OFFICE OF ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION, 03/11/1992, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19930323
- Chairperson:
- T. Bevill
- Committee:
- House Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- T92AD105
- Hearing Date:
- 19920311
- DOE Lead Office:
- AN
SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- OFFICE OF ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION
- Witness Name:
- V. Alessi
-
Hearing Text:
-
Statement of Victor Alessi
Director, Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation
U.S. Department of Energy
FY 1993 Appropriations Subcommittee Hearings
March 11, 1992, 11:00 a.m.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I welcome this
opportunity to present to your the activities of the Off
ice of Arms
Control and Non-proliferation, a new Department of Energy (DOE)
organization.
Recent dramatic changes in the world have increased the importance
of both arms control and non-proliferation issues to U.S. security.
To improve the Department's effectiveness in both of these areas,
Secretary of Energy, Admiral James D. Watkins, has consolidated the
Department's arms control and non-proliferation activities
previously under the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs and
Assistant Secre
tary for International Affairs and Energy Emergencies
respectively. The administrative steps necessary to finalize
establishment of this new office of Arms Control and Non-
proliferation (OAN) are nearly complete.
The Office will help the Department play a more active and
effective role in support of U.S. and international non-
proliferation efforts than has been the case in the past. The goal
of this organization will be to support the Secretary's objectives:
making the most efficient role in s
upport of U.S. and international
non-proliferation efforts than has been the case in the past. The
goal of this organization will be to support the Secretary's
objectives: making the most efficient use of DOE's unique technical
and analytical resources, including the specialized experience of
the Department and its highly regarded National Laboratories, while
adapting the DOE organization to meet evolving U.S. arms control
and non-proliferation policymaking and implementation support
needs.
MISSION
The Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation directs
development and coordination of DOE's policies, plans, and
procedures relating to arms control and non-proliferation; manages
DOE's supporting research and development for verification and
monitoring of arms control and non-proliferation; manages DOE's supporting
research and development for verification and monitoring of arms control
and non-proliferation treaties and agreements; integrates DOE's policies
an
d activities related to arms control and non-proliferation, including
cooperative program components (nuclear power, isotopes in industry,
medicine, agriculture) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) "Bargain"; serves as the DOE focal point for technical
support to other government agencies on arms control and non-proliferation
matters and represents DOE in related international negotiations and
consultations. In addition, the Office is playing an increasing role in
coordin
ating the Department's efforts in support of U.S. activities aimed
at assisting Russia and other states in the Commonwealth of Independent
States(CIS) in a number of critical areas (i.e., nuclear warhead
dismantlement, emergency response capabilities, export controls, fissile
materials accountability and safeguards, etc.). More specifically, the
mission of the new office Arms Control and Non-proliferation is to:
o establish a single effective DOE voice in development and
implementation of
U.S. arms control and non-proliferation
policies, including better integration as DOE's activities in
these two policy areas increase;
o represent the Department's interests in and provide technical
support to U.S. Government organizations responsible for
policymaking and implementation in the areas of arms control
and non-proliferation;
o participate in and provide technical representation to U.S.
bilateral/multilateral negotiations and activities with
foreign governments, agencies, and international organizations
related to arms control and non-proliferation;
o identify and appropriately utilize scientific and
technological expertise resident in the Department and its
National Laboratories, including development of new and
improved technologies, to aid the U.S. Government and the
international community in resolving difficult arms control
and non-proliferation policy, implementation, and compliance
analysis
issues;
o coordinate National Laboratory research, development and
analytical programs that support U.S. Government arms control
and non-proliferation activities;
o implement the Department's arms control and non-proliferation
responsibilities arising from treaties and agreements and
mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, and the US-IAEA Participation
Act of 1957;
o represent the De
partment's interests in and provide technical
support to all organizations responsible for policymaking and
implementation of export controls, including development of
the U.S. Government's Nuclear Referral List and participation
in international export control activities conducted by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Zangger Committee, Coordinating
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Gr
oup on
Chemical and Biological Weapons;
o implement the Department's responsibility to control U.S.
participation in foreign production of Special Nuclear Materials
under 10 CFR Part 810 and refer recommendations to the Secretary of
Energy for decisions;
o represent the Department's interests in and provide technical
support for all Departmental interactions, both within the U.S.
Government and with international bodies such as the
International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), relating to policy,
technology development and technical implementation for both
international safeguards and physical protection of nuclear
materials;
o represent the Department's interests in and provide technical
support for negotiation of U.S. bilateral and multilateral
agreements concerning cooperation in research and development
on international safeguards and the physical protection of nuclear
materials, and in implementing those
agreements; and
o conduct the U.S. support program to develop international safeguards
technologies for use by the IAEA and other international
non-proliferation organizations. Activities include performing system
studies on specific safeguards methods and operations, research and
development of equipment and techniques for use in non-proliferation
activities, and providing personnel training programs for the IAEA in
support of its international safeguards activiti
es.
FY 1993 FUNDING REQUEST
DOE Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation programs presently
are funded under the following four program lines with FY 1992/1993
budget requests as indicated:
(1) Verification and Control Technology $185,000,000/$192,715,000);
(2) Export Control ($5,941.000/$5,976,000) under Nuclear Safeguards and
Security;
(3) International Safeguards ($5,665.000/$5,675,000) under Nuclear
Safeguards a
nd Security); and
(4) The Non-proliferation Policy program ($1,457.000/$1.457,000)
plus a separate Reduced Enrichment for Research and Training
Reactor (RERTR) program ($1,300,000/$1.300.000), funded under
Departmental Administration, but now managed by the OAN
Non-proliferation Policy Office.
This relatively constant funding profile for the total
complement of OAN programs coupled with anticipated increases in OAN's
activities, Particularly in the
non-proliferation area, will
require that we do more without a commensurate increase in funding.
Verification and Control Technology
- Detection Technology
Under the Detection Technology Program, for which $146,915,000
is requested for FY 1993, we have developed, or are developing,
monitoring systems and inspection equipment to verify
compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), Nuclear
Non-Proliferation PT Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT),
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Tr
eaty (PNET), Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty INF, and Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty I CFE plus the
U.S./Soviet bilateral Chemical Weapons Destructions
Agreement, as well as the unratified Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now the CIS) on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), and the
Chemical Weapons Convention CWC . In addition, we are investigating arms
control technologies potentially applicable to th
e Open Skies Treaty
initiative. We are also commencing development of a Proliferation
Detection Technologies program for monitoring proliferation problem
countries.
Our verification and monitoring requirements involve a wide range
of capabilities, many of which are unique. Some of these
capabilities are embodied in new systems drawn from existing
technologies. This is particularly true for near-term
verification and monitoring needs. For example, the DOE built new
systems for local seismic measur
ements in order to have the
capability to verify the recently-ratified Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty. Similarly, the DOE developed a system to
distinguish between single and multiple warhead missiles for use
in verifying the INF Treaty, making use of equipment constructed
from off-the-shelf components for detecting neutrons.
Other capabilities are applied to development of new technologies,
many of which require advances in the state-of-the-art. For
example, the difficult demands of verifying
a prospective Chemical
Weapons Convention require technological capabilities that do not
now exist. The DOE Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation
attempts to anticipate future arms control initiatives by
developing technologies to make them effectively verifiable. Much
of the technology that will be used in current and near-term arms
control agreements is the result of long lead-time research and
development. The same will be true of future agreements.
For FY 1993, our Detection Technology
Program is organized into
four functional areas: (1) On-Site Verification; (2) Regional
Monitoring; (3) Remote Sensing; and (4) Advanced Concepts/Technology
Development.
On-site Verification activities are comprised of systems and
technologies that are used to monitor treaties with the
cooperation of the inspected party. A number of DOE-developed on-
site monitoring systems are now being used in implementing
treaties, e.g., the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
Since enactment of that t
reaty, the DOE technical community has
further exploited its broad scientific resources to apply
technological measurements and methods to verification regimes
negotiated for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty and the START Treaty.
Regional Monitoring activities include developing seismic
verification systems and data processing capabilities to detect,
identify, locate and characterize underground nuclear explosions,
emphasizing regional rather than teleseismic m
onitoring.
Remote Sensing activities have been underway for over thirty
years. These activities are comprised of systems and technologies
that are used to monitor treaties and agreements without the
cooperation of the other party. One example of DOE verification
efforts in this area is the satellite instrumentation program for
worldwide monitoring of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Another element of the Remote
Sensing activity is the development of new satell
ite sensing
techniques that cover portions of the electromagnetic spectrum
outside of the visible range for nuclear explosion detection. New
satellite sensing techniques are also being investigated that
would enhance our capabilities for monitoring the proliferation of
other weapons of mass destruction.
In the Advanced Concepts/Technology Development activity we will
continue a modest effort to extend the frontiers of science and
technology in ways that may be useful for future verification and
n
on-proliferation needs. Under this program, the DOE scientific
community is encouraged to invest its imagination and initiative
on technical concepts. This program generates and tests the
technical feasibility of new concepts and develops technologies
that could improve U.S. verification capabilities for existing
treaties, or that could be useful in helping to verify future arms
control regimes, including those involving bans on the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
It is important to
emphasize the versatility and quality of the
scientific support we receive from the DOE National Laboratories.
We consider their applied technical expertise, which evolved
primarily from nuclear weapons programs at the laboratories, to be
a highly valued national asset for arms control and non-
proliferation verification technology development. While we have
attempted to maintain a stable level of resource allocation to the
laboratories, we have also undertaken a concerted effort,
including a life-c
ycle planning process, to focus on longer-range
issues which allow us to begin and complete discrete projects in
an orderly and efficient manner. We believe that, because of the
opportunity to tap the broad expertise of the National
Laboratories, we at the DOE's Office of Arms Control and Non-
proliferation have a unique opportunity to apply that expertise to
the Nation's arms control treaty verification and non-
proliferation technical and analytical needs.
For nearer-term efforts related to exis
ting arms control and non-
proliferation treaties or those under negotiation, DOE works
closely with other agencies having verification technology
programs. In addition, DOE is a member of the interagency
committee responsible for advising the administration on
verification technology. DOE's cooperation and coordination with
other agencies involved in arms control and non-proliferation
enables it to be flexible and responsive in a timely way to new
initiatives that may require adjustments and additi
ons to our
research programs. Where resulting arms control and non-
proliferation verification technology requirements are better
defined and the need is more immediate, we draw upon existing
technology and adapt it to meet those requirements.
Recognizing that policies change as a result of international
events, related public activities, fiscal realities, or
legislative mandates, and given that technology development is
time consuming, we believe it is also prudent to pursue
long-term technology
development in support of more generic requirements.
For this reason we are investing a fraction of our resources
toward development of future technologies that are not directly
related to current arms control and non-proliferation agreements
in effect or being negotiated.
Analytical Support
The Analytical Support activities are managed by the Policy and
Technical Analysis Division. DOE has a major and increasingly
important interest in the pursuit and outcome of ongoing arms
control negotia
tions as well as prospective future arms control and
non-proliferation activities. This is particularly evident with regard to
nuclear testing and security policy initiatives involving nuclear weapons
where DOE actively participates in the policymaking and international
negotiation processes and where its National Laboratories and production
facilities are directly affected by resulting treaties, protocols, and
implementing procedures. We are involved in analytical support for the
full spectrum of po
tential arms control arrangements where it is essential
that preparation involve a thorough analysis of options available to the
United States, including assessment of their impact on U.S. and allied
security postures and of their effective verifiability.
In addition to DOE representation in interagency and international
arms control activities, there are other supporting studies and
analyses being conducted under this budget category. An effort that
illustrates how analytical studies support DOE's
participation in
arms control negotiations and policy development is the planning
and conduct of exercises and mock challenge inspections at sensitive DOE
facilities that would be subject to inspection under the Chemical Weapons
Convention currently being negotiated. These exercises advance on-site
inspection readiness and planning capabilities and assist the verification
inspection process. We are evaluating the relative merits of alternative
approaches to inspections and sharing the results with o
ther departments
and agencies. Other analysis underway includes our work on techniques that
could be used for verified and safe transportation, storage and
dismantlement of nuclear warheads plus controlled disposition of
associated special nuclear materials. Although verification of such
activities is not required under current arms control agreements or the
President's Nuclear Initiative announced in September, 1991, it is
important that we do our homework now to prepare for possible future
require
ments for such verification.
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Treaty Implementation
Funds for arms control and non-proliferation treaty implementation,
$15,000,000, are included in this budget request for FY 1993. The
DOE has developed the hydrodynamic yield measuring technology
(CORTEX) that will be used for TTBT on-site verification in the
Commonwealth of Independent States and the Local Seismic Network
(LSN) for use in on-site verification of the PNET. DOE personnel
have been trained and s
tand ready to conduct the technical aspects
of these verification activities. As directed by the National Security
Council Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), DOE will advise
and provide technical assistance to the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)
which has the primary responsibility for TTBT/PNET implementation. The
salaries of all DOE personnel, including contractor personnel, involved in
monitoring and inspection of U.S. and Russian explosions will be borne by
DOE. We presently have
a reduced need for technical assistance to OSIA and
for manpower to monitor explosions under TTBT/PNET because of the Russian
testing moratorium. This could change should Russia resume testing in FY
1993. Should the moratorium continue, portions of this funding will again
be used to support implementation of other treaties and agreements,
especially those in support of nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological
weapons non-proliferation efforts, UN Security Council Resolution 687
(Iraq), and the Pres
ident's September 27, 1991 Nuclear Initiative
pertaining to former Soviet Union weapon transportation, storage as
consistent with DOE mission responsibilities and capabilities.
Program Direction
The OAN Verification and Control Technology Program Direction, for
which $3,200,000 is requested in FY 1993, is separated into a
Headquarters element which manages and directs the overall DOE Arms
Control effort, and field elements which are responsible for the
implementation of TTBT verification requir
ements at the Nevada Test
Site (NTS) in accordance with federal and state laws. The role of
DOE as a full participant in the Arms Control community has
required a modest increase in staffing to assure interagency coordination
and to understand and gauge the impact of negotiations on the DOE mission
of developing, testing and producing nuclear weapons.
Capital Equipment
The FY 1993 OAN capital equipment request of $6,500,000 is
consistent with support for a stable research and development progr
am
which includes advanced concepts and methods, and development of
prototypes.
Construction
To support various efforts in verification and control technologies, we
need a facility within the DOE complex that will serve as a focal point
for related technical activities in national security, arms control, and
non-proliferation . Accordingly, we are requesting $10,000,000 in FY 1993
to continue work begun in FY 1990 on the Center for National Security and
Arms Control at Sandia National Laborator
ies in Albuquerque. When
completed in FY 1994, this facility will support systems analysis,
advanced concepts, ground-based verification, satellite monitoring,
intelligence, threat, and countermeasures activities. It is the only
dedicated arms control facility in the DOE complex.
Safeguards and Security, Export Control
Since last year, monumental changes have occurred world which have
direct impact on the international non-proliferation community and
U.S. national security. The Presidents of Ar
gentina and Brazil met
in Vienna, Austria, on December 13, 1991, signed a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
I August an September, 1991, South Africa first signed the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and then a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. France and China have recently
announced their commitment to sign the NPT as well. The Soviet Union
disintegrated into multiple independent states, posing risks of
a "brain
drain" of nuclear weapons experts and diversion of nuclear materials and
hardware to proliferant countries. In addition, many of the newly
independent former soviet republics will need safeguards agreements of
their own. North Korea, an NPT member which for years dodged IAEA
safeguards, finally signed a safeguards agreement but has not yet
permitted an inspection to take place. Iraq, ostensibly an NPT party,
egregiously transgressed the NPT with its illegal nuclear weapons program,
lead
ing to unprecedented onsite nuclear inspections by the IAEA and the UN
Special Commission for Iraq.
Iraq's Scud attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel were a sharp reminder of
the threat of proliferation. If Iraq's nuclear and chemical/biological
and missile programs had been allowed to proceed unchallenged, in a future
clash, these missiles could have been launched with nuclear or
chemical/biological warheads rather than high explosives. equally of
concern, the United States and other countries coul
d have been the target
of such an aggressive regime within the next decade.
In March 1963, President Kennedy questioned whether the President of the
United States in the 1970s would have to face a world in which 15 to 25
countries possessed nuclear weapons. The good news is that if we are not
constantly vigilant, his prediction could yet come true. Indeed, in many
respects, discovery of Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction was a global proliferation wake-up call.
In addition
to Iraq, the continued pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction by other problem countries provides another reason to
redouble our non- proliferation efforts. In the years ahead, this
will call for many things: learning the lessons of Iraq, including those
related to intelligence on proliferation; stepped up coordination among
nuclear suppliers to ensure effective implementation of agreed
export controls; new regional arms control initiatives to lessen
incentives for proliferation; buttressing the I
AEA inspection system,
while being prepared to draw on the experience of the UN Special
Commission for Iraq; successful conclusion of a global chemical weapons
ban; enhancing the effectiveness of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR); and thinking about new ways to bring the United Nations Security
Council to bear in helping to prevent proliferation. Blending arms control
and non- Proliferation in one office will strengthen DOE's contribution in
all of these important areas.
President Bush
has emphasized that the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles must be arrested and that our diplomacy
must work continually against the proliferation of such weapons and
missiles. Implementation of this policy has been profoundly evident
in actions that the United States has taken to support UN efforts to
eliminate Iraq's missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear
programs.
We in DOE are firmly committed to President Bush's goal of arresting
nuclear proliferation and, in cooperation
with other interested
agencies, have undertaken major efforts to achieve it. I am confident
that reorganization of DOE's non-proliferation efforts as recently
directed by Secretary Watkins will enable us to respond even more
effectively to the many challenges of this changed world order. As
was foreseen, this grouping provides a synergy greater than the sum of
its parts. The nuclear non-proliferation policy, international safeguards,
and export control functions complement my other responsib
ilities relating
to the control of nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological mass
destruction weapons and technologies. The verification technology R&D
activities of arms control mesh well with the needs of non-proliferation
efforts.
Let me highlight DOE' non-proliferation technology support activities, for
which the Y 1993 request is $11,651,000. Of this sum, $5,675,000 is for
International Safeguards Program and $5,976,000 is for Export
Control/Technology Transfer Control and related inte
ragency and
international non-proliferation activities.
Interagency Non-proliferation Activities
DOE is a key participant in the interagency process for developing and
implementing national security and non-proliferation controls on U.S.
nuclear and nuclear-related or dual-use exports. DOE's authority for its
efforts lie in various statutes, executive orders, treaties, and
implementing regulations and orders.
Most of the Department's export control activities are based on two
statutory prov
isions: Section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, and Section 309(c)'Of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
(NNPA) of 1978.
10 CFR Part 810.
Section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act requires that U.S. firms or
individuals intending to engage, directly or indirectly, in the
production of special nuclear material outside the United States
must obtain authorization from the Secretary of Energy. DOE
regulations implementing this statutory requirement are set out in
10 CFR Part 810. Becaus
e of the significance of this responsibility, the
Atomic Energy Act does not permit the Secretary of Energy to delegate the
authorizing function.
At the present time, U.S. persons intending to engage in activities
falling within the scope of Part 810 must submit an application to my
office. We conduct a staff analysis of the application and prepare a
proposed recommendation to the Secretary which is circulated for
concurrence to the Department of State, and to the Departments of Defense
and Commer
ce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for their views. Only when all this is completed
does the Secretary determine whether to authorize the activity.
Dual-Use Exports
The other major export control activity of my office relates to
so-called dual-use exports, items that could have nuclear as well
as nonnuclear applications. Section 309 (c) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act requires the Depar
tment of Commerce to control
such exports. By Presidential Executive Order the Departments of
Commerce and Energy jointly develop and maintain a list of such
export items, known as the Nuclear Referral List. Whenever
Commerce receives an application to export an item on the Nuclear
Referral List to a country of proliferation concern, it refers the
application to Energy for review and recommendation. In keeping
the list up to date and in making reviews, my office relies
extensively on experts at the
DOE National Laboratories and in the
nuclear weapon production complex to assess the significance of
the technology involved, its value to a would-be nuclear
proliferant, and the ease and likelihood of its diversion to a
clandestine nuclear program.
Whenever DOE's review determines that export of a dual-use item
may raise a potential proliferation concern, DOE refers the case
to the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC), an
interagency forum mandated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.
The Department of State chairs the SNEC and DOE provides the
Secretariat and maintains a classified computerized data base that
includes all export cases addressed by the SNEC. Other members
are the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The
Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency have
observer status. Referrals to the SNEC may be made by any member
agency but, in practice, the vast majority --about 90 per
cent --
are made by DOE. In 1991, DOE reviewed about 5,000 dual-use
export license applications. About 313 were referred to the SNEC,
which recommended denial of 28.
International Non-proliferation Activities
Providing quality support for the dynamic international non-
proliferation process requires a sustained DOE commitment to stay
abreast of problems, needs, and opportunities and to manage a
technical support program that makes emerging technologies
available for integration into evolving mo
nitoring and safeguards
programs.
The effectiveness of U.S. export control efforts requires that
the U.S. Government seek and obtain the cooperation of other supplier
countries. In this regard, DOE has been an active participant in
various international export control mechanisms -- including COCOM, which
stands for the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls, the
NPT Exporters Committee (also known as the Zangger Committee) and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The collapse of communi
sm, the breakup of the Soviet Union into
independent states, and political transformations in Eastern
Europe have led to liberalization of COCOM export controls. DOE
has been an active participant in formulating U.S. Government
positions regarding these changes. It has also taken initiatives
to help ensure that such liberalization, and changes of other
governments' export controls, do not lead to an unintended
weakening of parallel proliferation controls.
With regard to the NPT Exporters committee
, DOE has been working
with the State Department and other agencies, to upgrade the
"trigger list" for the control of gas centrifuge and gaseous
diffusion enrichment and reprocessing components. DOE has also
developed and published a guide on gaseous diffusion and gas
centrifuge equipment to assist officials in this and other
countries in enforcing export control laws based on the Zangger
"trigger list."
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which has not met officially
for some years, recently has
been revived in an expanded form.
One of its new goals is to address the issue of achieving
international non-proliferation control over dual-use exports.
This issue was brought to a head by two developments in recent
years. The first was the growth of emerging nuclear suppliers --
countries whose indigenous nuclear development has gone so far
that they are beginning to export their know-how and equipment.
The second was liberalization of COCOM controls mentioned earlier.
For several COCOM member
countries, COCOM control of a potentially
sensitive dual-use item provides the only legal basis for the
government to control that item, even if the item might contribute
to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. That is why in the past
18 months the U.S. Government worked with other COCOM countries to
make sure that any holes created by COCOM liberalization were
effectively plugged and laid the groundwork for establishing an
International Dual Use List of items that all supplier countries
should co
ntrol.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Support
The NPT has been a cornerstone of U.S. non-proliferation efforts,
providing a foundation for export controls, a basis for
safeguards, and creating a norm of non-proliferation. In 1995,
the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) will meet to determine whether to extend the NPT
indefinitely or for a fixed period or periods. Many issues will
be raised, including the extent to which the nuclear weapon states
have met t
he NPT's arms control and disarmament goals. In that
regard, the very extensive progress now being made in the nuclear
arms control field -- including the START agreement, the
President's September 27th, 1991 Nuclear Initiative, and the
prospect of further stabilizing nuclear reductions -- strongly
demonstrate our commitment to meeting those goals.
For our part, the Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation has
already begun to think about the issues likely to be raised at
this Extension Confer
ence and how best to make the case for
indefinite or long-term NPT extension. Its newly integrated
responsibilities for arms control and non-proliferation will
strengthen DOE's ability to continue to play a constructive role
in U.S. Government planning for a successful NPT Extension
Conference in 1995.
Role in UN Military Denuclearization Plan for Iraq
One of the most recent significant actions of my office concerns
Iraq. In the wake of the Gulf War, DOE's non-proliferation
community played a c
ritical role in formulating the U.S.
Government's plan for eliminating Iraq's future capability to
develop nuclear weapons. In addition, DOE and its laboratories
provided most of the U.S. experts for the IAEA inspections
conducted under the auspices of the UN Special Commission on
Iraq.
Role in Assistance to the Former Soviet Union
Assessing proliferation implications of the collapse of the Former Soviet
Union (FSU) is another critical area of my offices's involvement. DOE is
actively engaged
in U.S. Government efforts to prevent diversion of
nuclear weapons, materials, and technology from the FSU to proliferant
countries. This includes the human dimension of the proliferation threat,
that is the possible "brain drain" of FSU nuclear weapons scientists and
engineers. DOE is examining measures to assist the newly independent
states of the FSU to establish effective accounting and control systems
for fissile materials, as well as export control systems. We also are
reviewing employment o
ptions within the CIS for scientists and engineers
formerly engaged in weapons design and production. DOE-initiatives, two
of which were presented to President Yeltsin by Secretary of State Baker
in mid-February, 1992.
International Safeguards and Physical Security
I would next like to discuss with you DOE's International Safeguards and
Physical Security Program and our FY 1993 request of $5,373,000 (plus
$373,000 in capital equipment) for this program, which supports U.S. non-
proliferation a
nd national security objectives under the Atomic Energy
Act, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, and related Executive Orders and
Presidential directives.
The primary program objective is to provide a sound technical basis to
support U.S. non-proliferation policies, and to strengthen international
safeguards and physical security of fissile material through technical
support to the IAEA and cooperative efforts with other nations. This
requires management of the Department's policy and technology development
programs for international safeguards and physical security. These
programs are implemented through strong technical leadership and active
participation in negotiations collaboration with other U.S. agencies,
foreign nations, and international organizations to strengthen
international safeguards and security.
New challenges, however, increasingly face international safeguards.
After Iraq, there is not agreement on the need
for so-called "special
inspections" by the IAEA under its existing rights. But the IAEA, which
is responsible for implementing the regular international safeguards
regime, struggles to accomplish its work under a "zero real growth" budget
policy that has existed since 1981 and has now been compounded a new 13
percent budget deficit due to nonpayment by the defunct USSR of its share
of the IAEA budget. Concomitantly, the IAEA faces significant increases
in new safeguards obligations due to nations
signing new comprehensive
safeguards agreements and the need to strengthen safeguards worldwide in
order to maintain confidence in the non-proliferation regime. These
constraints heighten the importance of DOE's program to support
development of state-of-the-art technologies that will enhance the
effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards.
Speaking for President Bush at the IAEA General Conference in September
1991, Secretary Watkins pledged continued U.S. efforts to strengthen the
IAEA's sa
feguards system as an increasingly important objective strongly
supported by the U.S. Government. In that regard, as part of our non-
proliferation obligations and responsibilities, the Department provides
technical and financial assistance to the IAEA to strengthen international
safeguards and physical protection of special nuclear materials. In
particular, DOE's long-range base program for technology research and
development to strengthen international safeguards develops new technology
and concep
ts and includes international technology exchanges with other
nations. Tasks focus on implementation of IAEA safeguards at DOE
facilities pursuant to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Treaty and technology
development for IAEA safeguards at advanced nuclear facilities for
reprocessing, enrichment, and plutonium fuel fabrication.
Technology developed by DOE is transferred to the IAEA through the
U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS).
This voluntary support program is managed by t
he interagency Technical
Support Coordinating Committee and has been funded through the
Foreign Assistance Act since 1977. -We provide technical leadership for
POTAS, which responds to near-term and urgent needs identified by the.
IAEA Director General. Through POTAS, growing quantities of DOE-developed
equipment are being used by IAEA inspectors to measure nuclear
materials or for unattended surveillance at safeguarded facilities.
DOE also trains IAEA inspectors in effective and efficient use of
safeguards equipment. Since 1979, all IAEA inspectors have attended
our training courses at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
DOE also cosponsors international training courses with the IAEA
for foreign nationals in physical security and national systems for
accounting and control of nuclear materials,. Argentine and
Brazilian officials have credited their participation in these
courses as an important factor in helping establish the
Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials
under a treaty signed at Guadalajara, Mexico, in July 1991. This agency is
a cornerstone of the IAEA safeguards agreements which in December
1991 opened all Argentine and Brazilian nuclear facilities to inspection
by a joint safeguards inspection team patterned after the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and to comprehensive safeguards
inspections by the IAEA.
We also are responsible for coordinating and leading U.S.
participation in the Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safegua
rds
project (LASCARI). LASCAR is a multinational project, including
participation by the IAEA, EURATOM, Japan, France, Germany, the U.K., and
the U.S., to assist the IAEA with expert advice on developing safeguards
for large scale reprocessing plants.
DOE also manages the program for U.S. bilateral consultations on
physical security and leads the U.S. teams in these consultations.
The Departments of State and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
participate. These
consultations provide a channel for regular discussions of physical
security issues and informing other countries of U.S. technical
developments in physical security. These talks have contributed to
strengthening physical security worldwide over the past decade.
As part of U.S. support for international cooperation in research
and development on international safeguards and physical protection
worldwide, the Department has agreements for cooperation in these
areas in effect w
ith the Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute,
Japanese Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Company, German
Ministry of Science and Technology, French Atomic Energy
Commission, and EURATOM. The Department also has letter agreements for
cooperation with the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission, the Brazilian
Nuclear Energy Commission, and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.
Not least, under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, the Department
also assisted the IAEA in conducting a
series of special safeguards
inspections in Iraq by providing nuclear experts, safeguards
technology, and policy support. The lessons learned in Iraq
prompted the international community to take steps to strengthen IAEA
safeguards policy, methods, and technology. The Department's
leadership and assistance helped to put new "teeth" into international
safeguards.
The Department has for years sponsored a Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Workshop to introduce U.S. Government and contractor personnel to
non-proliferation policy issues, nuclear fuel cycle technology, and
paths toward nuclear weapons capability. The course also addresses
applicable U.S. statutes and regulations and the interaction of
U.S. non- proliferation policy, including the export control process.
Two follow- on workshops are also offered by the Department, one at Los
Alamos National Laboratory and the Nevada Test Site and the other
at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Participants include nuclear and
export policy officials an
d analysts, Foreign Service and intelligence
community personnel, customs officers, export control specialists
and licensing .officials, Congressional representatives, and others
with nuclear non- proliferation responsibilities. In response to
requests from their governments, for the past several years officials from
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia also have attended the
workshop.
Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy program is funded under the
Inte
rnational Affairs section of Departmental Administration. The
Nuclear Non-proliferation portion of the International Affairs
request for Fiscal Year 1993 is $1,457,000, the same as that for FY 1992.
Additionally, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR)
program, a separate category under Departmental Administration, is also
funded at the same level as FY 1992, that is, $1,300,000 for Fiscal Year
1993.
The DOE has a major role in implementing U.S. nuclear
non-proliferation policy,
including: support for the work of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); support for the
Department of State in negotiation of new international "agreements for
cooperation" in peaceful uses of nuclear energy; review and
approval of "subsequent arrangements" under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Atomic Energy Acts; and, managing implementation of the Reduced
Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) program aimed at reducing the
amount of high enriched uranium in international fuel c
ycle commerce. The
IAEA and other international organizations have undertaken major new
international nuclear safety initiatives in the wake of the Chernobyl
accident. We will continue to coordinate DOE involvement with other
offices and agencies to strengthen these safety, as well as safeguards,
activities to ensure the safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants
worldwide and to prevent diversion of nuclear material to nonpeaceful
purposes. We also develop DOE policy positions and coordinate
DOE
support for Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapons matters
with other Departments and Agencies including State, Defense, Commerce,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Support for the IAEA is provided in three major areas:
policy and funding; (2) conferences and meetings; and, (3)
recruitment support for the IAEA Secretariat and for
Technical Programs and Technical Assistance projec
ts.
The OAN is the primary focal point for DOE participation in and
support of IAEA programs. This includes coordination of interagency
technical reviews of IAEA programs, arranging of technical support from
the public and private sectors for these activities, and administration of
State Department funds which are transferred to DOE to support IAEA
training, fellowships, contributions in kind, safeguards and other
non-proliferation activities. The President's commitment to strengthen the
IAEA has
entailed intensified DOE support of IAEA activities, particularly
in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and
related events in Eastern Europe. We can expect the IAEA's role in
addressing global problems in the areas of safeguards, safety, nuclear
fuel cycle, and the environment to continue increasing. The number and
type of IAEA assistance requests will grow, and management of these
programs, together with enhanced U.S. resources, will involve
increased respons
ibility for management and control.
The Secretary of Energy traditionally heads the U.S. Delegation to
the IAEA General Conference and we participate at senior levels in
Board of Governors meetings. These commitments require extensive
preparation, advance planning, scheduling and preparing briefing
and issue papers as well as significant pre-meeting interagency
consultations. Our office also coordinates participation of
officials from other DOE offices and National Laboratories (as
well as from ot
her government agencies) in IAEA technical meetings
(such as reactor working groups) and we also coordinate
development of DOE positions on related technical and policy
issues. In 1993 there will be increased demand for international
action concerning the security and safety of nuclear fuel cycle
activities.
Agreements for Cooperation
The OAN coordinates DOE's technical support and advice to the
Secretary of State in negotiating nuclear "agreements for
cooperation" with other countries. Renegot
iation of present
agreements is a principal mandate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978. DOE has participated in negotiating agreements with
Japan, Australia, Canada, Sweden, China, Hungary, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia. Continuing work is required to develop and
implement administrative arrangements for bringing these
agreements into effect.
During 1993, we will undertake intensive cooperation with the
Department of State to begin negotiations for a new agreement with
EURATOM as the prese
nt one expires in 1995. It is very likely
that new republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States, as
well as other Eastern European countries, will want to reach
agreement with the United States on nuclear cooperation, following
the Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovakian leads.
Subsequent Arrangements
The DOE is responsible for analyzing and processing requests for
"subsequent arrangements" under provisions of the Atomic Energy
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Acts. These typically involve
re
quests for international sale or transfers of U.S.-origin
nuclear materials or retransfers and reprocessing of U.S.-origin
spent fuel and recovery of uranium and plutonium. Retransfer and
reuse of plutonium, for example, as plutonium-uranium oxide fuels
in Swiss power reactors, is a particularly sensitive issue. These
cases require extensive coordination among DOE National
Laboratories tracking nuclear materials and with other government
agencies, and often attract the attention of Congress and publi
c
interest groups. Proposed shipments of recovered plutonium from
Europe to Japan, in accordance with the new Agreement for
Cooperation, will require special efforts to satisfy both the
agreement and national and local concerns.
Policy Development and Support
The OAN supports DOE management in development of internal and
interagency positions reflecting energy security interests as part
of overall non-proliferation policy. Extensive preparations of
briefing materials and action memoranda will b
e required for
participating DOE principals, particularly in light of recent
developments in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the
Middle East. This office will continue to participate in
bilateral and multilateral negotiations and discussions both in
this country and overseas throughout the coming year, covering a
wide range of non-proliferation issues.
RERTR Program
The RERTR Program was established in 1978. Its purpose was to
contribute to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy by
minimizing
access by non-nuclear-weapon-states to highly enriched uranium
(HEU); reducing the risk of theft or seizure of HEU by terrorist
or other subnational groups; and reducing the demand for HEU for
civil uses, which could be invoked to justify construction or
operation by non-nuclear-weapon-states of enrichment facilities to
produce HEU. This has been one of our most successful non-
proliferation activities.
More specifically, the program has developed, tested and
demonstrated high density,
low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels which
will allow conversion of all but three foreign reactors fueled
with U.S.-origin HEU. A major effect has been substantial
reductions in the level of U.S. exports of HEU, further minimizing
possible international transportation risks. Our success in
obtaining substantial participation and cooperation from other
foreign countries in implementation of the program is exemplified
by a series of successful annual international RERTR meetings and
continuing close coop
eration among lead RERTR program people at
Argonne National Laboratory and many foreign laboratories and
research institutes. Argonne National Laboratory has developed
unsurpassed expertise and analytical capabilities for continued
application in demonstrating, to foreign as well as domestic
research reactor owners, the merits of converting to use of
presently qualified LEU fuels, including expert assistance in
obtaining necessary licensing approvals.
During the coming year, our primary RERTR impl
ementation
efforts with Argonne National Laboratory will be devoted to
achieving additional foreign reactor conversions to presently
qualified fuels. These efforts will include joint study programs and
safety analysis reviews. When foreign research reactor operators
request additional shipments of U.S. HEU fuel, Argonne will provide
U.S. government officials with evaluations of the technical and
economic justification for the requested exports or retransfers. A major
project will be overseeing
conversion from HEU to LEU of the Pitesti
research reactor, under an agreement successfully negotiated with Romania
during 1991. The first 5 fuel elements shipped from the U.S. have arrived
in Romania and actual reactor restart will take place early in 1992, under
Argonne oversight.
FUTURE PLANS
The DOE, utilizing the extensive technical expertise of its
National Laboratories, has established a concrete program of technology
development and analytical studies in s
upport of U.S. arms control
and non-proliferation policy formulation, treaty verification and
implementation, and R&D and technical support for monitoring and
compliance analysis. The consolidation of these major efforts under
the Office of Arms Control and Non-proliferation should permit a
focussing of the Department's extensive assets and a synergism of
activities that should significantly enhance the Department's
contributions to U.S. and _global security efforts. The process of
consolidation
and integration of responsibilities have just begun.
Already, we have seen concrete evidence of this consolidation in
the timely and effective support the DOE has provided to U.S. and
international activities in Iraq.
As the world moves from an East-West focus to a multipolar focus
on regional issues, it is essential that the DOE and the U.S.
Government configure itself and its programs to meet effectively the
challenges that this new security focus presents. The Department's
consolidation of
arms control and non-proliferation seeks to meet these
new challenges. We believe that the program we have laid out effectively
provides the necessary basis to support this important new direction.
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
Victor E. Alessi
Dr. Victor E. Alessi is the Director of the Office of Arms Control
and Nonproliferation in the Department of Energy (DOE). His duties
include overseeing DOE involvement in arms control, non-proliferation, and
verification technology development. His re
sponsibilities include
representing DOE in interagency policy meetings in these areas. He
was involved in the U.S. efforts that led to successful conclusion of
the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), Conventional Forces in Europe,
Threshold Test Ban, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START) Treaties. He also is in charge of DOE's
support to the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq.
Prior to joining DOE in January 1987, he was the Chief of Strategic
Affairs Division of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In
that capacity, he had responsibility for the START, Antisatellite Arms
Control, Defense and Space (D&S) negotiations, and the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC). He served on the SALT II, START, and
INF delegations. Dr. Alessi graduated from Fordham University in 1963
and received a Licentiate in Philosophy from the University in 1964. He
studied nuclear physics at Georgetown University where he received
an M.S. in 1968 and a Ph.D. in 1969.
He lives
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