Statement by IAEA Director General Hans Blix on IAEA inspections in Iraq to the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
inspections in Iraq to the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Washington, D.C., USA
23 October 1991
I want to thank the members of this committee for asking me to appear here today. I do not intend to make a long presentation, as I feel I can be of most help to you by responding to questions.
The International Atomic Energy Agency is an international organization, like the World Health Organization or the World Meteorological Organization. It has nearly 120 Member States, a budget of around 200 million dollars per year and about 2000 staff, most of them at our headquarters in Vienna. A Board of Governors consisting of 35 Member States is the policy making organ apart from the General Conference that meets once a year. Among the professional staff US citizens are the largest group. I am a Swedish citizen and I have been Director General for almost ten years now.
Established as part of the Atoms for Peace in the late fifties, the IAEA was given the tasks of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to operate safeguards verification that the uses were only peaceful. A~ency projects would only be established subject to safeguards. With the conclusion of the Tlatelolco Treaty making Latin America a nuclear weapon free zone and the Non Proliferation Treaty, the Agency received a drastically increased job, namely to verify that all present and future nuclear material in States adhering to these Treaties remained in exclusively peaceful uses. There are now some 140 parties to the NPT.
As a result of the Gulf War and Iraq's cease fire agreement with the United Nations, the Agency was given specific tasks by the Security Council. I must say we have learned a number of lessons in Iraq as we carry out this work.
The deep secrecy in which Iraq conducted a massive nuclear weapons development and production programme the extent of which we are still trying to determine dramatically demonstrates the Agency's need for intelligence information in the future.
In Resolution 687, which gave the IAEA unique rights, we were asked:
To carry out immediate on site inspections to determine Iraq's nuclear capability;
To develop a plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of nuclear related items which Iraq was not permitted to retain; and
To develop a plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations in the nuclear area under the Security Council's resolutions. These tasks have proven to be much larger, more complex and considerably more dramatic than we first expected, even though the IAEA has decades of on site inspections expertise, as well as state of the art equipment and laboratories in our Agency or at our command.
The IAEA has conducted seven inspections in Iraq. They clearly show that Iraq blatantly violated its sworn pledges to not seek to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. This information was not disclosed by Iraq as it agreed to do under the terms of the cease fire, but was offered grudgingly when offered at all, only after inspectors had uncovered the existence of previously undeclared activities. And let me say that we are not at all confident that everything has been revealed, even now.
As I noted earlier, our inspectors' discoveries have dramatically demonstrated our crucial need for information. It was intelligence information high tech and human intelligence that led to our teams uncovering the extent of Iraq's programme. The Agency's safeguards system is such that it cannot comb through every inch of a State, blindly searching for nuclear materials and installations. If the State fails to declare nuclear installations, as Iraq did, then we must learn through other sources where to look. The nuclear inspection teams that the IAEA and the Special Commission are sending to Iraq this year are provided with such information by Member States. This comes through the Special Commission which designates suspect sites for inspection.
This convinces me that the ability of our inspectors to uncover possible undeclared nuclear material and installations would increase significantly if
the IAEA were routinely provided with relevant information available to Member
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I am now preparing to set up a small unit within my office to analyse information for any clues as to non declared material. It is intended to have two analysts plus two clerical staff for this purpose. They will examine inhouse information mainly for the Safeguards Department. They should also follow media and periodicals for clues and information. And they should be ready to receive information from Member States, e.g. about any exports for sensitive equipment. They should also be ready to analyse information that Members may have from satellites and intelligence. They do not engage in intelligence collection but in analysis and evaluation.
There does not seem to be much point in laying down how Member States should convey information to the unit. It might be practical if a channel were established at the State's U~ Mission in Vienna. It might be practical further if there were routine, say quarterly reports and alarm reports, if anything urgent were to be transmitted.
Any Member State could volunteer information to the unit and the unit would have to assess the value, and follow up. It would have to assess whether the information was credible.
The unit would have to advise the Director General and the Deputy Director General for Safeguards whether explanations should be asked of a country because of specific information. And, if explanations were not deemed satisfactory, a special inspection should be requested.
Tight rules regarding confidentiality would govern the work. (This applies already to the Safeguards Department). Selection of the personnel would evidently be such that Member States would be ready to work with them. In closing, let me say that the International Atomic Energy Agency ls an instrument of those who belong to it. The Agency's resources both personnel and funds have been severely strained by the ever increasing responsibilities being placed upon it. We welcome this acknowledgement of our capability, but feel it is past time to face the undeniable fact that additional work and responsibilities must entail additional funding. The success or failure of the International Atomic Energy Agency depends on its Members' will and commitment to the principles for which the IAEA stands.
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