KH-1 CORONA
Go-ahead
The late 1950s were driven by a space reconnaissance imperative. NSC action 1849 assigned highest priority to development of an operational reconnaissance satellite on January 22, 1958. To protect this development, Air Force WS-117L program manager Col. Frederic C.E. Oder presented the system as an Air Force scientific satellite project known as Discoverer. As a precursor to later spacecraft designs, Discoverer fell under overall cognizance of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with the Air Force's Western Development Division, commanded by Major General Bernard A. Schriever, retaining technical management responsibilities. < 6 >
Conversion of WS-117L into a scientific satellite program was briefed to President Eisenhower at the White House in February 1958. Owing to the extreme sensitivity of the subject, details were furnished orally. It was explained that CORONA would orbit the earth three times, taking pictures as it passed over the Sino-Soviet bloc, and then would de-orbit the film capsule. It was of utmost importance to protect this project as the satellite cameras would only be able to discern objects 50 to 100 feet on a side. This being the case, it would be easy for the Soviets, if they learned about the project, to build dummies that could fool the satellite cameras; therefore, it was of paramount importance to keep them from learning it.
The President indicated the CIA should have exclusive control of the intelligence phases of the operation. He said only a handful of people should know about it. In a follow-up meeting Eisenhower said "emphatically that he believed the project should be centered in the new Defense space agency, doing what CIA wanted them to do." < 7 >
Following this meeting, the program was revised to include a Thor-Hustler upper stage (later known as the Lockheed-designed Agena satellite vehicle). White House endorsement of the effort, coupled with acceptance by the CIA of the approach, enabled CORONA to press forward. < 8 >
Additional factors leading to CIA involvement were its ability to contract with industry for expeditious procurement; the ability to maintain effective security; and the desire of the CIA to orient the program toward the collection of priority intelligence.
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