[Page: S4433]
Mr. ROBB (for himself, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Biden, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Murkowski) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:
S. Res. 92
Whereas North Korea stated its intention on March 12, 1993, to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done on July 1, 1968;
Whereas North Korea remains obligated under the Treaty for a 90-day period;
Whereas no other country has ever formally withdrawn from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
Whereas no other country has ever compelled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to request a special inspection of its nuclear facilities;
Whereas North Korea refuses to allow a special inspection of suspected nuclear waste sites in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
Whereas representatives from 35 countries make up the IAEA Board of Governors allowing the Agency to act in an impartial manner;
Whereas the United States withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula in 1991; and
Whereas annual Team Spirit U.S.-Republic of Korea exercises are conducted for defensive purposes are not a provocative act of war: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That (a) the Senate hereby condemns North Korea for its stated intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
(b) It is the sense of the Senate that the United States and its international partners should take measured steps to compel North Korea to remain a party to the Treaty and to allow unconditional special inspections of apparent nuclear waste sites and other areas suspected of harboring a nuclear weapons-building program.
[Page: S4434]
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a resolution condemning North Korea for its stated intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Senators Biden, Helms, and Murkowski join me, as original cosponsors.
Mr. President, North Korea's decision to opt out of the treaty suggests that President Kim Il-song and heir apparent Kim Chong-Il have adopted a go-for-broke strategy to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
Besides threatening the security of Northeast Asia, Pyongyang's move may provoke other rogue nations to follow suit--that is, leave the NPT--and critically undermine United States attempts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
To avoid that outcome, I believe the United States must respond with measured steps to compel North Korea to remain a party to the treaty, and to allow unconditional special inspections of areas suspected of harboring a nuclear-weapons building program.
Let me outline what I envision those steps to be.
Initially, Mr. President, I advocate a full-court diplomatic press, between now and the mid-June date, when the North's withdrawal from the treaty becomes effective, to promote dialog and communication with the North Korean leadership.
Our discussions at the counselor level in Beijing with the North, direct North-South talks, and interventions from other members of the international community, specifically China, are all means to persuade Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-Il of abiding by nonproliferation regime guidelines and permitting inspections.
A go slow approach is called for, Mr. President, where all voices are heard and listened to.
Simultaneous to the entreaties, this matter merits the consideration of the U.N. Security Council, notwithstanding official Chinese statements that `the PRC is opposed to North Korea's nuclear issues being referred to the United Nations.'
Mr. President, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's actions are grave and serious.
It is the first country, among 155 signatories, to accede to the NPT and then withdraw, and reject repeated IAEA requests for a special inspection.
In light of this United Nations affiliated agency's inability to enforce its own mandate, it is appropriate and necessary for the parent body to formally address the issue.
I was pleased to see the IAEA board of governors take this course of action yesterday when it approved referring North Korea's rejection of inspection requests to the United Nations.
Mr. President, while China's blocking of a March 12 attempt at the United Nations to initially condemn North Korea signifies reluctance to punish an old ally, the international community should not be deterred by these tactics.
In fact, to the degree that we do not lose sight of our objective of denying North Korea a nuclear weapons capability, there is ample incentive to work in tandem with China given Beijing's influence with Pyongyang.
Mr. President, should North Korean noncompliance continue through the spring months, a special U.N. envoy should be tasked to compel North Korea to rethink its decision, while resolutions of disapproval are adopted by the Security Council to build international consensus.
To add further pressure, a list of punitive sanctions should be crafted between now and mid-June.
The list should be shared with Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-Il so they understand the import of thumbing their noses at the international community.
Sanctions on oil would be particularly important, and agricultural products, military supplies, heavy machinery, and other strategic items should be targeted.
Along these lines, suspending Japanese investment in North Korea would be a key element of a general economic embargo.
Estimates of two way trade between the two countries range from $200 and $500 million.
While Chinese acquiescence on sanctions may be difficult to obtain, it should be pursued.
In 1991, North Korea reportedly received 1.1 million tons of oil from China, 1 million tons from Iran, and 40,000 tons from Libya.
The oil is North Korea's lifeline, and the mere threat of cutting it off could quickly change minds in Pyongyang.
Russia, too, has a role to play. Along with the other constituent Republics of the former Soviet Union, oil exports to North Korea last year totaled 340,000 tons, and there were noteworthy bilateral sales of Russian military equipment.
A multilateral embargo should attempt to zero out such trade.
Among our own limited options, the United States should lay the groundwork for halting its food shipments to North Korea. License authority presently exists for U.S. commercial sales of up to $1.2 billion.
Mr. President, the noose around North Korea's neck can be tightened further through military enforcement of sanctions, and it is not an option that I rule out. Failing eventual North Korean concessions, we have the capability to block North Korean shores from the import of Iranian and Libyan oil.
Mr. President, I have spent considerable time in the last month with United States intelligence and State Department officials, including just this morning, who confirm that North Korea is actively attempting to disguise its nuclear weapons program. It is a program that is alive, well, and speeding toward the ability to construct an atomic device.
Mr. President, I am not prepared to welcome North Korea into the nuclear club. I emphasize a route of dialog and communication to prevent that from occuring. Beyond diplomacy, I favor measured steps to bring this rogue nation into line.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I thank the majority leader and the Republican leader, and I yield the floor.
END
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