FY93 ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE REQUEST, 05/06/1992, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19920706
- Chairperson:
- S. Nunn
- Committee:
- Senate Arms Services
- Docfile Number:
- T92AC142
- Hearing Date:
- 19920506
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP
SUB
- Committee:
- Armed
- Hearing Subject:
- FY93 ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE REQUEST
- Witness Name:
- Secretary Watkins
-
Hearing Text:
-
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES D. WATKINS
SECRETARY OF ENERGY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
MAY 6, 1992
MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE
YOU TODAY TO PRESENT AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S FY 1993
BUDGET REQUEST FOR THOSE NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS FUNDED BY THE 050
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES ACCOUNT. PROGRAMS IN THIS CATEGORY ARE
ADMINISTERED BY THE OFFICES OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS; NEW PRODUCTION
REACTORS; ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT; ARMS
CONTROL; THE NAVAL REACTORS PROGRAM UNDER THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY;
SECURITY AFFAIRS; INTELLIGENCE; AND SECURITY EVALUATIONS UNDER THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH.
BUDGET REQUEST
OUR FY 1993 BUDGET REQUEST IS $12.1 BILLION, ABOUT A 2-PERCENT DECLINE
FROM FY 1992 WHEN ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION. THE BUDGET EMPHASIZES
MAINTAINING A REDUCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE AND DOWNSIZING THE
DEFENSE COMPLEX WHILE CONTINUING OUR COMMITMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL
RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES. TO REFLECT CHANGES IN THE
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE SUBMITTING A BUDGET
AMENDMENT TO FURTHER REDUCE THE FY 1993 REQUEST FOR WEAPONS PRODUCTION.
WITHIN THIS BUDGET, THERE IS A 24-PERCENT INCREASE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT TO SUPPORT OUR PRIORITY EFFORT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND CLEANUP.
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW
OVER THE PAST 3 YEARS, THE WORLD HAS UNDERGONE BREATHTAKING CHANGES.
THE CHANGES INCLUDE THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE
SOVIET UNION; THE POTENTIAL SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TO
CONFLICT-PRONE "THIRD WORLD" REGIONS; THE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE
NUMBER AND TYPES OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ACCELERATED BY THE
PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES IN HIS SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1991, AND HIS
STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 28, 1992; CONTINUED EMPHASIS
WITHIN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX ON FULL COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND ACCEPTED STANDARDS; AND SIGNIFICANT BUDGETARY
CONSTRAINTS. THESE CHANGES HAVE OPENED UP OPPORTUNITIES AND CREATED
CHALLENGES RIVALING THE GREATEST IN OUR HISTORY WITH THE RESULT THAT,
FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1945, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT BUILDING ANY
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
THESE CHANGES HAVE HAD A PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE MISSIONS AND PRIORITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. THE DIMINISHING STRATEGIC MILITARY THREAT
TO THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY ALLOWED THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE
SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF OUR NUCLEAR
DETERRENT. IF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) RESPONDS TO
HIS STATE OF THE UNION INITIATIVES, THERE WILL BE MORE. THIS, IN TURN,
HAS ALLOWED US TO BEGIN TO SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE AND RESTRUCTURE THE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX, WHILE FOCUSING ON ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP. AT
THE SAME TIME, THE REDUCED STRATEGIC THREAT REQUIRES US TO PAY GREATER
ATTENTION TO OTHER ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, SUCH AS THE GROWING
THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. BASED ON OUR
EFFORTS OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS AND THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE TO
IMPROVE THE CULTURE, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE
DEPARTMENT, I BELIEVE THE DOE IS NOW WELL POSITIONED TO ADDRESS THESE
CHANGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND CHALLENGES.
DEFENSE PROGRAMS MISSION AND PRIORITIES
THE DEFENSE PROGRAMS MISSION IS TO PROVIDE AND MAINTAIN SAFE, SECURE,
RELIABLE, AND SURVIVABLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS REQUIRED BY THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE AND APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT, IN AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND
AND COST-EFFECTIVE MANNER. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS MISSION,
EMPHASIS, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR TERM, WILL SHIFT TO ACTIVITIES RELATED
TO WARHEAD RETIREMENT AND DISMANTLEMENT; RECONFIGURATION OF THE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS COMPLEX; CONTINUING IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF
THE ENDURING WEAPONS STOCKPILE; NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
PREPARATION FOR ULTIMATE DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING (D&D) OF
EXCESS FACILITIES; AND THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY FROM THE WEAPONS
COMPLEX TO THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR TO ENHANCE U.S. COMPETITIVENESS. AT
THE SAME TIME, IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD, WE MUST MAINTAIN NUCLEAR
COMPETENCE IN OUR PRODUCTION COMPLEX AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES
AND WE MUST CONTINUE A MODEST NUMBER OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS TO
ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATION'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE.
K-REACTOR
SINCE AUGUST 1988, THE PRODUCTION REACTOR AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE
HAS BEEN IN EXTENDED OUTAGE WHILE WE HAVE ADDRESSED SAFETY CONCERNS.
OUR OBJECTIVE WAS, AND IS, TO ENSURE WE CAN PROVIDE RELIABLE TRITIUM
PRODUCTION CAPABILITY IN A MANNER THAT PROTECTS THE SAFETY AND HEALTH
OF THE WORKERS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE ENVIRONMENT. AS DEFENSE SECRETARY
CHENEY OUTLINED IN A RECENT LETTER TO THE CHAIRMEN OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES, IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY, WE MUST
HAVE IN PLACE A VIABLE PRODUCTION SOURCE OF TRITIUM UNTIL WE ARE ASSURED
OF A NEW AND RELIABLE LONG-TERM TRITIUM PRODUCTION SOURCE IN THE FIRST
DECADE OF THE NEXT CENTURY.
ON DECEMBER 13, 1991, I AUTHORIZED RESTART OF THE K-REACTOR FOLLOWING
AN EXTENSIVE 3-YEAR EFFORT TO SIGNIFICANTLY UPGRADE HARDWARE,
PROCEDURES, AND PERSONNEL TRAINING. THE DEPARTMENT RESPONDED TO
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD, WHICH
CARRIED OUT EXTENSIVE REVIEWS AND MEETINGS, INCLUDING PUBLIC HEARINGS
ON RESTART PREPARATION ACTIVITIES. ON DECEMBER 14, SAFETY EQUIPMENT
TESTING BEGAN FOR THE K-REACTOR. WE DISCOVERED A PROBLEM WITH THE
SAFETY RODS ON DECEMBER 16 AND HAD COMPLETED REPAIRING THOSE ANOMALIES
BY DECEMBER 24.
ON DECEMBER 24 WE DISCOVERED THAT ONE OF THE REACTORS' HEAT EXCHANGERS
WAS LEAKING PRIMARY COOLANT WATER INTO THE SAVANNAH RIVER. APPROXIMATELY
150 GALLONS (CONTAINING 6,000 CURIES) OF TRITIATED WATER ESCAPED FROM THE
K-REACTOR PLANT. THE LEAK STARTED ON DECEMBER 22. THE RELEASE RESULTED
FROM TECHNICAL FAILURE OF ONE OF THE TUBES IN ONE OF THE PLANT'S TWELVE
HEAT EXCHANGERS. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE LEAK WAS
CAUSED BY A SMALL HOLE IN THE SIDE OF ONE OF THE 9,000 STAINLESS STEEL
TUBES IN THE FAILED HEAT EXCHANGER. OTHER TUBES SHOWED NO SPECIAL WEAR
PROBLEMS.
THE LEAK, WHILE NOT POSING ANY HEALTH HAZARD, NONETHELESS LED TO
SEVERAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF SUCH A RELEASE.
Wt HAVE REPLACED THREE HEAT EXCHANGERS, IMPROVED PROCEDURES AND
TRAINING, AND INSTALLED IN-LINE TRITIUM MONITORING EQUIPMENT, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF WHICH WAS UNDERWAY PRIOR TO THE LEAK.
WE NOW SAMPLE WATER LEAVING THE PLANT EVERY TWO HOURS AT THE REACTOR
SITE, WHEREAS WE HAD BEEN TESTING WATER SAMPLES TWICE A DAY AT A
LABORATORY DISTANT FROM THE REACTOR SITE. WE ALSO HAVE COMPLETED AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENT, AN ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS, A
METALLURGICAL EVALUATION OF THE HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE FAILURE, AND A
TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF HEAT EXCHANGER INTEGRITY. RECENTLY, THE
DEPARTMENT BRIEFED THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD (DNFSB)
ON THE STATUS OF K-REACTOR ACTIVITIES AND THESE REPORTS.
AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY ACKNOWLEDGED, WE MADE A MISTAKE IN HANDLING THIS
INCIDENT. WE DID NOT DETECT THE LEAK SOON ENOUGH, DID NOT EFFECTIVELY
HANDLE THE PUBLIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH THE AREA COMMUNITIES, AND
WE ALLOWED TOO LONG A PERIOD TO ELAPSE BEFORE LOCAL OFFICIALS WERE
FULLY APPRISED OF ALL ASPECTS OF THIS EVENT. FORTUNATELY, THE RELEASE
HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT OR THE HEALTH OF THE CITIZENS
OF THE AREA. IN FACT, THE INDIVIDUAL EXPOSURE WAS ESTIMATED TO BE LESS
THAN 2 PERCENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY DRINKING WATER
STANDARD OF 4 MILLIREMS PER YEAR. TO HELP PRECLUDE RECURRENCE, WE HAVE
PUT IN PLACE A MUCH MORE RAPID RESPONSE PROGRAM TO ENSURE REAL-TIME
COMMUNICATION WITH ALL CONCERNED PARTIES:
AS I HAVE STATED, I WILL NOT APPROVE THE RESTART OF THE K-REACTOR
UNTIL ALL REVIEWS ARE COMPLETED AND THE NECESSARY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
ARE IMPLEMENTED. MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS WILL BE NOTIFIED PRIOR TO RESTART OF THE REACTOR. THE
DEPARTMENT WILL ALSO CONDUCT BRIEFINGS COORDINATED BY THE METRO AUGUSTA
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE WITH CITIZENS OF THE SAVANNAH RIVER AREA PRIOR TO
RESTART. I MUST EMPHASIZE THERE IS NO RUSH TO RESTART.
ONCE ALL PARTIES ARE NOTIFIED, THE DEPARTMENT WILL PROCEED WITH THE
POWER ASCENSION TEST PROGRAM, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO TAKE 2-3 MONTHS.
COMPLETING THE POWER ASCENSION TEST NOW IS VITAL TO ENSURE THAT ALL
MODIFICATION, TRAINING, AND PROCEDURE UPGRADES HAVE BEEN CORRECTLY
IMPLEMENTED. THIS ALSO ALLOWS US TO IDENTIFY ANY ADDITIONAL
MODIFICATIONS SO THAT WE CAN MAKE THEM DURING THE OUTAGE FOR TYING IN
THE COOLING TOWER. FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE POWER ASCENSION TEST
PROGRAM, THE REACTOR WILL BE SHUT DOWN TO REPLACE THE SAFETY RODS,
REPLACE HEAT EXCHANGERS, AND TIE-IN THE COOLING TOWER.
THE DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE COOLING TOWER TIE-IN IMMEDIATELY
AFTER THE RELATIVELY SHORT TEST PHASE DEMONSTRATES THE DEPARTMENT'S
COMMITMENT TO MINIMIZE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FROM FACILITY OPERATION.
THIS PLAN ALSO HELPS ENSURE THAT ALL SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES ARE
SATISFACTORILY IDENTIFIED AND RESOLVED PRIOR TO COMMENCING SUSTAINED
REACTOR DEMONSTRATION. THE OUTAGE IS EXPECTED TO TAKE 7-8 MONTHS, AFTER
WHICH WE PLAN TO RUN THE REACTOR (AT A 30-PERCENT POWER LEVEL) TO
DEMONSTRATE ITS CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE TRITIUM. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE PLAN TO
PLACE K-REACTOR IN A LOW-COST STANDBY MODE UNTIL WE ARE ASSURED OF HAVING
IN PLACE A NEW AND RELIABLE LONG-TERM TRITIUM PRODUCTION SOURCE.
ROCKY FLATS PLANT
FOLLOWING THE SUSPENSION OF PLUTONIUM OPERATIONS AT THE ROCKY FLATS
PLANT (RFP) IN NOVEMBER 1989, AND CONCURRENT WITH THE CHANGE OF THE
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING CONTRACTOR, SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS WERE
UNDERTAKEN TO IMPROVE MAINTENANCE, TESTING, AND OPERATION OF THE
PLUTONIUM FACILITIES AT THE PLANT. THE DEPARTMENT HAD PLANNED
SEQUENTIAL RESUMPTION OF PLUTONIUM OPERATIONS IN SIX BUILDINGS, LEADING
TO PLUTONIUM PIT PRODUCTION FOR NEW WEAPONS BUILDS, AS SOON AS REQUIRED
SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS WERE MADE AND DEMONSTRATED TO MY SATISFACTION AND
TO THAT OF THE APPROPRIATE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT
AUTHORITIES.
IN LIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT DECISION TO CANCEL NEW PRODUCTION OF
THE W88 TRIDENT II WARHEAD, THERE ARE NOW NO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD REQUIRE DOE TO PRODUCE PLUTONIUM PITS.
ACCORDINGLY, DOE IS BEGINNING THE TRANSITION OF THE RFP FROM NUCLEAR
PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES TOWARD CLEANUP OF THE PLANT, LEADING TO ITS
ULTIMATE DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING (D&D).
ALTHOUGH PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE
NOVEMBER 1989, A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY HAS BEEN ONGOING AT THE
RFP. PRODUCTION OF REQUIRED NONNUCLEAR COMPONENTS HAS CONTINUED AND
ACCOUNTED FOR ABOUT 25 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES OF
$1.6 BILLION FOR FY 1990-1992. OF THE REMAINING $1.2 BILLION, OVER 90
PERCENT OF THE EXPENDITURES HAVE BEEN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND
CLEANUP ACTIVITIES, SECURITY OF MATERIALS, AND SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS. MOST
OF THESE FUNDS WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED EVEN IF NO PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION
WORK HAD EVER BEEN PLANNED.
IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED IN BUILDING 559, AN ANALYTICAL LABORATORY
THAT IS NEEDED FOR BOTH PRODUCTION SUPPORT AND WASTE MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS.
FOLLOWING CONFIRMATION OF THESE IMPROVEMENTS BY AN OPERATIONAL READINESS
REVIEW (ORR), AND AFTER DETAILED ASSESSMENTS AND PUBLIC HEARINGS BY THE
DNFSB, I AUTHORIZED RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS IN THIS BUILDING ON FEBRUARY
4, 1992. ON APRIL 16 WE ACHIEVED A SIGNIFICANT MILESTONE AT ROCKY FLATS
OPERATIONS IN BUILDING 559. OPERATOR AND EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION EXERCISES
WITHOUT PLUTONIUM HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND ACTUAL PLUTONIUM CHEMISTRY IS
NOW BEING PERFORMED FOR FINAL QUALIFICATIONS UNDER CLOSELY SUPERVISED
CONDITIONS. THE PLUTONIUM START-UP TEST PLAN SCHEDULES 7 WEEKS OF
PLUTONIUM QUALIFICATION AND PROFICIENCY OPERATIONS, INCLUDING DRILLS.
THESE TEST OPERATIONS ARE BEING REVIEWED BY MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE
PROGRAMS OPERATIONAL READINESS REVIEW TEAM, WITH OVERSIGHT FROM THE
OFFICES OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH. ALSO
OBSERVING THE OPERATIONS ARE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
REPRESENTATIVES. THIS BUILDING IS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE VARIOUS CLEAN-UP
OPERATIONS AT THE RFP INTO THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
SIMILAR IMPROVEMENTS ARE WELL UNDERWAY IN BUILDING 707, FORMERLY THE
MAIN FABRICATION FACILITY. UPON COMPLETION OF THESE IMPROVEMENTS, THIS
FACILITY WILL BE PLACED IN AN APPROPRIATE CONTINGENCY STATUS PENDING
FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION PLAN AND SCHEDULE. WE
WILL BEGIN TO TRANSITION THE REMAINING PLUTONIUM FACILITIES TO A CONDITION
SUITABLE FOR TURNOVER TO ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT.
WE ARE ALSO ABOUT TO BEGIN OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS IN,BUILDING 371. THIS
BUILDING WILL THEN PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE DEPARTMENT'S PLANS FOR
COMPLYING WITH THE STATE OF COLORADO'S REGULATIONS ON RESIDUES AND FOR THE
D&D OF RFP.
THE MANY IMPROVEMENTS THAT WERE MADE DURING THE MORE THAN TWO YEARS THAT
PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION OPERATIONS WERE CURTAILED HAVE RESULTED IN
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OPERATIONAL AND SAFETY CULTURE AT THE
PLANT. MOREOVER, THE IMPROVEMENTS ARE AN INVESTMENT IN THE ULTIMATE
CLEANUP EFFORT AND HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR A MORE EFFICIENT TRANSITION
OF THE FACILITY TO D&D. IN ADDITION, THE PROCESS HAS BEEN A MODEL FOR
DOE'S RENEWED COMMITMENT TO CONSTRUCTIVE INVOLVEMENT WITH OUTSIDE
OVERSIGHT GROUPS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND THE PUBLIC.
STOCKPILE MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE/DISMANTLEMENT
WITH THE PRESIDENT'S BOLD INITIATIVES IN SEPTEMBER 1991 AND IN THE STATE
OF THE UNION ADDRESS, THE UNITED STATES RETAINS A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR
DETERRENT. HOWEVER, THE SMALLER STOCKPILE PROJECTED FOR THE NATION'S
FUTURE WILL DEPEND EVEN MORE HEAVILY ON ADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE TO ASSURE
ITS RELIABILITY BECAUSE THERE WILL BE FEWER WEAPONS AS WELL AS FEWER
WEAPON TYPES.
BOTH THE NUCLEAR AND NONNUCLEAR PRODUCTION PLANTS MUST MAINTAIN THEIR
CAPABILITIES EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE NO CURRENT PLANS TO BUILD NEW
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE SKILLS ARE UNIQUE AND HAVE TAKEN YEARS TO
DEVELOP TO THE HIGH LEVEL OF TECHNICAL EXCELLENCE AND SOPHISTICATION
WHICH EXIST TODAY. THEY MUST BE PRESERVED NOT ONLY FOR NORMAL STOCKPILE
SURVEILLANCE, EVALUATION, AND MAINTENANCE, BUT ALSO TO EFFECT NUCLEAR
WEAPON REPAIRS WHICH CAN BE REQUIRED, AND INDEED HAVE BEEN REQUIRED, OVER
THE YEARS IN OUR STOCKPILE. HAVING SAID THIS, I DO RECOGNIZE THAT WE
CANNOT PROCEED ON A "BUSINESS-AS-USUAL" BASIS. WE MUST MAKE COST SAVINGS
TO REFLECT REDUCED PRODUCTION, AND WE ARE DOING JUST THAT. WE ARE CARRYING
OUT THIS PLANNING IN A CAREFUL AND THOUGHTFUL MANNER, BALANCING OUR
OBLIGATIONS BOTH TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND TO THE U.S. TAXPAYERS. THIS
IS REFLECTED BOTH IN THE PRESIDENT'S FY 1993 BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEFENSE
PROGRAMS ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS IN AN AMENDMENT WHICH WILL SOON BE
SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS.
THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES HAVE ALSO ACCELERATED THE RETIREMENT,
DISMANTLEMENT, AND DISPOSAL OF A LARGE NUMBER OF WEAPONS IN THE
NUCLEAR ARSENAL. THIS WILL PRESENT A CHALLENGE TO THE DEPARTMENT'S
TRANSPORTATION FLEET, OUR LABORATORIES, AND TO THE DISASSEMBLY AND
DISPOSAL OPERATIONS CONDUCTED AT THE PANTEX PLANT. THIS IS A CHALLENGE
THAT THE DEPARTMENT IS UNIQUELY CAPABLE OF MEETING. WE PLAN TO UTILIZE
THE SAME STORAGE AND HANDLING PROCEDURES AND SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
PROCEDURES THAT HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY USED TO DISASSEMBLE NEARLY
50,000 WEAPONS OVER THE PAST 40 YEARS.
IN THE NEAR-TERM, DISASSEMBLY AND DISPOSAL OPERATIONS REQUIRE US TO
HOLD THE PLUTONIUM PITS FROM DISASSEMBLED WEAPONS AT PANTEX, A STAGING
ACTIVITY THAT WE HAVE CONDUCTED ROUTINELY AT THE PLANT OVER THE MANY
YEARS OF ITS OPERATION. THE DEPARTMENT IS PREPARING AN ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT (EA), TO BE ISSUED LATER THIS YEAR, TO COVER THE PLANT'S
ANTICIPATED INTERIM PLUTONIUM STAGING ACTIVITIES UNTIL THE DECISIONS ON
LONG-TERM DISPOSITION ARE MADE.
DECISIONS ON LONG-TERM PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION WILL BE BASED ON THE
WEAPONS COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT (PEIS), WHICH INCLUDES A PROCESS OF NEPA REVIEWS AND PUBLIC
COMMENT PERIODS. THIS PROCESS HAS ALREADY INCLUDED TWO DAYS OF PUBLIC
HEARINGS IN AMARILLO, INVOLVING TESTIMONY FROM STATE AND LOCAL
OFFICIALS AND LOCAL CITIZENS. NO DECISION ON LONG-TERM STORAGE WILL BE
MADE UNTIL THIS PUBLIC PROCESS IS COMPLETED AND I MAKE A RECORD OF
DECISION FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE FINAL PEIS.
RECONFIGURATION
SOON AFTER BECOMING SECRETARY IN EARLY 1989, 1 DIRECTED THAT THE
DEPARTMENT'S PLANS FOR MODERNIZING THE WEAPONS COMPLEX BE REEVALUATED
IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGING WORLD SITUATION. I PROVIDED ADDITIONAL
GUIDANCE IN AUGUST 1990 THAT RESULTED IN PUBLICATION OF THE WEAPONS
COMPLEX RECONFIGURATION STUDY IN FEBRUARY 1991. THIS STUDY CALLED FOR A
RECONFIGURED WEAPONS COMPLEX THAT WOULD BE SMALLER, LESS DIVERSE, AND
MORE ECONOMICAL BUT WOULD SAFELY AND .RELIABLY SUPPORT THE NUCLEAR
DETERRENT STOCKPILE OBJECTIVES CONSISTENT WITH THE REALITIES OF THE
EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. IN FEBRUARY 1991, WORK BEGAN ON A
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (PEIS) TO ANALYZE A RANGE
OF REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE CONFIGURATIONS FOR THE NEW COMPLEX--CALLED
COMPLEX 21. THE DRAFT PEIS IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR RELEASE IN DECEMBER
1992, FOLLOWED BY A FINAL PEIS AND RECORD OF DECISION (ROD) IN AUGUST
1993.
NEW PRODUCTION REACTOR
ON NOVEMBER 1, 1991, I ANNOUNCED THAT THE DEPARTMENT WOULD DEFER A
DECISION ON THE NPR SITE AND TECHNOLOGY AND INCLUDE THE ENVIRONMENTAL
ANALYSIS FOR THE NPR IN THE PEIS FOR RECONFIGURATION OF THE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS COMPLEX. COMBINING THESE EFFORTS WILL PERMIT THE DEPARTMENT TO
MAINTAIN BOTH REACTOR DESIGN TEAMS AT MINIMUM LEVELS WHILE ALLOWING
TIME TO ADEQUATELY CONSIDER THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGES IN REQUIREMENTS
RESULTING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 27, 1991, AND STATE OF THE
UNION INITIATIVES. THE ADDED TIME WILL ALLOW THE DEPARTMENT TO
DEMONSTRATE THE TECHNICAL VIABILITY OF K-REACTOR, THE ONLY CURRENT
PRODUCTION SOURCE FOR TRITIUM, AND EXAMINE ALTERNATIVES FOR TRITIUM
PRODUCTION, SUCH AS LINEAR ACCELERATORS, THAT SIMPLY WERE NOT POSSIBLE
ON THE PREVIOUS SCHEDULE. AS A RESULT Of THIS DEFERMENT, THE FY 1992
AND FY 1993 FUNDING FOR THE NPR PROGRAM HAS BEEN REDUCED AND A
SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE SAVINGS WILL BE APPLIED TO NEEDED
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND CLEANUP ACTIVITIES.
NONNUCLEAR CONSOLIDATION PLAN
WE ARE NOW PRESENTED WITH A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN THE TRANSITION
THAT WE ALL DESIRE TO A SMALLER, LESS DIVERSE, AND MORE ECONOMICAL
WEAPONS COMPLEX WITHOUT THE CONCURRENT PRESSURE TO SUSTAIN A LARGE NEW
WEAPONS PRODUCTION WORKLOAD. WE PLAN TO BEGIN THIS PROCESS WITH THE
CONSOLIDATION OF OUR NONNUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES.
THE RECONFIGURATION STUDY, ISSUED IN FEBRUARY 1991, STATED THAT A
PREFERRED OPTION WAS TO CONSOLIDATE AT A SINGLE SITE ALL NONNUCLEAR
MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES THAT CANNOT BE PRACTICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY
PRIVATIZED. FROM APRIL TO SEPTEMBER 1991, THE DEPARTMENT CONDUCTED A
STUDY COMPARING SIX ALTERNATIVE CONSOLIDATION SITE CANDIDATES: THE
KANSAS CITY PLANT (MISSOURI), THE MOUND PLANT (OHIO), THE PINELLAS
PLANT (FLORIDA), THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT (COLORADO), THE OAK RIDGE Y-12
PLANT (TENNESSEE), AND THE PANTEX PLANT (TEXAS). THE CANDIDATE SITES
WERE EVALUATED AGAINST THE FOLLOWING FOUR CRITERIA FOR CONSOLIDATION:
(1) ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND HEALTH (ES&H) RISKS; (2) TECHNICAL RISKS
TO THE WEAPONS PROGRAM; (3) CONSOLIDATION COSTS; AND (4) THE AMOUNT Of
TIME NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH CONSOLIDATION.
ON THE BASIS OF THIS ANALYSIS, THE STUDY RECOMMENDED THAT KANSAS CITY
BE DESIGNATED AS THE PREFERRED CONSOLIDATION SITE FOR MOST OF THE
NONNUCLEAR MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE WEAPONS
COMPLEX.
INITIALLY, IT WAS INTENDED THAT ALTERNATIVES FOR CONSOLIDATION OF
NONNUCLEAR MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE
RECONFIGURATION PEIS. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 27, 1991,
INITIATIVE CANCELED SEVERAL NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAMS AND SIGNIFICANTLY
REDUCED FUTURE PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS. ALTHOUGH AN ENVIRONMENTAL
ANALYSIS IS STILL REQUIRED PRIOR TO OUR FINAL DECISION, THE PRESIDENT'S
ANNOUNCEMENT PROVIDED A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO ACCELERATE THE
CONSOLIDATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES DURING A PERIOD OF VERY LOW
PRODUCTION WITHOUT IMPACTING NATIONAL SECURITY, IN ORDER TO MORE
QUICKLY ACHIEVE A SMALLER, MORE COST-EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PRODUCTION COMPLEX. ACCORDINGLY, I ANNOUNCED ON DECEMBER 16, 1991,
THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH CONSOLIDATION WOULD
BE ANALYZED IN A SEPARATE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (EA). SUCH AN
ASSESSMENT IS CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE ARE ANY SIGNIFICANT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH A PROPOSED ACTION. IF THERE ARE NO
SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS IDENTIFIED IN THE EA, A FINDING OF NO
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT IS ISSUED AND THE PROPOSED ACTION MAY PROCEED. THUS,
THE PROPOSAL TO CONSOLIDATE MOST OF THE NONNUCLEAR MANUFACTURING
ACTIVITIES AT THE KANSAS CITY SITE (THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE) AND
TRANSFER SELECTED ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES TO OTHER SITES, AS WELL AS AN
ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL OTHER ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION, WILL BE
ADDRESSED IN AN EA SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION BY THE END OF THE YEAR. I
PLAN TO ANNOUNCE THE LOCATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NONNUCLEAR
CONSOLIDATION AT THAT TIME.
FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 27, 1991, ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE
STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS, QUESTIONS WERE RAISED WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT
AS TO WHETHER THE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
STOCKPILE RESULTING FROM THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS MIGHT AFFECT THE
CONCLUSIONS IN THE NONNUCLEAR CONSOLIDATION PLAN, WHICH HAD BEEN
COMPLETED SHORTLY BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT. I ASKED THE AUTHORS OF THE
STUDY TO REEXAMINE THE CONCLUSIONS IN THE STUDY IN LIGHT OF THESE
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. ON MARCH 23, 1992, THE DEPARTMENT RELEASED
THE NONNUCLEAR CONSOLIDATION PLAN, WITH AN ADDENDUM THAT UPDATED THE
DOCUMENT TO TAKE THESE PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES INTO ACCOUNT. IT WAS
DETERMINED THAT THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE ORIGINAL STUDY WERE NOT
AFFECTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES. THE PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION
PLAN WILL BE FULLY OPEN TO PUBLIC COMMENT. BOTH STATE OFFICIALS AND
THE PUBLIC WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE PLAN AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND SUBMIT COMMENTS BEFORE ANY FINAL DECISIONS
ARE MADE. TO ENSURE THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION CONSIDERS ALL OPTIONS, WE
HAVE A STUDY UNDERWAY TO CONSIDER CONSOLIDATING ACTIVITIES AT TWO PLANTS.
THE RESULTS WILL BE AVAILABLE PRIOR TO OUR FINAL DECISION THIS FALL.
WORKER RETRAINING
AS THE DEFENSE COMPLEX IS DOWNSIZED, THE DEPARTMENT IS DEVELOPING A
COMPREHENSIVE RETRAINING AND RELOCATION PROGRAM TO HELP RETRAIN WORKERS
AS APPROPRIATE FOR NEW MISSIONS, SUCH AS ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP. WE ALSO
WILL HELP RELOCATE WORKERS TO OTHER DOE AND CONTRACTOR ACTIVITIES IF
AVAILABLE AND WILL WORK WITH STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS TO INCORPORATE
WORKERS INTO LOCAL ECONOMIES WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
AS THE WEAPONS PRODUCTION MISSION DIMINISHES AT SITES SUCH AS ROCKY
FLATS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT MISSION AT
THESE SITES IS EXPECTED TO STEADILY INCREASE TO REFLECT THE TRANSITION
OF FACILITIES FROM AN OPERATING CONFIGURATION TO ONE WHERE THE FACILITY
IS READY FOR DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING. OVER THE NEXT 6
MONTHS, EACH AFFECTED SITE WILL BE CONDUCTING A TASK ANALYSIS WHICH
INCLUDES IDENTIFICATION OF THE SKILL BASE NECESSARY FOR AN ORDERLY
TRANSITION TO AN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
MISSION.
THE DEPARTMENT'S INTENTION IS, TO THE GREATEST EXTENT PRACTICAL, TO
RETRAIN AND UTILIZE THE WORKFORCE TO CARRY OUT THIS NEW MISSION. FOR
EXAMPLE, AT THE FERNALD PLANT IN OHIO, ALL BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES
WILL BE OFFERED EMPLOYMENT WITH THE NEW CONTRACTOR BEING ACQUIRED TO
MANAGE THE CLEANUP AT COMPARABLE SALARY AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LEVELS.
THE NEW CONTRACTOR WILL ALSO BE DIRECTED TO HIRE AS MANY SALARIED
PERSONNEL AS IT CAN EFFECTIVELY EMPLOY. ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT
PERSONNEL NOT PRESENTLY TRAINED TO PERFORM CLEANUP WORK AND WHO WILL NOT
BE RETAINED BY THE NEW CONTRACTOR MUST BE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR
RETRAINING. THIS WILL MAKE THESE WORKERS MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE IN REMEDIATION
TECHNIQUES AND ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS SO THAT THEY CAN NOT ONLY BE
RECONSIDERED AS VACANCIES OCCUR BUT ALSO BECOME QUALIFIED FOR EMPLOYMENT
WITH OTHER SPECIALIZED REMEDIATION COMPANIES WORKING ON GOVERNMENT OR
COMMERCIAL SITES.
HOWEVER, IN SOME INSTANCES, A PORTION OF THE WORKFORCE MAY NOT BE
NEEDED. IN THOSE CASES, THE DEPARTMENT WILL WORK WITH STATE AND LOCAL
ORGANIZATIONS TO IDENTIFY JOB SKILLS THAT MAY BE NEEDED WITHIN THE
SURROUNDING AREA, INCLUDING OTHER DOE FACILITIES. IN PARALLEL WITH THIS
EFFORT, THE DEPARTMENT INTENDS TO DEVELOP A DOE CONTRACTOR-WIDE VACANCY
SYSTEM TO MATCH JOB SKILLS WITH JOB OPPORTUNITIES WITHIN THE ENTIRE DOE
COMPLEX. FURTHERMORE, WE WILL WORK WITH OUR CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT TO
PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR EARLY RETIREMENT AND FOR VOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS.
WE WILL ALSO PROVIDE- OUTPLACEMENT ASSISTANCE, SUCH AS RESUME
PREPARATION, COUNSELING, ASSISTANCE FOR JOB SEARCH, AND TUITION PAYMENT
FOR RETRAINING. WE WILL COORDINATE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TO
DRAW UPON FUNDING SET ASIDE FOR THESE PURPOSES. WE WILL ALSO COORDINATE
WITH THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION TO HELP STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS OBTAIN ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM GRANTS (WITH 25-PERCENT
MATCH) FOR COMMUNITY IMPACT ASSISTANCE, DRAWING UPON FUNDING EARMARKED
FOR DEFENSE-RELATED FACILITIES. THESE FUNDS MAY BE USED FOR A WIDE
RANGE OF DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MODIFICATION AND ALTERNATIVE
USES OF FACILITIES, EXPANSION OF COMMUNITY BUSINESSES, AND CREATION OF
OTHER NEW JOBS.
CHANGING ROLES OF THE WEAPONS LABORATORIES
THE WEAPONS LABORATORIES' DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D)
ACTIVITIES HISTORICALLY HAVE PROVIDED THE PRIMARY SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING FOR THE U.S. POLICY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.
THE LABORATORIES WERE ORIGINALLY CREATED TO DESIGN, DEVELOP, AND TEST
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY. AS THE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS COMPLEX MATURED, THE ROLES OF THESE LABORATORIES BROADENED INTO
ALL FACETS OF WEAPONS DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION SUPPORT,
STOCKPILE MAINTENANCE, AND STOCKPILE IMPROVEMENT.
NOW, THEIR MISSIONS ARE SHIFTING RAPIDLY. YET EVEN WITH THIS CHANGING
SITUATION, AN IMPORTANT MISSION MUST BE TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR COMPETENCE.
WE NEED A VIABLE WEAPONS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING PROGRAM TO
ENSURE THE ABILITY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, SUPPORT THE ENDURING STOCKPILE, AND ENSURE AGAINST
TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE BY A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY. NUCLEAR COMPETENCE
ALLOWS US TO PROVIDE FOR THE STOCKPILE, AND IT IS ALSO THE FOUNDATION
FOR TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP FOR RECONFIGURATION ACTIVITIES.
COMPETENCE WILL ENSURE US THE ABILITY TO DESIGN AND TEST NEW WEAPONS
SYSTEMS IF THEY ARE NEEDED, PROVIDE THE RIGOROUS TECHNOLOGICAL BASE
NEEDED FOR ENHANCED NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES, AND
PROVIDE THE WELLSPRING FROM WHICH NEW TECHNOLOGICAL INITIATIVES FOR
COMMERCIALIZATION MAY ARISE.
WE HAVE ALREADY SHIFTED SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES ABOUT $120 MILLION FOR FY
1993 -- FROM WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT TO OTHER R&D ACTIVITIES. THE FUNDS WILL
BE USED To ENHANCE THE LABORATORIES' R&D ACTIVITIES TO EMPHASIZE INTRINSIC
SAFETY AND SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS, BUILD-DOWN AND SURVIVABILITY OF
THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL, ACCELERATED WARHEAD RETIREMENTS AND DISMANTLEMENTS)
AND SUPPORT TO THE ENDURING STOCKPILE.
IN ADDITION TO THE CORE MISSIONS, THE LABORATORIES WILL ASSIST IN
DEVELOPING COST-EFFECTIVE PRODUCTION AND PROCESS DESIGNS FOR COMPLEX 21
AND PROVIDE TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP OF RECONFIGURATION ACTIVITIES.
THEY WILL PROVIDE LABORATORY SUPPORT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND
WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO WASTE
MINIMIZATION. IN CONJUNCTION WITH DOE'S OFFICE OF ARMS CONTROL AND
NONPROLIFERATION, THE LABORATORIES WILL ALSO CARRY OUT ENHANCED
NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES INTEGRATING DOE FUNCTIONS
IN POLICY, INTELLIGENCE, AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO
CONSOLIDATE SOME FUNCTIONS AMONG LABORATORIES TO SUPPORT A SINGLE
INTEGRATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM ACHIEVING MAXIMUM COST EFFECTIVENESS
WHILE PRESERVING COMPETITION WHERE NECESSARY.
NUCLEAR TESTING
RECENTLY A NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM BILL (H.R. 3636) WAS INTRODUCED
IN CONGRESS. IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED THAT THE MASSIVE CUTBACK IN STRATEGIC
AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES, AS OUTLINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER
27, 1991, SPEECH AND STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE, CALLS INTO QUESTION
THE NEED FOR FURTHER NUCLEAR TESTING. IT HAS ALSO BEEN ASSERTED THAT A
NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM WOULD CAUSE THIRD WORLD NATIONS WITH INTENTIONS
TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO FOREGO THEIR EFFORTS. THE PRESIDENT'S
INITIATIVES WILL GREATLY REDUCE THE OVERALL SIZE OF THE U.S. STOCKPILE,
BUT WILL NOT OBVIATE THE NEED TO CONDUCT A MODEST NUMBER OF NUCLEAR
TESTS. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED ITS LEVEL OF
NUCLEAR TESTING TO THE LOWEST POINT SINCE THE EARLY 1950s, WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF THE 1958-61 TEST MORATORIUM.
THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT IS DEPENDENT UPON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR
TESTING TO UNDERWRITE THE SAFETY, RELIABILITY, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE AND DEMONSTRATE THE SURVIVABILITY OF OUR
WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THERE HAVE BEEN OCCURRENCES IN MODERN U.S. NUCLEAR
WEAPONS DESIGNS THAT HAVE REQUIRED NUCLEAR TESTS OF STOCKPILE WARHEADS
TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS. FURTHERMORE, NUCLEAR TESTS HAVE UNCOVERED A NUMBER
OF WEAPON SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES AND DEFICIENCIES WHICH COULD NOT BE
PREDICTED ANALYTICALLY. A DRAMATIC EXAMPLE OF THIS INVOLVED A LOW
TEMPERATURE EXTREME TEST OF THE WARHEAD FOR THE AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE
MISSILE. THE TEST RESULTS WERE A COMPLETE SURPRISE IN THAT THE WARHEAD
EXPLODED WITH ONLY A FRACTION OF ITS DESIGN YIELD. THE WEAPON HAD BEEN
TESTED EXTENSIVELY IN NONNUCLEAR HYDRODYNAMIC TESTS, EVEN AT THE LOW
TEMPERATURE EXTREME, WITH NO INDICATION OF TROUBLE. A DESIGN CHANGE WAS
MADE TO THE WARHEAD AND IT WAS TESTED SUCCESSFULLY A YEAR LATER.
TESTING IS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE ENDURING
STOCKPILE. THE DRELL PANEL ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY RECOMMENDED THAT
THE UNITED STATES STRIKE A NEW BALANCE BETWEEN "THE DESIRED MILITARY
CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ENHANCED
SAFETY." TO DO SO, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD GIVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO
DESIGNS THAT WOULD MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS "AS SAFE AS PRACTICALLY
ACHIEVABLE." THERE ARE NO CURRENT PLANS TO "BUILD" NEW DESIGNS. HOWEVER,
WE ARE PLANNING TO DEVELOP "PIT RE-USER TECHNOLOGY AND "SUP-ER-SAFE"
WEAPONS DESIGNS AS THE MEANS TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY OF THE "ENDURING
STOCKPILE." OUR EFFORTS WILL ENSURE THAT THIS ENDURING CAPABILITY IS
MAINTAINED WITH MINIMAL CONSEQUENCES TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND WITH EVEN
GREATER ASSURANCE OF SAFETY FOR THE U.S. PUBLIC. WE KNOW HOW TO DEVELOP
SUCH "SUPER-SAFE" DESIGNS, BUT TO DO SO WILL REQUIRE NUCLEAR TESTING.
AS ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSENSITIVE HIGH EXPLOSIVES
(IHE) FOR USE IN OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIRED A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF
TESTS THROUGHOUT THE 1970s. LIKEWISE, DEVELOPMENT OF FIRE RESISTANT
PITS (FRP), A WARHEAD CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING THE HEAT OF A FIRE
WITHOUT DISPERSING PLUTONIUM, HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR THE PAST SEVERAL
YEARS. SEVERAL NUCLEAR TESTS HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO GET US TO THE POINT
WHERE SPECIALLY DESIGNED NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW ARE FIRE RESISTANT AGAINST
CERTAIN TYPES OF ACCIDENT SCENARIOS. MORE TESTS ARE REQUIRED TO EXAMINE
FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF FIRE RESISTANT PITS TO OTHER TYPES OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE AMONG THE MOST COMPLEX ENGINEERING AND PHYSICS
CHALLENGES AND AMONG THE MOST SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITIES MANKIND HAS
CREATED. WHILE ADVANCES IN THREE-DIMENSIONAL COMPUTER MODELING HAVE
MARKEDLY INCREASED OUR ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND AND PREDICT NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE, UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERIENCE
HAS SHOWN THAT COMPUTER MODELING, BY ITSELF, IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
PROVIDE FULL ASSURANCE OF WEAPONS RELIABILITY AND SAFETY. UNDERGROUND
NUCLEAR TESTING IS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE THE REQUISITE ASSURANCE THAT THESE
WEAPONS CAN FULFILL THEIR PURPOSE OF DETERRENCE SAFELY AND RELIABLY.
THE UNITED STATES MUST CONTINUE TO TEST. WE TEST ONLY AS MUCH AS
REQUIRED FOR OUR SECURITY. A HALT TO NUCLEAR TESTING WOULD NOT
ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOR WOULD IT INCREASE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.
SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE PROCEEDED WITH HIS NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENT IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY U.S. DECISION TO STOP TESTING. A HALT
IN TESTING WOULD ERODE U.S. CONFIDENCE IN OUR REMAINING NUCLEAR
DETERRENT AND WOULD SEVERELY RESTRICT OUR ABILITY TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS
IN NUCLEAR WEAPON SAFETY.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
PRESIDENT BUSH HAS RECOGNIZED THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. IN ENDORSING THE "NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY ARE ACHIEVED BY
INITIATIVE, "INVESTING IN THE TECHNOLOGIES OF TOMORROW ... WE NEED TO
SHARE THE RESULTS, GET THE GREAT IDEAS GENERATED BY PUBLIC FUNDS OUT INTO
THE PRIVATE SECTOR, OFF THE DRAWING BOARD AND ONTO STORE SHELVES.
DOE'S WEAPONS LABORATORIES HAVE BEEN WORKING AT THE CUTTING EDGE OF
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN AMERICA'S NUCLEAR
DETERRENT. THE SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING PRACTICED AT THE LABORATORIES
AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES IS CONDUCTED BY SOME OF THE BEST SCIENTISTS
AND ENGINEERS IN THE WORLD. THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY WEAPONS LABORATORIES
AT LOS ALAMOS, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE, AND SANDIA ARE SYNONYMOUS WITH
"LEADING EDGE" TECHNOLOGIES, WHICH HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THEIR PEERS VIA
32 "R&D 100" AWARDS IN THE PAST THREE YEARS. THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE
PRODUCED A RESERVOIR OF ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES WITHIN THE WEAPONS COMPLEX
THAT ARE OF SIGNIFICANT VALUE TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR.
I HAVE REQUESTED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL TO TRANSFER $50 MILLION FROM FY
1992 SAVINGS IN THE DEFENSE PROGRAMS BUDGET TO DOUBLE SPENDING ON
TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION ACTIVITIES FOR PROMISING DUAL USE
TECHNOLOGIES AT THE NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND TO FURTHER ENHANCE
TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIPS WITH U.S. INDUSTRY. IN ADDITION, IN THE FY 1993
BUDGET AMENDMENT WHICH YOU SHOULD BE RECEIVING SHORTLY WE HOPE TO
INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THE $91 MILLION ALREADY REQUESTED FOR TECHNOLOGY
COMMERCIALIZATION IN THE FY 1993 AEDA BUDGET.
WITHIN DEFENSE PROGRAMS, 27 "DUAL-USE" TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIPS ARE
ALREADY IN PLACE WITH OVER 30 COMPANIES AND 2 UNIVERSITIES. MOST OF
THESE PARTNERSHIPS WERE ENTERED INTO UNDER THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING
INITIATIVE (AMI). THE AMI FOCUSES ON COOPERATIVE RESOURCE-SHARED
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN DP LABORATORIES AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY
IN ADVANCING MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGIES. THE AMI HAS RESULTED IN AN
INCREASING NUMBER OF PARTNERSHIPS WITH MUTUAL BENEFIT TO THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORS.
EXAMPLES OF THE DEPARTMENT'S RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH
THE PRIVATE SECTOR INCLUDE:
o ON APRIL 23, 1992, THE DEPARTMENT SIGNED WITH THE NATIONAL
CENTER FOR MANUFACTURING SCIENCES (NCMS), WHICH REPRESENTS OVER
120 SMALL, MEDIUM, AND LARGE AMERICAN COMPANIES, AN "UMBRELLA"
COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (CRADA) TO ALLOW
NCMS MEMBER COMPANIES TO ACCESS THE UNCLASSIFIED TECHNOLOGIES
AND CAPABILITIES OF THE DOE DEFENSE COMPLEX UNDER FASTER, MORE
STREAMLINED PROCEDURES AIMED AT JOINT PROGRAMS WITH MUTUAL
BENEFIT TO DOE AND THE INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES.
o ADVANCED COMPUTER TECHNOLOGIES WILL BE GENERATED BY WORK
CONDUCTED UNDER THE MODEL CRADA TAILORED TO THE COMPUTER
INDUSTRY BY DOE AND THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS POLICY PROJECT (CSPP),
AN AFFILIATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF TWELVE OF THE
LARGEST AMERICAN COMPUTER COMPANIES. THE LETTER OF AGREEMENT
WHICH CONTAINED THE MODEL CRADA WAS SIGNED ON MARCH 20.
SUBSEQUENTLY 3 CRADAS WERE SIGNED ON MARCH 27 TO LAUNCH JOINT
COMPUTER RESEARCH VENTURE BY LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY AND
CRAY RESEARCH. THE GOALS OF THE THREE CRADAS ARE:
- TO DEVELOP A MORE ACCURATE OCEANIC-ATMOSPHERIC MODEL FOR
STUDYING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE.
- TO REDUCE THE COST OF DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING ADVANCED
COMPUTER CHIPS BY DEVELOPING ADVANCED SOFTWARE TO SIMULATE
ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVE EFFECTS IN ULTRAHIGH SPEED ELECTRONIC
DEVICES.
- TO IMPROVE COMPUTATIONAL CHEMISTRY CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO
MEET INDUSTRIAL NEEDS TO MODEL LARGE PROTEIN MOLECULES
CONTAINING MORE THAN 1,000 ATOMS. TODAY'S MODELING SYSTEMS
LIMIT STUDIES OF MOLECULAR DYNAMICS TO MOLECULES OF A FEW
HUNDRED ATOMS.
- COOPERATIVE R&D WITH MICROELECTRONICS AND MANUFACTURING IS THE
DOE MICROELECTRONICS QUALITY/RELIABILITY CENTER (MQRC) AT SANDIA
NATIONAL LABORATORY. THE MQRC FOCUSES ON ENSURING THE HIGHEST
RELIABILITY IN DOMESTICALLY PRODUCED INTEGRATED CIRCUITS (ICS).
THE CAPABILITIES OF THE MQRC COMPLEMENT THOSE OF INDUSTRY, AND
ARE USED TO DEVELOP TECHNICAL RESOURCES. THAT DO NOT EXIST IN
THE PRODUCT CYCLE, FROM R&D TO MANUFACTURING TO SATISFYING THE
END-USER. THE MQRC, WHICH HAD FOUR CRADAS APPROVED IN 1991,
RECEIVED A SPECIAL "AWARD FOR EXCELLENCE IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER"
FROM THE FEDERAL LABORATORY CONSORTIUM FOR WORK PERFORMED IN
1991. THE DEPARTMENT IS PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR A 3-YEAR PROGRAM
TO DEVELOP A BROAD-BASED "WIN-WIN" PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN INDUSTRY
AND DOE.
MAKING EFFECTIVE USE OF CRADAS HAS BEEN A CHALLENGE FOR DOE, THE
LABORATORIES, AND OUR INDUSTRIAL PARTNERS BECAUSE IT INVOLVES
DOING BUSINESS UNDER TERMS AND CONDITIONS THAT, IN MANY INSTANCES, ARE
UNFAMILIAR TO INDUSTRY. THUS, A MAJOR FOCUS FOR DOE THIS YEAR IS TO
SHORTEN THE CRADA APPROVAL PROCESS. GREATER FAMILIARITY WITH CRADA
APPROVAL PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS, AS WELL AS NEW STREAMLINED
APPROACHES, SUCH AS THE NCMS UMBRELLA CRADA, WILL HELP US SPEED UP THE
PROCESS.
I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT INDUSTRY MUST DEFINE THE CRITICAL
TECHNOLOGY, AREAS THAT ARE VITAL TO U.S. COMPETITIVENESS. DOE DOES NOT
PRESUME TO DEFINE COMMERCIAL REQUIREMENTS. INSTEAD, A PROCESS HAS BEEN
DEVELOPED THAT RELIES ON INDUSTRY TO DEFINE ITS COMMERCIAL AGENDA WHILE
DOE CONCENTRATES ON TECHNICAL MISSION REQUIREMENTS. A COMMON THEME ACROSS
ALL OF DOE'S COLLABORATIVE R&D IS "INDUSTRY PULL." THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION
OF TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION PROGRAMS IS DICTATED BY DEPARTMENTAL NEEDS
AND PRIVATE SECTOR REQUIREMENTS FOR INCREASED COMPETITIVENESS.
WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PROJECT
LAST OCTOBER, I DECLARED THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (WIPP) READY
TO INITIATE A TEST PROGRAM WITH TRU WASTE. I MADE THIS DECISION
FOLLOWING AN INTENSE 2-YEAR EFFORT TO COMPLETE EVERY TECHNICAL, SAFETY,
AND REGULATORY PREREQUISITE. THE USE OF A LIMITED AMOUNT OF TRU WASTE
FOR EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSES DURING THE TEST PROGRAM WILL ENABLE THE
DEPARTMENT TO GATHER THE DATA IT NEEDS TO DEMONSTRATE WHETHER WIPP IS
SUITABLE AS A PERMANENT DISPOSAL FACILITY-FOR TRU WASTES.
BECAUSE OF A LAWSUIT FILED IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE NEW
MEXICO ATTORNEY GENERAL, WHICH WAS LATER JOINED BY SEVERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS, THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND THREE U.S. CONGRESSMEN, I
VOLUNTARILY DELAYED SHIPMENTS OF TEST WASTE TO WIPP. IN JANUARY OF THIS
YEAR, THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULED
AGAINST DOE BY ISSUING A PERMANENT INJUNCTION THAT PERMANENTLY BARS
WASTE SHIPMENTS TO WIPP. WE HAVE APPEALED THIS RULING AND, IN FACT,
HAVE ORAL ARGUMENTS SCHEDULED IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ON MAY 15.
THIS COURT-ORDERED INJUNCTION, COUPLED WITH THE ABSENCE OF AN
ACCEPTABLE LAND WITHDRAWAL BILL FROM THE HOUSE, HAVE PLACED THE WIPP
PROJECT IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. WITHOUT JUDICIAL OR LEGISLATIVE RELIEF TO
ALLOW THE TEST PROGRAM TO PROCEED, I WILL BE FORCED IN THE VERY NEAR
FUTURE TO PLACE WIPP INTO A STAND BY MODE, WHICH WILL LIKELY ADD AT LEAST
2 MORE YEARS TO THE TIME NEEDED TO COMMENCE TESTING. ALL MOMENTUM WILL BE
LOST AND MANY TALENTED SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS MAY ALSO BE LOST. AT BEST,
IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO BEGIN REMOVING TRU WASTE FROM CURRENT
ABOVE-GROUND STORAGE SITES. AT WORST, THE TRU WASTE CURRENTLY STORED AT
MULTIPLE DOE SITES WOULD REMAIN THERE INDEFINITELY. HUNDREDS OF
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SPENT ON WIPP, AND FURTHER DELAY
MAY ADD ANYWHERE FROM $150 MILLION TO $1 BILLION TO THIS TOTAL.
I URGE YOUR HELP IF WE ARE TO RESOLVE THE IMPEDIMENTS THAT ARE
PREVENTING ME FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE WIPP PROJECT. I WOULD LIKE TO
THANK THE SENATE FOR ITS PASSAGE OF S.1671, WIPP LAND WITHDRAWAL
LEGISLATION, IN THE LAST SESSION.
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND CLEANUP
TURNING TO OUR ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND CLEANUP EFFORT, THE
DEPARTMENT HAS MADE GREAT STRIDES IN PLANNING, RELEASING OUR THIRD
ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT (EM) FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND
WORKING ON OUR FOURTH PLAN. WE ARE ALSO PROVIDING EVER-INCREASING
OPPORTUNITIES FOR STAKEHOLDER AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN PROGRAM
PLANNING AND ACTIVITIES, BUT REALIZE WE HAVE TO WORK HARDER TO FULLY
ACHIEVE OUR GOAL OF A NEW CULTURE OF OPENNESS, RESPONSIVENESS, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY.
IN THE WASTE MANAGEMENT AREA, WE HAVE COMPLETED ALL TECHNICAL
PREREQUISITES TO BEGIN THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT (WIPP) TEST
PHASE. WE HAVE ALSO CONTINUED CHECKOUTS AT THE DEFENSE WASTE PROCESSING
FACILITY AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE AND WE HAVE STARTED OPERATIONS OF THE
TSCA INCINERATOR AT OAK RIDGE. OVER 331,000 POUNDS OF LIQUID MIXED WASTE
WERE SAFELY INC,ITERATED IN FY 1991, AND THE GOAL FOR FY 1992 IS 2.5
MILLION POUNDS; A TOTAL OF 1.7 MILLION POUNDS HAS BEEN INCINERATED
SINCE START OF OPERATIONS IN APRIL 1991. WE HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL
PROGRESS TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF SAFETY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE
STORAGE OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE IN TANKS, PARTICULARLY AT THE HANFORD
RESERVATION. IN ADDITION, THE CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE OF OPERATIONS AT
ALL WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES HAVE BEEN IMPROVED THROUGH MANAGEMENT
INITIATIVES.
WHILE MUCH OF OUR ACTIVITY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AREA IS
STILL IN THE ASSESSMENT AND CHARACTERIZATION PHASE, WE HAVE DONE SOME
SIGNIFICANT REMEDIATION AND CLEANUP. IN FY 1991, WE COMPLETED SURFACE
REMEDIATION OF URANIUM MILL TAILINGS SITES AT DURANGO, COLORADO, AND
LOWMAN, IDAHO, AT A COST OF $9.2 MILLION, AND WE CONTINUED ACTIONS AT
ROCKY FLATS RELATED TO REMOVAL AND SOLIDIFICATION OF POND SLUDGE
CONTAMINATED WITH MIXED WASTE. WE COMPLETED THREE MAJOR SITE CLOSURES
AT SAVANNAH RIVER AT A COST OF $10.5 MILLION. AND AT HANFORD, WE
COMPLETED TWO EXPEDITED RESPONSE ACTIONS, INITIATED A THIRD, AND
EXCAVATED 120 DRUMS CONTAINING CONTAMINANTS AND 7,000 CUBIC YARDS OF
CONTAMINATED SOIL FROM UNLINED TRENCHES.
A FEW HIGHLIGHTS OF FY 1992 TO DATE INCLUDE ROBOTIC PLOTTING AND
BENTONITE CAPPING OF THE FERNALD K-65 SILOS AT A COST OF $5.0 MILLION
-- A SAVINGS OF $15 MILLION, DUE TO THE TECHNOLOGY EMPLOYED; COMPLETING
CONTAMINATED SEDIMENT CONTROL PROJECT IN WHITE OAK CREEK AT OAK RIDGE,
BEGINNING FULL-SCALE CARBON TETRACHLORIDE VAPOR EXTRACTION AT HANFORD; AND
ACHIEVING READINESS FOR OPERATION OF THE QUARRY WATER TREATMENT PLANT AT
THE WELDON SPRING SITE.
I WANT TO NOTE THE EXCELLENT PROGRESS WE ARE MAKING IN NEGOTIATING AND
EXECUTING COMPLIANCE AGREEMENTS WITH FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORS.
SINCE 1979, 76 AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED; ANOTHER 23 ARE CURRENTLY
UNDER NEGOTIATION. WE HAVE MET 95 PERCENT OF THE MILESTONES IN OUR
COMPLIANCE AGREEMENTS. (ALMOST ALL CASES WITHIN THE REMAINING 5 PERCENT
INVOLVED OUR BEING LATE IN SUBMITTING A WRITTEN DOCUMENT.) WE DO TAKE
OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER COMPLIANCE AGREEMENTS VERY SERIOUSLY AND ARE
ENDEAVORING TO MEET 100 PERCENT OF OUR MILESTONES.
IN THE TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, WE SUCCESSFULLY AND SAFELY
PROVIDED PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION SERVICES FOR DOE SHIPPING
CAMPAIGNS FOR THREE-MILE ISLAND, THE FOREIGN FUEL MOVEMENT PROJECT, THE
CESIUM 137 RETRIEVAL PROGRAM, AND BNL SPENT FUEL, AND WE EXPECT TO
RETURN $18 MILLION TO THE TREASURY BY LITIGATING DOE RAIL RATES THROUGH
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. WE ALSO COMPLETED A MAJOR EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS TRAINING EXERCISE AND WE INITIATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
TRAINING ACTIVITIES WITH HEADQUARTERS, FIELD OFFICES, STATE, TRIBAL,
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
IN THE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AREA, THE DEPARTMENT HAS INITIATED
NON-DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION OF BURIED WASTE SITES USING INSTRUMENTED
HELICOPTER FLYOVERS WITH INFRARED AND MAGNETIC IMAGING DEVICES;
DEMONSTRATED INNOVATIVE IN SITU DIRECTIONAL DRILLING TECHNOLOGIES THAT
USE HORIZONTAL WELLS AND ACHIEVE A FIVE-FOLD INCREASE IN EFFICIENCY OF
REMEDIATION; AND DEVELOPED TECHNOLOGIES FOR IN SITU AIR STRIPPING OF TCES
AT SAVANNAH RIVER. IN ADDITION, WE DEMONSTRATED SPRAY FORM CASTING WITHOUT
GENERATION OF ACIDIC HEAVY-METAL WASTES, COMPLETED INTEGRATED ROBOTICS
PLANNING, DEMONSTRATED AN AUTOMATED ANALYTICAL LABORATORY CAPABLE OF
HANDLING MIXED WASTE, DEVELOPED REMOTE MAPPING FOR MITIGATING RADON
RELEASES, AND DEVELOPED PROTOTYPE CLEANABLE STEEL HIGH EFFICIENCY
PARTICULATE AIR FILTERS.
IN THE EDUCATION AREA, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEARS 1992 AND 1993 PROVIDES $10 MILLION FOR TRAINING AND EDUCATION OF
PEOPLE ENGAGED IN HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE OR EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES AT
DOE FACILITIES AND PROVIDES $1 MILLION FOR CONDUCTING A SCHOLARSHIP AND
FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM THAT WILL ATTRACT HIGH-QUALITY STUDENTS INTO OUR
NATION'S UNIVERSITIES AND REQUIRE ONE YEAR OF OBLIGATED SERVICE WITH EM
FOR EVERY YEAR OF EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT. WE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED THREE
ACADEMIC PARTNERSHIPS THAT ALLOW US TO REACH 25 COLLEGES AND THOUSANDS OF
COLLEGE AND PRECOLLEGE STUDENTS.
CHALLENGES FACING EM
OUR GREATEST CHALLENGE AT PRESENT IS TO INITIATE A TEST PHASE WITH
TRANSURANIC WASTE AT WIPP. BEYOND THAT, WE NEED TO ARRIVE, AS A NATION,
AT A DEFINITION OF HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN. WE NEED TO ESTABLISH DE MINIMIS
LEVELS FOR MATERIALS AND LAND USE. WE DO NOT KNOW IF WE CAN RECYCLE
SOME OF OUR MATERIALS. WE DO KNOW THAT WE HAVE MORE THAN 7,000
BUILDINGS AT 39 SITES AND OTHER AREAS WHERE WE HAVE STRUCTURAL STEEL,
PIPING, CONCRETE, AND VALUABLE MATERIALS THAT CAN BE RECYCLED. BUT WE
ARE UNABLE TO RECYCLE THEM UNTIL WE HAVE ESTABLISHED HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN.
IT ALSO HAS TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT NOT ALL DOE SITES CAN BE RETURNED TO
"GREEN FIELD" CONDITIONS; NOR WOULD IT BE COST-EFFECTIVE OR RATIONAL TO DO
SO. WE ARE JUST BEGINNING TO ADDRESS LAND USE ISSUES AND RECOGNIZE THAT
THESE ARE SOME OF THE MOST CRUCIAL -- AND POTENTIALLY CONTENTIOUS --
ISSUES FACING DOE, AND, INDEED, THE NATION. IN ORDER TO GRAPPLE WITH THE
MYRIAD OF COMPLEX ISSUES RELATED TO REGULATORY LIMITS, RISKS TO HUMAN
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, AND LAND USE PLANNING, WE NEED A
NATIONAL-LEVEL DIALOGUE AMONG THE MANY PARTIES AFFECTED BY AND INTERESTED
IN THIS ISSUE, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS. I HOPE THAT MEMBERS OF
THIS COMMITTEE WILL ASSIST US IN RESOLVING SOME OF THESE ISSUES.
ONE PARTICULAR ISSUE I WANT TO MENTION IS THE STORAGE, TREATMENT, AND
DISPOSAL OF MIXED WASTE (WASTE THAT HAS BOTH RADIOACTIVE AND HAZARDOUS
COMPONENTS). WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HOW MIXED WASTE RELATES TO
COMPLIANCE PROVISIONS IN THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
(RCRA), ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE FEDERAL FACILITIES COMPLIANCE
LEGISLATION CURRENTLY BEFORE THE CONGRESS. WE FULLY SUPPORT THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE BILLS TO BRING FEDERAL FACILITIES
INTO COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE FEDERAL AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
AND, IN PARTICULAR, RCRA. WE ALSO SUPPORT, IN PRINCIPLE, BEING SUBJECT
TO FINES AND PENALTIES UNDER RCRA, WHEN WE MISS A VIABLE DEADLINE.
HOWEVER WE OBJECT TO BEING PENALIZED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WHEN
COMPLIANCE IS, IN FACT, IMPOSSIBLE.
ARMS CONTROL
RECENT DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE WORLD HAVE INCREASED THE IMPORTANCE OF
BOTH ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES TO U.S. SECURITY. TO
IMPROVE THE DEPARTMENT'S EFFECTIVENESS IN SUPPORTING U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN BOTH OF THESE AREAS I HAVE CONSOLIDATED THE
DEPARTMENT'S ARMS CONTROL AND NON- PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES WITHIN A NEW
OFFICE OF ARMS CONTROL NON-PROLIFERATION (AN) UNDER THE SECRETARIAT.
THIS WILL STRENGTHEN THE DEPARTMENT'S CAPABILITIES TO PLAY A MORE
ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE ROLE IN SUPPORTING TRADITIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS THE NEW APPROACHES
NEEDED TO RESPOND TO THE DYNAMIC CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE
WORLD'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. THESE INCLUDE INITIATIVES,
SUCH AS THOSE ARISING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 27, 1991 NUCLEAR
INITIATIVE AND THE RELATED SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION ACT AS WELL
AS FORMER SOVIET UNION RECIPROCAL UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS. THEY ALSO
INCLUDE MAJOR U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL NON- PROLIFERATION EFFORTS ARISING
FROM UN RESOLUTION 687 CONCERNING IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
OTHER GLOBAL CHANGES.
I EXPECT THIS NEW ORGANIZATION TO EXPAND DOE'S INVOLVEMENT IN ALL
THESE ACTIVITIES AND TO EXTEND THE AVAILABILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT'S
UNIQUE TECHNICAL AND ANALYTICAL RESOURCES, INCLUDING THE SPECIALIZED
EXPERIENCE OF DOE'S HIGHLY REGARDED NATIONAL LABORATORIES, TO MEET THE
RAPIDLY EVOLVING NEEDS OF THE GOVERNMENT. AMONG THESE GROWING NEEDS ARE
SUPPORT FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON- PROLIFERATION POLICYMAKING,
NEGOTIATION, DETECTION AND VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, COMPLIANCE DETERMINATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT FOR
THE EXPANDING SLATE OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS.
OF COURSE, THE MISSION OF THIS NEW OFFICE OF ARMS CONTROL AND NON-
PROLIFERATION INCLUDES THE TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS OF DIRECTING
DEVELOPMENT AND COORDINATION OF DOE'S POLICIES, PLANS, AND PROCEDURES
RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION; MANAGING DOE'S
SUPPORTING.RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR VERIFICATION AND MONITORING OF
ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS; INTEGRATING
DOE'S POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES RELATED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
NON-PROLIFERATION, INCLUDING COOPERATIVE PROGRAM COMPONENTS (NUCLEAR
POWER, ISOTOPES IN INDUSTRY, MEDICINE, AGRICULTURE) OF THE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT); SERVING AS THE DOE FOCAL POINT FOR TECHNICAL
SUPPORT TO OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ON ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION
MATTERS AND REPRESENTING DOE IN RELAYED INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND
CONSULTATIONS. WHILE SUSTAINING THESE ESTABLISHED FUNCTIONS, DEPARTMENTAL
CAPABILITIES ARE BEING ENLARGED AND EXPANDED TO COORDINATE THE
DEPARTMENT'S EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA AND OTHER
STATES IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) IN A NUMBER OF
CRITICAL AREAS (FOR EXAMPLE, SAFE, SECURE NUCLEAR WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT,
EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES, EXPORT CONTROLS, FISSILE MATERIALS
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SAFEGUARDS) AND IN FULFILLING NEW UNITED
NATIONS-MANDATED INSPECTIONS FOR AND DESTRUCTION OF IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION AND RELATED PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES. THE DEPARTMENT IS ALSO
PARTICIPATING IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DELIBERATIONS ON IMPROVED
REGIMES FOR CONTROLLING THE SPREAD OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS IN AN
INCREASINGLY MULTIPOLAR AND TECHNICALLY ADVANCED WORLD.
FUNDING TOTALING $204,346,000 IN THE AGGREGATE, WAS ORIGINALLY REQUESTED
FOR THE FOUR MAJOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION CATEGORIES
(VERIFICATION AND. CONTROL TECHNOLOGY; EXPORT CONTROL; INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARDS; AND NON- PROLIFERATION POLICY) IN THE FY 1993 BUDGET. THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION HAS INCREASED SPENDING IN THESE IMPORTANT AREAS BY 55
PERCENT OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS.
HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF ADDED AND CRITICALLY IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES
ASSOCIATED WITH SAFE, SECURE NUCLEAR WEAPON DISMANTLEMENT BY THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION AND NON- PROLIFERATION AREAS, WE ARE PROPOSING THAT THE
FORTHCOMING BUDGET AMENDMENT INCLUDE A REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS.
BUILDING ON THE EXTENSIVE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND VERSATILITY OF ITS
NATIONAL LABORATORIES, DOE HAS ESTABLISHED A SOLID PROGRAM OF
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYTICAL STUDIES IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY FORMULATION, TREATY VERIFICATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION, AND R&D AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR MONITORING AND
COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS. AS ALREADY REVEALED IN THE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE
SUPPORT THAT DOE HAS PROVIDED FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ AND
IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CONSOLIDATION OF THESE PROGRAMS UNDER THE
OFFICE OF ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION WILL ENHANCE
DOE'S CONTRIBUTIONS.
IN RESPONSE TO HISTORIC CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND
HEIGHTENED CONCERNS ABOUT PROLIFERATION, DOE HAS ADAPTED ITS
ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAMS TO MEET EFFECTIVELY THE CHALLENGES PRESENTED
BY THE NEW SITUATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROGRAM WE HAVE PRESENTED
PROVIDES AN EFFECTIVE BASIS FOR ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES THAT LIE
BEFORE US.
NAVAL REACTORS
THE PROGRAM'S MISSION TO PROVIDE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE NAVAL NUCLEAR
PROPULSION PLANTS AND ENSURE THEIR SAFE AND EFFECTIVE OPERATION
CONTINUES, BUT HOW WE ACHIEVE THAT MISSION WILL CHANGE. THE CHALLENGE IS
TO DOWNSIZE THE UNIQUE NAVAL NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL BASE WHILE RETAINING THE
CAPABILITY TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR PROPULSION
PLANTS MEETING THE PROGRAM'S EXACTING STANDARDS.
NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS ACCOUNT FOR OVER 45 PERCENT OF THE NAVY'S
COMBATANTS -- 139 SHIPS. THESE SHIPS HAVE ACCUMULATED 4,000 REACTOR
YEARS OF OPERATION WITHOUT A REACTOR ACCIDENT OR RELEASE OF
RADIOACTIVITY THAT HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE CREWS, THE PUBLIC,
OR THE ENVIRONMENT.
NAVAL REACTORS' SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT RECORD IS A RESULT OF HARD
WORK, DEDICATION, AND A SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFETY,
CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION. THE FY 1993
BUDGET REQUEST OF $807 MILLION SUPPORTS THEIR "CRADLE-TO-GRAVE"
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION. THIS REPRESENTS AN
INCREASE OF FIVE PERCENT OVER FY 1992 SPENDING, NOT INCLUDING PURCHASES
OF ENRICHED URANIUM.
SECURITY AFFAIRS
OVER 67 PERCENT OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
TASK FORCE REPORT WHICH WAS APPROVED ON DECEMBER 14, 1990, HAVE BEEN
IMPLEMENTED AND WE ARE DILIGENTLY WORKING ON THE REST. I WOULD LIKE TO
MENTION A FEW OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED.
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ESTABLISHING A SAFEGUARDS AND
SECURITY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM WILL INCLUDE
FORMAL TRAINING, SELF DEVELOPMENT AND INDIVIDUAL STUDY, ON-THE-JOB
EXPERIENCE, AND PERFORMANCE RELATED OBJECTIVES. THE RESULT OF THIS PROGRAM
WILL BE A MORE PROFESSIONAL AND EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
WORKFORCE.
AS A RESULT OF THE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED A
WIDE VARIETY OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY ITEMS, SUCH AS HELICOPTERS,
AMMUNITION, UNIFORMS, AND SECURITY FORCE EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS NUMEROUS
OTHER ITEMS FOR STANDARDIZATION THROUGH COMMON PROCUREMENT. THE CENTRAL
TRAINING ACADEMY WILL BE THE FOCAL POINT FOR STANDARDIZATION OF ALL
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY TRAINING TO ENSURE A WELL-TRAINED CADRE
THROUGHOUT THE DOE COMPLEX.
WHILE THESE ARE ONLY A FEW EXAMPLES OF RECENT SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
ACTION, THEY ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE LAST YEAR.
THE OFFICE OF SECURITY AFFAIRS IS WORKING IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH
ALL THE PSOs TO ENSURE THAT, AS RECONFIGURATION DECISIONS ARE MADE, THE
NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY ADJUSTMENTS ARE CONSIDERED.
INTELLIGENCE
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAVE
BEEN INFLUENCED BY A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS AND TRENDS. RECENT
EVENTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS AND THE INCREASED EMPHASIS BEING
PLACED ON MONITORING OF ACTIVITIES OF POTENTIAL PROLIFERANT NATIONS
HAVE DRIVEN A REASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT'S TOP INTELLIGENCE
REQUIREMENTS.
ACCORDINGLY, PROLIFERATION INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INCREASED
TO STRENGTHEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ASSESSMENTS OF WORLDWIDE
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN EXPORT CONTROLS AND
OTHER POLICY COUNTERMEASURES. EVENTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS WILL
CONTINUE TO BE MONITORED FOR IMPACT TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY WITH
SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE SECURITY OF COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES'
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ISSUES RELATED TO THEIR DISMANTLEMENT.
OFFICE OF SECURITY EVALUATIONS
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, I HAVE SUPPORTED VIGOROUS OVERSIGHT
PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY THE OFFICE OF SECURITY EVALUATIONS, THE PROGRAM
OFFICES, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FIELD OFFICES.
WHILE SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY REMAINS A PRIORITY ALONG WITH
ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH ISSUES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT, IT NO
LONGER REPRESENTS THE SIGNIFICANT CONCERN OF THE PAST. THE OVERSIGHT OF
THE PROGRAM IS EFFECTIVE AND BECOMING MORE SO. THIS IS FOCUSING
MANAGEMENT ATTENTION ON CRITICAL AREAS, INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
MANAGEMENT ACTIONS. MY THRUST IN THE FUTURE WILL BE TO INCREASE THE
COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM WHILE
MAINTAINING A COMPLETELY EFFECTIVE PROTECTION PROGRAM.
CONCLUSION
MR. CHAIRMAN, I BELIEVE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S FY 1993 ATOMIC
ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES BUDGET REQUEST IS SOUND AND BALANCED AND
PROVIDES STRONG SUPPORT TO OUR DEFENSE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP
MISSIONS. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH CONGRESS TO ENACT THIS BUDGET.
I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE : PRE-1989
Strategic Environment Weapons Complex
o Cold War Ongoing o 3 Reactors Shut Down for Safety
o INF Treaty in Force o NPR Program Accelerated
2 Reactor/2 Sites
o START Talks Ongoing o Modernization Report Submitted
to Congress (1/89)
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 1989-TODAY
Strategic Environment Weapons Complex
o Berlin Wall Falls (11/89) o Pit Production and Pu
Processing Suspended at Rocky
flats (11/89)- Safety
Upgrades Commence
o Plutonium Production
Terminated Throughout Complex
(1/90- Sufficient Inventory
o SRS Reactors Dedicated to
Tritium Only (1/90)
o All Defense Production
Terminated at Hanford and
Fernald (10/90)
o Reconfiguration Study
Published (2/91)
o NPR Downscoped form 2
Reactors/2 Sites to 1
Reactor/Site (2/91)
o SRS Reactors Cut from 3 to 1
(2/91)
o START Treaty Signed (7/91) o Hanford N-Reactor Terminated
as Tritium Backup (8/91)
o Soviet Coup Fails (8/91) o Separate NPR EIS Folded into
Reconfiguration PEIS (10/91)
- Initial Urgency Criteria No
Longer Justified
o President Announces Arms
Initiatives (9/91) o HEU Production Suspended at
Portsmouth (11/91)
o Soviet Union Collapses (12/91) o Preferred Non-Nuclear
Consolidation Plan Announced
(12/91) - EA
o President Offers Further o Commence Transfer of Rocky
Arms Initiatives (1/92) Flats to D&D
- Startup of Lab Building
559 (2/92)
- Startup of Building 707
for Self Cleanup (Excepted
FY 93)
**** NOTE DYNAMICS OF TRITIUM SUPPLY AND DEMAND CHART IS ATTACHED TO
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
**** NOTE REVISED K REACTOR SCHEDULE CHART IS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL
DOCUMENT
REMEDIAL ACTIONS TAKEN SINCE AUTHORIZED STARTUP
o Safety Rods
- Extensively Tested, Visually Examined, and Repaired
Malfunctioning Rods
Heat Exchanger Failure -- Tritium Leak
- Replaced 3 Heat Exchangers
- Improved Procedures and Training
- Completed an Environmental Analysis, and Incident
Investigation, a Failure Analysis, and Evaluation of the
Structural Integrity of the Heat Exchangers
- Instrumentation Alarms and Practices in Place to give Prompt
Indication of Any Tritium Leak
-- Installed In-line Tritium Monitoring Equipment
-- Sample Water Leaving the Plant Every 2 Hours On-site
versus 2 Times a Day at an Off-site Laboratory
**** NOTE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FY 1993 BUDGET TRENDS IS ATTACHED TO
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
**** NOTE NUCLEAR PRODUCTION WORKFORCE (POST JANUARY 1992 STATE-OF-UNION
ADDRESS) IS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
**** NOTE NON-NUCLEAR PRODUCTION WORKFORCE (POST JANUARY 1992 STATE-OF-THE
UNION ADDRESS) IS ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
**** NOTE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT WORKFORCE IS
ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
WORKER RETRAINING/DOE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE PLAN
o DOE has Developed a Transition and Adjustment Assistance Plan with
Full Participation of State and Local Officials
o Objective: Minimize the Impact of Changes in the Weapons Complex on
Workers and Communities
o Key Elements of Our Plan
- Employment of Displaced Workers on Cleanup Activities at the
same site, Providing Retraining as Necessary
-- Fernald ERMC Used as Model
- Recruitment and Placement at Other DOE Sites, with Priority
Given to Sites within Surrounding Geographic Area
- Placement with a DOE Contractor at Another Site Receiving Any
Portion of the Work
- Assistance in Other Outplacement Activities in Local Areas
Through Efforts of the Current Contractor
- Use of the President's Economic Adjustment Assistant Program
through Department of Defense and Coordination with the
Department of Labor ($150M Set-aside
- Coordinate with Economic Development Administration to Ensure
State and Local Government Entities Obtain Assistance (25%
Match/50M Set-aside/SBA Involvement)
- Investigate Other Opportunities for Obtaining Assistance from
Additional Sources
- A Recent Example is our Cooperation with Senator Brown and Local
Leaders in Colorado in which the Department is Making Available
$100,000 Plus an Additional $140,000 In-Kind Support in FY 92
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