• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

[Page: S3531]

Mr. LIEBERMAN submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. Con. Res. 19

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, to which 156 states are party, is the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime;

Whereas non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are obligated to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all sources of fissionable material within their territory, under their jurisdiction, or carried out under their control anywhere;

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency is permitted to conduct inspections in a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of any site, whether or not declared by that state, to ensure that all source of special fissionable material in that country is under safeguards;

Whereas North Korea is a non-nuclear weapon state which ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in December, 1985;

Whereas North Korea, after ratifying the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, refused until 1992 to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as required under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

Whereas International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of North Korea's nuclear materials indicate that North Korea has produced more bomb-grade material than it has declared;

Whereas North Korea has not given a scientifically satisfactory explanation of this discrepancy;

Whereas North Korea has refused to provide International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors full access to two sites for the purposes of verifying its compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Whereas, under pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide this full access, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, effective June 11; and

Whereas this withdrawal is unprecedented in the history of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and undermines the strength of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved that the Senate (with the House of Representatives concurring)--

(1) strongly supports the International Atomic Energy Agency's right to conduct inspections of any site in a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(2) condemns North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(3) urges the United States Security Council to insist that North Korea provide the International Atomic Energy Agency with full access before its official withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on June 12, 1993;

(4) urges the United States Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea, should it continue to refuse to provide this access; and

(5) calls on the President of the United States and the International community to take steps to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

• [Begin insert]

While North Korea signed the treaty in 1985, it did not allow inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] until last year. These inspections are integral to safeguarding fissionable material under the terms of the treaty. When the inspectors found that North Korea had produced more bomb-grade material than it had declared, the North Korean Government was unable to give any scientifically plausible explanation for the discrepancy. When the inspectors followed up with requests for access to sites not listed by the government, they were rebuffed.

Mr. President, at a time when nuclear weapons in the United States and the former Soviet Union are being reduced, North Korea and other radical states are attempting to secretly develop their own nuclear capabilities. Indeed, as a member in good standing of the IAEA. North Korea received technical assistance, including equipment and training from the IAEA, while developing their clandestine nuclear weapons program. This Congress must strongly support the right of the IAEA to conduct inspections in accordance with the treaty, and should call on the President and the international community to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This Congress must send a clear and unambiguous message to those nations pursuing nuclear capacities that such actions will not be tolerated. This Congress and the administration must be prepared to pursue sanctions against North Korea, should that nation continue to refuse to abide by the terms of the treaty. This resolution is intended to send such a message.

• [End insert]

END