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Iran’s Up-coming first Satellite Launch Attempt


“Kavoshgar” Sounding Rocket & the First Satellite Launch Vehicle “Safire”

© C. P. Vick 2008 All Rights Reserved

March 25, - April 12, 2008

Safir Technology

Safir-1, 2 Iranian Launch Vehicle

The Safire space booster appears to be little more than a compacted redesigned better performance version of the North Korean Teap’o-dong-1 design. Its probable payload capacity of less than 50 - 100 kg strongly indication it is a proof of principal pathfinder development launch vehicle that will give Iran two and three stage experience with liquid propellant launch vehicle technology. Iran has already demonstrated three stage operations with the solid propellant Ghadr-110/Ashura program 2,000km range designed now being deployed to replace the liquid propellant Shahab-3B, 3C/Ghadr already deployed. The Shahab-3B, 3C/Ghadr-1 design has a 2,000 km range performance. A variation on the Shahab-3C/Ghadr-1 called the Kavoshgar-1 was the sounding rocket successfully launched February 4, 2008. All of these systems owe their heritage to the Scud based technologies and the follow on No-dong-A and Taep’o-dong-1 launch vehicles.

What Is It with These Names Shahab-3 A, B, C, Ghadr, Ghadr-110, Ashura, Kavoshgar?

The Shahab-3, 3A are variants on the basic No-dong-A design while the Shahab-3B is a lengthened up-rated improvement on the Shahab-3A. The Ghadr-110 is the Ashura solid propellant replacement for the liquid propellant Shahab-3A, 3B & 3C series. The Ghadr-110 is the original name applied to the Iranian government renamed Ashura. The Kavoshgar is the Iranian Shahab-3C Ghadr missile system a lengthened up-rated Shahab-3B used as a sounding rocket vertical probe. All of this would suggest that the Iranians are playing “name games deception” because two systems they are not showing the really important Ghadr-101/110now recently displayed in flight and in background video and No-dong-B missiles are the critical strategic systems.  Basically the Shahab-3B had been displayed in parade some three times before a variant on it the “Ghadr” Shahab-3C was displayed in parade suggest that the Iranians were both playing games to make news and play the psychological warfare game of “Names games deception”. One could also wonder about the political agenda games from which one can only guess. The missile displayed are essentially variants of the Shahab-3B the same missile flight tested at least two or three times and also paraded with six missiles of the identical design in at least three national parades in all cases labeled Shahab-3. It is in fact the Shahab-3B, with its 1,800-2,000 km range missile and not the actual 2,000 km range Ghadr-101/110 series/“Ashura” solid propellant equivalent to the Shahab-3A, Shahab-3B & Shahab-3C performance missile.


 We have yet to see the storable propellant No-dong-B/Mirim IRBM known to have been received by Iran in December 2005 and soon afterwards flight tested, deployed by Iran that has a demonstrated range of 2,000 miles or 3,218 kilometers (3,000 kilometers) that is capable of flying (2,485 miles) or 4,000 kilometers. In spite of the released US, NIE on Iran's nuclear intent it is reasonably clear that Iran continues to develop strategic short, medium and intermediate ballistic missile delivery systems that could be used to carry future nuclear weapons if they choose to finalize their development as Iran continue to produce highly enriched nuclear materials so critical to a potential nuclear weapons program. Countries do not produce missiles to travel over thousands of kilometers to deliver mere “Fire Cracker” conventional high energy explosive warhead weapons unless they are intended to carry primarily nuclear, or chemical, biological weapons of mass destruction. The advances in the missile launch vehicle and re-entry vehicle program do mirror the advances in the parallel nuclear weapons program of the larger total weapons program. Generally speaking no country makes the investment up to the threshold of actually having nuclear weapons without completing the process.

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Page last modified: 21-07-2011 00:51:41 ZULU