Radio Electronic Combat
Whereas the Co-orbital ASAT and the Gorgon ABM interceptor are limited in their ability to negate only satellites in LEO, electronic warfare techniques, known as Radio Electronic Combat (REC) in the Russian Federation, are potentially effective at all altitudes, including GEO. In the late 1980's, Russian officials openly acknowledged not only the possibility of employing REC against enemy satellites but also the country's interest and ability in such methods (References 112-113). REC is a basic tenet of Russian terrestrial war-fighting doctrine, but its application to satellites may leave the attacker with considerable uncertainty as to the outcome of the engagement.
Electronic warfare (EW radioelektronnoy-borby) is a set of coordinated measures and actions for electronic destruction of enemy radio-electronic objects, radio-electronic protection of one’s own radio-electronic objects, as well as radio-electronic information support.
Electronic warfare occupies an important place in the system of comprehensive destruction of the enemy, the protection of friendly troops (forces) and facilities, information warfare and in the performance of operational (combat) missions by troops (forces). Organized and conducted with the aim of disorganizing the control systems of troops and enemy forces; reducing the effectiveness of the use of its weapons, military equipment and radio-electronic equipment; protection of weapons, military equipment and military facilities from enemy technical reconnaissance equipment; ensuring the stability of the systems and means of controlling their troops (forces) and weapons. Electronic warfare is carried out in close combination with fire destruction (capture, disabling) of the main objects of systems and means of command and control of troops (forces), weapons, reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy, and other types of operational support.
The goals of electronic warfare are achieved by performing a number of tasks, the main of which are: opening (detection) of the electronic situation; electronic destruction (suppression) of enemy command and control systems, weapons, reconnaissance and electronic warfare; destruction, destruction and (or) distortion of software and information in enemy automated control systems; reducing the effectiveness of the enemy's use of electronic warfare means; comprehensive technical monitoring of the state of protection of weapons, military equipment and military facilities from enemy technical reconnaissance means and countering them; ensuring electromagnetic compatibility of radio-electronic equipment.
The Russian military first became convinced of the effectiveness of Radio-Electronic Combat equipment more than a century ago, when in April 1904, during an attack by a Japanese squadron on Port Arthur, the radio stations of the Pobeda battleship and the coastal post "Golden Mountain" began to jam the Japanese airwaves, making it difficult to transmit telegrams from enemy spotter ships ... Since then, a lot of water had flowed under the bridge, and now the means of Radio-Electronic Combat have become simply irreplaceable. According to experts, without them, any army will turn into a confrontation between savages and the Western army, equipped to the teeth with the most modern military equipment.
The Armed Forces of the USSR began to pay serious attention to electronic warfare issues in 1950-1953, when the Korean War very convincingly demonstrated the effectiveness of the use of electronic warfare. Our command faced such problems as the development of the concept of electronic warfare, the creation of electronic suppression technology, and the formation of electronic warfare units and organs. In 1954-1959 The first battalions of radio interference for radio communications, radar and radio navigation were formed in all branches of the Armed Forces. In 1968-1973 Based on the accepted concept for the development of electronic warfare, taking into account the experience of the Vietnam War, an electronic warfare service was created and strengthened. It was this concept that made it possible to pursue a unified technical policy in the field of creating equipment for electronic suppression (REM), purposefully train specialists,
In the 1970s, with the emergence of new reconnaissance and control systems in the troops of a potential enemy and the improvement of existing ones, the need arose to find and develop new methods of conducting electronic warfare in operations. In this regard, the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces prepared and conducted a number of special and experimental operational-strategic exercises. For example, during the Efir-72 exercise, the general principles of electronic warfare were studied, and during the Efir-74 exercise, methods of conducting it were explored. Subsequently, during the “Electron-75” and “Impulse-76” exercises, various ways to increase the efficiency of electronic warfare and the most appropriate methods of combat use of electronic warfare forces and equipment were sought and tested. At the same time, an important conclusion was made about the transfer of electronic warfare efforts to the tactical level, to combined arms combat - where victory is directly forged.
Hostile unmanned aerial vehicles and precision guided munitions (PGMs) frequently use satellite signals to navigate to a designated target. Such PGMs can include, for example, guided mortars, guided artillery projectiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), missiles, glide bombs, and other projectiles capable of acquiring and using global positioning systems (GPS) or other SATNAV signals for guidance. A typical SATNAV PGM guidance system receives satellite signals to guide itself to a designated target. The satellite signals can be based on GPS technology or SATNAV alternatives to GPS, such as GLONASS, Galileo, or Beidou for example.
Current countermeasures against incoming objects use projectiles, such as bullets, that are configured to destroy or to disrupt the trajectory of an incoming projectile. The problems with countering a projectile with a counter-projectile, however, are numerous including the possibility of inadvertently striking a friendly aircraft or civilian buildings, reloading issues, shrapnel, and the possibility of misfiring.
Another countermeasure option involves the use of a targeted electromagnetic beam to heat a projectile to a disruption temperature to deflagrate the projectile. This solution, however, also risks potential problems with inadvertently damaging civilian aircraft or infrastructure and issues involving the energy or chemicals such a system would require.
Another countermeasure option, for missiles or weapons targeting vehicles in motion, is described in U.S. Pat. No. 7,489,264. That option contemplates using multiple electronic signals to coordinate electronic jamming signals for protecting multiple vehicles physically separated from one another against Home-on-Jam weapons. The vehicles exchange messages and coordinate a system to emit an alternate jamming signal creating a false target. The '264 system, however, does not contemplate a satellite guided projectile or a fixed-position defense.
Another countermeasure option, for SATNAV broadly, is to disrupt or eliminate satellite communication for all area-wide guidance systems at the satellite's transmission. This elimination, jamming, or spoofing of all satellite communication, however, would also disrupt all nearby equipment that also relies on SATNAV signals to operate, including UAVs, communication systems, and hand-held GPS navigation devices. The consequences of persistently jamming or spoofing all SATNAV signals in order to disrupt an incoming PGM attack would severely disrupt broad military and civilian activities. Additionally, there might be serious diplomatic consequences for disrupting the SATNAV signals of a system belonging to another state or, for example, on an expeditionary force disrupting the use of civilian GPS signals in a foreign city.
By providing a user with pre-set operational modes and the ability to customize the activity of the SATNAV jamming or spoofing antenna or antennae, the system's software management can enable front-line personnel to operate aspects or restrict the system to no user input. The system can enable automatic directional SATNAV jamming or spoofing against all potential inbound precision guided munitions while still allowing the use of friendly SATNAV systems with no disruption.
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