FY1992 BUDGET REQUEST - SECURITY AFFAIRS, 03/21/1991, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19910925
- Chairperson:
- J. Spratt
- Committee:
- House Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- T91AJ165
- Hearing Date:
- 19910321
- DOE Lead Office:
- SA
SUB
- Committee:
- DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel
- Hearing Subject:
- FY1992 BUDGET REQUEST - SECURITY AFFAIRS
- Witness Name:
- W. Barker
-
Hearing Text:
-
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM L. BARKER
ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
DOE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES PANEL
FY 1992 AUTHORIZATION HEARINGS
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the panel, I am William Barker, Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Affairs (DASSA). I am
pleased to address the Department of Energy's (DOE) Security
Affairs programs of Nuclear Safeguards and Security (including
Classification and Technology Policy), and Security Investigations,
and the FY 1992 budget request required to carry out these
programs.
Mr. Chairman, since I first appeared before this panel last year,
I am pleased to report that we have made significant progress in
many programmatic areas. However, as noted in Secretary Watkins'
recent Task Force report on the status of safeguards and security,
much remains to be done. As in the past, I will be pleased to meet
with you or panel members at any time to discuss matters of
interest.
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY TASK FORCE
As I reported last year, Secretary Watkins tasked Under Secretary
John Tuck in April 1989 to conduct a comprehensive assessment of
the status of security at DOE facilities. The Under Secretary
outlined a four-step plan and formed a task force of uniquely
qualified individuals to accomplish the review. The Task Force
examined missions, responsibilities, and objectives of Departmental
elements in support of security; evaluated previous studies,
reviews, and inspections; conducted an intensive analysis of
selected facilities and functions; and prepared a comprehensive
report.
The Secretary released the Task Force report on the status of
Safeguards and Security on December 14, 1990, addressing Safeguards
and Security Management, Planning, and Operations. Key elements of
the Task Force report call for the realignment of the safeguards
and security (S&S) and classification responsibilities from Defense
Programs; the establishment of professional development and intern
programs; the development of training and equipment standardization
programs; the realignment of S&S budget responsibilities; and
streamlining the security investigations and long-term planning
programs. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this
opportunity to provide you with some details of this report.
GOALS
The Secretary's Safeguards and Security Task Force was undertaken
to provide a status on the safeguards and security program at the
DOE and to provide recommended actions that would improve and
strengthen the safeguards and security posture in the DOE.
Concurrent with the release of the Task Force's Report, Secretary
Watkins issued a letter on December 14, 1990, that directed several
near- and long-term actions. The first action directed that the
Office of Safeguards and Security be transferred from Defense
Programs. This action is underway, as I stand before you today. It
is currently planned that the Office of Safeguards and Security
will report directly to the Office of the Under Secretary.
A vigorous mid-to-long-range professional development program, as
well as the establishment of an effective long-range intern program
for safeguards and security personnel, is being initiated. These
programs will be the cornerstone for development of future
safeguards and security managers and will provide promotional
prerequisites related to future job-related education and training
requirements.
Another effort, the standardization and certification of protective
force training, is to be accomplished through the Department's
Central Training Academy. The Central Training Academy is to report
directly to the Office of Safeguards and Security. Also,
standardization of equipment and physical security systems is long
overdue and must be accomplished in a cost effective and efficient
manner.
It is proposed that the Safeguards and Security Program be
identified as a separate entity in the departmental budget, thus
helping to improve the management of Safeguards and Security
resources throughout the Department. This recommendation is
currently being reviewed within the Department and DOE will be
working with the Office of Management and Budget and your staffs to
address the issues related to this action. We are planning to
streamline several areas of the Safeguards and Security program,
including the Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSA's),
and the Personnel Security Program. In the area of MSSA's we are
currently reviewing the process and will initiate corrective
measures over the next couple of months.
In the Personnel Security area, I need not tell you of the constant
delays encountered in this process. We have taken several
initiatives to improve this program. One initiative is to redefine
the categories for the various types of DOE classified information,
with a goal of decreasing the number of "Q" clearances. A second
initiative is to establish an accelerated access authorization
procedure. This proposed procedure is currently being tested at
Rocky Flats, and will undergo a complete evaluation before
implementation on a DOE-wide basis. Further, we are reviewing
Department of Defense clearance procedures for comparability;
expediting the transfer process of clearances between offices and
contractors, etc. We are working to accomplish these initiatives as
expeditiously as possible.
A specific recommendation of the report was to complete the
inventory of classified documents and revise document
accountability procedures. You can be assured that we are actively
working this issue. Another recommendation was to finalize the
Strategic Plan for Nuclear Material and Control and Accountability.
We are currently working to complete this plan by the end of 1991.
Although the recommendations I have noted today are but a small
percentage of the overall recommendations, I believe they are
representative of the major undertaking of this Department to
ensure a safeguards and security program which is second to none in
the Federal Government. I would be pleased to meet with you or your
staff to discuss any of these recommendations or any others which
are set forth in the Task Force Report.
I would now like to address some of the areas presented in the
budget before you today.
MISSION
The Security Affairs programs are the Department's cornerstones in
the development, implementation, and oversight of policy,
guidelines, and procedures to prevent the theft of nuclear weapons
or materials, the sabotage of Departmental facilities, and the
compromise of classified information. Further, the program provides
an effective technology base for application to Departmental S&S
programs; support of international safeguards and physical
protection to deter the diversion of nuclear materials and to
promote nonproliferation and national security objectives;
development and management of the classification and
declassification of information; control of proposed exports of
nuclear materials technology and equipment; and the implementation
of a program to transfer unclassified technology from our defense
complex to U.S. industry.
BUDGET
Security Affairs requests $158.6 million for FY 1992. This consists
of $96.0 million for Nuclear Safeguards and Security ($8.4 million
in operating expenses (exclusive of program direction) for
Classification and Technology Policy) and $62.6 million for
Security Investigations.
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM ACTIVITIES
Mr. Chairman, the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Program budget
request for FY 1992 is $96.0 million. Operating expenses require
$88.7 million (the $8.4 million for Classification and Technology
Policy is included in this requirement), capital equipment $5.3
million, and general plant project construction of $2.0 million. I
will address the following basic elements: S&S operations,
technology development, international safeguards, and
classification and technology policy.
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY OPERATIONS
The Safeguards and Security Operational Support activity request
for FY 1992 is $38.3 million. This budget request includes such
activities as the New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) ($3.8 million);
the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS)
($3.1 million); The Central Training Academy (CTA) ($10.1 million);
Technical Security Countermeasures (TSCM) program ($1.5 million);
and a number of Headquarters administered contracts, as well as
guidance and assistance to DOE field operations for safeguards and
security program improvements ($19.8 million).
The New Brunswick Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois, is the national
standards laboratory for nuclear materials measurements and serves
as the technical extension of the Office of Safeguards and Security
(OSS) in the areas of measurement science, calibration, and
evaluation of Materials Control and Accounting (MC&A) practices
within the DOE complex. NBL's functions include: maintaining and
improving an internationally-compatible reference base for
nuclear material measurements; assessing measurement technology in
support of the DOE nuclear fuel cycle and weapons production
activities; and developing, certifying, and distributing reference
materials for calibration and standardization of nuclear material
measurements. In its unique role as a government-owned,
government-operated laboratory, NBL also provides on-sight
technical assistance to Headquarters in the area of policy review
and implementation.
In cooperation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), we
will continue at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to operate the NMMSS, the
nation's single nuclear material database. The tracking of
US-origin nuclear material involving DOE contractors, NRC
licensees, and foreign trading partners is integral to the mission
for control of special nuclear material. NMMSS maintains
information needed by facilities to verify the shipment and receipt
of nuclear materials to reconcile nuclear material inventories at
DOE facilities.
The CTA at Albuquerque, NM is the focal point for all safeguards
and security training and dissemination of training principles.
Training at the CTA includes physical security, protective force
operations, security education, computer security, and MC&A. The
CTA will provide training oversight of the safeguards and security
training programs conducted at the DOE field operations offices.
The standardization of training has greatly facilitated the
development of a complex-wide protective force that is second to
none and more than able to counter threats against the Department's
nuclear materials and facilities. There has been a dramatic
increase in classes, from three courses offered in 1984 to more
than 60 courses projected for FY 1992. CTA is nationally recognized
as a valuable training asset. We are proud of the advances made at
CTA and will continue these improvements in FY 1992.
The major portion of the funding increase will maintain existing
facilities which, in some cases, are substandard. In addition, the
Department is requesting General Plant Project funds of $2 million
in FY 1992 for needed facility upgrades.
The DOE Technical Surveillance Countermeasures program protects
against the theft of classified information by technical means.
Modern intelligence collection utilizes equipment and devices
incorporating state-of-the-art technology to accomplish technical
penetrations of targeted areas. The detection of clandestinely
installed devices is extremely difficult, and countermeasures are
achieved only with highly trained personnel using specialized
techniques and equipment.
A program to certify the competency of DOE TSCM investigators has
been instituted, and is in place, for those who currently perform
services for the Department. These efforts in training and
certification continue to improve the overall technical security
posture of the Department.
As stated last year, we came to realize that a more effective S&S
planning process was needed to consider long-term programmatic
requirements and trends, identify strategic policy issues affecting
the outyears, and identify actions which address concerns and
vulnerabilities of the Department's critical facilities and assets.
A corporate planning approach has been developed with Master
Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSAS) as the base planning
documents. In support of the MSSA process, the standardization of
vulnerability assessments within the Department has led to the
development and use of sophisticated, user-oriented computer models
as tools for aiding in assessing the effectiveness of our facility
protection programs. The Secretary's task force has determined, and
we agree fully, that the time required to complete MSSAs, and the
associated costs, must be reduced. To accomplish this, we are
developing guidance that should streamline the process.
I am pleased to announce some progress on the DOE's airspace
initiative. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and DOE are
working together toward a goal of establishing new or expanded
airspace prohibitions over nine additional facilities. FAA and DOE
are proceeding with permanent rulemaking to accomplish this goal.
As an integral part of the process, we held informal public
meetings at nine locations this past spring. The Department
continues to make every effort to be responsive to all public
concerns. We have based our altitude and boundary proposals on
extensive discussions with our field security staffs and have
requested minimum altitudes consistent with our security and safety
needs. We have revised our time requirements to have these
restrictions in place from the Fall 1991 to the first half of 1992.
We continue to improve security policies, practices, and procedures
for classified document control, albeit not as quickly as we would
like. Initiatives, such as modified document accountability based
on 100 percent document inventory and a three-tiered document
access control program are underway to improve the classified
document control and accountability program. The comprehensive
secret document inventory is near completion. An Information
Security umbrella order is under development which integrates
various aspects of the control of classified information to provide
a comprehensive information security program.
Each year the national laboratories host many visitors and
assignees from foreign countries under agreements for cooperation
or on a scientist-to-scientist basis. These interactions are
integral to the scientific process, but must be conducted on an
appropriately controlled basis and then according to sound security
plans. The potential for inadvertent disclosure of classified or
sensitive information, or the use of such visits for the
intentional gathering of such information, is a concern. To counter
this concern, we have successfully implemented a Departmental Order
designed to improve physical and technology security and security
awareness associated with the visits and assignments program. I
would like to add, Mr. Chairman, that we are not completely
satisfied. There is more to be accomplished. However, we are
confident that our continuing improvements in the management of the
foreign visits and assignments program at all DOE facilities will
indicate that our objectives are being met.
TECHNOLOGY AND SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
The Technology and Systems Development activity request for FY 1992
is $26.7 million. The Technology and Systems Development program,
conducted at the national laboratories under Headquarters
direction, is an integral part of Nuclear Safeguards and Security
and provides the technology base for developing new systems
required to sustain a viable safeguards and security program. The
program's basic mission is the development and application of
state-of-the-art technologies for the protection of DOE sensitive
facilities, SNM, and classified matter. The Department's Technology
Development Program contributes to cost-effectiveness in all areas
by leveraging our personnel resources and improving the operational
efficiency of S&S systems. Many benefits are realized through the
use of technology to reduce manpower levels and through the
development of standardized systems. The use of new technologies to
facilitate engineering design and specification for construction
and equipment is also reducing our S&S costs.
Fiscal constraints on the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Program
continue to restrain development of the technology base and will
limit the technology available to improve our protection posture.
The continuing need for state-of-the-art S&S technologies is
especially relevant to Departmental initiatives for modernization
and plans for reconfiguration of the complex.
Identifying and addressing the technology development needs of the
DOE community are important planning factors. Proposed projects are
evaluated based on their potential to solve existing and future
problems. This provides emphasis for projects that offer potential,
cost-effective solutions to known safeguards and security problems
at multiple facilities. In addition to solving problems and
improving S&S capabilities, all proposed technology development
projects are evaluated for their potential to reduce the
operational outlay ("crosscut") estimates for S&S. This provides
incentive and leverage to improve both effectiveness and efficiency
of the overall S&S mission. Close coordination with outlay
programs, such as weapons, materials production, etc., is vital to
accomplish this goal.
Disseminating the S&S technology developed for the DOE complex to
other Government agencies is also a high priority. We consider our
DOE S&S technology development program a unique national resource
in assuring an awareness of technologies developed not only within
the Department, but also in assuring awareness and coordination of
technology development activities with other federal agencies.
Exchange of information about S&S technology is conducted through
the dissemination of technical reports and manuals to appropriate
audiences and end users and the conduct of training courses and
workshops. We continue to emphasize close interagency sharing and
coordination to minimize costs and reduce redundancies.
The FY 1992 request for the DOE Classified Computer Security
program is $3.3 million, and is provided through the Technology and
Systems Development Program. Significant activities of the
classified computer security program include the Center of
Excellence for Computer Security at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory and the Computer Incident Advisory Capability at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The Center provides support
for the education and training of computer security personnel. It
also provides field support and conducts technology development for
computer security. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
provides training, support, and assistance to DOE locations in the
detection, prevention and elimination of computer viruses and other
forms of computer intrusion and develops computer products for the
enhancement of computer security in the Department. Additional
computer security development work is sponsored at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory where products to support assurance of secure
computer software are being developed.
INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS
Our international safeguards program request for FY 1992 is $5.3
million. This program supports U.S. nonproliferation and national
security objectives, as required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978, the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, and
implementing Executive Orders and Presidential directives. The
primary objectives are to provide a sound technical basis for U.S.
policies and to strengthen international safeguards and physical
protection through technical support to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and cooperative efforts with other nations.
Initiatives to implement these requirements are based on the
DOE/OSS long-range technology development program for international
safeguards and bilateral exchanges of international safeguards and
physical protection technology with other nations and
organizations.
We are actively pursuing bilateral technical exchanges on physical
protection technology, technology development for new and improved
systems for IAEA safeguards and advanced safeguards technologies
and procedures to improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards
inspectors. Additionally, we are conducting international training
courses on international safeguards at the national level for
foreign nationals.
CLASSIFICATION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
The FY 1992 request for the Classification and Technology Policy
program, which is incorporated in the Nuclear Safeguards and
Security program budget, is $8.4 million, exclusive of program
direction. In FY 1992, we will continue to manage Defense Programs'
technology transfer activities. Funding for these activities, in
the amount of $32 million, has been requested in the Weapons
Research and Development budget.
The Classification and Technology Policy mission is to develop and
implement policy and procedures to identify classified and
unclassified sensitive information critical to the national
security, control nuclear-related exports, and develop and
implement the technology transfer policies and programs for Defense
Programs. Our goals are to utilize the technologies, capabilities,
and expertise resident in Defense Programs to promote the national
security, enhance U.S. industrial competitiveness, and allow for
industry interactions that foster increased technological vigor
within the complex. We will achieve these goals in concert with the
weapons development mission and the protection of sensitive
technologies and classified information.
The FY 1992 request will continue classification activities in
program areas involving sensitive technologies, such as inertial
confinement fusion, nuclear weapons nonproliferation, etc.;
classification assistance to the NRC and the Department of State in
matters pertaining to commercial uranium enrichment; implementation
of automated systems to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
the classification program; education and training; classification
appraisal program; and document review activities. By the end of FY
1991, we will have completed a comprehensive classification policy
study that was undertaken to determine whether current DOE
classification policies and procedures are adequate for the coming
decade, considering the significant world changes that have
occurred since the Atomic Energy Act was established in 1946. FY
1992 activities will focus on implementing the study's
recommendations (e.g., legislative changes, policy revisions,
declassifications, etc.).
Defense Programs has played a major role in developing and
implementing nuclear export control policy to ensure compliance
with U.S. national security and nuclear nonproliferation policies.
We continue to pursue measures to control technologies which could
assist potential proliferants in the design or production of
nuclear explosive devices. The Department has aggressively led a
significant effort to create an international nuclear dual-use
export control regime over items that have weapons as well as
commercial applications. This effort is particularly timely in view
of the need to inhibit exports to countries such as Iraq. In
addition, events brought about by the political transition
occurring in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have increased
pressure on the U.S. Government to identify those technologies and
commodities which continue to pose a national security concern. As
a consequence, we are involved in a major effort to revise
international controls in the Coordinating Committee on
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to ensure international
commerce will not undermine U.S. national security and
nonproliferation interests. We continue to exercise a leadership
role by providing technical and policy expertise in support of the
negotiation of major changes to existing international controls
over nuclear fuel cycle components subject to international
safeguards under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Exporters
Group.
I would also like to emphasize our strong commitment to technology
transfer in Defense Programs. The Secretary has singled out the
technology transfer program as a high priority of the Department,
and in Defense Programs we have set the course for an aggressive
program in FY 1992 and beyond.
As you know, the enactment of the National Competitiveness
Technology Transfer Act of 1989 and the amendment to the Atomic
Energy Act has allowed us to embark on a vigorous program of
technology transfer in Defense Programs. The advanced technology
and capabilities resident in the Defense Programs laboratories and
production plants are significant resources that can now be
directed towards strengthening the economic competitiveness of our
country in addition to protecting our national security.
During 1990, we worked with other elements of the Department to
develop guidelines and policies for technology transfer. Necessary
contract modifications have been negotiated and signed by the major
Defense Programs laboratories, and several cooperative research and
development agreements are in process. We are now turning our
emphasis to the initiation of cooperative ventures with private
sector partners. We have begun several projects in FY 1991 in areas
of technology ranging from precision machining and manufacturing,
lasers, computers, and microelectronics to advanced technical
training. We are continuing the Specialty Metals Processing
Consortium (SMPC) to assist in providing reliable domestic
suppliers for weapons program materials and for maintaining
state-of-the-art technologies in critical Defense Programs areas,
as well as potential commercial applications. The Advanced
Manufacturing Initiative (AMI), underway at our major defense
complex facilities, encompasses Defense Programs
manufacturing-related activities and is being conducted in
cooperation with the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences and
other private sector partners. Our strategy is to collaborate with
U.S. industry to transfer technology in critical areas to
strengthen our economic competitiveness to promote reliable
domestic suppliers for weapons program needs.
In FY 1992 we will continue to focus our efforts on implementing
additional technical programs in cooperation with U.S. industry.
Our program growth will allow for enhancement of additional areas
of technology critical to the weapons program; progression of
activities initiated in FY 1990 and FY 1991, such as the SMPC and
AMI programs; and the initiation of new technology transfer program
development activities to encourage more effective interactions
with U.S. industry, nationwide outreach and "inreach" programs, and
education and training initiatives which are also essential
elements of the program in FY 1992. The key to our success in
working with the private sector relies on our credibility as a
dependable partner. As our collaborative efforts proceed, we must
be in a position to commit the needed resources to support the
continuing growth of this program.
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
The FY 1992 request for personnel security investigations is $62.6
million. Security investigations are required by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, and Executive Orders 10450 and 10865. The
Department is mandated to use the Federal Bureau of Investigations
and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to conduct clearance
investigations. The FY 1992 budget provides for 11,179 initial
full-field investigations, 29,361 National Agency Checks, and
21,530 reinvestigations; and continued training for personnel
security specialists.
In 1986, we began a major initiative to reduce the numbers and
levels of clearances, resulting in a 15-percent reduction of
clearances from approximately 209,000 to the current level of about
178,100. We have assured continued emphasis on this aspect of the
program by requiring annual reviews and recertification of
clearances for DOE and contractor employees, and other agency
employees and contractors.
Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize the Department's continued
commitment to reducing the security reinvestigations backlog. We
have reduced the number of backlog reinvestigations from
approximately 132,000 in 1985 to approximately 27,000 at the end of
FY 1991. The elimination of this backlog is essential so that we
can ensure the integrity of our work force by maintaining current
background data on our employees and removing individuals with
derogatory information in their background from sensitive programs.
We have been working with senior officials of the OPM to insure
that OPM continues to meet DOE needs for reducing the
reinvestigations backlog. It is clear that OPM intends to make
every possible effort to meet our needs.
One key component of our efforts to address the potential insider
threat is the implementation of the Department-wide Personnel
Security Assurance Program (PSAP) which will systematically monitor
the reliability of selected DOE and contractor personnel. The PSAP,
as we mentioned last year, is a special access authorization
(security clearance) program for personnel who protect,
transport, or have direct access to significant quantities of
special nuclear material; operate nuclear material production
reactors; or could cause grave damage to nuclear weapons production
with the potential for significant impact on national security. The
PSAP, signed by the Secretary and sent to the Office of Management
and Budget for review pending publication in The Federal
Register, includes an annual supervisory review; medical
evaluation, which includes a physical examination, an alcohol
dependence/alcohol abuse evaluation, and a psychological
assessment; management review, including drug testing; and security
review. A training program, which has been field-tested, will be
implemented for individuals included in the program.
We also have two additional personnel security clearance
initiatives that we expect to implement during FY 1992: (1)
Accelerated Access Authorization (AAA) proposes the establishment
of a procedure whereby persons requiring "Q" clearances for the
first time might be employed in classified or nuclear
material-related activities in advance of the completion of
time-consuming investigations (83 days for AAA versus 310 days
currently) and (2) the Tiered Access Program is a three-tiered
approach to redefine the categories for the
various types of DOE classified information which dictate levels of
required security clearances. This initiative will increase
categories of access for "L" clearances and decrease the access
requiring "Q" clearances.
S&S CROSSCUT ESTIMATE
The Department's line item programs fund S&S activities at the
Department's field facilities. Total S&S funding is identified in
the Department's crosscut estimate, which is a summation of S&S
items in all the Department's program requests, including the OSS.
The Department's total crosscut estimate for FY 1992 is $1.1
billion, compared to $1.0 billion in FY 1991. The Defense
Programs' portion is $908 million in FY 1992, compared to $846
million in FY 1991.
As the Departmental coordinator, Security Affairs has a broad range
of responsibilities for crosscutting activities which include
ensuring that program budget submissions properly reflect S&S
considerations. We validate the need for S&S improvements, evaluate
proposed upgrade designs for adequacy, and verify the performance
of the upgrades once they are in place. This process is critical if
we are to assure continued progress in upgrading protection systems
at our sensitive facilities. For example, we have been engaged in
a massive effort to enhance the safeguards and security posture at
Rocky Flats on a very compressed schedule. Physical security
upgrades and enhanced nuclear materials control measures are being
made to ensure a high confidence that nuclear materials are
satisfactorily protected. Federal manpower resources, contractor
support and national laboratory experts are all focused on this
activity which is essential to the resumption of operations at this
essential facility.
Significant progress continues to be made toward increasing the
level of protection of our facilities and the protection of DOE
assets. Our ability to mitigate the potential outsider threat
remains at an acceptable level at our nuclear weapons facilities.
Sustained management attention to physical security upgrades and
the strengthening of DOE's protective forces contributed to this
accomplishment. The Department's protective forces are better
equipped and better trained and more capable of protecting our
national security assets. Our fabric for deterrence - access
controls, barriers, hardened sites, and security response teams
capabilities remains highly effective.
Current and future emphasis is required to ensure adequate
protection against the potential insider threat. Although progress
is being made against the insider threat, it is at a much slower
pace than we would like. Secretary Watkins' Safeguards and Security
Task Force confirmed the need for additional emphasis to mitigate
the insider threat.
A number of actions were initiated to address potential acts of
theft of SNM by insiders. The Department implemented
performance-oriented requirements to allow more cost-effective
expenditures of resources for material control and accountability
(MC&A) systems. Improvements in MC&A practices continue to be
emphasized at key sites. The S&S technology development program
continues to produce advances such as better site portal monitors
for detecting removal of SNM, and better measurement equipment and
data systems designed to increase the assurance that nuclear
material accounting records are not falsified by exploiting
measurement uncertainties or accounting records.
Measurement systems installed in-line at many facilities permit
more timely and accurate determination of material in process.
These improvements are designed to provide a defense-in-depth
approach. We have also organized teams of experts to investigate
and determine causes of incidents involving the MC&A of SNM.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, let me conclude today by
stating that the Department continues its commitment to excellence
in S&S. The Department's ability to mitigate the potential outsider
is at an acceptable level at our nuclear weapons facilities. We
recognize that much remains to be done to mitigate the potential
insider threat, and we are continuing to take actions to correct
this problem. We will continue to work with the Congress to ensure
that the protection of the Department's national security assets
are given the highest priority.
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