
Hypervelocity Projectiles 9.3 1.0 0
Optical Frequency Lasers 9.3 7.45 5.05
Total DOE Defense Programs $66.0 $13.15 $5.05
Our research on nuclear-power sources-was multi-agency funded. The DOE
funding for nuclear-power sources in FY 1992 was $40 million, and no FY
1993 funds are being used nor are FY 1994 funds requested.
Finally, the DOD also transfers SDI funding to DOE directly and
through other government agencies and the military services by
reimbursable government purchase requests for a variety of other
research projects. Historically, DOE has received over 100 of
these SDI-related reimbursable purchase requests in each of the last
few years. The reimbursable SDI funding received by DOE in FY 1992
was $306 million. It is estimated that the FY 1993 reimbursable
funding will be about $250 million and in FY 1994 this funding is
expected to be below $200 million. No DOE funds are used to support
these reimbursable projects.
NUCLEAR-DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. Provide by location the FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994
funding for x-ray laser, hypervelocity pellets, and optical frequency
lasers.
Dr. Beckner. I will provide this information for the record. (The
information follows:)
NUCLEAR DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS RESEARCH
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Approp. Approp. Request
X-Ray Laser:
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory $25.0 $4.7 $0.0
Sandia National
Laboratory 3.9 0.0 0.0
Nevada Test Site 18.5 0.0 0.0
Subtotal $47.4 $4.7 $0.0
Hypervelocity Projectiles:
Los Alamos National
Laboratory $8.5 $1.0 $0.0
Sandia National
Laboratory 0.8 0.0 0.0
Nevada Test Site 0.0 0.0 0.0
Subtotal $9.3 $1.0 $0.0
Optical Frequency Laser:
Los Alamos National
Laboratory $1.5 $0.75 $0.0
Sandia National
Laboratory 6.3 5.15 5.05
Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory 1.5 1.55 0.0
Subtotal $9.3 $7.45 $5.05
TOTAL, NDEW Research $66.0 $13.15 $5.05
NUCLEAR-DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS
Mr. Bevill. Describe the Brilliant Pebbles program being conducted
at DOE laboratories including milestones and funding provided by DOD
and DOE in FY 1990, FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. Due to changing National priorities and reduced
funding within DOD, SDIO notified DOE in early FY 1993 of their intent
to terminate DOE's participation in the Brilliant Pebbles (BP) program.
The BP program was conducted with the DOE laboratories (principally
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) to develop the key technologies
necessary for BP and to demonstrate concept feasibility. DOE was to
transfer these technologies to SDIO's industrial partners who would
(when authorized by Congress) be responsible for the actual
engineering development and production of any operational BP system.
Key technologies explored included advanced sensors, propulsion, and
processors. Integral to this effort was research to advance the state
of the art in miniaturization and development of lightweight
components. To demonstrate concept feasibility three flight experiments
were conducted, the last one occurring October 21, 1992. A fourth
flight experiment scheduled for later in FY 1993 was canceled. The BP
program within DOE is a reimbursable activity funded entirely by SDIO.
The budget profile is: FY 1990, $106.47M; FY 1991, $170.4M; FY 1992,
$77.2M; FY 1993, $10.0M; FY 1994, $0.00.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Mr. Bevill. Please list the technology transfer activities which
will be conducted by each laboratory in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994,
including funding for each task.
Dr. Beckner. The attached tables provide the requested
information for each year of the Defense Programs Technology Transfer
Initiative: FY 1992 through FY 1993. The FY 1993 figures do not include
the proposed $47 million reprogramming. Because the Technology Transfer
Initiative seeks to maximize fairness of opportunity in pursuing the
best dual-use technology transfer partnerships, the specific tasks to
be funded in FY 1994 will be identified closer to the commencement of
the fiscal year.
DOE/DP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INITIATIVE OBLIGATIONS
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993*
New Projects $41,126 $80,554
(including maturation)
Mortgages 6,342 57,483
Administration/Overhead 2,529 3,000
Total $49,997 $141,037
* FY 1993 totals include both obligations to date and estimates to end
of fiscal year.
******DOE/DP TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INITIATIVE FY 1991-92-93 PROJECTS
ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT******
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Mr. Bevill. What has been the return on investment to date such
as royalty fees, etc.?
Dr. Beckner. The return on the taxpayers' investment in dual-use
technology transfer partnerships is not measured primarily in terms of
royalties. The objectives of our dual-use technology transfer
partnerships are to improve U.S. economic competitiveness and to
benefit Defense Programs by improving the core competencies of our
weapons laboratories. Our measures of success are focused on measuring
the degree to which our technology transfer partnerships meet these
objectives. Given the long-term, leading- edge nature of our research
projects, their ultimate success or failure will take many years to
determine.
The Defense Programs Technology Transfer Initiative is in its
third year of operation, its budget having increased dramatically in
each of the 3 years. Our dual-use technology transfer partnerships are
typically 3-to-5 year agreements. The great majority of these projects
and programs were initiated within the past 12 months. Therefore, we
are not in a position to evaluate programmatic success or to report on
return on investment. However, performance measures have been
established which focus on currently available information. Some
measures are objective, others are subjective.
Objective performance measures focus on project or program
management such as milestone tracking and budget analysis. Measuring
the "customer satisfaction" of our partners is another measure of
return on investment, given the fact that nearly all of our partners
are industrial firms facing severely competitive market conditions.
Quantitative measures of customer satisfaction include number of
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) and other
technology transfer agreements signed, the responses to our
requests for proposals, and the total value of industrial contributions
for proposed and approved partnerships. Based on these and other
measures, our partners appear to be pleased with the Defense Programs
Technology Transfer Initiative.
Subjective measures of customer satisfaction include partnership
feedback forums such as the Industry Partners' Feedback Meeting, held
November 1992. Individual laboratories, most recently the Y-12 facility
at Oak Ridge, have also conducted surveys of their industry partners.
This feedback is being used to improve our technology transfer
processes.
While not a specific measure of return on investment, the
weapons laboratories had licensing income of approximately $1.2 million
in the past three years. This royalty income remains with the
laboratories and is used for payment of licensing expenses, education
and training of laboratory employees, payments to inventors, and
recoupment of costs associated with managing research and development
programs.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Mr. Bevill. How do you ensure that these funds are not used to
fund projects which have been turned down by other DOE program
organizations?
Dr. Beckner. Technology transfer projects involving the defense
laboratories are required to have mutual benefits for the laboratories
and the private-sector partner.. Proposed collaborative research
projects at the defense laboratories are typically submitted to DOE's
Office of Defense Programs (DP) for funding approval. Prior to
approving such proposals, DP works with other DOE programs to ensure
coordination and non-duplication of effort. For example, this year's FY
1993 Defense Programs Technology Transfer Initiative Call for
Proposals, our proposals were reviewed by five major DOE program
organizations: Conservation and Renewable Energy, Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management, Energy Research, Fossil Energy, and
Nuclear Energy. Accordingly, we believe this process avoids the
expenditure of funds on projects that have been turned down by other
DOE program organizations for lack of merit.
Also, DP intends to include other DOE programs in the selection of
the technical focus areas announced in calls for proposals, and in the
review of ongoing projects and programs.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the mechanism used to evaluate the
success of each partnership and to communicate lessons learned to
improve future partnerships.
Dr. Beckner. The objectives of our dual-use technology transfer
partnerships are to improve U.S. economic competitiveness, and to
benefit Defense Programs by improving the core competencies of our
weapons laboratories. Our measures of success are focused on measuring
the degree to which our technology transfer partnerships meet these
objectives. Given the long-term, leading-edge nature of our research
projects, their ultimate success or failure will take many years to
determine. As I mentioned earlier, the specific performance measures
employed by Defense Programs today focus on project or program
management such as milestone tracking and budget analysis.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Mr. Bevill: How many Federal and-contractor jobs by site are
funded by this program?
Dr. Beckner: The budget request contains projections for
contractor employment associated with the Defense funded Technology
Transfer Initiative, as detailed in the table below. Federal full-time
equivalents, other than the 18 currently supporting the Headquarters
organization, are more difficult to project because the program
receives matrix support from many organizations within the Department
of Energy operations offices. Overall, accurate projections of
employment related to these efforts remains difficult because the
program is composed of individually selected CRADAS, and the overall
effort has not yet reached steady state operations.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1993 FY 1994
FY 1992 Estimate Request
Funding $50,000 $141,000 $203,000
R&D Laboratory FTE's 117 342 432
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Mr. Bevill: How many jobs at which sites will be created if the
proposed reprogramming is approved?
Dr. Beckner: The proposed $47 million reprogramming would
transfer appropriated funds from weapons Research and Development
activities to dual-use technology transfer partnerships with U.S.
industry. Each type of programmatic activity would utilize scientists
and engineers now employed at the Department of Energy nuclear weapons
laboratories. Therefore, the reprogramming by itself would not create
new jobs at these facilities. However, because our dual-use technology
transfer partnerships lead to the commercialization of new technologies
in the United States, the long-term result of the reprogramming will be
to create new jobs in the private sector.
LABORATORY DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Bevill. What amounts are included for the discretionary
funding of the laboratory directors for FY 1992, FY 1993, and
FY 1994? By laboratory, please provide the amount of funding provided
and the percentage of total funding allowed for discretionary
purposes.
Dr. Beckner. Listed below are the amounts and percentages of
discretionary funding for the Laboratory Directed Research and
Development (LDRD) program for each of the three DOE nuclear weapons
laboratories:
LABORATORY DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
DISCRETIONARY FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992 FY 1993 (est) FY 1994 (est)
Lawrence Livermore $41.8 $67.1 $55*
Los Alamos $61.4 $66.5 $60*
Sandia $38.1 $58.3 $77*
* Estimated based on total of FY 1994 Laboratory Table Congressional
Submission (April 1993) plus estimated adjustments for Capital
Equipment and Work for Others
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OPERATING AND CAPITAL EQUIPMENT FUNDS
ALLOCATED TO LABORATORY DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
FY 1992 FY 1993 (est) FY 1994 (est)
Lawrence Livermore 4.0 6.0 6.0
Los Alamos 6.0 6.0 6.0
Sandia 2.8 4.3 5.0
LABORATORY DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a complete listing by laboratory of
each task or project funded from the discretionary accounts for FY 1992
and FY 1993 and the amount provided for each task. (Examples are not
acceptable. It must be a complete listing.)
Dr. Beckner. Please see attached listings.
*****LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, SANDIA NATIONAL
LABORATORIES AND LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY FY 92-93 LDRD
PROJECTS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT*****
LABORATORY-DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Bevill. Please identify by laboratory all projects which are
receiving funds in FY 1993 which have been funded for more than 3
years.
Dr. Beckner. At Lawrence Livermore and Sandia there are no
projects which are receiving FY 1993 funds and have been funded for
more than three years. At Los Alamos there are two projects out of the
total of 270. Specifically, project 90001, Numerical Laboratory in the
Mathematics and Computational Science Group and project 90002, Advanced
Free Electron Laser Initiative in the Exploratory Research and
Development Group. Both of these projects were initiated before
adoption of the three-year limit specified in DOE Order 6000.4A. They
will be concluded in FY 1993. No further projects will be approved for
more than 3 years.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill. Please describe all programs considered to be
"emergency response or operations" including the location, number of
FTES, and funding for each activity in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. Emergency Response activities that are funded by
Defense Programs are consolidated under the Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Military Application, Emergency Response
Program. The Emergency Response Program is composed of seven emergency
response assets, representing the principal United States capability to
respond to a nuclear weapon or civilian radiological accident or
incident and are the teams which would be deployed to the incident site
within the United States or worldwide.
Staffing, location, and funding requirements for each of the
emergency response assets is somewhat different than for other programs
within the Office of Defense Programs. While each of the emergency
response assets has a dedicated number of FTES, the majority of
scientific and technical personnel who staff the assets are volunteers
from the weapons complex, having extensive expertise derived from their
full-time positions as weapon physicists, engineers and technical
support staff. The FTEs for each asset, by location, will be
collected from each field location and provided at a later date.
Although day-to-day oversight of the deplorable assets is
conducted by our field offices, personnel and equipment are located at
sites throughout the weapon complex, mostly at Lawrence Livermore, Los
Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories.
CONSOLIDATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM
FUNDING AND FTEs SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Research & Development
Operating $38,019 $34,419 $42,977
Capital Equipment 8,530 3,686 8,524
Total $46,549 $38,105 $51,501
LAB FTE's 87 79 114
Stockpile Support
Operating* $ 6,975 $ 8,156 $11,205
Capital Equipment 900 985 1,190
Total $ 7,875 $ 9,141 $12,395
* Includes requirements associated with the planning, coordination,
implementation, and conduct of the Emergency Response Program
activities to include: the Accident Response Group, Radiological
Assistance Program, and Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training
Site. Does not include the Space Nuclear Power and Emergency Operations
Center activities in support of Emergency Operations and Continuity of
Government activities reflected in the Stockpile Support Emergency
Operations budget.
Accident Response Group
The Accident Response Group (ARG) is the Department's main
technical response team dealing with accidents or incidents involving
United States nuclear weapons or components in a peacetime environment.
The ARG is composed of weapons program scientists, engineers, and
technicians, along with specialized equipment derived from the weapons
complex. The ARG is responsible for advising the on scene commander
concerning weapon status, safety, stability, Explosive Ordinance
Disposal (EOD) and shipment if necessary.
The ARG might also be requested to assist a foreign nation in
response to accidents/incidents involving their nuclear weapons or
components.
Field Program Management for ARG is performed by the Albuquerque
Operations Office.
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
ACCIDENT RESPONSE GROUP
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $4,852 $6,100 $8,500
Aerial Measuring Systems
The Aerial Measuring Systems (AMS) is composed of scientists,
engineers, and other technical personnel, along with unique equipment
which collectively provide an aerial radiological survey and search
capability for responding to radiological emergencies, and is also used
to monitor the environment at the Department of Energy and other
Federal and commercial sites. Aerial radiological surveys are performed
with large arrays of sodium iodide detectors linked to a
geo-referenced, time-resolved, gamma spectrometry mounted on fixed- or
rotary-wing aircraft. Specially designed air sampling and monitoring
equipment incorporated onto AMS fixed-wing aircraft provide airborne
air sampling and cloud tracking capabilities, which can detect and
collect samples of airborne radioactive gas and particulates as a
result of a release. The AMS aircraft are maintained on emergency
standby basis at both Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada and Andrews
AFB, Maryland. Research and development activities are conducted at the
Department's Remote Sensing Laboratory, Nellis AFB, and the Special
Technologies Laboratory in Santa Barbara, California.
Field Program Management for AMS is performed by the Nevada
Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AERIAL MEASURING SYSTEMS
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $6,250 $6,390 $7,000
Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability
The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) is a
centralized computer-based prediction system located at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California. It provides
estimates of transport, diffusion, and deposition of radioactive
material released into the atmosphere and associated dose projections.
This predictive capability is based upon meteorological, topographical,
and source-term data providing plume and footprint deposition
information. In addition to DOE sites, ARAC is used by the Department
of Defense at weapons storage locations worldwide and Naval nuclear
reactor facilities. It is available to support emergency response
requirements of DOE's NEST, ARG and RAP assets and to support other
Federal agencies or foreign governments for radiological emergencies.
Field Program Management for ARAC is performed by the San
Francisco Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE ADVISORY CAPABILITY
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $4,390 $1,600 $7,500
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
To meet responsibilities for radiological monitoring and
assessment as set forth in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
Plan, the Department of Energy is responsible for establishing and
managing the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(FRMAC). The FRMAC is an operational center at or near the scene of a
radiological incident, which provides a focal point for coordination
and compilation of all offsite Federal radiological monitoring and
assessment activities. All Federal, state and local agencies concerned
with the radiologic incident are represented in the Center. Information
related to offsite radiological risks resulting from
accidents/incidents is consolidated and analyzed in the FRMAC. This
information is made available to the lead Federal agency, state and/or
local official(s) to aid in formulating policy decisions and for
taking appropriate protective actions.
Field Program Management for FRMAC is performed by the Nevada
Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $770 $660 $1,000
Nuclear Emergency Search Team
The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is a group of diverse
and specially trained engineers, scientists, and technicians from the
weapons complex, along with specialized equipment providing technical
assistance in response to a malevolent nuclear threat. NEST provides
the Department with the unique capability to assess the validity of
communicated nuclear threats and to counter any attempts by terrorists
or extortionists to achieve their objectives by utilization of stolen
nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radioactive dispersal
devices. Within the United States and its territories, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has primary responsibility for such incidents.
In incidents involving foreign locations, the Department of State would
be the lead Federal agency for the United States. NEST assets are
located primarily at the Department's facility at Nellis AFB, Nevada,
with a smaller initial response/advanced party capability located at
Andrews AFB, Maryland.
Field Program Management for NEST is performed by the Nevada
Operations Office.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $23,014 $23,920 $27,477
Radiological Assistance Program
The DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides a Federal
emergency radiological response capability at the local level. Eight
RAP regions provide initial "first responder" assistance, as they are
located at DOE field or area offices, providing regional coordination
and serving as the point of contact for providing the initial DOE
response. RAP teams are usually staffed with certified Health
Physicists and Registered Radiation Protection Technicians, providing
an excellent resource to assist state, local and tribal governments
with expert advice and support for accidents involving radioactive
materials. A RAP Team's assistance is scenario-dependent and consists
typically of the ability to conduct localized searches with hand-held
instruments to identify nature and extent of local contamination and to
provide non-clinical advice on health affect of radiation.
Field Program Management for the RAP is performed by geographical
regions: Brookhaven Area Office (Region 1); Oak Ridge Operations
Office (Region II); Savannah River Operations Office (Region III);
Albuquerque Operations Office (Region IV); Chicago Operations Office
(Region V); Idaho Operations Office (Region VI); San Francisco
Operations Office (Region VII); and Richland Operations Office (Region
VIII).
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $1,460 $1,387 $2,000
Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site
The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)
provides direct or consultative assistance with medical and health
physics support following radiation accidents. REAC/TS provides DOE
with a core capability for handling the medical aspects of radiation
accident/incident response, training of professional and technical
personnel in related specialty areas, and in resolving medical-legal
issues relating to alleged radiation exposure and subsequent health
issues. REAC/TS is designated by World Health Organization as the World
Collaboration Center for Radiation Accident Management. A comprehensive
medical assistance/treatment course for accidents involving radiation,
which is sponsored by DOE, is offered at the training site in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee, and is open to all government agencies as well as the
private sector.
Field Program Management for REAC/TS is performed by the Oak
Ridge Operations Office.
STOCKPILE SUPPORT
RADIATION EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE CENTER/TRAINING SITE
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating Funding $663 $669 $705
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
Mr. Bevill. What level of funding was provided for NEST in the
FY 1992, FY 1993, FY 1994? What emergencies were responded to in each
year?
Dr. Beckner. Over the past 3 fiscal years, there have been no
NEST deployments in response to malevolent nuclear threats. NEST did,
however, conduct seven threat assessments of alleged nuclear or
radiation dispersal devices and participated regularly in exercises, in
addition to its training and readiness requirements. (The information
follows:)
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM
FUNDING SUMMARY
(Dollars in Thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Operating $23,014 $23,920 $27,477
Capital Equipment 4,000 0 4,724
Total $27,014 $23,920 $32,201
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill. How are these programs coordinated with the Office
of Emergency Management?
Dr. Beckner. The "Emergency Management" activities funded under
Atomic Energy Defense Activities maintain the Department's seven
radiological emergency response assets or capabilities, which include:
the Accident Response Group; Aerial Measurement System; Atmospheric
Release Advisory Capability; Federal Radiological Monitoring and
Assessment Center; Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site;
and eight Radiological Assistance Program Teams.
Other "emergency management" functions within the Department are
the responsibility of the newly created Office of Intelligence and
National Security and are involved with certain aspects of all
emergencies of concern to the Department. This organization operates
the Headquarters Emergency Operations Center and ensures integration
and compatibility of all departmental Emergency Operations Centers.
The management of the Defense Programs' radiological response
program is the responsibility of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Military Application. Coordination between Defense Programs and the
Office of Intelligence and National Security takes place as required --
primarily to assure the effective functioning of the operations centers
to support radiological accidents or incidents.
AIRCRAFT INVENTORY
Mr. Bevill. Please provide by type of aircraft and location a
table showing the inventory of aircraft funded by Atomic Energy Defense
Activities. What additional purchases are planned in FY 93 and FY 94?
Mr. Brush. The following table, "Atomic Energy Defense Activity
Funded Aircraft," provides information regarding the type and location
of aircraft funded by Atomic Energy Defense Activities. These aircraft
are used for a number of missions, including hazardous materials
transport, nuclear emergency response, and security patrol. The
Department of Energy plans one aircraft purchase in fiscal year 1993,
using fiscal year 1992 funds. No purchase of aircraft is planned in
fiscal year 1994. (The information follows:)
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITY FUNDED AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT TYPE LOCATION COMMENT
DC-9 (N29AF) Albuquerque, New Mexico
DC-9 (N66AF) Albuquerque, New Mexico
DC-9 (N79SL) Albuquerque, New Mexico
DC-9 (Nl92SA) Albuquerque, New Mexico Aircraft is leased.
Lease expires 6/93 and
will not be renewed.
Lear 35A (NI35DE) Albuquerque, New Mexico
DHC-7 (N54026) Albuquerque, New Mexico Aircraft is leased.
Lease expires 10/93 and
will not be renewed.
B-200 (N7232R) Albuquerque, New Mexico
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITY FUNDED AIRCRAFT (continued)
DHC-6 (N35062) Albuquerque, New Mexico
DHC-6 (N72348) Albuquerque, New Mexico
DHC-6 (Unknown) Albuquerque, New Mexico Plans are to lease this
aircraft when the DHC-7
is deleted from the
inventory to continue to
provide service with a
smaller aircraft.
F-27F (N768RL) Livermore, California
CE-550 (NLOEG) Las Vegas, Nevada
A-100 (N20EG) Suitland, Maryland Aircraft will be excessed
in FY 1993.
Convair 580 Las Vegas, Nevada
(N30EG)
BO-105 (N40EG) Suitland, Maryland
BO-105 (N50EG) Las Vegas, Nevada
BO-105 (N60EG) Las Vegas, Nevada
BO-105 (N70EG) Las Vegas, Nevada
BO-105 (N5EG) Las Vegas, Nevada Aircraft destroyed in
crash. FY 1992 funds to
replace aircraft;
replacement expected in
FY 1993.
B-200 (N6451D) Las Vegas, Nevada
B-200 (Nl85XP) Las Vegas, Nevada
MBB BK-117 Savannah River, Georgia
(N116SR)
MBB BK-117 Savannah River, Georgia
(Nll7SR)
GENERAL DEFENSE ACTIVITIES - INDIRECT EXPENSES
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing indirect expenses for
this appropriation by activity and location for FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY
1994. Please show the components that comprise the indirect expense
accounts and then provide the indirect expenses as a percent of the
laboratory or site funding.
Dr. Beckner. Indirect costs in DOE are considered to be
allocable overhead costs. This overhead is comprised of costs incurred
for the general management, administration and operation of the
contractor, or other costs that benefit the entire enterprise which
cannot be directly associated with any specific work effort and which
are therefore allocated to all or most of the contractors' programs on
a standard basis. Although overhead components, or 'categories', vary
for every M&O contractor, and while DOE-wide overhead categories are
still being refined, overhead categories DOE-wide are currently
considered to be the following: Executive Direction; Human Resources;
Chief Financial Officer; Procurement; Legal; Logistics Support;
Administrative Support; Quality Assurance; Management/Allowance Fee;
Taxes; Information Services; Environment - Institutional; Safety &
Health - Institutional; Facilities Management/Engineering; Maintenance;
Safeguards -and Security; Laboratory Directed R&D; Information/Outreach
activities; Utilities; and Other.
As Secretary O'Leary has reported to you, improved procedures
for re.view and control of overhead have been implemented. Accompanying
these procedural changes has been in-house development of an improved
database. This database will allow a verified compilation of overhead
information in the array you have requested. Although much progress
has been made on development of this database, some system problems
are still being worked out. However, we are happy to provide a draft
of actual FY 1992 overhead costs and estimated FY 1993 overhead costs
of Major Defense Program Sites which are funded by Atomic Energy Defense
Activities, arrayed by activity (Decision Unit) and location, and
FY 1992 and FY 1993 overhead as a percent of laboratory or site funding.
Current, detailed, draft FY 1994 estimated costs are not scheduled for
submission to us until April 30. Final FY 1992/FY 1993/FY 1994 data,
arrayed as requested, will be provided as soon as the information is
reviewed and compiled and database difficulties are adequately resolved.
It should be noted that overhead varies among DOE sites, depending on
specific activities required to maintain basic site functions.
Furthermore, there are significant differences among these sites in
accounting systems, differences in their overhead definitions, and
overhead application algorithms. Because of these differences, it
would be inaccurate to compare these percentages against each other
without significant analysis.
(the infomation follows:)
*******DOE DEFENSE PROGRAM OVERHEAD COSTS FY 92-93 ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT******
GENERAL DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. For each defense facility by appropriation account,
please identify the amount of reimbursable work performed 1) for other
Federal agencies and 2) other than Federal agencies in FY 1992, FY 1993
and estimated for FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. The following tables outline the amount of
reimbursable work performed for other Federal agencies and other than
Federal agencies in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 at the DOE defense
facilities.
REIMBURSABLE WORK PERFORMED - FEDERAL AGENCIES
Weapons Activities
(obligations in thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Actual Estimate Estimate
Amarillo Plant $ 2,165 $ 2,263 $ 1,940
Ames Laboratory 849 1,123 1,123
Argonne National Laboratory 29,620 31,800 32,800
Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory 6,289 5,900 5,900
Brookhaven National Laboratory 7,590 10,263 9,031
Idaho Natl Engineering Lab 68,906 74,550 77,575
Kansas City Plant 13,508 26,411 3,980
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 8,500 7,300 7,300
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 12,714 14,490 14,845
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 198,719 328,400 440,891
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 128,704 160,300 164,006
Lovelace Biomed & Environmental
Res Lab (5) 140 150
MMES-Oak Ridge Central 178,069 232,204 226,570
Mound Laboratory 174 1,154 450
National Renewable Energy Lab 1,654 250 250
Nevada Test Site 228,160 235,000 223,200
Oak Ridge Institute for Science
and Education 2,369 1,330 1,400
Pacific Northwest Laboratory 93,509 63,000 63,000
Pinellas Plant (444) 640 600
Rocky Flats Plant (114) 1,500 1,500
Sandia Laboratories 299,110 354,611 372,343
Savannah River Laboratory 1,431 3,415 3,315
TOTAL - FEDERAL AGENCIES $1,281,477 $1,556,044 $1,652,169
REIMBURSABLE WORK PERFORMED - NON-FEDERAL AGENCIES
Defense
(obligations in thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Actual Estimate Estimate
Amarillo Plant $ 96 $ 100 $ 100
Idaho Natl Engineering Lab 0 500 500
Kansas City Plant 670 550 550
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 320 1,500 1,700
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 7,193 10,500 11,000
Lovelace Biomed & Environmental
Res Lab 1,044 0 0
MMES - Oak Ridge Central 0 1,500 1,500
Mound Laboratory (265) 500 500
Nevada Test Site 28,463 58,499 53,428
Pinellas Plant 4,160 5,555 5,255
Rocky Flats Plant 1,223 100 100
Sandia Laboratories 14,900 21,750 25,225
TOTAL - NON-FEDERAL AGENCIES 57,804 $ 101,054 99,858
GENERAL DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing uncommitted
obligations for each appropriation by program and location at the end
of fiscal year 1991, 1992 ind estimated for 1993.
Dr. Beckner. Prior to FY 1992, uncommitted operating expense
obligations were not captured by the Department's accounting system.
Beginning with the September 30, 1992 accounting reports, the
Department now collects more definitive data on uncommitted obligations
for the integrated management and operating (M&O) contractors by
operating, capital, and construction funds. These reports are compiled
three times a year; i.e., as of March 31, June 30, and September 30.
The following tables provide uncommitted obligations for each
appropriation at the end of fiscal year 1992. The Department has
performed a thorough analysis of FY 1992 uncommitted obligations and
significant portions have been applied to offset FY 1994 budget
requirements or earmarked for proposed FY 1993 reprogrammings.
Although forecasted FY 1993 year end data is not available in
this new reporting system, we will forward the fiscal year 1993
uncommitted obligations through March 31, 1993 as soon as the
information is received and compiled from the field. We estimate this
should be available by mid June 1993.
SEPTEMBER 30, 1992 UNCOMMITTED OBLIGATIONS
(dollars in thousands)
APPROPRIATION LOCATION PROGRAM AMOUNT
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES Albuquerque Research and Development $129,552
Testing 3,504
Stockpile Support 334,923
Program Direction 6,119
Other* 1,234
TOTAL, AL $475,332
Chicago Research and Development $142
Testing 56
Stockpile Support 523
Program Direction 241
TOTAL, CH $962
Idaho Research and Development $1,207
Stockpile Support 92
Program Direction 995
TOTAL, ID $2,294
Nevada Research and Development $11,885
Testing 35,238
Program Direction 3,007
Other* 588
TOTAL, NV $50,718
Oak Ridge Research and Development $7,279
Stockpile Support 148,464
Program Direction 1,453
Other* (1,279)
TOTAL, OR $155,917
Richland Research and Development $148
Stockpile Support 375
Program Direction 12
Other* 231
TOTAL, RL $766
San Francisco Research and Development $96,984
Testing 220
Stockpile Support 240
Program Direction 793
TOTAL, SF $98,237
Savannah River Stockpile Support $42,828
Program Direction 340
Other* 1,365
TOTAL, SR $44,533
TOTAL, WEAPONS ACTIVITIES $828,759
* "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers.
SEPTEMBER 30, 1992 UNCOMMITTED OBLIGATIONS
(dollars in thousands)
APPROPRIATION LOCATION PROGRAM AMOUNT
NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR Albuquerque NPR $739
Other* 98
TOTAL, AL $837
Chicago NPR $830
Other* 66
TOTAL, CH $896
Idaho NPR $13,711
Other* (2,523)
TOTAL, ID $11,188
Oak Ridge NPR $1,776
Other* 1,886
TOTAL, OR $3,662
Richland NPR $1,959
San Francisco NPR $107
Other* 22
TOTAL, OR 129
Savannah River NPR $444
TOTAL, NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR $19,115
* "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers.
SEPTEMBER 30, 1992 UNCOMMITTED OBLIGATIONS
(dollars in thousands)
APPROPRIATION LOCATION PROGRAM AMOUNT
DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL Albuquerque Corrective Activities $18,984
RESTORATION AND WASTE Environmental Restoration 30,921
MANAGEMENT Waste, Management 54,962
Technology Development 9,456
Transportation Management 278
Program Direction 63
Other* 1,275
TOTAL, AL $115,939
Chicago Corrective Activities $9
Environmental Restoration 3,423
Waste Management 8,274
Technology Development 5,223
Transportation Management 351
Program Direction 302
TOTAL, CH $17,582
Idaho Corrective Activities $6,147
Environmental Restoration 20,452
Waste Management 185,690
Technology Development 6,060
Transportation Management 3
Other* 34
TOTAL, ID $218,386
Nevada Corrective Activities $1,963
Environmental Restoration 7,089
Waste Management 3,735
Technology Development 1,303
Transportation Management 5
Other* 218
TOTAL, NV $14,313
Oak Ridge Corrective Activities $7,525
Environmental Restoration 147,059
Waste Management 48,513
Technology Development 15,847
Transportation Management 560
Program Direction 283
Other* (2,069)
TOTAL, OR $217,718
Richland Corrective Activities $4,363
Environmental Restoration 9,254
Waste Management 183,936
Technology Development 18,988
Transportation Management 537
Program Direction 457
Other* 247
TOTAL, RL $217,782
San Francisco Corrective Activities $6,746
Environmental Restoration 754
Waste Management 6,333
Technology Development (65)
TOTAL, SF $13,768
Savannah River Corrective Activities $8,888
Environmental Restoration 7,675
Waste Management 146,643
Technology Development 6,352
Program Direction 55
TOTAL, SR $169,613
TOTAL, DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MGMT $985,101
* "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers.
SEPTEMBER 30, 1992 UNCOMMITTED OBLIGATIONS
(dollars in thousands)
APPROPRIATION LOCATION PROGRAM AMOUNT
MATERIALS SUPPORT
AND OTHER
DEFENSE PROGRAMS Albuquerque Materials Support $6,479
Verification & Control Tech 12,945
Nuclear Safeguards & Security 1,061
Office of Intelligence 1,329
Education 327
Other* (314)
TOTAL, AL $21,827
Chicago Materials Support $1,115
Verification & Control Tech 1,635
Nuclear Safeguards & Security 680
Office of Intelligence 152
Education 212
Other* 88
TOTAL, CH $3,882
Idaho Materials Support $139,414
Verification & Control Tech 2,490
Nuclear Safeguards & Security 196
Office of Intelligence 652
Naval Reactors 13,249
Education 67
Other* 1,718
TOTAL, ID $157,786
Nevada Materials Support $432
Verification & Control Tech 988
Nuclear Safeguards & Security 107
Security Evaluation 571
Office of Intelligence 55
Naval Reactors 1
Other* (11)
TOTAL, NV 2,143
Oak Ridge Materials Support $46,158
Verification & Control Tech 1,275
Nuclear Safeguards & Security 821
Security Evaluation 4
Office of Intelligence 827
Naval Reactors 2
Education 551
Other* (1,520)
TOTAL, OR $48,118
Pittsburgh Naval Reactors $26,306
Other* (1,724)
TOTAL, PITTSBURGH $24,582
Richland Materials Support $8,161
Verification & Control Tech 2,361
Nuclear Safeguards & Security 501
Security Evaluation 3,087
Office of Intelligence 384
Other* 294
TOTAL, RL $14,788
San Francisco Materials Support $361
Verification & Control Tech 1,296
Nuclear Safeguards & Security 761
Security Evaluation 7
Office of Intelligence 381
Naval Reactors 14
Education 340
Other* 37
TOTAL, OR $3,197
Savannah River Materials Support $315,150
Verification & Control Tech 15
Nuclear Safeguards & Security 8
Office of Intelligence 87
Education 97
Other* 7,579
TOTAL, SR $322,936
Schenectady Naval Reactors $27,969
TOTAL, MATERIALS SUPPORT AND OTHER DEFENSE PROGRAMS $627,228
* "Other" primarily includes interoffice reconciling transfers.
K-REACTOR
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the K-Reactor at the
Savannah River Plant.
Dr. Beckner. The K-Reactor at Savannah River is currently shut
down, de-fueled, and drained of all moderator. The reactor and its
directly associated facilities are being transitioned to a cold-standby
condition with no planned provision for restart. Preparations are being
made to transfer the K-Reactor to the Office of Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management for decontamination and
decommissioning.
L-REACTOR
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of L-Reactor?
Dr. Beckner. The L-Reactor at Savannah River is currently shut
down, defueled, and drained of all moderator. The reactor mission has
been changed from service as a backup source of tritium to placement in
a cold-shutdown condition with no capability of restart. Preparations
are being made to transfer the reactor and its directly associated
facilities to the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management for decontamination and decommissioning. This transition
should be completed by FY 1996.
NUCLEAR MATERIALS SUPPORT
Mr. Bevill. The existing inventory of tritium will support
weapons stockpile requirements through what year and how many weapons
does that assume in the stockpile?
Dr. Beckner. The existing inventory of tritium will support
requirements, including maintenance of a five year reserve, until FY
2008. This analysis is based upon a stockpile declining from about
DELETED weapons in FY 1993 to a stable stockpile of approximately
DELETED weapons in FY 2003 and beyond.
PU-238 MISSION AT SAVANNAH RIVER
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the Pu-238 mission at
Savannah River. What is the total cost of the Pu-238 program by year
and how is the funding split by program and appropriation account?
Dr. Beckner. The Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) mission is accomplished
in the H-Area of the Savannah River Site (SRS). The HB-Line facility
and portions of the H-Canyon chemical processing plant at SRS are
currently operating to process existing supplies of Pu-238 for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Cassini mission.
The Pu-238 located at SRS and other locations will be dissolved in
HB-Line, blended to specifications for the Cassini mission, and made
into an oxide powder. The HB-Line started up in .January 1993 and
operations to support the Cassini mission are expected to continue
through late FY 1994. Following completion of processing of the
domestic source of Pu-238 for the Cassini mission, these same
facilities will be operated to process the first 5 kilograms of
Pu-238, that is being acquired from Russia, to meet NASA
specifications. In addition, follow-on operations are planned to
process scrap resulting from the Cassini program for use in future, but
as yet unidentified, NASA missions. Except for the potential for future
purchases from Russia or other foreign sources, this processing will
consume the entire U.S inventory of Pu-238. The costs associated with
Pu-238 processing at SRS total $130.9 million through FY 1994. The
following is a breakdown by program:
Pu-238 Production at Savannah River
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 TOTAL
Atomic
Energy
Defense
Activities, $8.0 $11.6 $19.1 $21.0 $17.1 $76.8
Defense
Programs
Energy
Supply
Research
and $0.0 $16.3 $11.2 $12.8 $13.8 $54.1
Development,
Nuclear
Energy
Total $8.0 $27.9 $30.3 $33.8 $30.9 $130.9
PU-238 REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Bevill. Please identify total Pu-238 requirements by year and
customer through the foreseeable future and the available inventory
of mate,rial. Will any material be purchased from Russia to meet NASA
needs?
Dr. Beckner. In a recent letter from the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), DOE was advised that NASA's requirements
by year are as follows:
NASA Pu-238 REQUIREMENTS
(Kilograms)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
14.0 10.0 1.0 2.5 11.0 20.0 7.0 28.0 21.5 17.5 132.5
The above number represents actual flight quantities of
Pu-238 and does not account for additional Pu-238 required for
production considerations, decay, and scrap rejects and losses. There
are about 64 kilograms of Pu-238 in the current United States
inventory, which must be processed at Savannah River to make the
material suitable for NASA missions. In December 1992, the Department
entered into a contract with Russia to purchase 5 kilograms of Pu-238
for NASA missions with an option to purchase an additional 35 kilograms
over the next 5 years. The first 5 kilograms is expected to arrive in
the United States this summer. There are no funds in the FY 1994 budget
for additional purchases of Russian Pu-238. Other foreign sources of
Pu-238 are being sought.
DUPONT SEVERANCE PAY
Mr. Bevill. What is the status of the severance pay issue with
DuPont for Savannah River Site employees?
Dr. Beckner. DuPont submitted a claim for reimbursement of $64
million on March 31, 1989, for severance pay paid to all former
employees, including those employees rehired by the Westinghouse
Savannah River Company. The Department denied DuPont's claim and DuPont
filed suit in the United States claims court.
The court decided that the contract language obligated the
Government to pay all DuPont's costs incurred under the contract,
unless specifically listed as an unallowable cost. Since severance pay
for service before October 1, 1985, was not specifically listed in the
contract as an unallowable cost, the Government was obligated to pay
DuPont's claim plus interest.
A payment of $85.1 million for the judgement was made by the
Treasury from the Judgement Fund to Morgan Guaranty Trust Company on
February 22, 1993. The Department of Energy received a letter from the
Department of Treasury on March 23 requesting reimbursement. The Office
of the Chief Financial Officer responded to this request on March 30,
1993, indicating that the Department plans to address this requirement
in the FY 1995 budget and will repay Treasury as soon as the funds are
appropriated.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS HEALTH STUDIES
Mr. Bevill. What health studies and associated funding are
included in this request, but managed by the Office of Environment,
Safety and Health?
Dr. Beckner. The health studies managed by the Office of
Environment, Safety and Health but funded in the Defense Programs
budget request include $6,500,000 for Marshall Islands resettlement
activities, and a total of $3,150,000 for dose reconstruction
activities. These dose reconstruction efforts are comprised of $740,000
for the Nevada Test Site; $840,000 for the Rocky Flats enhanced medical
surveillance for chronic beryllium disease; $500,000 for the Oak Ridge
Y-12 Plant's enhanced medical surveillance for chronic beryllium
disease effort; and $1,070,000 for a State agreement with Colorado for
dose reconstruction, toxicological review, and possible epidemiological
studies.
Funds were included within the Materials Support budget for the
Savannah River Health and Mortality Studies in FY 1992 and FY 1993
only. In FY 1994, these activities will be transferred to the Office of
Epidemiology and Health Surveillance in the Office of Environment,
Safety and Health. The Weapons Activities Appropriation Account
provides funding for the Marshall Islands activities, as well as the
beryllium studies and a portion of the dose reconstruction efforts.
NUCLEAR MATERIALS SUPPORT
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the status of the Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant.
Mr. Grimm. In April 1992, former Secretary of Energy Watkins
directed that spent fuel reprocessing operations at the Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant be discontinued, since there was no foreseen demand
for the recovered highly enriched uranium. Since that time, the
following activities have occurred. First, a Phaseout Plan has been
developed that describes how the surplus reprocessing facilities at the
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant will be stabilized in preparation for
either decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) or reuse. Second,
stabilization operations have begun in these facilities and are
scheduled for completion by the end of Fiscal Year 1994. Paralleling
these efforts is the preparation of a Transition Plan for the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant surplus facilities which describes how these
facilities will be transitioned to D&D or reuse, how stakeholders will
participate in these decisions, and how the potential worker impacts
and alternatives for minimizing adverse impacts will be resolved. Apart
from these activities, the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant waste
management programs continue to operate to process the inventories of
stored radioactive liquid wastes. Additionally, spent fuel receipt and
storage programs for Naval propulsion and Departmental research reactor
fuels continue. Facilities and personnel at the Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant are also involved in a new technology effort to.
develop treatment technologies for repository disposal of spent
nuclear fuels and for immobilization of converted high-level liquid
wastes.
SPENT FUEL INVENTORY AT SAVANNAH RIVER
Mr. Bevill. Has the Department performed the cost
and environmental analysis to confirm that processing the spent fuel
inventory at Savannah River is the best disposal option?
Dr. Beckner. Whether or not spent fuel is reprocessed, operation of
H-Canyon at Savannah River is required to solidify existing process
solutions into forms acceptable for safe long-term storage. Preliminary
operating cost estimates indicate these stabilization operations are
expected to take approximately 5 years at a cost of about $142 million
per year, for a total estimated cost of $710 million. Preliminary
studies indicate that reprocessing spent fuel could be completed within
that 5 year timeframe and would cost an additional $48 million in
operating expenses. Reprocessing of spent fuel would also provide
additional space in the Receiving Basin for the Offsite Fuels Facility
at Savannah River, enabling it to continue to accept University and DOE
research reactor fuels. The alternative of placing the aluminum clad
enriched uranium reactor fuel in interim storage may prove to be
technically feasible but is contingent upon the development of new
technology, which will probably delay removing the fuels from the
water filled storage basins where they are currently degrading in
condition due to corrosion. The Department is developing a phase out
plan for the processing-canyons; this plan will address what further
environmental reviews are required to support phaseout.
EMPLOYMENT LEVEL AT MATERIALS SUPPORT SITES
Mr. Bevill. Please provide the employment levels at all
Materials Production sites in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994.,
Dr. Beckner. The total Defense Programs employment levels for
the Materials Support sites for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 are shown
in a table which I would like to insert in the record. (The information
follows:)
CONTRACTOR EMPLOYMENT FOR MATERIALS SUPPORT SITES
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Idaho 1,147 1,010 60
Los Alamos National Laboratory 3,194 3,130 2,800
Oak Ridge (Include Y-12) 5,384 5,180 4,100
Richland 417 450 430
Savannah River 14,796 14,700 11,800
The laboratory numbers represent FTE'S; all others represent
end-of-year headcount and includes prime contractors and dedicated
subcontractors for the entire site. FY 1993 reflects the January 1993
field report rounded to the nearest multiple of ten.
NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR
Mr. Bevill. What is the current status of the New Production
Reactor program?
Dr. Beckner. In October 1992, the Secretary of Energy directed
that efforts for a new production reactor be deferred and that all
program activities be brought to a prompt and orderly closure. The
environmental analysis for the new tritium production source is being
included in the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for
Reconfiguration of the Nuclear Weapons Complex. The Record of Decision
for the Reconfigured Complex, including the technology and site for a
new tritium production source is scheduled for late 1994.
REACTOR ACTIVITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe how the Department used the $30
million provided for reactor activities in FY 1993. Is follow-on
funding required in FY 1994?
Dr. Beckner. The Department would like to use the $30 million
provided for reactor activities to evaluate a Modular High Temperature
Gas Reactor and an Advanced Light Water Reactor for consumption of
excess plutonium from. nuclear weapons plutonium.
The first phase of these evaluation which was initiated on
February 15, 1993, includes the evaluation of four reactor designs:
three Light Water Reactor Designs and the Modular High Temperature Gas
Reactor. $1 million has been allocated for each of the four designs (a
Liquid Metal Reactor is also being evaluated as part of the first
phase, but using a different source of funds). The Phase I evaluations
will be completed in mid-May and an evaluation report will be available
by the end of June 1993. A second phase will be conducted following
completion of Phase I using the balance of the $30 million. It is
expected that the Phase II work will extend into FY 1994. The second
phase will focus on technical questions and issues identified from the
initial phase. No follow-on funding has been identified for this
activity in the FY 1994 budget.
ACCELERATOR PRODUCTION OF TRITIUM PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Please describe the accelerator,production of the
tritium program, including funding and milestones.
Dr. Beckner. The accelerator production of tritium program is a
multi-organizational effort directed towards the development of a
preconceptual design of a linear accelerator facility for the
production of tritium. This will support a Secretary of Energy Record
of Decision on the tritium supply technology for the nuclear weapons
complex. The preconceptual design will be determined through analysis
and limited confirmatory experiments to characterize the production
performance, the environmental impact, and the safety of an accelerator
facility. The preconceptual design will support the estimation of costs
and schedules to acquire the facility including the cost of any
required development.
The accelerator being considered is a one billion electron volt,
two hundred milliampere proton linear accelerator, along with two
competing target systems, to meet a requirement to produce one quarter
of the original tritium goal quantity established for the New
Production Reactor program in 1988. Currently, technical activities are
being conducted by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Brookhaven
National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories under the overall
direction of the Department of Energy, Defense Programs.
The program is currently funded at $30 million. Projected
milestones include completion of the preconceptual design and the
development of program cost and schedule by the end of May 1993;
completion of formal documentation of the preconceptual design, final
data for the Complex 21 Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement; and confirmatory experiments by the end of September
1993.
WORKER RETRAINING
Mr. Bevill: Describe the programs being conducted to retain
employees from the weapons production complex to work on environmental
restoration and waste management programs.
Dr. Beckner: We currently expect employment reductions of about
8,000 workers throughout our weapons complex as a result of reductions
in the Defense Programs mission. At the same time, the Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management program will increase by about 4,500
new or transferred jobs, and other new jobs will be created as a result
of new and expanded energy programs. Retraining is one of several
initiatives the Department is taking to mitigate the impacts of the
budget reductions on our workers and communities. The initiatives
identified in the attached paper will be made available for those
workers who are adversely affected by this downsizing.
The objectives of the retraining initiatives for affected
employees will be primarily two-fold: (1) for positions which may be
available on-site at a DOE facility, and (2) for positions which may be
available off-site and not related to DOE programs. Opportunities
on-site may include positions in environmental restoration and waste
management and other programs which may be brought to the site. Workers
in jobs that are being eliminated will be given hiring preference for
new positions being created on-site or at other DOE sites. Retraining
activities for these positions will be based on the requirements for
the positions and the knowledge, skills, and abilities available among
the surplus workers.
Retraining initiatives to address opportunities off-site will
depend on assessments of position needs in the local and regional
economies. The DOE is working with the Departments of Labor, Commerce,
and Defense to investigate how local efforts can be supported and
coordinated,to create retraining and employment opportunities.
A fact sheet on the Department of Energy proposals for mitigating
the employment impacts is inserted for the record. (The information
follows:)
Fact Sheet Attachment
DOE PROPOSALS FOR MITIGATING EMPLOYMENT IMPACT
o The Department is preparing a comprehensive economic adjustment
program for all DOE facilities. The program will accomplish
congressional objectives established in section 3161 of the Fiscal
Year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, for the Department's
defense facilities, but will also provide coverage to other
employees and communities across the Department of Energy complex
who are subject to layoffs or other work force restructuring
actions.
o At our request, the Office of Management and Budget allocated $100
million more than their initial budget passback for FY 1994 to the
Department for worker training and adjustment. The full amount we
intend to spend on work force restructuring and economic adjustment
assistance in FY 1994 is about $200 million,,with additional funds
coming from existing program resources. About 8,000 jobs funded by
Defense Program activities are expected to be lost through FY 1994,
but we are hopeful of transferring many of the workers in those
jobs into other Departmental activities. The following is a list
of economic adjustment initiatives:
- Early announcement of workforce changes to allow the
Department to spread the required layoffs over the entire
fiscal year rather than all in one action.. Last year, the
Congress urged the Department to provide 120 day notice
before implementing workforce changes, and required site
plans to minimize employment impact. Beginning the planning
process early will soften the blow if FY 1993 money is used
to pay for retraining, relocation, and early retirement
incentives. We are committed to spending a minimum of $25
million in FY 1993 to begin this initiative. If early action
is taken, career planning and retraining assistance are more
likely to be effective in avoiding periods of lost income.
- Develop community economic adjustment plans. The Congress
provided funding to several agencies to provide economic
adjustment assistance to affected communities. The Economic
Development Administration in Commerce was provided with $80
million in planning grants to support community economic
adjustment for such purposes. The Office of Economic
Development Assistance in the Department of Defense was
provided $500 thousand to conduct pilot projects at some of
our sites, and has agreed to share their experiences in
assisting local communities. The Department will work with
the local community to obtain funding for such planning. We
will also work to promote partnerships and alliances
estimated at about $80 million in the areas of manufacturing
and dual-use technologies involving our nuclear weapons
laboratories and production facilities.
- Coordinate with the Department of Labor and the States to
provide retraining assistance. The Department will work with
Labor and the States to ensure that those employees that would
like to retrain for other opportunities will be provided
adequate support. The Congress provided $75 million in
special funds for this purpose for FY 1993. Our contractors
will develop retraining programs to help eligible workers
transition from Nuclear Weapons jobs that are being reduced or
eliminated to new jobs in Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management and other programs within the Department.
- Hiring preference and outplacement service. Our employees who
are subject to layoff at one site will receive preference for
hiring at other sites, and will be provided relocation
allowances to ease the transition to their new jobs. Our
contractors will establish employee assessment and
outplacement assistance centers at affected sites, and we
will establish complex-wide outplacement support services.
- Continuation of health benefits for 3 years. Any employee
terminated will be eligible to continue company health
benefits for 3 years -- the first year is fully covered,
in the second year the employee must pay for one-half of
the company contribution, and the third year the employee
must cover the full cost. The terminated employee is eligible
for the lower company group rate.
- Provide incentives for early retirement or voluntary
separations. Where appropriate, the Department will offer
cash incentives to encourage early retirements or voluntary
separations. Early retirement incentive programs are subject
to approval by Headquarters.
ANTICIPATED CONTRACTOR EMPLOYMENT REDUCTIONS
Mr. Bevill. Provide by site the anticipated number of employment
reductions in Defense Programs in FY 1993 and FY 1994.
Dr. Beckner. The anticipated contractor employment reductions in
FY 1993 and FY 1994 are shown in a table I would like to provide for
the record. (The information follows:)
04-May-93
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
FY 1994 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
CONTRACTOR EMPLOYMENT REDUCTIONS BY SITE
Site FY 1993 1/ FY 1994
Idaho (137) (950) 2/
Kansas City (491) (300)
Mound (195) (240)
Nevada (486) 20
Oak Ridge 7 (59)
Oak Ridge (Y-12) (211) (1,021)
Subtotal Oak Ridge (204) (1,080)
Pantex 91 30
Pinellas (486) (80)
Rocky Flats (782) (1,600)
Savannah River (96) (2,900)
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (259) (400) 2/
Sandia National Laboratories (138) (810)
Los Alamos National Laboratory (64) (330)
All Other Sites:
Brookhaven National Laboratory 2 0
Richland 37 (26)
Argonne National Laboratory 0 (14)
Subtotal All Other 39 (40)
Total DP (3,178) (8,680)
NOTES:
o Numbers for labs represent FTE'S; numbers for production facilities
represent end-of-fiscal year headcount.
o Numbers above are +/- 1 0 percent.
o No contractor input
o Includes prime contractors and dedicated subcontractors.
1/ Reflects January 1993 Field Reporting of, projected FY 1993
end-of-year manpower (rounded to the nearest multiple of ten)
2/ FY 1994 employment reflects transfer of mission to EM for Idaho
(1,000 FTE'S) and Rocky Flats (765 FTE's).
MISSION, ROLE, AND PRIORITIES
Mr. Bevill. Please describe how your mission, role and
priorities have hanged since the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and the significant downsizing of the U.S. weapons
production mission.
Mr. Ford. The mission of the Office of Intelligence is to provide
the Department, other U.S. Government policy makers, and the
Intelligence 30 Community with timely, accurate, high impact foreign
intelligence analyses; to deter and neutralize foreign intelligence
service actions in the U.S. to acquire classified and sensitive
unclassified information involving Departmental programs, facilities,
technology, and personnel; and provide threat assessment support to
both Headquarters and field operations. Our mission, from a
counterintelligence perspective, has been refocused from the
traditional communist and hostile intelligence service threats to
nontraditional adversaries and economic intelligence threats. Foreign
intelligence priorities have also changed. The Weapons Intelligence
Program is focusing on the safety, security, and use control of
Russian nuclear weapons, while no longer emphasizing the strategic
weapons threat. Increased attention is being focused on foreign nuclear
reactors, in view of the growing concerns about foreign nuclear reactor
accidents. The Science and Technology Intelligence Program is focusing
on economic and environmental science and technology, which is a change
from the defense science and technology emphasis of the past.
DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Mr. Bevill. Have there been any discussions within the
Intelligence Community on the appropriate size and focus of DOE's
intelligence program now that the national security needs have
changed?
Mr. Ford. Yes. The Community Management Staff has informed the
Department that its priorities and resource request for FY 1994 and
the out 30 years are consistent with its role with the Intelligence
Community. In various meetings of the Intelligence Community working
groups and committees, the role of the Department's intelligence
component and its contributions to national security has been singled
out. The Department's role in the Intelligence Community competitive
analysis of key intelligence questions and issues has been singled out
for its unique contributions. The Department's technical and analytical
expertise continues to sustain it as a major player in National
Intelligence Estimates. The Department will continue to be a major
contributor in the Intelligence Community assessments of potential
nuclear proliferant nations and contribute to their Economic Security
program activities. The Department will continue to be a lead player
in the Former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons dismantlement, including
the subsequent disposition of its component parts. In addition, the
Department will continue to be a lead player in the analysis,
assessment, and reporting of the Former Soviet Union nuclear weapons
safety, security, and control.
OTHER CABINET-LEVEL AGENCIES
Mr. Bevill. Now does the size and funding for this Department
of Energy compare to that of other Cabinet-level agencies in FY 1993
and FY 1994?
Mr. Ford. The following table provided by the Director of Central
Intelligence Community Management Staff reflects the size and funding
for the Department of Energy activities in comparison with other
Cabinet-level agencies.
FY 1994 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST
(Dollars in Thousands)
AGENCY DELETED
Dept. of Defense
Dept. of Justice (FBI)
Dept. of State DELETED
Dept. of Energy
Dept. of Treasury
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Bevill. What science and technology areas are being explored
in FY 1993 and FY 1994?
Mr. Ford. [Deleted]
STUDIES AND REPORTS
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of all studies or reports
prepared in each program area in FY 1992, FY 1993 and planned for
FY 1994. Identify whether these were anticipatory or responsive
products.
Mr. Ford. The materials that have been requested are being
prepared and will be provided to the Committee for their files.
COUNTERNARCOTICS
Mr. Bevill. Please Identify all funding in FY 1992, FY 1993, and
FY 1994, for counternarcotics activities, and describe the activities.
Mr. Ford. In FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 funds for
counternarcotics activities are $570 000; $360,000; and $200,000
respectively. The three activities being funded are the Vapor Generator,
Multiple Threat Analyzer, and Associated Particle Imaging. The Vapor
Generator provides a very precise measurement of cocaine vapor used to
calibrate detectors. The Multiple Threat Analyzer detects trace
amounts of drugs or chemicals used in the drug manufacturing process
by trapping single molecules for analysis. The current development
effort reduced the size of the instrument from room size to a two
cabinet size. The Associated Particle Imaging uses neutrons through a
special process to image and provide the element content of a closed
container. The process requires access to only one side of the target
and may be used to identify contraband inside suspect containers. No
new funding is required beyond FY 1993 for the Vapor Generator
and the Multiple Threat Analyzer.
DECLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFORMATION
Mr. Bevill. How has the declassification of U.S. nuclear weapons
and nuclear materials information impacted this program?
Mr. Ford. The declassification of U.S. nuclear weapons and
nuclear materials information has not impacted this program.
REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR
Mr. Bevill. Describe the three remaining foreign research
reactors still using highly enriched uranium (HEU). How old are
these reactors and what is their remaining useful life?
Dr. Alessi. There are three foreign research reactors using
HEU (the BR-2 in Belgium, and the RHF Grenoble and Orphee reactors
in France) which cannot convert to low enriched uranium (LEU) because
suitable high-density fuels have not been developed. The BR-2 is an
80 megawatt tank-type reactor with a fuel geometry of concentric
tubes composed of bent and swaged plates. It began operation in
1961. The continued life of the reactor is uncertain. There has been
speculation that the reactor may be shut down within the next two
years due to changes in anticipated workloads and because possible
costs associated with the necessary replacement of an aging beryllium
matrix.
The RHF Grenoble reactor is a 57 megawatt deuterium oxide
tank-type reactor.with a fuel geometry of involute plates. It began
operation in 1971 but was shut down in April 1991 for repair or
replacement of structural components supporting the core. It may
be restarted in 1994 and it could be expected to operate for an
additional 15-20 years.
The Orphee is a 14 megawatt pool-type reactor with a fuel
geometry of box-type fuel with plates. It began operation in 1980 and
can be expected to continue operating for another 15-20 years.
REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR
Mr. Bevill. Have the foreign governments indicated
that they want U.S. help in redesigning the fuel? How has this
interest been conveyed? Are these countries a proliferation concern?
Dr. Alessi. The BR-2 reactor operators have been very cooperative
with the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program
and participated in a joint study with Argonne National Laboratory
(ANL) on conversion feasibility during 1985-1988. BR-2 also
participated in preparation of International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) guidebooks on core conversions. The joint study
concluded that suitable low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel was not
available. It has offered to convert to use 45% enriched fuel if a
suitable fuel were qualified and licensed.
The Institute Laue-Langevin, which operates the RHF reactor, has
not made any commitment for conversion but it was very cooperative in
supplying ANL with the data necessary to perform a feasibility study
on LEU conversion. The September 1989 study concluded that suitable
LEU fuel was not currently available.
The Orphee is operated by the French Atomic Energy Commission
which has made no contact with the RERTR Program concerning reactor
conversion. Argonne National Laboratory estimates that, because the
fuel is similar to that used in the RHF reactor, that suitable fuel
is not available. There are no indications that the French would
cooperate on reactor conversion if a suitable fuel were developed.
There are no proliferation concerns for Belgium and France.
REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR
Mr. Bevill. Describe the total cost and schedule necessary to
design low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels for the remaining foreign
reactors using highly enriched uranium (HEU).
Dr. Alessi. Argonne National Laboratory estimates that the total
cost of a program to develop and demonstrate an improved type of highly
loaded LEU fuel plate for research reactors with a uranium loading
equivalent to the highest currently used HEU plate types (the three
remaining reactors) would be about $13,000,000 over a period of 5
years.
REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR
Mr. Bevill. How many U.S. research reactors use highly enriched
uranium (HEU)?
Dr. Alessi. There are 15 U.S. non-DOE reactors which still use
HEU. Of these, 9 have funding from DOE for safety analyses, 1 will
have funding for FY 93, 2 have inadequate funding for conversion,
1 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) requires high density
fuel not available, and 2 have requested exemptions from the NRC
requirement to convert (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
University of Missouri, Columbia).
DOE has 6 reactors which operate with power greater than 1
megawatt, and 4 with lifetime cores with powers less than 1 megawatt.
There are no plans to convert these reactors.
REDUCED ENRICHMENT RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR
Mr. Bevill. What type of research effort is currently being
conducted at what cost and which DOE site?
Dr. Alessi. Argonne National Laboratory currently is conducting
a research and development program for using low enriched uranium
(LEU) instead of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in targets for
production of fission product molybdenum-99 for use in medical
applications in cooperation with current commercial producers.
Current plans are to allocate $825,000 during fiscal years 1993-1996,
beginning with $275,000 for FY 1993.
In past years, DOE decided to forego development of high density
fuels for the three remaining foreign research reactors because it
was felt that the nonproliferation threats were low, and that these
fuels were highly developmental concepts which would require over
double the costs of the Argonne estimates and take at least eight
years. Failure to fund a sustained effort for the entire period
would result in wasting millions of dollars. Additionally, there was no
guarantee that any of the reactors would convert if the fuel were
developed. It is possible, however, that research and development in
this technology may be needed for the conversion of HEU reactors built
and supplied by the former Soviet Union under the Russian Reduced
Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program which is now in the
process of being established.
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY THREAT POLICY
Mr. Bevill. Has the 1983 Threat Policy Statement been updated? Is
there a need to modify this guidance? Please describe the revised threat
statement.
Mr. McFadden. The Director of Security Affairs issued a "Design
Basis Threat Policy for Department of Energy Programs and Facilities,"
dated April 1992. This policy replaced the 1983 Generic Threat
Statement and was founded on a January 31, 1992, Department of Energy
(DOE)/Department of Defense (DOD) "Memorandum of Agreement on the
Security Threats to DOE and DOD Nuclear Weapons Programs and
Facilities." The Memorandum of Agreement was based on a Defense
Intelligence Agency review of worldwide threats to United States
Government interests. The 1992 Design Basis Threat Policy is undergoing
review in the Office of Security Affairs for currency. The Design
Basis Threat Policy describes a spectrum of threats to DOE Programs
and activities ranging from terrorist threats to Departmental nuclear
weapons and production programs to the threats posed by criminals,
psychotics, radical environmentalists, foreign agents, and dissident or
disgruntled insiders. The Design Basis Threat Policy, classified
Confidential, National Security Information, provides guidance on the
characteristics of the various threats types and describes the
capabilities of the adversary. The Design Basis Threat Policy also
describes Safeguards and Security Program strategies for addressing
the threat spectrum. It also requires the development of site
specific considerations in mitigating threats.
THREATS TO DOE FACILITIES
Mr. Bevill. What is the most likely threat to DOE facilities and
what is the least likely?
Mr. McFadden. Terrorist threats to DOE programs and facilities,
while potentially resulting in catastrophic consequences, are the
least likely to occur. The threat posed by cleared and authorized
insiders is perhaps the most likely and includes theft of material and
equipment, espionage and sabotage. Departmental locations have also
been targeted by anti-nuclear and/or radical environmental extremist
groups, which has resulted in demonstrations, acts of civil
disobedience and trespass.
THREAT TO DOE FACILITIES
Mr. Bevill. Have any DOE facilities experienced any threat in
the past five years that approaches the threat guidance now in effect?
Mr. McFadden. Threats to Department of Energy (DOE) facilities
are identified in the Design Basis Threat Policy for the Department of
Energy Programs and Facilities, April 1992. Based on the eight threat
categories and associated characteristics detailed in this document,
no DOE facilities have experienced terrorist threats in the past five
years. The strategy to guard against threats to facilities emphasizes
providing a high degree of assurance of a capability to detect, assess,
delay, and inhibit unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, test
devices, and completed nuclear assemblies, Category II or greater
quantities of special nuclear materials and associated facilities
while providing command and control to protective forces. Safeguards
and security measures are also designed to prevent acts of sabotage.
Safeguards and security systems are performance tested to
ascertain their effectiveness in countering threats to assets and
facilities.
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM PLANNING AND INTEGRATION
Mr. Bevill. The Office of Security Evaluations stated in response
to a question in last year's hearing that, "Noticeably absent in the
overall improvement in safeguards and security posture is an
improvement in safeguards and security management and oversight.
The system lacks an integrated approach to planning and implementation
of the total program. The lack of integration is reflected in the
inconsistent quality of the programs and the persistence of costly,
manpower-intensive solutions. The underlying cause of these weaknesses
is inadequate program management and oversight at all levels." How do
you respond to this concern?
Mr. McFadden. The Department's safeguards and security planning
process is integrated through a number of mechanisms. First and
foremost is the development of two reports: the Master Safeguards and
Security Agreements (MSSAs) and the Site Safeguards and Security Plan
(SSSP). These reports are the product of a standardized and consistent
process designed to review and evaluate the protection posture of major
facilities. Based on this review, cost-effective protection measures
are selected to safeguard vital assets against vulnerabilities
identified during the review and planning process. Such measures may
include the development of line-item construction projects to implement
cost-effective improvements over a number of years.
The planning process, as well as the periodic survey program,
also provides for a regular management review of the protection posture
of the Department's facilities and any corrective actions in progress
to improve security. As noted in the 1992 Annual Report to the
Secretary, most major DOE facilities have an overall satisfactory
rating. Only six facilities were rated marginal, and, of these, three
have been uploaded to satisfactory during 1993. In addition, the
newly developed Safeguards and Security Information Management System
(SSIMS) serves as an important management tracking system. SSIMS, which
is linked electronically between Headquarters and Operations Offices,
permits management to conduct near "real-time" analysis on the status
of their respective protection programs.
In a continuing effort to ensure that safeguards and security is
a cost-effective program, the Department recently initiated a series
of resource reviews to identify additional cost-saving possibilities
which can be implemented while, at the same time, affording appropriate
protection for DOE assets. A review of Security Evaluations inspections
for 1992 indicates that no facilities were rated unsatisfactory in the
area of Protection Program Management nor were any facilities evaluated
by the Department as unsatisfactory overall.
The Office of Security Affairs was established to ensure clearer
lines of authority, management, and accountability; correct
organizational fragmentation and provide focused management in policy,
field oversight, Headquarters operations; and provide integration of
materials control and accountability and security disciplines; and we
are committed to making this happen.
CENTRAL TRAINING ACADEMY OPERATING COSTS
Mr. Bevill. What is the total cost of operating the Central
Training Academy and the FTEs in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994? Are
funds provided from any sources other than this budget?
Mr. McFadden. The costs for the Central Training Academy (CTA)
are as follows:
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Program $ 8,823 $ 7,323 $ 8,523
FTEs (5) 361* 393* 425
Total Central Training Academy $ 9,184 $ 7,716 $ 8,948
*In FY 1992 and FY 1993, these FTEs were funded from the Weapons
Production and Surveillance budget.
In addition to the above funding, CTA receives approximately
$200,000 annually to cover CTA staff travel and adjunct costs such as
freight expenses related to specially requested Mobile Training Team
activities. These Mobile Training Teams are in addition to normally
scheduled and budgeted CTA classes. These funds come from other
Departmental programs.
Since the establishment of the CTA, the Albuquerque Operations
Office has provided funding for CTA's rent, electricity, etc. (it is
estimated that approximately $500,000 is expended annually).
Also, in Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, the CTA received $2,000,000
annually in General Plant Project funding.
ACCELERATED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM (AAAP)
Mr. Bevill. How many individuals were approved using the
Accelerated Access Authorization Program in FY 1993 and FY 1994? What
activities - (including funding) are included in the Safeguards and
Security budget and the Security Investigations budget for this
program?
Mr. McFadden. For the period October 12, 1992, through
April 26, 1993, 140 individuals were approved for security clearance
on an interim basis using this program. The average processing time
under this program (from tests completion to approval) is 30 days. We
estimate that about 500 individuals will be approved under this program
in FY 1994. AAAP has been a significant factor in cost avoidance
without jeopardizing the safeguards and security of our National
Assets. Funding for this program (which will be funded solely from
the Security Investigations budget in FY 1995) is shown on a table
which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:)
ACCELERATED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM
(In Thousands of Dollars)
FY 1993 FY 1994
Nuclear Safeguards and Security
AAAP - Operational Activities $ 500 $ 500
AAAP - Technical Aspects - 0 210
guidance documents; research
and analysis, planning, 500 710
quality assurance, etc.
Security Investigations
AAAP - Full Implementation - 0 1,100
Initiate 5-year competitive
bid contract, and expand
number of individuals for
inclusion in program. $ 500 $1,810
PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. What is the Center for Human Reliability? When was it
established? What is the total budget in FY 1993 and FY 1994?
Mr. McFadden. The Center for Human Reliability Studies (CHRS) was
established in July 1989 to assist the Department of Energy (DOE) in
developing and implementing the Personnel Security Assurance Program
(PSAP) and other human reliability program initiatives. It is part
of the Medical Sciences Division of the Oak Ridge Institute for Science
and Education, a Management and Operating contractor of the DOE. It
utilizes a staff of 3 full-time employees and 18 consultants.
Through a comprehensive process of policy analysis, program
development, operational guidance, and followup program evaluation, the
CHRS supports the DOE in the PSAP and the Accelerated Access
Authorization Program. The CHRS provides expertise in the following
disciplines: personnel security; clinical psychology; human resource
management research and analysis; law, including labor and personnel
law; financial analysis; organizational and industrial psychology;
social psychology and sociology; counterintelligence; criminology,
criminal justice, and investigations; operations research and
statistics; and computer systems analysis to assist the DOE in
achieving program goals.
The total CHRS budget for FY 1993 was $485,000. The same amount
has been requested for FY 1994.
CROSSCUT OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY ESTIMATES
Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and
Security funding throughout the Department for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY
1994.
Mr. McFadden. The following information is provided:
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
FY 1994 Congressional Budget
Safeguards and Security Budget Estimates
BY FACILITY
(in thousands)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Safeguards Safeguards Safeguards
Organization/Facility & Security & Security & Security
Albuquerque
Albuquerque Direct 102,319 93,538 96,199
Allied (Kansas City) 6,960 7,941 9,069
Los Alamos Natl. Lab. 84,108 85,721 86,888
Mound 10,887 8,837 9,804
Pantex 53,473 24,600 45,600
Pinelies 7,020 5,590 5,100
Rocky Flats 76,153 74,937 73,222
Sandia Natl. Lab. 54,370 56,103 54,709
---------- --------- --------
Total, Albuquerque 395,290 357,267 380,591
Chicago
Chicago Direct 1,593 1,493 1,445
Ames Natl. Lab, 679 405 381
Argonne Natl Lab. 7,515 11,880 12,275
Brookhaven Natl. Lab. 7,344 635 673
Fermi National Lab. 1,732 1,837 2,531
New Brunswick Lab, 4,404 4,253 4,252
Natl. Renewable Energy Lab. 530 675 731
Princeton Plasma Physics Lab, 1,109 1,089 1,243
Superconducting Super Collider 1,025 1,300 1,400
---------- ---------- ----------
Total, Chicago 25,931 23,567 24,931
Idaho 43,359 45,804 45,081
Naval Petroleum Reserves 1,097 1,097 1.077
Nevada 80,764 81,368 73,407
Oak Ridge
Oak Ridge 82,877 73,885 79,112
WMCC - FMPC 2,717 2,510 1,844
Oak Ridge Assoc. Univ. 802 851 715
Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. 7,572 7,409 7,306
Y-12 59,755 52,775 35,771
---------- ---------- ----------
Total Oak Ridge 153,723 137,430 124,748
Pittsburgh Naval Reactors 12,497 14,266 12.042
Richland 66,030 64,992 68,391
San Francisco
San Francisco 6,892 9,535 9,559
Lawrence Livermore Natl. Lab. 42,309 38,752 33,179
-------- ---------- ----------
Total, San Francisco 49,201 48,287 42,738
0
Savannah River 159,880 157,876 127,754
0
Schenectady Naval Reactors 13,522 15,689 16,141
Office of Scientific & Tech. Infor. 804 851 800
Strategic Petroleum Reserve Off. 18,572 19,390 24,650
Western Area Power Admin. 848 870 870
Morgantown Energy Tech. Ctr. 558 499 725
Pittsburgh Energy Tech. Ctr. 1,400 1,600 1,916
Headquarters 102,805 99,920 99,760
---------- ---------- ----------
Total DOE Safeguards & Security 1,126,281 1,070,773 1,045,623
PROTECTIVE FORCE STRENGTH AND EXPENDITURES
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard
forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for FY 1992, FY
1993, and FY 1994.
Mr. McFadden. During the past six months, protective force
strength levels have been reduced by approximately 480
personnel complex-wide. At some Operations Offices, there has been a
commensurate reduction in Protective Force budgeting. At others,
budget changes have been less noticeable partly because savings
realized in personnel reductions are being rolled back into
automated protective systems. Protective requirements based on
categories of materials on hand and other unique facility concerns
are major factors influencing Protective Force strength levels and
budget considerations. The following table represents FY92-FY94
Protective Force strength levels and associated budgets.
*****PROTECTIVE FORCE LEVELS AND OPERATING BUDGETS*****
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT DETAIL
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and
funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in FY 1992,
FY 1993, and FY 1994.
Mr. McFadden. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows:
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TASKS AND FUNDING
(In Thousands of Dollars)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Chicago Field Office S&S Staff $ 1,176 $ 1,445 $ 1,445
Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade
Technical Assistance 409 313 313
Technical Support to Headquarters and
Field Assistance 3,857 1,763 1,792
Support Services Contracts 7,435 7,174 10,183
AOSS Modernization 1,200
Information Security Research Center 250 400 415
Technical Security Research Center 655 662 682
Total Additional Support $13,782 $11,757 $16,030
SECURITY EVALUATIONS RESULTS
Mr. Bevill. Please characterize the results of security
evaluations conducted at DOE sites during the last year.
Mr. Podonsky. The results of Security Evaluations inspections
and assessments activities are very briefly summarized with the
following information. The Security Evaluations Annual Report for
FY 1992 provides a more detailed assessment of the inspections
conducted and the overall status of DOE protection programs.
Protection of special nuclear material was adequate at all
facilities reviewed. Many sites are in the process of reducing or
consolidating their nuclear material inventories to facilitate
remediation efforts and reduce operating costs. Some sites have made
substantial progress by consolidating security interests and have
reduced both the direct (e.g., cost of guard force operations) and
indirect costs (e.g., time spent complying with security
requirements) of safeguards and security. Although protection of the
nuclear material is adequate, many facilities rely heavily on
manpower-intensive measures to provide adequate protection.
Protection of classified matter is inconsistent. Although
physical protection of classified documents at most facilities is
consistent with DOE order requirements, several facilities have
deficiencies in document control procedures and accountability
systems. Further, computer security at DOE facilities is not
uniformly effective.
Personnel security programs have improved considerably; the
elimination of the longstanding reinvestigation backlog is particularly
notable. However, continued attention is require to assure sustained
effectiveness and reduce the timeframes required to process clearances.
Protection program management within DOE requires continued
attention. Progress has been noted in some areas and at some
facilities. For example, significant progress was made toward
updating the DOE orders (most of which had not been updated since
1988). However, protection program management at all levels of DOE
can be improved. At the Headquarters level, additional effort is
necessary to resolve longstanding safeguards and security policy
issues and provide consistent and timely direction and guidance to the
field. At the field level, efforts to implement effective and efficient
systems should be more aggressively pursued, management control and
feedback systems (e.g., the survey and self-assessment programs)
should be improved, and the required planning documents should be
completed.
TRENDS TRACKING
Mr. Bevill. How does the Office of Security Evaluations track
trends or patterns in deficiencies identified at various sites?
Mr. Podonsky. Security Evaluations has several functions
that involve tracking safeguards and security trends and patterns:
the inspection program, the assessments program, the Facility Officer
program, and information management systems. These systems combine
to provide DOE managers with a comprehensive picture of the status
of safeguards and security programs, including trends and patterns
identified at various sites.
The inspection program is specifically designed to identify
strengths and weaknesses at individual DOE sites. The findings at each
facility are tracked through resolution and, where appropriate,
reinspection or safeguards and security readiness reviews are
conducted. Security Evaluations also routinely reviews Security Affairs
Safeguards and Security Information Management System (SSIMS), which
provides information on the status of findings throughout DOE.
In the assessments program, Security Evaluations periodically
reviews the status of selected program elements, focusing on trends
and patterns across DOE facilities. Innovative technologies,
safeguards and security policy issues, and potential program
enhancements are also identified. Reports summarizing the assessment
results are distributed to all DOE Operations Offices.
Security Evaluations assigns a Facility Officer to each major DOE
facility to monitor the status of each facility. One of the Facility
Officer's responsibilities is to track findings.
Security Evaluations uses a variety of hardcopy and computerized
information management systems to facilitate tracking trends and
patterns across DOE. As an example, Security Evaluations Policy
Information Resource Management System encompasses policy issues,
Security Evaluations findings, exceptions, working groups, and
orders. Security Evaluations is also currently working on developing
additional automated data bases.
Security Evaluations disseminates the results of its analysis of
trends and patterns through its annual reports (which summarize the
overall status of safeguards and security across DOE) and assessment
reports (which provide detailed information on selected topics).
Further, Security Evaluations routinely uses its analysis of trends
and patterns across DOE as a basis for inspection planning.
DEPARTMENT'S SECURITY POSTURE
Mr. Bevill. What improvements have you seen in the Department's
security posture since your office was established?
Mr. Podonsky. In the late 1970s, safeguards and security
entered a downswing in the cycle that is at least partly attributable
to a lack of attention to operational issues during the turmoil
associated with the creation of DOE. As an example of the lack of
attention, most of DOE's safeguards and security orders were not
issued until after 1984 (several years after the Department was
created). Predictably, the effectiveness of safeguards and security
programs had degraded to unacceptable levels in the early 1980s.
Category I quantities of special nuclear material were not
consistently provided adequate physical protection, accountability
systems were inadequate, protective force personnel were not adequately
equipped or trained, and protection of classified documents and
material was inadequate. In the early days of Security Evaluations
performance testing, facilities often performed miserably.
Since Security Evaluations was created as an independent office
in 1985, the overall status of protection of special nuclear material
has improved dramatically. Most DOE facilities completed safeguards
and security upgrade programs during the mid to late 1980s, investing
approximately $500 million in new security hardware and adding
thousands of security staff. Most vulnerabilities affecting high
priority special nuclear material targets have been addressed. While
problems occasionally recur, they are generally degradations in one
layer of a multi-layer security system rather than direct threats to
special nuclear material of the type frequently noted in the early
1980s.
In recent years, DOE safeguards and security programs have become
much more effective. Many improvements have resulted from heightened
attention to protection requirements, increased allocations of both
personnel and funding, and more intensive oversight. However, the
security systems are not optimally efficient. Many DOE facilities
still rely heavily on costly, manpower intensive measures to provide
adequate protection.
SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Mr. Bevill. Describe the most significant accomplishments of
the Office in FY 1992 and FY 1993. How has the security of the
Department been improved?
Mr. Podonsky. During FY 1992 and the first half of FY 1993,
Security Evaluations was able to maintain and enhance its inspection
program, refocus its assessments efforts on DOE's current needs, and
produce and disseminate information and tools to other DOE offices
for their use in inspection programs.
Security Evaluations inspection program continues to be regarded
as one of DOE's most effective oversight programs. Although we continue
to find and report problem areas, Security Evaluations is respected by
the field and viewed as a resource by DOE managers. DOE operations
office managers have repeatedly cited Security Evaluations process and
protocols as the model for other DOE oversight activities. One of the
most significant enhancements in the inspection program in the past 2
years has been the maturation of the Safeguards and Security Readiness
Review program. Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews are similar
to comprehensive inspections but are conducted on short notice and
are usually focused on selected aspects of a protection program. The
Safeguards and Security Readiness Review program's goal is to provide
an accurate picture of day-to-day readiness and to assure that
facilities do not relax between inspections. One of the primary
reasons Security Evaluations decided to emphasize Safeguards and
Security Readiness Reviews and conduct fewer comprehensive inspections
is cost savings. Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews are smaller
and cheaper to conduct. More importantly, however, Security Evaluations
found that the Safeguards and Security Readiness Review program has
significantly reduced the costs associated with facilities preparing
for inspections.
Another enhancement to the inspection program has been the
increased focus on protection program management. Security Evaluations
has been focusing on the protection program management topic in an
effort to assure that management is providing the resources necessary
to support security programs and is using those resources effectively.
Security Evaluations believes this is an important initiative and that
this will become increasingly more important as DOE manages the
transition to environmental restoration and remediation.
Security Evaluations has evaluated DOE's current needs and has
shifted the focus of its assessments program. Previously, assessment
reports focused primarily on program weaknesses. Recently, Security
Evaluations has been focusing not only on what is wrong but also on
what can be done. The reports on the personnel clearance process and
the use of helicopters throughout DOE are recent examples of Security
Evaluations assessments that provided DOE managers with the information
needed to enhance their programs. For example, in the personnel
clearance special study, Security Evaluations identified potential
enhancements that should reduce the time required in the processing
of clearance requests.
Recognizing that DOE managers must identify innovative safeguards
and security technologies that hold promise for cost-effective
application without loss of protection, Security Evaluations is
currently conducting a safeguards and security technology assessment.
DOE managers indicated that they are hindered by a lack of readily
available information about safeguards and security technology that
has the potential to reduce operating costs. To meet DOE needs,
Security Evaluations objectives are to identify user needs for
safeguards and security technology applications and to identify
and describe technologies that can be appropriately applied in the
near term to help the field apply resources more cost effectively.
The expected publication date for the assessment report is
July 15, 1993. The results of that assessment will be distributed to
all operations and program offices. The intent of the assessment is
to systematically identify existing or emerging technologies that
could provide effective security while reducing costs at DOE
facilities. The study is an example of Security Evaluations effort to
provide DOE managers with the information needed to manage effectively.
One of Security Evaluations secondary missions is to promote
communications and develop inspection techniques. In FY 1992, Security
Evaluations issued a set of comprehensive inspectors guides that cover
all major safeguards and security topics. These guides are used by the
field survey staff and personnel involved in self assessments, as well
as Security Evaluations inspectors. Security Evaluations also hosted
several interagency symposiums and an internal DOE forum. In these
meetings, Security Evaluations and other agencies and offices shared
techniques and tools. By sharing techniques and tools, Security
Evaluations is promoting a gradual but steady improvement in DOE
safeguards and security programs.
In addition to the concrete accomplishments, Security Evaluations
has an important role as a leader and trend setter. As Security
Evaluations focuses on selected aspects of DOE programs, those programs
tend to get the attention of DOE management and are improved. This
trend has been evident since the mid-1980s when Security Evaluations
focused primarily on vulnerabilities in the protection of DOE's most
sensitive security interests (nuclear weapons components and strategic
quantities of special nuclear material). As those vulnerabilities were
addressed, Security Evaluations gradually expanded its emphasis on
classified information, personnel, and computer security programs,
which have been gradually improving.
Security Evaluations views today's safeguards and security
challenges as efficiently maintaining adequate protection of vital
security interests in a idly changing environment. If DOE does not
anticipate and prepare for the rap future, security could once again
degrade to unacceptable levels. Conversely, if DOE is proactive and
starts managing resources more effectively now, adequate security can
be maintained at reduced costs. Therefore, in its role as a trend
setter, Security Evaluations will be increasingly focusing on protection
program management and cost-effective issues.
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS PACKAGING CERTIFICATION
Mr. Bevill. Describe the radioactive materials packaging
certification program. Why was it established? What activities are
required of your office to perform this function?
Mr. Brush. Based on the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the
unique nature of DOE, the Department of Transportation authorized DOE
to conduct its own radioactive materials certification program. The
program is required to be equivalent to that of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
The purpose of the radioactive materials packaging certification
program is to ensure the health and safety of the public and workers
and the protection of the environment when radioactive materials are
transported by DOE and its contractors. Principal functions of the
program include: evaluating packaging designs; maintaining a database
of certified packagings; and providing external liaison for packaging
certification matters between DOE and concerned agencies.
The evaluation of DOE packaging designs involves reviewing Safety
Analysis Reports for Packagings for compliance with DOE orders and with
the regulations of the Department of Transportation and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Evaluations are accomplished by performing
independent reviews and confirmatory analyses of structural, thermal,
containment, shielding, and criticality integrity; operating
procedures; acceptance tests; maintenance procedures; quality assurance;
and material information provided in the Safety Analysis Reports for
Packagings. On the basis of these reviews and analyses, the Department
determines that the packagings meet all applicable DOE orders and
other requirements.
MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT
Mr. Bevill. Last year you were very critical of the safeguards
and security management and oversight. Has there been noticeable
improvement in the past year?
Mr. Podonsky. Clearly, there has been improvement in safeguards
and security management in the past year at both Headquarters and in
the field. However, safeguards and security management must improve
further and adopt a more proactive stance if DOE is to resolve long
standing deficiencies and take advantage of the unparalleled
opportunities for reducing safeguards and security costs by
consolidating and, where possible, eliminating security interests.
At Headquarters, the efforts to update the DOE Orders, to
eliminate expensive but questionably effective policies (e.g.,
accountability systems for classified documents), and to eliminate
the reinvestigation backlog are examples of management's willingness
to tackle longstanding problems. However, many longstanding
deficiencies remain to be corrected. For example, as noted in the
Security Evaluations annual report and a recent General Accounting
Office study, many DOE facilities still do not have the basic planning
documents that are required to assure that the protection strategy
and objectives are current, approved, and understood by both the
facility and DOE Headquarters. Further, resolution of some issues
has been slow even when a clear course of action was identified,
as exemplified by the continued failure to document a clear and
consistent safeguards and, security policy to cover Work for Others.
At the field level, safeguards and security management has improved
but is not uniformly effective. For example, Operations Offices and
facilities have had varying levels of success in ongoing cost-reduction
efforts. Through a concerted transition effort, DOE's Hanford Site was
able to eliminate and consolidate security interests while maintaining
adequate security. This effort resulted in a dramatic reduction in the
number of security clearances (reduced by 66%) and potential longterm
cost savings, both in direct security costs and in indirect operational
costs associated with maintaining security. Other DOE offices have also
made some progress in trimming costs. However, some sites that have
experienced drastic reductions in weapons program activities have not
made corresponding progress in reducing safeguards and security costs.
PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. How many positions are included in the Personnel
Security Assurance Program (PSAP) in FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994?
How do you measure the effectiveness of this program? What are the
benefits?
Mr. McFadden. In FY 1992, 10,493 positions in the Department of
Energy and its contractor workforce were identified as PSAP positions.
The number of identified positions has since been revised downward,
due largely to changes in the DOE mission and the consequent
consolidation of special nuclear materials at certain sites. With
material consolidated in limited locations, less individuals require
placement in the PSAP. The number of identified positions and the
number of actual positions are disparate, as the program is in its
initial implementation. By FY 1994 the number of identified positions
and the number of actual positions should be equal at about 9,000
positions. In FY 1992 there were 210 occupied PSAP positions, all
under the Idaho Operations Office. In FY 1993 there were 7,996 PSAP
positions either occupied or in the initial processing stages.
The effectiveness of the program can be measured by an evaluation
of the attitudes of the individuals taking part in the PSAP. This
evaluation is conducted in both pre- and post-orientation for the
program, with followup evaluation done 1 year after initial orientation.
Effectiveness can also be measured through increased referrals for
security concerns and the greater sharing of information between the
evaluation elements of the program.
The benefits of the program include the ongoing evaluation of
individuals in highly sensitive positions to deter and detect behaviors
or conditions which might indicate security concerns. The evaluation
includes a medical examination, psychological assessment, drug
screening, and security review. The Office of Safeguards and Security
has determined that participation in the PSAP reduces the insider
threat from the violent insider to the passive insider.
PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. How many individuals were relieved of their positions
in this program (PSAP) in FY 1992 and FY 1993?
Mr. McFadden. A total of 10 individuals have been removed from PSAP
duties in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Two have subsequently been returned to
those duties.
SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and
level of clearances throughout the Department?
Mr. McFadden. As a result of the general downsizing of classified
activities within the Department, particularly in the nuclear weapons
program, the number of active security clearances were reduced during
the interval of April 1992 to April 1993 from about 176,000 to about
166,000. Additional reductions will be realized this year as the
national laboratories have been directed to eliminate corporate policies
that require all employees to be cleared as a condition of employment
at a Department of Energy owned site. Instead, Department contractor
employees will be processed for a Department of Energy clearance only
when such action can be justified based upon the duties of the
employee's position. Efforts are also underway at Department contractor
sites to consolidate classified and special nuclear material
inventories, which will result in the need for fewer clearances by
their employees.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS
Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and
types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other
Federal employees in FY 1992 and FY 1993.
Mr. McFadden. There are just under 167,000 clearances currently
held by DOE Employees, contractors, and other Federal employees.
Current information will be provided for the record.
CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1992
DOE DOE
EMPLOYEES CONTRACTORS 0GA CONGRESS TOTAL
ALBUQUERQUE
Q 1,465 34,502 138 0 36,105
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 20 546 0 0 566
SE 0 1 0 0 1
Total 1,485 35,049 138 0 36,672
CHICAGO
Q 240 1,339 6 0 1,585
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 22 690 0 0 712
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 262 2,029 6 0 2,297
HEADQUARTERS
Q 3,298 2,227 4,563 324 10,412
TS 153 47 2 0 202
L 120 275 192 1 588
SE 517 629 8 0 1,154
Total 4,088 3,178 4,765 325 12,356
IDAHO
Q 304 3,889 17 0 4,210
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 182 8,578 0 0 8,760
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 486 12,467 17 0 12,970
NEVADA
Q 386 7,278 58 0 7,722
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 1 428 1 0 430
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 387 7,706 59 0 8,152
OAKRIDGE
Q 827 20,199 143 0 21,169
TS 0 11 0 0 11
L 66 4,162 14 0 4,242
SE 4 19 0 0 23
Total 897 24,391 157 0 25,445
PITTSBURGH
Q 278 3,938 33 0 4,249
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 7,031 6 0 7,037
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 278 10,969 39 0 11,286
RICHLAND
Q 165 4,263 16 0 4,444
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 165 5,924 11 0 6,100
SE 1 0 0 0 1
Total 331 10,187 27 0 10,545
ROCKY FLATS
Q 204 9,830 9 0 10,043
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 405 0 0 405
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 204 10,235 9 0 10,448
SAN FRANCISCO
Q 212 12,886 5 0 13,103
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 211 0 0 211
SE 7 0 0 0 7
Total 219 13,097 5 0 13,321
SAVANNAH RIVER
Q 377 15,468 141 0 15,986
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 104 6,167 3 0 6,274
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 481 21,635 144 0 22,260
SCHENECTADY
Q 104 2,218 16 0 2,338
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 5,989 0 0 5,989
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 104 8,207 16 0 8,327
TOTALS
Q 7,860 118,037 5,145 324 131,366
TS 153 58 2 0 213
L 680 40,406 227 1 41,314
SE 529 649 8 0 1,186
GRAND TOTAL 9,222 159,150 5,382 325 174,079
CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1993
DOE DOE
EMPLOYEES CONTRACTORS 0GA CONGRESS TOTAL
ALBUQUERQUE
Q 1,709 35,290 72 0 37,071
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 10 504 0 0 514
SE 1 0 0 0 1
Total 1,720 35,794 72 0 37,586
CHICAGO
Q 238 1,246 8 0 1,492
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 26 653 0 0 679
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 264 1,899 8 0 2,171
HEADQUARTERS
Q 3,734 2,858 4,561 318 11,471
TS 143 17 3 0 163
L 81 274 161 1 517
SE 496 601 9 0 1,106
Total 4,454 3,750 4,734 319 13,257
IDAHO
Q 312 3,704 17 0 4,033
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 199 8,157 0 0 8,356
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 511 11,861 17 0 12,389
NEVADA
Q 409 6,419 33 0 6,861
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 238 1 0 239
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 409 6,657 34 0 7,100
OAK RIDGE
Q 556 16,370 114 0 17,040
TS 0 3 0 0 3
L 313 7,184 16 0 7,513
SE 0 17 0 0 17
Total 869 23,574 130 0 24,573
PITTSBURGH
Q 272 3,462 26 0 3,760
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 1 6,680 5 0 6,686
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 273 10,142 31 0 10,446
RICHLAND
Q 119 2,625 18 0 2,762
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 283 4,521 16 0 4,820
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 402 7,146 34 0 7,582
ROCKY FLATS
Q 153 7,371 4 0 7,528
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 1 222 1 0 224
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 154 7,593 5 0 7,752
SAN FRANCISCO
Q 239 13,162 4 0 13,405
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 2 198 0 0 200
SE 3 0 0 0 3
Total 244 13,360 4 0 13,608
SAVANNAH RIVER
Q 407 15,283 84 0 15,774
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 118 6,943 2 0 7,063
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 525 22,226 86 0 22,837
SCHENECTADY
Q 91 1,928 13 0 2,032
TS 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 5,443 0 0 5,443
SE 0 0 0 0 0
Total 91 7,371 13 0 7,475
TOTALS
Q 8,239 109,718 4,954 318 123,229
TS 143 20 3 0 166
L 1,034 41,017 202 1 42,254
SE 500 618 9 0 1,127
GRAND TOTAL 9,916 151,373 5,168 319 166,776
SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
Mr. Bevill. Now that several former nuclear materials production
sites have been deactivated and transferred to the waste cleanup
program, how has this impacted the number of security clearances?
Mr. McFadden. When a site is deactivated, the number of security
clearances associated with that site decreases. Usually, the level of
security clearances associated with a deactivated site also decreases.
At the Richland Operations Office, for example, the number of Q
clearances was reduced during the period from July 1990 through January
1993 from 10,235 to 2,753, or by 73 percent. At that same office, a
total of 2,591 security clearances were eliminated during the interval
of February 1992 through January 1993.
SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS
Mr. Bevill. What steps are being taken to reduce the number of
clearances? Are there any impediments to a quick reduction?
Mr. McFadden. As sites are deactivated, classified and special
nuclear 20 material inventories are consolidated or the sites
reconfigured as quickly as practicable. As consolidation and
reconfiguration activities proceed, security clearance levels and
numbers are also reduced in a prudent manner without endangering
National Security. The only impediment to a quick reduction will be
our limited ability to consolidate special nuclear material because
of limited storage and staging facilities.
PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. What is the Department's current security clearance
policy? When was this policy developed and when was it last updated?
Mr. McFadden. The Department's Personnel Security Program policies
and procedures are stipulated in Order 5631.2, last reissued on
September 15, 1992. The Department's security clearance policy conforms
to pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and Executive Orders
that require an individual's eligibility for access to classified
matter or special nuclear material to be based upon review and
adjudication of investigative reports provided by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or Office of Personnel Management, or other agencies or
departments provided that the scope and extent of the investigation
meets standards set by the Department of Energy. Individuals are
granted a security clearance only when access is required to classified
information or special nuclear materials and when it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to do so. When a serious question
is raised concerning an individual's eligibility for a security
clearance, the case is processed under Departmental administrative
review procedures to determine whether the security clearance should
be denied or revoked. Individuals granted a Department of Energy
security clearance are reinvestigated at 5-year intervals.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS
Mr. Bevill. What is the current backlog of reinvestigations? Is it
increasing? What efforts are being taken to reduce the backlog?
Mr. McFadden. As of March 1, 1993, the number of reinvestigations
that are due to be conducted (that is, the most recent investigation
was conducted more than 5 years ago) has been reduced to 7,672. This
number includes both backlogged cases, and cases that normally will
"come of age" as part of a continuing cycle of 5-year reinvestigations.
There are less than 2,000 reinvestigations remaining from the original
"backlog" of 132,000 reinvestigations that resulted from the Department
of Energy policy change of December 1985 which mandated reinvestigations
for all levels of security clearances every 5 years. The Department
anticipates elimination of the remaining 2,000 backlogged investigations
by the end of FY 1993. (NOTE: The 7,672 also includes 2,910 clearances
that are held by employees of other Federal Government agencies,)
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency,
of investigations and reinvestigations performed for FY 1992, FY 1993,
and FY 1994? Describe the reasons for the increases or decreases?
Mr. McFadden. The following data on investigations and
reinvestigations is inserted for the record: (The information follows:)
INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
ACTUAL ESTIMATED REQUEST
FBI Initial 44 12 10
FBI Reinvestigation 10 9 8
OPM Initial
Single Scope Background 0 10,700 10,000
Background 13,488 50 60
Limited Background 0 1,220 1,217
OPM Reinvestigations
Periodic - Single Scope 0 20,025 19,976
Special Background 371 0 0
Limited Background 21,716 7,809 0
OPM National Agency Checks
Initial 8,525 3,650 4,990
Reinvestigations 12,784 5,460 8,125
TOTAL INVESTIGATIONS 56,938 48,935 44,386
FBI investigations decreased in FY 1993 as that agency is now
being used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who
occupy positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (150
positions have such designations within the Department).
OPM Special Background Investigations (SBI) decreased in FY 1992
and were "zeroed" out in FY 1993. The Department adopted the Single
Scope Background Investigations (SSBI) which replaced and negated the
need for the SBI. SBI's were used primarily for individuals who
require access to Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI) access
approval.
OPM Background Investigations (BI) decreased beginning in FY 1993
when the SSBI became available. BI's will only be conducted on DOE
employees who occupy critical sensitive positions, but do not require
access to classified material in order to perform their official duties.
OPM Limited Background Investigations (LBI) conducted for
reinvestigations decreased in FY 1993 and will be "zeroed" for FY 1994
as a result of the adoption of the Periodic Reinvestigation - Single
Scope Background Investigation (PRIS) in December 1992. LBI's are
currently used only for initial L and Secret clearances for DOE
employees.
OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACC) will increase as the
need for the number of initial Q clearances is reduced.
PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM
Mr. Bevill. Describe the effort to develop an electronic transfer
program for security clearances, including the timetable for completion
and cost by year.
Mr. McFadden. The current time between the DOE request for a
background investigation and when the completed product is received
from the investigative agency (Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is
approximately 90 days. However, depending on the geographic location,
it takes another 15 to 30 days in mail time to send and receive the case
papers and completed investigation.
This project is to implement an electronic transfer system
(including appropriate safeguards of data) between each of the DOE
Operations Offices and the OPM's Office of Federal Investigations in
Boyers, Pennsylvania, which will allow the DOE to electronically
transfer the paperwork requesting a background investigation (including
fingerprints) to OPM, and when the background investigation is
completed, to have it electronically transferred to the appropriate DOE
Operations Office for adjudication. This will also allow transfer of
security files between DOE Operations Offices. The electronic transfer
system will reduce the mail time between DOE and OPM from several weeks
to several hours.
The FY 1994 Security Investigations budget includes $2,950,000 for
this project, which will take 2 years to complete, and approximately
$2,200,000 will be required in FY 1995.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs
showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs.
Mr. McFadden. Approximately 65 percent of the FY 1994 Security
Investigations budget will be allocated for Defense activities, as
shown below in the table which I would like to insert into the record.
(The information follows:)
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
FY 1994
Defense $34,667,750
Other than Defense 18,667,250
Total SI Budget 53,335,000
Use of Prior-Year-Funds (8,335,000)
FY 1994 REQUEST $45,000,000
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. What was the average cost by type and performing
agency of investigations and reinvestigations performed by FY 1992,
FY 1993, and FY 1994? What is the average completion time?
Mr. McFadden. Security investigations actual and estimated costs
for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 are shown in a table below which I
would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:)
ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED CASE COSTS
FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 Columns of the FY 1994 Congressional
Request
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
AGENCY/INVESTIGATION TYPE ACTUAL ESTIMATE ESTIMATE
FBI Background Investigation $4,089 $4,627 $4,997
OPM Single Scope Background N/A $2,850 $3,125
Investigation (SSBI) 1/
OPM Background Invest. (BI) 1/ $2,475 $2,575 $2,850
OPM Limited Background $1,250 $1,400 $1,550
Investigation (LBI) 2/
OPM Periodic Reinvest. SBI N/A $675 $750
(PRIS) 2/
OPM Special Background
Investigation (SBI) $2,575 N/A N/A
OPM National Agency Check $42 $45 $50
with Credit (NACC)
* FY 1993 and FY 1994 columns do not reflect OPM price increases
1/ For 75 day service
2/ For 120 day service
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is completing applicant cases
in 60 days and reinvestigations in 90 days. The Office of Personnel
Management is currently completing Single Scope Background
Investigations (used for the initial investigation for Q and Top
Secret clearances) in 74 days; Periodic Reinvestigations for Single
Scope Background Investigations (for reinvestigation of Q and Top
Secret clearances) in 120 days, and National Agency Checks with Credit
(used for initial and reinvestigation of L and Secret clearances) in 24
days.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET
Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakout, by activity, of.the $4.3 million
requested for Security Investigations Activities.
Mr. McFadden. The breakout of our request for Related Security
Investigations ActiVities is shown on a table which I would like to
insert in the record. (The information follows:)
RELATED SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITIES
Electronic Transfer Program $2,950,000
Implementation of Accelerated Access
Authorization Program (AAAP) 1,100,000
National Industrial Security Program
(NISP) support 250,000
Total Related SI Activities $4,300,000
NUCLEAR SAFETY
Mr. Bevill. What types of improvements in safety performance are
still needed?
Mr. Rollow. The observations from our on-site assessments,
technical reviews, and site representative program over the last few
years have revealed that safety performance improvements are still
needed in the following areas: 1) the understanding and control of
facility configuration, 2) design practice for safety systems, 3)
recognition and control of the implications of facility aging, 4)
improving the DOE interface with external safety organizations and
feedback of operating experience, 5) conduct of operations, 6) on-site
and off-site emergency preparedness, 7) radiological protection programs
for workers, and 8) self-assessment. Very significant improvements in
these areas have been made at some of the facilities that were the
subject of Office of Nuclear Safety assessments and operational
readiness reviews, and our assessment reports document these
improvements. However, improvements in these areas are still needed at
operating and shutdown DOE nuclear facilities.
Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of all reports your office has
prepared since its was established.
Mr. Rollow. The significant reports issued by the Office of
Nuclear Safety are listed below in chronological order. This list
reflects those reports that were published as a result of evaluations,
assessments and investigations. It also includes program and strategic
planning documents. In addition to the listed reports, the Office also
publishes weekly summary reports; letter reports on reviews of
environmental assessments and environmental impact statements; letter
reports (comments) on proposed orders or standards and guides; and
technical articles in scientific publications. (The information
follows:)
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY REPORTS
Office of Nuclear Safety Report on the Handling of Safety Information
Concerning Flammable Gases and Ferrocyanide at the Hanford Waste Tanks
(July 1990)
Strategic Plan for the Office of Nuclear Safety (October 1990)
Review of Readiness for the Resumption of Operations at Westinghouse
Idaho Nuclear Company New Waste Calcining Facility (November 1990)
Continued Operation of Savannah River Reactors Environmental Impact
Statement (November 7, 1990)
Restart Assessment of the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility
(TA-18) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (December 1990)
Office of Nuclear Safety Appraisal of Nuclear Safety Self-Assessment
Offices (February 1991)
New Production Reactor Draft Environmental Impact Statement (February
26, 1991)
Office of Nuclear Safety Startup Assessment of the Weapons Engineering
Tritium Facility (TA-16 at Los Alamos National Laboratory) (March
29, 1991)
Assessment of Resumption Activities for the High Flux Beam Reactor at
the Brookhaven National Laboratory (April 25, 1991)
Savannah River Site K-Reactor Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Restart
Criteria Assessment Report (June 1991)
Report of Investigation at Savannah River Regarding Switching of Diesel
Engine Parts Pertinent to a Root Cause Analysis (June 17, 1991)
Restart Assessment of the Advance Test Reactor Critical Facility at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (August 1991)
Restart Assessment of the Savannah River Site FB-Line Facility
(August 1991)
Review of the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor D-T Modifications and
Operations (August 28, 1991)
Review of the Consolidated Incineration Facility at the Savannah River
Site' (August 30, 1991)
Rocky Flats Building 559 Assessment Performed by Office of Nuclear
Safety and Office of Environment, Safety and Health (September 9,
1991)
Strategic Plan for the Office of Nuclear Safety (October 1991)
Report of an Investigation into Deterioration of the Plutonium Fuel
Form Fabrication Facility (PUFF) at the DOE Savannah River Site
(October 1991)
Office of Nuclear Safety Independent Assessment of Strike Operations
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (October 16, 1991)
Report on Investigation Into Allegations of Retaliation for Raising
Safety and Quality of Work Issues Regarding Argonne National
Laboratory's Integral Fast Reactor Project (December 1991)
United States Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Safety Assessment
of Readiness to Resume Operations at the Savannah River K-Reactor
(December 3, 1991)
Nuclear Safety Field Programs Division Quarterly Report, Idaho
(December 20, 1991)
Rocky Flats Plant Building 559 Assessment Report, Office of Nuclear
Safety and Office of Environment, Safety and Health November 18 to
December 13, 1991 (January 1992)
Rocky Flats Plant Building 559 Summary Assessment Report, Office of
Nuclear Safety and Office of Environment, Safety and Health November
18 to December 13, 1991 (January 1992)
Review of the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory at
Livermore (January 27, 1992)
Five-Year Program Plan for the Office of Nuclear Safety (February 1992)
Report on Violation of Radiological Control Procedures at Rocky Flats
(92-003) (February 19, 1992)
Review of Savannah River Site K-Reactor Transformer Failure
Investigation (February 19, 1992)
Nuclear Safety Field Programs Division Annual Report, Idaho (April 24,
1992)
Safety Assessment of HB-Line Separations Plant at Savannah River
Site (June 1992)
Report on Improper Recording of Tritium Analysis Results at Savannah
River Site K-Reactor (92-002) (June 16, 1992)
Nuclear Safety Field Programs Division Quarterly Report, Idaho (June
18, 1992)
Report on Possible Falsification of Records Pertaining to
Visual Checks of Selective Alpha Air Monitors at Savannah River
(92-005) (July 1, 1992)
Report on Tampering with Bioassay Urine Sample at Grand Junction
(92-011) (August 7, 1992)
Report on Falsification of Fire Watch Records at Savannah River
(92-010) (August 14, 1992)
Report on Tampering With a Life Safety/Disaster Warning System at Rocky
Flats (92-006) (August 24, 1992)
Suspect Materials Assessment of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR)
at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (September 1992)
Report on Alleged Falsification of Records Pertaining to the Restart of
Operations at the Savannah River HB-Line Facility (92-013)
(October 13, 1992)
Closure Assessment of the HB-Line Separations Plant at Savannah River
Site (November 1992)
Radiological Control Evaluation of Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
(November 2-6, 1992)
Assessment of the Readiness to Operate the Supercompaction and
Repackaging Facility at the Rocky Flats Plant (December 1992)
Radiological Control Evaluation of West Valley Demonstration Project
(December 7-11, 1992)
Review of the Corrective Action Plan for Resumption Activities of
Building 707 at the Rocky Flats Plant (January 1993)
Closure Assessment Follow-Up of the HB-Line Separations Plant at
Savannah River Site (January 1993)
Radiological Control Evaluation of Los Alamos National Laboratory
(TA-55) (January 25-29, 1993)
Nuclear Safety Field Programs Division (NS-40) Quarterly Report, Idaho
(February 8, 1993)
Nuclear Safety Field Programs Division (NS-40) Quarterly Report,
Savannah River (February 8, 1993)
Nuclear Safety Field Programs Division (NS-40) Quarterly Report,
Oak Ridge (February 8, 1993)
Report of Inquiry into Various Non-Specific Allegations at Oak Ridge
(92-014) (February 17, 1993)
Report on Inadvertent Shutdown of Tritium Analyzer Catalytic Converter
Heater at T Building (92-015) (February 18, 1993)
Radiological Control Evaluation of Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (March 15-19, 1993)
Radiological Control Evaluation of Nevada Test Site (March 22-26,
1993)
New Directions in Nuclear Safety Management and Organization
(April 2, 1993)
Operating Experience Weekly Summary (52 issues published to date, from
April 1992 through the present)
Safety Notices
Safety Notice 91-1, Criticality Safety Moderator Hazards
(September 1991)
Safety Notice 92-1, Criticality Safety Hazards Associated with Large
Vessels (February 1992)
Safety Notice 92-2, Radiation Streaming From Hot Cells (August 1992)
Safety Notice 92-3, Explosion Hazards of Uranium-Zirconium (August 1992)
Safety Notice 92-4, Facility Logs and Records (September 1992)
Safety Notice 92-5, Discharge of Fire Water Into a Critical Mass Lab
(October 1992)
Safety Notice 92-6, Estimated Critical Position (November 1992)
Safety Notice 93-1, Fire, Explosion, and High-Pressure Hazards
Associated with Waste Drums and Containers (February 1993)
Mr. Bevill. With the decision to curtail operations of many
defense production facilities and nuclear test reactors, how has your
mission been impacted?
Mr. Rollow. Recent decisions to curtail production operations
have changed the direction of our mission at those facilities entering
periods of prolonged shutdown or decontamination and decommissioning
(D&D). As you know, the Department continues to start major new nuclear
facilities such as the Savannah River Defense Waste Processing Facility
and the Replacement Tritium Facility, and it still operates many
non-reactor facilities and smaller reactors. In addition, new nuclear
facility designs are being considered. Therefore, the total range of
safety issues with which we are dealing is broadened.
Over the last two years, we devoted significant resources to
the evaluation of the production facilities, especially the Savannah
River K-Reactor and buildings 559 and 707 at the Rocky Flats plant. The
curtailment of defense production at these facilities, especially
Rocky Flats, limits the activities that will be conducted in the
buildings, but has not completely eliminated their potential hazards
to the workers or the public. With respect to nuclear test reactors and
research reactors, those that are currently operating are old and pose
unique challenges. The number and scope of nuclear safety assessments
and investigations are expected to remain at current levels as these
aging test and research reactors continue to operate.
Mr. Bevill. As many DOE nuclear facilities make the transition to
decommissioning, what are the most significant problems which can occur
during this time?
Mr. Rollow. Many of the problems that may arise from the
transition to decommissioning will be due to the lack of adequate
surveillance and maintenance programs, administrative controls, and a
uniform set of transition standards. Specific safety concerns range
from those arising from internally initiated events such as the
potential for criticality events to accidental releases initiated by
seismic and other external events. Facilities often degrade during
periods of extended shutdown, and when decontamination and
decommissioning operations are performed, deteriorated ventilation
systems and piping systems that are needed for cleanup may actually
hamper the success of the operation, or create significant safety
problems.
Mr. Bevill. Please describe activities to be performed by this
office in FY 1993 and FY 1994 for oversight of the gaseous diffusion
plants after they have been turned over to the Uranium Enrichment
Corporation in July 1993. What funding is associated with these
activities?
Mr. Rollow: On July 31, 1993, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation
is scheduled to lease the enrichment facilities, but not
all facilities at these two sites will be leased. We are continuing
discussions between the Department and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission on the lease of the Gaseous Diffusion plants to the
Uranium Enrichment Corporation.
The activities to be performed by this office in FY 1993 and FY
1994 are intended to provide assurance that the Gaseous Diffusion
Plants continue to operate safely and in accordance with Departmental
standards during the transition of plant operators and of regulatory
oversight. These activities include onsite assessments, safety
documentation reviews, and the daily review and analysis of operating
events. The estimated funding for these oversight activities is
approximately 250,000 dollars per year for FY 1993 and for FY 1994.
Mr. Bevill. Why is DOE funding independent oversight of 4 DOD
nuclear reactors, and at what level of funding?
Mr. Rollow. By letter of June 17, 1992, the Department of
Defense requested the Department of Energy to provide its views on
advising and assisting the Department of Defense in its oversight of
Defense nuclear reactors not under the cognizance of Naval Reactors.
Pursuant to Presidential Directive (PD/NSC-25) of September 23, 1961,
the Department of Defense has responsibility for identifying and
resolving health and safety problems related to Department of Energy
reactors that have been acquired in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 91b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. PD/NSC-25
also states that the Atomic Energy Commission (now Department of Energy)
will participate in the identification and resolution of health and
safety problems related to Department of Energy reactors as a matter
of responsibility. Consistent with this responsibility, the Department
is in the process of establishing a Memorandum of Understanding with
the Department of Defense. It should be noted, however, that one of
the four reactors (Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute,
Bethesda, MD) identified in earlier Departmental correspondence is
regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and it is not operated
under the provisions of paragraph 91b of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended. We will not provide oversight for the Armed Forces
Radiobiology Research Institute. Planned funding for FY 1993 and
FY 1994 is $250,000 for each year which will allow the use of
contractors to support the Office of Nuclear Safety.
Mr. Bevill. Please list each instance in which the Department has
taken enforcement action against contractors for violating nuclear
safety requirements; and list those violations which were referred to
the Justice Department.
Mr. Rollow. The Department has conducted several investigations
involving nuclear safety related matters, two of which were referred to
the Department of Justice for review and possible criminal prosecution.
These matters involve the possible falsification of records, a
violation of Title 18, Section 1001, and tampering with nuclear safety
related equipment, a violation of Title 18, Section 1361. Both cases
involve incidents occurring at the Savannah River Site. In each case,
the Justice Department declined prosecution. With respect to the
assessment of civil penalties under the enforcement provisions of the
Price Anderson Amendments Act (PAAA), the Department will first comply
with the Notice and Comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act before taking formal civil enforcement action. Therefore, until
both the final procedural rule and substantive nuclear safety rules
have been published in the Code of Federal Regulations as final rules,
the Department will not initiate civil enforcement action against
indemnified contractors.
In January of 1993, the Secretary approved the final Enforcement
Rule and Policy (10 CFR Part 820) for publication. At this time, the
rule is awaiting approval by the Office of Management and Budget. In
addition, the first set of substantive nuclear safety regulations, 10
CFR Part 830 (Nuclear Safety Management) and 10 CFR Part 835
(Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers) were published for
notice and comment in December 1991. These rules are being finalized
and will be published as final rules in the upcoming months.
Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakdown of the program direction funding
by year for salaries, benefits, travel and supporting services.
Mr. Rollow. A breakdown of the program direction funding by year
for salaries, benefits, travel and supporting services is as follows:
PROGRAM DIRECTION FUNDING
(in thousands of dollars)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994
Salaries $ 3,926 $ 6,370 $ 6,225
Benefits 1,063 1,720 1,720
Travel 651 1,455 1,365
Supporting Services 500 1,270 1,415
Total $ 6,140 $10,815 $10,725
THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill. This office was established to consolidate emergency
response activities throughout the Department. Instead of creating more
efficient operations, the total cost of emergency operations has
increased substantially. Please justify this increase in funding.
General Bickford. Efficiency of operations has increased with a
slight increase in funding. This increased funding results from
breaking out common funding support from the Atomic Energy Defense
Activities Appropriation. In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, common
funding support from the Atomic Energy Defense Activities Appropriation
amounted to $6.5 million and $3.05 million, respectively. Also, for
FY 1992, $214,000 supported 3 FTEs directly funded by Departmental
Administration. The increase from FY 1991 to FY 1992 is for additional
contractor assistance for training, emergency plans review, data
analyses, and to strengthen the DOE exercise and appraisal program.
Also, the funding increase provides for state-of-the-art communications,
display, and data processing equipment necessary for full operation of
the improved Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
The FY 1993 budget increase is for continued Emergency Management
System (EMS) enhancement and the EOC. Contractor support is required
to continue, expand, and improve the EMS appraisal program; contractor
and Federal support to meet guidance and oversight requirements of the
EMS Program; and contractor support to strengthen DOE's EMS exercise
and evaluation program to ensure effective EMS planning, preparedness,
and response to emergency situations; and continued improvement of the
Department-wide emergency training and technical assistance to the
readiness assurance program and to support other exercises. Funding for
the EOC supports continued oversight and operation of the Headquarters
EOC and the departmental emergency communication system between the
Field Offices EOCs. The funding increase for capital equipment ensures
compatibility throughout the Headquarters and Field Offices EOCs.
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS
Mr. Bevill. How are efforts of this office coordinated with
the emergency response and operations funded in the defense
programmatic areas?
General Bickford. The Office of Emergency Planning and
Operations is responsible for the development and operation of the
Department's Emergency Management System (EMS), which is the
framework for all of DOE's emergency planning, preparedness , and
readiness assurance activities. The EMS has been established to
ensure a fully coordinated and integrated emergency preparedness
program is maintained by the Department. The Office of Emergency
Planning and Operations is also responsible for ensuring that
Departmental policies and standards are appropriately applied in
emergency management programs. This is accomplished through the
review of emergency plans and procedures and periodic appraisals
of emergency management programs and evaluation of other emergency
preparedness activities.
Emergency response and operations activities funded in the
defense programmatic area include the unique radiological
emergency response assets (i.e., the Nuclear Emergency Search
Team, the Accident Response Group, the Aerial Measuring System,
the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, the Federal
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the Radiological
Assistance Program, and the Radiation Emergency Assistance
Center/Training Site) managed by the Department and the emergency
management programs for DOE's defense-related facilities,
operations, and activities. Program management responsibilities
for the response assets are solely within the defense programmatic
purview, subject to periodic review, appraisal, and evaluation by
the Office of Emergency Planning and Operations, as are the
emergency management programs for DOE's defense-related
facilities, operations, and activities.
Coordination is accomplished by the Office of Emergency
Planning and Operations through a number of mechanisms and
activities, including: chairing the Department's Emergency
Management Advisory Committee, which is comprised of
representatives of all Departmental elements with emergency
preparedness responsibilities and interests; participation in the
directives development process which sets Departmental
responsibilities, authorities, and requirements; review and
concurrence on emergency readiness assurance plans; and,
concurrence in selection of Departmental representatives to
interagency and international committees, work groups, and task
forces.
IMPORTATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PARTS
Mr. Rogers. The U.S. Customs Service has a large presence at all
US ports as well as the technology and capacity to inspect all goods
entering the U.S. Are there any joint initiatives between the
Departments of Energy and Defense and the Customs Service to detect the
importation of nuclear weapons and parts? Please describe these
initiatives including the requested funding for fiscal year 1994.
Mr. Ford. There are no joint initiatives between the Departments
of Energy and Defense and the Customs Service to detect the importation
of nuclear weapons and parts.
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND EXODUS OF
EXPERIENCED SCIENTISTS & ENGINEERS
Mr. Fazio. DOE spokesmen often assert that a Comprehensive Test
Ban (CTB) would-cause the exodus of experienced nuclear weapon
scientists and engineers from our national laboratories and that this
happened during the brief moratorium from 1958 to 1961. Could you
provide proof that this happened by providing the numbers of personnel
who left each lab at that time, or other evidence that supports such a
claim?
Dr. Beckner. During the U.S./U.K. moratorium that began in
October 1958, within one year approximately sixty percent of the work
force of 3,000 personnel at the Nevada Test Site had departed for other
unrelated employment. A prolonged delay in resuming underground testing
today is expected to result in a similar inability to maintain the
technical competence of critical skills and crafts.
At the Nevada Test Site, a significant portion of the technical
work force is nearing retirement age. It will be difficult to recruit a
new generation of replacements for certain unique skills once these
workers retire if we have no ongoing testing program. For example, we
currently have only one drill crew for underground testing. In
addition, the several hundred highly trained technical diagnostic
personnel would require 24 to 36 months to replace, with some critical
personnel requiring an additional 6 to 18 months to replace.
At the national laboratories, we have already reduced the number
of scientists and engineers who work in our core weapons research
program, due largely to shrinking mission requirements. For example, at
Lawrence Livermore the core research staff has been reduced from more
than 1800 in 1986 to less than 1000 today. Los Alamos has experienced
similar reductions. The dramatic reduction in the nuclear weapons RD&T
budget, which supports the primary defense competencies at,the
laboratories and underwrites the entire concept of stewardship of the
weapons stockpile, is sending a negative message to the staff and it
will be difficult to retain these talented people.
Despite the changes in the world power structure, we have not
yet achieved an international regime in which we will not rely upon
nuclear weapons as a component in the defense of our Nation and allies.
Until that happens, it is imperative that we remain vigilant in
assuring the continued safety and reliability of the weapons stockpile.
We must also guard against rendering ourselves unable to respond
rapidly to any possible reversals in the positive world developments
that have allowed us to accomplish arms control objectives and focus on
dismantlement.
PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2 STUDIES
Mr. Fazio. Please list all current warheads in Phase 1 (Concept
Definition) and Phase 2 (Feasibility Study) and Phase 2A.
Dr. Beckner. The Department is participating in the following
Phase 1 and Phase 2 studies: Precision Low-Yield Warhead Design Phase
1, Cruise Missile-size Warhead and B61-diameter Bomb Enhanced Surety
Phase 1, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Replacement Warhead Phase
2, and High Power Radio Frequency Warhead Phase 2.
NUCLEAR TESTING
Mr. Fazio. Provide the total annual budgets for nuclear
explosive testing for the last ten years and your future projection for
the next three. In a separate column please list the DOD/DNA annual
budgets for its weapons effects tests for the same periods of time.
Dr. Beckner. The total annual budgets for nuclear explosive
testing are provided in the table below for FY 1984 through FY 1994.
Amounts for FY 1995 through FY 1997 are not,provided since they are
planning estimates and will change as the Department's plans evolve for
certifying the continuing stockpile after the end of testing in FY
1996.
ANNUAL BUDGET FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TESTING
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1984 $565.0
FY 1985 613.6
FY 1986 567.0
FY 1987 618.7
FY 1988 609.6
FY 1989 585.3
FY 1990 553.3
FY 1991 499.5
FY 1992 510.8
FY 1993 419.4
FY 1994 461.8
(Includes Weapons Testing operating expenses, capital equipment,
and construction.)
The annual budgets for DOD/DNA weapons effects tests are not
readily available within the Department of Energy and will be provided
when they are obtained from the Department of Defense.
COSTS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. Fazio: How much has DOE, ERDA and the AEC spent (using the
Atomic Energy Defense Activities function) to develop and produce
nuclear weapons since 1960? Please provide the yearly amounts in both
current and constant (FY 1994 dollars).
Dr. Beckner: I would like to insert for the record a table which
lists the amount spent on developing and producing nuclear weapons from
FY 1960. through FY 1993 and our request for FY 1994. (The information
follows.)
COSTS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)
TOTAL TOTAL
YEAR CURRENT DOLLARS CONSTANT DOLLARS
1960 $ 901 $ 4,656
1961 906 4,580
1962 1,058 5,265
1963 1,135 5,565
1964 1,134 5,414
1965 1,066 4,912
1966 987 4,433
1967 983 4,205
1968 1,112 4,504
1969 1,286 4,937
1970 1,170 4,250
1971 1,138 3,948
1972 1,157 3,769
1973 1,209 3,610
1974 1,134 3,084
1975 1,126 2,878
1976 1,284 3,076
1977 1,461 3,261
1978 1,713 3,518
1979 1,989 3,747
1980 2,318 3,981
1981 2,938 4,722
1982 3,902 6,058
1983 4,634 6,942
1984 5,288 7,691
1985 5,961 8,443
1986 6,126 8,407
1987 6,026 8,021
1988 6,033 7,722
1989 6,220 7,640
1990 6,743 7,956
1991 6,695 7,509
1992 6,500 6,996
1993 5,773 5,981
1994 Estimate 4,666 4,666
TOTAL $103,772 $186,347
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the date when the most recent Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile Memorandum was signed? What are the signing dates of the
last three?
Dr. Beckner. The most recent Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum
was signed on January 19, 1993. The approval dates for the three
previous documents were July 20, 1992, July 2, 1991, and July 12,
1990.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Fazio. Two years ago you provided a list of the warheads in
the stockpile for FY 1990, FY 1991, and FY 1992 (see HAC, EWDA FY 1992,
Part 6, Pages 414-416). Please provide a list for FY 1992, FY 1993,
and FY 1994.
Dr. Deutch. The following are the warhead types in the stockpile
at the end of FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994:
FY 1992 - B53; W56; B57-2; B61-0,2,3,4,5,7,10; W62; W68; W69;
W76; W78; W80-0,1; B83-0; [deleted) W87; W88.
FY 1993 Projected - B53; B61-3,4,7,10; W62; W69; W76; W78;
W80-0,1; B83- 0,1; [deleted] W87; W88.
FY 1994 Projected - B53; B61-3,4,7,10; W62; W76; W78; W80-0,1;
B83-0,1; [deleted] W87; W88.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the W62 ALT 903?
Dr. Beckner. The W62 is a warhead for the Minuteman III delivery
system. ALT 903 is the designation for a W62 warhead Deleted
Deleted
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the W79-1 (910)?
Dr. Beckner. Since all W79 assets have been retired, this is a
historical designation with the following meaning. The W79-1 was the
warhead employed by 8 inch artillery tubes. ALT 910 was the
designation for a Deleted
Deleted
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the W80-1 ALT 908?
Dr. Beckner. The W80-1 is the warhead for the Submarine Launched
Cruise Missile system. ALT 908 is the designation for a W80-1 warhead
Deleted Deleted
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the B83 ALT 904?
Dr. Beckner. The B83 is the modern strategic bomb. ALT 904 was
a modification Deleted
Deleted
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the W87 ALT 323?
Dr. Beckner. The W87 is the warhead for the Peacekeeper missile.
ALT 323 was a modification Deleted
Deleted
HISTORY OF SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
Mr. Fazio. Sandia National Laboratories has published an
unclassified official history of the years 1945-1955 by Necah Stewart
Furman. Published by the University of New Mexico Press the volume is
an important contribution in establishing an accurate record of the
lab's accomplishments that can be read by the public. What plans does
Sandia have for future volumes for subsequent decades?
Dr. Beckner. Sandia plans to continue their narrative history
with the next segment to cover the period of 1955 through the
mid-1970s. Their newly instituted History Project Plan includes an oral
history project, preserving essential historical documentation, writing
site specific monographs, and a proposed History Museum/Visitor Center
being developed in conjunction with Sandia's 50th anniversary
celebration. A pictorial history entitled Sandia National Laboratories:
The First Half Century of Meeting the Challenge also has been
initiated.
HISTORIAN'S OFFICE AT LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
Mr. Fazio. What is the status of the historian's office at Los
Alamos National Laboratory? How many people work there? How large is
their budget? What are the responsibilities? Would you please list the
studies, reports, or books that the historian's office has produced
over the past ten years. What are the publishing plans for the next
five years? Do they include any unclassified histories of Los Alamos in
the post World War II period? Is there an oral history program underway
at Los Alamos? What is LANLs' position with regard to providing an
accurate historical record of its activities? Are there any special
plans for the fiftieth anniversary of its establishment?
Dr. Beckner. The Los Alamos.National Laboratory has an Archives
and History Program, which is administered by the Communications and
Records Management Division. The Archives and History Program has been
active since its creation in November 1982. The budget is approximately
$140,000 a year. The program employs one full-time staff member, one
full-time technician, one half-time staff member, and two affiliates.
The program responsibilities are twofold: to collect and preserve the
documentary heritage of the laboratory and to research and write
book-length histories that correspond with the tenure of each
Laboratory Director. There is no separate historian's office.
The Laboratory is committed to producing factual accounts of its
past. As part of its commitment, the Laboratory Archives assists
historians and journalists in writing about Laboratory history.
Publishing plans for the next five years include a history of Norris
Bradbury's tenure as Laboratory Director, reports on Operation
Greenhouse and Operation Ivy, and continuation of the Defense Science
Update series. Unclassified histories will include the Bradbury work
and possibly a redacted version of the Weapons Testing work. The oral
history work underway is tied directly to the individual histories,
i.e., part of the research for each volume.
The 50th Anniversary of the Laboratory will be a fitting
acknowledgement of the origins of the organization, combined with
professional and public events that reach out to the Laboratory's
constituencies. The activities, which will be carried on in the normal
course of Laboratory business, include: Seminar Series (Feb-Mar 1993),
Laboratory/Townsite Events (Jun 1993), and Northern New Mexico Outreach
(Jan-Dec 1993).
The books and articles produced over the last ten years are
listed below. (The information follows:)
Critical Assembly - A Technical History of the Oppenheimer
Years. Cambridge University Press, May 1993
A History of Weapons Testing (various dates). This consist-S of
reports on each of the Laboratory's test operations beginning with
Operation Crossroads and will conclude with a history of Operation
Hardtack. The following reports are written: Crossroads, Sandstone,
Ranger, Nougat, and TA-49.
A series of articles on weapon design, testing, and stockpile
management for Defense Science Update. Six articles have been written
for this ongoing series.
HISTORIAN'S OFFICE AT LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Mr. Fazio. What is the status of the historian's office at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory? How many people work there? How
large is their budget? What are the responsibilities? Would you please
list the studies, reports, or books that the historian's office has
produced over the past ten years. What are their publishing plans for
the next five years? Do they include any unclassified histories of
Lawrence Livermore in the 1950s and 1960s? Is there an oral history
program underway at Livermore? What is LLNLs' position with regard to
providing an accurate historical record of its activities?
Dr. Beckner. Lawrence Livermore established an Archives Office in
1981. A proposal approved by the Director in spring 1991 resulted in
the establishment of an Office of History and Historical records,
incorporating the former Archives Office. After a nationwide search, a
Laboratory Historian was selected and began work in January 1992. The
budget is $280,000 a year, about one-third of which funds the
Historian, and two-thirds funds the Historical Records activity. The
office employs 4 people consisting of 1 historian, 2 associate
administrators, 1 Laboratory associate, and 1 faculty member/grad
student (summer only). The Historian is responsible for writing
documented professional and popular historical accounts of the
Laboratory and its programs and oversees the Laboratory Archives. The
associate administrators and the Laboratory associate are responsible
for the Historical Records activities.
The Lawrence Livermore History Office was created to provide an
accurate historical record of Laboratory activities. The Laboratory
recognizes its own (and the DOE'S) important historical roles and its
twofold need for documenting its history: first, to augment the
Laboratory's corporate memory; and second, to provide an accounting
of Lawrence Livermore's past achievements for both its Government
sponsor and the American public.
Publishing plans for the next five years include a documented
chronology of Lawrence Livermore and its programs which is underway.
Based on archival research and available secondary sources, it will
present major . organizational and programmatic changes citing
appropriate sources. A key long-term project is a full-scale, book
length narrative history of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Based on archival research, interviews, and available literature, the
book will be scholarly in substance but popular in tone, intended for a
general audience but meeting all the criteria of scholarship, Closely
related to this larger project, but much sooner completed, will be a
70-page illustrated survey of main themes in the Laboratory's history.
All work, planned as well as completed, is intended for public
consumption, and no classified history is contemplated.
In regard to oral history, there is no formal oral history
program in progress, although some interviews have been conducted and a
fuller program is planned. The Laboratory recognizes oral history as a
vital supplement to fundamental historical research, especially when
early documentary records are incomplete. For many years the Laboratory
has collected and preserved taped presentations by, and discussions
with, former directors, senior scientists, and research program
leaders. These video documents will provide an important supplement to
a formal oral history program.
The Laboratory's historian office started operating in January
1992. To date, the publications consist primarily of an article in the
Laboratory's The Quarterly ("Polaris, Pluto, and Plowshare: How Three
R&D Programs Transformed the Laboratory," Sep 1992) and numerous
articles in the Laboratory's newspaper Newsline.
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
HISTORIAN FUNCTIONS
Mr. Fazio. The third volume of the official AEC history, Atoms
for War and Peace, by Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl was published
in 1989, covering the Eisenhower presidency, 1953-1961. What are the
DOE's plans for future volumes in the series? Who are the authors,
what is the status and when are they scheduled to be published?
Ms. Sye. Upon publication of Atoms for War and Peace, the
Department had planned to complete its history of the Atomic Energy
Commission in one more volume. In the interest of shortening the time
it takes to bring this kind of information before the public, however,
the Department is currently evaluating covering the time period
1961-1974 in two volumes. Whichever option is selected, the Department
envisions completion of the history of the AEC by 2000. The current
authors assigned to this task are Roger M. Anders and Terrence R.
Fehner.
HISTORIANS AT DOE
Mr. Fazio. Please list the number of historians that work for the
DOE or for its contractors at each facility? Has that number increased
or decreased in the past five years?
Dr. Beckner. There are eight Federal historians in the
Department: six in the History Division at DOE headquarters, and two at
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. While the number of
historians at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has remained
unchanged in the last five years, there has been an increase of one
historian at DOE Headquarters during that time period. That position
was added to assist in preparing the oldest records for shipment to the
National Archives and Records Administration for permanent retention
and custody.
Regarding our contractors, Lawrence Livermore currently employs
one historian who was hired in 1992. In the last five years there were
no historians employed at Lawrence Livermore before 1992. Los Alamos
currently employs three historians and has for the past five years.
Sandia currently employs one historian, who was hired in 1993. One
historian was employed at Sandia until 1990 and between 1990 and 1993
there were no historians.
DECLASSIFICATION
Mr. Fazio. Please explain the Department's policy of
systematically declassifying historical documents. Do they go to the
National Archives? How many staff are involved in the ongoing
declassification process? What function does the Coordination
Information Center in Las Vegas operated by REECo play?
Mr. McFadden. The Department has not previously conducted a
systematic review of its, or its predecessor agencies', historical
documents. We have developed an action plan to conduct systematic
declassification reviews of historical DOE documents at the National
Archives. The effort is scheduled to begin in early FY 1994 with the
hiring and training of additional contractor staff and classification
reviews actually beginning in mid FY 1994 in accordance with our FY
1994 budget request.
Historical documents in the custody of the Department go to the
National Archives. The Department is accelerating the transfer of
historical documents to the National Archives and recently transferred
sizeable portions of U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Secretariat records
to that agency.
The DOE Headquarters document declassification effort is staffed
by five contract and two Federal workers to perform classification
review of congressional material, documents requested under the Freedom
of Information Act, documents requested under the Executive Order
12356, and review of publicly releasable documents in support of
various DOE programs.
The Coordination and Information Center, an archives open to the
public, preserves declassified copies of historical documentation
dealing with atmospheric and early underground nuclear weapons testing
and its health effects.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. We were told during the FY 1989 hearings that the W71
Spartan warhead was going to be
Deleted
Deleted
What is the status of this warhead?
Dr. Beckner. The W71 Spartan Warhead was retired by the Department
of Defense in FY 1992.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. Why was it [the W71) ever kept to begin with?
Dr. Beckner. The W71 warhead had a special design which provided
a unique military capability. This capability would be both difficult
and costly for the Department of Energy to replicate. As a result, the
W71 was retained Deleted until the Department of
Defense completed a requirements study to ensure such i device was no
longer needed.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What are the plans for its [the W71's] retirement?
Dr. Beckner. The W71 was retired by the Department of Defense in
FY 1992. The Department of Energy is projected to begin W71
dismantlement activity in January of 1994 and complete the work in May
1994.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Fazio. A few years ago DNA presented a schedule which
included effects tests Mini Urn, Midnight Zone, Hyper Viper, Midnight
Aura, Distant Gale, and Mighty Wale. Two years ago we learned of tests
Mighty Uncle, Mineral Wagon, Divine Archer, and Misty Horizon. What
happened to the six earlier tests? Were they canceled or did they have
their names changed? If so what are the objective of any future DNA
tests.
Dr. Deutch. The six DNA tests you referred to are described as
follows:
Mini Urn became Mighty Uncle.
Midnight Zone was conducted as part of Distant Zenith in 1991.
Hyper Viper became Hybrid Vine which was canceled.
Midnight Aura became Divine Archer which was cancelled.
Distant Gale was canceled.
Mighty Wale became Mineral Wagon (future status is uncertain).
Future DNA tests are expected to support three different
objectives: 1) Preparation for a Comprehensive Test Ban with continued
correlation of aboveground and underground test data and computer code
validation. 2) Experiments in support of Strategic Defense Command
programs for effects on sensor/seeker technology and effects response
for materials development. 3) Response experiments for modifications to
one of the current strategic reentry systems.
B61 Bombs (U)
Mr. Fazio. The family of B61 bombs is somewhat confusing to the
uninitiated. Would you please list the different mods and how they are
related to one another. It would also be useful to list which military
services and non-U.S. NATO forces use each one.
Dr. Beckner. By the end of FY 1993, the B61 family will consist
of the mods 3, 4, 7, and 10. The mods 0, 2, and 5 will be retired
during this fiscal year.
Deleted Deleted
The mod 7 is a converted mod I bomb. The mod 10 utilizes components
from retired W85 warheads and from the mod 4.
The Air Force utilizes the mods 3, 4, 7, and 10.
Deleted
Deleted
B61 MODIFICATIONS
Mr. Fazio. Would any modifications of the B61 require fabrication
of new pits, which would not?
Dr. Beckner. B61 modifications to incorporate fire resistant
pits would involve rework of the pit but fabrication of new pits would
not be necessary.
WEAPONS SAFETY
Mr. Fazio. What safety and control features were added to the B28
bomb in the Stockpile Improvement Program?
Dr. Beckner. The purposes of the Stockpile Improvement Program
(SIP) to the B28FI were to provide enhanced nuclear safety in abnormal
environments and to improve command and control. The change was
accomplished by replacing the high-voltage thermal battery pack, the
high-voltage ready/safe switch,. and associated cables with a
transverter high-voltage power supply pack that incorporated a human
intent strong link switch, an MCCS Cat D PAL, and a lightning arrestor
connector. The strong links were collocated as closely as possible to
the warhead weaklinks, and the B52 Arming, Monitoring, and Control
System was modified in order to provide the unique signal. The
addition of a single strong link did not meet modern safety
requirements for abnormal environments.
WEAPONS SAFETY
Mr. Fazio. What safety and control features were added to the B53
bomb in the Stockpile Improvement Programs.
Dr. Beckner. The safety features upgrades are the same as the
those for the B28. However, no use control PAL upgrade was
accomplished. This system utilizes the aircraft coded switch system
for use control.
W79 SYSTEM
Mr. Fazio. Does the W79 have the ENDS system? If not what does
it have?
Dr. Beckner. The W79 has the ENDS system.
WEAPONS SAFETY
Mr. Fazio. Please describe the PAL for the SRAM II/W89.
Dr. Beckner. The W89 system was designed to include a Category D
PAL with Activated Processor (CAP).
WEAPONS SAFETY
Mr. Fazio. Please describe the PAL that was to have gone on the
B90.
Dr. Beckner. The B90 was designed to include a Category D PAL and
a Code Activated Processor (CAP).
WEAPONS SAFETY
Mr. Fazio. Please describe the PAL that was to have been for the
SRAM-T.
Dr. Beckner. The SRAM-T was designed with a Category F PAL and a
Code Activated Processor (CAP).
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. Are there any B-28 bombs left with operational forces?
When were they returned to DOE custody? What is the scheduled date
(month/year) for completion of Phase 7?
Dr. Beckner. The last B28 bombs were retired by the Department
of Defense in FY 1991. As a result, there are no B28 bombs left with
operational forces. The last B28 bomb was disassembled by the
Department of Energy in March 1992.
COMBINED DEVICE ASSEMBLY FACILITY
Mr. Fazio. When will the Combined Device Assembly Facility at NTS
be completed and operational?
Dr. Beckner. A Baseline Change Proposal for the combined Device
Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site was approved by the Chairman
of the Defense Programs Baseline Change Control Board on April 23,
1993. The revised project baseline calls for completion of construction
by July 1994 and,beginning of operations by February 1995.
Fire Resistant Pits (U)
Mr. Fazio. What sort of metal is used as the shell surrounding
the pit in a Fire-Resistant Pit?
Dr. Beckner.
Deleted
Deleted We are also studying
other approaches such as a welded beryllium shell and a tantalum
shell.
FIRE RESISTANT PITS IN W87/MX WARHEADS
Mr. Fazio. The FRP is normally used for bombs and ASMS. Why was
it used for the W87/MX warhead?
Dr. Beckner. The FRP was developed to contain molten plutonium in
the event of a fire and is a significant improvement in nuclear
material dispersal safety. While bombs and ASMs are more likely to be
involved in a fire than ICBMs, there is still a chance that ICBMs could
be exposed to a fire environment. Since FRP could be incorporated into
the W87 at minimal cost compared to the cost of the entire weapon
system, DOE decided to include it in the design of the W87 warhead.
W88 WARHEAD VERSUS MARK IV REENTRY VEHICLE
Mr. Fazio. The Trident II SLBM can carry two types of reentry
vehicle/warheads; the Mark V/W88 and the,Mark TV/W76. Is it possible to
fit a W88 warhead inside a Mark IV reentry vehicle?
Dr. Beckner. (Deleted]
B83 BOMB REQUIREMENTS
Mr. Fazio. Is there still a requirement for more B83 bombs than
have already been produced? If so how many more are required?
Dr. Beckner. There is no requirement for more B83 bombs. The
Department of Energy completed all build requirements for new B83 bombs
in March 1990.
Stockpile Improvement Program (U)
Mr. Fazio. The Stockpile Improvement Program was initiated in
1979. Please list the warhead types that have been in the program and
what was done in each instance.
Dr. Beckner. The following changes have been made as a result of
the Stockpile Improvement Program:
B28 Replaced Firing Set with one incorporating a single
strong link to improve detonation safety. All B28s are
now retired.
W31 Upgraded with modern detonation safety (ENDS). All
W31s are now retired.
B53 Added a single strong link to improve detonation
safety.
B61-1 Added ENDS and Insensitive High Explosive (IHE);
the improved weapon is the B61-7.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the retirement schedule for the W48? What is
the scheduled date (month/year) for completion of Phase 7?
Dr. Beckner. The W48 artillery shell was retired by the
Department of Defense in FY 1992. The Department of Energy currently
projects dismantlement of the last W48 in April 1995. This is a
planning date subject to possible change resulting from a variety of
factors associated with dismantlement of a large quantity and variety
of weapons such as waste stream management, logistics support and
dismantlement throughput capacities.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the retirement schedule for the W79? What is
the scheduled date (month/year) for completion of Phase 7?
Mr. Beckner. The W79 artillery shell was retired by the Department
of Defense in FY 1992. The Department of Energy currently projects
dismantlement of the last W79 in September 1995. This is a planning
date subject to possible change resulting from a variety of factors
associated with dismantlement of a large quantity and variety
of-weapons such as waste stream management, logistics support and
dismantlement throughput capacities.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the retirement schedule for the W70? What is
the scheduled date (month/year) for completion of Phase 7?
Dr. Beckner. The W70 Lance warhead was retired by the Department
of Defense in FY 1992. The Department of Energy currently projects
dismantlement of the last W70 in November 1994. This is a planning
date subject to possible change resulting from a variety of factors
associated with dismantlement of a large quantity and variety of a
weapons such as waste stream management logistics support and
dismantlement throughput capacities.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the retirement schedule for the B57 depth bomb?
What is the scheduled date (month/year) for completion of Phase 7?
Dr. Beckner. The B57 depth bomb was retired by the Department of
Defense in FY 1993. Since the nuclear packages of the B57 strike and
depth bombs are identical, the dismantlement line disposes of both
types of B57 simultaneously. The Department of Energy currently
projects dismantlement of the last B57 in April 1996. This is a
planning date subject to possible change resulting from a variety of
factors associated with dismantlement of a large quantity and Variety
of weapons such as waste stream management logistics support and
dismantlement throughput capacities.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the retirement schedule for the B57 strike
bomb? What is the scheduled date (month/year) for completion of Phase
7? Dr. Beckner. The last B57 strike bombs are planned for retirement by
the Department of Defense in FY 1993. Since the nuclear packages of
the B57 strike and depth bombs are identical, the dismantlement line
disposes of both types of B57 simultaneously. The Department of Energy
currently projects dismantlement of the last B57 in April 1996. This is
a planning date subject to possible change resulting from a variety of
factors associated with dismantlement of a large quantity and variety
of weapons such as waste stream management, logistics support and
dismantlement throughput capacities.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the retirement schedule for the W68? What is
the scheduled date (month/year) for completion of Phase 7?
Dr. Beckner. The W68 Poseidon warhead is planned to be retired by
the Department of Defense in FY Deleted The Department of Energy
currently projects dismantlement of the last W68 by Deleted
This is a planning date subject to possible change resulting from a
variety of factors associated with dismantlement of a large quantity
and variety of weapons such as waste stream management, logistics
support and dismantlement throughput capacities.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the retirement schedule of the W56? What is the
scheduled date (month/year) for completion of Phase 7?
Dr. Beckner. The W56 Minuteman 11 warhead is planned to be retired
by the Department of Defense in FY Deleted The Department of Energy
currently projects dismantlement of the last W56 in Deleted This is
a planning date subject to possible change resulting from a variety of
factors associated with dismantlement of a large quantity and variety
of weapons such as waste stream management, logistics support and
dismantlement throughput capacities.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Mr. Fazio. What is the retirement schedule for the W33? What is
the scheduled date (month/year) for completion of Phase 7?
Dr. Beckner. The W33 nuclear artillery shell was retired by the
Department of Defense in FY 1992. This weapon consists of two critical
nuclear components both of which must be assembled in order to
physically have the nuclear warhead. The Department of Energy destroyed
the entire quantity of one of these components in September 1992. As of
this date, there was no way to have a W33 in the nuclear inventory.
However, a quantity of the second component still exists. The last of
this component is projected to be destroyed in July 1993.
W69 Warhead Status (U)
Mr. Fazio. What is the status of the W69 warhead? Are there plans
to retrofit the W89 onto the SRAM A?
Dr. Beckner. The W69 is in the active stockpile but is scheduled
to be retired by the end of FY 1994. The W89 program has been
canceled.
Pantex Dismantlement Capacity (U)
Mr. Fazio. What is the capacity at Pantex to dismantle warheads?
How many can be disassembled per year? Please provide the disassembly
numbers for the-past five years.
Dr. Beckner. The capacity of the Pantex Plant to dismantle
weapons is based on a number of complicated factors. The most limiting
factor is the number of facilities and qualified workers available to
perform the dismantlement. Other factors which must be taken into
consideration are how long an individual warhead will take to be
dismantled, how many lines will be open at one time, and how many
warheads of each type must be dismantled. In general, we have
established the figure of 2,000 warheads as our goal for a single
year's dismantlement effort. During the past five years, we have
disassembled 5,841 warheads at Pantex.
1992 - 1303
1991 - 1595
1990 - 1154
1989 - 1208
1988 - 581
TOTAL 5841
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Fazio. What reasons determine retiring one warhead before
another?
Dr. Deutch. The DoD retires a warhead when it no longer satisfies
a military requirement, or when a warhead safety issue cannot be cost-
effectively resolved.
PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2 STUDIES
Mr. Fazio. In the FY 1993 budget documents it says, "A small
effort will continue to complete Concept Definition (Phase 1) studies
for Aircraft Delivered Precision Low-Yield Weapon, Hypervelocity
Aircraft Delivered Weapon, Tactical High RF Weapon, and Maneuvering
Reentry Vehicle (MARV) Warhead. Continue to support Phase 2 for
Strategic High Power RF Weapon." Please describe each of the five in
more detail. Did one of the military services initiate or support these
weapons?
Dr. Beckner. Of the five weapon concepts studies listed, only two
were initiated, and both were initiated at the request of the Air
Force. The two studies are the Aircraft Delivered Precision Low-Yield
Weapon and the Strategic High Power RF Weapon. Although the Department
of Defense had been considering the other three studies, they decided
not to request them and therefore they were not pursued.
The purpose of the Aircraft Delivered Precision Low-Yield Weapon
study is to evaluate the potential advantages of small, low-yield
precision guided weapons to reduce collateral damage-while maintaining
the same military effectiveness as current weapons. The Air Force's
experience from Desert Storm with the use of conventional high
explosive precision guided bombs and cruise missiles led them to
believe similar benefits could be possible with low-yield nuclear
weapons. This study began in January 1992 and will be completed in June
1993.
The Strategic High Power RF Weapon study has two tasks: (1)
perform joint DOD/DOE aboveground tests to acquire failure-level data
on foreign assets, and (2) perform feasibility studies on warhead
concepts that could provide failure-level outputs. Currently, most of
our efforts are directed to the first task. A coordinated joint DOD/DOE
test plan has been developed, analyses are in progress, and testing has
begun. The study started in September 1992 and is a 30-month study with
the first 12 to 18 months concentrating on the testing.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Fazio. Are there any warheads or bombs currently in the
"Inactive Reserve" category? Which ones are they and what is the
rationale for keeping them?
Dr. Deutch. There are [delete]
in the Inactive Reserve (IR) for FY 1993. Among other things, the IR
provides the U.S. a cost-effective, environmentally responsible method
to contend with current problems with the production complex and future
geopolitical uncertainty, which may place new requirements which cannot
be fulfilled by any other means. Given the severe reductions in the
nuclear weapons production complex and the expected loss of nuclear
testing, the Nation's ability to rebuild existing warheads and/or
manufacture new or modified warheads for replacement purposes is
severely constrained, and will continue to be so in the future. As a
result, we preserve certain warheads in the IR as an alternative to the
manufacture of new warheads to replace active weapons as necessary.
Moreover, the IR holds the Nation's only capacity for augmenting our
significantly reduced active nuclear forces in response to a reversal
in current geopolitical trends or the emergence of a new strategic
threat.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Myers. Dr. Deutch, over the next three years the United
States will remove [Deleted] weapon types from its active warhead
inventory and at this time is expected to not add any. Are any weapons
being currently reviewed for future deployment by the Department of
Defense?
Dr. Deutch. The DoD currently has no requirement for any new
types of nuclear weapons. Although there are several technologies being
explored in Phase 1 and Phase 2 studies, there are presently no plans
to take any of these studies into Phase 3 or beyond. Predictions about
what kinds of weapons may be required in some undefined future set of
circumstances are best left unmade at this time.
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
Mr. Myers. Are any other agencies besides DOE, DoD, and the
National Security Council involved in finalizing the new nuclear
weapons testing plan?
Dr. Beckner. Yes. The Department of State, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Joints Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and the Office of Management and Budget are also
involved in the development of the Presidential Review on Nuclear
Testing.
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
Mr. Myers. How many tests will be conducted in the remainder of
this fiscal year?
Dr. Beckner. Since the Presidential Report on Nuclear Testing has
not been submitted to Congress and a 90-day waiting period is called
for by the legislation, there is only a small possibility that a
nuclear test could be conducted this fiscal year.
PLUTONIUM AND TRITIUM PRODUCTION
Mr. Myers. Are any other nations still producing plutonium?
Mr. Ford. Yes. Plutonium is produced as a result of normal
reactor operation. However, we do not believe any of the five nuclear
weapons states are now separating plutonium for weapons purposes.
Russia has three dual purpose production reactors-still in operation,
two at Tomsk and one at Kransnoyarsk, that provide heat and electricity
to their respective sites and nearby communities. These reactors are
making plutonium that may be weapons grade and appear to be
reprocessing the spent fuel, which cannot be stored indefinitely.
However, we do not believe the recovered plutonium is being used for
nuclear weapons. Russia has indicated they would shutdown these
reactors toward the year 2000.
Mr. Myers. Are any other nations still producing tritium?
Mr. Ford. Yes. Several countries produce tritium, which has both
civil and military uses. Canada has a tritium extraction program to
remove tritium from its heavy water reactors as a health and safety
measure. Canada sells tritium for peaceful uses such as light sources
and medical tracer elements.
[Deleted]
We believe these reactors are still producing tritium, but they may
also be making a number of other isotopes for civil applications and
selling them on the international market.
PU-238 MISSION AT SAVANNAH RIVER
Mr. Myers. What is the status of the PU-238 mission at Savannah
River?
Dr. Beckner. The Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) mission is accomplished in
the H-Area of the Savannah River Site (SRS). The HB-Line facility and
portions of the H-Canyon chemical processing plant at SRS are currently
operating to process existing supplies of Pu-238 for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Cassini mission. Pu-238
located at SRS and other locations will be dissolved in HB-Line,
blended to specifications for the Cassini mission, and made into an
oxide powder. HB-Line started up in January 1993 and operations to
support the Cassini mission are expected to continue through late FY
1994. Following completion of processing of the domestic source of
Pu-238 for the Cassini mission, these same facilities will be operated
to process the first 5 kilograms of Pu-238, that is being acquired from
Russia, to meet NASA specifications. In addition, follow-on operations
are planned to process scrap resulting from the Cassini program for use
in future, but as yet unidentified, NASA missions.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Myers. Dr. Deutch, your testimony mentions a contingency plan
to meet unforeseen tritium needs. Please elaborate on that plan.
Dr. Deutch. In my testimony, I mentioned the need for DOE to
develop a contingency plan to meet unforeseen tritium needs. The DoD
will work with the DOE to complete this, or some other appropriate,
contingency plan over the next two years. DoD's role in such a plan is
to define the requirements and the DOE role is to proposed a solution
to meet those requirements. Since DOE only recently announced that they
will place Savannah River's K-Reactor in cold standby status, we have
had little opportunity to review options and develop a plan to meet
unforeseen contingency needs during the time period when no tritium
production capability exists. Ideally, what is required is a low
cost-of-ownership production capability that can be brought on line in
one to two years to furnish sufficient tritium should some unforeseen
circumstances cause the reserve to be consumed, thus placing the
efficiency of the stockpile in question.
FY 1993 UNOBLIGATED BALANCES
Mr. Myers. Please provide a list of the programs and projects
that would comprise the $696 million in FY 1993 unobligated balances.
Dr. Beckner. The $696 million that will be carried into FY 1994
to offset FY 1994 new budget authority includes $100 million for the
Savannah River Pension Fund Credit. I would like to provide a table for
the record that lists the currently planned sources for the remaining
$596 million to be carried into FY 1994. (The information follows:)
*******CHARTS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT********

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FY 1994 BUDGET OVERVIEW - ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, 04/28/1993, Question and Answer