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[Page: E637]

• Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, last Friday, North Korea announced that it will withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty rather than accept the required verification measures.

• Today, I am introducing legislation condemning North Korea's decision and urging the United Nations to take action, such as sanctions, if the North doesn't reconsider.

• North Korea has been stalling on its nonproliferation commitments for a long time. It acceded to the treaty in December 1985, but refused to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency inspections--required by the NPT--until last year.

• When IAEA inspections finally occurred, significant discrepancies arose. Evidence indicated that the North Koreans have produced more plutonium than they had declared. This is a serious matter, since it only takes about 10 pounds of plutonium to make a bomb.

• The IAEA sought access to two additional sites where it suspected North Korea was storing additional nuclear waste. Evidence of this waste would demonstrate that Pyongyang was still hiding part of its nuclear program. North Korea refused allow the IAEA to inspect these facilities, claiming they were military sites unrelated to its nuclear program.

• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states are obligated to accept IAEA safeguards on all of their source or bomb-grade nuclear material. The IAEA has the right to inspect any facility--even if its not an officially declared nuclear facility--in order to verify that all of this material is in fact under safeguards.

• In Iraq, the IAEA failed to rise to this challenge. The Agency failed to detect Saddam Hussein's elaborate clandestine nuclear weapons program. In North Korea the Agency--to its credit--was a little more aggressive in seeking access to these two undeclared sites. At the end of February, the IAEA Board of Governors gave North Korea a 1 month deadline to let the inspectors examine the two sites. Last Friday, North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, effective after the required 3 months notice had elapsed.

• This is a very disturbing event, since it strongly points in the direction of North Korea having an advanced nuclear weapons program. In the 23 years since the treaty went into force, none of the other 155 countries party to the treaty has ever made such a decision, not even Iraq. The international community must put strong pressure on North Korea to remain party to the treaty and to accept the treaty's obligations.

• This is also an extremely important test case of the IAEA's effectiveness. If the IAEA backs down and fails to get access to all suspect sites in North Korea, it can hardly expect to have any better luck in other countries with questionable activities like Iran. If the IAEA can only go where the host country allows it, we'll have Iraqs all over again and very limited enforcement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

• During the next 3 months, before any official withdrawal can take place, North Korea is still obligated to allow IAEA inspectors to examine suspect sites which may contain undeclared nuclear material. The United Nations Security Council must ensure that either North Korea reverses its position and remains party to the treaty-accepting all its obligations--or that it provides the IAEA with full access before it formally withdraws. One way or another, we must get to the bottom of North Korea's nuclear program. Pyongyang has made an international commitment to come clean on all its activities. The United Nations must make it carry out this promise, imposing economic sanctions if necessary.

• My resolution urges the United Nations to take these steps. It also supports the IAEA's efforts to get to the bottom of the North Korea situation--a welcome change from its attitude towards Iraq before the gulf war. Finally, the resolution calls for the President and the international community to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime. This must be a major foreign policy priority for the United States over the next 2 years running up to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

• One final point. You might wonder what sanctions can accomplish against a country as isolated as North Korea. In fiscal year 1991, the Department of Commerce licensed $1.2 billion worth of exports from the United States to North Korea--$1.2 billion.

• These exports included such items as: zirconium metal (used in nuclear fuel rods), oscilloscopes, computing equipment, lasers, electronic measuring/calibrating/testing equipment, and chemicals.

• The justification is that these high technology items are for medical or other humanitarian purposes. But by their very nature, dual-use items can be used for military activities as well, like building nuclear weapons or Scud-C missiles. What prevents North Korea from using these items for other, illicit purposes? This sounds like Iraq all over again.

• The World Trade Center blast is nothing compared to what even a poorly constructed first generation nuclear weapon would do. We can't sit back and let terrorist states acquire the ultimate weapon. We must increase the international pressure.

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which 156 states are party, is the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime;

Whereas nonnuclear weapon states that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are obligated to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all source or special fissionable material within their territory, under their jurisdiction, or carried out under their control anywhere;

Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency is permitted to conduct inspections in a nonnuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of any site, whether or not declared by that state, to ensure that all source or special fissionable material in that country is under safeguards;

Whereas North Korea is a nonnuclear weapon state which acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in December 1985;

Whereas North Korea, after acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, refused until 1992 to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as required under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Whereas International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of North Korea's nuclear materials strongly suggest that North Korea has produced more bomb-grade material than it has declared;

Whereas North Korea has not given a scientifically satisfactory explanation of this discrepancy;

Whereas North Korea refused to provide International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors full access to 2 sites for the purposes of verifying its compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Whereas, when called upon by the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide such full access as required by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, effective after the required three months notice; and

Whereas such withdrawal is unprecedented in the history of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and undermines the strength of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress--

(1) strongly supports the International Atomic Energy Agency's right to conduct inspections of any site in a nonnuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(2) condemns North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(3) urges the United Nations Security Council to insist that North Korea provide the International Atomic Energy Agency with full access before its official withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons takes place;

(4) urges the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea, should it continue to refuse to provide this access; and

(5) calls on the President of the United States and the international community to take steps to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

[Page: E638]

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