FY 93 (AEDA) AND DP NUCLEAR TESTING, 03/18/1992, Testimony

Basis Date:: 19920424
Chairperson:: J. Spratt
Committee:: House Armed Services
Docfile Number:: T92AD086
Hearing Date:: 19920318
DOE Lead Office:: DP SUB
Committee:: DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel
Hearing Subject:: FY 93 (AEDA) AND DP NUCLEAR TESTING
Witness Name:: R. Claytor
Hearing Text:

Statement of Richard Claytor Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs U.S. Department of Energy before the Committee on Armed Services Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel U.S. House of Representatives Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, I am pleased to appear before you today to testify in support of the Defense Programs (DP) portion of the Department of Energy's (DOE) FY 1993 Budget Request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities. STRATEGIC OVERVIEW Over the past 3 years, the world has undergone breathtaking changes. The changes include the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union; the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction to conflict-prone "Third World" regions; the significant reduction in the number and types of nuclear weapons, accelerated by the President's initiatives in his speech of September 27, 1991, and his State of the Union Address on January 28, 1992; the emphasis on full compliance with laws, regulations, and accepted standards in the nuclear weapons complex; the expectation by the U.S. public of a "peace dividend;" and significant budgetary constraints. These changes have opened up opportunities and created challenges rivaling the greatest in our history with the result that, for the first time since 1945, the United States is not building any nuclear weapons. These changes have had a profound effect on the missions and priorities of Defense Programs. The diminishing strategic military threat to the United States has allowed the President to make significant reductions in the size and structure of our nuclear deterrent. This, in turn, has allowed us to commence a significant reduction and restructuring of the nuclear weapons complex, while focusing on environmental cleanup. At the same time, the reduced strategic threat requires us to pay greater attention to other aspects of national security, such as the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The overriding challenge to the Office of Defense Programs at this historical turning point is effective execution of our mission in the face of no current or planned new weapons production workloads and increasingly constrained defense funding. MISSION AND PRIORITIES The Defense Programs mission is to provide and maintain safe, secure, reliable, and survivable nuclear weapons, as required by the Department of Defense and approved by the President, in a safe, secure, environmentally sound, and cost-effective manner. Within the framework of this mission, emphasis, at least in the near-term, will shift to activities related to warhead retirement and dismantlement; reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex; continuing improvements to the safety and security of the enduring weapons stockpile; nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; preparation for ultimate decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of excess facilities; and the transfer of technology between our weapons complex and the commercial sector to enhance U.S. competitiveness. At the same time, in an uncertain world, we must maintain nuclear competence in our production complex, in our nuclear weapons laboratories, and continue a modest number of underground nuclear tests to assure the integrity of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. In light of the President's recent decision to cancel new production of the W88 Trident II warhead, there are now no Department of Defense (DOD) requirements that would require DOE to produce plutonium pits. Accordingly, DOE is beginning the transition of the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) from nuclear production activities toward cleanup of the plant leading to its ultimate D&D. Although plutonium production operations have been suspended since November 1989, a substantial amount of activity has been ongoing at the RFP. Production of required nonnuclear components has continued and accounted for about 25 percent of the total operating expenditures of $1.6 billion for FY 1990-1992. Of the remaining $1.2 billion, over 90 percent of the expenditures have been for environmental monitoring, security of materials, and safety improvements. Most of these funds would have been required even if no plutonium production work had ever been planned. Improvements have been completed in Building 559, an analytical laboratory. Following confirmation of these improvements by an Operational Readiness Review (ORR), the Secretary authorized resumption of operations in this building on February 4, 1992. This building is required to support the various plutonium operations at the RFP into the foreseeable future. Similar improvements are well underway in Building 707, the main fabrication facility. Upon completion.of these improvements, this facility will be placed in an appropriate contingency status pending final resolution of the complex reconfiguration plan and schedule. Activities will begin to transition the remaining plutonium facilities to a condition suitable for turnover to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management. Conduct of operation improvements are proposed to be made in Building 371. This building would then play a central role in the Department's plans for complying with the State of Colorado's consent order on residues and for the D&D of the site. The many improvements that were made during the more than 2 years that plutonium production operations were curtailed have resulted in significant improvements in the operational and safety culture at the Plant. Moreover, the improvements are an investment in the ultimate cleanup effort and have set the stage for a more efficient transition of the facility to D&D. In addition, the process has been the focus for the DOE's renewed commitment to constructive involvement with outside oversight groups, State and local governments and the public. RECONFIGURATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX In January 1989, prior to Secretary Watkins' appointment as Secretary of Energy, the Department reported to Congress its intent to modernize and expand the nuclear weapons complex to support the Nation's nuclear deterrent. At that time the Department was planning to reactivate three reactors at Savannah River, which were shut down for safety concerns in 1988; maintain a backup reactor at Hanford; and site two new production reactors (NPR), each of a different design. After assuming office in early 1989, the Secretary directed that the plans for modernization be reevaluated in light of the changing world situation. Further direction was provided in August 1990 that resulted in publication of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study in February 1991. This study called for a reconfigured weapons complex that would be smaller, less diverse, and more economical but would safely and reliably support the nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives consistent with the realities of the emerging international security environment. In February 1991, work began on a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) to analyze a range of reasonable alternative configurations for Complex 21. The Department will use the PEIS process to help develop a comprehensive reconfiguration plan. The draft PEIS is now scheduled for release in December 1992, followed by a final PEIS and a Record of Decision (ROD) in August 1993. On November 1, 1991, Admiral Watkins announced that the Department would defer a decision on the NPR site and technology and include the environmental analysis for the NPR in the PEIS for reconfiguration of the nuclear weapons complex. Combining these efforts will permit maintaining both reactor design teams at minimum levels while allowing time to adequately consider the impact of the changes in requirements resulting from the President's September 27, 1991, and State of the Union initiatives. The added time will allow the Department to demonstrate the technical viability of K-Reactor, the only current production source for tritium, and examine other alternatives for tritium production, such as linear accelerators, that simply were not possible on the previous schedule. As a result of this deferment, the FY 1992 and FY 1993 funding for the NPR program has been reduced and a significant portion of the savings will be applied to needed environmental restoration and cleanup activities. This subject will be discussed more fully in separate testimony by the Director, Office of New Production Reactors. We are now presented with a unique opportunity to begin the transition that we all desire to a smaller, less diverse, and more economical weapons complex without the concurrent pressure to sustain a large new weapons reduction workload. We plan to begin this process with the consolidation of our nonnuclear weapons production activities. The Kansas City Plant is the preferred alternative site of in accordance with NEPA. If the Department determines that there is no significant environmental impact, we will begin a 3-year program to phase out our nonnuclear production operations at the Rocky Flats Plant by the end of FY 1994, and at the Mound and Pinellas facilities by the end of FY 1995, and transfer most of these activities to Kansas City or other existing facilities. The consolidation of these activities to Kansas City or other exiting facilities. The consolidation of these activities is expected to save the taxpayers between $150 and $200 million annually when fully implemented. WORKER RETRAINING The Department is developing a comprehensive retraining and relocated program to help retrain workers as appropriated for new missions, such as environmental cleanup; help relocated workers to other DOE and contractor activities if available; and work with State and local officials to incorporate workers into local economies whenever possible. As the Weapons production mission diminishes at sites like Rocky Flats, Mound, nd Pinellas, the Environmental Restoration and Waste Management mission at these sites is expected to steadily increase to reflect the transition of facilities from an operating configuration to one where the facility is ready for decontamination and decommissioning. Over the next 6 months, each site will be conducting a task analysis including a identification of the skill base necessary for an orderly transition to an Environmental Restoration Waste Management mission. The Department's intention is, to the greatest extent practical, to retrain and utilize the workforce to carry out this new mission. For example, at the Fernald Plant i Ohio, all bargaining unit employees will be offered employment with the new contractor being acquired to manage the clean-up contractor at comparable salary and employee benefit levels. The new contractor will also be directed to hire as many salaried personnel as it can effectively employ. Administrative and support personnel not presently trained to perform clean-up work and who will not retained by the new contractor must be afforded to opportunity for retraining. This will make these workers more knowledgeable in remediation techniques and environmental requirements so that they con not only be reconsidered as vacancies occur by also become qualified for employment with other specialized remediation companies working on government of or commercial sites. However, in some instances, a portion of the workforce may not be needed. I those cases, the Department will work with State and local organizations to identify job skills which may needed within the surrounding area, including other DOE facilities. I parallel with this effort, the Department intends to develop a DOE contractor-wide vacancy system to match job skills with job opportunities within the entire DOE complex. Furthermore, we will work with our contractor management to provide incentives for early retirement and for most voluntary separations. We will also provide out placement assistance such as resume preparation, counseling, assistance for job search and tuition payment for retraining. Coordination with the Department of Labor to draw upon funding set aside for defense-related facilities to provide for retraining, education, recruitment and placement, relocation and counseling assistance is planned. We will also coordinate with the Economic Development Administration to help State and local governments obtain Economic Adjustment Program grants (with 25 percent match) for community impact assistance, drawing upon funding earmarked for defense-related facilities. These funds may be used for a wide range of development activities including modification and alternative uses of facilities, expansion of community businesses and creation of other new jobs. DOWNSIZING THE WEAPONS COMPLEX As these types of reductions in the weapons complex are made in the future, the Department will need to undertake a significant effort to retain the nuclear competency skills necessary for a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile and to minimize the local economic impact of programmatic reductions and closure of facilities. During this interim period of transition, the requirements placed on the existing complex will still be significant. We must still continue to achieve and maintain compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, and DOE Orders. We will continue to make improvements in the conduct of all of our operations. As demonstrated at the Fernald site, the Department is committed to a safe and orderly transition of these sites to an Environmental Restoration and Waste Management mission. CONTINUING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW CULTURE Since issuance of the Secretary's 10 Point Plan in June 1989 to create a new culture of accountability, great strides have been made. Defense Programs, its laboratories, and its contractors have educated a significant portion of their staffs-in the principles and concepts of the conduct of operations and the need for compliance with DOE Orders. We have demonstrated and will continue to demonstrate that environment, safety, and health often takes priority over production and that the two are compatible. The capability for the line managers to perform self-assessment has greatly improved. Given the great changes occurring in our mission, we now have the opportunity to incorporate the new culture into the reconfigured complex and long-term maintenance of the DP complex. A substantial level of funding will still be needed to continue implementation of the new culture. A strong conduct of operations and thrust for excellence introduced at the inception of reconfiguration will assure a cost-effective, quality operation in which environment, safety, and health priorities will become the expected way of doing business. TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION Defense Programs will launch a series of broad new initiatives in FY 1993 which is expected to have a positive economic impact in the United States. Advanced computer technologies will be generated by work conducted under a model Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between DOE and the Computer Systems Policy Project (CSPP), an affiliation of chief executive officers of 12 of the largest American computer companies. Subject to the availability of adequate funding, additional breakthroughs are possible through collaborative R&D to be conducted by DP laboratories in tandem with major automobile manufacturers, machine tool firms, flat-panel display consortia, integrated circuit manufacturers, and advanced materials producers. The strategic direction of our Technology Commercialization programs will be dictated by industry. Several measures have been and will be taken to ensure this "industry pull" exists. For example, industry advisory committees are planned to support our Technology Commercialization process, keeping us focused on industrial needs and economic realities. In support of this vision, we will continue to forge new relationships with private industry. The CSPP model CRADA, now in the final stages of negotiation, is an important example. Also, we have been actively working with the Specialty Metals Processing Consortium (SMPC) and the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences (NCMS) for some time. International competitiveness in high-technology industries requires rapid development of new ideas. Therefore, DOE is working to streamline the negotiation of CRADA's and the funding of corresponding projects. One important step is now being taken: initiating strategic teamwork among the weapons laboratories. This teamwork will allow private-sector firms to identify the most appropriate laboratory - or combination of laboratories - for a specific technology or capability. Moreover, laboratory teamwork will enhance our response to "industry pull" by providing a more broad, yet unified, set of capabilities. We will continue to improve the effectiveness of our Technology Commercialization programs. Funding for these programs has grown to $50 million in FY 1992. We have received more than 100 proposals for FY 1992 collaborative projects; 43 have been selected for funding. Industry interest continues to grow. In FY 1993, we expect to manage a $91 million program which will accommodate the aforementioned major new initiatives as well as the continuation of projects started in prior years. Although the Technology Commercialization budget is small in comparison to commercial R&D funding, we believe that by investing in the commercialization of weapons laboratory technologies and capabilities the American taxpayer can realize returns on investment significantly higher than those earned today on independent research in the private sector. FISCAL YEAR 1993 BUDGET REQUEST DEFENSE PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 1993 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE $2,894 $2,515 a/ $2,511 b/ RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT TESTING 1,742 1,944 c/ 1,862 c/ (Includes Technology Comm.) WEAPONS PROGRAM DIRECTION 106 164 356 (Includes Reconfiguration) MATERIALS PRODUCTION 2,1236 l,877 1,777 TOTAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS $6,978 $6,500 $6,506 AS SPENT (WITH CARRYOVER) $6,851 $6,627 $6,506 a/ Does not reflect $127 million spending carryover from FY 1991. b/ Does not include full impact of potential workload funding adjustments currently under review as a result of the President's State of the Union Address. c/ RD&T numbers do not reflect planned carryover of $26 million. The FY 1993 budget request for DP is reduced by 1.8 percent from FY 1992 spending levels. Overall, this is a reduction in real growth of about 6 percent. The most significant reductions are in the Production and Surveillance and Materials Production program which decline 9 percent in real terms from FY 1992, which I will cover in detail later in my statement. The Research, Development and Testing (RD&T) account will decline 8 percent in real terms. Our budget request reflects reduced expenditures for capital equipment and construction in all programs, with new starts related primarily to safety and health issues. Although most accounts trend downward in FY 1993, there are two growth areas: Technology Commercialization and Weapons Complex Reconfiguration. Increased emphasis is planned for technology transfer to industry in several high technology areas, including microelectronics, high speed computing, and advanced ceramics. This budget request for Technology Commercialization activities is contained within the RD&T line, and increases to $91 million, $41 million over the FY 1992 level. Weapons Complex Reconfiguration funding is currently contained in the Weapons Program Direction line. The request for FY 1993 is $173 million, which is substantially higher than the FY 1992 level. This includes funding for a reconfiguration line item for nonnuclear manufacturing consolidation and to begin Title I engineering for the nuclear facilities consolidation following the Record of Decision scheduled for August 1993. The outyear funding projections for Defense Programs include no growth at the bottom line for our programs. We will accommodate growth areas, such as reconfiguration, at the expense of other ongoing efforts. Finally, it is important to note that the budget request for FY 1993 remains in the structure appropriated in FY 1992. This structure does not take into account the new Defense Programs organization, nor does it allow us to identify explicitly funding in "functional" areas such as environment, safety, and health in all of our program activities. We are working with the Department's Chief Financial Officer to examine these issues and propose changes to the Department's current budget structure targeted for the FY 1994-1995 budget submittal. The Department will keep the Congress fully informed about these proposed changes as we work to make the budget and reporting structure as responsive as possible to both the Department's priorities and management needs, and the need for comprehensive and current congressional oversight of our operations. The next major section covers the DP budget request in detail, by appropriation. It includes a discussion of program accomplishments during the past year and a detailed discussion of the budget justification. WEAPONS ACTIVITIES RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING The nuclear weapons RD&T complex consists of several key elements, including highly competent scientists, engineers and technicians, specialized equipment, and facilities. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Nevada Test Site (NTS) constitute the RD&T complex. These elements form the core of the RD&T program. The program is maintained to assure the ability to support evolving stockpile requirements, develop improved nuclear weapons surety features, and provide technical support for Complex 21 reconfiguration activities. The RD&T program, and the weapons laboratories specifically, are being reoriented to comply with recent Presidential initiatives. The laboratories are also currently undergoing a detailed review to examine what can be done to streamline and consolidate laboratory activities to reduce costs, without sacrificing technological effectiveness. There are specific mission changes in the FY 1993 budget related to the weapons laboratories. Reduced funding requirements for weapons development -- about $120 million -- have been reallocated within RD&T to enhance efforts in support of the President's initiatives. The redirection of R&D work will emphasize efforts related to warhead dismantlement, storage and disposal technology, nuclear non-proliferation, waste minimization and treatment, transportation and storage, technology commercialization and planning and management support of improved procedures and risk assessment. Underlying these changing missions and priorities is an effort to stabilize R&D employment at the laboratories at about the FY 1991 level, although the Weapons workforce supporting the laboratories Testing programs will continue to decline. Laboratory full-time equivalents levels have declined by almost 24 percent between FY 1987 and FY 1993. In a changing world, it is difficult to predict which technological options will be needed in the future. The technological superiority we have traditionally had can only be maintained if we support a Weapons Research, Development and Testing program appropriately sized and oriented to accommodate change. Research, Development and Testing capabilities that are perceived to be strong and viable are required to maintain strategy options, foster nuclear competence, and enhance the safety and security of the enduring stockpile. As long as there is a stockpile, the emphasis on improving nuclear weapons surety will remain paramount. We must continue to upgrade the stockpile as safety-related technologies become available. Weapons surety starts in the design, testing, and production cycles with measures to prevent accidents and extends to the control and handling of nuclear weapons and other procedures designed to avoid loss or diversion to unauthorized persons. We will also continue to conduct underground nuclear tests at the NTS. These tests are a crucial component of weapons research and development and while they are essential to demonstrate weapons system performance, they are equally important in retaining a competent RD&T workforce since scientists, and engineers must exercise their skills in order to retain them. The weapons program will maintain a level of testing consistent with programmatic needs, including the need to maintain nuclear design competence. While the overall number of nuclear tests will likely not increase significantly over the level planned for FY 1993, a finite number of nuclear tests must be conducted annually so that we will have confidence in our stockpiled weapons and can improve the level of safety and reliability of the stockpile. The threat assessment capability of the RD&T complex remains an important part of the program. Not only must we strive to never be surprised technologically, but we must also be prepared to respond to new threats as they arise. The threat assessment program attempts to address and understand the multitude of potential threats to our national security interests. The FY 1993 budget includes an aggressive program related to technology commercialization. Major FY 1993 laboratory/industry collaborations have been planned with the U.S. computer and semiconductor industries. A major program is also planned with the U.S. companies in the development of new ceramics. AID TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION The Weapons program has the lead technical support role in providing nuclear weapons surety assistance to the former Soviet Union. We will provide, through the State Department, technical assistance on matters of weapons transportation, disablement, use control, security, and the safe storage of fissionable materials. Concrete measures are under active bilateral discussion to determine the most effective means to provide assistance. FY 1991 ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ISSUES Recent accomplishments in Weapons Research, Development and Testing are presented below. LABORATORY FACILITIES Meeting the tough technical challenges and producing world class research has been the hallmark of DOE's three weapons laboratories over the years. During the past 3 years, our RD&T complex has been responding to a new set of challenges, the need to improve the quality of facility and site operations. Confronting these challenges is necessary regardless of the scope and direction of any possible programmatic mission change within the RD&T complex. Tiger Team assessments were conducted at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNL); and at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). These assessments were preceded by extensive and critical self-assessments. The Laboratories' self-assessments were frank discussions of root cause failings and management weaknesses. The SNL assessment took place in the April/May 1991 timeframe, and has been followed up by the development of a Corrective Action Plan that is in the final stages of Departmental review. Sandia's Corrective Action Plan will be presented to the Secretary for approval in mid-March. The plan reflects an estimated cost of a bout $223 million and a schedule that will cover 6 years -- FY 1992 through FY 1997. The FY 1993 portion of the Corrective Action Plan is estimated to be about $40 million and is included in the Department's budget request. The LANL Tiger Team assessment started in late September 1991, and was concluded in early November 1991. The development of a Corrective Action Plan is currently in its initial stages and is slated for completion in late summer or early fall 1992. Execution of approved Tiger Team Corrective Action Plans continues at the DOE Nevada Field Office (NV), LLNL, and Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore (SNLL). At NV about 37 percent of actions have been completed. LLNL has completed about 55 percent of its Corrective Action Plan and at SNLL, about 42 percent of the corrective actions have been completed. To give a much needed focus and perspective to our efforts to strengthen the operations and line management oversight activities of our facilities, DP initiated a disciplined and structured approach to identify specific DOE Order requirements, assess their applicability, determine the degree of compliance with the requirement, and identify and schedule the necessary measures to come into compliance. Within the RD&T Complex this DOE Order compliance self-assessment is being undertaken using a "graded approach" starting with selected facilities at the laboratories and the NTS. The "back end" of this process, the establishment and approval of Schedule Compliance Agreements, will, to a large measure, influence and frame resource requirements over the next several years. STRENGTHENING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING LINE MANAGEMENT Positive measures are continuing to strengthen line management oversight in our RD&T facilities. On site presence at LANL and LLNL has been solidified and enhanced by the establishment of DOE Facility Representative Programs. Coverage of these programs will be expanded over the next few years. Another fundamental step toward improving the conduct and quality of our RD&T facilities and site operations was taken during the past year. Formal conduct of operations programs and implementation plans were developed by the three weapons laboratories. These programs are based on DOE's adaptation of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations guidelines for the conduct of operations. These plans were presented to and approved by DP. As the nuclear weapons program is reoriented, our RD&T facilities and our ability to operate them in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner will be tested. New operations, or changes to existing operations may be required to support changing RD&T missions and programs. In most cases, these types of changes require redefinition of operational safety envelopes and development of new procedures. The changing scene in the weapons program also points out the need to proceed with closure, deactivation, and consolidation of some of our facilities and operations, for example: the closure of tritium operations in Technical Area 33 at LANL; the eventual closure and deactivation of tritium facilities at LLNL and SNLL; the downsizing of plutonium operations at LLNL and their eventual consolidation into plutonium operations at LANL; and the consolidation of nuclear materials storage at LANL, a key action in the completion of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building, upgrade program. Of course, overlaying all of this is the continuing challenge to enhance our line management oversight so that ES&H, as well as other operational expectations, are met. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS In the area of emergency preparedness and response, activities were conducted to maintain and enhance the Department's capability for responding to a nuclear weapons accident, malevolent nuclear incident, or other significant accident or incident involving radioactive material worldwide. During the past year, the Department's Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) provided direct support of activities addressing the Mt. Pinatubo volcano eruption, Kuwait oil fires, and other DOD efforts in the Persian Gulf. The President's initiatives to decrease the nuclear stockpile will result in increased movement of weapons throughout the U.S. and abroad. These activities will increase the risk of an incident for which our emergency response capabilities must be prepared to deal. For this very important reason, we are focusing management attention and resources in this area so that we are prepared to respond quickly and effectively to any nuclear emergency. TEST BAN READINESS PROGRAM The DOE is required by Section 1436 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989 to provide an annual report on the status of the Nuclear Test Ban Readiness Program. The Third Annual Test Ban Readiness Report (1991) is currently being prepared. Section 1436 requires three areas to be addressed in the report: stockpile inspection and nonexplosive testing; remanufacturing of existing nuclear weapons; and research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and engineering. Even though progress was made during the past year in all the specified areas, current understanding is inadequate to support devising a program that can assure continued stockpile reliability, or a credible deterrent, in the event of significant further limitations on nuclear testing. Moreover, a review of FY 1991's activities does not reveal any specific technical achievement that would permit early attainment of the program objectives. [[[ NOTE: WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CHART IS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ]]]] A principal objective in DOE's management of the laboratories is to stabilize the employment level supported by DP funding. To that end, the FY 1993 budget request incorporates a carryover of $26.0 million from FY 1992 to level R&D laboratory employment at about 7,362 full-time equivalents, which is comparable to FY 1991 for R&D. Overall, however, the level of RD&T employment continues downward, attributable to the declining level of effort in the underground testing program. Fiscal Year 1991 end-of-year employment was higher than projected, in anticipation of increased FY 1992 appropriations. Because we do not expect to sustain that higher level in FY 1993, a decision was made to carryover $26 million into FY 1993. The FTE's now projected for FY 1992 are 7,415; this provides an orderly ramp down to FY 1993. WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TOTAL CORE OPERATING ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1993 REQUEST OPERATING EXPENSES TECHNOLOGY BASE $ 414.8 $ 519.5 $ 536.2 WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, ENGINEERING AND CERTIFICATION 346.3 339.0 219.4 SPECIAL PROJECTS 69.2 87.5 89.1 TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION 20.0 38.6 91.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 24.0 32.7 32.9 TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES $ 874.3 $1,017.3 $968.6 The general thrust of the FY 1993 budget proposal for Core R&D is to maintain support for the major nuclear weapons related missions and to apply those resources freed by diminished near-term weapon system design and engineering requirements to areas of new or enhanced activities as mentioned previously. Stabilizing the level of laboratory employment funded by weapons Research and Development at least until such time as future mission needs are more definitely understood, continues to be a prime objective. The challenge is to define the future, and then restructure the laboratories to meet that future while maintaining the unique expertise essential to viable nuclear competence. The overall operating expense level for R&D declines about 3 percent from the FY 1992 level; however, we will seek to achieve about the FY 1991 level of R&D funded laboratory employment overall by utilizing $26.0 million of FY 1992 funding as discussed earlier. Technology Base funding is requested at $536.2 million. This represents a 3 percent increase over the FY 1992 level and a 29 percent increase over FY 1991. The technology base effort is the foundation of the program. Most importantly, it consists of a unique team of scientific and engineering experts in nuclear weapons design and technology. Maintaining the nuclear competence of this team and a stable employment level are crucial elements. The second component of the technology base is the unique array of highly specialized research facilities. These facilities are crucial in maintaining our nuclear technological edge and must be maintained to keep up with major advances in underlying science and technology. The technology base consists of fundamental research in specific areas of science and engineering bring where new understanding is required to resolve unknowns or problem areas. Weapons Development, Engineering, and Certification funding is requested at $219.4 million, about a 35 percent reduction from the FY 1992 level. This activity is responsible for improving safety and security of all nuclear weapons in the stockpile, maintaining weapons reliability, and for providing new weapons options. Within available resources in FY 1993, efforts will support stockpile maintenance and emphasis will be on developing a smaller, safer, more secure, and effective stockpile; accelerated warhead dismantlement; long-term staging and storage and disposal. There will also be support to the former Soviet Union in dismantlement process technology. Special projects funding is requested at $89.1 million, about a 2 percent increase over the FY 1992 level. This activity supports the Research and Development program including efforts related to improved hardware systems and procedures for the protection of nuclear weapons and strategic quantities of special nuclear material during shipment and storage. The increase in this area is for support of laboratory ES&H activities directly related to the program and maintenance of critical laboratory capabilities and facilities. Technology Commercialization funding for FY 1993 is requested at $91 million, a significant increase over the FY 1992 level of $50 million. This increase will allow us to engage in more large cooperative projects in critical technology areas while continuing programs started in previous years. Emergency Preparedness funding is requested at $32.9 million, which is basically the same funding as for FY 1992. This program includes maintenance, operations, and enhancement of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team capability; Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center activities; the Aerial Measurements System; and the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability. WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CORE CAPITAL EQUIPMENT SUMMARY ($ IN MILLIONS) , FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST R&D Core Program R&D Basic Equipment $ 46.9 $ 69.8 $ 53.6 R&D Computers 45.7 28.1 29.5 Total R&D Core Program 92.6 97.9 83.1 The total R&D capital equipment request is for $103.8 million. This includes $83.1 million for the R&D Core program, and $20.7 million for the Inertial Fusion (IF) program. For the R&D program, the basic equipment request of $53.6 million supports the highest priority needs. At the three weapons laboratories, LANL, LLNL, and SNL, there are nine major items of equipment requested. For R&D computers, the $29.5 million request supports seven major items of computer equipment at the three weapons laboratories. WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION SUMMARY ($ IN MILLION) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST Programmatic Construction Revitalization $78.2 $ 94.3 $119.5 R&D - GPP 20.0 21.4 21.0 Subtotal Programmatic 98.2 115.7 140.5 Safeguards and Security 2.1 6.8 1.0 Total R&D Construction $100.3 $122.5 $141.5 The construction request for R&D is $141.5 million. General plant projects (GPP) construction remains at about the same level as FY 1992. The revitalization program, initiated in FY 1984 to provide for the construction of new facilities and modifications, relocations, and additions to existing RD&T facilities, request for FY 1993 is $119.5 million. Under Revitalization $18.8 million is for construction subproject starts proposed for R&D, primarily to redress safety related issues. WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION NEW STARTS ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FUTURE TEC REQUEST YEARS 92-D-102 NUCLEAR WEAPONS RD&T FACILITIES REVITALIZATION PHASE IV, VL - GAS LINE REPLACEMENT, PHASE B, $ 5.8 $ 5.8 $0 LANL - STATIC VAR COMPENSATOR, LANL 9.2 2.9 6.3 - WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, NV 13.2 3.3 9.9 - ATMOSPHERIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY, LLNL 11.3 4.0 7.3 - DORMITORIES, NV 4.7 2.8 1.9 TOTAL R&D NEW STARTS $ 44.2 $ 18.8 $ 25.4 The Gas Line Replacement, LANL, is required to replace the last section of 130 miles of natural gas pipeline that serves LANL. The FY 1993 request is for $5.8 million. The Static Var Compensator, LANL, provides for installation of a thyristor-controlled static volt ampere reactive (VAR) compensator required by LANL electric power transmission and distribution system. The FY 1993 request is for $2.9 million. The Water Distribution Systems, NV, provides for expansion and upgrades to permanent water distribution systems supporting major weapons testing and support areas of the NTS. The FY 1993 request is for $3.3 million. The Atmospheric Emergency Response Facility, LLNL, is an office and research building which will provide operations support space for the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC). The FY 1993 request is for $4.0 million. The dormitories subproject at NV, provides for two 16,500 square- feet dormitories containing 53 single occupancy accommodations. The FY 1993 request is for $2.8 million. WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CONSTRUCTION ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FUTURE TEC REQUEST YEARS R&D S&S CONSTRUCTION $ 15.3 $ 1.0 $ 0 The FY 1993 request includes $1.0 million to continue our efforts to improve the overall safeguards and security posture. The FY 1993 request is for project 88-D-104 Safeguards and Security Upgrade, Phase II, LANL. This project provides for four major categories of safeguards and security upgrades: emergency perimeter fencing; physical security; special nuclear materials (SNM) monitoring; and substantial computing network equipment upgrades. Phase II is for continuation of improvements to the security of SNM and classified information at LANL. WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INERTIAL FUSION ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST OPERATING EXPENSE GAS LASER $ 10.9 $ 11.8 $ 11.0 GLASS LASER 102.3 106.4 117.7 PULSED POWER 29.3 31.5 30.0 SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES 15.4 15.6 15.6 SUBTOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES $ 157.9 $ 165.3 $ 174.3 CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 17.1 29.5 20.7 SUBTOTAL, INERTIAL FUSION $ 175.0 $ 194.8 $ 195.0 The FY 1993 budget request for Inertial Fusion (IF) is $174.3 million for operating expenses and $20.7 million for capital equipment, for a total request of $195 million. This program conducts experiments and develops high-power drivers to explore certain physics processes related to nuclear weapons. This is a multi-laboratory, experimental and theoretical effort with a near- term goal of achieving ignition and modest gain in a laboratory ignition facility. The long-term goal is to advance certain weapons physics simulation and effects capabilities and provide information on high-gain target behavior useful in civilian electric power applications. The Inertial Fusion program is planned to maintain about the FY 1992 level of effort in FY 1993. Operating funding is allocated to continue efforts directed toward expeditious demonstration of ignition and gain, in accordance with the National Academy of Sciences' recommendations. A major review of the Pulsed Power program is scheduled for summer 1992 and will provide additional direction for this program's efforts in FY 1993. The Department continues to work through the San Francisco Field Office to closeout contract obligations with KMS Fusion, Inc., the former target fabrication contractor. The IF capital equipment request of $20.7 million includes $13.1 million to continue the OMEGA laser upgrade at the University of Rochester. This supports a project completion date of 1995. WEAPONS TESTING TOTAL FUNDING ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST OPERATING EXPENSES $ 457.3 $ 457.5 $ 429.5 CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 31.5 34.5 31.1 CONSTRUCTION 10.7 19.4 13.3 TOTAL WEAPONS TESTING $ 499.5 $ 511.4 $ 473.9 LABORATORY MANPOWER WEAPONS TESTING (FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS) FY 1993 TESTING FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST LLNL 543 517 447 LANL 438 420 407 SNL 368 343 306 TOTAL TESTING 1,349 1,280 1,160 Underground nuclear testing is a critical component in our overall weapons R&D. As a result of the President's nuclear weapons initiative, testing to ensure confidence in a smaller, less diverse stockpile and in computational modeling is of increased importance since any problem could affect a greater portion of the stockpile. Weapons testing represents the highest priority experimental program of the R&D effort. Principal program objectives are to: evaluate and maintain confidence in the performance and safety of stockpile weapons; understand and predict the behavior of nuclear weapons systems; investigate new designs; develop safer, more secure, and effective weapons; develop nuclear designs with components that can be manufactured with less waste and environmental impact; and ensure the survivability of weapons and other military assets. WEAPONS TESTING OPERATING EXPENSES ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST OPERATING EXPENSES TECHNOLOGY BASE $ 140.1 $ 147.7 $ 102.8 WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, ENGINEERING AND CERTIFICATION 129.0 127.7 133.0 TESTING CAPABILITIES 183.2 177.1 188.4 MARSHALL ISLANDS 5.0 5.0 5.3 TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES $ 457.3 $ 457.5 $ 429.5 The FY 1993 budget request for Weapons Testing supports fewer tests than in FY 1992. Stabilizing the program and maximizing the data returned from each experiment are near-term goals. The technology base component of the Testing program supports R&D efforts to explore new weapons concepts and improve our understanding of the physical processes relevant to the nuclear weapons design. If additional restrictions are placed on nuclear testing, there will be a greater reliance on our current understanding of the performance of nuclear weapons. The weapons development, engineering, and certification effort supports work in the current stockpile and near-term improvements to the stockpile. After an experimental device is chosen for a weapons system, nuclear tests assure device performance reliability and ensure that the weapons are militarily useful, survivable, and includes the most effective safety features. Testing capabilities include activities necessary to maintain and enhance our capability to conduct underground nuclear tests at NTS and to conduct nonnuclear tests and field experiments elsewhere in support of NTS activities. The Marshall Islands Program is carried out by the Assistant Secretary for ES&H through the Office of Health Physics and Industrial Hygiene Programs. This program provides continued medical surveillance of people and the environment, restoration, and resettlement of the Marshall Islands. This category does not provide for underground nuclear tests. WEAPONS TESTING CAPITAL EQUIPMENT ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST BASIC EQUIPMENT $ 31.6 $ 34.5 $30.6 MARSHALL ISLANDS 0 0 .5 TOTAL CAPITAL EQUIPMENT $ 31.6 $ 34.5 $ 31.1 The request for basic equipment includes two helicopters with a TEC of $7.6 million. There is also a major item of automated data processing equipment requested at $0.6 million. There is also $0.5 million capital equipment requested to support Marshall Island activity. WEAPONS TESTING CONSTRUCTION ($ IN MILLION) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST CONSTRUCTION 93-D-102, NEVADA SUPPORT FACILITY, NV $ 0 $ 0 $ 2.0 GPD-101, GPP, VL 6.4 7.4 7.7 85-D-105, COMBINED DEVICE ASSEMBLY FACILITY, NV 4.2 12.0 3.6 TOTAL TESTING CONSTRUCTION $ 10.7 $ 19.4 $13.3 The construction request includes one new start, Project 93-D-102; Nevada Support Facility with a $36.6 million TEC. The FY 1993 request is for $2 million. This project will provide a new support facility of approximately 164,000 square feet and its related utilities to consolidate NV staff in a cost effective alternative to leased space. Work will also continue in the Combined Device Assembly Facility at NV. The FY 1993 funding is requested to continue and allow completion of construction, inspection, and procurement of special and standard equipment. There is also a $7.7 million FY 1993 request for GPP at various locations. WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE The nuclear weapons Production and Surveillance (P&S) complex is made up of seven government-owned, contractor-operated production facilities. These facilities are the Pantex Plant, the Rocky Flats Plant, the Y-12 Plant, the Savannah River Tritium Facility, the Kansas City Plant, the Mound Plant, and the Pinellas Plant. The components and products are moved between plant sites in a safe, secure transportation system. The President's initiatives to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile have had significant near-term and long-term effects on the weapons P&S complex. First, there has been a substantial and permanent reduction in new weapons builds throughout the planning period. Second, the rate of weapons retirements has accelerated with a corresponding near-term increase in warhead disposal activities. Finally, consolidation of nonnuclear manufacturing operations has been initiated. The schedule for future weapons deliveries was impacted by the President's recent initiatives on nuclear weapons. Key elements include: (1) elimination of the ground-launched, short-range weapons inventory (systems affected include artillery shells and the Lance Missile); (2) withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and attack submarines as well as those weapons associated with land based naval aircraft (systems affected include: Sea Launched Cruise Missile, strike bombs, and depth bombs); (3) removal of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) scheduled"for deactivation under Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), and ill bombers from alert status. Elimination of ICBM's will be accelerated once the START Treaty is ratified (systems affected: strategic bombs, Air Launched Cruise Missiles and Minuteman II); (4) cancellation of the replacement for the nuclear Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) on the strategic bomber and the tactical variant (systems affected: SRAM II and SRAM-T); (5) halt in production of the W88 Trident II warhead; (6) no new weapons systems were added to those scheduled for disposal (except the W79-1 artillery shell); and (7) acceleration of the rate of scheduled retirements. The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP), signed by the President, directs requirements for retirements. All warheads that are retired are scheduled for eventual dismantlement. The FY 1991-96 NWSP, issued in July 1991, required a significant increase in weapons disassemblies. To meet this demand, the Department of Energy (DOE) increased capacity at Pantex to dispose of 1,800 weapons in FY 1992 and 2,000 weapons in FY 1993. The President's initiative to decrease the stockpile will cause the dismantlement backlog to increase further. This will require DOE to work at the 2,000 per year disassembly rate longer than originally planned. Where possible, these actions have been reflected in the FY 1993 budget request. Following the reductions announced in the President's State of the Union Address, Secretary Watkins announced the Department would be submitting a budget amendment to reduce P&S spending by about $200 million. That amendment is not yet reflected in the budget figures. The proposed funding reductions will require closing facilities and reducing the workforce throughout the production plants. Reduced P&S funding will also mean a slower rate of DOE Order compliance at a time of increasing pressures to achieve improvements in the conduct of all operations. Most significantly, reduced funding will result in some decline in nuclear competence at a time when there is great uncertainty about what will be expected of the nuclear weapons production complex in the future. What constitutes minimum competency is of critical importance in bringing us through this transition period, and we must work to minimize any adverse impacts for the production complex. Production and Surveillance accomplishments during FY 1991, included continued production activities for the W88 warhead for the Trident II Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile System and delivery of the B61-10 tactical bomb. While the Department completed delivery of the B61-10, this was not a new build, but a conversion from the W85/Pershing II warhead. In terms of programs completed in FY 1991 (disposal) these included the following systems, B43, W44, W50, and the W85. In FY 1991, the P&S program emphasized implementing the Secretary's new culture. The program operated under the philosophy that there is no higher priority than safety, environment, and the health of DOE employees and the public. Compliance with laws, regulations, and DOE guidance that safeguard the public and provide security for nuclear materials and weapons components was equally supported. The weapons production complex took significant strides in meeting the challenges of the new culture by performing critical self-assessments, responding to Tiger Team assessments, and developing and initiating corrective action plans that have resulted in a new discipline and conduct of operation at all sites. There was a collective commitment to bringing environment, safety and health into the forefront of plant operations throughout the complex. Tiger Team corrective action plans and follow self- assessment programs provided a strong foundation for ES&H improvements. The FY 1992 Defense Authorization House Report 102-311 requires a report to Congress on nuclear weapons matters, for submission by April 1, 1992, to both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. This report is currently in preparation and will cover the nuclear weapons stockpile; tritium supply, production, and demand; warhead reuse; and operation of the Rocky Flats Plant. WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE TOTAL FUNDING ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 Enacted Enacted As Spent Request OPERATING EXPENSES $2,492.7 $2,273.9 $2,401.4 2,323.2 CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 114.1 87.9 87.9 80.7 CONSTRUCTION 307.1 153.6 153.6 162.4 TOTAL $2,913.9 $2,515.4 $2,642.9 $2,566.3 PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT $ 852.7 $ 768.4 $ 713.6 ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH 292.3 313.5 351.1 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY 182.1 193.1 195.0 UTILITIES, PLANT ENGINEERING AND MAINTENANCE 396.0 451.6 424.7 MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 368.0 401.5 372.3 OTHER COSTS 274.2 273.2 266.5 SUPPLEMENTAL ADJUSTMENT 127.4 (127.4) 0 SUBTOTAL, P&S OPERATING EXPENSES $2,492.7 $2,273.9 2,323.2 The functional programs within the P&S operating expense category are summarized below. The weapons production support request for FY 1993 is $713.6 million which represents a 7 percent decrease from FY 1992 level. This category includes activities such as processing, fabrication, assembly, evaluation, maintenance, dismantlement and disposal of nuclear weapons, and supporting activities including quality supervision and control, quality assurance, facility startup and standby, process development and other mission support. The FY 1993 request reflects substantial savings from workload eliminated by the President's nuclear weapon reduction initiatives as announced on September 27, 1991. Further reductions announced January 28, 1992, are not reflected in the budget figures. The emphasis of this program will correspondingly shift from fabrication and assembly of warheads to dismantlement and disposal activities. Stockpile maintenance and surveillance activities will continue with emphasis on safety, security, reliability, environmental soundness, and cost effectiveness. The ES&H request for FY 1993 is $351.1 million. This represents about a 12 percent increase over FY 1992 and is the only area that reflects real growth. Program requirements in these areas are driven by Federal, State and local laws and regulations and DOE directives. Environmental activities include auditing and evaluation, effluent and environmental monitoring and surveillance, air release activities, water discharge activities, solid waste activities, and permitting. A large portion of the growth this program is at Y-12 and results from implementation of the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment Agreement in Principle. Waste Management activities include refuse collection, handling, removal, disposal, and plant sanitation. The Health program supports those activities required for industrial hygiene, radiological protection, and occupational medicine. Safety activities are concerned with fire protection, industrial safety, nuclear facility safety, packaging certification, facility safety design, and risk management. The Safeguards and Security request for FY 1993 is $195 million. This is essentially flat when compared to FY 1992 as this program has experienced significant growth in FY 1991 and FY 1992, and progress has been made in remediating deficiencies identified by Security Inspection and Evaluation reviews and operating in accordance with Master Safeguards and Security Agreements. This program provides for nuclear material control and accountability activities, physical security, technical security, and personnel activities. The Utilities, Plant Engineering, and Maintenance request is $424.7 million. This is approximately a 6 percent decrease compared to FY 1992 as engineering activities in support of construction efforts within the production complex have been stabilized pending a complex reconfiguration decision in August 1993. The plant engineering program supports activities such as: preliminary cost estimate, preliminary design proposals, conceptual designs, cost/schedule control, value engineering, and computer-aided design / computer-aided engineering. The utilities program support activities are required to provide electricity, fuels, water, sewer, and utility support services. Normal escalation increases within this program in FY 1993 are offset by energy conservation and implementation of competitively bid contracts. The maintenance program includes manufacturing related maintenance, equipment maintenance, facilities maintenance, and plant maintenance. The Management and Administration request is $372.3 million, which is a 7 percent reduction from FY 1992 resulting from efforts to downsize the production complex. This program includes general management and administrative functions such as financial management, personnel, industrial relations, public relations, contractor award fees, mail services, payment of State and local taxes as well as management and administration of operational surety and non-weapons quality assurance activities. The request for other costs totals $266.5 million, a 2 percent reduction from FY 1992. Included in this category is the Emergency Operations program, which experiences an 11 percent growth over FY 1992 driven by a Secretarial initiative to enhance the capability of the Accident Response Group that responds to emergencies involving weapons or radioactive material. Also included in this category is the safe, secure transportation program which provides for transporting weapons, weapons components, and materials from DOE production plants and storage sites or other final destinations. A 3-year expansion of fleet, couriers, and vehicles was completed in FY 1992 to implement changes in air shipment policies. The FY 1993 request adds additional couriers and fleet maintenance costs resulting from expanded use of ground transportation, for safety reasons, first, but also to accommodate the large workload due to the increased numbers of weapons being retired. Lastly, this category includes the Federal support program which provides for management and oversight of the production complex. The reduced request is based on lower requirements for contractual support. WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE CAPITAL EQUIPMENT SUMMARY ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST BASIC EQUIPMENT $ 98.2 $ 75.2 $ 65.2 P&S COMPUTERS 15.9 12.7 15.5 TOTAL $ 114.1 $ 87.9 $ 80.7 Capital Equipment for weapons P&S is reduced about 8 percent compared to FY 1992. The request provides for basic equipment and major automated data equipment. This request provides the minimum level of support to prevent further increases in obsolete and worn-out equipment. There are four major items of equipment requested: (1) Electron Beam Welder, Kansas City Plant, TEC $1.2 million; (2) Arc Sawing System, Y-12 Plant, TEC $1.5 million; (3) Automated Measurement Instrument, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), TEC $1.2 million; and (4) Negative Pressure Chilled Water, LANL, TEC $1.5 million. WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE CONSTRUCTION SUMMARY ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST PROGRAMMATIC CONSTRUCTION WEAPONS SYSTEMS $ 13.4 $ 0 $ 0 FACILITY CAPABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 106.8 47.5 87.1 PRODUCTION SUPPORT FACILITIES 72.7 12.9 4.8 GENERAL PLANT PROJECTS 26.1 34.7 27.4 TOTAL PROGRAMMATIC CONSTRUCTION 219.0 95.1 119.3 ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH 19.2 25.0 43.1 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY 68.9 33.5 0 TOTAL P&S CONSTRUCTION $ 307.1 $153.6 $ 162.4 The request for P&S construction totals $162.4 million. During the FY 1993 budget cycle, the Department completed a review of all construction activities within the production complex. Those included in this request are considered necessary despite the reduced workload and a pending reconfiguration decision. There are four new project starts. The first is Life Safety Upgrades at the Y-12 Plant which will provide upgrading and modernization of fire protection systems, electrical equipment, mechanical systems, and emergency electrical generators, which provide power for critical life safety systems. This project is part of a program which is intended to upgrade the Y-12 Plant's compliance with the National Fire Protection Association codes relating to life safety. The scope of this project extends to over 50 buildings at Y-12. WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE CONSTRUCTION SUMMARY ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST PROGRAMMATIC CONSTRUCTION WEAPONS SYSTEMS $ 13.4 $ 0 $ 0 FACILITY CAPABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM 106.8 47.5 87.1 PRODUCTION SUPPORT FACILITIES 72.7 12.9 4.8 GENERAL PLANT PROJECTS 26.1 34.7 27.4 TOTAL PROGRAMMATIC CONSTRUCTION 219.0 95.1 119.3 ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH 19.2 25.0 43.1 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY 68.9 33.5 0 TOTAL P&S CONSTRUCTION $ 307.1 $ 153.6 $ 162.4 The request for P&S construction totals $162.4 million. During the FY 1993 budget cycle, the Department completed a review of all construction activities within the production complex. Those included in this request are considered necessary despite the reduced workload and a pending reconfiguration decision. There are four new project starts. The first is Life Safety Upgrades at the Y-12 Plant which will provide upgrading and modernization of fire protection systems, electrical equipment, mechanical systems, and emergency electrical generators, which provide power for critical life safety systems. This project is part of a program which is intended to upgrade the Y-12 Plant's compliance with the National Fire Protection Association codes relating to life safety. The scope of this project extends to over 50 buildings at Y-12. The three other new starts are under the Facilities Capability Assurance Program (FCAP). At Rocky Flats, there is the Plutonium Facilities Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Restoration Project which will restore aging heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems in 23 buildings. The revitalization of the HVAC and utility systems was critical to continued plutonium operations and is still necessary to support waste management and decontamination and decommissioning activities. At Y-12, there is a project to replace deteriorated facilities, which will design and construct production support facilities. The scope of this project covers the demolition of three existing buildings and the decommissioning of parts of three other buildings. The decommissioned space will be placed in standby mode. The functions proposed for this are presently located in six different buildings which will be over 50-years old when replaced. Once completed, savings in operating costs can be realized as a result of this consolidation and reduced maintenance. At the Kansas City Plant, there is the Upgrade of Materials Engineering Laboratory, which will upgrade 23,000 square feet of existing laboratory space and construct a 6,500 square foot addition. This laboratory is needed to evaluate material properties and to develop material fabrication processes. The existing laboratories suffer from severe overcrowding as the result of continued expansion and addition of evaluation processes without additional space. This situation will only worsen as the nonnuclear consolidation plan matures. WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE FY 1993 CONSTRUCTION - NEW STARTS ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FUTURE TEC REQUEST YEARS 93-D-122, LIFE SAFETY UPGRADES Y-12 PLANT (ES&H) $ 34.3 $ 2.7 $ 31.6 88-D-122, SUBPROJECTS (FCAP) PLUTONIUM FACILITIES HVAC RESTORATION, RF PLANT 20.7 3.3 17.4 REPLACE DETERIORATED FACILITIES, Y-12 PLANT 26.1 2.7 23.4 UPGRADE MATERIALS ENGINEERING LABORATORY, KC PLANT 13.2 .5 12.7 TOTAL - PRODUCTION AND SURVEILLANCE NEW STARTS $ 94.3 $ 9.2 $ 85.1 MATERIALS PRODUCTION Historically, funding for the Materials Production program provided for the production of new or virgin plutonium and tritium in N-Reactor at Richland, Washington, and the Savannah River Site (SRS) reactors at Aiken, South Carolina. Additionally, spent fuels from the Navy's nuclear propulsion reactors and from research reactors were reprocessed, and the recovered uranium was recycled into DOE production reactors. Currently, since there are no requirements for new weapons production, no reactor production of new plutonium will be needed. Furthermore, the return of large numbers of weapons for dismantlement will result in large quantities of plutonium reserves in the form of retired pits. Tritium requirements will be met primarily from recycle and from the operation of one reactor, K-Reactor, if necessary. The FY 1993 budget request reflects this strategy, and has been reduced to reflect the decision to place the L-Reactor in a minimum maintenance condition and not operate the New Special Recovery processing facility. REACTOR STRATEGY To briefly recap this strategy, the Secretary of Energy has determined that at most only one of the three reactors, the K-Reactor, will be needed to meet stockpile requirements. The L-Reactor will be maintained in a long-term minimum maintenance condition. P-Reactor operation has been terminated, and in August 1991 the Hanford N-.Reactor was terminated as a backup production source for tritium. Since August 1988, the production reactors at SRS have been in an extended outage while safety concerns are being addressed. Four principal areas for improvement have been identified: design bases and system performance, human performance, management systems and practices, and DOE on-site technical vigilance and oversight. The DOE's objective is to assure that its reactors can provide reliable nuclear materials production capability in a manner that protects the safety and heath of its workers and the public, as well as the environment. A Record of Decision (ROD) on Reactor Operations as issued on February 4, 1991. The ROD stated that DOE would continue to operate K- and L-Reactors at SRS, and terminate operation of P- Reactor in the immediate future. On December 9, 1991, the Secretary of Energy authorized the change in L-Reactor status from a 1-year restart capability to a minimum maintenance condition, which preserves the reactor so that it can be safely restarted 3 more years after a restart decision is made. On December 13, 1991, the Secretary of Energy authorized the restart of K-Reactor. P- Reactor has been defueled and placed in cold standby. K-REACTOR K-Reactor will be restarted to demonstrate, over an approximate 1-year period devoted to significant testing, that it is availability contingency production source of tritium. The Department then plans to shut it down a place it in a low-cost standby mode until we are assured of long-term tritium availability from a new production reactor or other source. During K-Reactor startup testing problems were identified with the safety rod latch mechanisms and several of the 12 main heat main heat exchangers in the plant, one of which caused the leak of tritiated water. Defective safety rod latches have been repaired and three heat exchangers have been replaced. Resumption of the startup test program is anticipated in April. The Department is taking a deliberate and cautious approach to the startup testing program to assure safe operation of the plant. Per the Consent Order between the State of South Carolina and DOE, the Department is authorized to operate K-Reactor until December 31, 1992, pending completion and tie-in of the cooling tower, which is scheduled for completion in the 4th quarter of FY 1992. A lawsuit was filed by the Natural Resources Defense Council, under the Clean Water Act, alleging that K-Reactor operation could not be resumed until thermal discharge standards, requiring the completion of the cooling tower, were met. On August 15, 1991, the South Carolina District Court ruled that the plaintiffs had no standing in the court and also denied the plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. On December 13, 1991, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling on standing, but upheld the denial of preliminary injunction and remanded the case back to the District Court for hearing. PROCESSING STRATEGY The plutonium facilities at SRS are now in a period of transition from supporting reactor plutonium production to plutonium processing functions. The New Special Recovery (NSR) Facility was scheduled for startup in FY 1992. The NSR Facility which would permit the recycle of plutonium from retired weapons will not be started up until firm requirements clearly mandate its need. Spent fuel containing plutonium and plutonium scrap will not necessarily be disposed of as waste. Some of the plutonium may be recovered to improve the ES&H aspects of the residual material in terms of storage or disposal. MATERIALS PRODUCTION TOTAL FUNDING ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 ACTUAL APPROP. REQUEST OPERATING EXPENSES: REACTOR OPERATIONS $ 782.5 $ 584.4 $ 553.2 PROCESSING 629.0 530.2 522.5 SUPPORTING SERVICES 293.8 304.5 308.8 PROGRAM DIRECTION 42.5 43.2 66.5 ENRICHED MATERIAL 117.8 0 0 SUBTOTAL, OPERATING $ 1,865.6 $1,462.3 $1,451.0 CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 105.6 91.2 83.9 CONSTRUCTION 276.9 323.4 241.8 TOTAL REQUEST $ 2,248.1 $1,876.9 $1,776.7 For FY 1993, the budget request for Materials Production is $1.77 billion. This is a decrease of $100 million from the FY 1992 appropriation of $1.87 billion and reflects the continuing downward trend due to declining demand for nuclear materials. Some of the major program decisions embodied in the FY 1993 budget submission are the decision to place L-Reactor in a minimum maintenance condition; the decision to not operate the New Special Recovery Facility within the F-Canyon processing facility at SRS; and the construction ramp-down of the Fuel Processing Restoration Project at the DOE Idaho Field Office (ID). The budget submission also reflects the commitment to the Department of Energy's operating philosophy, which requires that all facilities operate in a manner protective of the safety and health of the workers and the public, as well as the environment. The budget request for Materials Production is organized by program activities, and discussed below by site. The Savannah River Site funding constitutes the major portion -- 80 percent -- of the budget request. Approximately $215 million or 12 percent of the FY 1993 budget submission is for the continued operation of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, primarily to reprocess and store spent fuel from the Navy's nuclear propulsion program. The remaining 8 percent of the budget submission includes production support at our DOE Oak Ridge Field Office, Y-12 Facility, materials disposition activities, complex-wide support to SRS and ID, and program administration costs. MATERIALS PRODUCTION SAVANNAH RIVER SITE ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 ACTUAL APPROP. REQUEST OPERATING EXPENSES $1,224.6 $1,155.8 $1,160.6 CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 76.0 59.5 61.7 CONSTRUCTION FY 1993 PROJECT STARTS 0 0 3.8 FY 1992 PROJECT NEW STARTS 0 45.8 50.5 90-D-149 PLANT FIRE PROTECTION 13.1 39.0 44.2 86-D-149 PRODUCTIVITY RETENTION 42.4 33.5 18.4 ALL OTHER 94.6 90.8 66.1 TOTAL CONSTRUCTION 150 209.1 183.0 TOTAL REQUEST $1,450.6 $1,424.4 $1,405.3 Funding for the SRS remains essentially the same as last year. However, operating expenses increase slightly to fund additional DOE Federal staff at the site. This increase is more than offset by the reduction in new project starts. The $3.8 million in new starts will fund three essential ES&H projects on site. The Department remains committed to resuming, as soon as possible, the safe production of tritium at SRS in order to properly test systems modifications and demonstrate that these facilities can continue to provide material. K-REACTOR The FY 1993 budget request for K-Reactor assumes the startup and test operation of the reactor as soon as the startup problems mentioned earlier are corrected. Activities funded in FY 1993 will include routine maintenance, fire protection, safety analysis upgrades, extended maintenance of all vital electric, electronic and mechanical systems, and ongoing initiatives to upgrade facilities to commercial nuclear standards. Development of procedures and upgrades to training programs will continue. Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board-issues and recommendations will be addressed. Funding for infrastructure and services such as electrical power, steam, and domestic water will be required. Finally, indirect charges for laboratory support, ES&H activities, and security services will be incurred. L-REACTOR FY 1993 efforts at L-Reactor will involve the reactor's defueling; shutdown of reactor equipment and systems in a protected condition to prevent deterioration; and maintenance of the reactor in a defueled, protected status, which would permit any future decision to refuel and restart. Currently committed and planned L-Reactor upgrade activities will be discontinued. MISCELLANEOUS The Department does not envision producing plutonium-239 in production reactors for the foreseeable future. In addition, sufficient Pu 238 exists to meet known and firm projected mission needs. Operation of the Uranium Solidification Facility (USF) was suspended in FY 1992 because of cost and schedule concerns. The USF project will provide a facility at the SRS to convert uranium solution to a powder. This conversion process is a key step in the recovery and recycle of enriched uranium from irradiated reactor fuel elements. The recovery of this material is highly beneficial from both a cost and a radioactive waste minimization standpoint. Without operation of the USF, either processing of reactor fuel would cease after all uranyl nitrite tanks are filled or new tanks would have to be constructed. An additional $18 million for this project will be required in FY 1992. The SRS budget submission for FY 1993 also includes an additional $17 million for this project, for a total estimated cost increase to the project of $36 million. MATERIALS PRODUCTION IDAHO CHEMICAL PROCESSING PLANT ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 ACTUAL_ APPROP. REQUEST OPERATING EXPENSES $ 103.3 $ 138.2 $ 149.1 CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 8.0 12.5 13.0 CONSTRUCTION GENERAL PLANT PROJECTS 5.6 9.3 11.2 90-D-141 FIRE PROTECTION UPGRADE 6.0 12.0 1.6 85-D-139, FUEL PROCESSING RESTORATION 87.5 82.7 40.5 TOTAL CONSTRUCTION 99.1 104.0 53.3 TOTAL REQUEST $ 210.4 $ 254.7 $ 215.4 The FY 1993 budget request for Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) decreases by approximately $40 million from FY 1992 to FY 1993. The ICPP stores and reprocesses spent fuel from the Navy's Nuclear Propulsion program. Through reprocessing of this fuel, useable uranium is recovered'. The ICPP receives spent Nuclear Navy fuel on schedules consistent with returns of the Navy's nuclear fleet. Until the Department's Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) strategic plan is completed and implemented, the recovered HEU from processing of these fuels will be stored at the ICPP. The major reason for the decrease in funding at the ICPP is the completion of the Fire Protection Upgrade project, and the near completion of the Fuel Processing Restoration (FPR) project. The FPR is currently being reevaluated based on the need for HEU processing. The FPR project will replace the original uranium purification system with modern facilities, thereby increasing reliability and enhancing the safety of these operations. The benefits from completing this project are considerable: improvement of personnel safety by reducing radiation exposure, reduction of radioactive waste generation, compliance with today's more rigorous environmental protection standards, reduction of environmental discharges through the recycle of process water, and enhancement of nuclear criticality safety. The Fire Protection Upgrade project will correct life safety and fire protection deficiencies identified by independent studies. MATERIALS PRODUCTION ALL OTHER PROGRAMS ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 ACTUAL APPROP. REQUEST ALBUQUERQUE $ 31.9 $ 9.4 $ 11.7 OAK RIDGE 241.1 61.9 46.4 RICHLAND 228.4 42.6 51.7 SAN FRANCISCO 67.9 0.9 1.0 ALL OTHER 17.8 83.0 55.6 PROGRAM DIRECTION (7.2) (7.4) (14.5) REPROGRAMMING RESERVE (0) (40.1) (0) OPERATIONAL/TECHNICAL SUPPORT (10.6) (38.5) (40.7) TOTAL $ 587.1 $ 197.8 $ 156.0 In addition to funding at SRS and at the ICPP, the Materials Production budget requests $156 million for other DP sites. Approximately $40 million is currently being retained in a Headquarters reserve account in FY 1992 for reprogramming to the USF, to support the current level of Federal staffing within the Materials Production program, and to support increases to two essential security projects at SRS. After adjusting for this reprogramming, the level of funding for all other programs in FY 1993 is approximately the same level of funding as will be expended for similar activities in FY 1992. These activities are discussed below. MATERIALS DISPOSITION In FY 1991, the Department transferred a number of DP facilities to the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM). A portion of the responsibility of the Materials Production program is to conduct materials identification and characterization activities, as well as provide for the safeguard and storage of nuclear materials remaining at DOE facilities as a result of past DP operations, regardless of whether or not DP has a continued presence at those sites. A total of $40.4 million is requested for materials disposition activities. OAK RIDGE The FY 1993 request for Oak Ridge is $41.4 million, and includes funding for the Y-12 Plant, Feed Materials Production Center at Fernald, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Funding at the Y-12 Plant continues to decrease as the support to the SRS reactor operations for tritium production decreases. Minor funding for materials disposition activities at Fernald will continue to be required. The budget request for ORNL will support a number of activities relating to the production, storage, and/or distribution of miscellaneous nuclear material isotopes. OTHER FUNDING ISSUES I would like to bring to your attention two funding issues in which the Department currently is involved relating to the previous DOE contract at SRS with E.I. DuPont de Nemours (DuPont). PENSION FUND CREDIT Before Westinghouse became the prime contractor for the SRS, replacing DuPont, the DOE and DuPont jointly,:managed a pension fund for DuPont employees. Under the previous contract with DuPont, a pension fund was established to cover all DuPont employees. The DOE has determined that the pension fund was overcompensated by DuPont and DOE have completed negotiations to return $545 million plus interest from the pension fund to the DOE. The Department estimates it will receive $400 million towards the repayment in FY 1993 and will apply those funds to meet spending needs. This enabled the Department to reduce its appropriation request for the Atomic Energy Defense Activities by $400 million. SEVERANCE PAY LAWSUIT In 1987, DuPont advised the Government that it would not seek renewal of its contract. When Westinghouse assumed operation of the SRS in 1989, they agreed to hire existing DuPont employees. DuPont submitted to the DOE a claim for reimbursement of $64 million in severance pay which DuPont had paid to its employees against the instructions of the DOE. The DOE denied DuPonts' claim and DuPont filed suit in the U.S. claims court. The conclusion of the claims court is that U.S. must comply with the terms of its former contract, and must pay DuPont $64.4 million plus interest. No money has been budgeted by DOE for payment of the severance pay claim. The DOE is appealing the claims court decision to the Federal Circuit Court. WEAPONS PROGRAM DIRECTION WEAPONS PROGRAM DIRECTION BUDGET ($ IN MILLIONS) FY 1993 FY 1991 FY 1992 REQUEST PROGRAM DIRECTION OPERATING EXPENSES $ 104.7 $ 161.8 $ 325.9 CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 1.7 2.2 3.9 CONSTRUCTION 0 0 26.0 TOTAL PROGRAM DIRECTION $ 106.4 $ 164.0 $ 355.8 Weapons Program Direction provides funds to support Federal staff and the Department's effort to reconfigure the nuclear weapons complex. Within the $355.8 million request, $182.7 million is necessary for expenses related to Federal staff that will fund direct personnel related expenses, supporting services, and capital equipment at the following locations: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs; Office of the Deputy Science and Technology Advisor (Defense); Deputy Assistant Secretary for Weapons Complex Reconfiguration; Rocky Flats Program Office; Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Resource Management; Self-Assessment and Emergency Management; Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application; DOE Albuquerque Field Office, DOE Nevada Field Office, DOE San Francisco Field Office, and the Community Assistance Program at Los Alamos, New Mexico. An increase of $44.7 million is required to cover full-year salary requirements for increased staff approved for FY 1992; increased Headquarters contractual support for administrative and management implementation of DOE Orders and instructions; and Defense Programs payments for a larger share of the Headquarters overhead costs for space, supplies, telecommunications, etc. The weapons complex reconfiguration activity within Program Direction is $173.1 million of the $355.8 million request, an increase of $147.1 million over FY 1992. FY 1993 will see completion of the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Reconfiguration, which will include the environmental analysis for the New Production Reactor. Included in the increase for Reconfiguration is $20 million for the development and demonstration of emerging technologies to improve the operating efficiency of the reconfigured complex and a planning estimate of $87.9 million ($20 million in construction funds) to begin consolidation of the nonnuclear manufacturing facilities assuming a Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact. SUMMARY We must continue to support changing stockpile requirements and to maintain nuclear competence in our production complex and weapons laboratories so as to assure that we have a safe, secure, reliable, and survivable nuclear deterrent. At the same time, we must disassemble thousands of weapons being returned as a result of the President's initiatives and manage the reclaimed nuclear materials. With the dramatic world changes, the Department will have an increasingly important role to play in the control of weapons of mass destruction, in helping to prevent the spread of such weapons and in providing the technical support to an enhanced intelligence program. Finally, the Department must carry out these vital national security missions not only within a complex which is safe, secure, and environmentally sound, but also within one which is cost-effective, efficient and commensurate with a significantly reduced nuclear weapons stockpile.

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

FY 93 (AEDA) AND DP NUCLEAR TESTING, 03/18/1992, Testimony