DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR AND ARMS CONTROL, 05/14/1992, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19920820
- Chairperson:
- J. Johnston
- Committee:
- Senate Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- Q92AC211
- Hearing Date:
- 19920514
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP
SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR AND ARMS CONTROL
- Witness Name:
- R. Claytor
-
Hearing Text:
-
Statement of Richard Claytor
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
U.S. Department of Energy
FY 1993 Appropriations Hearings
May 14, 1992
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you
today to testify in support of the Defense Programs (DP) portion of the
Department of Energy's (DOE) FY 1993 Budget Request for Atomic Energy
Defense Activities.
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW
Over the past 3 years, the world has undergone breathtaking changes. The
changes include the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet
Union; the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction to
conflict-prone "Third World" regions; the significant reduction in the
number and types of nuclear weapons, accelerated by the President's
initiatives in his speech of September 27, 1991, and his State of the
Union Address on January 28, 1992; the emphasis on full compliance with
laws, regulations, and accepted standards in the nuclear weapons complex;
the expectation by the U.S. public of a "peace dividend;" and significant
budgetary constraints. These changes have opened up opportunities and
created challenges rivaling the greatest in our history with the result
that, for the first time since 1945, the United States is not building any
nuclear weapons.
These changes have had a profound effect on the missions and priorities of
Defense Programs. The diminishing strategic military threat to the United
States has allowed the President to make significant reductions in the
size and structure of our nuclear deterrent. This, in turn, has allowed us
to commence a significant reduction and restructuring of the nuclear
weapons complex, while focusing on environmental cleanup. At the same
time, the reduced strategic threat requires us to pay greater attention to
other aspects of national security, such as the growing threat of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The overriding challenge to
the Office of Defense Programs at this historical turning point is
effective execution of our mission in the face of no current or planned
new weapons production workloads and increasingly constrained defense
funding.
MISSION AND PRIORITIES
The Defense Programs mission is to provide and maintain safe, secure,
reliable, and survivable nuclear weapons, as required by the Department of
Defense and approved by the President, in a safe, secure, environmentally
sound, and cost-effective manner. Within the framework of this mission,
emphasis, at least in the near-term, will shift to activities related to
warhead retirement and dismantlement; reconfiguration of the nuclear
weapons complex; continuing improvements to the safety and security of the
enduring weapons stockpile; nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;
preparation for ultimate decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of
excess facilities; and the transfer of technology between our weapons
complex and the commercial sector to enhance U.S. competitiveness. At the
same time, in an uncertain world, we must maintain nuclear competence in
our production complex, in our nuclear weapons laboratories, and continue
a modest number of underground nuclear tests to assure the integrity of
the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
STOCKPILE MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE/MODERNIZATION/DISMANTLEMENT
Even with the President's bold initiatives in September and in the State
of the Union address, the United States retains a credible nuclear
deterrent. However, the smaller stockpile projected for the Nation's
future will depend even more heavily on adequate surveillance to assure
its reliability since there will be fewer weapons as well as fewer weapon
types in the stockpile.
As we downsize the weapons production complex through consolidation,
stockpile maintenance and evaluation will be a principal means by.which we
define and maintain nuclear production competence through the transition
period to the smaller, less diverse complex of the future. The
President's initiatives have also accelerated the retirement,
dismantlement, and disposal of a large number of weapons in the nuclear
arsenal. This will present a challenging workload involving both the
weapons production complex and the laboratories. The numbers and many
different types of weapons being dismantled will result in one of our key
facilities working to capacity through most of the 1990's. The plants and
the laboratories have both readjusted their priorities to emphasize work
in support of accelerated warhead dismantlement, storage and disposal, and
in related areas of verification and nonproliferation, in support of the
President's initiatives.
CHANGING ROLES OF THE WEAPONS LABORATORIES
The weapons-laboratories' defense Research and Development (R&D)
activities historically have provided the primary scientific and
technological underpinning for the U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence. The
laboratories were originally created to design, develop, and test nuclear
weapons in support of the U.S. defense strategy. As the nuclear weapons
complex matured, the roles of these laboratories broadened into all facets
of weapons design, development, production support, stockpile maintenance,
and stockpile improvement. The laboratories have also evolved into
multi-programmatic and multi-disciplinary facilities that have a broad
range of national research and development priorities consistent with the
broad range of DOE missions.
Now, their missions are shifting rapidly. Yet even with this changing
situation, an important near-term mission must be to maintain nuclear
competence. We need a viable Weapons Research, Development and Testing
program to assure the ability to deal effectively with major reductions in
nuclear weapons, support the enduring stockpile, and insure against
technological surprise by a potential adversary. This is nuclear technical
competence -- a core of competencies in nuclear weapons technologies and
disciplines -- that is at the heart of the laboratories. Nuclear
competence allows us to provide for the stockpile, and it is also the
foundation for technological leadership for reconfiguration activities.
Competence will assure us the ability to design and test new weapons
systems if they are needed; provide the rigorous technological base needed
for enhanced nonproliferation and arms control activities; and provide the
well-spring from which new technological initiatives for commercialization
may arise.
We have already shifted substantial resources -- about $120 million for FY
1993 -- from weapons development to other activities. The funds will be
used to enhance the laboratories' R&D activities to emphasize intrinsic
safety and security of nuclear warheads, build-down and survivability of
the nuclear arsenal, accelerated warhead retirements and dismantlements,
and support to the enduring stockpile.
In addition to the Core missions, the laboratories will assist in
developing cost-effective designs for Complex 21 and provide technological
leadership of Reconfiguration activities. They will provide laboratory
support for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management programs, with
special attention to waste minimization. In conjunction with DOE's Office
of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, the laboratories will carry out
enhanced nonproliferation and arms control initiatives integrating DOE
functions in policy, intelligence, and nuclear technologies.
Finally, we will continue to consolidate functions among laboratories to
support a single integrated nuclear weapons program achieving maximum cost
effectiveness while preserving competition where necessary.
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING
Recently a nuclear testing moratorium bill (H.R. 3636) was introduced in
Congress. It has been asserted that the massive cutback in strategic and
tactical nuclear forces, as outlined in the President's September 27,
1991, speech and State of the Union message, calls into question the need
for further nuclear testing. It has also been asserted that a nuclear
testing moratorium would cause Third World nations with intentions to
develop nuclear weapons to forego their efforts. The President's
initiatives will greatly reduce the overall size of the U.S. stockpile,
but will not obviate the need to conduct a modest number of nuclear tests.
The United States has already significantly reduced its level of nuclear
testing to the lowest point since the early 1950s, with the exception
of the 1958-61 test moratorium.
The credibility of our deterrent is dependent upon underground nuclear
testing to underwrite the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of our
nuclear weapons stockpile and demonstrate the survivability of our
weapons systems. There have been occurrences in modern U.S. nuclear
weapons designs that have required nuclear tests of stockpile warheads
to resolve problems. Furthermore, nuclear-tests have uncovered a number
of weapon system vulnerabilities and deficiencies which could not be
predicted analytically. A dramatic example of this involved a low
temperature extreme test of the warhead for the air-launched cruise
missile. The test results were a complete surprise in that the warhead
exploded with only a fraction of its design yield. The weapon had been
tested extensively in nonnuclear hydrodynamic tests, even at the low
temperature extreme, with no indication of trouble. A design change was
made to the warhead and it was tested successfully a year later.
Testing is also essential to ensure the safety of the enduring stockpile.
The Drell Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety recommended that the United
States strike a new balance between "the desired military characteristics
of nuclear weapons and requirements for enhanced safety." To do so, the
United States should give greater emphasis to designs that would make
nuclear weapons "as safe as practically achievable." There are ho current
plans to build new designs. However, we are planning to develop pit re-use
technology and weapons designs with enhanced safety as the means to ensure
the viability of the enduring stockpile. Our efforts will ensure that this
enduring capability is maintained with minimal consequences to the
environment and with even greater assurance of safety for the U.S. public.
We know how to develop such enhanced safety designs, but to do so will
require nuclear testing.
As additional examples, the development of InsensitiVe High Explosives
(IHE) for use in our nuclear weapons required a substantial number of
tests throughout the 1970s. Likewise, development of Fire Resistant Pits
(FRP), a warhead capable of withstanding the heat of a fire without
dispersing plutonium, has been going on for the past several years.
Several nuclear tests have been required to get us to the point where
specially designed nuclear weapons now are fire resistant against certain
types of accident scenarios. More tests are required to examine further
applications of fire resistant pits to other types of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons are among the most complex engineering and physics
challenges and among the most serious responsibilities mankind has
created. While advances in three-dimensional computer modeling have
markedly increased our ability to understand and predict nuclear
weapons and systems performance, underground nuclear testing experience
has shown that computer modeling, by itself, is not sufficient to
provide full assurance of weapons reliability and safety. Underground
nuclear testing is essential to provide the requisite assurance that these
weapons can fulfill their purpose of deterrence safely and reliably.
The United States must continue to test. We test only as much as
required for our security. A halt to nuclear testing would not eliminate
nuclear weapons nor would it increase international security. Saddam
Hussein would have proceeded with his nuclear weapons development
irrespective of any U.S. decision to stop testing. A halt in testing would
erode U.S. confidence in our remaining nuclear deterrent and would
severely restrict our ability to make improvements in nuclear weapon
safety.
K-REACTOR VIABILITY
Since August 1988, the Production Reactor at the Savannah River Site has
been in extended outage while we have addressed safety concerns. Our
objective was, and is, to ensure we can provide reliable tritium
production capability in a manner that protects the safety and health of
the workers, the public, and the environment. As Defense Secretary Cheney
outlined in a recent letter to the Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee and members of this Committee, in the interest of national
security, we Must have in place a viable production source of tritium
until we are assured of a new and reliable long-term tritium production
source in the first decade of the next century.
On December 13, 1991, I authorized restart of the K-Reactor following
an extensive 3-year effort to significantly upgrade hardware, procedures,
and personnel training. The Department responded to recommendations from
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, which carried out extensive
reviews and meetings, including public hearings on restart preparation
activities. On December 14, safety equipment testing began for the
K-Reactor. We discovered a problem with the safety rods on December 16 and
had completed repairing those anomalies by December 24.
On December 24 we discovered that one of the reactors' heat exchangers was
leaking primary coolant water into the Savannah River. Approximately 150
gallons (containing 6,000 curies) of tritiated water escaped from the
K-Reactor plant. The leak started on December 22. The release resulted
from mechanical failure of one of the tubes in one of the plant's twelve
heat exchangers. Subsequent investigation determined that the leak was
caused by a small hole in the side of one of the 9,000 stainless steel
tubes in the failed heat exchanger. Other tubes showed no special wear
problems.
The leak, while not posing any health hazard, nonetheless led to several
corrective actions to prevent a recurrence of such a release. We have
replaced three heat exchangers, improved procedures and training, and
installed in-line tritium monitoring equipment, the development of which
was underway prior to the leak. We now sample water leaving the plant
every two hours at the reactor site, whereas we had been testing water
samples twice a day at a laboratory distant from the reactor site. We also
have completed an investigation into the event, an environmental analysis,
a metallurgical evaluation of the heat exchanger tube failure, and a
technical evaluation of heat exchanger integrity. The Department has
briefed the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) on the causes
and corrective actions related to the heat exchanger incident.
As the Secretary has previously acknowledged, we made a mistake in
handling this incident. We did not detect the leak soon enough, did not
effectively handle the public information exchange with the area
communities, and we allowed too long a period to elapse before local
officials were fully apprised of all aspects of this event. Fortunately,
the release had no adverse effects on the environment or the health of the
citizens of the area. In fact, the individual exposure was estimated to be
less than 2 percent of the environmental protection agency drinking water
standard of 4 millirems per year. To help preclude recurrence, we have put
in place a much more rapid response program to ensure real-time
communication with all concerned parties.
On May 5, the Secretary authorized resumption of restart activities at
the Savannah River Site. The Department will now proceed with the power
ascension test program, which is expected to take 2-3 months. Completing
the power ascension test now is vital to ensure that all modification,
training, and procedure upgrades have been correctly implemented. This
also allows us to identify any additional modifications so that we can
make them during the outage for tying in the cooling tower. Following
completion of the power ascension test program, the reactor will be shut
down to replace the safety rods, replace heat exchangers, and tie-in the
cooling tower.
The decision to move forward with the cooling tower tie-in immediately
after the relatively short test phase demonstrates the Department's
commitment to minimize environmental impacts from facility operation.
This plan also helps ensure that all safety and operational issues are
satisfactorily identified and resolved prior to commencing sustained
reactor demonstration. The outage is expected to take 7-8 months, after
which we plan to run the reactor (at a 30-percent power level) to
demonstrate its capability to produce tritium. Subsequently, we plan to
place K-Reactor in a low-cost standby mode until we are assured of having
in place a new and reliable long-term tritium production source.
FUTURE OF ROCKY FLATS PLANT
Following the suspension of plutonium operations at the Rocky Flats Plant
(RFP) in November 1989, and concurrent with the change of the management
and operating contractor, significant efforts were undertaken to improve
maintenance, testing, and operation of the plutonium facilities at the
plant. The Department had planned sequential resumption of plutonium
operations in six buildings, leading to plutonium pit production for new
weapons builds, as soon as required safety improvements were made and
demonstrated to the Secretary's satisfaction and to that of the
appropriate internal and external oversight authorities.
In light of the President's recent decision to cancel new production of
the W88 Trident II Warhead, there are now no Department of Defense
requirements that would require DOE to produce plutonium pits.
Accordingly, DOE is beginning the transition of the Rocky Flats Plant
(RFP) from nuclear production activities toward cleanup of the plant,
leading to its ultimate Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D).
Although plutonium production operations have been suspended since
November 1989, a substantial amount of activity has been ongoing at the
RFP. Production of required nonnuclear components has continued and
accounted for about 25 percent of the total operating expenditures of $1.6
billion for FY 1990-1992. Of the remaining $1.2 billion, over 90 percent
of the expenditures have been for environmental compliance and cleanup
activities, security of materials, and safety improvements. Most of these
funds would have been required even if no plutonium production work had
ever been planned.
Improvements have been completed in Building 559, an analytical laboratory
that is needed for both production support and waste management functions.
Following confirmation of these improvements by an Operational Readiness
Review (ORR), and after detailed assessments and public hearings by the
DNFSB, The Secretary authorized resumption of operations in this building
on February 4, 1992. On April 16 we achieved a significant milestone at
Rocky Flats operations in Building 559. Operator and equipment
qualification exercises without plutonium have been completed and actual
plutonium chemistry is now being performed for final qualifications under
closely supervised conditions. The plutonium start-up test plan schedules
7 weeks of plutonium qualification and proficiency operations, including
drills. These test operations are being reviewed by members of the Defense
Programs Operational Readiness review team, with oversight from the
offices of Nuclear Safety and Environment, Safety and Health. Also
observing the operations are Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Representatives. This building is required to support the various cleanup
operations at the RFP into the foreseeable future.
Similar improvements are well underway in Building 707, formerly the main
fabrication facility. Upon completion of these improvements, this facility
will be placed in an appropriate contingency status pending final
resolution of the complex reconfiguration plan and schedule. We will begin
to transition the remaining plutonium facilities to a condition suitable
for turnover to Environmental Restoration and Waste Management. We are
also about to begin operational improvements in Building 371. This
building will then play a central role in the Department's plans for
complying with the State of Colorado's regulations on residues and for the
D&D of RFP.
The many improvements that were made during the more than two years that
plutonium production operations were curtailed have resulted in
significant improvements in the operational and safety culture at the
plant. Moreover, the improvements are an investment in the ultimate
cleanup effort and have set the stage for a more efficient transition of
the facility to D&D. In addition, the process has been a model for DOE's
renewed commitment to constructive involvement with outside oversight
groups, state and local governments, and the public.
RECONFIGURATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX
In January 1989, prior to Secretary Watkins' appointment as Secretary
of Energy, the Department reported to Congress its intent to modernize
and expand the nuclear weapons complex to support the Nation's nuclear
deterrent. At that time the Department was planning to reactivate three
reactors at Savannah River, which were shut down for safety concerns in
1988; maintain a backup reactor at Hanford; and site two new production
reactors (NPR), each of a different design.
After assuming office in early 1989, the Secretary directed that the
plans for modernization be reevaluated in light of the changing world
situation. Further direction was provided in August 1990 that resulted
in publication of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study in February
1991. This study called for a reconfigured weapons complex that would
be smaller, less diverse, and more economical but would safely and
reliably support the nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives consistent
with the realities of the emerging international security environment.
In February 1991, work began on a Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS) to analyze a range of reasonable alternative
configurations for Complex 21. The Department will use the PEIS process
to help develop a comprehensive reconfiguration plan. The draft PEIS is
now scheduled for release in December 1992, followed by a final PEIS
and a Record of Decision (ROD) in August 1993.
On November 1, 1991, Admiral Watkins announced that the Department would
defer a decision on the NPR site and technology and include the
environmental analysis for the NPR in the PEIS for reconfiguration of the
nuclear weapons complex. Combining these efforts will permit maintaining
both reactor design teams at minimum levels while allowing time to
adequately consider the impact of the changes in requirements resulting
from the President's September 27, 1991, and State of the Union
initiatives. The added time will allow the Department to demonstrate the
technical viability of K-Reactor, the only current production source for
tritium, and examine other alternatives for tritium production, such as
linear accelerators, that simply were not possible on the previous
schedule. As a result of this deferment, the FY 1992 and FY 1993 funding
for the NPR program has been reduced and a significant portion of the
savings will be applied to needed environmental restoration and cleanup
activities.
We are now presented with a unique opportunity to begin the transition
that we all desire to a smaller, less diverse, and more economical
weapons complex without the concurrent pressure to sustain a large new
weapons production workload. We plan to begin this process with the
consolidation of our nonnuclear weapons production activities. The
Kansas City Plant is the preferred alternative site for consolidation
of most nonnuclear component production activities. The Department is
performing an Environmental Assessment of the nonnuclear consolidation
alternatives in accordance with NEPA. If the Department determines that
there is no significant environmental impact, we will begin a 3-year
program to phase out our nonnuclear production operations at the Rocky
Flats Plant by the end of FY 1994, and at the Mound and Pinellas
facilities by the end of FY 1995, and transfer most of these activities to
Kansas City or other existing facilities. The consolidation of these
activities is expected to save the taxpayers between $150 and $200 million
annually when fully implemented. Let me emphasize, at this time no final
decisions have been made.
WORKER RETRAINING
The Department is developing a comprehensive retraining and relocation
program to help retrain workers as appropriate for now missions, such as
environmental cleanup; help relocate workers to other DOE and contractor
activities if available; and work with State and local officials to
incorporate workers into local economies whenever possible.
As the Weapons production mission diminishes at sites like Rocky Flats,
Mound, and Pinellas, the Environmental Restoration and Waste Management
mission at these sites is expected to steadily in.crease to reflect the
transition of facilities from an operating configuration to one where the
facility is ready for decontamination and decommissioning. Over the next
6 months, each site will be conducting a task analysis including an
identification of the skill base necessary for an orderly transition to an
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management mission.
The Department's intention is, to the greatest extent practical, to
retrain and utilize the workforce to carry out this new mission. For
example, at the Fernald Plant in Ohio, all bargaining unit employees
will be offered employment with the new contractor being acquired to
manage the clean-up contractor at comparable salary and employee
benefit levels. The new contractor will also be directed to hire as
many salaried personnel as it can effectively employ. Administrative and
support personnel not presently trained to perform clean-up work and who
will not be retained by the new contractor must be afforded the
opportunity for retraining. This will make these workers more
knowledgeable in remediation techniques and environmental requirements so
that they can not only be reconsidered as vacancies occur but also become
qualified for employment with other specialized remediation companies
working on government or commercial sites.
However, in some instances, a portion of the workforce may not be needed.
In those cases, the Department will work with State and local
organizations to identify job skills which may be needed within the
surrounding area, including other DOE facilities. In parallel with this
effort the Department intends to develop a DOE contractor-wide vacancy
system to match job skills with job opportunities within the entire DOE
complex. Furthermore, we will work with our contractor management to
provide incentives for early retirement and for voluntary separations. We
will also provide outplacement assistance such as resume preparation,
counseling, assistance for job search and tuition payment for retraining.
Coordination with the Department of Labor to draw upon funding set aside
for defense-related facilities to provide for retraining, education,
recruitment and placement, relocation and counseling assistance is
planned. We will also coordinate with the Economic Development
Administration to help State and local governments obtain Economic
Adjustment Program grants (with 25 percent match) for community impact
assistance, drawing upon funding earmarked for defense-related facilities.
These funds may be used for a wide range of development activities
including modification and alternative uses of facilities, expansion of
community businesses and creation of other new jobs.
DOWNSIZING THE WEAPONS COMPLEX
As these types of reductions in the weapons complex are made in the
future, the Department will need to undertake a significant effort to
retain the nuclear competency skills necessary for a reduced nuclear
weapons stockpile and to minimize the local economic impact of
programmatic reductions and closure of facilities. During this interim
period of transition, the requirements placed on the existing complex
will still be significant. We must still continue to achieve and maintain
compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, and DOE Orders. We will
continue to make improvements in the conduct of all of our operations. As
demonstrated at the Fernald site, the Department is committed to a safe
and orderly transition of these sites to an Environmental Restoration ind
Waste Management mission.
CONTINUING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW CULTURE
Since issuance of the Secretary's 10 Point Plan in June 1989 to create
a new culture of accountability, great strides have been made. Defense
Programs, its laboratories, and its contractors have educated a
significant portion of their staffs in ihe principles and concepts of the
conduct of operations and the need for compliance with DOE Orders. We have
demonstrated and will continue to demonstrate that environment, safety,
and health often takes priority over production and that the two are
compatible. The capability for the line managers to perform
self-assessment has greatly improved. Given the great changes occurring in
our mission, we now have the opportunity to incorporate the new culture
into the reconfigured complex and long-term maintenance of the DP complex.
A substantial level of funding will still be needed to continue
implementation of the new culture. A strong conduct of operations and
thrust for excellence introduced at the inception of reconfiguration will
assure a cost-effective, quality operation in which environment, safety,
and health priorities will become the expected way of doing business.
TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION
Defense Programs will launch a series of broad new initiatives in FY 1993
which is expected to have a positive economic impact in the United States.
Advanced computer technologies will be generated by work conducted under
a model Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between DOE
and the Computer Systems Policy Project (CSPP), an affiliation of chief
executive officers of 12 of the largest American computer companies.
Subject to the availability of adequate funding, additional breakthroughs
are possible through collaborative R&D to be conducted by DP laboratories
in tandem with major automobile manufacturers, machine tool firms,
flat-panel display consortia, integrated circuit manufacturers, and
advanced materials producers.
The strategic direction of our Technology Commercialization programs will
be dictated by industry. Several measures have been and will be taken to
ensure this "industry pull" exists. For example, industry advisory
committees are planned to support our Technology Commercialization
process, keeping us focused on industrial needs and economic realities.
In support of this vision, we will continue to forge new relationships
with private industry. The CSPP model CRADA, signed on March 20, 1992,
is an important example. Also, we have been actively working with the
Specialty Metals Processing Consortium (SMPC) and the National Center for
Manufacturing Sciences (NCMS).
On April 23, the Department signed with the NCMS an umbrella CRADA to
allow NCMS member companies to access the unclassified technologies and
capabilities of the DOE defense complex under faster, more streamlined
procedures aimed at Joint programs with mutual benefit to DOE and the
individual companies.
International competitiveness in high-technology industries requires rapid
development of new ideas. Therefore, DOE is working to streamline the
negotiation of CRADA's and the funding of corresponding projects. One
important step is now being taken: initiating strategic teamwork among the
weapons laboratories. This teamwork will allow private-sector firms to
identify the most appropriate laboratory - or combination of laboratories
- for a specific technology or capability. Moreover, laboratory teamwork
will enhance our response to "industry pull" by providing a more broad,
yet unified, set of capabilities.
We will continue to improve the effectiveness of our Technology
Commercialization programs. Funding for these programs has grown to $50
million in FY 1992. We have received more than 100 proposals for FY
1992 collaborative projects; 43 have been selected for funding. Industry
interest continues to grow. In addition, in the FY 1993 budget amendment
which you should be receiving shortly we hope to increase significantly
the $91 million already requested for technology commercialization in the
FY 1993 AEDA budget.
Although the Technology Commercialization budget is small in comparison to
commercial R&D funding, we believe that by investing in the
commercialization of weapons laboratory technologies and capabilities the
American taxpayer can realize returns on investment significantly higher
than those earned today on independent research in the private sector.
FISCAL YEAR 1993 BUDGET REQUEST
DEFENSE PROGRAMS
FISCAL YEAR 1993 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE $2,894 $2,515 a/ $2,511 b/
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & TESTING 1,742 1,944 c/ 1.862 c/
(Includes Technology Comm.)
WEAPONS PROGRAM DIRECTION 106 164 356
(Includes Reconfiguration)
MATERIALS PRODUCTION 2,236 1,877 1,777
TOTAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS $6,978 $6,500 $6,506
AS SPENT (WITH CARRYOVER) $6,851 $6,627 $6,506
a/ Does not reflect $127 million spending carryover from FY 1991.
b/ Does not include full impact of potential workload funding adjustments
currently under review as a result of the President's State of the
Union Address.
c/ RD&T numbers do not reflect planned carryover of $26 million.
The FY 1993 budget request for DP is reduced by 1.8 percent from FY 1992
spending levels. Overall, this is a reduction in real growth of about 6
percent. The most significant reductions are in the Production and
Surveillance and Materials Production program which decline 9 percent in
real terms from FY 1992, which I will cover in detail later in my
statement. The Research, Development and Testing (RD&T) account will
decline 8 percent in real terms. Our budget request reflects reduced
expenditures for capital equipment and construction in all programs, with
new starts related primarily to safety and health issues.
Although most accounts trend downward in FY 1993, there are two growth
areas: Technology Commercialization and Weapons Complex Reconfiguration.
Increased emphasis is planned for technology transfer to industry in
several high technology areas, including microelectronics, high speed
computing, and advanced ceramics. This budget request for Technology
Commercialization activities is contained within the RD&T line, and
increases to $91 million, $41 million over the FY 1992 level.
Weapons Complex Reconfiguration funding is currently contained in the
Weapons Program Direction line. The request for FY 1993 is $173 million,
which is substantially higher than the FY 1992 level. This includes
funding for a reconfiguration line item for nonnuclear manufacturing
consolidation and to begin Title I engineering for the nuclear facilities
consolidation following the Record of Decision scheduled for August 1993.
The outyear funding projections for Defense Programs include no growth
at the bottom line for our programs. We will accommodate growth areas,
such as reconfiguration, at the expense of other ongoing efforts.
Finally, it is important to note that the budget request for FY 1993
remains in the structure appropriated in FY 1992. This structure does not
take into account the new Defense Programs organization, nor does it allow
us to identify explicitly funding in "functional" areas such as
environment, safety, and health in all of our program activities. We are
working with the Department's Chief Financial Officer to examine these
issues and propose changes to the Department's current budget structure
targeted for the FY 1994-1995 budget submittal. The Department will keep
the Congress fully informed about these proposed changes as we work to
make the budget and reporting structure as responsive as possible to both
the Department's priorities and management needs, and the need for
comprehensive and current congressional oversight of our operations.
The next major section covers the DP budget request in detail, by
appropriation. It includes a discussion of program accomplishments during
the past year and a detailed discussion of the budget justification.
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING
The nuclear weapons RD&T complex consists of several key elements,
including highly competent scientists, engineers and technicians,
specialized equipment, and facilities. The Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Sandia National
Laboratories (SNL), and the Nevada Test Site (NTS) constitute the RD&T
complex. These elements form the core of the RD&T program. The program is
maintained to assure the ability to support evolving stockpile
requirements, develop improved nuclear weapons surety features, and
provide technical support for Complex 21 reconfiguration activities.
The RD&T program, and the weapons laboratories specifically, are being
reoriented to comply with recent Presidential initiatives. The
laboratories are also currently undergoing a detailed review to examine
what can be done to streamline and consolidate laboratory activities to
reduce costs, without sacrificing technological effectiveness.
There are specific mission changes in the FY 1993 budget related to
the weapons laboratories. Reduced funding requirements for weapons
development -- about $12O million -- have been reallocated within RD&T
to enhance efforts in support of the President's initiatives. The
redirection of R&D work will emphasize efforts related to warhead
dismantlement, storage and disposal technology, nuclear non-proliferation,
waste minimization and treatment, transportation and storage, technology
commercialization and planning and management support of improved
procedures and risk assessment. Underlying these changing missions and
priorities is an effort to stabilize R&D employment at the laboratories-at
about the FY 1991 level, although the Weapons workforce supporting the
laboratories Testing programs will continue to decline. Laboratory
full-time equivalents levels have declined by almost 24 percent between FY
1987 and FY 1993.
In a changing world, it is difficult to predict which technological
options will be needed in the future. The technological superiority we
have traditionally had can only be maintained if we support a Weapons
Research, Development and Testing program appropriately sized and
oriented to accommodate change. Research, Development and Testing
capabilities that are perceived to be strong and viable are required to
maintain strategy options, foster nuclear competence, and enhance the
safety and security of the enduring stockpile.
As long as there is a stockpile, the emphasis on improving nuclear weapons
surety will remain paramount. We must continue to upgrade the stockpile as
safety-related technologies become available. Weapons surety starts in the
design, testing, and production cycles with measures to prevent accidents
and extends to the control and handling of nuclear weapons and other
procedures designed to avoid loss or diversion to unauthorized persons.
We will also continue to conduct underground nuclear tests at the NTS.
These tests are a crucial component of weapons research and development
and while they are essential to demonstrate weapons system performance,
they are equally important in retaining a competent RD&T workforce since
scientists and engineers must exercise their skills in order to retain
them. The weapons program will maintain a level of testing consistent
with programmatic needs, including the need to-maintain nuclear design
competence. While the overall number of nuclear tests will likely not
increase significantly over the level planned for FY 1993, a finite
number of nuclear tests must be conducted annually so that we will have
confidence in our stockpiled weapons and can improve the level of
safety and reliability of the stockpile.
The threat assessment capability of the RD&T complex remains an important
part of the program. Not only must we strive to never be surprised
technologically, but we must also be prepared to respond to new threats as
they arise. The threat assessment program attempts to address and
understand the multitude of potential threats to our national security
interests.
The FY 1993 budget includes an aggressive program related to technology
commercialization. Major FY 1993 laboratory/industry collaborations have
been planned with the U.S. computer and semiconductor industries. A major
program is also planned with the U.S. companies in the development of new
ceramics.
AID TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
The Weapons program has the lead technical support role in providing
nuclear weapons surety assistance to the former Soviet Union. We will
provide, through the State Department, technical assistance on matters of
weapons transportation, disablement, use control, security, and the safe
storage of fissionable materials. Concrete measures are under active
bilateral discussion to determine the most effective means to provide
assistance.
FY 1991 ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ISSUES
Recent accomplishments in Weapons Research, Development and Testing are
presented below.
LABORATORY FACILITIES
Meeting the tough technical challenges and producing world class research
has been the hallmark of DOE's three weapons laboratories over the years.
During the past 3 years, our RD&T complex has been responding to a new set
of challenges, the need to improve the quality of facility and site
operations. Confronting these challenges is necessary regardless of the
scope and direction of any possible programmatic mission change within the
RD&T complex.
Tiger Team assessments were conducted at Sandia National Laboratories,
Albuquerque (SNL); and at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). These
assessments were preceded by extensive and critical self-assessments. The
Laboratories' self-assessments were frank discussions of root cause
failings and management weaknesses.
The SNL assessment took place in the April/May 1991 timeframe, and has
been followed up by the development of a Corrective Action Plan that is
in the final stages of Departmental review. Sandia's Corrective Action
Plan was approved by the Secretary on March 27, 1992. The plan reflects
an estimated cost of about $223 million and a schedule that will cover
6 years FY 1992 through FY 1997. The FY 1993 portion of the Corrective
Action Plan is estimated to be about $40 million and is included in the
Department's budget request.
The LANL Tiger Team assessment started in late September 1991, and was
concluded in early November 1991. The development of a Corrective Action
Plan is currently in its initial stages and is slated for completion in
late summer or early fall 1992.
Execution of approved Tiger Team Corrective Action Plans continues at
the DOE Nevada Field Office (NV), LLNL, and Sandia National Laboratories,
Livermore (SNLL). At NV about 37 percent of actions have been completed.
LLNL has completed about 55 percent of its Corrective Action Plan and at
SNLL, about 42 percent of the corrective actions have been completed.
To give a much needed focus and perspective to our efforts to strengthen
the operations and line management oversight activities of our facilities,
DP initiated a disciplined and structured approach to identify specific
DOE Order requirements, assess their applicability, determine the degree
of compliance with the requirement, and identify and schedule the
necessary measures to come into compliance. Within the RD&T Complex this
DOE Order compliance self-assessment is being undertaken using a "graded
approach" starting with selected facilities at the laboratories and the
NTS. The "back end" of this process, the establishment and approval of
Schedule Compliance Agreements, will, to a large measure, influence and
frame resource requirements over the next several years.
STRENGTHENING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING LINE MANAGEMENT
Positive measures are continuing to strengthen line management oversight
in our RD&T facilities. On site presence at LANL and LLNL has been
solidified and enhanced by the establishment of DOE Facility
Representative Programs. Coverage of these programs will be expanded over
the next few years.
Another fundamental step toward improving the conduct and quality of our
RD&T facilities and site operations was taken during the past year. Formal
conduct of operations programs and implementation plans were developed by
the three weapons laboratories. These programs are based on DOE's
adaptation of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations guidelines for the
conduct of operations. These plans were presented to and approved by DP.
As the nuclear weapons program is reoriented, our RD&T facilities and our
ability to operate them in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound
manner will be tested. New operations, or changes to existing operations
may be required to support changing RD&T missions and programs. In most
cases, these types of changes require redefinition of operational safety
envelopes and development of new procedures.
The changing scene in the weapons program also points out the need to
proceed with closure, deactivation, and consolidation of some of our
facilities and operations, for example: the closure of tritium operations
in Technical Area 33 at LANL; the eventual closure and deactivation of
tritium facilities at LLNL and SNLL; the downsizing of plutonium
operations at LLNL and their eventual consolidation into plutonium
operations at LANL; and the consolidation of nuclear materials storage at
LANL, a key action in the completion of the Chemistry and.Metallurgy
Research Building upgrade program.
Of course, overlaying all of this is the continuing challenge to enhance
our line management oversight so that ES&H, as well as other operational
expectations, are met.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
In the area of emergency preparedness and response, activities were
conducted to maintain and enhance the Department's capability for
responding to a nuclear weapons accident, malevolent nuclear incident,
or other significant accident or incident involving radioactive material
worldwide. During the past year, the Department's Atmospheric Release
Advisory Capability (ARAC) -provided direct support of activities
addressing the Mt. Pinatubo volcano eruption, Kuwait oil fires, and other
DOD efforts in the Persian Gulf.
The President's initiatives to decrease the nuclear stockpile will result
in increased movement of weapons throughout the U.S. and abroad. These
activities will increase the risk of an incident for which our emergency
response capabilities must be prepared to deal. For this very important
reason, we are focusing management attention and resources in this area so
that we are prepared to respond quickly and effectively to any nuclear
emergency.
TEST BAN READINESS PROGRAM
The DOE is required by Section 1436 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 1989 to provide an annual report on the status of the Nuclear
Test Ban Readiness Program. The Third Annual Test Ban Readiness Report
(1991) is currently being prepared.
Section 1436 requires three areas to be addressed in the report: stockpile
inspection and nonexplosive testing; remanufacturing of existing nuclear
weapons; and research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and
engineering. Even though progress was made during the past year in all the
specified areas, current understanding is inadequate to support devising
a program that can assure continued stockpile reliability, or a credible
deterrent, in the event of significant further limitations on nuclear
testing. Moreover, a review of FY 1991's activities does not reveal any
specific technical achievement that would permit early attainment of the
program objectives.
WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
TOTAL FUNDING
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993 FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 W/CARRYOVER REQUEST W/CARRYOVER
OPERATING EXPENSES $1,032.2 $1,182.6 $1,156.6 $1,142.9 $1,168.9
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 109.7 127.5 127.5 103.8 103.8
CONSTRUCTION 100.3 122.5 122.5 141.5 141.5
TOTAL R&D BUDGET $1,242.2 $1,432.6 $1,406.6 $1,388.2 $1,414.2
LABORATORY MANPOWER
WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS)
FY 1991 FY 1993 FY 1993
APPROP. FY 1992 REQUEST W/CARRYOVER
LLNL 2,613 2,684 2,768 2,831
LANL 1,983 2,074 1,903 1,960
SNL 2,766 2,862 2,486 2,571
TOTAL R&D BUDGET 7,362 7,620 7,157 7,362
ACTUAL/PROJECTION 7,529 7,415 --- 7,362
A principal objective in DOE's management of the laboratories is to
stabilize the employment level supported by DP funding. To that end, the
FY 1993 budget request incorporates a carryover of $26.0 million from FY
1992 to level R&D laboratory employment at about 7,362 full-time
equivalents, which is comparable to FY 1991 for R&D. Overall, however, the
level of RD&T employment continues downward, attributable to the declining
level of effort in the underground testing program.
Fiscal Year 1991 end-of-year employment was higher than projected, in
anticipation of increased FY 1992 appropriations. Because we do not expect
to sustain that higher level in FY 1993, a decision was made to
carryover $26 million into FY 1993. The FTE's now projected for FY 1092
are 7,415; this provides an orderly ramp down to FY 1993.
WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
TOTAL CORE OPERATING
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
OPERATING EXPENSES
TECHNOLOGY BASE $ 414.8 $ 519.5 $ 536.2
WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, ENGINEERING
AND CERTIFICATION 346.3 339.0 219.4
SPECIAL PROJECTS 69.2 87.5 89.1
TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION 20.0 38.6 91.0
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 24.0 32.7 32.9
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES $ 874.3 $1,017.3 $ 968.6
The general thrust of the FY 1993 budget proposal for Core R&D is
to maintain support for the major nuclear weapons related missions and
to apply those resources freed by diminished near-term weapon system
design and engineering requirements to areas of new or enhanced activities
as mentioned previously. Stabilizing the level of laboratory employment
funded by weapons Research and Development at least until such time as
future mission needs are more definitely understood, continues to be a
prime objective. The challenge is to define the future, and then
restructure the laboratories to meet that future while maintaining the
unique expertise essential to viable nuclear competence.
The overall operating expense level for R&D declines about 3 percent from
the FY 1992 level; however, we will seek to achieve about the FY 1991
level of R&D funded laboratory employment overall by utilizing $26.0
million of FY 1992 funding as discussed earlier.
Technology Base funding is requested at $536.2 million. This represents
a 3 percent increase over the FY 1992 level and a 29 percent increase over
FY 1991. The technology base effort is the foundation of the program. Most
importantly, it consists of a unique team of scientific and engineering
experts in nuclear weapons design and technology. Maintaining the nuclear
competence of this team and a stable employment level are crucial
elements. The second component of the technology base is the unique array
of highly specialized research facilities. These facilities are crucial in
maintaining our nuclear technological edge and must be maintained to keep
up with major advances in underlying science and technology. The
technology base consists of fundamental research in specific areas of
science and engineering where new understanding is required to resolve
unknowns or problem areas.
Weapons Development, Engineering, and Certification funding is requested
at $219.4 million, about a 35 percent reduction from the FY 1992 level.
This activity is responsible for improving safety and security of all
nuclear weapons in the stockpile, maintaining weapons reliability, and for
providing new weapons options. Within available resources in FY 1993,
efforts will support stockpile maintenance and emphasis will be on
developing a smaller, safer, more secure, and effective stockpile;
accelerated warhead dismantlement; long-term staging and storage and
disposal. There will also be support to the former Soviet Union in
dismantlement process technology.
Special projects funding is requested at $89.1 million, about a 2 percent
increase over the FY 1992 level. This activity supports the Research and
Development program including efforts related to improved hardware systems
and procedures for the protection of nuclear weapons and strategic
quantities of special nuclear material during shipment and storage. The
increase in this area is for support of laboratory ES&H activities
directly related to the program and maintenance of critical laboratory
capabilities and facilities.
Technology Commercialization funding for FY 1993 is requested at $91
million, a significant increase over the FY 1992 level of $50
million. This increase will allow us to engage in more large
cooperative projects in critical technology areas while continuing
programs started in previous years.
Emergency Preparedness funding is requested at $32.9 million, which is
basically the same funding as for FY 1992. This program includes
maintenance, operations, and enhancement of the Nuclear Emergency Search
Team capability; Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
activities; the Aerial Measurements System; and the Atmospheric Release
Advisory Capability.
WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CORE CAPITAL EQUIPMENT SUMMARY
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
R&D Core Program
R&D Basic Equipment $ 46.9 $ 69.8 $ 53.6
R&D Computers 45.7 28.1 29.5
Total R&D Core Program 92.6 97.9 83.1
The total R&D capital equipment request is for $103.8 million. This
includes $83.1 million for the R&D Core program, and $20.7 million for the
Inertial Fusion (IF) program.
For the R&D program, the basic equipment request of $53.6 million supports
the highest priority needs. At the three weapons laboratories, LANL, LLNL,
and SNL, there are nine major items of equipment requested. For R&D
computers, the $29.5 million request supports seven major items of
computer equipment at the three weapons laboratories.
WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
CONSTRUCTION SUMMARY
($ IN MILLION)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
Programmatic Construction
Revitalization $ 78.2 $ 94.3 $119.5
R&D - GPP 20.0 21.4 21.0
Subtotal Programmatic 98.2 115.7 140.5
Safeguards and Security 2.1 6.8 1.0
Total R&D Construction $100.3 $122.5 $141.5
The construction request for R&D is $141.5 million. General plant projects
(GPP) construction remains at about the same level as FY 1992. The
revitalization program, initiated in FY 1984 to provide for the
construction -of new facilities and modifications, relocations, and
additions to existing RD&T facilities, request for FY 1993 is $119.5
million. Under Revitalization $18.8 million is for construction subproject
starts proposed for R&D, primarily to redress safety related issues.
WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
CONSTRUCTION NEW STARTS
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993 FUTURE
TEC REQUEST YEARS
92-D-102 NUCLEAR WEAPONS
RD&T FACILITIES REVITALIZATION
PHASE IV, VL
- GAS LINE REPLACEMENT, PHASE B, $ 5.8 $ 5.8 $ 0
LANL
- STATIC VAR COMPENSATOR, LANL 9.2 2.9 6.3
- WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, NV 13.2 3.3 9.9
- ATMOSPHERIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE
FACILITY, LLNL 11.3 4.0 7.3
- DORMITORIES, NV 4.7 2.8 1.9
TOTAL R&D NEW STARTS $44.2 $18.8 $ 25.4
The Gas Line Replacement, LANL, is required to replace the last section
of 130 miles of natural gas pipeline that serves LANL. The FY 1993 request
is for $5.8 million.
The Static Var Compensator, LANL, provides for installation of a
thyristor- controlled static volt ampere reactive (VAR) compensator
required by LANL electric power transmission and distribution system. The
FY 1993 request is for $2.9 million.
The Water Distribution Systems, NV, provides for expansion and upgrades
to permanent water distribution systems supporting major weapons testing
and support areas of the NTS. The FY 1993 request is for $3.3 million.
The Atmospheric Emergency Response Facility, LLNL, is an office and
research building which will provide operations support space for the
Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC). The FY 1993 request is for
$4.0 million.
The dormitories subproject at NV, provides for two 16,500 square-feet
dormitories containing 53 single occupancy accommodations. The FY 1993
request is for $2.8 million.
WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CONSTRUCTION
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993 FUTURE
TEC REQUEST YEARS
R&D S&S CONSTRUCTION $ 15.3 $ 1.0 $ 0
The FY 1993 request includes $1.0 million to continue our efforts to
improve the overall safeguards and security posture. The FY 1993 request
is for project 88-D-104 Safeguards and Security Upgrade, Phase II, LANL.
This project provides for four major categories of safeguards and security
upgrades: emergency perimeter fencing; physical security; special nuclear
materials (SNM) monitoring; and substantial computing network equipment
upgrades. Phase II is for continuation of improvements to the security of
SNM and classified information at LANL.
WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
INERTIAL FUSION
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
OPERATING EXPENSE
GAS LASER $ 10.9 $ 11.8 $ 11.0
GLASS LASER 102.3 106.4 117.7
PULSED POWER 29.3 31.5 30.0
SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES 15.4 15.6 15.6
SUBTOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES $ 157.9 $ 165.3 $ 174.3
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 17.1 29.5 20.7
SUBTOTAL, INERTIAL FUSION $ 175.0 $ 194.8 $ 195.0
The FY 1993 budget request for Inertial Fusion (IF) is $174.3
million for operating expenses and $20.7 million for capital equipment,
for a total request of $195 million. This program conducts experiments and
develops high-power drivers to explore certain physics processes related
to nuclear weapons. This is a multi-laboratory, experimental and
theoretical effort with a near-term goal of achieving ignition and modest
gain in a laboratory ignition facility. The long-term goal is to advance
certain weapons physics simulation and effects capabilities and provide
information on high-gain target behavior useful in civilian electric power
applications. The Inertial Fusion program is planned to maintain about the
FY 1992 level of effort in FY 1993. Operating funding is allocated to
continue efforts directed toward expeditious demonstration of ignition and
gain, in accordance with the National Academy of Sciences'
recommendations. A major review of the Pulsed Power program is scheduled
for summer 1992 and will provide additional direction for this program's
efforts in FY 1993. The Department continues to work through the San
Francisco Field Office to closeout contract obligations with KMS Fusion,
Inc., the former ta?get fabrication contractor. The IF capital equipment
request of $20.7 million includes $13.1 million to continue the OMEGA
laser upgrade at the University of Rochester. This supports a project
completion date of 1995.
WEAPONS TESTING
TOTAL FUNDING
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
OPERATING EXPENSES $ 457.3 $ 457.5 $ 429.5
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 31.5 34.5 31.1
CONSTRUCTION 10.7 19.4 13.3
TOTAL WEAPONS TESTING $ 499.5 $ 511.4 $ 473.9
LABORATORY MANPOWER
WEAPONS TESTING
(FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS)
FY 1993
TESTING FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
LLNL 543 517 447
LANL 438 420 407
SNL 368 343 306
TOTAL TESTING 1,349 1,280 1,160
Underground nuclear testing is a critical component in our overall
weapons R&D. As a result of the President's nuclear weapons initiative,
testing to ensure confidence in a smaller, less diverse stockpile and
in computational modeling is of increased importance since any problem
could affect a greater portion of the stockpile. Weapons testing
represents the highest priority experimental program of the R&D effort.
Principal program objectives are to: evaluate and maintain confidence
in the performance and safety of stockpile weapons; understand and
predict the behavior of nuclear weapons systems; investigate new
designs;-develop safer, more secure, and effective weapons; develop
nuclear designs with components that can be manufactured with less
waste and environmental impact; and ensure the survivability of weapons
and other military assets.
WEAPONS TESTING
OPERATING EXPENSES
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
OPERATING EXPENSES
TECHNOLOGY BASE $ 140.1 $ 147.7 $ 102.8
WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, ENGINEERING
AND CERTIFICATION 129.0 127.7 133.0
TESTING CAPABILITIES 183.2 177.1 188.4
MARSHALL ISLANDS 5.0 5.0 5.3
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES $ 457.3 $ 457.5 $ 429.5
The FY 1993 budget request for Weapons Testing supports fewer tests than
in FY 1992. Stabilizing the program and maximizing the data returned from
each experiment are near-term goals.
The technology base component of the Testing program supports R&D efforts
to explore new weapons concepts and improve our understanding of the
physical processes relevant to the nuclear weapons design. If additional
restrictions are placed on nuclear testing, There will be a greater
reliance on our current understanding of the performance of nuclear
weapons.
The weapons development,.engineering, and certification effort supports
work in the current stockpile and near-term improvements to the stockpile.
After an experimental device is chosen for a weapons system,-nuclear tests
assure device performance reliability and ensure that the weapons are
militarily useful, survivable, and includes the most effective safety
features. Testing capabilities include activities necessary to maintain
and enhance our capability to conduct underground nuclear tests at NTS and
to conduct nonnuclear tests and field experiments elsewhere in support of
NTS activities.
The Marshall Islands Program is carried out by the Assistant Secretary for
ES&H through the Office of Health Physics and Industrial Hygiene Programs.
This program provides continued medical surveillance of people and the
environment, restoration, and resettlement of the Marshall Islands. This
category does not provide for underground nuclear tests.
WEAPONS TESTING
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
BASIC EQUIPMENT $ 31.6 $ 34.5 $ 30.6
MARSHALL ISLANDS 0 0 .5
TOTAL CAPITAL EQUIPMENT $ 31.6 $ 34.5 $ 31.1
The request for basic equipment includes two helicopters with a TEC of
$7.6 million. There is also a major item of automated data processing
equipment requested at $0.6 million. There is also $0.5 million capital
equipment requested to support Marshall Island activity.
WEAPONS TESTING
CONSTRUCTION
($ IN MILLION)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
CONSTRUCTION
93-D-102, NEVADA SUPPORT
FACILITY, NV $ 0 $ 0 $ 2.0
GPD-101,.GPP, VL 6.4 7.4 7.7
85-0-105, COMBINED DEVICE ASSEMBLY
FACILITY, NV 4.2 12.0 3.6
TOTAL TESTING CONSTRUCTION $ 10.7 $ 19.4 $ 13.3
The construction request includes one new start, Project 93-D-102;
Nevada Support Facility with a $36.6 million TEC. The FY 1993 request
is for $2 million. This project will provide a new support facility of
approximately 164,000 square feet and its related utilities to consolidate
NV staff in a cost effective alternative to leased space. Work will also
continue in the Combined Device Assembly Facility at NV. The FY 1993
funding is requested to continue and allow completion of construction,
inspection, and procurement of special and standard equipment. There is
also a $7.7 million FY 1993 request for GPP at various locations.
WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE
The nuclear weapons Production and Surveillance (P&S) complex is made
up of seven government-owned, contractor-operated production facilities.
These facilities are the Pantex Plant, the Rocky Flats Plant, the Y-12
Plant, the Savannah River Tritium Facility, the Kansas City Plant, the
Mound Plant, and the Pinellas Plant. The components and products are moved
between plant sites in a safe, secure transportation system.
The President's initiatives to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile have
had significant near-term and long-term effects on the weapons P&S
complex. First, there has been a substantial and permanent reduction in
new weapons builds throughout the planning period. Second, the rate of
weapons retirements has accelerated with a corresponding near-term
increase in warhead disposal activities. Finally, consolidation of
nonnuclear manufacturing operations has been initiated.
The schedule for future weapons deliveries was impacted by the President's
recent initiatives on nuclear weapons. Key elements include: (1)
elimination of the ground-launched, short-range weapons inventory (systems
affected include artillery shells and the Lance Missile); (2) withdrawal
of all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and attack submarines
as well as those weapons associated with land based naval aircraft
(systems affected include: Sea Launched Cruise Missile, strike bombs, and
depth bombs); (3) removal of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)
scheduled for deactivation under Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
and all bombers from alert status. Elimination of ICBM's will be
accelerated once the START Treaty is ratified (systems affected:
strategic bombs, Air Launched Cruise Missiles and Minuteman II); (4)
cancellation of the replacement for the nuclear Short Range Attack Missile
(SRAM) on the strategic bomber and the tactical variant (systems affected:
SRAM II and SRAM-T); (5) halt in production of the W88 Trident II warhead;
(6) no new weapons systems were added to those scheduled for disposal
(except the W79-1 artillery shell); and (7) acceleration of the rate of
scheduled retirements.
The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP), signed by the President,
directs requirements for retirements. All warheads that are retired are
scheduled for eventual dismantlement. The FY 1991-96 NWSP, issued in July
1991, required a significant increase in weapons disassemblies. To meet
this demand, the Department of Energy (DOE) increased capacity at Pantex
to dispose of 1,800 weapons in FY 1992 and 2,000 weapons in FY 1993. The
President's initiative to decrease the stockpile will cause the
dismantlement backlog to increase further. This will require DOE to work
at the 2,000 per year disassembly rate longer than originally planned.
Where possible, these actions have been reflected in the FY 1993 budget
request. Following the reductions announced in the President's State of
the Union Address, Secretary Watkins announced the Department would be
submitting a budget amendment to reduce P&S spending by about $200
million. That amendment is not yet reflected in the budget figures. The
proposed funding reductions will require closing facilities and reducing
the workforce throughout the production plants. Reduced P&S funding will
also mean a slower rate of DOE Order compliance at a time of increasing
pressures to achieve improvements in the conduct of all operations. Most
significantly, reduced funding will result in some decline in nuclear
competence at a time when there is great uncertainty about what will be
expected of the nuclear weapons production complex in the future. What
constitutes minimum competency is of critical importance in bringing us
through this transition period, and we must work to minimize any adverse
impacts for the production complex.
Production and Surveillance accomplishments during FY 1991, included
continued production activities for the W88 warhead for the Trident II
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile System and delivery of the B61-10
tactical bomb. While the Department completed delivery of the B61-10,
this was not a new build, but a conversion from the W85/Pershing II
warhead. In terms of programs completed in FY 1991 (disposal) these
included the following systems, B43, W44, W50, and the W85.
In FY 1991, the P&S program emphasized implementing the Secretary's new
culture. The program operated under the philosophy that there is no higher
priority than safety, environment, and the health of DOE employees and the
public. Compliance with laws, regulations, and DOE guidance that safeguard
the public and provide security for nuclear materials and weapons
components was equally supported. The weapons production complex took
significant strides in meeting the challenges of the new culture by
performing critical self-assessments, responding to Tiger Team
assessments, and developing and initiating corrective action plans that
have resulted in a new discipline and conduct of operation at all sites.
There was a collective commitment to bringing environment, safety and
health into the forefront of plant operations throughout the complex.
Tiger Team corrective action plans and follow-on self-assessment programs
provided a strong foundation for ES&H improvements.
The FY 1992 Defense Authorization House Report 102-311 requires a report
to Congress on nuclear weapons matters to both the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees. The report is currently in preparation and will cover
the nuclear weapons stockpile; tritium supply, production, and demand;
warhead reuse; and operation of the Rocky Flats Plant.
WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE
TOTAL FUNDING
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
Enacted Enacted As Spent Request
OPERATING EXPENSES $2,492.7 $2,273.9 $2,401.4 $2,323.2
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 114.1 87.9 87.9 80.7
CONSTRUCTION 307.1 153.6 153.6 162.4
TOTAL $2,913.9 $2,515.4 $2,642.9 $2,566.3
PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND-SUPPORT $ 852.7 $ 768.4 $ 713.6
ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH 292.3 313.5 351.1
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY 182.1 193.1 195.0
UTILITIES, PLANT ENGINEERING
AND MAINTENANCE 396.0 451.6 424.7
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 368.0 401.5 372.3
OTHER COSTS 274.2 273.2 266.5
SUPPLEMENTAL ADJUSTMENT 127.4 (127.4) 0
SUBTOTAL, P&S OPERATING EXPENSES $2,492.7 $2,273.9 $2,323.2
The functional programs within the P&S operating expense category are
summarized below.
The weapons production support request for FY 1993 is $713.6 million
which represents a 7 percent decrease from FY 1992 level. This category
includes activities such as processing, fabrication, assembly, evaluation,
maintenance, dismantlement and disposal of nuclear weapons, and supporting
activities including quality supervision and control, quality assurance,
facility startup and standby, process development and other mission
support. The FY 1993 request reflects substantial savings from workload
eliminated by the President's nuclear weapon reduction initiatives as
announced on September 27, 1991. Further reductions announced January 28,
1992, are not reflected in the budget figures. The emphasis of this
program will correspondingly shift from fabrication and assembly of
warheads to dismantlement and disposal activities. Stockpile maintenance
and surveillance activities will continue with emphasis on safety,
security, reliability, environmental soundness, and cost effectiveness.
The ES&H request for FY 1993 is $351.1 million. This represents about
a 12 percent increase over FY 1992 and is the only area that reflects
real growth. Program requirements in these areas are driven by Federal,
State and local laws and regulations and DOE directives. Environmental
activities .include auditing and evaluation, effluent and environmental
monitoring and surveillance, air release activities, water discharge
activities, solid waste activities, and permitting. A large portion of
the growth in this program is at Y-12 and results from implementation
of the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment Agreement in
Principle. Waste Management activities include refuse collection,
handling, removal, disposal, and plant sanitation. The Health program
supports those activities required for industrial hygiene, radiological
protection, and occupational medicine. Safety activities are concerned
with fire protection, industrial safety, nuclear facility safety,
packaging certification, facility safety design, and risk management.
The Safeguards and Security request for FY 1993 is $195 million. This is
essentially flat when compared to FY 1992 as this program has experienced
significant growth in FY 1991 and FY 1992, and progress has been made in
remediating,deficiencies identified by Security Inspection and Evaluation
reviews and operating in accordance with Master Safeguards and Security
Agreements. This program provides for nuclear material control and
accountability activities, physical security, technical security, and
personnel activities.
The Utilities, Plant Engineering, and Maintenance request is $424.7
million. This is approximately a 6 percent decrease compared to FY 1992 as
engineering activities in support of construction efforts within the
production complex have been stabilized pending a complex reconfiguration
decision in August 1993. The plant engineering program supports activities
such as: preliminary cost estimate, preliminary design proposals,
conceptual designs, cost/schedule control, value engineering, and
computer-aided design/computer- aided engineering. The utilities program
support activities are required to provide electricity, fuels, water,
sewer, and utility support services. Normal escalation increases within
this program in FY 1993 are offset by energy conservation and
implementation of competitively bid contracts. The maintenance program
includes manufacturing related maintenance, equipment maintenance,
facilities maintenance, and plant maintenance.
The Management and Administration request is $372.3 million, which. is
a 7 percent reduction from FY 1992 resulting from efforts to downsize
the production complex. This program includes general management and
administrative functions such as financial management, personnel,
industrial relations, public relations, contractor award fees, mail
services, payment of State and local taxes as well as management and
administration of operational surety and nonweapons quality assurance
activities.
The request for other costs totals $266.5 million, a 2 percent reduction
from FY 1992. Included in this category is the Emergency Operations
program, which experiences an 11 percent growth over FY 1992 driven by a
Secretarial initiative to enhance the capability of the Accident Response
Group that responds to emergencies involving weapons or radioactive
material. Also included in this category is the safe, secure
transportation program which provides for transporting weapons, weapons
components, and materials from DOE production plants and storage sites or
other final destinations. A 3-year expansion of fleet, couriers, and
vehicles was completed in FY 1992 to implement changes in air shipment
policies. The FY 1993 request adds additional couriers and fleet
maintenance costs resulting from expanded use of ground transportation,
for safety reasons, first, but also to accommodate the large workload due
to the increased numbers of weapons being retired. Lastly, this category
includes the Federal support program which provides for management and
oversight of the production complex. The reduced request is based on lower
requirements for contractual support.
WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT SUMMARY
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
BASIC EQUIPMENT $ 98.2 $ 75.2 $ 65.2
P&S COMPUTERS 15.9 12.7 15.5
TOTAL $ 114.1 $ 87.9 $ 80.7
Capital Equipment for weapons P&S is reduced about 8 percent compared to
FY 1992. The request provides for basic equipment and major automated data
equipment. This request provides the minimum level of support to prevent
further increases in obsolete and worn-out equipment. There are four major
items of equipment requested: (1) Electron Beam Welder, Kansas City Plant,
TEC $1.2 million; (2) Arc Sawing System, Y-12 Plant, TEC $1.5 million; (3)
Automated Measurement Instrument, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
TEC $1.2 million; and (4) Negative Pressure Chilled Water, LANL, TEC $1.5
million.
WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE
CONSTRUCTION SUMMARY
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
PROGRAMMATIC CONSTRUCTION
WEAPONS SYSTEMS $ 13.4 $ 0 $ 0
FACILITY CAPABILITY ASSURANCE
PROGRAM 106.8 47.5 87.1
PRODUCTION SUPPORT FACILITIES 72.7 12.9 4.8
GENERAL PLANT PROJECTS 26.1 34.7 27.4
TOTAL PROGRAMMATIC CONSTRUCTION 219.0 95.1 119.3
ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH 19.2 25.0 43.1
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY 68.9 33.5 0
TOTAL P&S CONSTRUCTION $ 307.1 $ 153.6 $ 162.4
The request for P&S construction totals $162.4 million. During the FY 1993
budget cycle, the Department completed a review of all construction
activities within the production complex. Those included in this request
are considered necessary despite the reduced workload and a pending
reconfiguration decision. There are four new project starts. The first is
Life Safety Upgrades at the Y-12 Plant which will provide upgrading and
modernization of fire protection systems, electrical equipment, mechanical
systems, and emergency electrical generators, which provide power for
critical life safety systems. This project is part of a program which is
intended to upgrade the Y-12 Plant's compliance with the National Fire
Protection Association codes relating to life safety. The scope of this
project extends to over 50 buildings at Y-12.
The three other new starts are under the Facilities Capability Assurance
Program (FCAP). At Rocky Flats, there is the Plutonium Facilities Heating
Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Restoration Project which will
restore aging heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems in 23
buildings. The revitalization of the HVAC and utility systems was critical
to continued plutonium operations and is still necessary to support waste
management and decontamination and decommissioning activities. At Y-12,
there is a project to replace deteriorated facilities, which will design
and construct production support facilities. The scope of this project
covers the demolition of three existing buildings and the decommissioning
of parts of three other buildings. The decommissioned space will be placed
in standby mode. The functions proposed for this are presently located in
six different buildings which will be over 50-years old when replaced.
Once completed, savings in operating costs can be realized as a result of
this consolidation and reduced maintenance. At the Kansas City Plant,
there is the Upgrade of Materials Engineering Laboratory, which will
upgrade 23,000 square feet of existing laboratory space and construct a
6,500 square foot addition. This laboratory is needed to evaluate
material properties and to develop material fabrication processes. The
existing laboratories suffer from severe overcrowding as the result of
continued expansion and addition of evaluation processes without
additional space. This situation will only worsen as the nonnuclear
consolidation plan matures.
WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE
FY 1993 CONSTRUCTION - NEW STARTS
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993 FUTURE
TEC REQUEST YEARS
93-D-122, LIFE SAFETY UPGRADES
Y-12 PLANT (ES&H) $ 34.3 $ 2.7 $ 31.6
88-D-122, SUBPROJECTS (FCAP)
PLUTONIUM FACILITIES HVAC
RESTORATION, RF PLANT 20.7 3.3 17.4
REPLACE DETERIORATED
FACILITIES, Y-12 PLANT 26.1 2.7 23.4
UPGRADE MATERIALS ENGINEERING
LABORATORY, KC PLANT 13.2 .5 12.7
TOTAL - PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE
NEW STARTS $ 94.3 $ 9.2 $ 85.1
MATERIALS PRODUCTION
Historically, funding for the Materials Production program provided for
the production of new or virgin plutonium and tritium in N-Reactor at
Richland, Washington, and the Savannah River Site (SRS) reactors at
Aiken, South Carolina. Additionally, spent fuels from the Navy's
nuclear propulsion reactors and from research reactors were reprocessed,
and the recovered uranium was recycled into DOE production reactors.
Currently, since there are no requirements for new weapons production,
no reactor production of new plutonium will be needed. Furthermore, the
return of large numbers of weapons for dismantlement will result in
large quantities of plutonium reserves in the form of retired pits.
Tritium requirements will be met primarily from recycle and from the
operation of one reactor, K-Reactor, if necessary. The FY 1993 budget
request reflects this strategy, and has been reduced to reflect the
decision to place the L-Reactor in a minimum maintenance condition and not
operate the New Special Recovery processing facility.
REACTOR STRATEGY
To briefly recap this strategy, the Secretary of Energy has determined
that at most only one of the three reactors, the K-Reactor, will be
needed to meet stockpile requirements. The L-Reactor will be maintained
in a long-term minimum maintenance condition. P-Reactor operation has
been terminated, and in August 1991 the Hanford N-Reactor was terminated
as a backup production source for tritium.
Since August 1988, the production reactors at SRS have been in an extended
outage while safety concerns are being addressed. Four principal areas for
improvement have been identified: design bases and system performance,
human performance, management systems and practices, and DOE on-site
technical vigilance and oversight. The DOE's objective is to assure that
its reactors can provide reliable nuclear materials production capability
in a manner that protects the safety and health of its workers and the
public, as well as the environment.
A Record of Decision (ROD) on Reactor Operations was issued on February
4, 1991. The ROD stated that DOE would continue to operate K- and
L-Reactors at SRS, and terminate operation of P-Reactor in the immediate
future. On December 9, 1991, the Secretary of Energy authorized the change
in L-Reactor status from a 1-year restart capability to a minimum
maintenance condition, which preserves the reactor so that it can be
safely restarted 3 or more years after a restart decision is made. On
December 13, 1991, the Secretary of Energy authorized the restart of
K-Reactor, P-Reactor has been defueled and placed in cold standby.
K-REACTOR
K-Reactor will be restarted to demonstrate, over an approximate 1-year
period devoted to significant testing, that it is a viable contingency
production source of tritium. The Department then plans to shut it down
and place it in a low-cost standby mode until we are assured of long-term
tritium availability from a new production reactor or other source.
During K-Reactor startup testing, problems were identified. with the
safety rod latch mechanisms and several of the 12 main heat exchangers
in the plant, one of which caused the leak of tritiated water. Defective
safety rod latches have been repaired and three heat exchangers have been
replaced. Resumption of the startup test program was authorized on May 5.
The Department is taking a deliberate and cautious approach to the startup
testing program to assure safe operation of the plant.
Per the Consent Order between the State of South Carolina and DOE, the
Department is authorized to operate K-Reactor until December 31, 1992,
pending completion and tie-in of the cooling tower, which is scheduled
for completion in the 4th quarter of FY 1992.
A lawsuit was filed by the Natural Resources Defense Council, under the
Clean Water Act, alleging that K-Reactor operation could not be resumed
until thermal discharge standards, requiring the completion of the
cooling tower, were met. On August 15, 1991, the South Carolina District
Court ruled that the plaintiffs had no standing in the court and also
denied the plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. On December 13,
1991, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
ruling on standing, but upheld the denial of preliminary injunction and
remanded the case back to the District Court for hearing.
PROCESSING STRATEGY
The plutonium facilities at SRS are now in a period of transition from
supporting reactor plutonium production to plutonium processing functions.
The New Special Recovery (NSR) Facility was scheduled for startup in FY
1992. The NSR Facility which would permit the recycle of plutonium from
retired weapons will not be started up until firm requirements clearly
mandate its need. Spent fuel containing plutonium and plutonium scrap will
not necessarily be disposed of as waste. Some of the plutonium may be
recovered to improve the ES&H aspects of the residual material in terms of
storage or disposal.
MATERIALS PRODUCTION
TOTAL FUNDING
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
ACTUAL APPROP. REQUEST
OPERATING EXPENSES:
REACTOR OPERATIONS $ 782.5 $ 584.4 $ 553.2
PROCESSING 629.0 530.2 522.5
SUPPORTING SERVICES 293.8 304.5 308.8
PROGRAM DIRECTION 42.5 43.2 66.5
ENRICHED MATERIAL 117.8 0 0
SUBTOTAL, OPERATING $1,865.6 $1,462.3 $1,451.0
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 105.6 91.2 83.9
CONSTRUCTION 276.9 323.4 241.8
TOTAL REQUEST $2,248.1 $1,876.9 $1,776.7
For FY 1993, the budget request for Materials Production is $1.77
billion. This is a decrease of $100 million from the FY 1992 appropriation
of $1.87 billion and reflects the continuing downward trend due to
declining demand for nuclear materials.
Some of the major program decisions embodied in the FY 1993 budget
submission are the decision to place L-Reactor in a minimum maintenance
condition; the decision to not operate the New Special Recovery Facility
within the F-Canyon processing facility at SRS; and the construction
ramp-down of the Fuel Processing Restoration Project at the DOE Idaho
Field Office (ID).
The budget submission also reflects the commitment to the Department
of Energy's operating philosophy, which requires that all facilities
operate in a manner protective of the safety and health of the workers and
the public, as well as the environment.
The budget request for Materials Production is organized by program
activities, and discussed below by site. The Savannah River Site funding
constitutes the major portion -- 80 percent -- of the budget request. The
Secretary's decision to phase out reprocessing operations at the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant and the Savannah River H-Canyon will result in
an immediate budget savings and is contained in the FY 1993 budget
amendment. The remaining 8 percent of the budget submission includes
production support at our DOE Oak Ridge Field Office, Y-12 Facility,
materials disposition activities, complex-wide support to SRS and ID, and
program administration costs.
MATERIALS PRODUCTION
SAVANNAH RIVER SITE
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
ACTUAL APPROP. REQUEST
OPERATING EXPENSES $1,224.6 $1,155.8 $1,160.6
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 76.0 59.5 61.7
CONSTRUCTION
FY 1993 PROJECT STARTS 0 0 3.8
FY 1992 PROJECT NEW STARTS 0 45.8 50.5
90-D-149 PLANT FIRE PROTECTION 13.1 39.0 44.2
86-D-149 PRODUCTIVITY RETENTION 42.4 33.5 18.4
ALL OTHER 94.6 90.8 66.1
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION 150.0 209.1 183.0
TOTAL REQUEST $1,450.6 $1,424.4 $1,405.3
Funding for the SRS remains essentially the same as last year. However,
operating expenses increase slightly to fund additional DOE Federal staff
at the site. This increase is more than offset by the reduction in new
project starts. The $3.8 million in new starts will fund three essential
ES&H projects on site.
The Department remains committed to resuming, as soon as possible, the
safe production of tritium at SRS in order to properly test systems
modifications and demonstrate that these facilities can continue to
provide material.
K-REACTOR
The FY 1993 budget request for K-Reactor assumes the startup and test
operation of the reactor as soon as the startup problems mentioned earlier
are corrected. Activities funded in FY 1993 will include routine
maintenance, fire protection, safety analysis upgrades, extended
maintenance of all vital electric, electronic and mechanical systems, and
ongoing initiatives to upgrade facilities to commercial nuclear standards.
Development of procedures and upgrades to training programs will continue.
Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board issues and recommendations will be
addressed. Funding for infrastructure and services such as electrical
power, steam, and domestic water will be required. Finally, indirect
charges for laboratory support, ES&H activities, and security services
will be incurred.
L-REACTOR
FY 1993 efforts at L-Reactor will involve the reactor's defueling;
shutdown of reactor equipment and systems in a protected condition to
prevent deterioration; and maintenance of the reactor in a defueled,
protected status, which would permit any future decision to refuel and
restart. Currently committed and planned L-Reactor upgrade activities
will be discontinued.
MISCELLANEOUS
The Department does not envision producing plutonium-239 in production
reactors for the foreseeable future. In addition, sufficient Pu 238
exists tb meet known and firm projected mission needs.
Operation of the Uranium Solidification Facility (USF) was suspended
in FY 1992 because of cost and schedule concerns. The USF project will
provide a facility at the SRS to convert uranium solution to a powder.
This conversion process is a key step in the recovery and recycle of
enriched uranium from irradiated reactor fuel elements. The recovery of
this material is highly beneficial from both a cost and a radioactive
waste minimization standpoint. Without operation of the USF, either
processing of reactor fuel would cease after all uranyl nitrate tanks
are filled or new tanks would have to be constructed. An additional $18
million for this project will be required in FY 19.92. The SRS budget
submission for FY 1993 also includes an additional $17 million for this
project, for a total estimated cost increase to the project of $36
million.
MATERIALS PRODUCTION
IDAHO CHEMICAL PROCESSING PLANT
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
ACTUAL APPROP. REQUEST
OPERATING EXPENSES $ 103.3 $ 138.2 $ 149.1
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 8.0 12.5 13.0
CONSTRUCTION
GENERAL PLANT PROJECTS 5.6 9.3 11.2
90-D-141 FIRE PROTECTION
UPGRADE 6.0 12.0 1.6
85-D-13g, FUEL PROCESSING
RESTORATION 87.5 82.7 40.5
TOTAL CONSTRUCTION 99.1 104.0 53.3
TOTAL REQUEST $ 210.4 $ 254.7 $ 215.4
On April 29, the Secretary announced his decision to phase out the
reprocessing of spent fuel by the Department. The Department submitted
this item as part of the FY 1993 budget amendment request to the Office
of Management and Budget. The decision to end reprocessing is based on
the dramatic initiatives by the President to reduce the nuclear weapons
stockpile and that enough HEU exists in the inventory and can be recycled
from retired weapons to meet projected needs for decades.
The termination of reprocessing of spent fuel will result in a change
in employment levels at the Idaho and Savannah River facilities. The
employment impacts at Idaho will mean the loss of approximately 500
construction project jobs and 550 operating jobs at the ICPP.
The reduction at the Savannah River Site's H-Canyon reprocessing plant
will occur over a 5 to 6 year period of time. No immediate impact is
expected. This will allow the plant to finish processing work required to
support the fuel needs for a scheduled NASA mission and to stabilize
liquid solutions currently stored in the H-Canyon.
MATERIALS PRODUCTION
ALL OTHER PROGRAMS
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993
ACTUAL APPROP. REQUEST
ALBUQUERQUE $ 31.9 $ 9.4 $ 11.7
OAK RIDGE 241.1 61.9 46.4
RICHLAND 228.4 42.6 51.7
SAN FRANCISCO 67.9 0.9 1.0
ALL OTHER 17.8 83.0 55.6
PROGRAM DIRECTION (7.2) (7.4) (14.5)
REPROGRAMMING RESERVE (0) (40.1) (0)
OPERATIONAL/TECHNICAL
SUPPORT (10.6) (38.5) (40.7)
TOTAL $ 587.1 $ 197.8 $ 156.0
The Materials Production budget requests $156 million for other DP sites.
Approximately $40 million is currently being retained in a Headquarters
reserve account in FY 1992 for reprogramming to the USF, to support the
current level of Federal staffing within the Materials Production program,
and to support increases to two essential security projects at SRS. After
adjusting for this reprogramming, the level of funding for all other
programs in FY 1993 is approximately the same level of funding as will be
expended for similar activities in FY 1992. These activities are discussed
below.
MATERIALS DISPOSITION
In FY 1991, the Department transferred a number of DP facilities to the
Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM). A portion
of the responsibility of the Materials Production program is to conduct
materials identification and characterization activities, as well as
provide for the safeguard and storage of nuclear materials remaining at
DOE facilities as a result of past DP operations, regardless of whether or
not DP has a continued presence at those sites. A total of $40.4 million
is requested for materials disposition activities.
OAK RIDGE
The FY 1993 request for Oak Ridge is $41.4 million, and includes funding
for the Y-12 Plant, Feed Materials Production Center at Fernald, and the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Funding at the Y-12 Plant continues
to decrease as the support to the SRS reactor operations for tritium
production decreases. Minor funding for materials disposition activities
at Fernald will continue to be required. The budget request for ORNL will
support a number of activities relating to the production, storage, and/or
distribution of miscellaneous nuclear material isotopes.
OTHER FUNDING ISSUES
I would like to bring to your attention two funding issues in which the
Department currently is involved relating to the previous DOE contract at
SRS with E.I. DuPont de Nemours (DuPont).
PENSION FUND CREDIT
Before Westinghouse became the prime contractor for the SRS, replacing
DuPont, the DOE and DuPont jointly managed a pension fund for DuPont
employees. Under the previous contract with DuPont, a pension fund was
established to cover all DuPont employees. The DOE has determined that
the pension fund was overcompensated by DuPont. DuPont and DOE have
completed negotiations to return $545 million plus interest from the
pension fund to the DOE. The Department estimates it will receive $400
million towards the repayment in FY 1993 and will apply those funds to
meet spending needs. This enabled the Department to reduce its
appropriation request for the Atomic Energy Defense Activities by $400
million.
SEVERANCE PAY LAWSUIT
In 1987, DuPont advised the Government that it would not seek renewal
of its contract. When Westinghouse assumed operation of the SRS in 1989,
they agreed to hire existing DuPont employees. DuPont submitted to the DOE
a claim for reimbursement of $64 million in severance pay which DuPont had
paid to its employees against the instructions of the DOE. The DOE denied
DuPonts' claim and DuPont filed suit in the U.S. claims court. The
conclusion of the claims court is that U.S. must comply with the terms
of its former contract, and must pay DuPont $64.4 million plus interest.
No money has been budgeted by DOE for payment of the severance pay claim.
The DOE is appealing the claims court decision to the Federal Circuit
Court.
WEAPONS PROGRAM DIRECTION
WEAPONS PROGRAM DIRECTION BUDGET
($ IN MILLIONS)
FY 1993
FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST
PROGRAM DIRECTION
OPERATING EXPENSES $ 104.7 $ 161.8 $ 325.9
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 1.7 2.2 3.9
CONSTRUCTION 0 0 26.0
TOTAL PROGRAM DIRECTION $ 106.4 $ 164.0 $ 355.8
Weapons Program Direction provides funds to support Federal staff
and the Department's effort to reconfigure the nuclear weapons complex.
Within the $355.8 million request, $182.7 million is necessary for
expenses related to Federal staff that will fund direct,personnel related
expenses, supporting services, and capital equipment at the following
locations: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs; Office
of the Deputy Science and Technology Advisor (Defense); Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Weapons Complex Reconfiguration; Rocky Flats Program Office;
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Resource Management;
Self-Assessment and Emergency Management; Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Military Application; DOE Albuquerque Field Office, DOE Nevada Field
Office, DOE San Francisco Field Office, and the Community Assistance
Program at Los Alamos, New Mexico. An increase of $44.7 million is
required to cover full-year salary requirements for increased staff
approved for FY 1992; increased Headquarters contractual support for
administrative and management implementation of DOE Orders and
instructions; and Defense Programs payments for a larger share of the
Headquarters overhead costs for space, supplies, telecommunications, etc.
The weapons complex reconfiguration activity within Program Direction is
$173.1 million of the $355.8 million request, an increase of $147.1
million over FY 1992. FY 1993 will see completion of the Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement for Reconfiguration, which will include the
environmental analysis for the New Production Reactor. Included in the
increase for Reconfiguration is $20 million for the development and
demonstration of emerging technologies to improve the operating efficiency
of the reconfigured complex and a planning estimate of $87.9 million ($20
million in construction funds) to begin consolidation of the nonnuclear
manufacturing facilities assuming a Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact.
SUMMARY
We must continue to support changing stockpile requirements and to
maintain nuclear competence in our production complex and weapons
laboratories so as to assure that we have a safe, secure, reliable, and
survivable nuclear deterrent. At the same time, we must disassemble
thousands of weapons being returned as a result of the President's
initiatives and manage the reclaimed nuclear materials. With the dramatic
world changes, the Department will have an increasingly important role to
play in the control of weapons of mass destruction, in helping to prevent
the spread of such weapons and in providing the technical support to an
enhanced intelligence program. Finally, the Department must carry out
these vital national security missions not only within a complex which is
safe, secure, and environmentally sound, but also within one which is
cost-effective, efficient and commensurate with a significantly reduced
nuclear weapons stockpile.
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