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DM-15A/B Nike Zeus A

In March 1955, as part of its air defense research, the Army commissioned Bell Telephone Laboratories, the research and development branch of the Western Electric Company, to examine the prospects for developing a strategic ABM system. Bell Labs had developed the first generation nonnuclear Nike I (Ajax) antiaircraft surface- to- air missile (SAM) and was developing a second generation nuclear-armed Nike B (Hercules) SAM.

Bell Labs conducted an 18 month Nike II feasibility study that examined continental United States air defense requirements for the 1960s against both high-performance air-breathing threats and longrange ballistic missiles. Initially, the study explored the possibility of a common antiaircraft defense system covering all high-altitude threats, which employed a missile with different warheads, one for use against missiles and one for use against aircraft. In June 1955, as concern increased over the ICBM threat, the Army requested the study shift its focus primarily to missile defense.

The Nike II study assumed that a precisely guided nuclear warhead would be necessary to ensure successful interception of a ballistic missile. By comparison to World War II air defense objectives, where a 10 to 15 percent attrition rate was acceptable against aircraft, the nuclear ballistic missile threat required defense levels of 95 to 100 percent attrition against hard to kill reentry vehicles. Studies showed that using a 50 kiloton nuclear warhead in the interceptor missile required relatively small miss distances to kill an enemy warhead, and the use of a high-yield defensive warhead did not reduce the need for a guidance system of high accuracy.

The study assessed the midcourse intercept option too difficult to be feasible and proposed a terminal-phase interceptor in its place. Technological limitations suggested that a homing system would be unworkable for the interceptor and the most attractive guidance method would be one based on the Nike Ajax/Nike Hercules command systems.

In February 1957, the Army initiated the Nike II development program with Western Electric as the prime contractor, and Bell Labs and the Douglas Aircraft Company as subcontractors, and changed the name to the Nike Zeus Project. The contract laid out a six-year development program for the Nike Zeus antimissile missile system under the supervision of the Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency, an element of the Army Ordnance Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

A few weeks after the 04 October 1957 Sputnik launch, the Army stood firm in pressing for Nike Zeus development. General Taylor advised Congress: “We can see no reason why the country cannot have an antimissile defense for a price which is within reach. I am sure many of you have heard the statement that the dollar requirements for this kind of defense are astronomical and that the whole concept is beyond consideration. I can assure you that the studies which I have seen lead me to a different conclusion. We can have an antimissile defense….”

The Army’s preliminary deployment studies reportedly estimated that 60 Nike Zeus batteries, each armed with 50 interceptors, would be sufficient to protect major cities and major military installations and would cost approximately $10 billion. The costs rose to approximately $15 billion for 120 Zeus batteries offering expanded coverage to urban centers with populations larger than 100,000 and major industrial targets.

Refinements in the missile design and other system components continued and in late 1961 a Zeus missile supported by all of its associated system components successfully intercepted a Nike Hercules target missile at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. In early 1962, the Army transported the entire system to the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands and began conducting a series of Zeus tests against live ICBM targets.

Although the test program showed promise in 1962, DoD decided not to proceed further with Nike Zeus development. Nike Zeus had too many technical and operational shortcomings to warrant continuation.

DM-15B Nike Zeus