NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, 04/24/1991, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19910930
- Chairperson:
- J. Dingell
- Committee:
- House Energy and Commerce
- Docfile Number:
- T91BA192
- Hearing Date:
- 19910424
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP
SUB
- Committee:
- Oversight and Investigations
- Hearing Subject:
- NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
- Witness Name:
- R. Heusser
-
Hearing Text:
-
STATEMENT OF ROGER K. HEUSSER
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CLASSIFICATION,
SECURITY AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
APRIL 24, 1991
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before your
Subcommittee, in accordance with your letter to Secretary Watkins
dated April 10, 1991, to provide information regarding my nuclear
nonproliferation responsibilities in my former position as Deputy
Director, Office of Classification and Technology Policy, Defense
Program at the Department of Energy (DOE). In addition, and in
accordance with your letter with your letter to Secretary Watkins
of April 17, 1991, I am providing information to your Subcommittee
regarding my role in preparing a report in early 1989 recommending
strengthening of the United States (U.S.) nuclear nonproliferation
policy with regard to Iraq. Attached to this statement is a copy of
my biography for the Subcommittee's information.
Prior to the reorganization of April 1, 1991, in addition to
my present responsibilities for the development and implementation
of DOE-wide policy and procedures for the classification and
control of sensitive information critical to the nonproliferation
policy and managing programs to control nuclear national security,
I had responsibility for delineating energy- related exports from
the U.S. in coordination with our allies. In addition, I previously
directed the development of a program to promote the transfer of
Defense Programs funded technology to the U.S. private sector to
enhance U.S. competitiveness.
NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES
Mr. Chairman, the legal basis for the Department's nuclear
nonproliferation responsibilities is very broad. Among the most
important are the Atomic Energy and Nuclear Nonproliferation Acts,
as well as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. According to
Section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the
DOE implementing regulation 10 CFR Part 810, "Unclassified
Activities in Foreign Atomic Energy Programs," specific
authorizations are required from the Secretary of Energy for
activities by any U.S. firm or individuals intending to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the production of special
nuclear materials, i.e., plutonium or enriched uranium, outside of
the U.S. This applies to activities concerning fuel fabrication and
reprocessing and heavy water production as well.
A process was well established within my former office to
handle Part 810 authorizations. First, a DOE staff analysis is
prepared based on a number of criteria. Second, based on the staff
analysis, a draft proposed recommendation to the Secretary of
Energy is coordinated with the Department of State for Departments
of Defense and Commerce, and the Nuclear Regulatory concurrence,
and with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Commission
for their review. Only after all of these other agencies are
consulted is the recommendation transmitted to the Secretary of
Energy for his determination as to whether or not the activity
should be authorized.
The Department of Commerce controls dual-use exports, i.e.,
exports that could have nuclear proliferation applications, as
well as civilian ones. In accordance with well established
procedures, the Department of Commerce refers applications to DOE
for our review and recommendations when they involve the export of
items on the Nuclear Referral List to countries of proliferation
concern which are designated by the Department of State. In the
event that DOE's review indicates a proliferation concern, the
application is referred to the Subgroup on Nuclear Export
Coordination (SNEC) where it is analyzed in an interagency group
composed of the Departments of Energy, State, Defense, and
Commerce; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. During 1990, about 5,000 dual-use export
licenses were reviewed by my former office. Of these, about 250
were of proliferation concern and, therefore, were transmitted to
the SNEC for review. Regarding dual-use export licenses
applications were transmitted to the SNEC, of which 15 were
recommended to Iraq, as recently indicated by the Department of
Commerce, 30 for denial.
INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES
Mr. Chairman, in my former position I also provided leadership and
direction regarding bilateral and multilateral activities to
promote and strengthen international nonproliferation activities.
My office was very active in participating in meetings of the
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to
control exports of national security importance to the Soviet
bloc, the Peoples Republic of China, and their allies. In early
1990, the President ordered the liberalization of COCOM controls.
This action was taken as a result of the changed military
situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. At that time,
our office became concerned that this liberalization could result
in the removal of items of proliferation concern from the export
lists of other countries. For example, some countries have only
one mechanism of control and COCOM liberalization could result in
the removal of their only controls to prohibit key exports to
proliferant countries, i.e., Iraq. This action could inadvertently
have helped a proliferant country. For some time we had been
concerned about better controls over dual-use technologies on a
world-wide basis. We were seeking to close opportunities that
could provide a path for diversion of equipment to emerging
proliferant nations, e.g. Iraq. Therefore, our office initiated
the development of an International Dual-Use List to identify
technologies of concern and to help block this possible diversion
path. As a result, a precedent setting meeting was held in The
Hague, Netherlands, last March in which there was overwhelming
agreement among 26 nuclear supplier nations that such an
International Dual-Use List should be negotiated and eventually
implemented.
PROLIFERATION CONCERNS
In the fall of 1988, when I entered my former position as
Deputy Director, Office of Classification and Technology Policy, I
became concerned over the transfer abroad of nuclear-related
technology and information from the DOE's laboratories. Civilians
are prohibited from transferring export controlled information
abroad, but the same DOE information that would be subject to
export controls if produced by the private sector, is not exempt
from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This means that it
must be released to anyone upon request. In addition, once
released under the FOIA, the information becomes exempt from Part
810 controls. We see this as being tantamount to exporting the
information abroad. Although the Department of Defense has specific
statutory authority to withhold government export controlled
information, the DOE does not.
A March 1988 Technology Security report that was prepared by
our office at the direction of the then Acting Assistant Secretary
for Defense Programs, documented that the DOE laboratories were
being successfully targeted by proliferant nations, including Iraq,
to obtain export controlled information critical to nuclear weapons
technology. One of the methods they used to obtain this
information was the traditional "Dear Colleague" letter saying
please send me your reports. We subsequently conducted a study
that revealed that each week as many as 250 requests for
information were coming from foreign sources to just one of our
national laboratories. It was estimated that thousands of documents
per year were being published by the national laboratories which
should have been protected as export controlled information.
Therefore, in November 1988, we circulated a draft order for
comment which would have required the DOE offices and laboratories
to identify and mark requirements placed on the private sector and
the Department of information that should be export controlled,
similar to those Defense. The DOE Office of the General Counsel
verbally advised us that the DOE had no statutory basis for
issuing such an order.
We then prepared guidelines for export controlled information
which were issued by the Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense
Programs on January 19, 1989, to the DOE operations offices and
national laboratories. The Acting Assistant Secretary issued them
as "guidelines" since the DOE order was not approved and they
could not be contractually enforced. The Acting Assistant
Secretary directed that we prepare a memorandum to the DOE's
General Counsel requesting their assistance in seeking legislative
solutions on the issue of export General Counsel on January 12,
1989, pointing out that: (1) Article I controlled information. He
then signed the memorandum to the DOE's of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty commits signatories to neither directly nor
indirectly assist nonweapon states in the development of nuclear
explosive devices; and (2) without an appropriate exemption in the
FOIA, the DOE is releasing information that the Department of
Defense would withhold. I understand that DOE's Office of the
General Counsel is considering this matter.
We became concerned that the national laboratories might
inadvertently export equipment and materials without following
appropriate procedures. Therefore, we prepared correspondence which
was signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military
Application reminding them that the DOE operations offices and
national laboratories must follow U.S. export control regulations.
IRAQ PROLIFERATION CONCERNS
I was very concerned regarding any possible nuclear weapons
proliferation endeavors, particularly Iraq, since my former office
had nuclear nonproliferation responsibility. Some of the national
experts I spoke with in early 1989 said it would take Iraq over 10
years to get an atomic bomb and advised me not to be concerned.
But I was. My concern was over the development of Iraq's "first"
atomic bomb which would take a much shorter time than a modern
weapons system program. It is important to remember that the
Soviets, Chinese, and Indians developed and deployed their first
atomic bombs much faster development of a proliferant country's
first atomic bomb since after than experts predicted. I believe it
is essential to prevent the that there is not much the U.S. can
do without a major risk of nuclear conflagration.
There are three well known parts to a crude atomic bomb: (1)
the nuclear materials, i.e., uranium and plutonium; (2) the high
explosives to compress the nuclear materials, and (3) the
nonnuclear components, e.g. capacitors and firing sets to make it
work. In early 1989, we reviewed information that led me to be
concerned that Iraq had a broadly-based covert procurement endeavor
to acquire components and knowledge needed to develop their first
atomic bomb. For example, I believed that they were attempting to
acquire key equipment, advanced high explosive technology, and
nonnuclear weapon components like capacitors, some with the same
specifications used in modern U.S. nuclear weapons. When we put
these "pieces" of information together, it was a clear signal to me
that Iraq had a major effort to develop an atomic bomb. The sources
of this information varied from several reliable U.S. and foreign
reports to information from export control experts and personnel
in the national weapons laboratories. Some information indicated
that the U.S. was being targeted for diversions. We were concerned
that surreptitious procurement of items in the U.S. by Iraq would
not only embarrass the U.S., but would injure its valuable
national nonproliferation credentials.
We were concerned enough to work through a weekend to prepare
a summary report to advise the Secretary of Energy regarding the
Iraq nuclear situation. Since the DOE is responsible to advise on
nuclear proliferation matters, we recommended that Admiral Watkins
contact Secretary Baker, who is responsible overall for the
nation's nonproliferation policies, to discuss a review of the
Iraq situation under the auspices of the National Security Council
to determine options and recommendations for further action. Along
with the report, we began preparing a briefing for the Secretary.
The report was completed and I briefed Dr. Gilbert, the then
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs, Defense Programs,
regarding the Iraq Gilbert indicated that we needed to get this to
Admiral Watkins, the nuclear connection. He reviewed the report
and quickly concurred. Dr. Secretary of Energy, quickly and
directed me to coordinate it with the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Intelligence. We tried to reach agreement on the early 1989
report regarding the Iraq situation with the Office of
Intelligence so it could be transmitted to the Secretary for
action. However, we were unable to gain their concurrence. At that
point, we decided to increase our attention on our export control
review activities regarding Iraq and to do the best we could with
our limited resources to closely monitor the situation.
That concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
answer any question that you may have.
Attachment
ROGER K. HEUSSER
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CLASSIFICATION
Mr. Heusser is currently Deputy Director of the Office of
Classification, Security Affairs, which is responsible for
development and implementation of policy and procedures to
classify and control sensitive information critical to the
national security. Mr. Heusser's prior position was Deputy
Director, Office of Classification and Technology Policy, Defense
Programs, which, in addition to classification, included
delineating policy and managing Department of Energy (DOE) programs
to control nuclear energy related exports from the United States
(U.S.) and its allies. In addition, he was responsible for
developing a program to promote transfer of Defense Programs
funded technology to the U.S. private sector to improve U.S.
competitiveness. At that time, Mr. Heusser was also Chairman of the
Weapons Research, Development, and Testing Reconfiguration
Modernization Group.
Mr. Heusser also led the Operational and Management Assessment
Tiger Team at the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, Colorado, and
prepared reports concerning management adequacy and solid waste
and residue management systems. Further, Mr. Heusser chaired the
group which prepared the DOE's Waste Minimization and Avoidance
Plan. In addition, he prepared a recent report on DOE's management
of plutonium residue recovery.
The Department presented Mr. Heusser the Exceptional Service Award
in 1988.
Prior to assuming his current assignment, Mr. Heusser
was the Senior Strategic Planning Advisor to the Assistant Secretary
for Defense Program, accomplishing a number of nuclear weapons
production complex. In addition, he served as senior evaluations
regarding waste minimization and revitalization of the DOE
representative to the Chernobyl negotiations in Vienna, Austria,
which culminated in two successful treaties.
Former positions include Director, Division of Waste Management
Research and Development and Director, Division of Material
Processing where Mr. Heusser had increasing levels of
responsibility regarding the management of nuclear wastes and
nuclear operations.
Earlier in his career, Mr. Heusser completed several successful
assignments for the General Electric Company at Hanford. He was
instructor of chemistry at Oregon State University and Columbia
Basin College in Pasco, Washington, as well as Assistant Professor
of Management Science at Frostburg State College in Maryland. In
addition, he completed several assignments with the Atomic Energy
Commission at Hanford.
Mr. Heusser received a B.S. degree in Chemistry from Linfield
College (1963) in Oregon; a M.S. degree in Chemistry from Oregon
State University (1968); and a M.B.A. degree in Management from
Frostburg State College (1980) in Maryland, graduating Summa Cum
Laude.
Mr. Heusser is currently located in room C-377 at Germantown,
Maryland, telephone 353-3526 (FTS 233-3526).
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