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Space


Command Control Military Space

SOVIET MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES

By Charles S. Sheldon II[1917-1981], was Chief of the Science Policy Research Division of the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service

1971-1975

SPACE RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS

A. TRAFFIC CONTROL There is no evidence yet that the Russians have advanced to applying either their passive navigation system or any active system to traffic control. The general principles of an active control system were described under the section on navigation.

Other countries of the world are talking about both maritime and aviation systems which will give position information in the first generation, and then later permit traffic control, especially important both to such busy air corridors as the North Atlantic , and to sea corridors such as channels and approaches to major ports.

The Russians have acknowledged the importance of space technology to such systems in the future. It is not clear whether they will join at an early date in the civilian international systems being formed today, or whether they will earlier develop their own systems within their military services and then use the bargaining tools of hardware and systems to gain a bigger place in any later international system. They have made reference to a traffic control system which would use 24 satellites properly deployed.

B. MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL

Although the word "control" appears in this heading, the needs and functions are somewhat different from what is entailed in traffic control. Command and control has always been a feature of mass military operations headed by a commander and staff. But development of systems to provide timely and reliable command and control has received great impetus since World War II. This is not the place to explore the history of general staffs or the systems by which missions, plans, and tasks were carried out in combined staffs and theaters of operations in World War II. The big postwar change was the absolute necessity for controlling the use of nuclear weapons. The concept was that when the strategic bomber fleets of one side took off to begin hostilities, early warning radars and other sources would alert the opposite forces to get airborne and start toward their targets of retaliation. If the enemy turned back, or the alert was a false alarm, then a fail-safe system was supposed to turn back the responding airborne forces. Such systems provided horrendous problems of achieving close to absolute reliability to prevent the unnecessary use of nuclear weapons. These problems were multiplied many-fold when the subsonic aircraft and even the supersonic aircraft were replaced by ballistic missiles. Instead of hours for verification, the theory was that any missiles in soft launch sites would have to be on their way before they were themselves destroyed in less than an hour after launch by the enemy and there would be many minutes less warning if the first alerts came from the ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) installations in Alaska, Greenland, and England rather than from sensors close to the enemy launch sites. The notion of sure commands, proper authentication, and high speed response could only be carried out with the aid of computers and carefully thought out systems. But in some cases, high speed was not the only need. If a Moscow or a Washington were to be obliterated through missile attack, it might be necessary to have the necessary second strike kind of information travel to hardened silos and to hidden submarines in many oceans, regardless of what happened to the normal command structure. This suggested to military planners a place for space communications specialized for these command and control purposes. It also raised many issues which go beyond civilian communications satellite needs. Essentially, the added need was survivability. This might be achieved by hiding the satellites in high orbits where they were harder to locate and track especially if given the right radar-absorbing exteriors. It might also involve heavy shielding against radiation. It might involve use of wider frequency bands not to carry many channels of messages simultaneously, but the few key messages certainly, dodging around normal electronic countermeasures such as Jamming. It might involve having many satellites so that some would survive even if others were destroyed. Command and control systems rarely rely upon any single link, since the basic concept must remain functional if all the rest of the investment in expensive weapons is to pay off in believable deterrence, or, in the ultimate, in successful combat. Presumably the U.S. Navy's continuing interest in Project Sanguine, an extensive long wave, low frequency broadcasting system that would reach submarines completely under water is symptomatic of the need to have alternative channels of communication.

The exact nature of command and control systems is highly protected by security in any country, lest an enemy try to overcome it or to spoof it with false signals. Hence, we cannot expect the Russians to disclose what is the extent and the technology of their command and control system, which probably uses space for part of it. Presumably the Molniya 1 or other Molniya satellites provide the most obvious link, but would not be enough. Whatever more protected systems exist presumably would use encrypted messages, perhaps buried in other traffic to be non-conspicuous, or they might be sent on unusual frequencies less likely to be as easily monitored. They might use highly directional signals to minimize interception. These might come in short bursts to minimize the chance of monitoring. All these techniques are well known from articles in the international literature. In essence, the big difference is that ordinary traffic moves in large volume whether in plain language or encrypted, and if changing levels of activity are to be hidden, then dummy traffic is used regularly to disguise the real rising and falling of activity. By contrast, command and control traffic tends to be quite brief, but must be instantly recognized and understood by its intended recipients, to whom it is covertly or securely addressed.

Again, in the absence of any Soviet publicity, this study can only make some inferential guesses about command and control satellites in the Soviet military space stable.

UNMANNED SPACE ACTIVITIES

1976-1980 MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, AND CONTROL

 

TACTICAL AND THEATRE COMMUNICATIONS; OCTUPLE LAUNCHES

Octuple launches appear as routine replacements for satellites which have failed electronically.

In 1981, there were three such launches; Kosmos 1250-1257, Kosmos 1287-1294, and Kosmos 1320-1327. In the latter case all eight payloads were found in slightly higher orbits than usual and it may be that there was a minor malfunction in the timing of the ejection sequence. The rocket's final stage was tracked in the usual orbit.

In 1982 and 1983 there were two octuple launches respectively; Kosmos 1357-1364 and 1388-1395 in 1982 and Kosmos 1429-1436 and 1473-1480 in 1983.

COVERT STORE-DUMP MISSIONS

Nine such missions were launched in 1981 through 1983 with a further launch early in 1984. The replacement sequence is shown in table 7.

Notes:

1. Kosmos numbers are given in 3 main columns with 120- spacing in right ascension of ascending between columns

2. Data above the broken line indicates the status of the constellation at the start of 1980

3. Three paytoads are shown offset horn the main columns by some 10-. These mark the establishment of a new constellation somewhat displaced from the original.

Kosmos 1269, the first of these, was replaced by Kosmos 1302 after a period of less than 3 months and Kosmos 1302 was itself replaced before either of the other two operational satellites in the constellation.

The first launch of 1983, Kosmos 1452, was not placed in precisely the same plane as Kosmos 1371 and when Kosmos 1486 proved to be an exact replacement for Kosmos 1354, doubts arose as to whether or not Kosmos 1452 was part of the series. However, Kosmos 1503, the last of the 1983 launches was also displaced from the main groups and when Kosmos 1538 was launched early in 1984, there was once more a constellation of three at 120° spacing. It remains to be seen if the old constellation is maintained simultaneously by further launches or is permitted to phase itself out.

1981-87 military space activities observation missions

Reconnaissance is a general term encompassing a variety of tech­ niques aimed at the collection of intelligence. Imaging techniques are usually referred to as photographic reconnaissance, but in addi­ tion to lens systems, include scanning radiometers and radar sys­ tems. Passive electronic intelligence gathering systems depend upon the reception of electromagnetic emanations from Earth- based radars and the interception of radio transmissions.

COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL

These functions are usually considered together under the collec­ tive term C-cubed (C 3) or, with the addition of intelligence, as C- cubed I (C 3I).

Semi-Synchronous Satellites

It is generally believed that the Molniya 1 communications satel­ lites described above primarily serve governmental and military needs. 72 Early in 1976, the 32nd Molniya 1 was placed into an or­ bital plane exactly midway between two of the four standard Mol­niya planes. Three more launches that year completed a set of four Molniya 1 satellites positioned midway between the standard loca­tions. It was suggested that Molniya Is had assumed a wholly mili­ tary role, but no sooner had this been published than four new Molniya Is were placed into the original positions. Stephen Birkill showed that the four inter-group Molniyas operated only on the Asian loop, transmitting a digital fsk signal in what was presumed to be a military mode, whereas the other four and their accompa­ nying Molniya 3s carried domestic traffic on both Asian and North American loops of their orbits. 73

Geosynchronous Satellites

As noted earlier, IFRB notices have provided details of frequen­ cies and locations for Gals (Tack) which appears to be the name of transponders hosted onboard Raduga satellites. Uplink between 7.9 and 8.4 GHz and downlink between 7.25 and 7.75 GHz are in bands officially allocated for Government service, but internationally rec­ognized as military communications bands.

Tactical and Theater Communications

Since 1970 the Soviet Union has regularly launched groups of eight satellites with periods close to 115 minutes at 74° inclination using a single C-l launch vehicle from Plesetsk. Although the or­ bital planes drift relative to each other due to differences in the orbital periods, new launches are invariably made into the same orbital plane as that employed initially. A reasonable explanation for this has yet to be advanced. It is believed that a constellation of 24 such satellites forms the operational segment of a real-time tac­ tical communications system within a given theater of operations of a military store-dump system, a view strengthened by Depart­ ment of Defense (DOD) testimony before Congress that such sys­ tems exist beyond the more open Molniya systems.

Between 1970 and 1980 there were 26 such octuple launches at an average rate of two or three annually, with single launches in 1970, and 1977, three launches in each of 1973, 1975 and 1980, and a record four launches in 1978.

There were three octuple launches in 1981, but the third de­ ployed its payloads, Cosmos 1320-1327, into higher than nominal orbits characteristic of a small timing error in the ejection se quence. 74 There were two octuple launches in each of 1982 and 1983.

Covert Store-Dump

Another sub-set of Cosmos satellites in near-circular orbits at 74° inclination, but with 100.8 minute periods, operates as a three-sat­ ellite system with orbital planes spaced at 120°. These are thought to perform clandestine store-dump missions in a COMINT (commu­ nications intelligence) role. (In April 1977, an Iranian was arrested by the Shah's police for allegedly receiving coded KGB communica­ tions, via a satellite, displaying the message on the LED output of a small pocket electronic calculator.) 75

Between their introduction in 1970 and 1980 there were 22 such launches with single launches in 1970, 1973, 1974 and 1980 and three launches in each of 1976, 1978 and 1979. Satellites in this system are replaced on average once every 14 months.

The nine missions launched in the years 1981 through 1983 are displayed in table 3. The first of these, Cosmos 1269, was replaced by Cosmos 1302 after a period of less than three months and there was a third launch into that same plane before launches into either of the other two planes. Interpretation of this as due to the rapid failure of the earlier satellites in the plane should be adopted with caution. As will be reported in chapter 4, it has been discov­ ered that this sub-set of satellites employs two discreet frequencies and more than one satellite can be operational in a particular plane at a given time.

Table 3 shows that the first launch of 1983, Cosmos 1452, was not placed in precisely the same plane as Cosmos 1371. Cosmos 1503, the last of the 1983 launches, was also displaced from the standard planes. The repositioning of the planes was completed in 1984 and the original planes were phased out as their last satellites reached the ends of their operational lives.

TABLE 3.—ORBITAL PLANE LOCATIONS OF COSMOS SATELLITES FOR COVERT STORE-DUMP COMMUNICATIONS:1981-1983

__________________________________ 1100 ______ 1190 _____ 1140 ____

1981 ...................................................................... 1269

__________________________________ 1302 ______________________

1982 ...................................................................... 1331

1354

__________________________________ 1371
__________________________________ 1420 ______________________

1983 ...................................................................... 1452

1486

1503

Notes:

  • Orbital planes are separated by 120' in right ascension of the ascending node.
  • Cosmos numbers immediately below the double ruling at the head of the table indicate the operational status as of Dec. 31, 1980
  • Commencing in 1983 with Cosmos 1452 the orbital planes of the constellation were displaced by some 10° from their original locations. The repositioning was completed by Cosmos 1538 in 1984.
  • Table prepared for the Congressional Research Service by G.E. Perry.

communications, command and control (C 3)

SEMI-SYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES AND GEOSYNCHRONOUS SATELLITES

It was noted in the historical summary in chapter X that Mol niya 1 satellites in semi-synchronous orbits were believed to pri­marily serve governmental and military needs. Molniya 1 satellites continued to be launched during the period 1984 through 1986. No such satellites were launched in 1987 but there were two further launches in the series during the first half of 1988. Details of the Molniya launches are given in chapter X. The possible use of Raduga geosynchronous satellites for military communications has also been noted in earlier chapters. Some geosynchronous Cosmos satellites may also serve in a similar capacity.

TACTICAL AND THEATER COMMUNICATIONS

Octuple Launches

There were seven octuple launches from 1984 through 1987. These are listed in table 51. As is usual, all launches placed their multiple payloads into the same orbital plane as that used for the original launch of the sub-set in 1970.

Evidence supporting the view that the payloads in a single launch are identical is to be found in the radar cross-sections deter­ mined by the AN/FPS-85 radar at Eglin A.F.B., Florida, and given in the U.S. Space Command's Satellite Catalog. With two excep­ tions, the values given for the 56 payloads resulting from these launches lie between 0.84 and 2.01 square meters. The 8.18 and 4.66 square meters given for Cosmos 1642 and Cosmos 1750 respectively are so different from the others as to be suspect.

An alternative role has been suggested for the octuple payloads based on a description of the Latvian University's laser rangefinder reported in the geodesy section of chapter 3. In that section, the writer suggested that the "target" of the Riga laser was the 60 cm- diameter, U.S. LAGEOS satellite. Nicholas Johnson chose to identi­ fy the "targets" as the octuple payloads. 23 One of his reasons for this was the statement in the TASS announcement which ascribed an orbital velocity in excess of 7 km/s, consistent with the 7.1 km/s of the octuple payloads, to the "target". The 5.7 km/s orbital veloc­ ity of LAGEOS clearly is not consistent with the TASS figure. The root of the disagreement is an inconsistency in the TASS data. In addition to the orbital velocity, a value of "6,000 to 7,000 km" was given for the height of the "target" satellite(s) above the Earth's surface. Orbital velocities at these heights are 5.68 and 5.46 km/s respectively and the mean height of the LAGEOS orbit is just less than 6,000 km. A contributing factor to Johnson's analysis was an article on space methods in geodesy which described the use of identical satellites in a single orbit for geodetic purposes. 24

Sextuple Launches

A new sub-set of Cosmos satellites made its appearance with two launches in 1985 and a further two launches in 1987. In this subset, six payloads are launched at a time by an F-2 from Plesetsk using a deployment mechanism closely resembling that of the C-l octu­ ple payload launches. Although it is by no means certain that these satellites have communications roles, they are considered here for convenience because of the similarity and because they were ini­ tially considered to be taking over the role of the octuple launched payloads. 25

LE 51.—OCTUPLE LAUNCHES OF COSMOS TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES: 1984-1987

Cosmos number and designator Launch date Apogee Perigee '"{JjJ* ^Jital

1522-1529 84-01A-H ............................................................ 1/5/84 1494 1461 74.0 115.6

1559-1566 84-52A-H ........................................................... 5/28/84 1510 1471 74.0 115.8

1635-1642 85-23A-H .................................................... 3/21/85 1513 1474 74.1 115.9

1716-1723 86-02A-H .................................................... 1/9/86 1492 1465 74.0 115.5

1748-1755 86-42A-H .................................................... 6/6/86 1470 1454 74.0 115.2

1794-1801 86-92A-H ......................................................... 11/21/86 1501 1467 74.0 115.6

1852-1859 87-51A-H ........................................................... 6/16/87 1501 1473 74.0 115.7

Notes:

1. All satellites were launched from Plesetsk by the C-l.

I Apogee and perigee heights in kilometers, inclination in degrees and orbital period in minutes.

3 Orbital data, which may differ from that given in the Master Log, has been computed from two line orbital element sets provided by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. 4. Table prepared for the Congressional Research Service by G. E. Perry.

Whereas all octuple payloads had been placed into the same plane as that used for the original launch, the 1985 sextuple pay- loads were in planes which were nearly 180° apart. The first sextu­ ple launch of 1987 was practically co-planar with the second of the 1985 launches, reviving thoughts of their taking over the octuple's role, but the second sextuple launch of 1987 was into a plane at 90° to the first. When the 1988 sextuple launch went into the same plane as the first of the 1987 launches, it began to look as if an operational constellation of 12 satellites in two mutually perpendic­ ular planes was intended, although the mission remained undeter­ mined.

In another difference from the octuple launches, radar cross-sec­ tion evidence points to the 1985 sextuple payloads not being identi­cal. Both launches produced two payloads with radar cross-sections of between 3.79 and 4.50 square meters with four smaller payloads having radar cross-sections of between 0.24 and 0.82 square meters. Five of the first sextuple payloads in 1987 had radar cross-sections varying between 4.32 and 5.66 square meters—comparable data for the sixth payload is not available—and a case could be made for them being identical. Values for five of the second sextuple pay- loads that year varied from 1.88 to 4.69 square meters, the sixth being undetermined.

On November 22, 1985, 44 days after launch, NORAD sensors cataloged nine fragments associated with Cosmos 1691, one of the two larger satellites from that launch and the last to be deployed. This is characteristic of some minor military missions thought to be for calibration of radars or exercising of ABM forces. No such event has been associated with multiple payload launches before or since that occasion.

Table 52 lists the sextuple payload launches in the Cosmos series from 1985 through 1987.

Covert Store—Dump

The covert store-dump constellation of Cosmos satellites was in the transitional phase of relocating the orbital planes at the begin­ ning of 1984. During 1983, Cosmos 1452 and Cosmos 1503 had been placed in planes displaced by some 10° from the planes utilized prior to 1983.

TABLE 52. SEXTUPLE LAUNCHES OF COSMOS SATELLITES: 1985-1987

Cosmos number and designator Launch date Apogee Perigee ln[*| a" ^Jital

1617-1622 85-03A-F ...................... 1/15/85 1414 1414 82.6 114.1

1690-1695 85-94A-F ...................... 10/9/85 1417 1382 82.6 113.8

1827-1832 87-26A-F ...................... 3/13/87 1412 1396 82.6 113.9

1875-1880 87-74A-F ........................ 9/7/87 1411 1387 82.6 113.8

Notes:

  • All satellites were launched from Plesetsk by the F-2.
  • Apogee and perigee heights in kilometers, inclination in degrees and orbital period in minutes.
  • Orbital data, which may differ from that given in the Master Log. has been computed from two line orbital element sets provided by NASA's
    Goddard Space Flight Center
  • Cosmos 1691 disintegrated 11/22/85.
  • Table prepared for the Congressional Research Service by G. E. Perry.

Cosmos 1538, the first of the 1984 launches in this sub-set, com­ pleted the relocation and once more there were operational satel­ lites in three planes spaced at 120° in right ascension.

When Clifford Ranft embarked on a program of routine monitor­ ing of ELINT satellites on 153.42 and 153.48 MHz, he also investi­ gated other frequencies at 60 kHz intervals from these to test the possibility of discovering further satellite signals. Before long he logged signals on 153.60 MHz and over a period of five days accu­ mulated sufficient observations to establish possible values for the orbital periods which included 100.71 minutes. It was quickly con­ firmed that his new signals were emanating from the store-dump communications satellites in the Cosmos series. 26 Ranft later dis­ covered that certain of these satellites transmitted on 153.66 MHz. His observations revealed that, as in the case of the ELINT satel­lites, there could be more than one satellite active in a given plane at any one time.

Table 53 lists the store-dump communications satellites in the Cosmos series from 1985 through 1987, with transmission frequen­cies where known.

TABLE 53. COSMOS STORE-DUMP COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES: 1984-1987

Cosmos number and designator Launch date Apogee Perigee '"f' " 9jjjjj'

1538 84-19A ............................ 2/21/84 810 778 74.1 100.8

1570 84-56A ......................... 6/8/84 809 791 74.1 100.9

1624 85-06A ............................ 1/17/85 808 785 74.1 100.8

1680 85-79A ............................ 9/4/85 807 784 74.1 100.8

1741 86-30A ............................ 4/17/86 811 782 74.0 100.8

1763 86-52A ............................ 7/16/86 805 758 74.0 100.5

1777 86-70A ............................ 9/10/86 812 777 74.0 100.8

1814 87-06A ............................ 1/21/87 810 771 74.1 100.7

1850 87-49A ............................ 6/9/87 807 783 74.0 100.8

1898 87-98A .......................... 12/1/87 810 778 74.0 100.8

Notes:

  • All satellites were launched from Plesetsk by the C-l.
  • Apogee and perigee heights in kilometers, inclination in degrees and orbital period in minutes.
  • Orbital data, which may differ from that given in the Master Log, has been computed from two line orbital element sets provided by NASA's
    Goddard Space Flight Center.
  • Table prepared for the Congressional Research Service by G. E. Perry.

Table 54 shows the replacement sequence of the Cosmos store-dump communications satellites in their respective planes, together with the transmission frequencies, where known, for the period 1984 through 1987.

Two routine replacement launches during the first half of 1988 placed Cosmos 1937 and Cosmos 1934 into planes 3' and 2' respec­tively.

TABLE 54.—ORBITAL PLANE LOCATIONS OF COSMOS STORE-DUMP COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES:

1984-1987

__________________________ 1 ______ T ______ 2 ______ T_ ______ 3 ______ 3'

__________________________ 1420 __________________ 1503f ____________ 1452

1984 ................................................................ 1538" ........................................................

________________________ ...................................................................... 1570°

1985 .......................................................................................................................... 1624°

________________________ ............. 1680° ........................................................

1986 ............................................................................................. 1741° ............................

.......................................... 1763"

______________________________________________________ 1777 s

1987 .................................................................. 1814° ......................................

.......................................... 1850°

............................................................................................................................... 1898 6

Notes:

  • Orbital planes are separated by 120* in right ascension of the ascending node.
  • Cosmos numbers immediately below the double line at the top of the table indicate the operational status as of Dec. 31, 1983.
  • Commencing in 1983 with Cosmos 1452 the orbital planes of the constellation were displaced by some 10° from their original locations. The repositioning was completed by Cosmos 1538 in 1984.
  • The orbital period of Cosmos 1763 is lower than those of the other members of the constellation, causing it to drift off station.
  • Satellites transmit on 153.60 and 153.66 MHz. Frequencies identified by C.H. Ranft are indicated by superscripts ° or « respectively.
  • Table prepared for the Congressional Research Service by G. E. Perry.

References:

A. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75, OVERVIEW, FACILITIES AND HARDWARE MANNED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT PROGRAMS, BIOASTRONAUTICS CIVIL AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PLANS, STAFF REPORT , THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE .SCIENCES, UNITED STATES SENATE, BY THE SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, VOLUME – I, AUGUST 30, 1976, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON : 1976,

A1. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1976-80 (WITH SUPPLEMENTARY DATA THROUGH 1983), UNMANNED SPACE ACTIVITIES, PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF Hon. JOHN C. DANFORTH, Chairman, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE, Part 3, MAY 1985, Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Congress, 1 st. session, COMMITTEE PRINT, S. Prt. 98-235, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1985

A . SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1981-87, SPACE SCIENCE, SPACE APPLICATIONS, MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS, ADMINISTRATION, RESOURCE BURDEN, AND MASTER LOG OF SPACEFLIGHTS, Part 2, April 1989, Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1989, Committee print 1981-87- part-2

72. Johnson, N. L. op. cit., p. 59.

73. Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80, Pt. 3, p. 1086

74 Johnson, N. L. Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, 1982. p. 59-6(i.

75. Moss, R. Sunday Telegraph, London, Nov. 5, 1978. p. 21

23. Johnson, N. L. The Soviet Year in Space 1987. Teledyne Brown Engineering, Colorado
Springs, CO., 1988. p. 35.

24. Mikisha, A. M. Znaniye, Sept. 1983.

25. Aerospace Daily, Jan. 22, 1985, p. 108.

26 Perry, G. E. Oscar News, AMSAT



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