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Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, press reports indicate that the Clinton administration is moving toward a decision to offer significant concessions in exchange for North Korean actions that Pyongyang is already required to take under international law.
Specifically, Secretaries Christopher and Aspin are reportedly recommending that the United States agree to cancel next year's Team Spirit exercise in exchange for Pyongyang allowing the IAEA to resume its inspections of North Korea's declared nuclear sites. The word `declared' is a critical modifier, since it refers only to those nuclear facilities that North Korea has decided to let the IAEA inspect, which is to say those that Pyongyang thought would yield no evidence of its nuclear weapon program.
It does not include other facilities that informed specialists are persuaded are critical to Pyongyang's bomb program. In order to gain access for inspectors to two suspect sites, the Clinton administration is reportedly considering granting economic concessions and the prospect of diplomatic recognition.
And, it should be noted, the Clinton administration has already made a significant concession by giving North Korea high-level talks. In exchange for this concession, North Korea has become more recalcitrant: halting IAEA inspections of declared sites; threatening to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and demanding more concessions just to go back to square one.
In a paper issued over the weekend by the Forum for International Policy, the situation was summarized as follows:
In a reversal of longstanding U.S. policy, senior Administration officials have held at least two rounds of negotiations with their North Korean counterparts over the past several months. These talks, however, have produced little more than backsliding as Pyongyang introduces new problems and attempts to extract new concessions as its price just for returning to the point at which the current crisis began.
This last point is crucial. We are giving ground just to keep North Korea from backsliding. Yet our experience to date has been that preemptive concessions produce more backsliding, not progress.
Some might dismiss the Forum's views as mere partisan pot-shots, since it is led by two high-ranking Bush administration officials, Brent Scowcroft and Larry Eagleburger. I would point out, however, that the Forum is a bipartisan group whose leadership also includes such prominent Democrats as Lloyd Cutler, Dante Fascell, and Robert Strauss. And one of the principal authors of this paper on the Korean nuclear crisis, Arnold Kanter, served not only in the Bush and Reagan administrations, but in the Carter administration, as well.
I think the Forum's paper, entitled `North Korea: The Clock is Ticking' is a sound analysis of the risks associated with the policy toward which the administration is apparently moving. I will submit the entire paper for the Record, but would like to summarize some of its key points and recommendations.
The United States, it argues, must present North Korea with a clear choice between the status quo ante, in which there was the
prospect that North Korea could begin to integrate itself into the family of nations and address its economic failure, and the alternative of increasing isolation, pressure, and pain.
`It is inconceivable,' the authors argue, that the process of integration `could be resumed unless and until North Korea has acted to end the current crisis. We must not suggest to other would-be proliferators that the treat of an indigenous weapons program is the key that unlocks the treasure trove of economic and political benefits.' Yet that appears to be exactly the approach the administration is pursuing.
The authors recommend diplomatic efforts to persuade China and Russia to support this strategy and inform Pyongyang that they will not veto a Security Council resolution imposing economic sanctions. The administration should begin now to design a package of sanctions centered on halting Pyongyang's imports of oil, which are critical to North Korea's military and key sectors of its economy. Since China now supplies two-thirds of those imports and could supply all of them, we should urge China to join an effort to steadily reduce Phongyang's oil imports--at the very least, not to replace oil imports cut by other suppliers.
Such a strategic dialogue about mutual security concerns, not the current agenda of bilateral issues and irritants, should be the centerpiece of President Clinton's meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin later this week, they argue. This should be accompanied, they propose, by a serious intelligence exchange in which we explain to Chinese officials why the North Korean nuclear issue requires urgent action.
They also urge diplomatic efforts to pursuade Seoul and Tokyo that this approach will not provoke Pyongyang, but provides it will a peaceful way out of the crisis.
The authors also offer three military recommendations:
Do not treat Team Spirit as merely a bargaining chip to be used in an effort to affect the tactical state of play.
Conduct a multilateral naval exercise off North Korea's coast demonstrate the capability and will be enforce economic sanctions, should they be imposed. Seek to persuade as many countries as possible to participate, particularly South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China.
Conduct a joint United States-South Korean exercise to strengthen the defense of Seoul, emphasizing capabilities such as air defense that Pyongyang should not consider provocative.
These exercises, they argue, should not be `tied to or conditioned on near-term North Korean actions.' They should instead be conducted `as soon as possible and without reference to the State of play on the nuclear issue.' At the same time, we should make clear that the need for such exercises in the future would depend on increasing stability on the peninsula and reducing threats to peace in the region.
Mr. President, while these recommendations will raise questions, particularly regarding how our allies in Seoul and Tokyo would respond to them, I believe they deserve serious and immediate consideration before any more concessions are made, particularly concessions on the 1994 Team Spirit exercise.
Unfortunately, it does appear that some in the administration are treating Team Spirit as merely a bargaining chip, something we can easily give up in order to send a political signal.
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TEAM SPIRIT REQUIRED FOR READINESS
Mr. President, conducting or canceling Team Spirit is not just a political signal to the North. This exercise is critical to maintaining Allied readiness on the Korean peninsula. Readiness is not something that can be stored on the shelf indefinitely. It decays with time:
There is a constant turnover of personnel in both United States forces in South Korea and South Korea's own forces, and the performance of those assuming new assignments on the peninsula is highly dependent on realistic exercises.
Even for those soldiers in Korea with significant experience in their current assignment, performance erodes as more time elapses after the last realistic exercise. And, in general, the rate of erosion accelerates with time, so that if a major annual exercise is skipped, it does not just double the erosion of readiness. If the administration decides to skip Team Spirit in 1994, the degradation of readiness in the coming year can be expected to be much greater than that experienced since Team Spirit was last conducted in early 1993.
This is especially true given the introduction this year of new plans, procedures, and organizations that must be exercised.
On this last point, Mr. President, I would draw your attention to recent press reports that, in response to a report by the Pentagon's Inspector General, our commanders in South Korea have made numerous changes in procedures related to United States reinforcement of South Korea. According to the lead story in the current issue of Defense Week, the IG identified a wide variety of deficiencies in plans for `the reception, staging and onward movement of forces scheduled to deploy' to Korea. According to the IG, `As a result [of these deficiencies] the ability to provide forces as needed to execute the warfighting plan to defend Korea was substantially weakened.' Among the deficiencies cited were a lack of docks, aircraft hangars and parking areas, unloading areas, railroad facilities, trucks, billeting and storage structures.
In response to these criticisms, with which United States commanders in Korea officially concurred, numerous changes in plans have been made. To cite a few examples:
The theater commander is updating his `time-phased force deployment data' plan, which details landing sequences so that reinforcements do not overload limited facilities.
Alternative ports and airfields have been identified and integrated into war plans.
Updates are being made in bridge, tunnel, and rail data.
All in-place and reinforcing aircraft have been assigned designated parking spaces.
And numerous other changes have been made related to nitty-gritty details that are essential to a complex military operation being successful.
These changes will undoubtedly raise readiness in the long run. Initially, however, they could actually decrease readiness until they are exercised and the inevitable kinks are worked out. Any time changes are made to a complex system, glitches are to be expected.
And if we learned anything from Operation Desert Shield, it should have been that moving military forces around the world ready to fight is a highly complex process and that it takes time to improvise around the glitches that arise. We were fortunate to have the time in Desert Shield because Saddam stopped at the Saudi border.
We do not have that luxury on the Korean peninsula. Seoul is within artillery range of North Korean forces. As recent press reports have highlighted, North Korea has been steadily moving forces forward in recent years so that some 70 percent are now within 60 miles of the border.
We simply would not have the time to improvise around very many glitches and kinks once hostilities became inevitable or started. Our plans must work the first time with a minimum of glitches. An enormous number of lives would hang in the balance.
Many who are not overly supportive of defense had a clear understanding of this type of problem when the issue was the computer software to command a star wars missile defense. I can only hope they will be as perceptive when it comes to this equally complex system to defend the Korean peninsula. The bottom line is that the only way to have confidence that this system will work satisfactorily is to exercise it.
Contrary to the implications of statements of anonymous administration sources, foregoing Team Spirit '94 would be a major decision since it would result in a degradation of Allied readiness at precisely the time when maintaining and, indeed, enhancing that readiness may be crucial to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression from the North.
Finally, Mr. President, I must rebut a seriously erroneous assertion being made by anonymous administration officials. Numerous recent press reports have suggested that giving up Team Spirit '94 would not constitute a concession because Congress failed to fund this exercise in the recently adopted defense appropriations bill.
I have checked with the Appropriations Committee and can confirm that the bill did not in limit the administration's ability to conduct Team Spirit. There may be a question of whether the administration's budget request was originally intended to support Team Spirit, but administration officials have told the media that the Pentagon will be allowed to continue preparations for the exercise, indicating that it intended and is able to pay for Team Spirit out of the requested funds, which Congress has approved.
Mr. President, there seems to be no way to interpret this erroneous, anonymous assertion as anything other than an effort to escape political responsibility for the consequences of a decision to cancel Team Spirit. This plunge for political cover is particularly deplorable since it undermines our leverage with North Korea. At the same time as it prepares to make a very major concession to Pyongyang by treating Team
Spirit as a bargaining chip, the administration seems to be deliberately cheapening the value of that currency, thereby diminishing the gains we can hope to obtain in exchange.
Far from protecting the administration from political criticism, such amateurish poker playing can only increase the already significant doubts that exist regarding this administration's ability to manage international affairs.
It inevitably raises comparison to a previous Democratic administration. Sixteen years ago, a relatively inexperienced team of policymakers proposed a Korean policy that undermined allied confidence in America and could have led Seoul to question its commitment to forego nuclear weapons.
Today a new team of relatively inexperienced policymakers is crafting another dubious Korean policy that has the potential for undermining Allied confidence in America and could lead Tokyo and Seoul to pursue nuclear weapons programs.
The parallels are inexact, but the risks today are at least as severe.
President Clinton does deserve credit for taking a personal interest in this deepening crisis. He has gone to Korea. He has been briefed by our military commanders there. He has continued President Bush's policy of freezing United States troop reductions in Korea so long as the current crisis remains unresolved. He has used firm rhetoric in describing American weapons capability.
But it is not clear if these commendable steps are being translated into a workable policy that will defend American and allied interests.
President Carter at the urging of Members of Congress, including Senator Nunn, Senator Glenn, myself, and others decided to reverse a disastrous course of action. I recall this history well since one of the first actions I took after joining the Senate was to travel to South Korea and other East Asian capitals in January 1979 to investigate the consequences of the Carter administration's proposed withdrawal of the 2d Infantry Division.
It is my hope that President Clinton will not need congressional intervention to rescue him from this Korean crisis. But this requires that he not proceed down the mistaken path his advisers seem to be mapping for him.
I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the two documents I mentioned earlier.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
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From the Forum for International Policy, November 1993
North Korea: The Clock Is Ticking
The North Korean nuclear problem has finally made the front page. There is a growing awareness both that it is deadly serious and that it may be about to get even worse. In brief, the North Korean nuclear problem could easily--and abruptly--become a genuine crisis, a real question of war and peace. We now need to move beyond expressions of concern about the seriousness of the problem to a clear strategy and a concrete program of action.
The stakes are enormous. Both South Korea and Japan face growing pressure to counter a suspected North Korean nuclear weapons program with nuclear weapons programs of their own. Even if those two countries continue to resist the nuclear temptation, however, the entire global non-proliferation regime could unravel if countries from Ukraine to Pakistan conclude that the international community is prepared to stand by while North Korea defies its mandates or pursues a nuclear weapons program.
In a reversal of longstanding U.S. policy, senior Administration officials have held at least two rounds of negotiations with their North Korean counterparts over the past several months. These talks, however, have produced little more than further North Korean backsliding as Pyongyang introduces new problems and attempts to extract new concessions as its price just for returning to the point at which the current crisis began. They also have created at least the appearance that their stonewalling, far from imposing a cost or penalty, is being rewarded by continued American eagerness to negotiate further.
Time is not on our side: doubts among key regional states about U.S. purposes and priorities are growing, and the issue is becoming ever more urgent.
THE PROBLEM
We do not know for certain whether the North Koreans removed spent fuel from their nuclear reactors for reprocessing into weapons-grade material before the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began its monitoring of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Some experts estimate that they may already have stockpiled enough material to produce as many as three to five nuclear weapons, and may be at work on building the weapons themselves. Inspections of `suspect sites' at Yongbyon could clarify this uncertainty. But not only has North Korea blocked these so-called `special' inspections, it is also steadily increasing its defiance of the IAEA.
When North Korea finally ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1991, the IAEA installed seals, monitoring cameras, and other devices at declared North Korean nuclear facilities as part of a `safeguards' program to help determine whether weapons-related activities were taking place. Pyongyang now refuses to permit the IAEA to conduct even the `routine and ad hoc' inspections it previously had allowed. With these inspections blocked, the IAEA's cameras are ceasing to function as their film and batteries run out. The seals and other monitoring devices need to be inspected to ensure that they remain intact and have not been tampered with.
This North Korean defiance means that the `continuity of safeguards' will continue to degrade and soon will break down with the result that the international community will not be able to determine whether Pyongyang has removed additional spent fuel from its Yongbyon reactors. At that point, uncertainty about how many `bombs worth' of nuclear material North Korea may have would increase substantially. The result of all this is growing uncertainty, suspicion and instability.
A STRATEGY
Faced with this urgent situation, the United States needs a strategy that combines boldness with subtlety. It should have three immediate objectives:
Preserving the continuity of IAEA safeguards so that the current uncertainties about the North Korean nuclear program do not worsen;
Effective international inspections both of the declared facilities and `suspect sites' at Yongbyon to help learn whether and how much plutonium may already have been diverted; and
Putting in place a continuing regime of effective inspections to block North Korea from developing a nuclear weapon.
Our goal is to achieve real, near-term results. How these are achieved--under the auspices of the IAEA, as part of the North-South denuclearization agreement, or in some other way--is of secondary importance.
CRYSTALLIZING PYONGYANG'S CHOICES
The strategy must also present the North Koreans with a clear choice. On the one hand, it can return to the status quo ante. The period that preceded this crisis held some promise of a process that could begin to integrate North Korea into the family of nations. North Korea seemed to appreciate the difficulties of its own isolation and its need for economic and diplomatic ties to the West. South Korea, Japan, and the United States had been prepared to move in this direction. The way was open for an evolution leading to the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, access to trade and investment, and assurances that peaceful North Korea has nothing to fear from its neighbors.
This process was interrupted, however, by the current nuclear crisis. It is inconceivable that it could be resumed unless and until North Korea has acted to end the current crisis, without precondition or reward. We must not suggest to other would-be proliferators that the threat of an indigenous nuclear weapons program is the key that unlocks the treasure trove of economic and political benefits. But we will offer North Korea the chance to see and rectify its mistake.
The nuclear program is hardly the only serious issue we have with North Korea. But these other issues can be addressed as part of our overall relationship once North Korea has returned to the status quo ante. For that to happen, the nuclear crisis must be resolved.
The other choice for North Korea must be isolation, pressure, and pain that will mount the longer it defies the international community and pursues its nuclear ambitions.
NEXT STEPS
The international community or the United States alone, if necessary, must be willing to take every step necessary to dissuade North Korea from continuing its present course, beginning with the following:
Political Actions: Diplomatically, we need to demonstrate to North Korea its diplomatic isolation on this issue. The November 1 United Nations resolution was a good start. By vote of 140 to 1 North Korea, the U.N. General Assembly explicitly rejected Pyongyang's claim of IAEA bias, and called on North Korea to `cooperate fully with the agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement.'
We also need to target key regional actors. We need to persuade Russia and especially China to make clear to North Korea--privately but unmistakably--that they will not veto a UN Security Council resolution to impose economic sanctions. We also need to persuade South Korea and Japan that our approach, while determined, is not provocative and offers the North Koreans a peaceful way out. But it does reflect our firm view that a nuclear-armed North Korea would be an intolerable threat to the security of Asia and beyond. Firm action now by these and other concerned nations can avoid two worse choices: a nuclear-armed North Korea or drastic actions to prevent it.
Military Actions: We should look for steps that make clear our determination to deny North Korea a nuclear weapons capability. We also should look for measures that reassure Seoul we have no intention of provoking a North Korean military response, while at the same time making clear our unshakable commitment to the successful defense of South Korea, starting with Seoul. Finally, we should not treat decisions about near-term military steps--including Exercise Team Spirit--simply as bargaining chips to be played or traded in an effort to affect the tactical state of play.
We should implement promptly two military actions which are specifically designed to support the strategy outlined above. One would be a multilateral naval exercise off the coast of North Korea to signal to Pyongyang a capability and determination to enforce economic sanctions should they be imposed. To underscore that this is an international effort to stop the North Korean nuclear program, as many countries as possible should be encouraged to participate--particularly South Korea, Japan, Russia and China--A second would be a joint United States ROK exercise to strengthen the defense of Seoul, emphasing capabilities such as ground-based air defenses that Pyongyang should not regard as provocative.
Exercises such as these would be intended to signal the international community's willingness to move from talk to action while consideration of economic sanctions continues, as well as its resolve to respond to any North Korean military provocation. To make clear that they are not simply bargaining chips, neither exercise should be tied to or conditioned on near-term North Korean actions. Both instead should be conducted as soon as possible and without reference to the state of play on the nuclear issue. At the same time, we should make clear that the need for such exercises, including Exercise Team Spirit and other military deployments in the future would depend on progress in strengthening stability on the Korean peninsula and reducing threats to peace and security in Northeast Asia.
Economic Actions: Surrounded by the Asian economic miracle. North Korea is steadily descending into economic crisis. At least some elements of the leadership understand that the worsening domestic situation and the accelerating gap between North and South increasingly will threaten Pyongyang's political and economic survival. We should use the leverage provided by its desperate straits to help persuade Pyongyang' to abandon its nuclear program.
Specifically, we should begin now to design a package of sanctions centered on cutting off North Korean imports of oil. Although oil makes up only about 10 percent of total North Korean energy consumption, it is critical to its military forces, to its coal mining industry (which in turn provides about 75 percent of North Korea's energy needs), and other key sectors of the economy. Oil imports already are down by about one-third to one-half from the mid-1980s. As the regime surely must understand, further significant reductions in oil imports would cripple, if not strangle, the already faltering North Korean economy, with unpredictable, but surely serious, political consequences.
If the prospect of an oil cutoff is to be truly credible, however, Chinese cooperation would be indispensable. Beijing accounts for about two-thirds of North Korea's current oil imports, most of which are delivered via pipeline. Should it so decide, Beijing could easily provide all of North Korea's current oil needs, even if a naval blockade cuts off tankers delivering oil from other suppliers.
We should urge China to join in an international effort steadily to reduce North Korea's oil imports. At a minimum, we should ask China not to replace oil imports from other suppliers that were cut off by a naval blockade or other actions. Put simply, with Beijing's support, manipulation of oil imports could prove to be an important source of leverage. Without that cooperation, economic measures virtually are certain to be ineffective and to leave more forceful actions as the only alternative.
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A PROPITIOUS TIME TO ACT
The Chinese do not need to be convinced that a North Korean nuclear capability would be a serious threat to their interests. They do remain to be persuaded, however, that the North Korean nuclear problem requires urgent action rather than what the Chinese call `patient talk;' that we have in mind a strategy that can succeed with their active involvement but will fail without it--leaving only worse and starker alternatives; and that their cooperation will redound to their benefit rather than to their detriment. As the UN resolution suggests, this will be an uphill effort: China was one of only nine countries which abstained on the UN resolution. The seriously strained relations between the United States and China is an added complication.
At the same time, however, U.S.-PRC cooperation on this issue could add a strategic dimension--grounded in a serious dialogue about mutual security interests and concerns--that would benefit the U.S.-Chinese relationship more generally. Framing a discussion of the North Korean issue, this strategic dialogue--rather than the current agenda of bilateral issues and irritants--should be the centerpiece of the meeting between President Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin scheduled for later this month in Seattle. The Seattle meeting should be preceded by a serious intelligence exchange in which the U.S. side undertakes to explain all the reasons why we are convinced that the North Korean nuclear problem not only is serious, but requires urgent action.
The objective in Seattle is not to ignore our bilateral differences with China but to find common ground on an issue of mutual importance that transcends the bilateral issues. If this goal can be achieved, it would hold the promise of reversing North Korea's march toward nuclear weapons, of putting a key bilateral relationship on a new, stronger footing, and of providing a more constructive framework for tackling bilateral problems.
The importance of dealing firmly with the North Korean issue is profound. The Cold War may be over but, as North Korea demonstrates, we continue to live in an age that poses real questions of nuclear war and peace. The United States must lead the international community's response to this crisis. For its approach to succeed, it must have the clear support of Congress and the American people. The President therefore needs to explain to the American people--promptly and persistently--what is at stake and what the United States must and will do.
Principal Authors: Arnold Kanter is a Senior Associate with the Forum for International Policy. During the Bush Administration, he was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Senior Director for Defense Policy at the National Security Council. Stephen Hadley is a Senior Associate with the Forum for International Policy. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and has also served on the National Security Council staff. He is currently a partner of the law firm Shea and Gardner.
From Defense Week, Nov. 15, 1993
Substantial Weaknesses Mar Reinforcement of Korea: IG
Inadequate contingency planning by U.S. commanders has `substantially weakened' South Korea's defense against an onslaught from the North, according to a classified report by the Pentagon Inspector General.
Declassified excerpts were obtained by Defense Week. News of the heretofore unpublicized assessment comes as tensions with North Korea escalate over its nuclear weapons program.
According to one excerpt, the U.S. has not `adequately planned for the reception, staging and onward movement of forces scheduled to deploy' to the Korean peninsula.
The report outlined a laundry list of logistical shortfalls that are somewhat surprising given the 40-year standoff with North Korea. The deficiencies include a lack of docks, aircraft hangars and parking areas, unloading areas, railroad facilities, trucks, billeting and storage structures.
`As a result, the ability to provide forces as needed to execute the warfighting plan to defend Korea was substantially weakened,' it said.
The reinforcement issue takes on heightened significance as the tense standoff with North Korea continues over nuclear inspections. U.N.-imposed sanctions designed to force North Korean acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections could spark a violent North Korean reaction, senior Pentagon officials have warned.
The IG's report paints a picture of serious planning shortfalls on numerous fronts--deficiencies which U.S. Forces in Korea claim to have vigorously attacked.
To shore up the South's defenses, the IG recommended `development of alternative planning' for reinforcements and `identification of solutions to space shortages for arriving aircraft and personnel.'
In particular, the report cited the need to ensure that alternative ports are available to receive reinforcements. It also called for additional cargo handling equipment and stevedores.
`We recommend that the commander, 7th U.S. Air Force, identify solutions to alleviate shortages of facilities and real estate for aircraft and personnel.'
In addition, the IG recommended purchasing equipment and supplies, including such basics as uniforms, needed by the Korean Service Corps. The corps is a para-military labor force dating to the Korean War, when laborers provided support service to U.S. military forces.
Fully implementing the recommendations would `help ensure that sufficient personnel and resources will be available for arriving forces to be integrated with Combined [U.S. and Korean] Forces in the defense of South Korea,' added the report.
The IG noted that, `Reinforcement of warfighting units requires a coordinated effort on the part of all forces involved: those already in Korea and those scheduled to deploy in the event of hostilities.'
The North Korean Army fields 1.1 million troops against 700,000 South Korean and 37,000 U.S. troops. About 70 percent of the North's troops are within about 60 miles of the border, meaning there would be little warning of an attack.
Given the small number forward deployed U.S. forces, reinforcements would be `particularly vital' to South Korea's defense, said the IG. The Aspin Pentagon's `bottom-up' review envisions massive deployments from U.S.-based forces to reinforce such a contingency.
PENTAGON MOVING TO PLUG GAPS
According to management comments in the IG's report, U.S. Forces in Korea, or USFK, officially concurred with the IG's findings. It has launched an extensive revamping of its reinforcing and logistics capabilities.
Many improvements took place after the IG concluded its investigation.
Although most of the report is classified, the extent of improvements indicates the scope of deficiencies.
Management said it worked with the South Korean government to update a port study and is negotiating an agreement for more materiel handling equipment. The USFK has also bought and tested 40 additional heavy equipment railcars and updated its bridge, tunnel and rail data.
To reduce space shortfalls, the 7th Air Force has retained exclusive use of some facilities at joint U.S./Korean bases, improving its `beddown' capability. Many U.S. facilities at joint bases were scheduled to revert to South Korea.
To improve wartime host-nation support, the USFK has completed staffing of eight support agreements where just one such agreement existed at the IG investigation's conclusion.
The USFK has also submitted 35 additional `memorandum of agreements,' or MOAs, to the South Korean defense ministry for more host-nation support.
In moves specifically related to the IG's conclusion, USFK identified alternative ports and incorporated them into a revised operational plan. The command also is negotiating separate agreements providing enough materiel handling equipment and stevedores.
After a review of the USFK wartime transportation requirements the South Korean defense ministry concluded `assets have been determined to be adequate to satisfy deployment requirements,' said the management comments.
The 7th Air Force established a `supportability team' to survey its capacity to absorb reinforcements and transmitted its recommendations to Pacific Air Forces for approval.
To improve host-nation support, USFK and the South Korean government will establish a special steering committee. The charter has been initialed by both sides and `negotiations for final conclusion are currently progressing.'
The USFK also said that reinforcement logistics materiel and doctrine were `exercised to the extent possible considering funding constraints' during Team Spirit '93.
Validation of available ramp space at joint U.S./Korean air bases and at U.S.-only installations completed in April 1993 `resulted in designated parking for all inplace and augmenting aircraft,' the comments added.
Air base facilities shortages are being addressed through potential construction projects and by updating the theater commander's so-called `time-phased force deployment data' plan. That plan details landing sequences so that reinforcements don't overload limited facilities.
A feasibility study for using offbase hotels to board incoming troops was slated for completion last month. It may lead to another MOA.
The South Koreans have designated a secondary air base to `alleviate congestion' at Kimhae, the primary air field slated to receive U.S. reinforcement, the USFK wrote. `Discussions are in progress for U.S. use of the newly constructed air freight terminal at this secondary' base.
Recommendations for beefing up `operational project stocks' used to support reinforcing forces are slated for submission to Army headquarters this month. Commercial leasing agreements with Korean companies for additional wartime vehicles should be completed in December.
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KOREA SHORTFALLS MAY BE NOTHING NEW
According to Bob Gaskin, the ex-assistant director of the Pentagon's Net Assessment Office until 1992, problems with reinforcing Korea have long been well-known. And they are still enormous. USFK' efforts to plug the shortfalls are `like taking an ice pick to a mountain,' he said.
Gaskin said if war comes, Pusan port and Kimhae airfield will be subjected to constant North Korean terrorist, commando and Scud attacks. `They're not going to leave them alone.'
Panicky refugees will clog severely limited transportation arteries, complicating the rapid deployment of reinforcements, said Gaskin, now with Business Executives for National Security.
A Pentagon official intimately familiar with the U.S. Korean campaign plan defended it last week. `The fact is that you could look at any plan that has not yet been executed and say that it will . . . or won't work. You can make that statement on any plan that has not been executed.' But he admitted that `you can always make [the plan] better.'
Gaskin said the number of troops slated to reinforce Korea had not changed much with new planning. The recent `bottom-up' review kept reinforcements at roughly Cold War levels, he said.
But that review did call for `increased early-arriving land-based and carrier aircraft and long-range bombers.' It also called for airlift and sealift upgrades to support `rapid closure of heavy forces.'
Gaskin also blamed the South Koreans for failing to make sure their logistics capabilities were up to snuff. Unlike Saudi Arabia where the royal family `put its money where it's concerns are,' the Koreans haven't spent `the money that is needed.'
Gaskin said he submitted a `very disturbing' 1991 report laying out the full scope of problems with U.S. reinforcing plans but charged it was `blocked' from getting to then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney.
`Many of these problems were addressed in the report two years ago. The report is explosive and detailed, point, chapter and verse.'
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. Daschle). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
END
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